GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR BY GENERAL FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI TRANSLATED BY ALLEN H. POWLES 1912 All the patriotic sections of the German people were greatly excitedduring the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on allhearts that in the settlement of the Morocco dispute no mere commercialor colonial question of minor importance was being discussed, but thatthe honour and future of the German nation were at stake. A deep rifthad opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomatic actionof the Government. Public opinion, which was clearly in favour ofasserting ourselves, did not understand the dangers of our politicalposition, and the sacrifices which a boldly-outlined policy would havedemanded. I cannot say whether the nation, which undoubtedly in anoverwhelming majority would have gladly obeyed the call to arms, wouldhave been equally ready to bear permanent and heavy burdens of taxation. Haggling about war contributions is as pronounced a characteristic ofthe German Reichstag in modern Berlin as it was in medieval Regensburg. These conditions have induced me to publish now the following pages, which were partly written some time ago. Nobody can fail to see that we have reached a crisis in our national andpolitical development. At such times it is necessary to be absolutelyclear on three points: the goals to be aimed at, the difficulties to besurmounted, and the sacrifices to be made. The task I have set myself is to discuss these matters, stripped of alldiplomatic disguise, as clearly and convincingly as possible. It isobvious that this can only be done by taking a national point of view. Our science, our literature, and the warlike achievements of our past, have made me proudly conscious of belonging to a great civilized nationwhich, in spite of all the weakness and mistakes of bygone days, must, and assuredly will, win a glorious future; and it is out of the fulnessof my German heart that I have recorded my convictions. I believe thatthus I shall most effectually rouse the national feeling in my readers'hearts, and strengthen the national purpose. THE AUTHOR. _October, 1911_ CONTENTS PREFACE INTRODUCTION Power of the peace idea--Causes of the love of peace in Germany-- German consciousness of strength--Lack of definite political aims --Perilous situation of Germany and the conditions of successful self-assertion--Need to test the authority of the peace idea, and to explain the tasks and aims of Germany in the light of history CHAPTER ITHE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR Pacific ideals and arbitration--The biological necessity of war--The duty of self-assertion--The right of conquest--The struggle for employment--War a moral obligation--Beneficent results of war --War from the Christian and from the materialist standpoints-- Arbitration and international law--Destructiveness and immorality of peace aspirations--Real and Utopian humanity--Dangerous results of peace aspirations in Germany--The duty of the State CHAPTER IITHE DUTY TO MAKE WAR Bismarck and the justification of war--The duty to fight--The teaching of history--War only justifiable on adequate grounds--The foundations of political morality--Political and individual morality --The grounds for making war--The decision to make war--The responsibility of the statesman CHAPTER IIIA BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT The ways of Providence in history--Christianity and the Germans-- The Empire and the Papacy--Breach between the German World Empire and the revived spiritual power--Rise of the great States of Europe and political downfall of Germany after the Thirty Years' War--Rise of the Prussian State--The epoch of the Revolution and the War of Liberation--Intellectual supremacy of Germany--After the War of Liberation--Germany under William I. And Bismarck--Change in the conception of the State and the principle of nationality--New economic developments and the World Power of England--Rise of other World Powers-- Socialism, and how to overcome it--German science and art-- Internal disintegration of Germany and her latent strength CHAPTER IVGERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION Grounds of the intellectual supremacy of Germany--Germany's role as spiritual and intellectual leader--Conquest of religious and social obstacles--Inadequacy of our present political position-- To secure what we have won our first duty--Necessity of increasing our political power--Necessity of colonial expansion-- Menace to our aspirations from hostile Powers CHAPTER VWORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL Points of view for judging of the political situation--The States of the Triple Alliance--The political interests of France and Russia-- The Russo-French Alliance--The policy of Great Britain-- America and the rising World Powers of the Far East--The importance of Turkey--Spain and the minor States of Europe--Perilous position of Germany--World power or downfall--Increase of political power: how to obtain it--German colonial policy--The principle of the balance of power in Europe--Neutral States--The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other States--Germany and the rules of international politics --The foundations of our internal strength CHAPTER VITHE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMY FOR WAR Its necessity--Its twofold aspect--The educational importance of military efficiency--Different military systems--Change in the nature of military efficiency due to the advance of civilization-- Variety of methods of preparation for war--The armaments of minor States--The armaments of the Great Powers--Harmonious development of all elements of strength--Influence on armaments of different conceptions of the duties of the State--Permanent factors to be kept in sight in relation to military preparedness-- Statecraft in this connection CHAPTER VIITHE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR Our opponents--The French army--The military power of Russia-- The land forces of England--The military power of Germany and Austria; of Italy--The Turkish army--The smaller Balkan States --The Roumanian army--The armies of the lesser States of Central Europe--Greece and Spain--The fleets of the principal naval Powers--The enmity of France--The hostility of England-- Russia's probable behaviour in a war against Germany--The military situation of Germany--Her isolation--What will be at stake in our next war--Preparation for war CHAPTER VIIITHE NEXT NAVAL WAR England's preparations for a naval war against Germany--Germany's first measures against England--England and the neutrality of the small neighbouring States--The importance of Denmark--Commercial mobilization--The two kinds of blockade: The close blockade and the extended blockade--England's attack on our coasts--Co-operation of the air-fleet in their defence--The decisive battle and its importance--Participation of France and Russia in a German-English war CHAPTER IXTHE CRUCIAL QUESTION Reciprocal relations of land and sea power--The governing points of view in respect of war preparations--Carrying out of universal military service--The value of intellectual superiority--Masses, weapons, and transport in modern war--Tactical efficiency and the quality of the troops--The advantage of the offensive--Points to be kept in view in war preparations--Refutation of the prevailing restricted notions on this head--The _Ersatzreserve_--New formations--Employment of the troops of the line and the new formations--Strengthening of the standing army--The importance of personality CHAPTER XARMY ORGANIZATION Not criticism wanted of what is now in existence, but its further development--Fighting power and tactical efficiency--Strength of the peace establishment--Number of officers and N. C. O. 's, especially in the infantry--Relations of the different arms to each other--Distribution of machine guns--Proportion between infantry and artillery--Lessons to be learned from recent wars with regard to this--Superiority at the decisive point--The strength of the artillery and tactical efficiency--Tactical efficiency of modern armies--Tactical efficiency and the marching depth of an army corps--Importance of the internal organization of tactical units--Organization and distribution of field artillery; of heavy field howitzers--Field pioneers and fortress pioneers--Tasks of the cavalry and the air-fleet--Increase of the cavalry and formation of cyclist troops--Tactical organization of the cavalry--Development of the air-fleet--Summary of the necessary requirements--Different ways of carrying them out--Importance of governing points of view for war preparations CHAPTER XITRAINING AND EDUCATION The spirit of training--Self-dependence and the employment of masses-- Education in self-dependence--Defects in our training for war on the grand scale--Need of giving a new character to our manoeuvres and to the training of our commanders--Practical training of the artillery-- Training in tactical efficiency--Practice in marching under war conditions--Training of the train officers and column leaders-- Control of the General Staff by the higher commanders--Value of manoeuvres: how to arrange them--Preliminary theoretical training of the higher commanders--Training of the cavalry and the airmen; of the pioneers and commissariat troops--Promotion of intellectual development in the army--Training in the military academy CHAPTER XIIPREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR The position of a World Power implies naval strength--Development of German naval ideals--The task of the German fleet; its strength --Importance of coast defences--Necessity of accelerating our naval armaments--The building of the fleet--The institution of the air-fleet--Preliminary measures for a war on commerce-- Mobilization--General points of view with regard to preparations for the naval war--Lost opportunities in the past CHAPTER XIIITHE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION The universal importance of national education--Its value for the army--Hurtful influences at work on it--Duties of the State with regard to national health--Work and sport--The importance of the school--The inadequacy of our national schools--Military education and education in the national schools--Methods of instruction in the latter--Necessity for their reform--Continuation schools--Influence of national education on the Russo-Japanese War--Other means of national education--The propaganda of action CHAPTER XIVFINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR Duties of the State in regard to war preparations--The State and national credit--The financial capacity of Germany--Necessity of new sources of revenue--The imperial right of inheritance--Policy of interests and alliances--Moulding and exploitation of the political situation--The laws of political conduct--Interaction of military and political war preparations--Political preparations for our next war--Governing factors in the conduct of German policy EPILOGUE The latest political events--Conduct of the German Imperial Government --The arrangement with France--Anglo-French relations and the attitude of England--The requirements of the situation GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR INTRODUCTION The value of war for the political and moral development of mankind hasbeen criticized by large sections of the modern civilized world in a waywhich threatens to weaken the defensive powers of States by underminingthe warlike spirit of the people. Such ideas are widely disseminated inGermany, and whole strata of our nation seem to have lost that idealenthusiasm which constituted the greatness of its history. With theincrease of wealth they live for the moment, they are incapable ofsacrificing the enjoyment of the hour to the service of greatconceptions, and close their eyes complacently to the duties of ourfuture and to the pressing problems of international life which await asolution at the present time. We have been capable of soaring upwards. Mighty deeds raised Germanyfrom political disruption and feebleness to the forefront of Europeannations. But we do not seem willing to take up this inheritance, and toadvance along the path of development in politics and culture. Wetremble at our own greatness, and shirk the sacrifices it demands fromus. Yet we do not wish to renounce the claim which we derive from ourglorious past. How rightly Fichte once judged his countrymen when hesaid the German can never wish for a thing by itself; he must alwayswish for its contrary also. The Germans were formerly the best fighting men and the most warlikenation of Europe. For a long time they have proved themselves to be theruling people of the Continent by the power of their arms and theloftiness of their ideas. Germans have bled and conquered on countlessbattlefields in every part of the world, and in late years have shownthat the heroism of their ancestors still lives in the descendants. Instriking contrast to this military aptitude they have to-day become apeace-loving--an almost "too" peace-loving--nation. A rude shock isneeded to awaken their warlike instincts, and compel them to show theirmilitary strength. This strongly-marked love of peace is due to various causes. It springs first from the good-natured character of the German people, which finds intense satisfaction in doctrinaire disputations andpartisanship, but dislikes pushing things to an extreme. It is connectedwith another characteristic of the German nature. Our aim is to be just, and we strangely imagine that all other nations with whom we exchangerelations share this aim. We are always ready to consider the peacefulassurances of foreign diplomacy and of the foreign Press to be no lessgenuine and true than our own ideas of peace, and we obstinately resistthe view that the political world is only ruled by interests and neverfrom ideal aims of philanthropy. "Justice, " Goethe says aptly, "is aquality and a phantom of the Germans. " We are always inclined to assumethat disputes between States can find a peaceful solution on the basisof justice without clearly realizing what _international_ justice is. An additional cause of the love of peace, besides those which are rootedin the very soul of the German people, is the wish not to be disturbedin commercial life. The Germans are born business men, more than any others in the world. Even before the beginning of the Thirty Years' War, Germany was perhapsthe greatest trading Power in the world, and in the last forty yearsGermany's trade has made marvellous progress under the renewed expansionof her political power. Notwithstanding our small stretch of coast-line, we have created in a few years the second largest merchant fleet in theworld, and our young industries challenge competition with all the greatindustrial States of the earth. German trading-houses are establishedall over the world; German merchants traverse every quarter of theglobe; a part, indeed, of English wholesale trade is in the hands ofGermans, who are, of course, mostly lost to their own country. Underthese conditions our national wealth has increased with rapid strides. Our trade and our industries--owners no less than employés--do not wantthis development to be interrupted. They believe that peace is theessential condition of commerce. They assume that free competition willbe conceded to us, and do not reflect that our victorious wars havenever disturbed our business life, and that the political power regainedby war rendered possible the vast progress of our trade and commerce. Universal military service, too, contributes to the love of peace, forwar in these days does not merely affect, as formerly, definite limitedcircles, but the whole nation suffers alike. All families and allclasses have to pay the same toll of human lives. Finally comes theeffect of that universal conception of peace so characteristic of thetimes--the idea that war in itself is a sign of barbarism unworthy of anaspiring people, and that the finest blossoms of culture can only unfoldin peace. Under the many-sided influence of such views and aspirations, we seementirely to have forgotten the teaching which once the old German Empirereceived with "astonishment and indignation" from Frederick the Great, that "the rights of States can only be asserted by the living power";that what was won in war can only be kept by war; and that we Germans, cramped as we are by political and geographical conditions, require thegreatest efforts to hold and to increase what we have won. We regard ourwarlike preparations as an almost insupportable burden, which it is thespecial duty of the German Reichstag to lighten so far as possible. Weseem to have forgotten that the conscious increase of our armament isnot an inevitable evil, but the most necessary precondition of ournational health, and the only guarantee of our international prestige. We are accustomed to regard war as a curse, and refuse to recognize itas the greatest factor in the furtherance of culture and power. Besides this clamorous need of peace, and in spite of its continuedjustification, other movements, wishes, and efforts, inarticulate andoften unconscious, live in the depths of the soul of the German people. The agelong dream of the German nation was realized in the politicalunion of the greater part of the German races and in the founding of theGerman Empire. Since then there lives in the hearts of all (I would notexclude even the supporters of the anti-national party) a proudconsciousness of strength, of regained national unity, and of increasedpolitical power. This consciousness is supported by the fixeddetermination never to abandon these acquisitions. The conviction isuniversal that every attack upon these conquests will rouse the wholenation with enthusiastic unanimity to arms. We all wish, indeed, to beable to maintain our present position in the world without a conflict, and we live in the belief that the power of our State will steadilyincrease without our needing to fight for it. We do not at the bottom ofour hearts shrink from such a conflict, but we look towards it with acertain calm confidence, and are inwardly resolved never to letourselves be degraded to an inferior position without striking a blow. Every appeal to force finds a loud response in the hearts of all. Notmerely in the North, where a proud, efficient, hard-working race withglorious traditions has grown up under the laurel-crowned banner ofPrussia, does this feeling thrive as an unconscious basis of allthought, sentiment, and volition, in the depth of the soul; but in theSouth also, which has suffered for centuries under the curse of pettynationalities, the haughty pride and ambition of the German stock livein the heart of the people. Here and there, maybe, such emotions slumberin the shade of a jealous particularism, overgrown by the richer andmore luxuriant forms of social intercourse; but still they are animatedby latent energy; here, too, the germs of mighty national consciousnessawait their awakening. Thus the political power of our nation, while fully alive below thesurface, is fettered externally by this love of peace. It frittersitself away in fruitless bickerings and doctrinaire disputes. We nolonger have a clearly defined political and national aim, which gripsthe imagination, moves the heart of the people, and forces them to unityof action. Such a goal existed, until our wars of unification, in theyearnings for German unity, for the fulfilment of the Barbarossa legend. A great danger to the healthy, continuous growth of our people seems tome to lie in the lack of it, and the more our political position in theworld is threatened by external complications, the greater is thisdanger. Extreme tension exists between the Great Powers, notwithstanding allpeaceful prospects for the moment, and it is hardly to be assumed thattheir aspirations, which conflict at so many points and are so oftenpressed forward with brutal energy, will always find a pacificsettlement. In this struggle of the most powerful nations, which employ peacefulmethods at first until the differences between them grow irreconcilable, our German nation is beset on all sides. This is primarily a result ofour geographical position in the midst of hostile rivals, but alsobecause we have forced ourselves, though the last-comers, the virtualupstarts, between the States which have earlier gained their place, andnow claim our share in the dominion of this world, after we have forcenturies been paramount only in the realm of intellect. We have thusinjured a thousand interests and roused bitter hostilities. It must bereserved for a subsequent section to explain the political situationthus affected, but one point can be mentioned without furtherconsideration: if a violent solution of existing difficulties isadopted, if the political crisis develops into military action, theGermans would have a dangerous situation in the midst of all the forcesbrought into play against them. On the other hand, the issue of thisstruggle will be decisive of Germany's whole future as State and nation. We have the most to win or lose by such a struggle. We shall be beset bythe greatest perils, and we can only emerge victoriously from thisstruggle against a world of hostile elements, and successfully carrythrough a Seven Years' War for our position as a World Power, if we gaina start on our probable enemy as _soldiers_; if the army which willfight our battles is supported by all the material and spiritual forcesof the nation; if the resolve to conquer lives not only in our troops, but in the entire united people which sends these troops to fight forall their dearest possessions. These were the considerations which induced me to regard war from thestandpoint of civilization, and to study its relation to the greattasks of the present and the future which Providence has set before theGerman people as the greatest civilized people known to history. From this standpoint I must first of all examine the aspirations forpeace, which seem to dominate our age and threaten to poison the soul ofthe German people, according to their true moral significance. I musttry to prove that war is not merely a necessary element in the life ofnations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a truecivilized nation finds the highest expression of strength and vitality. I must endeavour to develop from the history of the German past in itsconnection with the conditions of the present those aspects of thequestion which may guide us into the unknown land of the future. Thehistorical past cannot be killed; it exists and works according toinward laws, while the present, too, imposes its own drasticobligations. No one need passively submit to the pressure ofcircumstances; even States stand, like the Hercules of legend, at theparting of the ways. They can choose the road to progress or todecadence. "A favoured position in the world will only become effectivein the life of nations by the conscious human endeavour to use it. " Itseemed to me, therefore, to be necessary and profitable, at this partingof the ways of our development where we now stand, to throw what light Imay on the different paths which are open to our people. A nation mustfully realize the probable consequences of its action; then only can ittake deliberately the great decisions for its future development, and, looking forward to its destiny with clear gaze, be prepared for anysacrifices which the present or future may demand. These sacrifices, so far as they lie within the military and financialsphere, depend mainly on the idea of what Germany is called upon tostrive for and attain in the present and the future. Only those whoshare my conception of the duties and obligations of the German people, and my conviction that they cannot be fulfilled without drawing thesword, will be able to estimate correctly my arguments and conclusionsin the purely military sphere, and to judge competently the financialdemands which spring out of it. It is only in their logical connectionwith the entire development, political and moral, of the State that themilitary requirements find their motive and their justification. CHAPTER I THE RIGHT TO MAKE WAR Since 1795, when Immanuel Kant published in his old age his treatise on"Perpetual Peace, " many have considered it an established fact that waris the destruction of all good and the origin of all evil. In spite ofall that history teaches, no conviction is felt that the strugglebetween nations is inevitable, and the growth of civilization iscredited with a power to which war must yield. But, undisturbed by suchhuman theories and the change of times, war has again and again marchedfrom country to country with the clash of arms, and has proved itsdestructive as well as creative and purifying power. It has notsucceeded in teaching mankind what its real nature is. Long periods ofwar, far from convincing men of the necessity of war, have, on thecontrary, always revived the wish to exclude war, where possible, fromthe political intercourse of nations. This wish and this hope are widely disseminated even to-day. Themaintenance of peace is lauded as the only goal at which statesmanshipshould aim. This unqualified desire for peace has obtained in our days aquite peculiar power over men's spirits. This aspiration finds itspublic expression in peace leagues and peace congresses; the Press ofevery country and of every party opens its columns to it. The current inthis direction is, indeed, so strong that the majority of Governmentsprofess--outwardly, at any rate--that the necessity of maintaining peaceis the real aim of their policy; while when a war breaks out theaggressor is universally stigmatized, and all Governments exertthemselves, partly in reality, partly in pretence, to extinguish theconflagration. Pacific ideals, to be sure, are seldom the real motive of their action. They usually employ the need of peace as a cloak under which to promotetheir own political aims. This was the real position of affairs at theHague Congresses, and this is also the meaning of the action of theUnited States of America, who in recent times have earnestly tried toconclude treaties for the establishment of Arbitration Courts, first andforemost with England, but also with Japan, France, and Germany. Nopractical results, it must be said, have so far been achieved. We can hardly assume that a real love of peace prompts these efforts. This is shown by the fact that precisely those Powers which, as theweaker, are exposed to aggression, and therefore were in the greatestneed of international protection, have been completely passed over inthe American proposals for Arbitration Courts. It must consequently beassumed that very matter-of-fact political motives led the Americans, with their commercial instincts, to take such steps, and induced"perfidious Albion" to accede to the proposals. We may suppose thatEngland intended to protect her rear in event of a war with Germany, butthat America wished to have a free hand in order to follow her policy ofsovereignty in Central America without hindrance, and to carry out herplans regarding the Panama Canal in the exclusive interests of America. Both countries certainly entertained the hope of gaining advantage overthe other signatory of the treaty, and of winning the lion's share forthemselves. Theorists and fanatics imagine that they see in the effortsof President Taft a great step forward on the path to perpetual peace, and enthusiastically agree with him. Even the Minister for ForeignAffairs in England, with well-affected idealism, termed the procedure ofthe United States an era in the history of mankind. This desire for peace has rendered most civilized nations anemic, andmarks a decay of spirit and political courage such as has often beenshown by a race of Epigoni. "It has always been, " H. Von Treitschketells us, "the weary, spiritless, and exhausted ages which have playedwith the dream of perpetual peace. " Everyone will, within certain limits, admit that the endeavours todiminish the dangers of war and to mitigate the sufferings which warentails are justifiable. It is an incontestable fact that wartemporarily disturbs industrial life, interrupts quiet economicdevelopment, brings widespread misery with it, and emphasizes theprimitive brutality of man. It is therefore a most desirableconsummation if wars for trivial reasons should be rendered impossible, and if efforts are made to restrict the evils which follow necessarilyin the train of war, so far as is compatible with the essential natureof war. All that the Hague Peace Congress has accomplished in thislimited sphere deserves, like every permissible humanization of war, universal acknowledgment. But it is quite another matter if the objectis to abolish war entirely, and to deny its necessary place inhistorical development. This aspiration is directly antagonistic to the great universal lawswhich rule all life. War is a biological necessity of the firstimportance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot bedispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludes every advancement of the race, and therefore all realcivilization. "War is the father of all things. " [A] The sages ofantiquity long before Darwin recognized this. [Footnote A: (Heraclitus of Ephesus). ] The struggle for existence is, in the life of Nature, the basis of allhealthy development. All existing things show themselves to be theresult of contesting forces. So in the life of man the struggle is notmerely the destructive, but the life-giving principle. "To supplant orto be supplanted is the essence of life, " says Goethe, and the stronglife gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds goodeverywhere. Those forms survive which are able to procure themselves themost favourable conditions of life, and to assert themselves in theuniversal economy of Nature. The weaker succumb. This struggle isregulated and restrained by the unconscious sway of biological laws andby the interplay of opposite forces. In the plant world and the animalworld this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy. In the humanrace it is consciously carried out, and regulated by social ordinances. The man of strong will and strong intellect tries by every means toassert himself, the ambitious strive to rise, and in this effort theindividual is far from being guided merely by the consciousness ofright. The life-work and the life-struggle of many men are determined, doubtless, by unselfish and ideal motives, but to a far greater extentthe less noble passions--craving for possessions, enjoyment and honour, envy and the thirst for revenge--determine men's actions. Still moreoften, perhaps, it is the need to live which brings down even natures ofa higher mould into the universal struggle for existence and enjoyment. There can be no doubt on this point. The nation is made up ofindividuals, the State of communities. The motive which influences eachmember is prominent in the whole body. It is a persistent struggle forpossessions, power, and sovereignty, which primarily governs therelations of one nation to another, and right is respected so far onlyas it is compatible with advantage. So long as there are men who havehuman feelings and aspirations, so long as there are nations who strivefor an enlarged sphere of activity, so long will conflicting interestscome into being and occasions for making war arise. "The natural law, to which all laws of Nature can be reduced, is the lawof struggle. All intrasocial property, all thoughts, inventions, andinstitutions, as, indeed, the social system itself, are a result of theintrasocial struggle, in which one survives and another is cast out. Theextrasocial, the supersocial, struggle which guides the externaldevelopment of societies, nations, and races, is war. The internaldevelopment, the intrasocial struggle, is man's daily work--the struggleof thoughts, feelings, wishes, sciences, activities. The outwarddevelopment, the supersocial struggle, is the sanguinary struggle ofnations--war. In what does the creative power of this struggle consist?In growth and decay, in the victory of the one factor and in the defeatof the other! This struggle is a creator, since it eliminates. " [B] [Footnote B: Clauss Wagner, "Der Krieg als schaffendes Weltprinzip. "] That social system in which the most efficient personalities possess thegreatest influence will show the greatest vitality in the intrasocialstruggle. In the extrasocial struggle, in war, that nation will conquerwhich can throw into the scale the greatest physical, mental, moral, material, and political power, and is therefore the best able to defenditself. War will furnish such a nation with favourable vital conditions, enlarged possibilities of expansion and widened influence, and thuspromote the progress of mankind; for it is clear that those intellectualand moral factors which insure superiority in war are also those whichrender possible a general progressive development. They confer victorybecause the elements of progress are latent in them. Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily choke the growth of healthybudding elements, and a universal decadence would follow. "War, " says A. W. Von Schlegel, "is as necessary as the struggle of the elements inNature. " Now, it is, of course, an obvious fact that a peaceful rivalry may existbetween peoples and States, like that between the fellow-members of asociety, in all departments of civilized life--a struggle which need notalways degenerate Into war. Struggle and war are not identical. Thisrivalry, however, does not take place under the same conditions as theintrasocial struggle, and therefore cannot lead to the same results. Above the rivalry of individuals and groups within the State stands thelaw, which takes care that injustice is kept within bounds, and that theright shall prevail. Behind the law stands the State, armed with power, which it employs, and rightly so, not merely to protect, but actively topromote, the moral and spiritual interests of society. But there is noimpartial power that stands above the rivalry of States to restraininjustice, and to use that rivalry with conscious purpose to promote thehighest ends of mankind. Between States the only check on injustice isforce, and in morality and civilization each people must play its ownpart and promote its own ends and ideals. If in doing so it comes intoconflict with the ideals and views of other States, it must eithersubmit and concede the precedence to the rival people or State, orappeal to force, and face the risk of the real struggle--i. E. , ofwar--in order to make its own views prevail. No power exists which canjudge between States, and makes its judgments prevail. Nothing, in fact, is left but war to secure to the true elements of progress theascendancy over the spirits of corruption and decay. It will, of course, happen that several weak nations unite and form asuperior combination in order to defeat a nation which in itself isstronger. This attempt will succeed for a time, but in the end the moreintensive vitality will prevail. The allied opponents have the seeds ofcorruption in them, while the powerful nation gains from a temporaryreverse a new strength which procures for it an ultimate victory overnumerical superiority. The history of Germany is an eloquent example ofthis truth. Struggle is, therefore, a universal law of Nature, and the instinct ofself-preservation which leads to struggle is acknowledged to be anatural condition of existence. "Man is a fighter. " Self-sacrifice is arenunciation of life, whether in the existence of the individual or inthe life of States, which are agglomerations of individuals. The firstand paramount law is the assertion of one's own independent existence. By self-assertion alone can the State maintain the conditions of lifefor its citizens, and insure them the legal protection which each man isentitled to claim from it. This duty of self-assertion is by no meanssatisfied by the mere repulse of hostile attacks; it includes theobligation to assure the possibility of life and development to thewhole body of the nation embraced by the State. Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations increase in numbers. From agiven moment they require a continual expansion of their frontiers, theyrequire new territory for the accommodation of their surplus population. Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the cost of its possessors--that is to say, by conquest, which thus becomes a law of necessity. The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. At first theprocedure is pacific. Over-populated countries pour a stream ofemigrants into other States and territories. These submit to thelegislature of the new country, but try to obtain favourable conditionsof existence for themselves at the cost of the original inhabitants, with whom they compete. This amounts to conquest. The right of colonization is also recognized. Vast territories inhabitedby uncivilized masses are occupied by more highly civilized States, andmade subject to their rule. Higher civilization and the correspondinglygreater power are the foundations of the right to annexation. This rightis, it is true, a very indefinite one, and it is impossible to determinewhat degree of civilization justifies annexation and subjugation. Theimpossibility of finding a legitimate limit to these internationalrelations has been the cause of many wars. The subjugated nation doesnot recognize this right of subjugation, and the more powerful civilizednation refuses to admit the claim of the subjugated to independence. This situation becomes peculiarly critical when the conditions ofcivilization have changed in the course of time. The subject nation has, perhaps, adopted higher methods and conceptions of life, and thedifference in civilization has consequently lessened. Such a state ofthings is growing ripe in British India. Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. Itmay be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which themother-country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is toacquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct ofself-preservation leads inevitably to war, and the conquest of foreignsoil. It is not the possessor, but the victor, who then has the right. The threatened people will see the point of Goethe's lines: "That which them didst inherit from thy sires, In order to possess it, must be won. " The procedure of Italy in Tripoli furnishes an example of suchconditions, while Germany in the Morocco question could not rouseherself to a similar resolution. [C] [Footnote C: This does not imply that Germany could and ought to haveoccupied part of Morocco. On more than one ground I think that it wasimperative to maintain the actual sovereignty of this State on the basisof the Algeçiras Convention. Among other advantages, which need not bediscussed here, Germany would have had the country secured to her as apossible sphere of colonization. That would have set up justifiableclaims for the future. ] In such cases might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is atonce the supreme right, and the dispute as to what is right is decidedby the arbitrament of war. War gives a biologically just decision, sinceits decisions rest on the very nature of things. Just as increase of population forms under certain circumstances aconvincing argument for war, so industrial conditions may compel thesame result. In America, England, Germany, to mention only the chief commercialcountries, industries offer remunerative work to great masses of thepopulation. The native population cannot consume all the products ofthis work. The industries depend, therefore, mainly on exportation. Workand employment are secured so long as they find markets which gladlyaccept their products, since they are paid for by the foreign country. But this foreign country is intensely interested in liberating itselffrom such tribute, and in producing itself all that it requires. Wefind, therefore, a general endeavour to call home industries intoexistence, and to protect them by tariff barriers; and, on the otherhand, the foreign country tries to keep the markets open to itself, tocrush or cripple competing industries, and thus to retain the consumerfor itself or win fresh ones. It is an embittered struggle which ragesin the market of the world. It has already often assumed definitehostile forms in tariff wars, and the future will certainly intensifythis struggle. Great commercial countries will, on the one hand, shuttheir doors more closely to outsiders, and countries hitherto on thedown-grade will develop home industries, which, under more favourableconditions of labour and production, will be able to supply goodscheaper than those imported from the old industrial States. These latterwill see their position in these world markets endangered, and thus itmay well happen that an export country can no longer offer satisfactoryconditions of life to its workers. Such a State runs the danger not onlyof losing a valuable part of its population by emigration, but of alsogradually falling from its supremacy in the civilized and politicalworld through diminishing production and lessened profits. In this respect we stand to-day at the threshold of a development. Wecannot reject the possibility that a State, under the necessity ofproviding remunerative work for its population, may be driven into war. If more valuable advantages than even now is the case had been at stakein Morocco, and had our export trade been seriously menaced, Germanywould hardly have conceded to France the most favourable position in theMorocco market without a struggle. England, doubtless, would not shrinkfrom a war to the knife, just as she fought for the ownership of theSouth African goldfields and diamond-mines, if any attack threatened herIndian market, the control of which is the foundation of her worldsovereignty. The knowledge, therefore, that war depends on biologicallaws leads to the conclusion that every attempt to exclude it frominternational relations must be demonstrably untenable. But it is notonly a biological law, but a moral obligation, and, as such, anindispensable factor in civilization. The attitude which is adopted towards this idea is closely connectedwith the view of life generally. If we regard the life of the individual or of the nation as somethingpurely material, as an incident which terminates in death and outwarddecay, we must logically consider that the highest goal which man canattain is the enjoyment of the most happy life and the greatest possiblediminution of all bodily suffering. The State will be regarded as a sortof assurance office, which guarantees a life of undisturbed possessionand enjoyment in the widest meaning of the word. We must endorse theview which Wilhelm von Humboldt professed in his treatise on the limitsof the activity of the State. [D] The compulsory functions of the Statemust be limited to the assurance of property and life. The State will beconsidered as a law-court, and the individual will be inclined to shunwar as the greatest conceivable evil. [Footnote D: W. Von Humboldt, "Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen derWirksamkelt des Staates zu bestimmen. "] If, on the contrary, we consider the life of men and of States as merelya fraction of a collective existence, whose final purpose does not reston enjoyment, but on the development of intellectual and moral powers, and if we look upon all enjoyment merely as an accessory of thechequered conditions of life, the task of the State will appear in avery different light. The State will not be to us merely a legal andsocial insurance office, political union will not seem to us to have theone object of bringing the advantages of civilization within the reachof the individual; we shall assign to it the nobler task of raising theintellectual and moral powers of a nation to the highest expansion, andof securing for them that influence on the world which tends to thecombined progress of humanity. We shall see in the State, as Fichtetaught, an exponent of liberty to the human race, whose task it is toput into practice the moral duty on earth. "The State, " says Treitschke, "is a moral community. It is called upon to educate the human race bypositive achievement, and its ultimate object is that a nation shoulddevelop in it and through it into a real character; that is, alike fornation and individuals, the highest moral task. " This highest expansion can never be realized in pure individualism. Mancan only develop his highest capacities when he takes his part in acommunity, in a social organism, for which he lives and works. He mustbe in a family, in a society, in the State, which draws the individualout of the narrow circles in which he otherwise would pass his life, andmakes him a worker in the great common interests of humanity. The Statealone, so Schleiermacher once taught, gives the individual the highestdegree of life. [E] [Footnote E: To expand the idea of the State into that of humanity, andthus to entrust apparently higher duties to the individual, leads toerror, since in a human race conceived as a whole struggle and, byImplication, the most essential vital principle would be ruled out. Anyaction in favour of collective humanity outside the limits of the Stateand nationality is impossible. Such conceptions belong to the widedomain of Utopias. ] War, from this standpoint, will be regarded as a moral necessity, if itis waged to protect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. As human life is now constituted, it is political idealism which callsfor war, while materialism--in theory, at least--repudiates it. If we grasp the conception of the State from this higher aspect, weshall soon see that it cannot attain its great moral ends unless itspolitical power increases. The higher object at which it aims isclosely correlated to the advancement of its material interests. It isonly the State which strives after an enlarged sphere of influence thatcreates the conditions under which mankind develops into the mostsplendid perfection. The development of all the best human capabilitiesand qualities can only find scope on the great stage of action whichpower creates. But when the State renounces all extension of power, andrecoils from every war which is necessary for its expansion; when it iscontent to exist, and no longer wishes to grow; when "at peace onsluggard's couch it lies, " then its citizens become stunted. The effortsof each individual are cramped, and the broad aspect of things is lost. This is sufficiently exemplified by the pitiable existence of all smallStates, and every great Power that mistrusts itself falls victim to thesame curse. All petty and personal interests force their way to the front during along period of peace. Selfishness and intrigue run riot, and luxuryobliterates idealism. Money acquires an excessive and unjustifiablepower, and character does not obtain due respect: "Man is stunted by peaceful days, In idle repose his courage decays. Law is the weakling's game. Law makes the world the same. But in war man's strength is seen, War ennobles all that is mean; Even the coward belies his name. " SCHILLER: _Braut v. Messina_. "Wars are terrible, but necessary, for they save the State from socialpetrifaction and stagnation. It is well that the transitoriness of thegoods of this world is not only preached, but is learnt by experience. War alone teaches this lesson. " [F] [Footnote F: Kuno Fischer, "Hegel, " i. , p. 737. ] War, in opposition to peace, does more to arouse national life and toexpand national power than any other means known to history. Itcertainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but atthe same time it evokes the noblest activities of the human nature. Thisis especially so under present-day conditions, when it can be regardednot merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as theexpression of the united will of a whole nation. All petty private interests shrink into insignificance before the gravedecision which a war involves. The common danger unites all in a commoneffort, and the man who shirks this duty to the community is deservedlyspurned. This union contains a liberating power which produces happy andpermanent results in the national life. We need only recall the unitingpower of the War of Liberation or the Franco-German War and theirhistorical consequences. The brutal incidents inseparable from every warvanish completely before the idealism of the main result. All the shamreputations which a long spell of peace undoubtedly fosters areunmasked. Great personalities take their proper place; strength, truth, and honour come to the front and are put into play. "A thousand touchingtraits testify to the sacred power of the love which a righteous warawakes in noble nations. " [G] [Footnote G: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte, " i. , p. 482. ] Frederick the Great recognized the ennobling effect of war. "War, " hesaid, "opens the most fruitful field to all virtues, for at every momentconstancy, pity, magnanimity, heroism, and mercy, shine forth in it;every moment offers an opportunity to exercise one of these virtues. " "At the moment when the State cries out that its very life is at stake, social selfishness must cease and party hatred be hushed. The individualmust forget his egoism, and feel that he is a member of the whole body. He should recognize how his own life is nothing worth in comparison withthe welfare of the community. War is elevating, because the individualdisappears before the great conception of the State. The devotion of themembers of a community to each other is nowhere so splendidlyconspicuous as in war. .. . What a perversion of morality to wish toabolish heroism among men!" [H] [Footnote H: Treitschke, "Politik" i. , p. 74. ] Even defeat may bear a rich harvest. It often, indeed, passes anirrevocable sentence on weakness and misery, but often, too, it leads toa healthy revival, and lays the foundation of a new and vigorousconstitution. "I recognize in the effect of war upon nationalcharacter, " said Wilhelm von Humboldt, "one of the most salutaryelements in the moulding of the human race. " The individual can perform no nobler moral action than to pledge hislife on his convictions, and to devote his own existence to the causewhich he serves, or even to the conception of the value of ideals topersonal morality. Similarly, nations and States can achieve no loftierconsummation than to stake their whole power on upholding theirindependence, their honour, and their reputation. Such sentiments, however, can only be put into practice in war. Thepossibility of war is required to give the national character thatstimulus from which these sentiments spring, and thus only are nationsenabled to do justice to the highest duties of civilization by thefullest development of their moral forces. An intellectual and vigorousnation can experience no worse destiny than to be lulled into a Phaecianexistence by the undisputed enjoyment of peace. From this point of view, efforts to secure peace are extraordinarilydetrimental to the national health so soon as they influence politics. The States which from various considerations are always active in thisdirection are sapping the roots of their own strength. The United Statesof America, e. G. , in June, 1911, championed the ideas of universalpeace in order to be able to devote their undisturbed attention tomoney-making and the enjoyment of wealth, and to save the three hundredmillion dollars which they spend on their army and navy; they thus incura great danger, not so much from the possibility of a war with Englandor Japan, but precisely because they try to exclude all chance ofcontest with opponents of their own strength, and thus avoid the stressof great political emotions, without which the moral development of thenational character is impossible. If they advance farther on this road, they will one day pay dearly for such a policy. Again, from the Christian standpoint we arrive at the same conclusion. Christian morality is based, indeed, on the law of love. "Love God aboveall things, and thy neighbour as thyself. " This law can claim nosignificance for the relations of one country to another, since itsapplication to politics would lead to a conflict of duties. The lovewhich a man showed to another country as such would imply a want of lovefor his own countrymen. Such a system of politics must inevitably leadmen astray. Christian morality is personal and social, and in its naturecannot be political. Its object is to promote morality of theindividual, in order to strengthen him to work unselfishly in theinterests of the community. It tells us to love our individual enemies, but does not remove the conception of enmity. Christ Himself said: "I amnot come to send peace on earth, but a sword. " His teaching can never beadduced as an argument against the universal law of struggle. Therenever was a religion which was more combative than Christianity. Combat, moral combat, is its very essence. If we transfer the ideas ofChristianity to the sphere of politics, we can claim to raise the powerof the State--power in the widest sense, not merely from the materialaspect--to the highest degree, with the object of the moral advancementof humanity, and under certain conditions the sacrifice may be madewhich a war demands. Thus, according to Christianity, we cannotdisapprove of war in itself, but must admit that it is justified morallyand historically. Again, we should not be entitled to assume that from the opposite, thepurely materialistic, standpoint war is entirely precluded. Theindividual who holds such views will certainly regard it with disfavour, since it may cost him life and prosperity. The State, however, as suchcan also come from the materialistic standpoint to a decision to wagewar, if it believes that by a certain sacrifice of human lives andhappiness the conditions of life of the community may be improved. The loss is restricted to comparatively few, and, since the fundamentalnotion of all materialistic philosophy inevitably leads to selfishness, the majority of the citizens have no reason for not sacrificing theminority in their own interests. Thus, those who from the materialisticstandpoint deny the necessity of war will admit its expediency frommotives of self-interest. Reflection thus shows not only that war is an unqualified necessity, butthat it is justifiable from every point of view. The practical methodswhich the adherents of the peace idea have proposed for the preventionof war are shown to be absolutely ineffective. It is sometimes assumed that every war represents an infringement ofrights, and that not only the highest expression of civilization, butalso the true welfare of every nation, is involved in the fullestassertion of these rights, and proposals are made from time to time onthis basis to settle the disputes which arise between the variouscountries by Arbitration Courts, and so to render war impossible. Thepolitician who, without side-interests in these proposals, honestlybelieves in their practicability must be amazingly short-sighted. Two questions in this connection are at once suggested: On what right isthe finding of this Arbitration Court based? and what sanctions insurethat the parties will accept this finding? To the first question the answer is that such a right does not, andcannot, exist. The conception of right is twofold. It signifies, firstly, the consciousness of right, the living feeling of what is rightand good; secondly, the right laid down by society and the State, eitherwritten or sanctioned by tradition. In its first meaning it is anindefinite, purely personal conception; in its second meaning it isvariable and capable of development. The right determined by law is onlyan attempt to secure a right in itself. In this sense right is thesystem of social aims secured by compulsion. It is therefore impossiblethat a written law should meet all the special points of a particularcase. The application of the legal right must always be qualified inorder to correspond more or less to the idea of justice. A certainfreedom in deciding on the particular case must be conceded to theadministration of justice. The established law, within a given andrestricted circle of ideas, is only occasionally absolutely just. The conception of this right is still more obscured by the complexnature of the consciousness of right and wrong. A quite differentconsciousness of right and wrong develops in individuals, whetherpersons or peoples, and this consciousness finds its expression in mostvaried forms, and lives in the heart of the people by the side of, andfrequently in opposition to, the established law. In Christian countriesmurder is a grave crime; amongst a people where blood-vengeance is asacred duty it can be regarded as a moral act, and its neglect as acrime. It is impossible to reconcile such different conceptions ofright. There is yet another cause of uncertainty. The moral consciousness ofthe same people alters with the changing ideas of different epochs andschools of philosophy. The established law can seldom keep pace withthis inner development, this growth of moral consciousness; it lagsbehind. A condition of things arises where the living moralconsciousness of the people conflicts with the established law, wherelegal forms are superannuated, but still exist, and Mephistopheles'scoffing words are true: "Laws are transmitted, as one sees, Just like inherited disease. They're handed down from race to race, And noiseless glide from place to place. Reason they turn to nonsense; worse, They make beneficence a curse! Ah me! That you're a grandson you As long as you're alive shall rue. " _Faust_ (translation by Sir T. Martin). Thus, no absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share thesame ideas in their private and social intercourse. The conception ofthe constitutional State in the strictest sense is an impossibility, andwould lead to an intolerable state of things. The hard and fastprinciple must be modified by the progressive development of the fixedlaw, as well as by the ever-necessary application of mercy and ofself-help allowed by the community. If sometimes between individuals theduel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must auniversal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicatedrelations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its ownconception of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, whichspring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historicallife. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, andnone can say that one nation has a better right than the other. Therenever have been, and never will be, universal rights of men. Here andthere particular relations can be brought under definite internationallaws, but the bulk of national life is absolutely outside codification. Even were some such attempt made, even if a comprehensive internationalcode were drawn up, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice its ownconception of right to it. By so doing it would renounce its highestideals; it would allow its own sense of justice to be violated by aninjustice, and thus dishonour itself. Arbitration treaties must be peculiarly detrimental to an aspiringpeople, which has not yet reached its political and national zenith, andis bent on expanding its power in order to play its part honourably inthe civilized world. Every Arbitration Court must originate in a certainpolitical status; it must regard this as legally constituted, and musttreat any alterations, however necessary, to which the whole of thecontracting parties do not agree, as an encroachment. In this way everyprogressive change is arrested, and a legal position created which mayeasily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check theexpansion of the young and vigorous State in favour of one which issinking in the scale of civilization. These considerations supply the answer to the second decisive question:How can the judgment of the Arbitration Court be enforced if any Staterefuses to submit to it? Where does the power reside which insures theexecution of this judgment when pronounced? In America, Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, declared in 1908that the High Court of International Justice established by the secondHague Conference would be able to pronounce definite and bindingdecisions by virtue of the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. The present leaders of the American peace movement seem to share thisidea. With a childlike self-consciousness, they appear to believe thatpublic opinion must represent the view which the American plutocratsthink most profitable to themselves. They have no notion that thewidening development of mankind has quite other concerns than materialprosperity, commerce, and money-making. As a matter of fact, publicopinion would be far from unanimous, and real compulsion could only beemployed by means of war--the very thing which is to be avoided. We can imagine a Court of Arbitration intervening in the quarrels of theseparate tributary countries when an empire like the Roman Empireexisted. Such an empire never can or will arise again. Even if it did, it would assuredly, like a universal peace league, be disastrous to allhuman progress, which is dependent on the clashing interests and theunchecked rivalry of different groups. So long as we live under such a State system as at present, the GermanImperial Chancellor certainly hit the nail on the head when he declared, in his speech in the Reichstag on March 30, 1911, that treaties forarbitration between nations must be limited to clearly ascertainablelegal issues, and that a general arbitration treaty between twocountries afforded no guarantee of permanent peace. Such a treaty merelyproved that between the two contracting States no serious inducement tobreak the peace could be imagined. It therefore only confirmed therelations already existing. "If these relations change, if differencesdevelop between the two nations which affect their national existence, which, to use a homely phrase, cut them to the quick, then everyarbitration treaty will burn like tinder and end in smoke. " It must be borne in mind that a peaceful decision by an ArbitrationCourt can never replace in its effects and consequences a warlikedecision, even as regards the State in whose favour it is pronounced. Ifwe imagine, for example, that Silesia had fallen to Frederick the Greatby the finding of a Court of Arbitration, and not by a war ofunparalleled heroism, would the winning of this province have beenequally important for Prussia and for Germany? No one will maintain this. The material increase in power which accrued to Frederick's country bythe acquisition of Silesia is not to be underestimated. But far moreimportant was the circumstance that this country could not be conqueredby the strongest European coalition, and that it vindicated its positionas the home of unfettered intellectual and religious development. It waswar which laid the foundations of Prussia's power, which amassed aheritage of glory and honour that can never be again disputed. Warforged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the New Germany could growup as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future. Here oncemore war showed its creative power, and if we learn the lessons ofhistory we shall see the same result again and again. If we sum up our arguments, we shall see that, from the most oppositeaspects, the efforts directed towards the abolition of war must not onlybe termed foolish, but absolutely immoral, and must be stigmatized asunworthy of the human race. To what does the whole question amount? Itis proposed to deprive men of the right and the possibility to sacrificetheir highest material possessions, their physical life, for ideals, andthus to realize the highest moral unselfishness. It is proposed toobviate the great quarrels between nations and States by Courts ofArbitration--that is, by arrangements. A one-sided, restricted, formallaw is to be established in the place of the decisions of history. Theweak nation is to have the same right to live as the powerful andvigorous nation. The whole idea represents a presumptuous encroachmenton the natural laws of development, which can only lead to the mostdisastrous consequences for humanity generally. With the cessation of the unrestricted competition, whose ultimateappeal is to arms, all real progress would soon be checked, and a moraland intellectual stagnation would ensue which must end in degeneration. So, too, when men lose the capacity of gladly sacrificing the highestmaterial blessings--life, health, property, and comfort--for ideals; forthe maintenance of national character and political independence; forthe expansion of sovereignty and territory in the interests of thenational welfare; for a definite influence in the concert of nationsaccording to the scale of their importance in civilization; forintellectual freedom from dogmatic and political compulsion; for thehonour of the flag as typical of their own worth--then progressivedevelopment is broken off, decadence is inevitable, and ruin at home andabroad is only a question of time. History speaks with no uncertainvoice on this subject. It shows that valour is a necessary condition ofprogress. Where with growing civilization and increasing materialprosperity war ceases, military efficiency diminishes, and theresolution to maintain independence under all circumstances fails, therethe nations are approaching their downfall, and cannot hold their ownpolitically or racially. "A people can only hope to take up a firm position in the politicalworld when national character and military tradition act and react uponeach. " These are the words of Clausewitz, the great philosopher of war, and he is incontestably right. These efforts for peace would, if they attained their goal, not merelylead to general degeneration, as happens everywhere in Nature where thestruggle for existence is eliminated, but they have a direct damagingand unnerving effect. The apostles of peace draw large sections of anation into the spell of their Utopian efforts, and they thus introducean element of weakness into the national life; they cripple thejustifiable national pride in independence, and support a nervelessopportunist policy by surrounding it with the glamour of a higherhumanity, and by offering it specious reasons for disguising its ownweakness. They thus play the game of their less scrupulous enemies, justas the Prussian policy, steeped in the ideas of universal peace, did in1805 and 1806, and brought the State to the brink of destruction. The functions of true humanity are twofold. On the one hand there is thepromotion of the intellectual, moral, and military forces, as well asof political power, as the surest guarantee for the uniform developmentof character; on the other hand there is the practical realization ofideals, according to the law of love, in the life of the individual andof the community. It seems to me reasonable to compare the efforts directed towards thesuppression of war with those of the Social Democratic Labour party, which goes hand in hand with them. The aims of both parties are Utopian. The organized Labour party strives after an ideal whose realization isonly conceivable when the rate of wages and the hours of work aresettled internationally for the whole industrial world, and when thecost of living is everywhere uniformly regulated. Until this is the casethe prices of the international market determine the standard of wages. The nation which leaves this out of account, and tries to settleindependently wages and working hours, runs the risk of losing itsposition in the international market in competition with nations whowork longer hours and at lower rates. Want of employment and extrememisery among the working classes would inevitably be the result. On theother hand, the internationalization of industries would soon, byexcluding and preventing any competition, produce a deterioration ofproducts and a profound demoralization of the working population. The case of the scheme for universal peace is similar. Its execution, aswe saw, would be only feasible in a world empire, and this is asimpossible as the uniform regulation of the world's industries. A Statewhich disregarded the differently conceived notions of neighbouringcountries, and wished to make the idea of universal peace the guidingrule for its policy, would only inflict a fatal injury on itself, andbecome the prey of more resolute and warlike neighbours. We can, fortunately, assert the impossibility of these efforts afterpeace ever attaining their ultimate object in a world bristling witharms, where a healthy egotism still directs the policy of mostcountries. "God will see to it, " says Treitschke, [I] "that war alwaysrecurs as a drastic medicine for the human race!" [Footnote I: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p. 76. ] Nevertheless, these tendencies spell for us in Germany no inconsiderabledanger. We Germans are inclined to indulge in every sort of unpracticaldreams. "The accuracy of the national instinct is no longer a universalattribute with us, as in France. " [J] We lack the true feeling forpolitical exigencies. A deep social and religious gulf divides theGerman people into different political groups, which are bitterlyantagonistic to each other. The traditional feuds in the political worldstill endure. The agitation for peace introduces a new element ofweakness, dissension, and indecision, into the divisions of our nationaland party life. [Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p. 81. ] It is indisputable that many supporters of these ideas sincerely believein the possibility of their realization, and are convinced that thegeneral good is being advanced by them. Equally true is it, however, that this peace movement is often simply used to mask intensely selfishpolitical projects. Its apparent humanitarian idealism constitutes itsdanger. Every means must therefore be employed to oppose these visionaryschemes. They must be publicly denounced as what they really are--as anunhealthy and feeble Utopia, or a cloak for political machinations. Ourpeople must learn to see that _the maintenance of peace never can or maybe the goal of a policy_. The policy of a great State has positive aims. It will endeavour to attain this by pacific measures so long as that ispossible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentousquestions which influence definitely the entire development of a nation, the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep thisconviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, theidealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulatinglaw of development, must be repeatedly emphasized. The apostles of thepeace idea must be confronted with Goethe's manly words: "Dreams of a peaceful day? Let him dream who may! 'War' is our rallying cry, Onward to victory!" CHAPTER II THE DUTY TO MAKE WAR Prince Bismarck repeatedly declared before the German Reichstag that noone should ever take upon himself the immense responsibility ofintentionally bringing about a war. It could not, he said, be foreseenwhat unexpected events might occur, which altered the whole situation, and made a war, with its attendant dangers and horrors, superfluous. Inhis "Thoughts and Reminiscences" he expresses himself to this effect:"Even victorious wars can only be justified when they are forced upon anation, and we cannot see the cards held by Providence so closely as toanticipate the historical development by personal calculation. " [A] [Footnote A: "Gedanken und Erinnerungen, " vol. Ii. , p. 93. ] We need not discuss whether Prince Bismarck wished this dictum to beregarded as a universally applicable principle, or whether he uttered itas a supplementary explanation of the peace policy which he carried outfor so long. It is difficult to gauge its true import. The notion offorcing a war upon a nation bears various interpretations. We must notthink merely of external foes who compel us to fight. A war may seem tobe forced upon a statesman by the state of home affairs, or by thepressure of the whole political situation. Prince Bismarck did not, however, always act according to the strictletter of that speech; it is his special claim to greatness that at thedecisive moment he did not lack the boldness to begin a war on his owninitiative. The thought which he expresses in his later utterancescannot, in my opinion, be shown to be a universally applicable principleof political conduct. If we wish to regard it as such, we shall not onlyrun counter to the ideas of our greatest German Prince, but we excludefrom politics that independence of action which is the true motiveforce. The greatness of true statesmanship consists in a knowledge of thenatural trend of affairs, and in a just appreciation of the value of thecontrolling forces, which it uses and guides in its own interest. Itdoes not shrink from the conflicts, which under the given conditions areunavoidable, but decides them resolutely by war when a favourableposition affords prospect of a successful issue. In this way statecraftbecomes a tool of Providence, which employs the human will to attain itsends. "Men make history, " [B] as Bismarck's actions clearly show. [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte, " i. , p. 28. ] No doubt the most strained political situation may unexpectedly admit ofa peaceful solution. The death of some one man, the setting of somegreat ambition, the removal of some master-will, may be enough to changeit fundamentally. But the great disputes in the life of a nation cannotbe settled so simply. The man who wished to bring the question to adecisive issue may disappear, and the political crisis pass for themoment; the disputed points still exist, and lead once more to quarrels, and finally to war, if they are due to really great and irreconcilableinterests. With the death of King Edward VII. Of England the policy ofisolation, which he introduced with much adroit statesmanship againstGermany, has broken down. The antagonism of Germany and England, basedon the conflict of the interests and claims of the two nations, stillpersists, although the diplomacy which smoothes down, not alwaysprofitably, all causes of difference has succeeded in slackening thetension for the moment, not without sacrifices on the side of Germany. It is clearly an untenable proposition that political action shoulddepend on indefinite possibilities. A completely vague factor would bethus arbitrarily introduced into politics, which have already manyunknown quantities to reckon with; they would thus be made more or lessdependent on chance. It may be, then, assumed as obvious that the great practical politicianBismarck did not wish that his words on the political application of warshould be interpreted in the sense which has nowadays so frequently beenattributed to them, in order to lend the authority of the great man to aweak cause. Only those conditions which can be ascertained and estimatedshould determine political action. For the moral justification of the political decision we must not lookto its possible consequences, but to its aim and its motives, to theconditions assumed by the agent, and to the trustworthiness, honour, andsincerity of the considerations which led to action. Its practical valueis determined by an accurate grasp of the whole situation, by a correctestimate of the resources of the two parties, by a clear anticipation ofthe probable results--in short, by statesmanlike insight and promptnessof decision. If the statesman acts in this spirit, he will have an acknowledgedright, under certain circumstances, to begin a war, regarded asnecessary, at the most favourable moment, and to secure for his countrythe proud privilege of such initiative. If a war, on which a Ministercannot willingly decide, is bound to be fought later under possibly farmore unfavourable conditions, a heavy responsibility for the greatersacrifices that must then be made will rest on those whose strength andcourage for decisive political action failed at the favourable moment. In the face of such considerations a theory by which a war ought neverto be brought about falls to the ground. And yet this theory has in ourday found many supporters, especially in Germany. Even statesmen who consider that the complete abolition of war isimpossible, and do not believe that the _ultima ratio_ can be banishedfrom the life of nations, hold the opinion that its advent should bepostponed so long as possible. [C] [Footnote C: Speech of the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, onMarch 30, 1911. In his speech of November 9, 1911, the ImperialChancellor referred to the above-quoted words of Prince Bismarckin order to obtain a peaceful solution of the Morocco question. ] Those who favour this view take up approximately the same attitude asthe supporters of the Peace idea, so far as regarding war exclusively asa curse, and ignoring or underestimating its creative and civilizingimportance. According to this view, a war recognized as inevitable mustbe postponed so long as possible, and no statesman is entitled to useexceptionally favourable conditions in order to realize necessary andjustifiable aspirations by force of arms. Such theories only too easily disseminate the false and ruinous notionthat the maintenance of peace is the ultimate object, or at least thechief duty, of any policy. To such views, the offspring of a false humanity, the clear and definiteanswer must be made that, under certain circumstances, it is not onlythe right, but the moral and political duty of the statesman to bringabout a war. Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact thatwars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected thehappiest results, both politically and socially. A feeble policy hasalways worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite firmness totake the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact toadjust the differences of irreconcilable foes, and deceived himself asto the gravity of the situation and the real importance of the matter. Our own recent history in its vicissitudes supplies us with the moststriking examples of this. The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successfuland deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in thesteps of his glorious ancestor. "He noticed how his state occupied anuntenable middle position between the petty states and the great Powers, and showed his determination to give a definite character (_décider cetêtre_) to this anomalous existence; it had become essential to enlargethe territory of the State and _corriger la figure de la Prusse_, ifPrussia wished to be independent and to bear with honour the great nameof 'Kingdom. '" [D] The King made allowance for this political necessity, and took the bold determination of challenging Austria to fight. None ofthe wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did hepostpone as long as possible. He had always determined to be theaggressor, to anticipate his opponents, and to secure for himselffavourable prospects of success. We all know what he achieved. The wholehistory of the growth of the European nations and of mankind generallywould have been changed had the King lacked that heroic power ofdecision which he showed. [Footnote D Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte, " i. , p. 51. ] We see a quite different development under the reign of FrederickWilliam III. , beginning with the year of weakness 1805, of which ournation cannot be too often reminded. It was manifest that war with Napoleon could not permanently be avoided. Nevertheless, in spite of the French breach of neutrality, the PrussianGovernment could not make up its mind to hurry to the help of the alliedRussians and Austrians, but tried to maintain peace, though at a greatmoral cost. According to all human calculation, the participation ofPrussia in the war of 1805 would have given the Allies a decisivesuperiority. The adherence to neutrality led to the crash of 1806, andwould have meant the final overthrow of Prussia as a State had not themoral qualities still existed there which Frederick the Great hadingrained on her by his wars. At the darkest moment of defeat they shonemost brightly. In spite of the political downfall, the effects ofFrederick's victories kept that spirit alive with which he had inspiredhis State and his people. This is clearly seen in the quite differentattitude of the Prussian people and the other Germans under thedegrading yoke of the Napoleonic tyranny. The power which had beenacquired by the Prussians through long and glorious wars showed itselfmore valuable than all the material blessings which peace created; itwas not to be broken down by the defeat of 1806, and rendered possiblethe heroic revival of 1813. The German wars of Unification also belong to the category of warswhich, in spite of a thousand sacrifices, bring forth a rich harvest. The instability and political weakness which the Prussian Governmentshowed in 1848, culminating in the disgrace of Olmütz in 1850, haddeeply shaken the political and national importance of Prussia. On theother hand, the calm conscious strength with which she faced once moreher duties as a nation, when King William I. And Bismarck were at thehelm, was soon abundantly manifest. Bismarck, by bringing about ourwars of Unification in order to improve radically an untenable positionand secure to our people healthy conditions of life, fulfilled thelong-felt wish of the German people, and raised Germany to theundisputed rank of a first-class European Power. The military successesand the political position won by the sword laid the foundation for anunparalleled material prosperity. It is difficult to imagine howpitiable the progress of the German people would have been had not thesewars been brought about by a deliberate policy. The most recent history tells the same story. If we judge the Japanesestandpoint with an unbiased mind we shall find the resolution to fightRussia was not only heroic, but politically wise and morallyjustifiable. It was immensely daring to challenge the Russian giant, butthe purely military conditions were favourable, and the Japanese nation, which had rapidly risen to a high stage of civilization, needed anextended sphere of influence to complete her development, and to opennew channels for her superabundant activities. Japan, from her own pointof view, was entitled to claim to be the predominant civilized power inEastern Asia, and to repudiate the rivalry of Russia. The Japanesestatesmen were justified by the result. The victorious campaign createdwider conditions of life for the Japanese people and State, and at oneblow raised it to be a determining co-factor in international politics, and gave it a political importance which must undeniably lead to greatmaterial advancement. If this war had been avoided from weakness orphilanthropic illusions, it is reasonable to assume that matters wouldhave taken a very different turn. The growing power of Russia in theAmur district and in Korea would have repelled or at least hindered theJapanese rival from rising to such a height of power as was attainedthrough this war, glorious alike for military prowess and politicalforesight. The appropriate and conscious employment of war as a political means hasalways led to happy results. Even an unsuccessfully waged war maysometimes be more beneficial to a people than the surrender of vitalinterests without a blow. We find an example of this in the recentheroic struggle of the small Boer States against the British Empire. Inthis struggle they were inevitably defeated. It was easy to foresee thatan armed peasantry could not permanently resist the combined forces ofEngland and her colonies, and that the peasant armies generally couldnot bear heavy losses. But yet--if all indications are notmisleading--the blood shed by the Boer people will yield a free andprosperous future. In spite of much weakness, the resistance was heroic;men like President Stein, Botha, and De Wett, with their gallantfollowers, performed many great military feats. The whole nationcombined and rose unanimously to fight for the freedom of which Byronsings: "For freedom's battle once begun, Bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, Though baffled oft, is ever won. " Inestimable moral gains, which can never be lost in any laterdevelopments, have been won by this struggle. The Boers have maintainedtheir place as a nation; in a certain sense they have shown themselvessuperior to the English. It was only after many glorious victories thatthey yielded to a crushingly superior force. They accumulated a store offame and national consciousness which makes them, though conquered, apower to be reckoned with. The result of this development is that theBoers are now the foremost people in South Africa, and that Englandpreferred to grant them self-government than to be faced by theircontinual hostility. This laid the foundation for the United Free Statesof South Africa. [E] [Footnote E: "War and the Arme Blanche, " by Erskine Childers: "The truthcame like a flash . .. That all along we had been conquering thecountry, not the race; winning positions, not battles" (p. 215). "To . .. Aim at so cowing the Boer national spirit, as to gain apermanent political ascendancy for ourselves, was an object beyondour power to achieve. Peaceable political fusion under our own flagwas the utmost we could secure. That means a conditional surrender, or a promise of future autonomy" (pp. 227-228). Lord Roberts wrotea very appreciative introduction to this book without any protestagainst the opinions expressed in it. ] President Kruger, who decided on this most justifiable war, and notCecil Rhodes, will, in spite of the tragic ending to the war itself, beknown in all ages as the great far-sighted statesman of South Africa, who, despite the unfavourable material conditions, knew how to value theinestimable moral qualities according to their real importance. The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have beendeliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiestresults. War, nevertheless, must always be a violent form of politicalagent, which not only contains in itself the danger of defeat, but inevery case calls for great sacrifices, and entails incalculable misery. He who determines upon war accepts a great responsibility. It is therefore obvious that no one can come to such a decision exceptfrom the most weighty reasons, more especially under the existingconditions which have created national armies. Absolute clearness ofvision is needed to decide how and when such a resolution can be taken, and what political aims justify the use of armed force. This question therefore needs careful consideration, and a satisfactoryanswer can only be derived from an examination of the essential duty ofthe State. If this duty consists in giving scope to the highest intellectual andmoral development of the citizens, and in co-operating in the moraleducation of the human race, then the State's own acts must necessarilyconform to the moral laws. But the acts of the State cannot be judged bythe standard of individual morality. If the State wished to conform tothis standard it would often find itself at variance with its ownparticular duties. The morality of the State must be developed out ofits own peculiar essence, just as individual morality is rooted in thepersonality of the man and his duties towards society. The morality ofthe State must be judged by the nature and _raison d'être_ of the State, and not of the individual citizen. But the end-all and be-all of a Stateis power, and "he who is not man enough to look this truth in the faceshould not meddle in politics. " [F] [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p 3, and ii. , p 28. ] Machiavelli was the first to declare that the keynote of every policywas the advancement of power. This term, however, has acquired, sincethe German Reformation, a meaning other than that of the shrewdFlorentine. To him power was desirable in itself; for us "the State isnot physical power as an end in itself, it is power to protect andpromote the higher interests"; "power must justify itself by beingapplied for the greatest good of mankind. " [G] [Footnote G: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p 3, and ii. , p 28. ] The criterion of the personal morality of the individual "rests in thelast resort on the question whether he has recognized and developed hisown nature to the highest attainable degree of perfection. " [H] If thesame standard is applied to the State, then "its highest moral duty isto increase its power. The individual must sacrifice himself for thehigher community of which he is a member; but the State is itself thehighest conception in the wider community of man, and therefore the dutyof self-annihilation does not enter into the case. The Christian duty ofsacrifice for something higher does not exist for the State, for thereis nothing higher than it in the world's history; consequently it cannotsacrifice itself to something higher. When a State sees its downfallstaring it in the face, we applaud if it succumbs sword in hand. Asacrifice made to an alien nation not only is immoral, but contradictsthe idea of self-preservation, which is the highest ideal of aState. " [I] [Footnote H: _Ibid. _] [Footnote I: _Ibid_. , i. , p 3. ] I have thought it impossible to explain the foundations of politicalmorality better than in the words of our great national historian. Butwe can reach the same conclusions by another road. The individual isresponsible only for himself. If, either from weakness or from moralreasons, he neglects his own advantage, he only injures himself, theconsequences of his actions recoil only on him. The situation is quitedifferent in the case of a State. It represents the ramifying and oftenconflicting interests of a community. Should it from any reason neglectthe interests, it not only to some extent prejudices itself as a legalpersonality, but it injures also the body of private interestswhich it represents. This incalculably far-reaching detriment affectsnot merely one individual responsible merely to himself, but a mass ofindividuals and the community. Accordingly it is a moral duty of theState to remain loyal to its own peculiar function as guardian andpromoter of all higher interests. This duty it cannot fulfil unless itpossesses the needful power. The increase of this power is thus from this standpoint also the firstand foremost duty of the State. This aspect of the question supplies afair standard by which the morality of the actions of the State can beestimated. The crucial question is, How far has the State performed thisduty, and thus served the interests of the community? And this notmerely in the material sense, but in the higher meaning that materialinterests are justifiable only so far as they promote the power of theState, and thus indirectly its higher aims. It is obvious, in view of the complexity of social conditions, thatnumerous private interests must be sacrificed to the interest of thecommunity, and, from the limitations of human discernment, it is onlynatural that the view taken of interests of the community may beerroneous. Nevertheless the advancement of the power of the State mustbe first and foremost the object that guides the statesman's policy. "Among all political sins, the sin of feebleness is the mostcontemptible; it is the political sin against the Holy Ghost. " [J] Thisargument of political morality is open to the objection that it leadslogically to the Jesuitic principle, that the end justifies the means;that, according to it, to increase the power of the State all measuresare permissible. [Footnote J: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p 3. ] A most difficult problem is raised by the question how far, forpolitical objects moral in themselves, means may be employed which mustbe regarded as reprehensible in the life of the individual. So far as Iknow, no satisfactory solution has yet been obtained, and I do not feelbound to attempt one at this point. War, with which I am dealing atpresent, is no reprehensible means in itself, but it may become so if itpursues unmoral or frivolous aims, which bear no comparison with theseriousness of warlike measures. I must deviate here a little from mymain theme, and discuss shortly some points which touch the question ofpolitical morality. The gulf between political and individual morality is not so wide as isgenerally assumed. The power of the State does not rest exclusively onthe factors that make up material power--territory, population, wealth, and a large army and navy: it rests to a high degree on moral elements, which are reciprocally related to the material. The energy with which aState promotes its own interests and represents the rights of itscitizens in foreign States, the determination which it displays tosupport them on occasion by force of arms, constitute a real factor ofstrength, as compared with all such countries as cannot bring themselvesto let things come to a crisis in a like case. Similarly a reliable andhonourable policy forms an element of strength in dealings with alliesas well as with foes. A statesman is thus under no obligation to deceivedeliberately. He can from the political standpoint avoid allnegotiations which compromise his personal integrity, and he willthereby serve the reputation and power of his State no less than when heholds aloof from political menaces, to which no acts correspond, andrenounces all political formulas and phrases. In antiquity the murder of a tyrant was thought a moral action, and theJesuits have tried to justify regicide. [K] At the present day politicalmurder is universally condemned from the standpoint of politicalmorality. The same holds good of preconcerted political deception. AState which employed deceitful methods would soon sink into disrepute. The man who pursues moral ends with unmoral means is involved in acontradiction of motives, and nullifies the object at which he aims, since he denies it by his actions. It is not, of course, necessary thata man communicate all his intentions and ultimate objects to anopponent; the latter can be left to form his own opinion on this point. But it is not necessary to lie deliberately or to practise craftydeceptions. A fine frankness has everywhere been the characteristic ofgreat statesmen. Subterfuges and duplicity mark the petty spirit ofdiplomacy. [Footnote K: Mariana, "De rege et regis institutione. " Toledo, 1598. ] Finally, the relations between two States must often be termed a latentwar, which is provisionally being waged in peaceful rivalry. Such aposition justifies the employment of hostile methods, cunning, anddeception, just as war itself does, since in such a case both partiesare determined to employ them. I believe after all that a conflictbetween personal and political morality may be avoided by wise andprudent diplomacy, if there is no concealment of the desired end, and itis recognized that the means employed must correspond to the ultimatelymoral nature of that end. Recognized rights are, of course, often violated by political action. But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they areof human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There areconditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth ofthings; in this case the _summum jus summa injuria_ holds good, and theinfringement of the right appears morally justified. York's decision toconclude the convention of Tauroggen was indisputably a violation ofright, but it was a moral act, for the Franco-Prussian alliance was madeunder compulsion, and was antagonistic to all the vital interests of thePrussian State; it was essentially untrue and immoral. Now it is alwaysjustifiable to terminate an immoral situation. As regards the employment of war as a political means, our argumentshows that it becomes the duty of a State to make use of the _ultimaratio_ not only when it is attacked, but when by the policy of otherStates the power of the particular State is threatened, and peacefulmethods are insufficient to secure its integrity. This power, as we saw, rests on a material basis, but finds expression in ethical values. Wartherefore seems imperative when, although the material basis of power isnot threatened, the moral influence of the State (and this is theultimate point at issue) seems to be prejudiced. Thus apparentlytrifling causes may under certain circumstances constitute a fullyjustifiable _casus belli_ if the honour of the State, and consequentlyits moral prestige, are endangered. This prestige is an essential partof its power. An antagonist must never be allowed to believe that thereis any lack of determination to assert this prestige, even if the swordmust be drawn to do so. In deciding for war or peace, the next important consideration iswhether the question under discussion is sufficiently vital for thepower of the State to justify the determination to fight; whether theinevitable dangers and miseries of a war do not threaten to inflictgreater injury on the interests of the State than the disadvantageswhich, according to human calculation, must result if war is notdeclared. A further point to be considered is whether the generalposition of affairs affords some reasonable prospect of militarysuccess. With these considerations of expediency certain other weightyaspects of the question must also be faced. It must always be kept in mind that a State is not justified in lookingonly to the present, and merely consulting the immediate advantage ofthe existing generation. Such policy would be opposed to all thatconstitutes the essential nature of the State. Its conduct must beguided by the moral duties incumbent on it, which, as one step isgained, point to the next higher, and prepare the present for thefuture. "The true greatness of the State is that it links the past withthe present and the future; consequently the individual has no right toregard the State as a means for attaining his own ambitions in life. " [L] [Footnote L: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p 3. ] The law of development thus becomes a leading factor in politics, and inthe decision for war this consideration must weigh more heavily than thesacrifices necessarily to be borne in the present. "I cannot conceive, "Zelter once wrote to Goethe, "how any right deed can be performedwithout sacrifice; all worthless actions must lead to the very oppositeof what is desirable. " A second point of view which must not be neglected is precisely thatwhich Zelter rightly emphasizes. A great end cannot be attained exceptby staking large intellectual and material resources, and no certaintyof success can ever be anticipated. Every undertaking implies a greateror less venture. The daily intercourse of civic life teaches us thislesson; and it cannot be otherwise in politics where account must betaken of most powerful antagonists whose strength can only be vaguelyestimated. In questions of comparatively trifling importance much may bedone by agreements and compromises, and mutual concessions may produce asatisfactory status. The solution of such problems is the sphere ofdiplomatic activity. The state of things is quite different when vitalquestions are at issue, or when the opponent demands concession, butwill guarantee none, and is clearly bent on humiliating the other party. Then is the time for diplomatists to be silent and for great statesmento act. Men must be resolved to stake everything, and cannot shun thesolemn decision of war. In such questions any reluctance to face theopponent, every abandonment of important interests, and every attempt ata temporizing settlement, means not only a momentary loss of politicalprestige, and frequently of real power, which may possibly be made goodin another place, but a permanent injury to the interests of the State, the full gravity of which is only felt by future generations. Not that a rupture of pacific relations must always result in such acase. The mere threat of war and the clearly proclaimed intention towage it, if necessary, will often cause the opponent to give way. Thisintention must, however, be made perfectly plain, for "negotiationswithout arms are like music-books without instruments, " as Frederick theGreat said. It is ultimately the actual strength of a nation to whichthe opponent's purpose yields. When, therefore, the threat of war isinsufficient to call attention to its own claims the concert must begin;the obligation is unconditional, and the _right_ to fight becomes the_duty_ to make war, incumbent on the nation and statesman alike. Finally, there is a third point to be considered. Cases may occur wherewar must be made simply as a point of honour, although there is noprospect of success. The responsibility of this has also to be borne. Soat least Frederick the Great thought. His brother Henry, after thebattle of Kolin, had advised him to throw himself at the feet of theMarquise de Pompadour in order to purchase a peace with France. Again, after the battle of Kunersdorf his position seemed quite hopeless, butthe King absolutely refused to abandon the struggle. He knew better whatsuited the honour and the moral value of his country, and preferred todie sword in hand than to conclude a degrading peace. PresidentRoosevelt, in his message to the Congress of the United States ofAmerica on December 4, 1906, gave expression to a similar thought. "Itmust ever be kept in mind, " so the manly and inspiriting words ran, "that war is not merely justifiable, but imperative, upon honourable menand upon an honourable nation when peace is only to be obtained by thesacrifice of conscientious conviction or of national welfare. A just waris in the long-run far better for a nation's soul than the mostprosperous peace obtained by an acquiescence in wrong or injustice. .. . It must be remembered that even to be defeated in war may be better thannot to have fought at all. " To sum up these various views, we may say that expediency in the highersense must be conclusive in deciding whether to undertake a war initself morally justifiable. Such decision is rendered more easy by theconsideration that the prospects of success are always the greatest whenthe moment for declaring war can be settled to suit the political andmilitary situation. It must further be remembered that every success in foreign policy, especially if obtained by a demonstration of military strength, not onlyheightens the power of the State in foreign affairs, but adds to thereputation of the Government at home, and thus enables it better tofulfil its moral aims and civilizing duties. No one will thus dispute the assumption that, under certaincircumstances, it is the moral and political duty of the State to employwar as a political means. So long as all human progress and all naturaldevelopment are based on the law of conflict, it is necessary to engagein such conflict under the most favourable conditions possible. When a State is confronted by the material impossibility of supportingany longer the warlike preparations which the power of its enemies hasforced upon it, when it is clear that the rival States must graduallyacquire from natural reasons a lead that cannot be won back, when thereare indications of an offensive alliance of stronger enemies who onlyawait the favourable moment to strike--the moral duty of the Statetowards its citizens is to begin the struggle while the prospects ofsuccess and the political circumstances are still tolerably favourable. When, on the other hand, the hostile States are weakened or hampered byaffairs at home and abroad, but its own warlike strength shows elementsof superiority, it is imperative to use the favourable circumstances topromote its own political aims. The danger of a war may be faced themore readily if there is good prospect that great results may beobtained with comparatively small sacrifices. These obligations can only be met by a vigorous, resolute, activepolicy, which follows definite ideas, and understands how to arouse andconcentrate all the living forces of the State, conscious of the truthof Schiller's lines: "The chance that once thou hast refused Will never through the centuries recur. " The verdict of history will condemn the statesman who was unable to takethe responsibility of a bold decision, and sacrificed the hopes of thefuture to the present need of peace. It is obvious that under these circumstances it is extremely difficultto answer the question whether in any special case conditions existwhich justify the determination to make war. The difficulty is all thegreater because the historical significance of the act must beconsidered, and the immediate result is not the final criterion of itsjustification. War is not always the final judgment of Heaven. There are successeswhich are transitory while the national life is reckoned by centuries. The ultimate verdict can only be obtained by the survey of longepochs. [M] [Footnote M: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , p 2. ]54The man whose high and responsible lot is to steer the fortunes of agreat State must be able to disregard the verdict of his contemporaries;but he must be all the clearer as to the motives of his own policy, andkeep before his eyes, with the full weight of the categoricalimperative, the teaching of Kant: "Act so that the maxim of thy will canat the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation. " [N] [Footnote N: Kant, "Kritik der praktischen Vernuft, " p. 30. ] He must have a clear conception of the nature and purpose of the State, and grasp this from the highest moral standpoint. He can in no other waysettle the rules of his policy and recognize clearly the laws ofpolitical morality. He must also form a clear conception of the special duties to befulfilled by the nation, the guidance of whose fortunes rests in hishands. He must clearly and definitely formulate these duties as thefixed goal of statesmanship. When he is absolutely clear upon this pointhe can judge in each particular case what corresponds to the trueinterests of the State; then only can he act systematically in thedefinite prospect of smoothing the paths of politics, and securingfavourable conditions for the inevitable conflicts; then only, when thehour for combat strikes and the decision to fight faces him, can he risewith a free spirit and a calm breast to that standpoint which Lutheronce described in blunt, bold language: "It is very true that men writeand say often what a curse war is. But they ought to consider how muchgreater is that curse which is averted by war. Briefly, in the businessof war men must not regard the massacres, the burnings, the battles, andthe marches, etc. --that is what the petty and simple do who only lookwith the eyes of children at the surgeon, how he cuts off the hand orsaws off the leg, but do not see or notice that he does it in order tosave the whole body. Thus we must look at the business of war or thesword with the eyes of men, asking, Why these murders and horrors? Itwill be shown that it is a business, divine in itself, and as needfuland necessary to the world as eating or drinking, or any other work. "[O] [Footnote O: Luther, "Whether soldiers can be in a state of salvation. "] Thus in order to decide what paths German policy must take in order tofurther the interests of the German people, and what possibilities ofwar are involved, we must first try to estimate the problems of Stateand of civilization which are to be solved, and discover what politicalpurposes correspond to these problems. CHAPTER III A BRIEF SURVEY OF GERMANY'S HISTORICALDEVELOPMENT The life of the individual citizen is valuable only when it isconsciously and actively employed for the attainment of great ends. Thesame holds good of nations and States. They are, as it were, personalities in the framework of collective humanity, infinitelyvarious in their endowments and their characteristic qualities, capableof the most different achievements, and serving the most multifariouspurposes in the great evolution of human existence. Such a theory will not be accepted from the standpoint of thematerialistic philosophy which prevails among wide circles of our nationto-day. According to it, all that happens in the world is a necessaryconsequence of given conditions; free will is only necessity becomeconscious. It denies the difference between the empiric and theintelligible Ego, which is the basis of the notion of moral freedom. This philosophy cannot stand before scientific criticism. It seemseverywhere arbitrarily restricted by the narrow limits of theinsufficient human intelligence. The existence of the universe isopposed to the law of a sufficient cause; infinity and eternity areincomprehensible to our conceptions, which are confined to space andtime. The essential nature of force and volition remains inexplicable. Werecognize only a subjectively qualified phenomenon in the world; theimpelling forces and the real nature of things are withdrawn from ourunderstanding. A systematic explanation of the universe is quiteimpossible from the human standpoint. So much seems clear--although nodemonstrable certainty attaches to this theory--that spiritual lawsbeyond the comprehension of us men govern the world according to aconscious plan of development in the revolving cycles of a perpetualchange. Even the gradual evolution of mankind seems ruled by a hiddenmoral law. At any rate we recognize in the growing spread ofcivilization and common moral ideas a gradual progress towards purer andhigher forms of life. It is indeed impossible for us to prove design and purpose in everyindividual case, because our attitude to the universal whole is toolimited and anomalous. But within the limitations of our knowledge ofthings and of the inner necessity of events we can at least try tounderstand in broad outlines the ways of Providence, which we may alsoterm the principles of development. We shall thus obtain useful guidancefor our further investigation and procedure. The agency and will of Providence are most clearly seen in the historyof the growth of species and races, of peoples and States. "What istrue, " Goethe once said in a letter to Zelter, "can but be raised andsupported by its history; what is false only lowered and dissipated byits history. " The formation of peoples and races, the rise and fall of States, thelaws which govern the common life, teach us to recognize which forceshave a creative, sustaining, and beneficent influence, and which worktowards disintegration, and thus produce inevitable downfall. We arehere following the working of universal laws, but we must not forgetthat States are personalities endowed with very different humanattributes, with a peculiar and often very marked character, and thatthese subjective qualities are distinct factors in the development ofStates as a whole. Impulses and influences exercise a very differenteffect on the separate national individualities. We must endeavour tograsp history in the spirit of the psychologist rather than of thenaturalist. Each nation must be judged from its own standpoint if wewish to learn the general trend of its development. We must study thehistory of the German people in its connection with that of the otherEuropean States, and ask first what paths its development has hithertofollowed, and what guidance the past gives for Our future policy. Fromthe time of their first appearance in history the Germans showedthemselves a first-class civilized people. When the Roman Empire broke up before the onslaught of the barbariansthere were two main elements which shaped the future of the West, Christianity and the Germans. The Christian teaching preached equalrights for all men and community of goods in an empire of masters andslaves, but formulated the highest moral code, and directed theattention of a race, which only aimed at luxury, to the world beyond thegrave as the true goal of existence. It made the value of man as man, and the moral development of personality according to the laws of theindividual conscience, the starting-point of all development. It thusgradually transformed the philosophy of the ancient world, whosemorality rested solely on the relations with the state. Simultaneouslywith this, hordes of Germans from the thickly-populated North pouredvictoriously in broad streams over the Roman Empire and the decayingnations of the Ancient World. These masses could not keep theirnationality pure and maintain their position as political powers. TheStates which they founded were short-lived. Even then men recognized howdifficult it is for a lower civilization to hold its own against ahigher. The Germans were gradually merged in the subject nations. TheGerman element, however, instilled new life into these nations, andoffered new opportunities for growth. The stronger the admixture ofGerman blood, the more vigorous and the more capable of civilization didthe growing nations appear. In the meantime powerful opponents sprung up in this newly-formed world. The Latin race grew up by degrees out of the admixture of the Germanswith the Roman world and the nations subdued by them, and separateditself from the Germans, who kept themselves pure on the north of theAlps and in the districts of Scandinavia. At the same time the idea ofthe Universal Empire, which the Ancient World had embraced, continued toflourish. In the East the Byzantine Empire lasted until A. D. 1453. In the West, however, the last Roman Emperor had been deposed by Odoacer in 476. Italy had fallen into the hands of the East Goths and Lombardssuccessively. The Visigoths had established their dominion in Spain, andthe Franks and Burgundians in Gaul. A new empire rose from the latter quarter. Charles the Great, with hispowerful hand, extended the Frankish Empire far beyond the boundaries ofGaul. By the subjugation of the Saxons he became lord of the countrybetween the Rhine and the Elbe; he obtained the sovereignty in Italy bythe conquest of the Lombards, and finally sought to restore the WesternRoman Empire. He was crowned Emperor in Rome in the year 800. Hissuccessors clung to this claim; but the Frankish Empire soon fell topieces. In its partition the western half formed what afterwards becameFrance, and the East Frankish part of the Empire became the laterGermany. While the Germans in the West Frankish Empire, in Italy andSpain, had abandoned their speech and customs, and had graduallyamalgamated with the Romans, the inhabitants of the East FrankishEmpire, especially the Saxons and their neighbouring tribes, maintainedtheir Germanic characteristics, language, and customs. A powerfulGerman [A] kingdom arose which renewed the claims of Charles the Great tothe Western Roman Empire. Otto the Great was the first _German_ King whotook this momentous step. It involved him and his successors in aquarrel with the Bishops of Rome, who wished to be not only Heads of theChurch, but lords of Italy, and did not hesitate to falsify archives inorder to prove their pretended title to that country. [Footnote A: German (Deutsch=diutisk) signifies originally "popular, "opposed to "foreign"--_e. G. _, the Latin Church dialect. It was firstused as the name of a people, in the tenth century A. D. ] The Popes made good this right, but they did not stop there. Living inRome, the sacred seat of the world-empire, and standing at the head of aChurch which claimed universality, they, too, laid hold in their own wayof the idea of universal imperium. The notion was one of the boldestcreations of the human intellect--to found and maintain aworld-sovereignty almost wholly by the employment of spiritual powers. Naturally these Papal pretensions led to feuds with the Empire. Thefreedom of secular aspirations clashed with the claims of spiritualdominion. In the portentous struggle of the two Powers for thesupremacy, a struggle which inflicted heavy losses on the German Empire, the Imperial cause was worsted. It was unable to mould the widelydifferent and too independent subdivisions of the empire into ahomogeneous whole, and to crush the selfish particularism of theestates. The last Staufer died on the scaffold at Naples under the axeof Charles of Anjou, who was a vassal of the Church. The great days of the German-Roman Empire were over. The German powerlay on the ground in fragments. A period of almost complete anarchyfollowed. Dogmatism and lack of patriotic sentiment, those badcharacteristics of the German people, contributed to extend thisdestruction to the economic sphere. The intellectual life of the Germanpeople deteriorated equally. At the time when the Imperial power wasbudding and under the rule of the highly-gifted Staufers, German poetrywas passing through a first classical period. Every German country wasringing with song; the depth of German sentiment found universalexpression in ballads and poems, grave or gay, and German idealisminspired the minnesingers. But with the disappearance of the Empireevery string was silent, and even the plastic arts could not rise abovethe coarseness and confusion of the political conditions. The materialprosperity of the people indeed improved, as affairs at home were betterregulated, and developed to an amazing extent; the Hanseatic League boreits flag far and wide over the northern seas, and the greattrade-routes, which linked the West and Orient, led from Venice andGenoa through Germany. But the earlier political power was never againattained. Nevertheless dislike of spiritual despotism still smouldered in thebreasts of that German people, which had submitted to the Papacy, andwas destined, once more to blaze up into bright flames, and this time inthe spiritual domain. As she grew more and more worldly, the Church hadlost much of her influence on men's minds. On the other hand, a refiningmovement had grown up in humanism, which, supported by the spirit ofantiquity, could not fail from its very nature to become antagonistic tothe Church. It found enthusiastic response in Germany, and was joined byeveryone whose thoughts and hopes were centred in freedom. Ulrich vonHutten's battle-cry, "I have dared the deed, " rang loud through thedistricts of Germany. Humanism was thus in a sense the precursor of the Reformation, whichconceived in the innermost heart of the German people, shook Europe toher foundations. Once more it was the German people which, as formerlyin the struggle between the Arian Goths and the Orthodox Church, shedit's heart's blood in a religious war for spiritual liberty, and now fornational independence also. No struggle more pregnant with consequencesfor the development of humanity had been fought out since the Persianwars. In this cause the German people nearly disappeared, and lost allpolitical importance. Large sections of the Empire were abandoned toforeign States. Germany became a desert. But this time the Church didnot remain victorious as she did against the Arian Goths and theStaufers. It is true she was not laid prostrate; she still remained amighty force, and drew new strength from the struggle itself. Politically the Catholic States, under Spanish leadership, won anundisputed supremacy. But, on the other hand, the right to spiritualfreedom was established. This most important element of civilization wasretained for humanity in the reformed Churches, and has become eversince the palladium of all progress, though even after the Peace ofWestphalia protracted struggles were required to assert religiousfreedom. The States of the Latin race on their side now put forward strong claimsto the universal imperium in order to suppress the German ideas offreedom. Spain first, then France: the two soon quarrelled amongthemselves about the predominance. At the same time, in GermanizedEngland a firs-class Protestant power was being developed, and the ageof discoveries, which coincided roughly with the end of the Reformationand the Thirty Years' War, opened new and unsuspected paths to humanintellect and human energy. Political life also acquired a freshstimulus. Gradually a broad stream of immigrants poured into thenewly-discovered districts of America, the northern part of which fellto the lot of the Germanic and the southern part to that of the Latinrace. Thus was laid the foundation of the great colonial empires, andconsequently, of world politics. Germany remained excluded from thisgreat movement, since she wasted her forces in ecclesiastical disputesand religious wars. On the other hand, in combination with England, theLow Countries and Austria, which latter had at the same time to repelthe inroad of Turks from the East, she successfully curbed the Frenchambition for sovereignty in a long succession of wars. England by thesewars grew to be the first colonial and maritime power in the world. Germany forfeited large tracts of territory, and lost still more inpolitical power. She broke up into numerous feeble separate States, which were entirely void of any common sympathy with the German cause. But this very disintegration lent her fresh strength. A centre ofProtestant power was established in the North--i. E. , Prussia. After centuries of struggle the Germans had succeeded in driving back theSlavs, who poured in from the East, in wrestling large tracts from them, and in completely Germanizing them. This struggle, like that with theniggard soil, produced a sturdy race, conscious of its strength, whichextended its power to the coasts of the Baltic, and successfully plantedGermanic culture in the far North. The German nation was finallyvictorious also against Swedes, who disputed the command of the Baltic. In that war the Great Elector had laid the foundations of a strongpolitical power, which, under his successors, gradually grew into aninfluential force in Germany. The headship of Protestant Germanydevolved more and more on this state, and a counterpoise to CatholicAustria grew up. This latter State had developed out of Germany into anindependent great Power, resting its supremacy not only on a Germanpopulation, but also on Hungarians and Slavs. In the Seven Years' WarPrussia broke away from Catholic Austria and the Empire, and confrontedFrance and Russia as an independent Protestant State. But yet another dark hour was in store for Germany, as she once moreslowly struggled upwards. In France the Monarchy has exhausted theresources of the nation for its own selfish ends. The motto of themonarchy, _L'état c'est moi, _ carried to an extreme, provoked atremendous revulsion of ideas, which culminated in the stupendousrevolution of 1789, and everywhere in Europe, and more specially inGermany, shattered and swept away the obsolete remnants of medievalism. The German Empire as such disappeared; only fragmentary States survived, among which Prussia alone showed any real power. France once again underNapoleon was fired with the conception of the universal imperium, andbore her victorious eagles to Italy, Egypt, Syria, Germany, and Spain, and even to the inhospitable plains of Russia, which by a gradualpolitical absorption of the Slavonic East, and a slow expansion of powerin wars with Poland, Sweden, Turkey, and Prussia, had risen to animportant place among the European nations. Austria, which had becomemore and more a congeries of different nationalities, fell before themighty Corsican. Prussia, which seemed to have lost all vigour in herdream of peace, collapsed before his onslaught. But the German spirit emerged with fresh strength from the deepesthumiliation. The purest and mightiest storm of fury against the yoke ofthe oppressor that ever honoured an enslaved nation burst out in theProtestant North. The wars of liberation, with their glowing enthusiasm, won back the possibilities of political existence for Prussia and forGermany, and paved the way for further world-wide historicaldevelopments. While the French people in savage revolt against spiritual and seculardespotism had broken their chains and proclaimed their _rights, _ anotherquite different revolution was working in Prussia--the revolution of_duty_. The assertion of the rights of the individual leads ultimatelyto individual irresponsibility and to a repudiation of the State. Immanuel Kant, the founder of critical philosophy, taught, in oppositionto this view, the gospel of moral duty, and Scharnhorst grasped the ideaof universal military service. By calling upon each individual tosacrifice property and life for the good of the community, he gave theclearest expression to the idea of the State, and created a sound basison which the claim to individual rights might rest at the same timeStein laid the foundations of self-employed-government in Prussia. While measures of the most far-reaching historical importance were thusbeing adopted in the State on which the future fate of Germany was todepend, and while revolution was being superseded by healthy progress, aGerman Empire of the first rank, the Empire of intellect, grew up in thedomain of art and science, where German character and endeavour foundthe deepest and fullest expression. A great change had been effected inthis land of political narrowness and social sterility since the year1750. A literature and a science, born in the hearts of the nation, anddeeply rooted in the moral teaching of Protestantism, had raised theirminds far beyond the boundaries of practical life into the sunlitheights of intellectual liberty, and manifested the power andsuperiority of the German spirit. "Thus the new poetry and sciencebecame for many decades the most effectual bond of union for thisdismembered people, and decided the victory of Protestantism in Germanlife. " [B] [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte", i. , p. 88. ] Germany was raised to be once more "the home of heresy, since shedeveloped the root-idea of the Reformation into the right ofunrestricted and unprejudiced inquiry". [C] Moral obligations, such as nonation had ever yet made the standard of conduct, were laid down in thephilosophy of Kant and Fichte, and a lofty idealism inspired the songsof her poets. The intense effect of these spiritual agencies wasrealized in the outburst of heroic fury in 1813. "Thus our classicalliterature, starting from a different point, reached the same goal asthe political work of the Prussian monarchy", [D] and of those men ofaction who pushed this work forward in the hour of direst ruin. [Footnote C: _Ibid. , _ i. , p. 90. ] [Footnote D: _Ibid. _] The meeting of Napoleon and Goethe, two mighty conquerors, was an eventin the world's history. On one side the scourge of God, the greatannihilator of all survivals from the past, the gloomy despot, the lastabortion of the revolution--a "Part of the power that still Produces Good, while still devising Ill"; on the other, the serenely grave Olympian who uttered the words, "Letman be noble, resourceful, and good"; who gave a new content to thereligious sentiment, since he conceived all existence as a perpetualchange to higher conditions, and pointed out new paths in science; whogave the clearest expression to all aspirations of the human intellect, and all movements of the German mind, and thus roused his people toconsciousness; who finally by his writings on every subject showed thatthe whole realm of human knowledge was concentrated in the German brain;a prophet of truth, an architect of imperishable monuments which testifyto the divinity in man. The great conqueror of the century was met by the hero of intellect, towhom was to fall the victory of the future. The mightiest potentate ofthe Latin race faced the great Germanic who stood in the forefront ofhumanity. Truly a nation which in the hour of its deepest political degradationcould give birth to men like Fichte, Scharnhorst, Stein, Schiller, andGoethe, to say nothing about the great soldier-figures of the wars ofLiberation, must be called to a mighty destiny. We must admit that in the period immediately succeeding the greatstruggle of those glorious days, the short-sightedness, selfishness, andweakness of its Sovereigns, and the jealousy of its neighbours, robbedthe German people of the full fruits of its heroism, devotion, and pureenthusiasm. The deep disappointment of that generation found expressionin the revolutionary movement of 1848, and in the emigration ofthousands to the free country of North America, where the Germans took aprominent part in the formation of a new nationality, but were lost totheir mother-country. The Prussian monarchy grovelled before Austria andRussia, and seemed to have forgotten its national duties. Nevertheless in the centre of the Prussian State there was springing upfrom the blood of the champions of freedom a new generation that nolonger wished to be the anvil, but to wield the hammer. Two men came tothe front, King William I. And the hero of the Saxon forest. Resolutelythey united the forces of the nation, which at first opposed them fromignorance, and broke down the selfishness and dogmatic positivism of thepopular representatives. A victorious campaign settled matters withAustria, who did not willingly cede the supremacy in Germany, and leftthe German Imperial confederation without forfeiting her place as aGreat Power. France was brought to the ground with a mighty blow; thevast majority of the German peoples united under the Imperial crownwhich the King of Prussia wore; the old idea of the German Empire wasrevived in a federal shape by the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. The German idea, as Bismarck fancied it, ruled from the NorthSea to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a phoenix from theashes, the German giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the old GermanConfederation, and stretched his mighty limbs. It was an obvious and inevitable result that this awakening of Germanyvitally affected the other nations which had hitherto divided theeconomic and political power. Hostile combinations threatened us on allsides in order to check the further expansion of our power. Hemmed inbetween France and Russia, who allied themselves against us, we failedto gather the full fruits of our victories. The short-sightedness andparty feuds of the newly-formed Reichstag--the old hereditary failingsof our nation--prevented any colonial policy on broad lines. The intenselove of peace, which the nation and Government felt, made us fall behindin the race with other countries. In the most recent partition of the earth, that of Africa, victoriousGermany came off badly. France, her defeated opponent, was able to foundthe second largest colonial Empire in the world; England appropriatedthe most important portions; even small and neutral Belgium claimed acomparatively large and valuable share; Germany was forced to be contentwith some modest strips of territory. In addition to, and in connectionwith, the political changes, new views and new forces have come forward. Under the influence of the constitutional ideas of Frederick the Great, and the crop of new ideas borne by the French Revolution, the conceptionof the State has completely changed since the turn of the century. Thepatrimonial state of the Middle Ages was the hereditary possession ofthe Sovereign. Hence sprung the modern State, which represents thereverse of this relation, in which the Sovereign is the first servant ofthe State, and the interest of the State, and not of the ruler, is thekey to the policy of the Government. With this altered conception of theState the principle of nationality has gradually developed, of which thetendency is as follows: Historical boundaries are to be disregarded, andthe nations combined into a political whole; the State will thus acquirea uniform national character and common national interests. This new order of things entirely altered the basis of internationalrelations, and set new and unknown duties before the statesman. Commerceand trade also developed on wholly new lines. After 1815 the barriers to every activity--guilds and traderestrictions--were gradually removed. Landed property ceased to be amonopoly. Commerce and industries flourished conspicuously. "Englandintroduced the universal employment of coal and iron and of machineryinto industries, thus founding immense industrial establishments; bysteamers and railways she brought machinery into commerce, at the sametime effecting an industrial revolution by physical science andchemistry, and won the control of the markets of the world by cotton. There came, besides, the enormous extension of the command of credit inthe widest sense, the exploitation of India, the extension ofcolonization over Polynesia, etc. " England at the same time girdled theearth with her cables and fleets. She thus attained to a sort ofworld-sovereignty. She has tried to found a new universal Empire; not, indeed, by spiritual or secular weapons, like Pope and Emperor in bygonedays, but by the power of money, by making all material interestsdependent on herself. Facing her, between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, linking the Westand the East, the United States of North America have risen to be anindustrial and commercial power of the first rank. Supported byexceptionally abundant natural resources, and the unscrupulously pushingcharacter of her inhabitants, this mighty Empire aims at a suitablerecognition of her power in the council of the nations, and is on thepoint of securing this by the building of a powerful navy. Russia has not only strengthened her position in Europe, but hasextended her power over the entire North of Asia, and is pressingfarther into the centre of that continent. She has already crossedswords with the States of the Mongolian race. This vast population, which fills the east of the Asiatic continent, has, after thousands ofyears of dormant civilization, at last awakened to political life, andcategorically claims its share in international life. The entrance ofJapan into the circle of the great World Powers means a call to arms. "Asia for the Asiatics, " is the phrase which she whispers beneath herbreath, trusting in the strength of her demand. The new Great Power hasemerged victoriously from its first encounter with a European foe. China, too, is preparing to expand her forces outwardly. A mightymovement is thrilling Asia--the awakening of a new epoch. Dangers, then, which have already assumed a profound importance for thecivilized countries of Europe, are threatening from Asia, the old cradleof the nations. But even in the heart of the European nations, forceswhich have slumbered hitherto are now awake. The persisting ideas of theFrench Revolution and the great industrial progress which characterizedthe last century, have roused the working classes of every country to aconsciousness of their importance and their social power. The workers, originally concerned only in the amelioration of their materialposition, have, in theory, abandoned the basis of the modern State, andseek their salvation in the revolution which they preach. They do notwish to obtain what they can within the limitations of the historicallyrecognized State, but they wish to substitute for it a new State, inwhich they themselves are the rulers. By this aspiration they not onlyperpetually menace State and society, but endanger in the separatecountries the industries from which they live, since they threaten todestroy the possibility of competing in the international markets bycontinuous increase of wages and decrease of work. Even in Germany thismovement has affected large sections of the population. Until approximately the middle of the last century, agriculture andcattle-breeding formed the chief and most important part of Germanindustries. Since then, under the protection of wise tariffs, and inconnection with the rapid growth of the German merchant navy, trade hasmarvellously increased. Germany has become an industrial and tradingnation; almost the whole of the growing increase of the population findswork and employment in this sphere. Agriculture has more and more lost itsleading position in the economic life of the people. The artisanclass has thus become a power in our State. It is organized in tradeunions, and has politically fallen under the influence of theinternational social democracy. It is hostile to the national classdistinctions, and strains every nerve to undermine the existing power ofthe State. It is evident that the State cannot tolerate quietly this dangerousagitation, and that it must hinder, by every means, the efforts of theanti-constitutionalist party to effect their purpose. The law ofself-preservation demands this; but it is clear that, to a certainpoint, the pretensions of the working classes are justified. The citizenmay fairly claim to protect himself from poverty by work, and to have anopportunity of raising himself in the social scale, if he willinglydevotes his powers. He is entitled to demand that the State should grantthis claim, and should be bound to protect him against the tyranny ofcapital. Two means of attaining such an object are open to the State: first, itmay create opportunities of work, which secure remunerative employmentto all willing hands; secondly, it may insure the workman by legislationagainst every diminution in his capacity to work owing to sickness, age, or accident; may give him material assistance when temporarily out ofwork, and protect him against compulsion which may hinder him fromworking. The economical prosperity of Germany as the visible result of threevictorious campaigns created a labour market sufficiently large forpresent purposes, although without the conscious intention of the State. German labour, under the protection of the political power, gained amarket for itself. On the other hand, the German State has intervenedwith legislation, with full consciousness of the end and the means. AsScharnhorst once contrasted the duty of the citizen with the rights ofman, so the Emperor William I. Recognized the duty of the State towardsthose who were badly equipped with the necessaries of life. The positionof the worker was assured, so far as circumstances allowed, by sociallegislation. No excuse, therefore, for revolutionary agitation nowexisted. A vigorous opposition to all the encroachments of the social democratsindicated the only right way in which the justifiable efforts of theworking class could be reconciled with the continuance of the existingState and of existing society, the two pillars of all civilization andprogress. This task is by no means completed. The question still is, Howto win back the working class to the ideals of State and country? Willingworkers must be still further protected against social democratic tyranny. Germany, nevertheless, is in social-political respects at the head ofall progress in culture. German science has held its place in the world. Germany certainly took the lead in political sciences during the lastcentury, and in all other domains of intellectual inquiry has won aprominent position through the universality of her philosophy and herthorough and unprejudiced research into the nature of things. The achievements of Germany in the sphere of science and literature areattested by the fact that the annual export of German books to foreigncountries is, according to trustworthy estimates, twice as large as thatof France, England, and America combined. It is only in the domain ofthe exact sciences that Germany has often been compelled to giveprecedence to foreign countries. German art also has failed to win aleading position. It shows, indeed, sound promise in many directions, and has produced much that is really great; but the chaos of ourpolitical conditions is, unfortunately, reflected in it. The GermanEmpire has politically been split up into numerous parties. Not only arethe social democrats and the middle class opposed, but they, again, aredivided among themselves; not only are industries and agriculture bitterenemies, but the national sentiment has not yet been able to vanquishdenominational antagonisms, and the historical hostility between Northand South has prevented the population from growing into a completelyunited body. So stands Germany to-day, torn by internal dissensions, yet full ofsustained strength; threatened on all sides by dangers, compressed intonarrow, unnatural limits, she still is filled with high aspirations, inher nationality, her intellectual development, in her science, industries, and trade. And now, what paths does this history indicate to us for the future?What duties are enforced on us by the past? It is a question of far-reaching importance; for on the way in which theGerman State answers this question, depend not only our own furtherdevelopment, but to some extent the subsequent shaping of the history ofthe world. CHAPTER IV GERMANY'S HISTORICAL MISSION Let us pass before our mind's eye the whole course of our historicaldevelopment, and let us picture to ourselves the life-giving streams ofhuman beings, that in every age have poured forth from the Empire ofCentral Europe to all parts of the globe; let us reflect what rich seedsof intellectual and moral development were sown by the Germanintellectual life: the proud conviction forces itself upon us withirresistible power that a high, if not the highest, importance for theentire development of the human race is ascribable to this Germanpeople. This conviction is based on the intellectual merits of our nation, onthe freedom and the universality of the German spirit, which have everand again been shown in the course of its history. There is no nationwhose thinking is at once so free from prejudice and so historical asthe German, which knows how to unite so harmoniously the freedom of theintellectual and the restraint of the practical life on the path of freeand natural development. The Germans have thus always been thestandard-bearers of free thought, but at the same time a strong bulwarkagainst revolutionary anarchical outbreaks. They have often been worstedin the struggle for intellectual freedom, and poured out their bestheart's blood in the cause. Intellectual compulsion has sometimes ruledthe Germans; revolutionary tremors have shaken the life of thispeople--the great peasant war in the sixteenth century, and thepolitical attempts at revolution in the middle of the nineteenthcentury. But the revolutionary movement has been checked and directedinto the paths of a healthy natural advancement. The inevitable need ofa free intellectual self-determination has again and again disengageditself from the inner life of the soul of the people, and broadened intoworld-historical importance. Thus two great movements were born from the German intellectual life, onwhich, henceforth, all the intellectual and moral progress of man mustrest: the Reformation and the critical philosophy. The Reformation, which broke the intellectual yoke, imposed by the Church, which checkedall free progress; and the Critique of Pure Reason, which put a stop tothe caprice of philosophic speculation by defining for the human mindthe limitations of its capacity for knowledge, and at the same timepointed out in what way knowledge is really possible. On thissubstructure was developed the intellectual life of our time, whosedeepest significance consists in the attempt to reconcile the result offree inquiry with the religious needs of the heart, and to lay afoundation for the harmonious organization of mankind. Torn this way andthat, between hostile forces, in a continuous feud between faith andknowledge, mankind seems to have lost the straight road of progress. Reconciliation only appears possible when the thought of religiousreformation leads to a permanent explanation of the idea of religion, and science remains conscious of the limits of its power, and does notattempt to explain the domain of the supersensual world from the resultsof natural philosophy. The German nation not only laid the foundations of this great strugglefor an harmonious development of humanity, but took the lead in it. Weare thus incurring an obligation for the future, from which we cannotshrink. We must be prepared to be the leaders in this campaign, which isbeing fought for the highest stake that has been offered to humanefforts. Our nation is not only bound by its past history to take partin this struggle, but is peculiarly adapted to do so by its specialqualities. No nation on the face of the globe is so able to grasp and appropriateall the elements of culture, to add to them from the stores of its ownspiritual endowment, and to give back to mankind richer gifts than itreceived. It has "enriched the store of traditional European culturewith new and independent ideas and ideals, and won a position in the greatcommunity of civilized nations which none else could fill. " "Depth ofconviction, idealism, universality, the power to look beyond all thelimits of a finite existence, to sympathize with all that is human, totraverse the realm of ideas in companionship with the noblest of allnations and ages--this has at all times been the German characteristic;this has been extolled as the prerogative of German culture. " [A] To nonation, except the German, has it been given to enjoy in its inner self"that which is given to mankind as a whole. " We often see in othernations a greater intensity of specialized ability, but never the samecapacity for generalization and absorption. It is this quality whichspecially fits us for the leadership in the intellectual world, andimposes on us the obligation to maintain that position. [Footnote A: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte, " i. , p. 95. ] There are numerous other tasks to be fulfilled if we are to dischargeour highest duty. They form the necessary platform from which we canmount to the highest goal. These duties lie in the domains of scienceand politics, and also in that borderland where science and politicstouch, and where the latter is often directly conditioned by the resultsof scientific inquiry. First and foremost it is German science which must regain itssuperiority in unwearying and brilliant research in order to vindicateour birthright. On the one hand, we must extend the theory of theperceptive faculty; on the other, we must increase man's dominion overNature by exploring her hidden secrets, and thus make human work moreuseful and remunerative. We must endeavour to find scientific solutionsof the great problems which deeply concern mankind. We need not restrictourselves to the sphere of pure theory, but must try to benefitcivilization by the practical results of research, and thus createconditions of life in which a purer conception of the ideal life canfind its expression. It is, broadly speaking, religious and social controversies whichexercise the most permanent influence on human existence, and conditionnot only our future development, but the higher life generally. Theseproblems have occupied the minds of no people more deeply andpermanently than our own. Yet the revolutionary spirit, in spite of theempty ravings of social democratic agitators, finds no place in Germany. The German nature tends towards a systematic healthy development, whichworks slowly in opposition to the different movements. The Germans thusseem thoroughly qualified to settle in their own country the greatcontroversies which are rending other nations, and to direct them intothe paths of a natural progress in conformity with the laws ofevolution. We have already started on the task in the social sphere, and shall nodoubt continue it, so far as it is compatible with the advantages of thecommunity and the working class itself. We must not spare any efforts tofind other means than those already adopted to inspire the working classwith healthy and patriotic ambitions. It is to be hoped, in any case, that if ever a great and common duty, requiring the concentration of the whole national strength, is imposedupon us, that the labour classes will not withhold their co-operation, and that, in face of a common danger, our nation will recover that unitywhich is lamentably deficient to-day. No attempt at settlement has been made in the religious domain. The oldantagonists are still bitterly hostile to each other, especially inGermany. It will be the duty of the future to mitigate the religious andpolitical antagonism of the denominations, under guarantees of absoluteliberty of thought and all personal convictions, and to combine theconflicting views into a harmonious and higher system. At present thereappears small probability of attaining this end. The dogmatism ofProtestant orthodoxy and the Jesuitic tendencies and ultramontanism ofthe Catholics, must be surmounted, before any common religious movementcan be contemplated. But no German statesman can disregard this aspectof affairs, nor must he ever forget that the greatness of our nation isrooted exclusively on Protestantism. Legally and socially alldenominations enjoy equal rights, but the German State must neverrenounce the leadership in the domain of free spiritual development. Todo so would mean loss of prestige. Duties of the greatest importance for the whole advance of humancivilization have thus been transmitted to the German nation, as heir ofa great and glorious past. It is faced with problems of no lesssignificance in the sphere of its international relations. Theseproblems are of special importance, since they affect most deeply theintellectual development, and on their solution depends the position ofGermany in the world. The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the stormsand struggles of the past. The Germany of to-day, consideredgeographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of theEmperors; it comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A largenumber of German fellow-countrymen have been incorporated into otherStates, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who havedeveloped into a separate nationality, but in language and nationalcustoms cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed ofher natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the mostcharacteristically German stream, the much lauded German Rhine, lieoutside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where thestrength of the modern German Empire grew up in centuries of war againstthe Slavs, the possessions of Germany are menaced. The Slavonic wavesare ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength. Signs of political weakness are visible here, while for centuries theoverflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreigncountries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it isabsorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Evento-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where itsincreasing population may find remunerative work and a German way ofliving. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the German nation and itsintellectual importance. At an earlier epoch, to be sure, when Germans had in the course ofcenturies grown accustomed to the degradation of being robbed of allpolitical significance, a large section of our people did not feel thisinsufficiency. Even during the age of our classical literature thepatriotic pride of that idealistic generation "was contented with thethought that no other people could follow the bold flights of Germangenius or soar aloft to the freedom of our world citizenship. " [B] [Footnote B: Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte, " i. , p. 195. ] Schiller, in 1797, could write the lines: "German majesty and honour Fall not with the princes' crown; When amid the flames of war German Empire crashes down, German greatness stands unscathed. " [C] [Footnote C: Fragment of a poem on "German Greatness, " published in 1905by Bernhard Suphan. ] The nobler and better section of our nation, at any rate, holdsdifferent sentiments to-day. We attach a higher value to the influenceof the German spirit on universal culture than was then possible, sincewe must now take into consideration the immense development of Germanyin the nineteenth century, and can thus better estimate the oldimportance of our classical literature. Again, we have learnt from thevicissitudes of our historical growth to recognize that the full and duemeasure of intellectual development can only be achieved by the politicalfederation of our nation. The dominion of German thought canonly be extended under the aegis of political power, and unless we actin conformity to this idea, we shall be untrue to our great dutiestowards the human race. Our first and positive duty consists, therefore, in zealously guardingthe territories of Germany, as they now are, and in not surrendering afoot's breadth of German soil to foreign nationalities. On the west theambitious schemes of the Latin race have been checked, and it is hard toimagine that we shall ever allow this prize of victory to be snatchedagain from our hands. On the south-east the Turks, who formerlythreatened the civilized countries of Europe, have been completelyrepulsed. They now take a very different position in European politicsfrom that which they filled at the time of their victorious advancewestwards. Their power on the Mediterranean is entirely destroyed. Onthe other hand, the Slavs have become a formidable power. Vast regionswhich were once under German influence are now once more subject toSlavonic rule, and seem permanently lost to us. The present RussianBaltic provinces were formerly flourishing seats of German culture. TheGerman element in Austria, our ally, is gravely menaced by the Slavs;Germany herself is exposed to a perpetual peaceful invasion of Slavonicworkmen. Many Poles are firmly established in the heart of Westphalia. Only faint-hearted measures are taken to-day to stem this Slavonicflood. And yet to check this onrush of Slavism is not merely anobligation inherited from our fathers, but a duty in the interests ofself-preservation and European civilization. It cannot yet be determinedwhether we can keep off this vast flood by pacific precautions. It isnot improbable that the question of Germanic or Slavonic supremacy willbe once more decided by the sword. The probability of such a conflictgrows stronger as we become more lax in pacific measures of defence, andshow less determination to protect the German soil at all costs. The further duty of supporting the Germans in foreign countries in theirstruggle for existence and of thus keeping them loyal to theirnationality, is one from which, in our direct interests, we cannotwithdraw. The isolated groups of Germans abroad greatly benefit ourtrade, since by preference they obtain their goods from Germany; butthey may also be useful to us politically, as we discover in America. The American-Germans have formed a political alliance with the Irish, and thus united, constitute a power in the State, with which theGovernment must reckon. Finally, from the point of view of civilization, it is imperative topreserve the German spirit, and by so doing to establish _foci_ ofuniversal culture. Even if we succeed in guarding our possessions in the East and West, andin preserving the German nationality in its present form throughout theworld, we shall not be able to maintain our present position, powerfulas it is, in the great competition with the other Powers, if we arecontented to restrict ourselves to our present sphere of power, whilethe surrounding countries are busily extending their dominions. If wewish to compete further with them, a policy which our population and ourcivilization both entitle and compel us to adopt, we must not hold backin the hard struggle for the sovereignty of the world. Lord Rosebery, speaking at the Royal Colonial Institute on March 1, 1893, expressed himself as follows: "It is said that our Empire isalready large enough and does not need expansion. .. . We shall have toconsider not what we want now, but what we want in the future. .. . Wehave to remember that it is part of our responsibility and heritage totake care that the world, so far as it can be moulded by us, shouldreceive the Anglo-Saxon and not another character. " [D] [Footnote D: This passage is quoted in the book of the French ex-MinisterHanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique. "] That is a great and proud thought which the Englishman then expressed. If we count the nations who speak English at the present day, and if wesurvey the countries which acknowledge the rule of England, we mustadmit that he is justified from the English point of view. He does nothere contemplate an actual world-sovereignty, but the predominance ofthe English spirit is proclaimed in plain language. England has certainly done a great work of civilization, especially fromthe material aspect; but her work is one-sided. All the colonies whichare directly subject to English rule are primarily exploited in theinterest of English industries and English capital. The work ofcivilization, which England undeniably has carried out among them, hasalways been subordinated to this idea; she has never justified hersovereignty by training up a free and independent population, and bytransmitting to the subject peoples the blessings of an independentculture of their own. With regard to those colonies which enjoyself-government, and are therefore more or less free republics, asCanada, Australia, South Africa, it is very questionable whether theywill permanently retain any trace of the English spirit. They are notonly growing States, but growing nations, and it seems uncertain at thepresent time whether England will be able to include them permanently inthe Empire, to make them serviceable to English industries, or even tosecure that the national character is English. Nevertheless, it is agreat and proud ambition that is expressed in Lord Rosebery's words, andit testifies to a supreme national self-confidence. The French regard with no less justifiable satisfaction the work done bythem in the last forty years. In 1909 the former French Minister, Hanotaux, gave expression to this pride in the following words: "Tenyears ago the work of founding our colonial Empire was finished. Francehas claimed her rank among the four great Powers. She is at home inevery quarter of the globe. French is spoken, and will continue to bespoken, in Africa, Asia, America, Oceania. Seeds of sovereignty are sownin all parts of the world. They will prosper under the protection ofHeaven. " [E] [Footnote E: Hanotaux, "Fashoda et le partage de l'Afrique. "] The same statesman criticized, with ill-concealed hatred, the Germanpolicy: "It will be for history to decide what has been the leadingthought of Germany and her Government during the complicated disputesunder which the partition of Africa and the last phase of Frenchcolonial policy were ended. We may assume that at first the adherents toBismarck's policy saw with satisfaction how France embarked on distantand difficult undertakings, which would fully occupy the attention ofthe country and its Government for long years to come. Nevertheless, itis not certain that this calculation has proved right in the long-run, since Germany ultimately trod the same road, and, somewhat late, indeed, tried to make up for lost time. If that country deliberately abandonedcolonial enterprise to others, it cannot be surprised if these haveobtained the best shares. " This French criticism is not altogether unfair. It must be admitted withmortification and envy that the nation vanquished in 1870, whose vitalpowers seemed exhausted, which possessed no qualification forcolonization from want of men to colonize, as is best seen in Algeria, has yet created the second largest colonial Empire in the world, andprides herself on being a World Power, while the conqueror of Gravelotteand Sedan in this respect lags far behind her, and only recently, in theMorocco controversy, yielded to the unjustifiable pretensions of Francein a way which, according to universal popular sentiment, was unworthyalike of the dignity and the interests of Germany. The openly declared claims of England and France are the more worthy ofattention since an _entente_ prevails between the two countries. In theface of these claims the German nation, from the standpoint of itsimportance to civilization, is fully entitled not only to demand a placein the sun, as Prince Bülow used modestly to express it, but to aspireto an adequate share in the sovereignty of the world far beyond thelimits of its present sphere of influence. But we can only reach thisgoal, by so amply securing our position in Europe, that it can neveragain be questioned. Then only we need no longer fear that we shall beopposed by stronger opponents whenever we take part in internationalpolitics. We shall then be able to exercise our forces freely in fairrivalry with the other World Powers, and secure to German nationalityand German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due tothem. Such an expansion of power, befitting our importance, is not merely afanciful scheme--it will soon appear as a political necessity. The fact has already been mentioned that, owing to political union andimproved economic conditions during the last forty years, an era ofgreat prosperity has set in, and that German industries have been widelyextended and German trade has kept pace with them. The extraordinarycapacity of the German nation for trade and navigation has once morebrilliantly asserted itself. The days of the Hanseatic League havereturned. The labour resources of our nation increase continuously. Theincrease of the population in the German Empire alone amounts yearly toa million souls, and these have, to a large extent, found remunerativeindustrial occupation. There is, however, a reverse side to this picture of splendiddevelopment. We are absolutely dependent on foreign countries for theimport of raw materials, and to a considerable extent also for the saleof our own manufactures. We even obtain a part of our necessaries oflife from abroad. Then, again, we have not the assured markets whichEngland possesses in her colonies. Our own colonies are unable to takemuch of our products, and the great foreign economic spheres try toclose their doors to outsiders, especially Germans, in order toencourage their own industries, and to make themselves independent ofother countries. The livelihood of our working classes directly dependson the maintenance and expansion of our export trade. It is a questionof life and death for us to keep open our oversea commerce. We shallvery soon see ourselves compelled to find for our growing populationmeans of life other than industrial employment. It is out of thequestion that this latter can keep pace permanently with the increase ofpopulation. Agriculture will employ a small part of this increase, andhome settlements may afford some relief. But no remunerative occupationwill ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire forthe whole population, however favourable our international relations. Weshall soon, therefore, be faced by the question, whether we wish tosurrender the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly inthe hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them ahome in our own German colonies, and so retain them for the fatherland. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. If theunfortunate course of our history has hitherto prevented us frombuilding a colonial Empire, it is our duty to make up for lost time, andat once to construct a fleet which, in defiance of all hostile Powers, may keep our sea communications open. We have long underestimated the importance of colonies. Colonialpossessions which merely serve the purpose of acquiring wealth, and areonly used for economic ends, while the owner-State does not think ofcolonizing in any form or raising the position of the aboriginalpopulation in the economic or social scale, are unjustifiable andimmoral, and can never be held permanently. "But that colonization whichretains a uniform nationality has become a factor of immense importancefor the future of the world. It will determine the degree in which eachnation shares in the government of the world by the white race. It isquite imaginable that a count owns no colonies will no longer countamong the European Great Powers, however powerful it may otherwise be. "[F] [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , Section 8. ] We are already suffering severely from the want of colonies to meet ourrequirements. They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to ourgrowing working population, but would supply raw materials andfoodstuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to thatimmense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lyingunproductive in Germany, or is in the service of foreign interests. Wefind throughout the countries of the world German merchants, engineers, and men of every profession, employed actively in the service of foreignmasters, because German colonies, when they might be profitably engaged, do not exist. In the future, however, the importance of Germany willdepend on two points: firstly, how many millions of men in the worldspeak German? secondly, how many of them are politically members of theGerman Empire? These are heavy and complicated duties, which have devolved on us fromthe entire past development of our nation, and are determined by itspresent condition as regards the future. We must be quite clear on thispoint, that no nation has had to reckon with the same difficulties andhostility as ours. This is due to the many restrictions of our politicalrelations, to our unfavourable geographical position, and to the courseof our history. It was chiefly our own fault that we were condemned topolitical paralysis at the time when the great European States builtthemselves up, and sometimes expanded into World Powers. We did notenter the circle of the Powers, whose decision carried weight inpolitics, until late, when the partition of the globe was longconcluded. All which other nations attained in centuries of naturaldevelopment--political union, colonial possessions, naval power, international trade--was denied to our nation until quite recently. Whatwe now wish to attain must be _fought for_, and won, against a superiorforce of hostile interests and Powers. It is all the more emphatically our duty plainly to perceive what pathswe wish to take, and what our goals are, so as not to split up ourforces in false directions, and involuntarily to diverge from thestraight road of our intended development. The difficulty of our political position is in a certain sense anadvantage. By keeping us in a continually increasing state of tension, it has at least protected us so far from the lethargy which so oftenfollows a long period of peace and growing wealth. It has forced us tostake all our spiritual and material forces in order to rise to everyoccasion, and has thus discovered and strengthened resources which willbe of great value whenever we shall be called upon to draw the sword. CHAPTER V WORLD POWER OR DOWNFALL In discussing the duties which fall to the German nation from itshistory and its general as well as particular endowments, we attemptedto prove that a consolidation and expansion of our position among theGreat Powers of Europe, and an extension of our colonial possessions, must be the basis of our future development. The political questions thus raised intimately concern all internationalrelations, and should be thoroughly weighed. We must not aim at theimpossible. A reckless policy would be foreign to our national characterand our high aims and duties. But we must aspire to the possible, evenat the risk of war. This policy we have seen to be both our right andour duty. The longer we look at things with folded hands, the harder itwill be to make up the start which the other Powers have gained on us. "The man of sense will by the forelock clutch Whatever lies within his power, Stick fast to it, and neither shirk, Nor from his enterprise be thrust, But, having once begun to work, Go working on because he must. " _Faust_ (translated by Sir Theodore Martin). The sphere in which we can realize our ambition is circumscribed by thehostile intentions of the other World Powers, by the existingterritorial conditions, and by the armed force which is at the back ofboth. Our policy must necessarily be determined by the consideration ofthese conditions. We must accurately, and without bias or timidity, examine the circumstances which turn the scale when the forces whichconcern us are weighed one against the other. These considerations fall partly within the military, but belong mainlyto the political sphere, in so far as the political grouping of theStates allows a survey of the military resources of the parties. We musttry to realize this grouping. The shifting aims of the politics of theday need not be our standard; they are often coloured by considerationsof present expediency, and offer no firm basis for forming an opinion. We must rather endeavour to recognize the political views and intentionsof the individual States, which are based on the nature of things, andtherefore will continually make their importance felt. The broad linesof policy are ultimately laid down by the permanent interests of acountry, although they may often be mistaken from short-sightedness ortimidity, and although policy sometimes takes a course which does notseem warranted from the standpoint of lasting national benefits. Policyis not an exact science, following necessary laws, but is made by menwho impress on it the stamp of their strength or their weakness, andoften divert it from the path of true national interests. Suchdigressions must not be ignored. The statesman who seizes hisopportunity will often profit by these political fluctuations. But thestudent who considers matters from the standpoint of history must keephis eyes mainly fixed on those interests which seem permanent. We musttherefore try to make the international situation in this latter senseclear, so far as it concerns Germany's power and ambitions. We see the European Great Powers divided into two great camps. On the one side Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded a defensivealliance, whose sole object is to guard against hostile aggression. Inthis alliance the two first-named States form the solid, probablyunbreakable, core, since by the nature of things they are intimatelyconnected. The geographical conditions force this result. The two Statescombined form a compact series of territories from the Adriatic to theNorth Sea and the Baltic. Their close union is due also to historicalnational and political conditions. Austrians have fought shoulder toshoulder with Prussians and Germans of the Empire on a hundredbattlefields; Germans are the backbone of the Austrian dominions, thebond of union that holds together the different nationalities of theEmpire. Austria, more than Germany, must guard against the inroads ofSlavism, since numerous Slavonic races are comprised in her territories. There has been no conflict of interests between the two States since thestruggle for the supremacy in Germany was decided. The maritime andcommercial interests of the one point to the south and south-east, thoseof the other to the north. Any feebleness in the one must reactdetrimentally on the political relations of the other. A quarrel betweenGermany and Austria would leave both States at the mercy ofoverwhelmingly powerful enemies. The possibility of each maintaining itspolitical position depends on their standing by each other. It may beassumed that the relations uniting the two States will be permanent solong as Germans and Magyars are the leading nationalities in theDanubian monarchy. It was one of the master-strokes of Bismarck's policyto have recognized the community of Austro-German interests even duringthe war of 1866, and boldly to have concluded a peace which renderedsuch an alliance possible. The weakness of the Austrian Empire lies in the strong admixture ofSlavonic elements, which are hostile to the German population, and showmany signs of Pan-Slavism. It is not at present, however, strong enoughto influence the political position of the Empire. Italy, also, is bound to the Triple Alliance by her true interests. Theantagonism to Austria, which has run through Italian history, willdiminish when the needs of expansion in other spheres, and of creating anatural channel for the increasing population, are fully recognized byItaly. Neither condition is impossible. Irredentism will then lose itspolitical significance, for the position, which belongs to Italy fromher geographical situation and her past history, and will promote hertrue interests if attained, cannot be won in a war with Austria. It isthe position of a leading political and commercial Mediterranean Power. That is the natural heritage which she can claim. Neither Germany norAustria is a rival in this claim, but France, since she has taken up apermanent position on the coast of North Africa, and especially inTunis, has appropriated a country which would have been the most naturalcolony for Italy, and has, in point of fact, been largely colonized byItalians. It would, in my opinion, have been politically right for us, even at the risk of a war with France, to protest against thisannexation, and to preserve the territory of Carthage for Italy. Weshould have considerably strengthened Italy's position on theMediterranean, and created a cause of contention between Italy andFrance that would have added to the security of the Triple Alliance. The weakness of this alliance consists in its purely defensivecharacter. It offers a certain security against hostile aggression, butdoes not consider the necessary development of events, and does notguarantee to any of its members help in the prosecution of its essentialinterests. It is based on a _status quo_, which was fully justified inits day, but has been left far behind by the march of political events. Prince Bismarck, in his "Thoughts and Reminiscences, " pointed out thatthis alliance would not always correspond to the requirements of thefuture. Since Italy found the Triple Alliance did not aid herMediterranean policy, she tried to effect a pacific agreement withEngland and France, and accordingly retired from the Triple Alliance. The results of this policy are manifest to-day. Italy, under anundisguised arrangement with England and France, but in directopposition to the interests of the Triple Alliance, attacked Turkey, inorder to conquer, in Tripoli, the required colonial territory. Thisundertaking brought her to the brink of a war with Austria, which, asthe supreme Power in the Balkan Peninsula, can never tolerate theencroachment of Italy into those regions. The Triple Alliance, which in itself represents a natural league, hassuffered a rude shock. The ultimate reason for this result is found inthe fact that the parties concerned with a narrow, short-sighted policylook only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard tothe vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will notregain its original strength until, under the protection of the alliedarmies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. Wemust therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in theBalkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can wecalculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our ownpolitical endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests tostrengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, anessential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors ofthe past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only thenwill Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its realmeaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negativeresults, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vitalinterests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten withsterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do notconcern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by theconsideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or, indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente, _ wouldprobably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria. Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests ofItaly, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, andincur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such acontingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, wemust not disregard her relations with England as well as with France. England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable effortsto win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses inGibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, whichsecure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest incommanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England'sMediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially incombination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace thecoasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war againstEngland _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoidingsuch a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. Sheis thus in an extremely difficult double position; herself a member ofthe Triple Alliance, she is in a situation which compels her to makeovertures to the opponents of that alliance, so long as her own alliescan afford no trustworthy assistance to her policy of development. It isour interest to reconcile Italy and Turkey so far as we can. France and Russia have united in opposition to the Central EuropeanTriple Alliance. France's European policy is overshadowed by the idea of_revanche_. For that she makes the most painful sacrifices; for that shehas forgotten the hundred years' enmity against England and thehumiliation of Fashoda. She wishes first to take vengeance for thedefeats of 1870-71, which wounded her national pride to the quick; shewishes to raise her political prestige by a victory over Germany, and, if possible, to regain that former supremacy on the continent of Europewhich she so long and brilliantly maintained; she wishes, if fortunesmiles on her arms, to reconquer Alsace and Lorraine. But she feels tooweak for an attack on Germany. Her whole foreign policy, in spite of allprotestations of peace, follows the single aim of gaining allies forthis attack. Her alliance with Russia, her _entente_ with England, areinspired with this spirit; her present intimate relations with thislatter nation are traceable to the fact that the French policy hoped, and with good reason, for more active help from England's hostility toGermany than from Russia. The colonial policy of France pursues primarily the object of acquiringa material, and, if possible, military superiority over Germany. Theestablishment of a native African army, the contemplated introduction ofa modified system of conscription in Algeria, and the politicalannexation of Morocco, which offers excellent raw material for soldiers, so clearly exhibit this intention, that there can be no possibleillusion as to its extent and meaning. Since France has succeeded in bringing her military strength toapproximately the same level as Germany, since she has acquired in herNorth African Empire the possibility of considerably increasing thatstrength, since she has completely outstripped Germany in the sphere ofcolonial policy, and has not only kept up, but also revived, the Frenchsympathies of Alsace and Lorraine, the conclusion is obvious: Francewill not abandon the paths of an anti-German policy, but will do herbest to excite hostility against us, and to thwart German interests inevery quarter of the globe. When she came to an understanding with theItalians, that she should be given a free hand in Morocco if she allowedthem to occupy Tripoli, a wedge was driven into the Triple Alliancewhich threatens to split it. It may be regarded as highly improbablethat she will maintain honourably and with no _arrière-pensée_ theobligations undertaken in the interests of German commerce in Morocco. The suppression of these interests was, in fact, a marked feature of theFrench Morocco policy, which was conspicuously anti-German. The Frenchpolicy was so successful that we shall have to reckon more than ever onthe hostility of France in the future. It must be regarded as a quiteunthinkable proposition that an agreement between France and Germany canbe negotiated before the question between them has been once moredecided by arms. Such an agreement is the less likely now that Francesides with England, to whose interest it is to repress Germany butstrengthen France. Another picture meets our eyes if we turn to theEast, where the giant Russian Empire towers above all others. The Empire of the Czar, in consequence of its defeat in Manchuria, andof the revolution which was precipitated by the disastrous war, isfollowing apparently a policy of recuperation. It has tried to come toan understanding with Japan in the Far East, and with England in CentralAsia; in the Balkans its policy aims at the maintenance of the _statusquo_. So far it does not seem to have entertained any idea of war withGermany. The Potsdam agreement, whose importance cannot beoverestimated, shows that we need not anticipate at present anyaggressive policy on Russia's part. The ministry of Kokowzew seemslikely to wish to continue this policy of recuperation, and has the morereason for doing so, as the murder of Stolypin with its accompanyingevents showed, as it were by a flash of lightning, a dreadful picture ofinternal disorder and revolutionary intrigue. It is improbable, therefore, that Russia would now be inclined to make armed interventionin favour of France. The Russo-French alliance is not, indeed, sweptaway, and there is no doubt that Russia would, if the necessity arose, meet her obligations; but the tension has been temporarily relaxed, andan improvement in the Russo-German relations has been effected, althoughthis state of things was sufficiently well paid for by the concessionsof Germany in North Persia. It is quite obvious that this policy of marking time, which Russia isadopting for the moment, can only be transitory. The requirements of themighty Empire irresistibly compel an expansion towards the sea, whetherin the Far East, where it hopes to gain ice-free harbours, or in thedirection of the Mediterranean, where the Crescent still glitters on thedome of St. Sophia. After a successful war, Russia would hardly hesitateto seize the mouth of the Vistula, at the possession of which she haslong aimed, and thus to strengthen appreciably her position in theBaltic. Supremacy in the Balkan Peninsula, free entrance into the Mediterranean, and a strong position on the Baltic, are the goals to which the Europeanpolicy of Russia has naturally long been directed. She feels herself, also, the leading power of the Slavonic races, and has for many yearsbeen busy in encouraging and extending the spread of this element intoCentral Europe. Pan-Slavism is still hard at work. It is hard to foresee how soon Russia will come out from her retirementand again tread the natural paths of her international policy. Herpresent political attitude depends considerably on the person of thepresent Emperor, who believes in the need of leaning upon a strongmonarchical State, such as Germany is, and also on the character of theinternal development of the mighty Empire. The whole body of the nationis so tainted with revolutionary and moral infection, and the peasantryis plunged in such economic disorder, that it is difficult to see fromwhat elements a vivifying force may spring up capable of restoring ahealthy condition. Even the agrarian policy of the present Governmenthas not produced any favourable results, and has so far disappointedexpectations. The possibility thus has always existed that, under thestress of internal affairs, the foreign policy may be reversed and anattempt made to surmount the difficulties at home by successes abroad. Time and events will decide whether these successes will be sought inthe Far East or in the West. On the one side Japan, and possibly China, must be encountered; on the other, Germany, Austria, and, possibly, Turkey. Doubtless these conditions must exercise a decisive influence on theFranco-Russian Alliance. The interests of the two allies are notidentical. While France aims solely at crushing Germany by an aggressivewar, Russia from the first has more defensive schemes in view. Shewished to secure herself against any interference by the Powers ofCentral Europe in the execution of her political plans in the South andEast, and at the same time, at the price of an alliance, to raise, onadvantageous terms in France, the loans which were so much needed. Russia at present has no inducement to seek an aggressive war withGermany or to take part in one. Of course, every further increase of theGerman power militates against the Russian interests. We shall thereforealways find her on the side of those who try to cross our political paths. England has recently associated herself with the Franco-RussianAlliance. She has made an arrangement in Asia with Russia by which thespheres of influence of the two parties are delimited, while with Franceshe has come to terms in the clear intention of suppressing Germanyunder all circumstances, if necessary by force of arms. The actually existing conflict of Russian and English interests in theheart of Asia can obviously not be terminated by such agreements. So, also, no natural community of interests exists between England andFrance. A strong French fleet may be as great a menace to England as toany other Power. For the present, however, we may reckon on anAnglo--French _entente_. This union is cemented by the common hostilityto Germany. No other reason for the political combination of the twoStates is forthcoming. There is not even a credible pretext, which mightmask the real objects. This policy of England is, on superficial examination, not verycomprehensible. Of course, German industries and trade have lately madeastounding progress, and the German navy is growing to a strength whichcommands respect. We are certainly a hindrance to the plans whichEngland is prosecuting in Asiatic Turkey and Central Africa. This maywell be distasteful to the English from economic as well as politicaland military aspects. But, on the other hand, the American competitionin the domain of commercial politics is far keener than the German. TheAmerican navy is at the present moment stronger than the German, andwill henceforth maintain this precedence. Even the French are on thepoint of building a formidable fleet, and their colonial Empire, so faras territory is concerned, is immensely superior to ours. Yet, in spiteof all these considerations, the hostility of the English is primarilydirected against us. It is necessary to adopt the English standpoint inorder to understand the line of thought which guides the Englishpoliticians. I believe that the solution of the problem is to be foundin the wide ramifications of English interests in every part of theworld. Since England committed the unpardonable blunder, from her point ofview, of not supporting the Southern States in the American War ofSecession, a rival to England's world-wide Empire has appeared on theother side of the Atlantic in the form of the United States of NorthAmerica, which are a grave menace to England's fortunes. The keenestcompetition conceivable now exists between the two countries. Theannexation of the Philippines by America, and England's treaty withJapan, have accentuated the conflict of interests between the twonations. The trade and industries of America can no longer be checked, and the absolutely inexhaustible and ever-growing resources of the Unionare so prodigious that a naval war with America, in view of the vastdistances and wide extent of the enemies' coasts, would prove a verybold, and certainly very difficult, undertaking. England accordingly hasalways diplomatically conceded the claims of America, as quite recentlyin the negotiations about fortifying the Panama Canal; the objectclearly is to avoid any collision with the United States, from fearingthe consequences of such collision. The American competition in tradeand industries, and the growth of the American navy, are tolerated asinevitable, and the community of race is borne in mind. In this sense, according to the English point of view, must be understood the treaty bywhich a Court of Arbitration between the two countries was established. England wishes, in any case, to avert the danger of a war with America. The natural opposition of the two rival States may, however, in thefurther development of things, be so accentuated that England will beforced to assert her position by arms, or at least to maintain anundisputed naval supremacy, in order to emphasize her diplomatic action. The relations of the two countries to Canada may easily become strainedto a dangerous point, and the temporary failure of the ArbitrationTreaty casts a strong light on the fact that the American people does notconsider that the present political relations of the two nations arepermanent. There is another danger which concerns England more closely and directlythreatens her vitality. This is due to the nationalist movement in Indiaand Egypt, to the growing power of Islam, to the agitation forindependence in the great colonies, as well as to the supremacy of theLow-German element in South Africa. Turkey is the only State which might seriously threaten the Englishposition in Egypt by land. This contingency gives to the nationalmovement in Egypt an importance which it would not otherwise possess; itclearly shows that England intensely fears every Pan-Islamitic movement. She is trying with all the resources of political intrigue to underminethe growing power of Turkey, which she officially pretends to support, and is endeavouring to create in Arabia a new religious centre inopposition to the Caliphate. The same views are partially responsible for the policy in India, wheresome seventy millions of Moslems live under the English rule. England, so far, in accordance with the principle of _divide et impera_, hasattempted to play off the Mohammedan against the Hindu population. Butnow that a pronounced revolutionary and nationalist tendency showsitself among these latter, the danger is imminent that Pan-Islamism, thoroughly roused, should unite with the revolutionary elements ofBengal. The co-operation of these elements might create a very gravedanger, capable of shaking the foundations of England's high position inthe world. While so many dangers, in the future at least, threaten both at home andabroad, English imperialism has failed to link the vast Empire together, either for purposes of commerce or defence, more closely than hitherto. Mr. Chamberlain's dream of the British Imperial Customs Union hasdefinitely been abandoned. No attempt was made at the ImperialConference in 1911 to go back to it. "A centrifugal policy predominated. . .. . When the question of imperial defence came up, the policy wasrejected which wished to assure to Great Britain the help of the overseadominions in every imaginable eventuality. " The great self-ruledcolonies represent allies, who will stand by England in the hour ofneed, but "allies with the reservation that they are not to be employedwrongfully for objects which they cannot ascertain or do notapprove. " [A] There are clear indications that the policy of thedominions, though not yet planning a separation from England, iscontemplating the future prospect of doing so. Canada, South Africa, andAustralia are developing, as mentioned in Chapter IV. , into independentnations and States, and will, when their time comes, claim formalindependence. [Footnote A: Th. Schiemann in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of July 5, 1911. ] All these circumstances constitute a grave menace to the stability ofEngland's Empire, and these dangers largely influence England's attitudetowards Germany. England may have to tolerate the rivalry of North America in herimperial and commercial ambitions, but the competition of Germany mustbe stopped. If England is forced to fight America, the German fleet mustnot be in a position to help the Americans. Therefore it must bedestroyed. A similar line of thought is suggested by the eventuality of a greatEnglish colonial war, which would engage England's fleets in far distantparts of the world. England knows the German needs and capabilities ofexpansion, and may well fear that a German Empire with a strong fleetmight use such an opportunity for obtaining that increase of territorywhich England grudges. We may thus explain the apparent indifference ofEngland to the French schemes of aggrandizement. France's capability ofexpansion is exhausted from insufficient increase of population. She canno longer be dangerous to England as a nation, and would soon fallvictim to English lust of Empire, if only Germany were conquered. The wish to get rid of the dangers presumably threatening from theGerman quarter is all the more real since geographical conditions offera prospect of crippling the German overseas commerce without anyexcessive efforts. The comparative weakness of the German fleet, contrasted with the vast superiority of the English navy, allows acorrespondingly easy victory to be anticipated, especially if the Frenchfleet co-operates. The possibility, therefore, of quickly and completelygetting rid of one rival, in order to have a free hand for all othercontingencies, looms very near and undoubtedly presents a practicablemeans of placing the naval power of England on a firm footing for yearsto come, of annihilating German commerce and of checking the importanceof German interests in Africa and Northern Asia. The hostility to Germany is also sufficiently evident in other matters. It has always been England's object to maintain a certain balance ofpower between the continental nations of Europe, and to prevent any oneof them attaining a pronounced supremacy. While these States crippledand hindered each other from playing any active part on the world'sstage, England acquired an opportunity of following out her own purposesundisturbed, and of founding that world Empire which she now holds. Thispolicy she still continues, for so long as the Powers of Europe tie eachother's hands, her own supremacy is uncontested. It follows directlyfrom this that England's aim must be to repress Germany, but strengthenFrance; for Germany at the present moment is the only European Statewhich threatens to win a commanding position; but France is her bornrival, and cannot keep on level terms with her stronger neighbour on theEast, unless she adds to her forces and is helped by her allies. Thusthe hostility to Germany, from this aspect also, is based on England'smost important interests, and we must treat it as axiomatic andself-evident. The argument is often adduced that England by a war with Germany wouldchiefly injure herself, since she would lose the German market, which isthe best purchaser of her industrial products, and would be deprived ofthe very considerable German import trade. I fear that from the Englishpoint of view these conditions would be an additional incentive to war. England would hope to acquire, in place of the lost German market, alarge part of those markets which had been supplied by Germany beforethe war, and the want of German imports would be a great stimulus, andto some extent a great benefit, to English industries. After all, it is from the English aspect of the question quitecomprehensible that the English Government strains every nerve to checkthe growing power of Germany, and that a passionate desire prevails inlarge circles of the English nation to destroy the German fleet which isbuilding, and attack the objectionable neighbour. English policy might, however, strike out a different line, and attemptto come to terms with Germany instead of fighting. This would be themost desirable course for us. A Triple Alliance--Germany, England, andAmerica--has been suggested. [B] But for such a union with Germany to bepossible, England must have resolved to give a free course to Germandevelopment side by side with her own, to allow the enlargement of ourcolonial power, and to offer no political hindrances to our commercialand industrial competition. She must, therefore, have renounced hertraditional policy, and contemplate an entirely new grouping of theGreat Powers in the world. [Footnote B: "The United States and the War Cloud in Europe, " by Th. Schiemann, _McClure's Magazine_, June, 1910. ] It cannot be assumed that English pride and self-interest will consentto that. The continuous agitation against Germany, under the tacitapproval of the Government, which is kept up not only by the majority ofthe Press, but by a strong party in the country, the latest statementsof English politicians, the military preparations in the North Sea, andthe feverish acceleration of naval construction, are unmistakableindications that England intends to persist in her anti-German policy. The uncompromising hostility of England and her efforts to hinder everyexpansion of Germany's power were openly shown in the very recentMorocco question. Those who think themselves capable of impressing onthe world the stamp of their spirit, do not resign the headship withouta struggle, when they think victory is in their grasp. A pacific agreement with England is, after all, a will-o'-the-wisp whichno serious German statesman would trouble to follow. We must always keepthe possibility of war with England before our eyes, and arrange ourpolitical and military plans accordingly. We need not concern ourselveswith any pacific protestations of English politicians, publicists, andUtopians, which, prompted by the exigencies of the moment, cannot alterthe real basis of affairs. When the Unionists, with their greater fixityof purpose, replace the Liberals at the helm, we must be prepared for avigorous assertion of power by the island Empire. On the other hand, America, which indisputably plays a decisive part inEnglish policy, is a land of limitless possibilities. While, on the oneside, she insists on the Monroe doctrine, on the other she stretches outher own arms towards Asia and Africa, in order to find bases for herfleets. The United States aim at the economic and, where possible, thepolitical command of the American continent, and at the naval supremacyin the Pacific. Their interests, both economic and political, notwithstanding all commercial and other treaties, clash emphaticallywith those of Japan and England. No arbitration treaties could alter this. No similar opposition to Germany, based on the nature of things, has atpresent arisen from the ambitions of the two nations; certainly not inthe sphere of politics. So far as can be seen, an understanding withGermany ought to further the interests of America. It is unlikely thatthe Americans would welcome any considerable addition to the power ofEngland. But such would be the case if Great Britain succeeded ininflicting a political and military defeat on Germany. For a time it seemed as if the Anglo-American negotiations aboutArbitration Courts would definitely end in an alliance against Germany. There has, at any rate, been a great and widespread agitation against usin the United States. The Americans of German and Irish stock resolutelyopposed it, and it is reasonable to assume that the anti-German movementin the United States was a passing phase, with no real foundation in thenature of things. In the field of commerce there is, no doubt, keencompetition between the two countries, especially in South America;there is, however, no reason to assume that this will lead to politicalcomplications. Japan has, for the time being, a direct political interest for us onlyin her influence on the affairs of Russia, America, England, and China. In the Far East, since Japan has formed an alliance with England, andseems recently to have effected an arrangement with Russia, we have tocount more on Japanese hostility than Japanese friendship. Her attitudeto China may prove exceptionally important to our colonial possessionsin East Asia. If the two nations joined hands--a hardly probableeventuality at present--it would become difficult for us to maintain anindependent position between them. The political rivalry betweenthe two nations of yellow race must therefore be kept alive. If they areantagonistic, they will both probably look for help against each otherin their relations with Europe, and thus enable the European Powers toretain their possessions in Asia. While the aspiring Great Powers of the Far East cannot at presentdirectly influence our policy, Turkey--the predominant Power of the NearEast--is of paramount importance to us. She is our natural ally; it isemphatically our interest to keep in close touch with her. The wisestcourse would have been to have made her earlier a member of the TripleAlliance, and so to have prevented the Turco-Italian War, whichthreatens to change the whole political situation, to our disadvantage. Turkey would gain in two ways: she assures her position both againstRussia and against England--the two States, that is, with whosehostility we have to reckon. Turkey, also, is the only Power which canthreaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the shortsea-route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare nosacrifices to secure this country as an ally for the eventuality of awar with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours. It is also tothe obvious advantage of Italy that Turkey maintain her commandingposition on the Bosphorus and at the Dardanelles, that this importantkey should not be transferred to the keeping of foreigners, and belongto Russia or England. If Russia gained the access to the Mediterranean, to which she has solong aspired, she would soon become a prominent Power in its easternbasin, and thus greatly damage the Italian projects in those waters. Since the English interests, also, would be prejudiced by such adevelopment, the English fleet in the Mediterranean would certainly bestrengthened. Between England, France, and Russia it would be quiteimpossible for Italy to attain an independent or commanding position, while the opposition of Russia and Turkey leaves the field open to her. From this view of the question, therefore, it is advisable to end theTurco-Italian conflict, and to try and satisfy the justifiable wishes ofItaly at the cost of France, after the next war, it may be. Spain alone of the remaining European Powers has any independentimportance. She has developed a certain antagonism to France by herMorocco policy, and may, therefore, become eventually a factor in Germanpolicy. The petty States, on the contrary, form no independent centresof gravity, but may, in event of war, prove to possess a by no meansnegligible importance: the small Balkan States for Austria and Turkey;Denmark, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and eventually Sweden, forGermany. Switzerland and Belgium count as neutral. The former was declaredneutral at the Congress of Vienna on November 20, 1815, under thecollective guarantee [C] of the signatory Powers; Belgium, in theTreaties of London of November 15, 1831, and of April 19, 1839, on thepart of the five Great Powers, the Netherlands, and Belgium itself. [Footnote C: By a collective guarantee is understood the _duty_ of thecontracting Powers to take steps to protect this neutrality when allagree that it is menaced. Each individual Power has the _right_ tointerfere if it considers the neutrality menaced. ] If we look at these conditions as a whole, it appears that on thecontinent of Europe the power of the Central European Triple Allianceand that of the States united against it by alliance and agreementbalance each other, provided that Italy belongs to the league. If wetake into calculation the imponderabilia, whose weight can only beguessed at, the scale is inclined slightly in favour of the TripleAlliance. On the other hand, England indisputably rules the sea. Inconsequence of her crushing naval superiority when allied with France, and of the geographical conditions, she may cause the greatest damage toGermany by cutting off her maritime trade. There is also a notinconsiderable army available for a continental war. When allconsiderations are taken into account, our opponents have a politicalsuperiority not to be underestimated. If France succeeds instrengthening her army by large colonial levies and a strong Englishlanding-force, this superiority would be asserted on land also. If Italyreally withdraws from the Triple Alliance, very distinctly superiorforces will be united against Germany and Austria. Under these conditions the position of Germany is extraordinarilydifficult. We not only require for the full material development of ournation, on a scale corresponding to its intellectual importance, anextended political basis, but, as explained in the previous chapter, weare compelled to obtain space for our increasing population and marketsfor our growing industries. But at every step which we take in thisdirection England will resolutely oppose us. English policy may not yethave made the definite decision to attack us; but it doubtless wishes, by all and every means, even the most extreme, to hinder every furtherexpansion of German international influence and of German maritimepower. The recognized political aims of England and the attitude of theEnglish Government leave no doubt on this point. But if we were involvedin a struggle with England, we can be quite sure that France would notneglect the opportunity of attacking our flank. Italy, with herextensive coast-line, even if still a member of the Triple Alliance, will have to devote large forces to the defence of the coast to keep offthe attacks of the Anglo-French Mediterranean Fleet, and would thus beonly able to employ weaker forces against France. Austria would beparalyzed by Russia; against the latter we should have to leave forcesin the East. We should thus have to fight out the struggle againstFrance and England practically alone with a part of our army, perhapswith some support from Italy. It is in this double menace by sea and onthe mainland of Europe that the grave danger to our political positionlies, since all freedom of action is taken from us and all expansionbarred. Since the struggle is, as appears on a thorough investigation of theinternational question, necessary and inevitable, we must fight it out, cost what it may. Indeed, we are carrying it on at the present moment, though not with drawn swords, and only by peaceful means so far. On theone hand it is being waged by the competition in trade, industries andwarlike preparations; on the other hand, by diplomatic methods withwhich the rival States are fighting each other in every region wheretheir interests clash. With these methods it has been possible to maintain peace hitherto, butnot without considerable loss of power and prestige. This apparentlypeaceful state of things must not deceive us; we are facing a hidden, but none the less formidable, crisis--perhaps the most momentous crisisin the history of the German nation. We have fought in the last great wars for our national union and ourposition among the Powers of _Europe_; we now must decide whether wewish to develop into and maintain a _World Empire_, and procure forGerman spirit and German ideas that fit recognition which has beenhitherto withheld from them. Have we the energy to aspire to that great goal? Are we prepared to makethe sacrifices which such an effort will doubtless cost us? or are wewilling to recoil before the hostile forces, and sink step by step lowerin our economic, political, and national importance? That is what isinvolved in our decision. "To be, or not to be, " is the question which is put to us to-day, disguised, indeed, by the apparent equilibrium of the opposing interestsand forces, by the deceitful shifts of diplomacy, and the officialpeace-aspirations of all the States; but by the logic of historyinexorably demanding an answer, if we look with clear gaze beyond thenarrow horizon of the day and the mere surface of things into the regionof realities. There is no standing still in the world's history. All is growth anddevelopment. It is obviously impossible to keep things in the _statusquo_, as diplomacy has so often attempted. No true statesman will everseriously count on such a possibility; he will only make the outward andtemporary maintenance of existing conditions a duty when he wishes togain time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is thetrend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferiortools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with thepowers of a continuous development. We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standingstill, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression, and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented withour present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals arestraining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, toextend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually andadvance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged withpeaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able tocontinue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced uponus by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if ourarms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, andwe should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would besacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, andthe blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritualand moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of Germanthought--would for long ages be lost to mankind. If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such acatastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means toattain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even atthe risk of a war with numerically superior foes. Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this byacquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where Germancolonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered fromRussia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetualincitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the formerSouth Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition ofPoland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polishpopulation. Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen ourpolitical power in other ways. In the first place, our political position would be considerablyconsolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger thatFrance will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we findourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way or another _wemust square our account with France_ if we wish for a free hand in ourinternational policy. This is the first and foremost condition of asound German policy, and since the hostility of France once for allcannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled byforce of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can neveragain come across our path. Further, we must contrive every means of strengthening the politicalpower of our allies. We have already followed such a policy in the caseof Austria when we declared our readiness to protect, if necessary witharmed intervention, the final annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina byour ally on the Danube. Our policy towards Italy must follow the samelines, especially if in any Franco-German war an opportunity should bepresented of doing her a really valuable service. It is equally goodpolicy in every way to support Turkey, whose importance for Germany andthe Triple Alliance has already been discussed. Our political duties, therefore, are complicated, and during theTurco-Italian War all that we can do at first is to use our influence asmediators, and to prevent a transference of hostilities to the BalkanPeninsula. It cannot be decided at this moment whether furtherintervention will be necessary. Finally, as regards our own position inEurope, we can only effect an extension of our own political influence, in my opinion, by awakening in our weaker neighbours, through theintegrity and firmness of our policy, the conviction that theirindependence and their interests are bound up with Germany, and are bestsecured under the protection of the German arms. This conviction mighteventually lead to an enlargement of the Triple Alliance into a CentralEuropean Federation. Our military strength in Central Europe would bythis means be considerably increased, and the extraordinarilyunfavourable geographical configuration of our dominions would beessentially improved in case of war. Such a federation would be theexpression of a natural community of interests, which is founded on thegeographical and natural conditions, and would insure the durability ofthe political community based on it. We must employ other means also for the widening of our colonialterritory, so that it may be able to receive the overflow of ourpopulation. Very recent events have shown that, under certaincircumstances, it is possible to obtain districts in Equatorial Africaby pacific negotiations. A financial or political crash in Portugalmight give us the opportunity to take possession of a portion of thePortuguese colonies. We may assume that some understanding existsbetween England and Germany which contemplates a division of thePortuguese colonial possessions, but has never become _publici juris_. It cannot, indeed, be certain that England, if the contingency arrives, would be prepared honestly to carry out such a treaty, if it actuallyexists. She might find ways and means to invalidate it. It has even beenoften said, although disputed in other quarters, that Great Britain, after coming to an agreement with Germany about the partition of thePortuguese colonies, had, by a special convention, guaranteed Portugalthe possession of _all_ her colonies. Other possible schemes may be imagined, by which some extension of ourAfrican territory would be possible. These need not be discussed heremore particularly. If necessary, they must be obtained as the result ofa successful European war. In all these possible acquisitions ofterritory the point must be strictly borne in mind that we requirecountries which are climatically suited to German settlers. Now, thereare even in Central Africa large regions which are adapted to thesettlement of German farmers and stock-breeders, and part of ouroverflow population might be diverted to those parts. But, generallyspeaking, we can only obtain in tropical colonies markets for ourindustrial products and wide stretches of cultivated ground for thegrowth of the raw materials which our industries require. Thisrepresents in itself a considerable advantage, but does not release usfrom the obligation to acquire land for actual colonization. A part of our surplus population, indeed--so far as present conditionspoint--will always be driven to seek a livelihood outside the borders ofthe German Empire. Measures must be taken to the extent at least ofproviding that the German element is not split up in the world, butremains united in compact blocks, and thus forms, even in foreigncountries, political centres of gravity in our favour, markets for ourexports, and centres for the diffusion of German culture. An intensive colonial policy is for us especially an absolute necessity. It has often been asserted that a "policy of the open door" can replacethe want of colonies of our own, and must constitute our programme forthe future, just because we do not possess sufficient colonies. Thisnotion is only justified in a certain sense. In the first place, such apolicy does not offer the possibility of finding homes for the overflowpopulation in a territory of our own; next, it does not guarantee thecertainty of an open and unrestricted trade competition. It secures toall trading nations equal tariffs, but this does not imply by any meanscompetition under equal conditions. On the contrary, the political powerwhich is exercised in such a country is the determining factor in theeconomic relations. The principle of the open door prevailseverywhere--in Egypt, Manchuria, in the Congo State, in Morocco--andeverywhere the politically dominant Power controls the commerce: inManchuria Japan, in Egypt England, in the Congo State Belgium, and inMorocco France. The reason is plain. All State concessions fallnaturally to that State which is practically dominant; its products arebought by all the consumers who are any way dependent on the power ofthe State, quite apart from the fact that by reduced tariffs and similaradvantages for the favoured wares the concession of the open door can beevaded in various ways. A "policy of the open door" must at best beregarded as a makeshift, and as a complement of a vigorous colonialpolicy. The essential point is for a country to have colonies or its ownand a predominant political influence in the spheres where its marketslie. Our German world policy must be guided by these considerations. The execution of such political schemes would certainly clash with manyold-fashioned notions and vested rights of the traditional Europeanpolicy. In the first place, the principle of the balance of power inEurope, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almostsacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirelydisregarded. The idea of a balance of power was gradually developed from the feelingthat States do not exist to thwart each other, but to work together forthe advancement of culture. Christianity, which leads man beyond thelimits of the State to a world citizenship of the noblest kind, and laysthe foundation of all international law, has exercised a wide influencein this respect. Practical interests, too, have strengthened the theoryof balance of power. When it was understood that the State was a power, and that, by its nature, it must strive to extend that power, a certainguarantee of peace was supposed to exist in the balance of forces. Theconviction was thus gradually established that every State had a closecommunity of interests with the other States, with which it entered intopolitical and economic relations, and was bound to establish some sortof understanding with them. Thus the idea grew up in Europe of aState-system, which was formed after the fall of Napoleon by the fiveGreat Powers--England, France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, whichlatter had gained a place in the first rank by force of arms; in 1866Italy joined it as the sixth Great Power. "Such a system cannot be supported with an approximate equilibrium amongthe nations. " "All theory must rest on the basis of practice, and areal equilibrium--an actual equality of power--is postulated, "[D] Thiscondition does not exist between the European nations. England byherself rules the sea, and the 65, 000, 000 of Germans cannot allowthemselves to sink to the same level of power as the 40, 000, 000 ofFrench. An attempt has been made to produce a real equilibrium byspecial alliances. One result only has been obtained--the hindrance ofthe free development of the nations in general, and of Germany inparticular. This is an unsound condition. A European balance of powercan no longer be termed a condition which corresponds to the existingstate of things; it can only have the disastrous consequences ofrendering the forces of the continental European States mutuallyineffective, and of thus favouring the plans of the political powerswhich stand outside that charmed circle. It has always been England'spolicy to stir up enmity between the respective continental States, andto keep them at approximately the same standard of power, in orderherself undisturbed to conquer at once the sovereignty of the seas andthe sovereignty of the world. [Footnote D: Treitschke. ] We must put aside all such notions of equilibrium. In its presentdistorted form it is opposed to our weightiest interests. The idea of aState system which has common interests in civilization must not, ofcourse, be abandoned; but it must be expanded on a new and more justbasis. It is now not a question of a European State system, but of oneembracing all the States in the world, in which the equilibrium isestablished on real factors of power. We must endeavour to obtain inthis system our merited position at the head of a federation of CentralEuropean States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, inone way or the other, to its true value, and correspondingly to increaseour own power. A further question, suggested by the present political position, iswhether all the political treaties which were concluded at the beginningof the last century under quite other conditions--in fact, under adifferent conception of what constitutes a State--can, or ought to be, permanently observed. When Belgium was proclaimed neutral, no onecontemplated that she would lay claim to a large and valuable region ofAfrica. It may well be asked whether the acquisition of such territoryis not _ipso facto_ a breach of neutrality, for a State fromwhich--theoretically at least--all danger of war has been removed, hasno right to enter into political competition with the other States. Thisargument is the more justifiable because it may safely be assumed that, in event of a war of Germany against France and England, the two lastmentioned States would try to unite their forces in Belgium. Lastly, theneutrality of the Congo State [E] must be termed more than problematic, since Belgium claims the right to cede or sell it to a non-neutralcountry. The conception of permanent neutrality is entirely contrary tothe essential nature of the State, which can only attain its highestmoral aims in competition with other States. Its complete developmentpresupposes such competition. [Footnote E: The Congo State was proclaimed neutral, but withoutguarantees, by Acts of February 26, 1885. ] Again, the principle that no State can ever interfere in the internalaffairs of another State is repugnant to the highest rights of theState. This principle is, of course, very variously interpreted, andpowerful States have never refrained from a higher-handed interferencein the internal affairs of smaller ones. We daily witness instances ofsuch conduct. Indeed, England quite lately attempted to interfere in theprivate affairs of Germany, not formally or by diplomatic methods, butnone the less in point of fact, on the subject of our navalpreparations. It is, however, accepted as a principle of internationalintercourse that between the States of one and the same political systema strict non-interference in home affairs should be observed. Theunqualified recognition of this principle and its application topolitical intercourse under all conditions involves seriousdifficulties. It is the doctrine of the Liberals, which was firstpreached in France in 1830, and of which the English Ministry of LordPalmerston availed themselves for their own purpose. Equally false isthe doctrine of unrestricted intervention, as promulgated by the Statesof the Holy Alliance at Troppau in 1820. No fixed principles forinternational politics can be laid down. After all, the relation of States to each other is that of individuals;and as the individual can decline the interference of others in hisaffairs, so naturally, the same right belongs to the State. Above theindividual, however, stands the authority of the State, which regulatesthe relations of the citizens to each other. But no one stands above theState, which regulates the relations of the citizens to each other. Butno one stands above the State; it is sovereign and must itself decidewhether the internal conditions or measures of another state menace itsown existence or interests. In no case, therefore, may a sovereign Staterenounce the right of interfering in the affairs of other States, shouldcircumstances demand. Cases may occur at any time, when the partydisputes or the preparations of the neighboring country becomes a threatto the existence of a State. "It can only be asserted that every Stateacts at its own risk when it interferes in the internal affairs ofanother State, and that experience shows how very dangerous such aninterference may become. " On the other hand, it must be remembered thatthe dangers which may arise from non-intervention are occasionally stillgraver, and that the whole discussion turns, not on an internationalright, but simply and solely on power and expediency. I have gone closely into these questions of international policybecause, under conditions which are not remote, they may greatlyinfluence the realization of our necessary political aspirations, andmay give rise to hostile complications. Then it becomes essential thatwe do not allow ourselves to be cramped in our freedom of action byconsiderations, devoid of any inherent political necessity, which onlydepend on political expediency, and are not binding on us. We mustremain conscious in all such eventualities that we cannot, under anycircumstances, avoid fighting for our position in the world, and thatthe all-important point is, not to postpone that war as long aspossible, but to bring it on under the most favourable conditionspossible. "No man, " so wrote Frederick the Great to Pitt on July 3, 1761, "if he has a grain of sense, will leave his enemies leisure tomake all preparations in order to destroy him; he will rather takeadvantage of his start to put himself in a favourable position. " If we wish to act in this spirit of prompt and effective policy whichguided the great heroes of our past, we must learn to concentrate ourforces, and not to dissipate them in centrifugal efforts. The political and national development of the German people has always, so far back as German history extends, been hampered and hindered by thehereditary defects of its character--that is, by the particularism ofthe individual races and States, the theoretic dogmatism of the parties, the incapacity to sacrifice personal interests for great nationalobjects from want of patriotism and of political common sense, often, also, by the pettiness of the prevailing ideas. Even to-day it ispainful to see how the forces of the German nation, which are sorestricted and confined in their activities abroad, are wasted infruitless quarrels among themselves. Our primary and most obvious moral and political duty is to overcomethese hereditary failings, and to lay a secure foundation for a healthy, consistent development of our power. It must not be denied that the variety of forms of intellectual andsocial life arising from the like variety of the German nationality andpolitical system offers valuable advantages. It presents countlesscentres for the advancement of science, art, technical skill, and a highspiritual and material way of life in a steadily increasing development. But we must resist the converse of these conditions, the transference ofthis richness in variety and contrasts into the domain of politics. Above all must we endeavour to confirm and consolidate the institutionswhich are calculated to counteract and concentrate the centrifugalforces of the German nature--the common system of defence of our countryby land and sea, in which all party feeling is merged, and a strongnational empire. No people is so little qualified as the German to direct its owndestinies, whether in a parliamentarian or republican constitution; tono people is the customary liberal pattern so inappropriate as to us. Aglance at the Reichstag will show how completely this conviction, whichis forced on us by a study of German history, holds good to-day. The German people has always been incapable of great acts for the commoninterest except under the irresistible pressure of external conditions, as in the rising of 1813, or under the leadership of powerfulpersonalities, who knew how to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses, tostir the German spirit to its depths, to vivify the idea of nationality, and force conflicting aspirations into concentration and union. We must therefore take care that such men are assured the possibility ofacting with a confident and free hand in order to accomplish great endsthrough and for our people. Within these limits, it is in harmony with the national German characterto allow personality to have a free course for the fullest developmentof all individual forces and capacities, of all spiritual, scientific, and artistic aims. "Every extension of the activities of the State isbeneficial and wise, if it arouses, promotes, and purifies theindependence of free and reasoning men; it is evil when it kills andstunts the independence of free men. " [F] This independence of theindividual, within the limits marked out by the interests of the State, forms the necessary complement of the wide expansion of the centralpower, and assures an ample scope to a liberal development of all oursocial conditions. [Footnote F: Treitschke, "Politik, " i. , Section 2. ] We must rouse in our people the unanimous wish for power in this sense, together with the determination to sacrifice on the altar of patriotism, not only life and property, but also private views and preferences inthe interests of the common welfare. Then alone shall we discharge ourgreat duties of the future, grow into a World Power, and stamp a greatpart of humanity with the impress of the German spirit. If, on thecontrary, we persist in that dissipation of energy which now marks ourpolitical life, there is imminent fear that in the great contest of thenations, which we must inevitably face, we shall be dishonourablybeaten; that days of disaster await us in the future, and that onceagain, as in the days of our former degradation, the poet's lament willbe heard: "O Germany, thy oaks still stand, But thou art fallen, glorious land!" KÖRNER. CHAPTER VI THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ARMING FOR WAR Germany has great national and historical duties of policy and cultureto fulfil, and her path towards further progress is threatened byformidable enmities. If we realize this, we shall see that it will beimpossible to maintain our present position and secure our futurewithout an appeal to arms. Knowing this, as every man must who impartially considers the politicalsituation, we are called upon to prepare ourselves as well as possiblefor this war. The times are passed when a stamp of the foot raised anarmy, or when it was sufficient to levy the masses and lead them tobattle. The armaments of the present day must be prepared in peace-timedown to the smallest detail, if they are to be effective in time ofneed. Although this fact is known, the sacrifices which are required forwarlike preparations are no longer so willingly made as the gravity ofthe situation demands. Every military proposal is bitterly contested inthe Reichstag, frequently in a very petty spirit, and no one seems tounderstand that an unsuccessful war would involve our nation in economicmisery, with which the most burdensome charges for the army (and thesefor the most part come back again into the coffers of the country)cannot for an instant be compared. A victorious war, on the other hand, brings countless advantages to the conqueror, and, as our last greatwars showed, forms a new departure in economic progress. The fact isoften forgotten that military service and the observance of the nationalduty of bearing arms are in themselves a high moral gain for ourpeople, and improve the strength and capacity for work. Nor can it beignored that a nation has other than merely economic duties todischarge. I propose to discuss the question, what kind and degree ofpreparation for war the great historical crisis through which we arepassing demands from us. First, however, it will be profitable toconsider the importance of preparations for war generally, and not somuch from the purely military as from the social and political aspect;we shall thus strengthen the conviction that we cannot serve the trueinterests of the country better than by improving its militarycapabilities. Preparation for war has a double task to discharge. Firstly, it mustmaintain and raise the military capabilities of the nation as a nationalasset; and, secondly, it must make arrangements for the conduct of thewar and supply the requisite means. This capability of national defence has a pronounced educative value innational development. As in the social competition the persons able to protect themselves holdthe field--the persons, that is, who, well equipped intellectually, donot shirk the contest, but fight it out with confidence and certainty ofvictory--so in the rivalry of nations and States victory rests with thepeople able to defend itself, which boldly enters the lists, and iscapable of wielding the sword with success. Military service not only educates nations in warlike capacity, but itdevelops the intellectual and moral qualities generally for theoccupations of peace. It educates a man to the full mastery of his body, to the exercise and improvement of his muscles; it develops his mentalpowers, his self-reliance and readiness of decision; it accustoms him toorder and subordination for a common end; it elevates his self-respectand courage, and thus his capacity for every kind of work. It is a quite perverted view that the time devoted to military servicedeprives economic life of forces which could have been moreappropriately and more profitably employed elsewhere. These forces arenot withdrawn from economic life, but are trained for economic life. Military training produces intellectual and moral forces which richlyrepay the time spent, and have their real value in subsequent life. Itis therefore the moral duty of the State to train as many of itscountrymen as possible in the use of arms, not only with the prospect ofwar, but that they may share in the benefits of military service andimprove their physical and moral capacities of defence. The sums whichthe State applies to the military training of the nation are distinctlyan outlay for social purposes; the money so spent serves social andeducative ends, and raises the nation spiritually and morally; it thuspromotes the highest aims of civilization more directly thanachievements of mechanics, industries, trades, and commerce, whichcertainly discharge the material duties of culture by improving thenational livelihood and increasing national wealth, but bring with thema number of dangers, such as craving for pleasure and tendency toluxury, thus slackening the moral and productive fibres of the nations. Military service as an educational instrument stands on the same levelas the school, and, as will be shown in a later section, each mustcomplete and assist the other. But a people which does not willinglybear the duties and sacrifices entailed by school and military servicerenounces its will to live, and sacrifices objects which are noble andassure the future for the sake of material advantages which areone-sided and evanescent. It is the duty, therefore, of every State, conscious of its obligationstowards civilization and society, remorselessly to put an end to alltendencies inimical to the full development of the power of defence. Themethod by which the maintenance and promotion of this defensive powercan be practically carried out admits of great variety. It dependslargely on the conditions of national life, on the geographical andpolitical circumstances, as well as on past history, and consequentlyranges between very wide extremes. In the Boer States, as among most uncivilized peoples, the militarytraining was almost exclusively left to the individual. That wassufficient to a certain point, since their method of life in itself madethem familiar with carrying arms and with riding, and inured them tohard bodily exertions. The higher requirements of combination, subordination, and campaigning, could not be met by such a militarysystem, and the consequences of this were felt disastrously in theconduct of the war. In Switzerland and other States an attempt is madeto secure national defence by a system of militia, and to take accountof political possibilities. The great European States maintain standingarmies in which all able-bodied citizens have to pass a longer orshorter period of military training. England alone keeps up a mercenaryarmy, and by the side of it a territorial army, whose ranks are filledby volunteers. In these various ways different degrees of military efficiency areobtained, but, generally, experience shows that the more thorough andintelligent this training in arms, the greater the development of therequisite military qualities in the units; and the more these qualitiesbecome a second nature, the more complete will be their warlike efficiency. When criticizing the different military systems, we must remember thatwith growing civilization the requisite military capacities are alwayschanging. The duties expected from the Roman legionary or the soldierswho fought in line under Frederick the Great were quite different fromthose of the rifleman and cavalryman of to-day. Not merely have thephysical functions of military service altered, but the moral qualitiesexpected from the fighting man are altered. This applies to theindividual soldier as much as to the whole army. The character ofwarfare has continually been changing. To fight in the Middle Ages or inthe eighteenth century with comparatively small forces was one thing; itis quite another to handle the colossal armies of to-day. Thepreparations for war, therefore, in the social as well as militarysense, must be quite different in a highly developed modern civilizedState from those in countries, standing on a lower level ofcivilization, where ordinary life is full of military elements, and waris fought under relatively simple conditions. The crushing superiority of civilized States over people with a lessdeveloped civilization and military system is due to this altered formof military efficiency. It was thus that Japan succeeded in raisingherself in a brief space to the supremacy in Eastern Asia. She now reapsin the advancement of her culture what she sowed on the battlefield, andproves once again the immeasurable importance, in its social andeducational aspects, of military efficiency. Our own country, byemploying its military powers, has attained a degree of culture which itnever could have reached by the methods of peaceful development. When we regard the change in the nature of military efficiency, we findourselves on ground where the social duty of maintaining the physicaland moral power of the nation to defend itself comes into direct contactwith the political duty of preparing for warfare itself. A great variety of procedure is possible, and actually exists, in regardto the immediate preparations for war. This is primarily expressed inthe choice of the military system, but it is manifested in various otherways. We see the individual States--according to their geographicalposition, their relations to other States and the military strength oftheir neighbours, according to their historic claims and their greateror less importance in the political system of the world--making theirmilitary preparations with more or less energy, earnestness, andexpenditure. When we consider the complex movements of the life ofcivilized nations, the variety of its aims and the multiplicity of itsemotions, we must agree that the growth or decrease of armaments iseverywhere affected by these considerations. War is only a _means_ ofattaining political ends and of supporting moral strength. Thus, if England attaches most weight to her navy, her insular positionand the wide oversea interests which she must protect thoroughly justifyher policy. If, on the other hand, England develops her land forces onlywith the objects of safeguarding the command of her colonies, repellinga very improbable hostile invasion, and helping an allied Power in acontinental war, the general political situation explains the reason. Asa matter of fact, England can never be involved in a great continentalEuropean war against her will. So Switzerland, which has been declared neutral by political treaties, and can therefore only take the field if she is attacked, rightly laysmost stress on the social importance of military service, and tries todevelop a scheme of defence which consists mainly in increasing thesecurity afforded by her own mountains. The United States of America, again, are justified in keeping their land forces within very modestlimits, while devoting their energies to the increase of their navalpower. No enemy equal to them in strength can ever spring up on thecontinent of America; they need not fear the invasion of anyconsiderable forces. On the other hand, they are threatened by overseaconflicts, of epoch-making importance, with the yellow race, which hasacquired formidable strength opposite their western coast, and possiblywith their great trade rival England, which has, indeed, often madeconcessions, but may eventually see herself compelled to fight for herposition in the world. While in some States a restriction of armaments is natural andjustifiable, it is easily understood that France must strain every nerveto secure her full recognition among the great military nations ofEurope. Her glorious past history has fostered in her great politicalpretensions which she will not abandon without a struggle, although theyare no longer justified by the size of her population and herinternational importance. France affords a conspicuous example ofself-devotion to ideals and of a noble conception of political and moralduties. In the other European States, as in France, external politicalconditions and claims, in combination with internal politics, regulatethe method and extent of warlike preparations, and their attitude, whichnecessity forces upon them, must be admitted to carry its ownjustification. A State may represent a compact unity, from the point of view ofnationality and civilization; it may have great duties to discharge inthe development of human culture, and may possess the national strengthto safeguard its independence, to protect its own interests, and, undercertain circumstances, to persist in its civilizing mission andpolitical schemes in defiance of other nations. Another State may bedeficient in the conditions of individual national life and in elementsof culture; it may lack the resources necessary for the defence andmaintenance of its political existence single-handed in the teeth of allopposition. There is a vast difference between these two cases. A State like the latter is always more or less dependent on thefriendliness of stronger neighbours, whether it ranks in public law asfully independent or has been proclaimed neutral by internationalconventions. If it is attacked on one side, it must count on supportfrom the other. Whether it shall continue to exist as a State and underwhat conditions must depend on the result of the ensuing war and theconsequent political position--factors that lie wholly outside its ownsphere of power. This being the case, the question may well be put whether such a Stateis politically justified in requiring from its citizens in time of peacethe greatest military efforts and correspondingly large pecuniaryexpenditure. It will certainly have to share the contest in which it isitself, perhaps, the prize, and theoretically will do best to have thelargest possible military force at its disposal. But there is anotheraspect of the question which is at least arguable. The fighting power ofsuch a State may be so small that it counts for nothing in comparisonwith the millions of a modern army. On the other hand, where appreciablemilitary strength exists, it may be best not to organize the army with aview to decisive campaigning, but to put the social objects of militarypreparation into the foreground, and to adopt in actual warfare adefensive policy calculated to gain time, with a view to the subsequentinterference of the prospective allies with whom the ultimate decisionwill rest. Such an army must, if it is to attain its object, represent areal factor of strength. It must give the probable allies that effectiveaddition of strength which may insure a superiority over the antagonist. The ally must then be forced to consider the interests of such secondaryState. The forces of the possible allies will thus exercise a certaininfluence on the armament of the State, in combination with the localconditions, the geographical position, and the natural configuration ofthe country. It is only to be expected that, since such various conditions exist, theutmost variety should also prevail among the military systems; and suchis, in fact, the case. In the mountain stronghold of Switzerland, which has to reckon with thepolitical and military circumstances of Germany, France, and Italy, preparations for war take a different shape from those of Holland, situated on the coast and secured by numerous waterways, whose politicalindependence is chiefly affected by the land forces of Germany and thenavy of England. The conditions are quite otherwise for a country which relies wholly onits own power. The power of the probable antagonists and of the presumable allies willhave a certain importance for it, and its Government will in its plans andmilitary preparations pay attention to their grouping and attitudes;but these preparations must never be motived by such considerationsalone. The necessity for a strong military force is permanent andunqualified; the political permutations and combinations are endless, and the assistance of possible allies is always an uncertain andshifting factor, on which no reliance can be reposed. The military power of an independent State in the true sense mustguarantee the maintenance of a force sufficient to protect the interestsof a great civilized nation and to secure to it the necessary freedom ofdevelopment. If from the social standpoint no sacrifice can beconsidered too great which promotes the maintenance of national militaryefficiency, the increase in these sacrifices due to political conditionsmust be willingly and cheerfully borne, in consideration of the objectthereby to be gained. This object--of which each individual must beconscious--if conceived in the true spirit of statesmanship, comprisesthe conditions which are decisive for the political and moral future ofthe State as well as for the livelihood of each individual citizen. A civilization which has a value of its own, and thus forms a vitalfactor in the development of mankind, can only flourish where all thehealthy and stimulating capacities of a nation find ample scope ininternational competition. This is also an essential condition for theunhindered and vigorous exercise of individual activities. Where thenatural capacity for growth is permanently checked by externalcircumstances, nation and State are stunted and individual growth is setback. Increasing political power and the consequent multiplication ofpossibilities of action constitute the only healthy soil for theintellectual and moral strength of a vigorous nation, as is shown byevery phase of history. The wish for culture must therefore in a healthy nation express itselffirst in terms of the wish for political power, and the foremost duty ofstatesmanship is to attain, safeguard, and promote this power, by forceof arms in the last resort. Thus the first and most essential duty ofevery great civilized people is to prepare for war on a scalecommensurate with its political needs. Even the superiority of the enemycannot absolve from the performance of this requirement. On thecontrary, it must stimulate to the utmost military efforts and the moststrenuous political action in order to secure favourable conditions forthe eventuality of a decisive campaign. Mere numbers count for less thanever in modern fighting, although they always constitute a veryimportant factor of the total strength. But, within certain limits, which are laid down by the law of numbers, the true elements ofsuperiority under the present system of gigantic armies are seen to bespiritual and moral strength, and larger masses will be beaten by asmall, well-led and self-devoting army. The Russo-Japanese War hasproved this once more. Granted that the development of military strength is the first duty ofevery State, since all else depends upon the possibility to assert_power_, it does not follow that the State must spend the total of itspersonal and financial resources solely on military strength in thenarrower sense of army and navy. That is neither feasible norprofitable. The military power of a people is not exclusively determinedby these external resources; it consists, rather, in a harmoniousdevelopment of physical, spiritual, moral, financial, and militaryelements of strength. The highest and most effective military systemcannot be developed except by the co-operation of all these factors. Itneeds a broad and well-constructed basis in order to be effective. Inthe Manchurian War at the critical moment, when the Japanese attackingstrength seemed spent, the Russian military system broke down, becauseits foundation was unstable; the State had fallen into political andmoral ruin, and the very army was tainted with revolutionary ideas. The social requirement of maintaining military efficiency, and thepolitical necessity for so doing, determine the nature and degree ofwarlike preparations; but it must be remembered that this standard maybe very variously estimated, according to the notion of what the State'sduties are. Thus, in Germany the most violent disputes burst outwhenever the question of the organization of the military forces isbrought up, since widely different opinions prevail about the duties ofthe State and of the army. It is, indeed, impossible so to formulate and fix the political dutiesof the State that they cannot be looked at from another standpoint. Thesocial democrat, to whom agitation is an end in itself, will see theduty of the State in a quite different light from the political_dilettante_, who lives from hand to mouth, without making the bearingof things clear to himself, or from the sober Statesman who looks to thewelfare of the community and keeps his eyes fixed on the distant beaconson the horizon of the future. Certain points of view, however, may be laid down, which, based on thenature of things, check to some degree any arbitrary decision on thesemomentous questions, and are well adapted to persuade calm andexperienced thinkers. First, it must be observed that military power cannot be improvised inthe present political world, even though all the elements for it arepresent. Although the German Empire contains 65, 000, 000 inhabitants, compared to40, 000, 000 of French, this excess in population represents merely somuch dead capital, unless a corresponding majority of recruits areannually enlisted, and unless in peace-time the necessary machinery isset up for their organization. The assumption that these masses would beavailable for the army in the moment of need is a delusion. It would notmean a strengthening, but a distinct weakening, of the army, not to saya danger, if these untrained masses were at a crisis suddenly sent onactive service. Bourbaki's campaign shows what is to be expected fromsuch measures. Owing to the complexity of all modern affairs, thecontinuous advance in technical skill and in the character of warlikeweapons, as also in the increased requirements expected from theindividual, long and minute preparations are necessary to procure thehighest military values. Allusion has already been made to this at thebeginning of this chapter. It takes a year to complete a 30-centimetrecannon. If it is to be ready for use at a given time, it must have beenordered long beforehand. Years will pass before the full effect of thestrengthening of the army, which is now being decided on, appears in therolls of the Reserve and the Landwehr. The recruit who begins hisservice to-day requires a year's training to become a useful soldier. With the hasty training of substitute reservists and such expedients, wemerely deceive ourselves as to the necessity of serious preparations. Wemust not regard the present only, but provide for the future. The same argument applies to the political conditions. The man who makesthe bulk of the preparations for war dependent on the shifting changesof the politics of the day, who wishes to slacken off in the work ofarming because no clouds in the political horizon suggest the necessityof greater efforts, acts contrary to all real statesmanship, and issinning against his country. The moment does not decide; the great political aspirations, oppositions, and tensions, which are based on the nature ofthings--these turn the scale. When King William at the beginning of the sixties of the last centuryundertook the reorganization of the Prussian army, no political tensionexisted. The crisis of 1859 had just subsided. But the King hadperceived that the Prussian armament was insufficient to meet therequirements of the future. After a bitter struggle he extorted from hispeople a reorganization of the army, and this laid the foundationswithout which the glorious progress of our State would never have begun. In the same true spirit of statesmanship the Emperor William II. Haspowerfully aided and extended the evolution of our fleet, without beingunder the stress of any political necessity; he has enjoyed the cheerfulco-operation of his people, since the reform at which he aimed wasuniversally recognized as an indisputable need of the future, andaccorded with traditional German sentiment. While the preparation for war must be completed irrespectively of thepolitical influences of the day, the military power of the probableopponents marks a limit below which the State cannot sink withoutjeopardizing the national safety. Further, the State is bound to enlist in its service all the discoveriesof modern science, so far as they can be applied to warfare, since allthese methods and engines of war, should they be exclusively in thehands of the enemy, would secure him a distinct superiority. It is anobvious necessity to keep the forces which can be put into the field asup-to-date as possible, and to facilitate their military operations byevery means which science and mechanical skill supply. Further, the armymust be large enough to constitute a school for the whole nation, inwhich a thoroughgoing and no mere superficial military efficiency may beattained. Finally, the nature of the preparation for war is to some degreeregulated by the political position of the State. If the State hassatisfied its political ambitions and is chiefly concerned with keepingits place, the military policy will assume a more or less defensivecharacter. States, on the other hand, which are still desirous ofexpansion, or such as are exposed to attacks on different sides, mustadopt a predominantly offensive military system. Preparations for war in this way follow definite lines, which aredictated by necessity and circumstances; but it is evident that a widescope is still left for varieties of personal opinion, especially wherethe discussion includes the positive duties of the State, which may leadto an energetic foreign policy, and thus possibly to an offensive war, and where very divergent views exist as to the preparation for war. Inthis case the statesman's only resource is to use persuasion, and to soclearly expound and support his conceptions of the necessary policy thatthe majority of the nation accept his view. There are always andeverywhere conditions which have a persuasive character of their own, and appeal to the intellects and the feelings of the masses. Every Englishman is convinced of the necessity to maintain the commandof the sea, since he realizes that not only the present powerfulposition of the country, but also the possibility of feeding thepopulation in case of war, depend on it. No sacrifice for the fleet istoo great, and every increase of foreign navies instantly disquietspublic opinion. The whole of France, except a few anti-military circles, feels the necessity of strengthening the position of the State, whichwas shaken by the defeats of 1870-71, through redoubled exertions in themilitary sphere, and this object is being pursued with exemplaryunanimity. Even in neutral Switzerland the feeling that political independencerests less on international treaties than on the possibility ofself-defence is so strong and widespread that the nation willinglysupports heavy taxation for its military equipment. In Germany, also, itshould be possible to arouse a universal appreciation of the greatduties of the State, if only our politicians, without any diplomaticevasion, which deceives no one abroad and is harmful to the people athome, disclosed the true political situation and the necessary objectsof our policy. To be sure, they must be ready to face a struggle with public opinion, as King William I. Did: for when public opinion does not stand under thecontrol of a master will or a compelling necessity, it can be led astraytoo easily by the most varied influences. This danger is particularlygreat in a country so torn asunder internally and externally as Germany. He who in such a case listens to public opinion runs a danger ofinflicting immense harm on the interests of State and people. One of the fundamental principles of true statesmanship is thatpermanent interests should never be abandoned or prejudiced for the sakeof momentary advantages, such as the lightening of the burdens of thetaxpayer, the temporary maintenance of peace, or suchlike speciousbenefits, which, in the course of events, often prove distinctdisadvantages. The statesman, therefore, led astray neither by popular opinion nor bythe material difficulties which have to be surmounted, nor by thesacrifices required of his countrymen, must keep these objects carefullyin view. So long as it seems practicable he will try to reconcile theconflicting interests and bring them into harmony with his own. Butwhere great fundamental questions await decision, such as the actualenforcement of universal service or of the requirements on whichreadiness for war depends, he must not shrink from strong measures inorder to create the forces which the State needs, or will need, in orderto maintain its vitality. One of the most essential political duties is to initiate and sanctionpreparations for war on a scale commensurate with the existingconditions; to organize them efficiently is the duty of the militaryauthorities--a duty which belongs in a sense to the sphere of strategy, since it supplies the machinery with which commanders have to reckon. Policy and strategy touch in this sphere. Policy has a strategic duty toperform, since it sanctions preparations for war and defines their limit. It would, therefore, be a fatal and foolish act of political weakness todisregard the military and strategic standpoint, and to make the bulk ofthe preparations for war dependent on the financial moans momentarilyavailable. "No expenditure without security, " runs the formula in whichthis policy clothes itself. It is justified only when the security isfixed by the expenditure. In a great civilized State it is the dutieswhich must be fulfilled--as Treitschke, our great historian and nationalpolitician, tells us--that determine the expenditure, and the greatFinance Minister is not the man who balances the national accounts bysparing the national forces, while renouncing the politicallyindispensable outlay, but he who stimulates all the live forces of thenation to cheerful activity, and so employs them for national ends thatthe State revenue suffices to meet the admitted political demands. Hecan only attain this purpose if he works in harmony with the Ministersfor Commerce, Agriculture, Industries, and Colonies, in order to breakdown the restrictions which cramp the enterprise and energy of theindividual, to make all dead values remunerative, and to createfavourable conditions for profitable business. A great impulse mustthrill the whole productive and financial circles of the State, if theduties of the present and the future are to be fulfilled. Thus the preparation for war, which, under modern conditions, calls forvery considerable expenditure, exercises a marked influence on theentire social and political life of the people and on the financialpolicy of the State. CHAPTER VII THE CHARACTER OF OUR NEXT WAR The social necessity of maintaining the power of the nation to defenditself, the political claims which the State puts forward, the strengthof the probable hostile combinations, are the chief factors whichdetermine the conditions of preparation for war. I have already tried to explain and formulate the duties in the spheresof policy and progress which our history and our national characterimpose on us. My next task is to observe the possible militarycombinations which we must be prepared to face. In this way only can we estimate the dangers which threaten us, and canjudge whether, and to what degree, we can carry out our politicalintentions. A thorough understanding of these hostile counter-movementswill give us a clear insight into the character of the next war; andthis war will decide our future. It is not sufficient to know the military fighting forces of ourprobable antagonists, although this knowledge constitutes the necessarybasis for further inquiry; but we must picture to ourselves theintensity of the hostility with which we have to reckon and the probableefficiency of oar enemies. The hostility which we must anticipate isdetermined by the extent to which mutual political schemes and ambitionsclash, and by the opposition in national character. Our opinion as tothe military efficiency of our rivals must be based on the latest dataavailable. If we begin by looking at the forces of the individual States and groupsof States which may be hostile to us, we have the following results:According to the recent communications of the French Finance MinisterKlotz (in a speech made at the unveiling of a war memorial in Issoudan), the strength of the French army on a peace footing in the year 1910amounted in round figures to 580, 000 men. This included the "ColonialCorps, " stationed in France itself, which, in case of war, belongs tothe field army in the European theatre of war, and the "Serviceauxiliaire "--that is, some 30, 000 non-efficients, who are drafted infor service without arms. The entire war establishment, according to theinformation of the same Minister, including field army and reserves, consists of 2, 800, 000 men available on mobilization. A reduction fromthis number must be made in event of mobilization, which French sourcesput down at 20 per cent. The whole strength of the French field army andreserves may therefore be reckoned at some 2, 300, 000. To this must be added, as I rather from the same source, 1, 700, 000Territorials, with their "reserve, " from which a reduction of 25 percent. , or roughly 450, 000 men, must be made. If it is assumed that, in case of war, the distribution of the arms willcorrespond to that in peace, the result is, on the basis of the strengthof separate arms, which the Budget of 1911 anticipates, that out of the2, 300, 000 field and reserve troops there must be assigned--to theinfantry, about 1, 530. 000; to the cavalry, about 230, 000 (since aconsiderable part of the reservists of these arms are employed in thetransport service); to the artillery, about 380, 000; to the pioneers, 70, 000: to train and administration services (trains, columns, medicalservice, etc. ), 90, 000. No further increase in these figures is possible, since in France 90 percent, of all those liable to serve have been called up, and thebirth-rate is steadily sinking. While in 1870 it reached 940, 000 yearly, it has sunk in 1908 to 790. 000. Recourse already has been had to theexpedient of requiring smaller qualifications than before, and offilling the numerous subsidiary posts (clerks, waiters, etc. ) with lessefficient men, in order to relieve the troops themselves. Under these conditions, it was necessary to tap new sources, and theplan has been formed of increasing the troops with native-born Algeriansand Tunisians, in order to be able to strengthen the European army withthem in event of war. At the same time negroes, who are excellent andtrustworthy material, are to be enrolled in West Africa. A limitedconscription, such as exists in Tunis, is to be introduced into Algeria. The black army is at first to be completed by volunteers, andconscription will only be enforced at a crisis. These black troops arein the first place to garrison Algeria and Tunis, to release the troopsstationed there for service in Europe, and to protect the white settlersagainst the natives. Since the negroes raised for military service areheathen, it is thought that they will be a counterpoise to theMohammedan natives. It has been proved that negro troops stand theclimate of North Africa excellently, and form very serviceable troops. The two black battalions stationed in the Schauja, who took part in themarch to Fez, bore the climate well, and thoroughly proved their value. There can be no doubt that this plan will be vigorously prosecuted, withevery prospect of success. It is so far in an early stage. Legislativeproposals on the use of the military resources offered by the nativeAlgerians and the West African negroes have not yet been laid beforeParliament by the Government. It cannot yet be seen to what extent thenative and black troops will be increased. The former Minister of War, Messimy, had advocated a partial conscription of the native Algerians. An annual muster is made of the Algerian males of eighteen years of ageavailable for military service. The Commission appointed for the purposereported in 1911 that, after the introduction of the limited service inthe army and the reserve, there would be in Algeria and Tunisia combinedsome 100, 000 to 120, 000 native soldiers available in war-time. Theycould also be employed in Europe, and are thus intended to strengthenthe Rhine army by three strong army corps of first-class troops, who, inthe course of years, may probably be considerably increased by theformation of reserves. As regards the black troops, the matter is different. France, in herWest African possessions combined, has some 16, 000 negro troopsavailable. As the black population numbers 10, 000, 000 to 12, 000, 000, these figures may be considerably raised. Since May, 1910, there has been an experimental battalion of Senegalesesharp-shooters in Southern Algeria, and in the draft War Budget for 1912a proposal was made to transfer a second battalion of Senegalese toAlgeria. The conclusion is forced upon us that the plan of sending blacktroops in larger numbers to Algeria will be vigorously prosecuted. Thereis, however, no early probability of masses of black troops beingtransported to North Africa, since there are not at present a sufficientnumber of trained men available. The Senegalese Regiments 1, 2 and 3, stationed in Senegambia, are hardly enough to replace and complete theSenegalese troops quartered in the other African colonies of France. Although there is no doubt that France is in a position to raise astrong black army, the probability that black divisions will beavailable for a European war is still remote. But it cannot bequestioned that they will be so some day. Still less is any immediate employment of native Moroccan troops inEurope contemplated. Morocco possesses very good native warriors, butthe Sultan exerts effective sovereignty only over a part of theterritory termed "Morocco. " There cannot be, therefore, for years tocome any question of employing this fighting material on a large scale. The French and Moroccan Governments are for the moment occupied inorganizing a serviceable Sultan's army of 20, 000 men to secure thecommand of the country and to release the French troops in Morocco. The annexation of Morocco may for the time being mean no great additionto military strength; but, as order is gradually established, thecountry will prove to be an excellent recruiting depot, and France willcertainly use this source of power with all her accustomed energy inmilitary matters. For the immediate future we have, therefore, only to reckon with thereinforcements of the French European army which can be obtained fromAlgeria and Tunisia, so soon as the limited system of conscription isuniversally adopted there. This will supply a minimum of 120, 000men, and the tactical value of these troops is known to any who havewitnessed their exploits on the battlefields of Weissenburg and Wörth. At least one strong division of Turcos is already available. Next to the French army, we are chiefly concerned with the militarypower of Russia. Since the peace and war establishments are notpublished, it is hard to obtain accurate statistics; no information isforthcoming as to the strength of the various branches of the service, but the totals of the army may be calculated approximately. According tothe recruiting records of the last three years, the strength of theRussian army on a peace footing amounts to 1, 346, 000 men, inclusive ofCossacks and Frontier Guards. Infantry and sharp-shooters are formedinto 37 army corps (1 Guards, 1 Grenadiers, and 25 army corps in Europe;3 Caucasian, 2 Turkistanian, and 5 Siberian corps). The cavalry isdivided into divisions, independent brigades, and separate independentregiments. In war, each army corps consists of 2 divisions, and is in round figures42, 000 strong; each infantry division contains 2 brigades, at a strengthof 20, 000. Each sharp-shooter brigade is about 9, 000 strong, the cavalrydivisions about 4, 500 strong. On the basis of these numbers, we arriveat a grand total of 1, 800, 000 for all the army corps, divisions, sharp-shooter brigades, and cavalry divisions. To this must be addedunattached troops and troops on frontier or garrison duty, so that thewar strength of the standing army can be reckoned at some 2, 000, 000. This grand total is not all available in a European theatre of war. TheSiberian and Turkistanian army corps must be deducted, as they wouldcertainly be left in the interior and on the eastern frontier. For themaintenance of order in the interior, it would probably be necessary toleave the troops in Finland, the Guards at St. Petersburg, at least onedivision at Moscow, and the Caucasian army corps in the Caucasus. Thiswould mean a deduction of thirteen army corps, or 546, 000 men; so thatwe have to reckon with a field army, made up of the standing army, 1, 454, 000 men strong. To this must be added about 100 regiments ofCossacks of the Second and Third Ban, which may be placed at 50, 000 men, and the reserve and Empire-defence formations to be set on foot in caseof war. For the formation of reserves, there are sufficient trained menavailable to constitute a reserve division of the first and second rankfor each corps respectively. These troops, if each division is assumedto contain 20, 000 men, would be 1, 480, 000 men strong. Of course, acertain reduction must be made in these figures. Also it is not knownwhich of these formations would be really raised in event ofmobilization. In any case, there will be an enormous army ready to beput into movement for a great war. After deducting all the forces whichmust be left behind in the interior, a field army of 2, 000, 000 men couldeasily be organized in Europe. It cannot be stated for certain whetherarms, equipment, and ammunition for such a host can be supplied insufficient quantity. But it will be best not to undervalue an Empirelike Russia in this respect. Quite another picture is presented to us when we turn our attention toEngland, the third member of the Triple Entente. The British Empire is divided from the military point of view into twodivisions: into the United Kingdom itself with the Colonies governed bythe English Cabinet, and the self-governing Colonies. These latter haveat their disposal a militia, which is sometimes only in process offormation. They can be completely ignored so far as concerns anyEuropean theatre of war. The army of the parts of the Empire administered by the English Cabinetdivides into the regular army, which is filled up by enlistment, thenative troops, commanded by English officers, and the Territorial army, a militia made up of volunteers which has not reached the intended totalof 300, 000. It is now 270, 000 strong, and is destined exclusively forhome defence. Its military value cannot at present be ranked veryhighly. For a Continental European war it may be left out of account. Wehave in that case only to deal with a part of the regular English army. This is some 250, 000 strong. The men serve twelve years, of which sevenare with the colours and five in the reserve. The annual supply ofrecruits is 35, 000. The regular reserve is now 136, 000 strong. There isalso a special reserve, with a militia-like training, which is enlistedfor special purposes, so that the grand total of the reserve reaches thefigure of 200, 000. Of the regular English army, 134, 000 men are stationed in England, 74, 500 in India (where, in combination with 159, 000 native troops, theyform the Anglo-Indian army), and about 39, 000 in differentstations--Gibraltar, Malta, Egypt, Aden, South Africa, and the otherColonies and Protectorates. In this connection the conditions in Egyptare the most interesting: 6, 000 English are stationed there, while inthe native Egyptian army (17, 000 strong; in war-time, 29, 000 strong)one-fifth of the officers are Englishmen. It may be supposed that, inview of the great excitement in the Moslem world, the position of theEnglish is precarious. The 11, 000 troops now stationed in South Africaare to be transferred as soon as possible to Mediterranean garrisons. Inevent of war, a special division will, on emergency, be organized there. For a war in Continental Europe, we have only to take into account theregular army stationed in England. When mobilized, it forms the "regularfield army" of 6 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division, 2 mountedbrigades and army troops, and numbers 130, 000 men, without columns andtrains. The regular troops in the United Kingdom which do not form partof the regular field army are some 100, 000 strong. They consist of avery small number of mobile units, foot artillery, and engineers forcoast defence, as well as the reserve formations. These troops, withsome 13, 000 militia artillery and militia engineers, constitute the HomeArmy, under whose protection the Territorial field army is completingits organization. Months must certainly elapse before portions of thisarmy can strengthen the regular field army. At the most 150, 000 men maybe reckoned upon for an English expeditionary force. These troopscompose at the same time the reserve of the troops stationed in theColonies, which require reinforcements at grave crises. This constitutesthe weak point in the British armament. England can employ her regulararmy in a Continental war so long only as all is quiet in the Colonies. This fact brings into prominence how important it will be, should warbreak out, to threaten England in her colonial possessions, andespecially in Egypt. Against the powerful hosts which the Powers of the Triple Entente canput into the field, Germany can command an active army of 589, 705 men(on peace establishment, including non-commissioned officers) and about25, 500 officers; while Austria has an army which on a peace footing is361, 553 men and about 20, 000 officers strong. The combined war strengthof the two States may be estimated as follows: In Germany there were drafted into the army, including volunteers andnon-combatants, in 1892, 194, 664 men; in 1909, 267, 283 men; or on anaverage for seventeen years, 230, 975 men annually. This gives a total of3, 926, 575 men. If we estimate the natural decrease at 25 per cent. , wehave 2, 944, 931 trained men left. By adding the peace establishment toit, we arrive at an estimated strength of 3, 534, 636, which the Frenchcan match with about the same figures. The annual enlistment in Austria amounts to some 135, 000. Liability toserve lasts twelve years, leaving out of account service in theLandsturm. Deducting the three years of active service, this gives atotal of 1, 215, 000, or, after the natural decrease by 25 per cent. , 911, 250 men. To this must be added the nine yearly batches of trainedLandsturm, which, after the same deductions, will come likewise to911, 250. The addition of the peace strength of the army will produce agrand total of 2, 184, 053 men on a war footing; approximately as many asRussia, after all deductions, can bring into the field in Europe. In what numbers the existing soldiers would in case of war be availablefor field formations in Germany and Austria is not known, and it wouldbe undesirable to state. It depends partly on the forces available, partly on other circumstances winch are not open to public discussion. However high our estimate of the new formations may be, we shall neverreach the figures which the combined forces of France and Russiapresent. We must rather try to nullify the numerical superiority of theenemy by the increased tactical value of the troops, by intelligentgeneralship, and a prompt use of opportunity and locality. Even theaddition of the Italian army to the forces of Germany and Austria wouldnot, so far as I know, restore numerical equality in the field. In France it has been thought hitherto that two or three army corps mustbe left on the Italian frontier. Modern French writers [A] are alreadyreckoning so confidently on the withdrawal of Italy from the TripleAlliance that they no longer think it necessary to put an army in thefield against Italy, but consider that the entire forces of France areavailable against Germany. [Footnote A: Colonel Boucher, "L'offensive contre l'Allemagne. "] The peace establishment of the Italian army amounts, in fact, to 250, 000men, and is divided into 12 army corps and 25 divisions. The infantry, in 96 regiments, numbers 140, 000; there are besides 12 regiments ofBersaglieri, with which are 12 cyclist battalions and 8 Alpine regimentsin 78 companies. The cavalry consists of 29 regiments, 12 of which areunited in 3 cavalry divisions. The artillery has a strength of 24 fieldartillery regiments and 1 mounted regiment of artillery, and numbers 193field and 8 mounted batteries. Besides this there are 27 mountainbatteries and 10 regiments of garrison artillery in 98 companies. Lastly, there are 6 engineer regiments, including a telegraph regimentand an airship battalion. The Gendarmerie contains 28, 000 men. On a war footing the strength of the field army is 775, 000. Some 70, 000men are enrolled in other formations of the first and second line. Themilitia is some 390, 000 strong. The strength of the reserves who mightbe mobilized is not known. The field army is divided into 3 armies of 9army corps in all, to which are added 8 to 12 divisions of theTerritorial army and 4 cavalry divisions. As to colonial troops, Italy can command in Benadir the services of 48officers and 16 non-commissioned officers of Italian birth, and 3, 500native soldiers; in Eritrea there are 131 officers, 644 non-commissionedofficers and privates of Italian birth, and 3, 800 natives. Italy thus can put a considerable army into the field; but it isquestionable whether the South Italian troops have much tactical value. It is possible that large forces would be required for coast-defence, while the protection of Tripoli, by no means an easy task, would claim apowerful army if it is to be held against France. The Turkish military forces would be of great importance if they joinedthe coalition of Central European Powers or its opponents. The regular peace establishment of the Turkish army amounts to 275, 000men. In the year 1910 there were three divisions of it: I. The Active Army (Nizam): Infantry 133, 000 Cavalry 26, 000 Artillery 43, 000 Pioneers 4, 500 Special troops 7, 500 Train formations 3, 000 Mechanics 3, 000 A total, that is, of 220, 000 men. 2. The Redif (militia) cadres, composed of infantry, 25, 000 men. Withinthis limit, according to the Redif law, men are enlisted in turns forshort trainings. 3. Officers in the Nizam and Redif troops, military employés, officials, and others, more than 30, 000. The entire war strength of the Turkish army amounts to 700, 000 men. Weneed only to take into consideration the troops from Europe, Anatolia, Armenia, and Syria. All these troops even are not available in aEuropean theatre of war. On the other hand, the "Mustafiz" may beregarded as an "extraordinary reinforcement"; this is usually raised forlocal protection or the maintenance of quiet and order in the interior. To raise 30, 000 or 40, 000 men of this militia in Europe is the simplestprocess. From the high military qualities of the Turkish soldiers, theTurkish army must be regarded as a very important actor. Turkey thus isa very valuable ally to whichever party she joins. The smaller Balkan States are also able to put considerable armies intothe field. Montenegro can put 40, 000 to 45, 000 men into the field, with 104 cannonsand 44 machine guns, besides 11 weak reserve battalions for frontier andhome duties. Servia is supposed to have an army 28, 000 strong on a peace footing;this figure is seldom reached, and sinks in winter to 10, 000 men. Thewar establishment consists of 250, 000 men, comprising about 165, 000rifles, 5, 500 sabres, 432 field and mountain guns (108 batteries of 4guns); besides this there are 6 heavy batteries of 4 to 6 cannons and228 machine guns available. Lastly come the reserve formations (thirdline), so that in all some 305, 000 men can be raised, exclusive of themilitia, an uncertain quantity. The Bulgarian army has a peace establishment of 59, 820 men. It is notknown how they are distributed among the various branches of theservice. On a war footing an army of 330, 000 is raised, includinginfantry at a strength of 230, 000 rifles, with 884 cannons, 232 machineguns, and 6, 500 sabres. The entire army, inclusive of the reserves andnational militia, which latter is only available for home service andcomprises men from forty-one to forty-six years of age, is said to be400, 000 strong. Rumania, which occupies a peculiar position politically, forms a powerin herself. There is in Rumania, besides the troops who according totheir time of service are permanently with the colours, a militiacavalry called "Calarashi" (intelligent young yeomen on good horses oftheir own), whose units serve intermittently for short periods. In peace the army is composed of 5, 000 officers and 90, 000 men of thepermanent establishment, and some 12, 000 serving intermittently. Theinfantry numbers some 2, 500 officers and 57, 000 men, the permanentcavalry (Rosiori) some 8, 000 men with 600 officers, and the artillery14, 000 men with 700 officers. For war a field army can be raised of some 6, 000 officers and 274, 000men, with 550 cannons. Of these 215, 000 men belong to the infantry, 7, 000 to the cavalry, and 20, 000 to the artillery. The cavalry istherefore weaker than on the peace footing, since, as it seems, a partof the Calarashi is not to be employed as cavalry. Inclusive of reservesand militia, the whole army will be 430, 000 strong. There are 650, 000trained men available for service. Although the Balkan States, from a military point of view, chieflyconcern Austria, Turkey, and Russia, and only indirectly come intorelations with Germany, yet the armies of the smaller Central EuropeanStates may under some circumstances be of direct importance to us, ifthey are forced or induced to take part with us or against us in aEuropean war. Of our western neighbours, Switzerland and Holland come first underconsideration, and then Belgium. Switzerland can command, in case of war, a combined army of 263, 000 men. The expeditionary force, which is of first importance for an offensivewar, consists of 96, 000 infantry and 5, 500 cavalry, with 288 field gunsand 48 field howitzers (the howitzer batteries are in formation), atotal of 141, 000 men. The Landwehr consists of 50. 000 infantry and 4, 000 cavalry, with 3612-centimetre cannons belonging to foot artillery. It has a totalstrength of 69, 000 men. The Landsturm finally has a strength of 53, 000men. The Dutch army has a peace establishment averaging 30, 000 men, whichvaries much owing to the short period of service. There are generallyavailable 13, 000 infantry, 3, 000 cavalry, 5, 000 field artillery, 3, 400garrison artillery, and I, 400 engineers, pontonniers, and transporttroops. The field army in war is 80, 000 strong, and is made up of 64, 000infantry, cyclist, and machine-gun sections, 2, 600 cavalry, 4, 400artillery, and goo engineers. It is formed into 4 army divisions each of15 battalions, 4 squadrons, 6 batteries, and 1 section engineers. Thereis, further, a garrison army of 80, 000 men, which consists of 12 activeand 48 Landwehr infantry battalions, 44 active and 44 Landwehr footartillery companies, and 10 companies engineers and pontonniers, including Landwehr. The Dutch coast also is fortified. At Holder, Ymuiden, Hook of Holland, at Völkerack and Haringvliet there are variousoutworks, while the fortifications at Flushing are at presentunimportant. Amsterdam is also a fortress with outlying fortificationsin the new Dutch water-line (Fort Holland). Holland is thus well adapted to cause serious difficulties to an Englishlanding, if her coast batteries are armed with effective cannons. Itwould easily yield to a German invasion, if it sided against us. Belgium in peace has 42, 800 troops available, distributed as follows:26, 000 infantry, 5, 400 cavalry, 4, 650 field artillery, 3, 400 garrisonartillery, 1, 550 engineers and transport service. On a war footing the field army will be 100, 000 strong, comprising74, 000 infantry, 7, 250 cavalry, 10, 000 field artillery, 1, 900 engineersand transport service, and is formed into 4 army divisions and 2 cavalrydivisions. The latter are each 20 squadrons and 2 batteries strong; eachof the army divisions consists nominally of 17 battalions infantry, 1squadron, 12 batteries, and 1 section engineers. In addition there is agarrison army of 80, 000, which can be strengthened by the _gardecivique_, Antwerp forms the chief military base, and may be regarded asa very strong fortress. Besides this, on the line of the Maas, there arethe fortified towns of Liege, Huy, and Namur. There are no coastfortifications. Denmark, as commanding the approaches to the Baltic, is of greatmilitary importance to us. Copenhagen, the capital, is a strongfortress. The Army, on the other hand, is not an important factor ofstrength, as the training of the units is limited to a few months. ThisState maintains on a peace footing some 10, 000 infantry, 800 cavalry, 2, 300 artillery, and 1, 100 special arms, a total of 14, 200 men; but thestrength varies between 7, 500 and 26. 000. In war-time an army of 62, 000men and 10, 000 reserves can be put into the field, composed numericallyof 58, 000 infantry, 3, 000 cavalry, 9, 000 artillery, and 2, 000 specialarms. Sweden can command eight classes of the First Ban, which comprises unitsfrom twenty-one to twenty-eight years of age, and is 200, 000 strong, aswell as four classes of the Second Ban, with a strength of 90, 000, whichis made up of units from twenty-eight to thirty-two years of age. Thereare also available 30, 000 trained volunteers, students and ex-studentsfrom twenty-one to thirty-two years of age. The eight classes of the Landsturm are 165, 000 men strong. It can, accordingly, be roughly calculated what field army can be raised in caseof war. The entire First Ban certainly comes under this head. In Greece, which does not signify much for a European war, but might incombination with the small Balkan States prove very troublesome toTurkey, and is therefore important for us, an active army of 146, 000 mencan be put into the field; there are besides this 83, 000 men in theLandwehr and 63, 000 men in the Landsturm. Spain has a peace army of 116, 232 men, of whom 34, 000 are permanentlystationed in Africa. In war she can raise 327, 000 men (140, 000 activearmy, 154, 000 garrison troops, 33, 000 gendarmerie). The mobilization isso badly organized that at the end of a month 70, 000 to 80, 000 men couldat most be put into the field. As regards the naval forces of the States which concern us to-day, theaccompanying table, which is taken from the _Nauticus_ of 1911, affordsa comparative epitome, which applies to May, 1911. It shows that, numerically, the English fleet is more than double as strong as ours. This superiority is increased if the displacements and the number ofreally modern ships are compared. In May we possessed only fourbattleships and one armed cruiser of the latest type; the English haveten ships-of-the-line and four armed cruisers which could be reckonedbattleships. The new ships do not materially alter this proportion. Thecomparative number of the ships-of-the-line is becoming more favourable, that of the armoured cruisers will be less so than it now is. It may benoticed that among our cruisers are a number of vessels which reallyhave no fighting value, and that the coast-defence ironclads cannot becounted as battleships. France, too, was a little ahead of us in thenumber of battleships in May, 1911, but, from all that is hitherto knownabout the French fleet, it cannot be compared with the German in respectof good material and trained crews. It would, however, be an importantfactor if allied with the English. |Battle- |Armoured |Armoured| Armoured |Protected |Number |N SNation. |ships |Coast |Gunboats| Cruisers |Cruisers |of |u u |above |Defence |and | | |Torpedo |m b |5, 000 |Vessels |Armoured| | |Vessels |b m |Tons. |from |Ships | | | |e a | |3000 Tons|under | | | |r r | |to 5, 000 |3, 000 | | | | i | |Tons |Tons | | | | i +--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+o n |No|Displ. |No|Displ. |No|Displ|No|Displ. |No|Displ. | |From|f e | | | | | | | | | | |200+|80- | s | | | | | | | | | | |Tons| 200| | | | | | | | | | | | |Tons|---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+---GERMANY: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |25|332, 410| 5|20, 600| -| --- |10|114, 590|33|122, 130| 117| 70| 12Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4| --- | 7| --- | 14| -- | -- | | | | | | | | | | | | |ENGLAND: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |50|793, 260| -| --- | -| --- |38|484, 970|66|333, 540| 223| 36| 53Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building|12|286, 640| -| --- | -| --- | 6|145, 320|20|101, 320| 51| -- | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | |FRANCE: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |22|314, 930| -| --- | -| --- |22|214, 670|10| 50, 780| 71| 191| 52Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 93, 880| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 13| -- | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | |ITALY: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready | 8| 96, 980| -| --- | -| --- |10| 79, 530| 4| 10, 040| 53| 39| 7Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| 84, 000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 10, 200| 14| 28| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | |AUSTRIA- | | | | | | | | | | | | | HUNGARY | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |11|102, 620| -| --- | -| --- | 3| 18, 870| 4| 10, 590| 18| 66| 7Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 5| 94, 500| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| --- | 6| -- | -- | | | | | | | | | | | | |RUSSIA: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Baltic | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready | 4| 62, 300| -| --- | 1|1, 760| 6| 64, 950| 4| 27, 270| 60| 19| 13Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 8| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 1| -- | 1Black Sea| | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ready | 6| 72, 640| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 3| 13, 620| 17| 10| 4Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 4| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 7Siberian | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fleet |--| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 2| 9, 180| 20| 7| 13 | | | | | | | | | | | | |UNITED | | | | | | | | | | | | | STATES: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |30|434, 890| 4|13, 120| -| --- |14|181, 260|16| 65, 270| 40| 28| 19Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 7|190, 000| -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 14| -- | 20 | | | | | | | | | | | | |JAPAN: | | | | | | | | | | | | |Ready |13|194, 690| 2| 8, 540| -| --- |13|139, 830|12| 49, 170| 59| 49| 12Voted or | | | | | | | | | | | | | building| 3| --- | -| --- | -| --- | 4|107, 120| 3| 15, 000| 2| -- | 1---------+--+-------+--+------+--+-----+--+-------+--+-------+----+----+--- Let us assume that in event of war England as well as France must leavea certain naval force in the Mediterranean, which need not be strongerthan the combined Italian and Austrian fleets, but might be smaller, inevent of a change in the grouping of the States; let us further assumethat numerous cruisers will be detained at the extra-Europeanstations--the fact, however, remains that England and France togethercan collect against Germany in the North Sea a fleet of battleshipsalone three times as strong as that of Germany, and will be supported bya vastly superior force of torpedo-vessels and submarines. If Russiajoins the alliance of these Powers, that would signify another additionto the forces of our opponents which must not be underestimated, sincethe Baltic Fleet in the spring of 1911 contained two large battleships, and the Baltic fleet of cruisers is always in a position to threaten ourcoasts and to check the free access to the Baltic. In one way or theother we must get even with that fleet. The auxiliary cruiser fleet ofthe allies, to which England can send a large contingent, would also besuperior to us. As regards _matériel_ and training, it may be assumed that our fleet isdistinctly superior to the French and Russian, but that England is ourequal in that respect. Our ships' cannons will probably show asuperiority over the English, and our torpedo fleet, by its recklessenergy, excellent training, and daring spirit of adventure, will make upsome of the numerical disadvantage. It remains to be seen whether theseadvantages will have much weight against the overwhelming superiority ofan experienced and celebrated fleet like the English. Reflection shows that the superiority by sea, with which we must undercertain circumstances reckon, is very great, and that our position inthis respect is growing worse, since the States of the Triple Ententecan build and man far more ships than we can in the same time. If we consider from the political standpoint the probable attitude ofthe separate States which may take part in the next war against Germany, we may assume that the intensity of the struggle will not be the same inevery case, since the political objects of our possible antagonists arevery different. If we look at France first, we are entitled to assume that single-handedshe is not a match for us, but can only be dangerous to us as a memberof a coalition. The tactical value of the French troops is, of course, very high; numerically the army of our neighbour on the west is almostequal, and in some directions there may be a superiority in organizationand equipment; in other directions we have a distinct advantage. TheFrench army lacks the subordination under a single commander, the unitedspirit which characterizes the German army, the tenacious strength ofthe German race, and the _esprit de corps_ of the officers. France, too, has not those national reserves available which would allow us almost todouble our forces. These are the conditions now existing. But if theFrench succeed in making a large African army available for a Europeantheatre, the estimate of strength of the French army as compared withours will be quite different. This possibility must be borne in mind, for, according to the whole previous development of affairs, we maysafely assume that France will leave no stone unturned to acquire, ifonly for a time, a military superiority over Germany. She knows wellthat she cannot reach her political goal except by a complete defeat ofher eastern neighbour, and that such a result can only be obtained bythe exercise of extraordinary efforts. It is certain that France will not only try to develop her own militarypower with the utmost energy, but that she will defend herselfdesperately if attacked by Germany; on the other hand, she will probablynot act on the offensive against Germany unless she has increased herown efficiency to the utmost limit, and believes that she has securedthe military supremacy by the help of active allies. The stakes are toohigh to play under unfavourable conditions. But if France thinks she hasall the trumps in her hands, she will not shrink from an offensive war, and will stake even thing in order to strike us a mortal blow. We mustexpect the most bitter hostility from this antagonist. Should the TripleAlliance break up--as seems probable now--this hour will soon havestruck. [B] If the war then declared be waged against us in combinationwith England, it may be assumed that the allied Great Powers wouldattempt to turn our strategical right flank through Belgium and Holland, and penetrate into the heart of Germany through the great gap in thefortresses between Wesel and Flushing. This operation would have theconsiderable advantage of avoiding the strong line of the Rhine andthreatening our naval bases from the land side. From the superiority ofthe combined Anglo-French fleet, the army of invasion could withoutdifficulty have its base on our coasts. Such an operation wouldenormously facilitate the frontal attack on our west frontier, and wouldenable the French to push a victorious advance onward to the Rhine, after investing Metz and Diedenhofen. [Footnote B: Written in October, 1911. ] England, with whose hostility, as well with that of the French, we mustreckon, could only undertake a land war against us with the support ofan ally who would lead the main attack. England's troops would onlyserve as reinforcements; they are too weak for an independent campaign. English interests also lie in a quite different field, and are notcoincident with those of France. The main issue for England is to annihilate our navy and overseacommerce, in order to prevent, from reasons already explained, anyfurther expansion of our power. But it is not her interest to destroyour position as a Continental Power, or to help France to attain thesupremacy in Europe. English interests demand a certain equilibriumbetween the Continental States. England only wishes to use France inorder, with her help, to attain her own special ends, but she will neverimpose on herself sacrifices which are not absolutely necessary, for theprivate advantage of her ally. These principles will characterize herplan of campaign, if she sees herself compelled by the politicalposition and the interests of her naval supremacy to take part in a waragainst us. If England, as must be regarded probable, determines sooner or later onthis step, it is clearly to her advantage to win a rapid victory. In thefirst place, her own trade will not be injured longer than necessary bythe war; in the second place, the centrifugal forces of her looselycompacted World Empire might be set in movement, and the Colonies mightconsult their own separate interests, should England have her hands tiedby a great war. It is not unlikely that revolutions might break out inIndia and Egypt, if England's forces were long occupied with a Europeanwar. Again, the States not originally taking part in the war mightinterfere in our favour, if the decision were much delayed. It wasimportant for us in 1870-71 to take Paris quickly, in order to forestallany interference of neutrals. Similar conditions might arise in the caseof England. We must therefore make up our minds that the attack by seawill be made with the greatest and most persistent vigour, with the firmresolve to destroy completely our fleet and our great commercialcentres. It is also not only possible, but probable, that England willthrow troops on the Continent, in order to secure the co-operation ofher allies, who might demand this guarantee of the sincerity of Englishpolicy, and also to support the naval attack on the coast. On the otherhand, the land war will display the same kind of desperate energy onlyso far as it pursues the object of conquering and destroying our navalbases. The English would be the less disposed to do more than thisbecause the German auxiliaries, who have so often fought England'sbattles, would not be forthcoming. The greatest exertions of the nationwill be limited to the naval war. The land war will be waged with adefinitely restricted object, on which its character will depend. It isvery questionable whether the English army is capable of effectivelyacting on the offensive against Continental European troops. In SouthAfrica the English regiments for the most part fought very bravely andstood great losses; on the other hand, they completely failed in theoffensive, in tactics as in operations, and with few exceptions thegeneralship was equally deficient. The last manoeuvres on a large scale, held in Ireland, under the direction of General French, did not, according to available information, show the English army in afavourable light so far as strategical ability went. If we now turn our attention to the East, in order to forecast Russia'sprobable behaviour, we must begin by admitting that, from a Russianstandpoint, a war in the West holds out better prospects of success thana renewed war with Japan, and possibly with China. The Empire of theCzar finds in the West powerful allies, who are impatiently waiting tojoin in an attack on Germany. The geographical conditions and means ofcommunication there allow a far more rapid and systematic development ofpower than in Manchuria. Public opinion, in which hatred of Germany isas persistent as ever, would be in favour of such a war, and a victoryover Germany and Austria would not only open the road to Constantinople, but would greatly improve the political and economic influence of Russiain Western Europe. Such a success would afford a splendid compensationfor the defeats in Asia, and would offer advantages such as never couldbe expected on the far-distant Eastern frontiers of the Empire. Should Russia, then, after weighing these chances launch out into anoffensive war in the West, the struggle would probably assume a quitedifferent character from that, for example, of a Franco-German war. Russia, owing to her vast extent, is in the first place secure againstcomplete subjugation. In case of defeat her centre of gravity is notshifted. A Russian war can hardly ever, therefore, become a struggle forpolitical existence, and cause that straining of every nerve which sucha struggle entails. The inhabitants will hardly ever show self-devotionin wars whose objects cannot be clear to them. Throughout the vastEmpire the social and also political education, especially among thepeasants, is so poor, that any grasp of the problems of a foreign policyseems quite out of the question. The sections of the people who haveacquired a little superficial learning in the defective Russian schoolshave sworn to the revolutionary colours, or follow a blindanti-progressive policy which seems to them best to meet theirinterests. The former, at least, would only make use of a war to promotetheir own revolutionary schemes, as they did in the crisis of theRusso-Japanese War. Under the circumstances, there can be little idea ofa united outburst of the national spirit which would enable an offensivewar to be carried on with persistent vigour. There has been anextraordinary change in the conditions since 1812, when the peopleshowed some unanimity in repelling the invasion. Should Russia to-day beinvolved in a Western war with Germany and Austria, she could neverbring her whole forces into play. In the first place, the revolutionaryelements in the heart of the State would avail themselves of everyweakening of the national sources of power to effect a revolution ininternal politics, without any regard for the interests of thecommunity. Secondly, in the Far East, Japan or China would seize themoment when Russia's forces in the West were fully occupied to carry outtheir political intentions towards the Empire of the Czar by force ofarms. Forces must always be kept in reserve for this eventuality, as wehave already mentioned. Although Russia, under the present conditions, cannot bring her wholepower to bear against Germany and Austria, and must also always leave acertain force on her European Southern frontier, she is less affected bydefeats than other States. Neither the Crimean War nor the greaterexertions and sacrifices exacted by her hard-won victory over the Turks, nor the heavy defeats by the Japanese, have seriously shaken Russia'spolitical prestige. Beaten in the East or South, she turns to anothersphere of enterprise, and endeavours to recoup herself there for herlosses on another frontier. Such conditions must obviously affect the character of the war. Russiawill certainly put huge armies into the field against us. In the warsagainst Turkey and Japan the internal affairs of the Empire preventedthe employment of its full strength; in the latter campaignrevolutionary agitation in the army itself influenced the operations andbattles, and in a European war the same conditions would, in allprobability, make themselves emphatically felt, especially if defeatsfavoured or encouraged revolutionary propaganda. In a war againstRussia, more than in any other war, _c'est le premier pas qui coûte_. If the first operations are unsuccessful, their effect on the wholeposition will be wider than in any other war, since they will excite inthe country itself not sympathetic feelings only, but also hostileforces which would cripple the conduct of the war. So far as the efficiency of the Russian army goes, the Russo-JapaneseWar proved that the troops fight with great stubbornness. The struggleshowed numerous instances of heroic self-devotion, and the heaviestlosses were often borne with courage. On the other hand, the Russianarmy quite failed on the offensive, in a certain sense tactically, butessentially owing to the inadequacy of the commanders and the failure ofthe individuals. The method of conducting the war was quite wrong;indecision and irresolution characterized the Russian officers of everygrade, and no personality came forward who ever attempted to rise abovemediocrity. It can hardly be presumed that the spirit of Russiangeneralship has completely changed since the defeats in Manchuria, andthat striking personalities have come on the stage. This army musttherefore always be met with a bold policy of attack. When we contrast these conditions with the position of Germany, wecannot blink the fact that we have to deal with immense militarydifficulties, if we are to attain our own political ends or repelsuccessfully the attack of our opponents. In the first place, the geographical configuration and position of ourcountry are very unfavourable. Our open eastern frontier offers noopportunity for continued defence, and Berlin, the centre of thegovernment and administration, lies in dangerous proximity to it. Ourwestern frontier, in itself strong, can be easily turned on the norththrough Belgium and Holland. No natural obstacle, no strong fortress, isthere to oppose a hostile invasion and neutrality is only a paperbulwark. So in the south, the barrier of the Rhine can easily be turnedthrough Switzerland. There, of course, the character of the countryoffers considerable difficulties, and if the Swiss defend themselvesresolutely, it might not be easy to break down their resistance. Theirarmy is no despicable factor of strength, and if they were attacked intheir mountains they would fight as they did at Sempach and Murten. The natural approaches from the North Sea to the Baltic, the Sound andthe Great Belt, are commanded by foreign guns, and can easily fall aprey to our enemies. The narrow coast with which we face to the North Sea forms in itself astrong front, but can easily be taken in the rear through Holland. England is planted before our coasts in such a manner that our entireoversea commerce can be easily blocked. In the south and south-eastalone are we secured by Austria from direct invasion. Otherwise we areencircled by our enemies. We may have to face attacks on three sides. This circumstance compels us to fight on the inner lines, and sopresents certain advantages; but it is also fraught with dangers, if ouropponents understand how to act on a correct and consistent plan. If we look at our general political position, we cannot conceal the factthat we stand isolated, and cannot expect support from anyone incarrying out our positive political plans. England, France, and Russiahave a common interest in breaking down our power. This interest willsooner or later be asserted by arms. It is not therefore the interest ofany nation to increase Germany's power. If we wish to attain anextension of our power, as is natural in our position, we must win it bythe sword against vastly superior foes. Our alliances are defensive, notmerely in form, but essentially so. I have already shown that this is acause of their weakness. Neither Austria nor Italy are in any way boundto support by armed force a German policy directed towards an increaseof power. We are not even sure of their diplomatic help, as the conductof Italy at the conference of Algeçiras sufficiently demonstrated. Iteven seems questionable at the present moment whether we can alwaysreckon on the support of the members of the Triple Alliance in adefensive war. The recent _rapprochement_ of Italy with France andEngland goes far beyond the idea of an "extra turn. " If we consider howdifficult Italy would find it to make her forces fit to cope withFrance, and to protect her coasts against hostile attacks, and if wethink how the annexation of Tripoli has created a new possession, whichis not easily defended against France and England, we may fairly doubtwhether Italy would take part in a war in which England and France wereallied against us. Austria is undoubtedly a loyal ally. Her interestsare closely connected with our own, and her policy is dominated by thesame spirit of loyalty and integrity as ours towards Austria. Nevertheless, there is cause for anxiety, because in a conglomerateState like Austria, which contains numerous Slavonic elements, patriotism may not be strong enough to allow the Government to fight tothe death with Russia, were the latter to defeat us. The occurrence ofsuch an event is not improbable. When enumerating the possibilities thatmight affect our policy, we cannot leave this one out of consideration. We shall therefore some day, perhaps, be faced with the necessity ofstanding isolated in a great war of the nations, as once Frederick theGreat stood, when he was basely deserted by England in the middle of thestruggle, and shall have to trust to our own strength and our ownresolution for victory. Such a war--for us more than for any other nation--must be a war for ourpolitical and national existence. This must be so, for our opponents canonly attain their political aims by almost annihilating us by land andby sea. If the victory is only half won, they would have to expectcontinuous renewals of the contest, which would be contrary to theirinterests. They know that well enough, and therefore avoid the contest, since we shall certainly defend ourselves with the utmost bitterness andobstinacy. If, notwithstanding, circumstances make the war inevitable, then the intention of our enemies to crush us to the ground, and our ownresolve to maintain our position victoriously, will make it a war ofdesperation. A war fought and lost under such circumstances woulddestroy our laboriously gained political importance, would jeopardizethe whole future of our nation, would throw us back for centuries, wouldshake the influence of German thought in the civilized world, and thuscheck the general progress of mankind in its healthy development, forwhich a flourishing Germany is the essential condition. Our next warwill be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. "World poweror downfall!" will be our rallying cry. Keeping this idea before us, we must prepare for war with the confidentintention of conquering, and with the iron resolve to persevere to theend, come what may. We must therefore prepare not only for a short war, but for a protractedcampaign. We must be armed in order to complete the overthrow of ourenemies, should the victory be ours; and, if worsted, to continue todefend ourselves in the very heart of our country until success at lastis won. It is therefore by no means enough to maintain a certain numericalequality with our opponents. On the contrary, we must strive to call upthe entire forces of the nation, and prepare and arm for the greatdecision which impends. We must try also to gain a certain superiorityover our opponents in the crucial points, so that we may hold somewinning trumps in our hand in a contest unequal from the very first. Wemust bear these two points in mind when preparing for war. Only bycontinually realizing the duties thus laid on us can we carry out ourpreparations to the fullest, and satisfy the demands which the futuremakes on us. A nation of 65, 000, 000 which stakes _all_ her forces onwinning herself a position, and on keeping that position, cannot beconquered. But it is an evil day for her if she relies on the semblanceof power, or, miscalculating her enemies' strength, is content withhalf-measures, and looks to luck or chance for that which can only beattained by the exertion and development of all her powers. CHAPTER VIII THE NEXT NAVAL WAR In the next European land war we shall probably face our foes withAustria at our side, and thus will be in a position to win the dayagainst any opposing forces. In a naval war we shall be thrown on ourown resources, and must protect ourselves single-handed against thesuperior forces which will certainly press us hard. There can be no doubt that this war will be waged with England, for, although we cannot contemplate attacking England, as such an attackwould be hopeless, that country itself has a lively interest in checkingour political power. It will therefore, under certain conditions, attack_us_, in order to annihilate our fleet and aid France. The English have, besides, taken good care that the prospect of a war with them shouldalways be held before our eyes. They talk so much of a possible Germanattack that it cannot surprise them if the light thrown on the questionis from the opposite point of view. Again, the preparations which theyare making in the North Sea show clearly that they certainly havecontemplated an attack on Germany. These preparations are like astrategic march, and the natural extension of their naval bases leavesno doubt as to their meaning. The great military harbour of Rosyth isadmittedly built for the eventuality of a war with Germany, and can meannothing else. Harwich has also been recently made into an especiallystrong naval base, and, further, the roadstead of Scapa Flow in theOrkney Isles has been enlarged into a cruiser station. These aremeasures so directly and obviously directed against us that they demandan inquiry into the military position thus created. The English have only considered the possibility of a German war since1902. Before that year there was no idea of any such contingency, and itis therefore not unnatural that they are eager to make up for lost time. This fact does not alter the hostile character of the measures and thecircumstance that the English preparations for war are exclusivelydirected against Germany. We must therefore--as the general position of the world leads us tobelieve--reckon on the probability of a naval war with England, andshall then have to fight against an overwhelming superiority. It will beso great that we cannot hope for a long time to be able to take theoffensive against the English fleet. But we must contemplate thepossibility of becoming its master in one way or another, and of winningthe freedom of the seas, if England attacks us. We shall now discussthis possibility. On this matter I am expressing my personal views only, which are not confused by any technical naval knowledge, and restexclusively on general military considerations, in which our presupposedantagonists can, and will, indulge quite as well as myself. I shall notbetray any secrets of the Admiralty, since I do not know any. But Iconsider it expedient that the German people should clearly understandwhat dangers threaten from England, and how they can be met. In the view of these dangers and the circumstance that we are not strongenough to entertain any idea of provoking a battle, the questionremains, What are the means of defensive naval strategy to secureprotection from a superior and well-prepared enemy, and gradually tobecome its master? The plan might be formed of anticipating the enemy by a sudden attack, instead of waiting passively for him to attack first, and of opening thewar as the Japanese did before Port Arthur. In this way the Englishfleet might be badly damaged at the outset of the real hostilities, itssuperiority might be lessened, and the beginning of the effectiveblockade delayed at least for a short time. It is not unthinkable thatsuch an attempt will be made. Such an undertaking, however, does notseem to me to promise any great success. The English have secured themselves against such attacks bycomprehensive works of defence in their exposed harbours. It seemsdangerous to risk our torpedo-boats and submarines, which we shallurgently need in the later course of the war, in such bold undertakings. Even the war against the English commerce holds out less prospects thanformerly. As soon as a state of political tension sets in, the Englishmerchantmen will be convoyed by their numerous cruisers. Under suchcircumstances our auxiliary cruisers could do little; while our foreignservice ships would soon have to set about attacking the enemy'swarships, before coal ran short, for to fill up the coal-bunkers ofthese ships will certainly be a difficult task. The war against the English commerce must none the less be boldly andenergetically prosecuted, and should start unexpectedly. The prizeswhich fall into our hands must be remorselessly destroyed, since it willusually be impossible, owing to the great English superiority and thefew bases we have abroad, to bring them back in safety without exposingour vessels to great risks. The sharpest measures must be taken againstneutral ships laden with contraband. Nevertheless, no very valuableresults can be expected from a war against England's trade. On thecontrary, England, with the numerous cruisers and auxiliary cruisers ather disposal, would be able to cripple our oversea commerce. We must beready for a sudden attack, even in peace-time. It is not England'scustom to let ideal considerations fetter her action if her interestsare at stake. Under these circumstances, nothing would be left for us but to retirewith our war-fleet under the guns of the coast fortifications, and bythe use of mines to protect our own shores and make them dangerous toEnglish vessels. Mines are only an effective hindrance to attack if theycan be defended. But they can cause considerable damage if the enemy hasno knowledge of their existence. It would be necessary to take further steps to secure the importationfrom abroad of supplies necessary to us, since our own communicationswill be completely cut off by the English. The simplest and cheapest waywould be if we obtained foreign goods through Holland or perhaps neutralBelgium; and could export some part of our own products through thegreat Dutch and Flemish harbours. New commercial routes might bediscovered through Denmark. Our own oversea commerce would remainsuspended, but such measures would prevent an absolute stagnation oftrade. It is, however, very unlikely that England would tolerate suchcommunications through neutral territory, since in that way the effectof her war on our trade would be much reduced. The attempt to blockthese trade routes would approximate to a breach of neutrality, and theStates in question would have to face the momentous question, whetherthey would conform to England's will, and thus incur Germany's enmity, or would prefer that adhesion to the German Empire which geographydictates. They would have the choice between a naval war with Englandand a Continental war with their German neighbours--two possibilities, each of which contains great dangers. That England would pay muchattention to the neutrality of weaker neighbours when such a stake wasat issue is hardly credible. The ultimate decision of the individual neutral States cannot beforeseen. It would probably depend on the general political position andthe attitude of the other World Powers to the Anglo-German contest. Thepolicy adopted by France and Russia would be an important factor. Onecan easily understand under these circumstances that the Dutch areseriously proposing to fortify strongly the most important points ontheir coast, in order to be able to maintain their neutrality on the seaside. They are also anxious about their eastern frontier, whichobviously would be threatened by a German attack so soon as they sidedwith our enemies. I shall not enter further into the political and military possibilitieswhich might arise if Holland, Belgium, and Denmark were driven to asympathetic understanding by the war. I will only point out howwidespread an effect the naval war can, or rather must, exercise on theContinental war and on the political relations generally. The attitudeof Denmark would be very important, since the passage to and from theBaltic must mainly depend on her. It is vital to us that thesecommunications be kept open, and measures must be taken to insure this. The open door through the Belt and the Sound can become highly importantfor the conduct of the war. Free commerce with Sweden is essential forus, since our industries will depend more and more on the Swedishiron-ore as imports from other countries become interrupted. It will rest with the general state of affairs and the policy of theinterested nations whether this sea route can be safeguarded bydiplomatic negotiations, or must be kept open by military action. Wecannot allow a hostile power to occupy the Danish islands. Complicated and grave questions, military as well as political, are thusraised by an Anglo-German war. Our trade would in any case suffergreatly, for sea communications could be cut off on every side. Let usassume that France and Russia seal our land frontiers, then the onlytrade route left open to us is through Switzerland and Austria--acondition of affairs which would aggravate difficulties at home, andshould stimulate us to carry on the war with increased vigour. In anycase, when war threatens we must lose no time in preparing a road onwhich we can import the most essential foodstuffs and raw materials, andalso export, if only in small quantities, the surplus of our industrialproducts. Such measures cannot be made on the spur of the moment. Theymust be elaborated in peace-time, and a definite department of theGovernment must be responsible for these preparations. The Ministry ofCommerce would obviously be the appropriate department, and should, incollaboration with the great commercial houses, prepare the routes whichour commerce must follow in case of war. There must be a sort ofcommercial mobilization. These suggestions indicate the preliminary measures to be adopted by usin the eventuality of a war with England. We should at first carry on adefensive war, and would therefore have to reckon on a blockade of ourcoasts, if we succeed in repelling the probable English attack. Such a blockade can be carried out in two ways. England can blockadeclosely our North Sea coast, and at the same time bar the Danishstraits, so as to cut off communications with our Baltic ports; or shecan seal up on the one side the Channel between England and theContinent, on the other side the open sea between the North of Scotlandand Norway, on the Peterhead-Ekersund line, and thus cripple our overseacommerce and also control the Belgo-Dutch, Danish, and Swedish shipping. A close blockade in the first case would greatly tax the resources ofthe English fleet. According to the view of English experts, if ablockade is to be maintained permanently, the distance between the baseand the blockading line must not exceed 200 nautical miles. Since allthe English naval ports are considerably farther than this from ourcoast, the difficulties of carrying on the blockade will be enormouslyincreased. That appears to be the reason why the estuary at Harwich hasrecently been transformed into a strong naval harbour. It is consideredthe best harbourage on the English coast, and is hardly 300 nauticalmiles from the German coast. It offers good possibilities offortification, and safe ingress and egress in time of war. The distancefrom the German ports is not, however, very material for purposes ofblockade. The English, if they planned such a blockade, would doubtlesscount on acquiring bases on our own coast, perhaps also on the Dutchcoast. Our task therefore is to prevent such attempts by every means. Not only must every point which is suitable for a base, such asHeligoland, Borkum, and Sylt, be fortified in time of peace, but allattempts at landing must be hindered and complicated by our fleet. Thistask can only be fulfilled by the fleet in daytime by submarines; bynight torpedo-boats may co-operate, if the landing forces are still onboard. Such close blockade offers various possibilities of damaging the enemy, if the coast fortifications are so constructed with a view to theoffensive that the fleet may rally under their protection, and thus gainan opportunity of advancing from their stations for offensiveoperations. Such possibilities exist on our north coast, and our effortsmust be turned towards making the most varied use of them. We mustendeavour by renewed and unexpected attacks, especially by night, partlywith submarines and torpedo-boats, partly with battleships, to give theblockading fleet no breathing-time, and to cause it as much loss aspossible. We must not engage in a battle with superior hostile forces, for it is hardly possible at sea to discontinue a fight, because thereis no place whither the loser can withdraw from the effect of theenemy's guns. An engagement, once begun must be fought out to the end. And appreciable damage can be inflicted on the enemy only if a boldattack on him is made. It is only possible under exceptionallyfavourable circumstances--such, for example, as the proximity of thefortified base--to abandon a fight once begun without very heavylosses. It might certainly be practicable, by successful reconnoitring, to attack the enemy repeatedly at times when he is weakened in one placeor another. Blockade demands naturally a certain division of forces, andthe battle-fleet of the attacking party, which is supposed to lie behindthe farthest lines of blockade and observation, cannot always hold thehigh seas in full strength. The forces of the defending party, however, lie in safe anchorages, ready to sally out and fight. Such a blockade might, after all, be very costly to the attacking party. We may therefore fairly assume that the English would decide in favourof the second kind. At all events, the harbour constructions, partlybuilding, partly projected, at Rosyth and Scapa Flow, were chosen withan eye to this line of blockade. It would entail in the north thebarring of a line about 300 nautical miles long, a scheme quite feasiblefrom the military aspect. Only a small force is required to seal up theChannel, as the navigation route is very narrow. In addition to allthis, the great English naval depots--Dover, Portsmouth, Portland, andPlymouth--are situated either on the line of blockade or immediatelybehind it. Besides, every advance against this line from the north isflanked by Sheerness and Harwich, so that a retreat to the German coastmight be barred. The conditions for the northern line of blockade willbe no less favourable when the projected harbour works are finished. Theblockading fleet finds, therefore, a base in the great harbour ofRosyth, while a cruiser squadron might lie in support off the OrkneyIsles. Every attacking fleet from the German north coast will beunhesitatingly attacked on the flank from Rosyth and Sheerness, and cutoff from its line of retreat. It is thus almost impossible, owing to theEnglish superiority, to inflict any serious damage on the blockadingfleet on this line, and the only course left is to advance from theBaltic against the north-eastern part of the blockading line. Here weshould have a tolerably secure retreat. This accentuates once more thesupreme importance to us of keeping open, at all costs, the passagethrough the Sound and the Great Belt. The command of these straits willnot only secure the Baltic basin for us, but also keep open thesally-ports for our offensive operations against the English blockadingfleet. In spite of all the advantages which the extended system of blockadeoffers to the English, there are two objections against it which arewell worth considering from the English point of view. Firstly, itprejudices the interests of a number of nations whose coasts are washedby the North Sea and the Baltic, since they are included in theblockade; secondly, it compels England to break up her fleet into two orthree divisions. As to the first objection, we have hinted that England will scarcely letherself be hindered in the pursuit of her own advantage by the interestsof weaker third parties. It is also conceivable that some satisfactoryarrangement as to the blockade can be made with the States affected. Asregards the splitting up of the fleet, no especially disadvantageousconditions are thereby produced. It is easy to reunite the temporarilydivided parts, and the strength of the combined fleet guarantees thesuperiority of the separate divisions over the German forces at sea. Nevertheless, this division of the attacking fleet gives the defendingparty the chance of attacking some detached portions before junctionwith the main body, and of inflicting loss on them, if the enemy can bedeceived and surprised by prompt action. The demonstrations which arethe ordinary tactics in war on land under such conditions cannot beemployed, owing to the facility with which the sea can be patrolled. This blockade would ultimately weaken and weary the attacking party. Butit must be recognized that it is a far easier plan to carry out than theclose blockade, and that it would tax the offensive powers of our fleetmore severely. We should not only have to venture on attacks infar-distant waters, but must be strong enough to protect efficiently thethreatened flank of our attacking fleet. After all, it is improbable that the English would have recourse to amere blockade. The reasons which would prompt them to a rapid decisionof the war have been already explained. It was shown that, in the eventof their fighting in alliance with France, they would probably attemptto land troops in order to support their fleet from the land side. Theycould not obtain a decisive result unless they attempted to capture ournaval bases--Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland, the mouth of the Elbe, andKiel--and to annihilate our fleet in its attempt to protect theseplaces, and thus render it impossible for us to continue the war by sea. It is equally certain that our land forces would actively operateagainst the English attempts at landing, and that they would affordextraordinarily important assistance to the defence of the coast, byprotecting it against attacks from the rear, and by keeping open thecommunications with the hinterland. The success of the English attackwill much depend on the strength and armament of the coastfortifications. Such a war will clearly show their value both as purelydefensive and as offensive works. Our whole future history may turn uponthe impregnability of the fortifications which, in combination with thefleet, are intended to guard our coasts and naval bases, and shouldinflict such heavy losses on the enemy that the difference of strengthbetween the two fleets would be gradually equalized. Our ships, it mustbe remembered, can only act effectively so long as our coastfortifications hold out. No proof is required that a good Intelligence system is essential to adefensive which is based on the policy of striking unexpected blows. Such a system alone can guarantee the right choice of favourable momentsfor attack, and can give us such early information of the operativemovements of the hostile fleet that we can take the requisite measuresfor defence, and always retreat before an attack in superior numbers. The numerical superiority of the English cruisers is so great that weshall probably only be able to guarantee rapid and trustworthy"scouting" by the help of the air-fleet. The importance of the air-fleetmust not therefore be under-valued; and steps must be taken to repel theenemy's airships, either by employing specially contrived cannons, or byattacking them directly. If it is possible to employ airships for offensive purposes also, theywould support our own fleet in their contest with the superior Englishforce by dropping explosives on the enemy's ships, and might thuscontribute towards gradually restoring the equilibrium of the opposingforces. These possibilities are, however, vague. The ships are protectedto some extent by their armour against such explosives as could bedropped from airships, and it is not easy to aim correctly from aballoon. But the possibility of such methods of attack must be kept inmind. So far as aviation goes, the defending party has the advantage, for, starting from the German coast, our airships and flying-machines wouldbe able to operate against the English attacking fleet more successfullythan the English airships against our forts and vessels, since theywould have as a base either the fleet itself or the distant Englishcoast. Such possibilities of superiority must be carefully watched for, andnothing must be neglected which could injure the enemy; while theboldest spirit of attack and the most reckless audacity must go hand inhand with the employment of every means which, mechanical skill and thescience of naval construction and fortification can supply. This is theonly way by which we may hope so to weaken our proud opponent, that wemay in the end challenge him to a decisive engagement on the open sea. In this war we _must_ conquer, or, at any rate, not allow ourselves tobe defeated, for it will decide whether we can attain a position as aWorld Power by the side of, and in spite of, England. This victory will not be gained merely in the exclusive interests ofGermany. We shall in this struggle, as so often before, represent thecommon interests of the world, for it will be fought not only to winrecognition for ourselves, but for the freedom of the seas. "This wasthe great aim of Russia under the Empress Catherine II. , of France underNapoleon I. , and spasmodically down to 1904 in the last pages of herhistory; and the great Republic of the United States of North Americastrives for it with intense energy. It is the development of the rightof nations for which every people craves. " [A] [Footnote A: Schiemann. ] In such a contest we should not stand spiritually alone, but all on thisvast globe whose feelings and thoughts are proud and free will join usin this campaign against the overweening ambitions of one nation, which, in spite of all her pretence of a liberal and a philanthropic policy, has never sought any other object than personal advantage and theunscrupulous suppression of her rivals. If the French fleet--as we may expect--combines with the English andtakes part in the war, it will be much more difficult for us to wagethan a war with England alone. France's blue-water fleet would hold ourallies in the Mediterranean in check, and England could bring all herforces to bear upon us. It would be possible that combined fleets of thetwo Powers might appear both in the Mediterranean and in the North Sea, since England could hardly leave the protection of her Mediterraneaninterests to France alone. The prospect of any ultimately successfulissue would thus shrink into the background. But we need not even thendespair. On the contrary, we must fight the French fleet, so to speak, on land--i. E. , we must defeat France so decisively that she would becompelled to renounce her alliance with England and withdraw her fleetto save herself from total destruction. Just as in 1870-71 we marched tothe shores of the Atlantic, so this time again we must resolve on anabsolute conquest, in order to capture the French naval ports anddestroy the French naval depots. It would be a war to the knife withFrance, one which would, if victorious, annihilate once for all theFrench position as a Great Power. If France, with her fallingbirth-rate, determines on such a war, it is at the risk of losing herplace in the first rank of European nations, and sinking into permanentpolitical subservience. Those are the stakes. The participation of Russia in the naval war must also be contemplated. That is the less dangerous, since the Russian Baltic fleet is at presentstill weak, and cannot combine so easily as the English with the French. We could operate against it on the inner line--i. E. , we could use theopportunity of uniting rapidly our vessels in the Baltic by means of theKaiser-Wilhelm Canal; we could attack the Russian ships in vastlysuperior force, and, having struck our blow, we could return to theNorth Sea. For these operations it is of the first importance that theDanish straits should not be occupied by the enemy. If they fell intothe hands of the English, all free operations in the Baltic would bealmost impossible, and our Baltic coast would then be abandoned to thepassive protection of our coast batteries. CHAPTER IX THE CRUCIAL QUESTION I have examined the probable conditions of the next naval war in somedetail, because I thought that our general political and militaryposition can only be properly estimated by considering the variousphases of the war by sea and by land, and by realizing the possibilitiesand dangers arising from the combined action of the hostile forces onour coasts and land frontiers. In this way only can the direction bedecided in which our preparations for war ought to move. The considerations, then, to which the discussion about the naval warwith England and her probable allies gave rise have shown that we shallneed to make very great exertions to protect ourselves successfully froma hostile attack by sea. They also proved that we cannot count on anultimate victory at sea unless we are victorious on land. If anAnglo-French army invaded North Germany through Holland, and threatenedour coast defences in the rear, it would soon paralyze our defence bysea. The same argument applies to the eastern theatre. If Russian armiesadvance victoriously along the Baltic and co-operate with a combinedfleet of our opponents, any continuation of the naval war would berendered futile by the operations of the enemy on land. We know also that it is of primary importance to organize our forces onland so thoroughly that they guarantee the possibility, under allcircumstances, of our victoriously maintaining our position on theContinent of Europe. This position must be made absolutely safe beforewe can successfully carry on a war by sea, and follow an imperial policybased on naval power. So long as Rome was threatened by Hannibal inItaly there could be no possible idea of empire. She did not begin hertriumphal progress in history until she was thoroughly secure in her owncountry. But our discussion shows also that success on land can be influenced bythe naval war. If the enemy succeeds in destroying our fleet and landingwith strong detachments on the North Sea coast, large forces of the landarmy would be required to repel them, a circumstance widely affectingthe progress of the war on the land frontiers. It is therefore vitallynecessary to prepare the defence of our own coasts so well that everyattack, even by superior numbers, may be victoriously repelled. At the same time the consideration of the political position presses theconviction home that in our preparations for war there must be no talkof a gradual development of our forces by sea and land such as may laythe lightest possible burden on the national finances, and leave amplescope for activity in the sphere of culture. The crucial point is to putaside all other considerations, and to prepare ourselves with the utmostenergy for a war which appears to be imminent, and will decide the wholefuture of our politics and our civilization. The consideration of thebroad lines of the world policy and of the political aspirations of theindividual States showed that the position of affairs everywhere iscritical for us, that we live at an epoch which will decide our place asa World Power or our downfall. The internal disruption of the TripleAlliance, as shown clearly by the action of Italy towards Turkey, threatens to bring the crisis quickly to a head. The period whichdestiny has allotted us for concentrating our forces and preparingourselves for the deadly struggle may soon be passed. We must use it, ifwe wish to be mindful of the warning of the Great Elector, that we areGermans. This is the point of view from which we must carry out ourpreparations for war by sea and land. Thus only can we be true to ournational duty. I do not mean that we should adopt precipitately measures calculatedmerely for the exigencies of the moment. All that we undertake in thecause of military efficiency must meet two requirements: it must answerthe pressing questions of the present, and aid the development of thefuture. But we must find the danger of our position a stimulus todesperate exertions, so that we may regain at the eleventh hoursomething of what we have lost in the last years. Since the crucial point is to safeguard our much-threatened position onthe continent of Europe, we must first of all face the serious problemof the land war--by what means we can hope to overcome the greatnumerical superiority of our enemies. Such superiority will certainlyexist if Italy ceases to be an active member of the Triple Alliance, whether nominally belonging to it, or politically going over toIrredentism. The preparations for the naval war are of secondaryimportance. The first essential requirement, in case of a war by land, is to makethe total fighting strength of the nation available for war, to educatethe entire youth of the country in the use of arms, and to makeuniversal service an existing fact. The system of universal service, born in the hour of need, has by asplendid development of strength liberated us from a foreign yoke, hasin long years of peace educated a powerful and well-armed people, andhas brought us victory upon victory in the German wars of unification. Its importance for the social evolution of the nation has been discussedin a separate chapter. The German Empire would to-day have a mightypolitical importance if we had been loyal to the principle on which ourgreatness was founded. France has at the present day a population of some 40, 000, 000; Russia inEurope, with Poland and the Caucasus, has a population of 140, 000, 000. Contrasted with this, Germany has only 65, 000, 000 inhabitants. But sincethe Russian military forces are, to a great extent, hampered by veryvarious causes and cannot be employed at any one time or place, and arealso deficient in military value, a German army which corresponded tothe population would be certainly in a position to defend itselfsuccessfully against its two enemies, if it operated resolutely on theinner line, even though England took part in the war. Disastrously for ourselves, we have become disloyal to the idea ofuniversal military service, and have apparently definitely discontinuedto carry it out effectively. The country where universal service existsis now France. With us, indeed, it is still talked about, but it is onlykept up in pretence, for in reality 50 per cent. , perhaps, of theable-bodied are called up for training. In particular, very little usehas been made of the larger towns as recruiting-grounds for the army. In this direction some reorganization is required which willenergetically combine the forces of the nation and create a real army, such as we have not at the present time. Unless we satisfy this demand, we shall not long be able to hold our own against the hostile Powers. Although we recognize this necessity as a national duty, we must notshut our eyes to the fact that it is impossible in a short time to makeup our deficiencies. Our peace army cannot be suddenly increased by150, 000 men. The necessary training staff and equipment would not beforthcoming, and on the financial side the required expenditure couldnot all at once be incurred. The full effectiveness of an increased armyonly begins to be gradually felt when the number of reservists andLandwehr is correspondingly raised. We can therefore only slowly recurto the reinforcement of universal service. The note struck by the newFive Years Act cannot be justified on any grounds. But although we wishto increase our army on a more extensive scale, we must admit that, evenif we strain our resources, the process can only work slowly, and thatwe cannot hope for a long time to equalize even approximately thesuperior forces of our opponents. We must not, therefore, be content merely to strengthen our army; wemust devise other means of gaining the upper hand of our enemies. Thesemeans can only be found in the spiritual domain. History teaches us by countless examples that numbers in themselves haveonly been the decisive factor in war when the opponents have beenequally matched otherwise, or when the superiority of the one partyexceeds the proportion required by the numerical law. [A] In most casesit was a special advantage possessed by the one party--better equipment, greater efficiency of troops, brilliant leadership, or more ablestrategy--which led to victory over the numerically superior. Romeconquered the world with inferior forces; Frederick the Great withinferior forces withstood the allied armies of Europe. Recent historyshows us the victory of the numerically weaker Japanese army over acrushingly superior opponent. We cannot count on seeing a greatcommander at our head; a second Frederick the Great will hardly appear. Nor can we know beforehand whether our troops will prove superior to thehostile forces. But we can try to learn what will be the decisivefactors in the future war which will turn the scale in favour of victoryor defeat. If we know this, and prepare for war with a set purpose, andkeep the essential points of view always before us, we might create areal source of superiority, and gain a start on our opponents whichwould be hard for them to make up in the course of the war. Should wethen in the war itself follow one dominating principle of the policywhich results from the special nature of present-day war, it must bepossible to gain a positive advantage which may even equalize aconsiderable numerical superiority. [Footnote A: _Cf_. V. Bernhardi, "Vom heutigen Kriege, " vol. I. , chap. Ii. ] The essential point is not to match battalion with battalion, batterywith battery, or to command a number of cannons, machine guns, airships, and other mechanical contrivances equal to that of the probableopponent; it is foolish initiative to strain every nerve to be abreastwith the enemy in all material domains. This idea leads to a certainspiritual servility and inferiority. Rather must an effort be made to win superiority in the factors on whichthe ultimate decision turns. The duty of our War Department is toprepare these decisive elements of strength while still at peace, and toapply them in war according to a clearly recognized principle ofsuperiority. This must secure for us the spiritual and so the materialadvantage over our enemies. Otherwise we run the danger of being crushedby their weight of numbers. We cannot reach this goal on the beaten roads of tradition and habit byuninspired rivalry in arming. We must trace out with clear insight theprobable course of the future war, and must not be afraid to tread newpaths, if needs be, which are not consecrated by experience and use. Newgoals can only be reached by new roads, and our military history teachesus by numerous instances how the source of superiority lies in progress, in conscious innovations based on convincing arguments. The spiritualcapacity to know where, under altered conditions, the decision must besought, and the spiritual courage to resolve on this new line of action, are the soil in which great successes ripen. It would be too long a task in this place to examine more closely thenature of the future war, in order to develop systematically the ideaswhich will prove decisive in it. These questions have been thoroughlyventilated in a book recently published by me, "Vom heutigen Kriege"("The War of To-day"). In this place I will only condense the results ofmy inquiry, in order to form a foundation for the further considerationof the essential questions of the future. In a future European war "masses" will be employed to an extentunprecedented in any previous one. Weapons will be used whose deadlinesswill exceed all previous experience. More effective and varied means ofcommunication will be available than were known in earlier wars. Thesethree momentous factors will mark the war of the future. "Masses" signify in themselves an increase of strength, but they containelements of weakness as well. The larger they are and the less they canbe commanded by professional soldiers, the more their tacticalefficiency diminishes. The less they are able to live on the countryduring war-time, especially when concentrated, and the more they aretherefore dependent on the daily renewal of food-supplies, the slowerand less mobile they become. Owing to the great space which they requirefor their deployment, it is extraordinarily difficult to bring them intoeffective action simultaneously. They are also far more accessible tomorally depressing influences than compacter bodies of troops, and mayprove dangerous to the strategy of their own leaders, if supplies runshort, if discipline breaks down, and the commander loses his authorityover the masses which he can only rule under regulated conditions. The increased effectiveness of weapons does not merely imply a longerrange, but a greater deadliness, and therefore makes more exactingclaims on the _moral_ of the soldier. The danger zone begins sooner thanformerly; the space which must be crossed in an attack has become farwider; it must be passed by the attacking party creeping or running. Thesoldier must often use the spade in defensive operations, during whichhe is exposed to a far hotter fire than formerly; while under allcircumstances he must shoot more than in bygone days. The quick firingwhich the troop encounters increases the losses at every incautiousmovement. All branches of arms have to suffer under these circumstances. Shelter and supplies will be more scanty than ever before. In short, while the troops on the average have diminished in value, the demandsmade on them have become considerably greater. Improved means of communication, finally, facilitate the handling andfeeding of large masses, but tie them down to railway systems and mainroads, and must, if they fail or break down in the course of a campaign, aggravate the difficulties, because the troops were accustomed to theiruse, and the commanders counted upon them. The direct conclusion to be drawn from these reflections is that a greatsuperiority must rest with the troops whose fighting capabilities andtactical efficiency are greater than those of their antagonists. The commander who can carry out all operations quicker than the enemy, and can concentrate and employ greater masses in a narrow space thanthey can, will always be in a position to collect a numerically superiorforce in the decisive direction; if he controls the more effectivetroops, he will gain decisive successes against one part of the hostilearmy, and will be able to exploit them against other divisions of itbefore the enemy can gain equivalent advantages in other parts of thefield. Since the tactical efficiency and the _moral_ of the troops are chieflyshown in the offensive, and are then most needful, the necessaryconclusion is that safety only lies in offensive warfare. In an attack, the advantage, apart from the elements of moral strengthwhich it brings into play, depends chiefly on rapidity of action. Inasmuch as the attacking party determines the direction of the attackto suit his own plans, he is able at the selected spot to collect asuperior force against his surprised opponent. The initiative, which isthe privilege of the attacking party, gives a start in time and placewhich is very profitable in operations and tactics. The attacked partycan only equalize this advantage if he has early intimation of theintentions of the assailant, and has time to take measures which holdout promise of success. The more rapidly, therefore, the attackingGeneral strikes his blow and gains his success, and the more capable histroops, the greater is the superiority which the attack in its natureguarantees. This superiority increases with the size of the masses. If the advancingarmies are large and unwieldy, and the distances to be covered great, itwill be a difficult and tedious task for the defending commander to takeproper measures against a surprise attack. On the other hand, theprospects of success of the attacking General will be very favourable, especially if he is in the fortunate position of having better troops athis disposal. Finally, the initiative secures to the numerically weaker a possibilityof gaining the victory, even when other conditions are equal, and allthe more so the greater the masses engaged. In most cases it isimpossible to bring the entire mass of a modern army simultaneously andcompletely into action. A victory, therefore, in the decisivedirection--the direction, that is, which directly cuts the arteries ofthe opponent--is usually conclusive for the whole course of the war, andits effect is felt in the most distant parts of the field of operations. If the assailant, therefore, can advance in this direction with superiornumbers, and can win the day, because the enemy cannot utilize hisnumerical superiority, there is a possibility of an ultimate victoryover the arithmetically stronger army. In conformity to this law, Frederick the Great, through superior tactical capability and strikingstrength, had always the upper hand of an enemy far more powerful inmere numbers. No further proof is required that the superiority of the attackincreases in proportion to the rapidity with which it is delivered, andto the lack of mobility of the hostile forces. Hence the possibility ofconcealing one's own movements and damaging the effective tactics of theenemy secures an advantage which, though indirect, is yet veryappreciable. We arrive, then, at the conclusion that, in order to secure thesuperiority in a war of the future under otherwise equal conditions, itis incumbent on us: First, during the period of preparation to raise thetactical value and capabilities of the troops as much as possible, andespecially to develop the means of concealing the attacking movementsand damaging the enemy's tactical powers; secondly, in the war itself toact on the offensive and strike the first blow, and to exploit themanoeuvring capacity of the troops as much as possible, in order to besuperior in the decisive directions. Above all, a State which hasobjects to attain that cannot be relinquished, and is exposed to attacksby enemies more powerful than itself, is bound to act in this sense. Itmust, before all things, develop the attacking powers of its army, sincea strategic defensive must often adopt offensive methods. This principle holds good pre-eminently for Germany. The points which Ihave tried to emphasize must never be lost sight of, if we wish to facethe future with confidence. All our measures must be calculated to raisethe efficiency of the army, especially in attack; to this end all elsemust give way. We shall thus have a central point on which all ourmeasures can be focussed. We can make them all serve one purpose, andthus we shall be kept from going astray on the bypaths which we all tooeasily take if we regard matters separately, and not as forming parts ofa collective whole. Much of our previous omissions and commissions wouldhave borne a quite different complexion had we observed this unifyingprinciple. The requirements which I have described as the most essential aresomewhat opposed to the trend of our present efforts, and necessitate aresolute resistance to the controlling forces of our age. The larger the armies by which one State tries to outbid another, thesmaller will be the efficiency and tactical worth of the troops; and notmerely the average worth, but the worth of each separate detachment assuch. Huge armies are even a danger to their own cause. "They will besuffocated by their own fat, " said General v. Brandenstein, the greatorganizer of the advance of 1870, when speaking of the mass-formation ofthe French. The complete neglect of cavalry in their proportion to thewhole bulk of the army has deprived the commander of the means to injurethe tactical capabilities of the enemy, and to screen effectually hisown movements. The necessary attention has never been paid in the courseof military training to this latter duty. Finally, the tacticalefficiency of troops has never been regarded as so essential as itcertainly will prove in the wars of the future. A mechanical notion of warfare and weak concessions to the pressure ofpublic opinion, and often a defective grasp of the actual needs, haveconduced to measures which inevitably result in an essentialcontradiction between the needs of the army and the actual end attained, and cannot be justified from the purely military point of view. It wouldbe illogical and irrelevant to continue in these paths so soon as it isrecognized that the desired superiority over the enemy cannot be reachedon them. This essential contradiction between what is necessary and what isattained appears in the enforcement of the law of universal militaryservice. Opinion oscillates between the wish to enforce it more or less, and the disinclination to make the required outlay, and recourse is hadto all sorts of subterfuges which may save appearances without giving agood trial to the system. One of these methods is the _Ersatzreserve_, which is once more being frequently proposed. But the situation is by nomeans helped by the very brief training which these units at bestreceive. This system only creates a military mob, which has no capacityfor serious military operations. Such an institution would be a heavystrain on the existing teaching _personnel_ in the army, and would beindirectly detrimental to it as well. Nor would any strengthening of thefield army be possible under this scheme, since the cadres to containthe mass of these special reservists are not ready to hand. This masswould therefore only fill up the recruiting depots, and facilitate tosome degree the task of making good the losses. A similar contradiction is often shown in the employment of the troops. Every army at the present time is divided into regular troops, who arealready organized in time of peace and are merely brought to fullstrength in war-time, and new formations, which are only organized onmobilization. The tactical value of these latter varies much accordingto their composition and the age of the units, but is always muchinferior to that of the regular troops. The Landwehr formations, whichwere employed in the field in 1870-71, were an example of this, notwithstanding the excellent services which they rendered, and the newFrench formations in that campaign were totally ineffective. The sphereof activity of such troops is the second line. In an offensive war theirduty is to secure the railroads and bases, to garrison the conqueredterritory, and partly also to besiege the enemies' fortresses. In fact, they must discharge all the duties which would otherwise weaken thefield army. In a defensive war they will have to undertake the local andmainly passive defence, and the support of the national war. By actingat first in this limited sphere, such new formations will graduallybecome fitted for the duties of the war, and will acquire a degree ofoffensive strength which certainly cannot be reckoned upon at the outsetof the war; and the less adequately such bodies of troops are suppliedwith columns, trains, and cavalry, the less their value will be. Nevertheless, it appears to be assumed by us that, in event of war, suchtroops will be partly available in the first line, and that decisiveoperations may be entrusted to them. Reserves and regulars are treatedas equivalent pieces on the board, and no one seems to suppose that someare less effective than others. A great danger lies in this mechanicalconception. For operations in the field we must employ, wherever possible, regularsonly, and rather limit our numbers than assign to inferior troops tasksfor which they are inadequate. We must have the courage to attack, ifnecessary, with troops numerically inferior but tactically superior andmore efficient; we must attack in the consciousness that tacticalstriking power and efficiency outweigh the advantages of greaternumbers, and that with the immense modern armies a victory in thedecisive direction has more bearing on the ultimate issue than everbefore. The decision depends on the regular troops, not on the masses which areplaced at their side on mobilization. The commander who acts on thisprinciple, and so far restricts himself in the employment of masses thathe preserves the complete mobility of the armies, will win a strongadvantage over the one whose leader is burdened with inferior troops andtherefore is handicapped generally, and has paid for the size of hisarmy by want of efficiency. The mass of reserves must, therefore, beemployed as subsidiary to the regular troops, whom they must relieve asmuch as possible from all minor duties. Thus used, a superiority in thenumbers of national reserves will secure an undoubted superiority in theactual war. It follows directly from this argument that we must do our best torender the regular army strong and efficient, and that it would be amistake to weaken them unnecessarily by excessive drafts upon their_personnel_ with the object of making the reserves tactically equal tothem. This aim may sometimes be realized; but the general level ofefficiency throughout the troops would be lowered. Our one object must therefore be to strengthen our regular army. Anincrease of the peace footing of the standing army is worth far morethan a far greater number of badly trained special reservists. It issupremely important to increase the strength of the officers on theestablishment. The stronger each unit is in peace, the more efficientwill it become for war, hence the vital importance of aiming at quality, not quantity. Concentration, not dilution, will be our safeguard. If wewish to encourage the enforcement of universal service by strengtheningthe army, we must organize new peace formations, since the number ofprofessional officers and sub-officers will be thus increased. This stepis the more necessary because the present available cadres areinsufficient to receive the mass of able-bodied recruits and to providefor their thorough training. The gradual enforcement of universal military service hand in hand withan increase of the regular army is the first practical requirement. Weshall now consider how far the tactical value of the troops, theefficiency of the army, the cavalry, and the screening service can beimproved by organization, equipment, and training. I must first point out a factor which lies in a different sphere to thequestions already discussed, but has great importance in every branch ofmilitary activity, especially in the offensive, which requires promptoriginal action--I mean the importance of personality. From the Commander-in-Chief, who puts into execution the conceptions ofhis own brain under the pressure of responsibility and shifting fortune, and the Brigadier, who must act independently according to a givengeneral scheme; to the dispatch rider, surrounded with dangers, and leftto his own resources in the enemy's country, and the youngest private inthe field fighting for his own hand, and striving for victory in theface of death; everywhere in the wars of to-day, more than in any otherage, personality dominates all else. The effect of mass tactics hasabolished all close formations of infantry, and the individual is leftto himself. The direct influence of the superior has lessened. In thestrategic duties of the cavalry, which represent the chief activity ofthat arm, the patrol riders and orderlies are separated more than beforefrom their troop and are left to their own responsibility. Even in theartillery the importance of independent action will be more clearlyemphasized than previously. The battlefields and area of operations haveincreased with the masses employed. The Commander-in-Chief is far lessable than ever before to superintend operations in various parts of thefield; he is forced to allow a greater latitude to his subordinates. These conditions are very prominent in attacking operations. When on the defensive the duty of the individual is mainly to hold hisground, while the commander's principal business is to utilize thereserves. On the offensive, however, the conditions change from momentto moment, according to the counter-movements of the enemy, which cannotbe anticipated, and the success or failure of the attacking troops. Eventhe individual soldier, as the fight fluctuates, must now push on, nowwait patiently until the reinforcements have come up; he will often haveto choose for himself the objects at which to fire, while never losingtouch with the main body. The offensive makes very varied calls on thecommander's qualities. Ruse and strategy, boldness and unsparing energy, deliberate judgment and rapid decision, are alternately demanded fromhim. He must be competent to perform the most opposite duties. All thisputs a heavy strain on personality. It is evident, then, that the army which contains the greatest number ofself-reliant and independent personalities must have a distinctadvantage. This object, therefore, we must strive with every nerve toattain: to be superior in this respect to all our enemies. And thisobject can be attained. Personality can be developed, especially in thesphere of spiritual activity. The reflective and critical powers can beimproved by continuous exercise; but the man who can estimate theconditions under which he has to act, who is master of the element inwhich he has to work, will certainly make up his mind more rapidly andmore easily than a man who faces a situation which he does not grasp. Self-reliance, boldness, and imperturbability in the hour of misfortuneare produced by knowledge. This is shown everywhere. We see the awkwardand shy recruit ripen into a clear-headed smart sergeant; and the sameprocess is often traced among the higher commands. But where the mentaldevelopment is insufficient for the problems which are to be solved, thepersonality fails at the moment of action. The elegant guardsmanBourbaki collapsed when he saw himself confronted with the task ofleading an army whose conditions he did not thoroughly grasp. GeneralChanzy, on the other hand, retained his clear judgment and resolutedetermination in the midst of defeat. Thus one of the essential tasks ofthe preparations for war is to raise the spiritual level of the army andthus indirectly to mould and elevate character. Especially is itessential to develop the self-reliance and resourcefulness of those inhigh command. In a long military life ideas all too early growstereotyped and the old soldier follows traditional trains of thoughtand can no longer form an unprejudiced opinion. The danger of suchdevelopment cannot be shut out. The stiff and uniform composition of thearmy which doubles its moral powers has this defect: it often leads to aone-sided development, quite at variance with the many-sidedness ofactual realities, and arrests the growth of personality. Something akinto this was seen in Germany in the tentative scheme of an attack _enmasse_. United will and action are essential to give force its greatestvalue. They must go hand in hand with the greatest spiritualindependence and resourcefulness, capable of meeting any emergency andsolving new problems by original methods. It has often been said that one man is as good as another; thatpersonality is nothing, the type is everything; but this assertion iserroneous. In time of peace, when sham reputations flourish and no realstruggle winnows the chaff from the coin, mediocrity in performance isenough. But in war, personality turns the scale. Responsibility anddanger bring out personality, and show its real worth, as surely as achemical test separates the pure metal from the dross. That army is fortunate which has placed men of this kind in theimportant posts during peace-time and has kept them there. This is theonly way to avoid the dangers which a one-sided routine produces, and tobreak down that red-tapism which is so prejudicial to progress andsuccess. It redounds to the lasting credit of William I. That for thehighest and most responsible posts, at any rate, he had already in timeof peace made his selection from among all the apparently great menaround him; and that he chose and upheld in the teeth of all oppositionthose who showed themselves heroes and men of action in the hour ofneed, and had the courage to keep to their own self-selected paths. Thisis no slight title to fame, for, as a rule, the unusual rouses envy anddistrust, but the cheap, average wisdom, which never prompted action, appears as a refined superiority, and it is only under the pressure ofthe stern reality of war that the truth of Goethe's lines is proved: "Folk and thrall and victor can Witness bear in every zone: Fortune's greatest gift to man Is personality alone. " CHAPTER X ARMY ORGANIZATION I now turn to the discussion of some questions of organization, but itis not my intention to ventilate all the needs and aims connected withthis subject that occupy our military circles at the present time. Ishall rather endeavour to work out the general considerations which, inmy opinion, must determine the further development of our army, if wewish, by consistent energy, to attain a superiority in the directionswhich will certainly prove to be all-important in the next war. It willbe necessary to go into details only on points which are especiallynoteworthy or require some explanation. I shall obviously come intoopposition with the existing state of things, but nothing is furtherfrom my purpose than to criticize them. My views are based ontheoretical requirements, while our army, from certain definitelypresented beginnings, and under the influence of most different men andof changing views, in the midst of financial difficulties and politicaldisputes, has, by fits and starts, grown up into what it now is. It is, in a certain sense, outside criticism; it must be taken as somethingalready existing, whose origin is only a subject for a subsequenthistorical verdict. But the further expansion of our army belongs to thefuture, and its course can be directed. It can follow well-definedlines, in order to become efficient, and it is politically mostimportant that this object should be realized. Therefore I shall notlook back critically on the past, but shall try to serve the future. The guiding principle of our preparations for war must be, as I havealready said, the development of the greatest fighting strength and thegreatest tactical efficiency, in order through them to be in a positionto carry on an offensive war successfully. What follows will, therefore, fall naturally under these two heads. Fighting strength rests partly, asalready said, on the training (which will be discussed later), thearming, and the _personnel_, partly on the composition of the troops, and, therefore, in the case of line regiments, with which we chieflyhave to deal, since they are the real field troops, on the strength oftheir peace establishment. It was shown in the previous chapter howessential it is to have in the standing army not only the necessarycadres ready for the new formations, but to make the separate branchesso strong that they can easily be brought up to full strength inwar-time. The efficiency and character of the superiors, the officers and thenon-commissioned officers, are equally weighty factors in the value ofthe troops. They are the professional supporters of discipline, decision, and initiative, and, since they are the teachers of thetroops, they determine their intellectual standard. The number ofpermanent officers on the establishment in peace is exceedingly small inproportion to their duties in the training of the troops and to thedemands made of them on mobilization. If we reflect how many officersand non-commissioned officers from the standing army must be transferredto the new formations in order to vitalize them, and how the moderntactical forms make it difficult for the superior officer to assert hisinfluence in battle, the numerical inadequacy of the existing_personnel_ is clearly demonstrated. This applies mainly to theinfantry, and in their case, since they are the decisive arm, asufficient number of efficient officers is essential. All the moreimportant is it, on the one hand, to keep the establishment of officersand non-commissioned officers in the infantry at full strength, and, onthe other hand, to raise the efficiency of the officers andnon-commissioned officers on leave or in the reserve. This latter is aquestion of training, and does not come into the present discussion. The task of keeping the establishments at adequate strength is, in asense, a financial question. The amount of the pay and the prospectswhich the profession holds out for subsequent civil posts greatly affectthe body of non-commissioned officers, and therefore it is important tokeep step with the general increase in prices by improved pecuniaryadvantages. Even for the building up of the corps of officers, thefinancial question is all-important. The career of the officer offersto-day so little prospect of success and exacts such efficiency andself-devotion from the individual, that he will not long remain in theservice, attractive as it is, if the financial sacrifices are so high asthey now are. The infantry officer especially must have a betterposition. Granted that the cavalry and mounted artillery officers incurgreater expenses for the keep of their horses than the infantry officerhas to pay, the military duties of the latter are by far the moststrenuous and require a very considerable outlay on clothing. It wouldbe, in my opinion, expedient to give the infantry officer more pay thanthe cavalry and artillery officers, in order to make service in that armmore attractive. There is a rush nowadays into the mounted arm, forwhich there is a plethora of candidates. These arms will always be wellsupplied with officers. Their greater attractiveness must becounterbalanced by special advantages offered by the infantry service. By no other means can we be sure of having sufficient officers in thechief arm. If the fighting strength in each detachment depends on its compositionand training, there are other elements besides the tactical value of thetroops which determine the effectiveness of their combined efforts inaction; these are first the leadership, which, however, depends onconditions which are beyond calculation, and secondly the numericalproportion of the arms to each other. Disregarding provisionally thecavalry, who play a special role in battle, we must define theproportion which artillery must bear to infantry. With regard to machine guns, the idea that they can to some extentreplace infantry is quite erroneous. Machine guns are primarily weaponsof defence. In attack they can only be employed under very favourableconditions, and then strengthen only one factor of a successfulattack--the fire-strength--while they may sometimes hinder thatimpetuous forward rush which is the soul of every attack. Hence, thisauxiliary weapon should be given to the infantry in limited numbers, andemployed mainly on the defensive fronts, and should be often massed intolarge units. Machine-gun detachments should not overburden the marchingcolumns. The relation of infantry to artillery is of more importance. Infantry is the decisive arm. Other arms are exclusively there to smooththeir road to victory, and support their action directly or indirectly. This relation must not be merely theoretical; the needs of the infantrymust ultimately determine the importance of all other fightinginstruments in the whole army. If we make this idea the basis of our argument, the following is theresult. Infantry has gained enormously in defensive power owing tomodern weapons. The attack requires, therefore, a far greatersuperiority than ever before. In addition to this, the breadth of frontin action has greatly increased in consequence of the former closetactical formations having been broken up through the increase of fire. This refers only to the separate detachment, and does not justify theconclusion that in the future fewer troops will cover the same spaces asbefore. This assumption applies at the most to defence, and then only ina limited sense. In attack the opposite will probably be the case. Thetroops must therefore be placed more deeply _en échelon _than in thelast wars. Now, the average breadth of the front in attack must regulatethe allotment of artillery to infantry. No definite proportion can besettled; but if the theoretical calculation be compared with theexperiences of the last wars, conclusions may be obtained which willmost probably prove appropriate. No more than this can be expected inthe domain of military science. If we agree to the above-mentioned proportion of breadth and depth in aninfantry attack, we shall be driven to insist on a reduction ofartillery as compared with the past; but should we think that modernartillery helps the attack, especially by indirect fire, we mustadvocate, from the standpoint of offensive warfare, an increase of theartillery. Actual war experiences alone can find the true middle pathbetween these two extremes. If the frontal development of the artillery of a modern army corps, or, better still, two divisions, be regarded from the point of view that theguns cannot advance in connected line, but that only the speciallyadapted parts of the field can be used for artillery development, theconclusion is certain that by such frontal extension the infantry isreduced to a covering line for the artillery. In forming this opinion wemust not assume the normal strength of the infantry, but take intoaccount that the strength of the infantry in war rapidly melts away. Ifwe estimate the companies on the average at two-thirds of their properstrength, we shall be above rather than below the real figures. Suchinfantry strength will, of course, be sufficient to defend the positiontaken up by the artillery, but it is hardly enough to carry out, in thatsection of the field, a decisive attack, which, under present conditions, requires greater numbers and depth than before. In this connection it is very instructive to study the second part ofthe Franco-German War, and the Boer War, as well as the Manchuriancampaign. Some of the German infantry had in the first-named periodextraordinarily diminished in numbers; companies of 120 men were notrare. The artillery, on the contrary, had remained at its originalstrength. The consequences naturally was that the powers of the Germanson the offensive grew less and the battles and skirmishes were not sodecisive as in the first part of the war. This condition would haveshown up more distinctly against an enemy of equal class than in thecontest with the loosely-compacted, raw French levies. In the formercase the offensive would have been impracticable. The strong artillery, under the existing conditions, no doubt gave great support to the weakinfantry; but an unbiassed opinion leads to the conclusion that, underthe then existing proportion of the arms to each other, the infantry wastoo weak to adopt energetic offensive tactics against a well-matchedenemy. This is irresistibly proved if we consider what masses ofinfantry were needed at Wörth and St. Privat, for instance, in spite ofthe support of very superior artillery, in order to defeat a weakerenemy of equal class. Again, in South Africa, the overwhelming superiority of the English inartillery was never able to force a victory. In Manchuria the state ofthings was very instructive. Numerically the Russian artillery wasextraordinarily superior to the enemy's, and the range of the Russianfield guns was longer than that of the Japanese; nevertheless, theJapanese succeeded in beating an enemy stronger in infantry also, because, in the decisive directions of attack, they were able to unitesuperior forces of infantry and artillery, while the Russian artillerywas scattered along the whole of their broad front. The lesson of this war is that, apart from the close relation of thearms to each other in the separate units, the co-operation of theseunits must be looked at, if the strength of the two sister arms is to beappropriately determined. The requirement that each separate tactical unit should he made equal orsuperior in artillery to the corresponding hostile unit is thoroughlymechanical, as if in war division always fought against division andcorps against corps! Superiority at the decisive point is the crucialtest. This superiority is attained by means of an unexpectedconcentration of forces for attack, and there is no reason why thesuperiority in artillery should not also be brought about in this way. If by superior tactical skill two army corps, each with 96 guns, combineagainst a hostile army which brings 144 guns into action, that signifiesa superiority of 48 guns and a double superiority in infantry. If it isassumed that on both sides the army corps is armed with 144 guns, andthat in consequence of this the tactical superiority has become soslight that neither side can claim a superiority in one direction, thenequal forces meet, and chance decides the day. Since the Japanese weretactically more efficient than their enemy and took the offensive, theywere enabled to unite the superior forces in the most decisivedirections, and this advantage proved far greater than the numericalsuperiority of the Russian army as a whole. If we look at the whole matter we shall come to the conclusion that theartillery, if it is not a question of pure defence, need never occupywithin a line of battle so much ground that the concentration of aconsiderably superior force of infantry for attack is rendered doubtful. In this respect we have, in our present organization already exceededthe expedient proportion between the two arms in favour of theartillery. The conclusion is that this latter arm never need, within theseparate divisions, be made so strong that the attacking capacities ofthe army are thereby prejudiced. This is the decisive point. Any excessin artillery can be kept on the battlefield in reserve when space isrestricted; if the attacking efficiency of the troops is reduced, thenartillery becomes a dead weight on the army instead of an aid tovictory. It is far more important to be able to unite superior forcesfor a decisive attack than to meet the enemy with equally matched forcesalong the whole front. If we observe this principle, we shall often beweaker than the enemy on the less important fronts; this disadvantagemay be partly counterbalanced by remaining on the defensive in such aposition. It becomes a positive advantage, if, owing to an overpoweringconcentration of forces, victory is won at the decisive point. Thisvictory cancels all the failures which may have been recorded elsewhere. The operative superiority of an enemy is determined by the greatermarching capacity of the troops, by the rapid and systematic working ofthe communications with the rear, and, above all, by the length of thecolumns of the operating troops. Under the modern system of colossalarmaments, an army, especially if in close formation, cannot possiblylive on the country; it is driven to trust to daily food-supplies fromthe rear. Railways are used as far as possible to bring up the supplies;but from the railhead the communication with the troops must bemaintained by columns of traction waggons and draught animals, which goto and fro between the troops, the rearward magazines, and the railhead. Since traction waggons are restricted to made roads, the directcommunication with the troops must be kept up by columns of draughtanimals, which can move independently of the roads. The waggons ofprovisions, therefore, which follow the troops, and are filled daily, must come up with them the same day, or there will be a shortage offood. This is only possible if the troop column does not exceed acertain length and starts at early morning, so that the transportwaggons, which, at the end of the march, must be driven from the rear tothe head of the column, can reach this before the beginning of thenight's rest. The fitness of an army for attack can only be maintainedif these supplies are uninterrupted; there must also be a sufficientquantity of tinned rations and provisions which the soldiers can carrywith them. If the length of the columns exceeds the limit here laiddown, the marches must be proportionately shortened. If unusuallylengthy marches are made, so that the provision carts cannot reach thetroops, days of rest must be interposed, to regulate the supply. Thusthe capacity of an army to march and to carry out operations is directlydependent on the possibility of being fed from the rear. A carefulcalculation, based on practical experiences, shows that, in order toaverage 20 to 22 kilometres a day--the minimum distance required from anarmy--no column on a road ought to exceed a length of about 25kilometres This consideration determines the depth of the army corps onthe march, since in an important campaign and when massing for battletroops seldom march in smaller bodies than a corps. This calculation, by which the conditions of modern war are compulsorilyaffected, makes it highly necessary that the system of supplies andrations should be carefully organized. The restoration of any destroyedrailways, the construction of light railways, the organization ofcolumns of motor transport waggons and draught animals, must be preparedby every conceivable means in time of peace, in order that in war-timethe railroads may follow as closely as possible on the track of thetroops, and that the columns may maintain without interruptioncontinuous communications between the troops and the railhead. In orderto keep this machinery permanently in working order, and to surmount anycrisis in bringing up supplies, it is highly advisable to have an amplestock of tinned rations. This stock should, in consideration of thenecessary mass-concentration, be as large as possible. Care must betaken, by the organization of trains and columns, that the stock oftinned provisions can be quickly renewed. This would be best done byspecial light columns, which are attached to the army corps outside theorganization of provision and transport columns, and follow it at such adistance, that, if necessary, they could be soon pushed to the front byforced or night marches. There is naturally some reluctance to increasethe trains of the army corps, but this necessity is unavoidable. It isfurther to be observed that the columns in question would not be verylong, since they would mainly convey condensed foods and otherprovisions compressed into the smallest space. An immense apparatus of train formations, railway and telegraph corps, and workmen must be got ready to secure the efficiency of a modern armywith its millions. This is absolutely necessary, since without it thetroops in modern warfare would be practically unable to move. It is farmore important to be ahead of the enemy in this respect than in anyother, for there lies the possibility of massing a superior force at thedecisive point, and of thus defeating a stronger opponent. However careful the preparations, these advantages can only be attainedif the troop columns do not exceed the maximum strength which can be fedfrom the rear, if the necessary forward movement is carried out. Everything which an army corps requires for the war must be kept withinthese limits. Our modern army corps without the heavy artillery of the field armycorresponds roughly to this requirement. But should it be lengthened bya heavy howitzer battalion, with the necessary ammunition columns, itwill considerably exceed the safe marching depth--if, that is, thenecessary advance-guard distance be included. Since, also, the infantryis too weak in proportion to the space required by the artillery todeploy, it becomes advisable in the interests both of powerful attackand of operative efficiency, within the separate troop organizations tostrengthen the numbers of the infantry and reduce those of theartillery. In addition to the length of the column, the arrangement of the divisionis very important for its tactical efficiency. This must be such as topermit the most varied employment of the troops and the formation ofreserves without the preliminary necessity of breaking up all the units. This requirement does not at all correspond to our traditionalorganization, and the man to insist upon it vigorously has not yetappeared, although there can be no doubt as to the inadequacy of theexisting tactical organization, and suitable schemes have already beendrawn up by competent officers. The army corps is divided into two divisions, the division into twoinfantry brigades. All the brigades consist of two regiments. Theformation of a reserve makes it very difficult for the commander to fixthe centre of gravity of the battle according to circumstances and hisown judgment. It is always necessary to break up some body when areserve has to be formed, and in most cases to reduce the officers ofsome detachment to inactivity. Of course, a certain centre of gravityfor the battle may be obtained by assigning to one part of the troops awider and to the other a narrower space for deployment. But thisprocedure in no way replaces a reserve, for it is not always possible, even in the first dispositions for the engagement, to judge where thebrunt of the battle will be. That depends largely on the measures takenby the enemy and the course of the battle. Napoleon's saying, "_Je m'engage et puis je vois, "_ finds itsapplication, though to a lessened extent, even to-day. The division ofcavalry brigades into two regiments is simply a traditional institutionwhich has been thoughtlessly perpetuated. It has not been realized thatthe duties of the cavalry have completely changed, and that brigades oftwo regiments are, in addition to other disadvantages, too weak to carrythese duties out. This bisecting system, by restricting the freedom of action, contradictsthe most generally accepted military principles. The most natural formation is certainly a tripartition of the units, asis found in an infantry regiment. This system permits the separatedivisions to fight near each other, and leaves room for the withdrawalof a reserve, the formation of a detachment, or the employment of thesubdivisions in lines _(Treffen)_, for the principle of the wing attackmust not be allowed to remain merely a scheme. Finally, it is the bestformation for the offensive, since it allows the main body of the troopsto be employed at a single point in order to obtain a decisive resultthere. A special difficulty in the free handling of the troops is produced bythe quite mechanical division of the artillery, who bring into actiontwo kinds of ordnance--cannons and howitzers. These latter can, ofcourse, be used as cannons, but have special functions which are notalways required. Their place in the organization, however, is preciselythe same as that of the cannons, and it is thus very difficult to employthem as their particular character demands. The object in the whole of this organization has been to make corps anddivisions equal, and if possible superior, to the correspondingformations of the enemy by distributing the batteries proportionatelyaccording to numbers among the divisions. This secured, besides, theundeniable advantage of placing the artillery directly under the ordersof the commanders of the troops. But, in return, it robbed thecommanding General of the last means secured by the organization ofenforcing his tactical aims. He is now forced to form a reserve forhimself out of the artillery of the division, and thus to deprive onedivision at least of half its artillery. If he has the natural desire towithdraw for himself the howitzer section, which is found in onedivision only, the same division must always be subjected to thisreduction of its strength, and it is more than problematical whetherthis result always fits in with the tactical position. It seems at leastworth while considering whether, under these circumstances, it would notbe a more appropriate arrangement to attach a howitzer section to eachdivision. The distribution of the heavy field howitzers is another momentousquestion. It would be in accordance with the principles that guide thewhole army to divide them equally among the army corps. This arrangementwould have much in its favour, for every corps may find itself in aposition where heavy howitzer batteries can be profitably employed. Theycan also, however, be combined under the command of theGeneral-in-Chief, and attached to the second line of the army. The firstarrangement offers, as has been said, many advantages, but entails thegreat disadvantage that the line of march of the army corps isdangerously lengthened by several kilometres, so that no course is leftbut either to weaken the other troops of the corps or to sacrifice theindispensable property of tactical efficiency. Both alternatives areinadmissible. On the other hand, since the employment of heavy howitzersis by no means necessary in every engagement, but only when an attack isplanned against a strongly-posted enemy, it may be safely assumed thatthe heavy howitzers could be brought up in time out of the second lineby a night march. Besides, their mobility renders it possible to detachsingle batteries or sections, and on emergency to attach them to an armycorps temporarily. There is a prevalent notion that the heavy howitzers are principallyused to fight the enemy's field artillery, and therefore must be on thespot in every engagement. They have even been known to stray into theadvance guard. I do not approve of this idea. The enemy's fieldartillery will fire indirectly from previously masked positions, and insuch case they cannot be very successfully attacked by heavy howitzers. It seems to me quite unjustifiable, with the view of attaining thisproblematic object, to burden the marching columns permanently with longunwieldy trains of artillery and ammunition, and thus to render theireffectiveness doubtful. No doubt the Japanese, who throughout the war continually increasedtheir heavy field howitzers, ultimately attached artillery of that sortto every division. The experiences of that war must not, however, beoverestimated or generalized. The conditions were quite _sui generis_. The Japanese fought on their whole front against fortified positionsstrengthened by heavy artillery, and as they attacked the enemy's linein its whole extension, they required on their side equally heavy guns. It should be noticed that they did not distribute their very effective12-centimetre field howitzers along the whole front, but, so far as Ican gather, assigned them all to the army of General Nogi, whose dutywas to carry out the decisive enveloping movement at Mukden. TheJapanese thus felt the need of concentrating the effect of theirhowitzers, and as we hope we shall not imitate their frontal attack, butbreak through the enemy's front, though in a different way from theirs, the question of concentration seems to me very important for us. Under these circumstances it will be most advantageous to unite theheavy batteries in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. They thus bestserve his scheme of offence. He can mass them at the place which hewishes to make the decisive point in the battle, and will thus attainthat end most completely, whereas the distribution of them among thearmy corps only dissipates their effectiveness. His heavy batteries willbe for him what the artillery reserves are for the divisional General. There, where their mighty voice roars over the battlefield, will be thedeciding struggle of the day. Every man, down to the last private, knowsthat. I will only mention incidentally that the present organization of theheavy artillery on a peace footing is unsatisfactory. The batterieswhich in war are assigned to the field army must in peace also be placedunder the orders of the corps commanders _(Truppenführer)_ if they areto become an organic part of the whole. At present the heavy artilleryof the field army is placed under the general-inspection of the footartillery, and attached to the troops only for purposes of manoeuvres. It thus remains an isolated organism so far as the army goes, and doesnot feel itself an integral part of the whole. A clear distinctionbetween field artillery and fortress artillery would be more practical. This view seems at first sight to contradict the requirement that theheavy batteries should form a reserve in the hands of theCommander-in-Chief. As the armies do not exist in peace-time, andmanoeuvres are seldom carried out in army formation, the result of thepresent organization is that the tactical relations of the heavyartillery and the other troops are not sufficiently understood. Thisdisadvantage would be removed if heavy artillery were assignedpermanently to each army corps. This would not prevent it being unitedin war-time in the hands of the army leaders. On the contrary, theywould be used in manoeuvres in relation to the army corps in preciselythe same sense as they would be in war-time in relation to the armies. The operations of the army in the enemy's countries will be far moreeffective if it has control of the railways and roads. That implies notmerely the restoration of railroads that may have been destroyed, butthe rapid capture of the barrier forts and fortresses which impede theadvance of the army by cutting off the railway communications. We weretaught the lesson in 1870-71 in France how far defective railwaycommunications hindered all operations. It is, therefore, of vitalimportance that a corps should be available, whose main duty is thedischarge of these necessary functions. Until recently we had only one united corps of pioneers, which wasorganized alike for operations in the field and for siege operations, but these latter have recently been so much developed that that systemcan no longer supply an adequate technical training for them. The demands made by this department of warfare, on the one hand, and bythe duties of pioneering in the field on the other, are so extensive andso essentially different that it seems quite impracticable to trainadequately one and the same corps in both branches during two years'service. The chief functions of the field pioneer are bridge-building, fortifying positions, and supporting the infantry in the attack onfortified places. The most important part of the fortress pioneer'sduties consists in sapping, and, above all, in mining, in preparing forthe storming of permanent works, and in supporting the infantry in theactual storm. The army cannot be satisfied with a superficial trainingfor such service; it demands a most thorough going previous preparation. Starting from this point of view, General v. Beseler, the lateInspector-General of Fortresses and Pioneers, who has done inestimableservice to his country, laid the foundations of a new organization. Thisfollows the idea of the field pioneers and the fortress pioneers--arudimentary training in common, followed by separate special trainingfor their special duties. We must continue on these lines, and developmore particularly the fortress pioneer branch of the service in betterproportion to its value. In connection with the requirements already discussed, which aredirectly concerned with securing and maintaining an increase of tacticalefficiency, we must finally mention two organizations which indirectlyserve the same purpose. These diminish the tactical efficiency of theenemy, and so increase our own; while, by reconnoitring and by screeningmovements, they help the attack and make it possible to take the enemyunawares--an important condition of successful offensive warfare. Irefer to the cavalry and the air-fleet. The cavalry's duties are twofold. On the one hand, they must carry outreconnaissances and screening movements, on the other hand they mustoperate against the enemy's communications, continually interrupt theregular renewal of his supplies, and thus cripple his mobility. Every military expert will admit that our cavalry, in proportion to thewar-footing of the army, and in view of the responsible duties assignedthem in war, is lamentably weak. This disproportion is clearly seen ifwe look at the probable wastage on the march and in action, and realizethat it is virtually impossible to replace these losses adequately, andthat formations of cavalry reserves can only possess a very limitedefficiency. Popular opinion considers cavalry more or less superfluous, because in our last wars they certainly achieved comparatively littlefrom the tactical point of view, and because they cost a great deal. There is a general tendency to judge cavalry by the standard of 1866 and1870-71. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this standard ismisleading. On the one hand, the equipment was then so defective that itcrippled the powers of the mounted man in the most important points; onthe other hand, the employment of the cavalry was conducted on a whollyantiquated system. It was, consequently, not armed for independentmovements. What they then did must not be compared with what will berequired from them in the future. In wars in which mounted forces werereally effective, and not hampered in their movements by preconceivednotions (as in the American War of Secession and the Boer War), theiremployment has been continuously extended, since the great value oftheir operative mobility was convincingly shown, especially in Africa, notwithstanding all modern weapons. These are the wars which must bestudied in order to form a fair opinion. They will convince us that anincrease of our cavalry is absolutely imperative. It will, of course, only be valuable when the divisions of the army cavalry are equippedwith columns and trains in such a way that they can operateindependently. The effectiveness of the cavalry depends entirely on thefulfilment of this condition. It is also imperatively necessary, whenthe measures of our opponents are considered, to strengthen the fightingforce of the cavalry by an adequate addition of cyclist sections. Thisis the more requisite, as, on the one hand, the attack on the enemy'scommunications must expect vigorous opposition, and, on the other hand, the screening duties, which are even more important for the offensivethan the reconnaissances, are likely to be specially successful ifcavalry and cyclists combine. Again, an increased strength of cavalry isundeniably required to meet the reconnoitring and screening troops ofthe enemy. Besides the strengthening of this arm and the addition of cyclists, another organization is required if the cavalry are to do usefulservice. Brigades of two regiments and divisions of six regiments are inwar-time, where all depends on decisive action, far too small, as I haverepeatedly demonstrated without being refuted. The brigades must in war be three regiments strong. The strength of thedivisions and corps may vary according to the requirements of the timebeing. Just because our cavalry is so weak, the organization must be ina high degree elastic. There can, besides, be no doubt on the point thatthe side which commands the services of the stronger cavalry, led onmodern lines, will have at the outset quite inestimable advantage overthe enemy, which must make itself felt in the ultimate issue. I might remark incidentally that the mounted batteries which areattached to the army cavalry must be formed with four guns each, so thatthe division with its three parts would have the control of threebatteries, and, if necessary, a battery could be assigned to eachbrigade. That is an old suggestion which the Emperor William I. Oncemade, but it has never yet been considered. It is not with cavalryusually a question of protracted artillery engagements, but of utilizingmomentary opportunities; the greatest mobility is required together withthe most many-sided efficiency and adaptability. There can obviously, therefore, be no question of a systematic combination with theartillery. Such a thing can only be of value in the case of cavalry whenit is important to make a decisive attack. The reconnaissance and screening duties of the cavalry must be completedby the air-fleet. Here we are dealing with something which does not yetexist, but we can foresee clearly the great part which this branch ofmilitary science will play in future wars. [A] It is therefore necessaryto point out in good time those aspects of it which are of specialweight in a military sense, and therefore deserve peculiar considerationfrom the technical side. [Footnote A: The efficiency and success of the Italian aviators inTripoli are noteworthy, but must not be overvalued. There were noopponents in the air. ] The first requirement is that airships, in addition to simplicity ofhandling and independence of weather, should possess a superior fightingstrength, for it is impossible effectively to screen the movements ofthe army and to open the road for reconnaissances without attackingsuccessfully the hostile flying-machines and air cruisers. The power to fight and destroy the hostile airships must be the leadingidea in all constructions, and the tactics to be pursued must be at oncethought out in order that the airships may be built accordingly, sincetactics will be essentially dependent on the construction and thetechnical effectiveness. These reciprocal relations must be borne inmind from the first, so as to gain a distinct advantage over ouropponents. If the preceding remarks are epitomized, we have, apart from thenecessity of enforcing universal service, quite a long list of proposedchanges in organization, the adoption of which will considerably improvethe efficiency of our army. The whole organization must be such that the column length of the armycorps does not exceed the size which allows a rapid advance, though thesupplies are exclusively drawn from magazine depots. In case of the larger formations, and especially of the army corps asbeing the tactical and operative unit, the principle of tripartitionmust be observed. The infantry must be, in proportion to the artillery, substantiallystrengthened. The artillery must be organized in such a way that it is possible toconcentrate the fire of the howitzers where required without breaking upthe units. The cavalry must be increased, strengthened by cyclist sections, and soorganized as to insure their efficiency in war. The formation of reinforcements, especially for supplies, must be soelaborated that, on a rapid advance, an efficient system of feeding thetroops entirely from magazine depots can be maintained. The air-fleet must be energetically developed with the object of makingit a better fighting machine than that of the enemy. Finally, and this is the most important thing, we must strain everynerve to render our infantry tactically the best in the world, and totake care that none but thoroughly efficient formations are employed inthe decisive field war. The fulfilment of all these requirements on the basis of our presentorganization offers naturally great difficulties and can hardly becarried out. It is impossible to imagine a German Reichstag which, without the most extreme pressure of circumstances, could resolve tomake for the army the sacrifices called for by our political condition. The temptation to shut the eyes to existing dangers and to limitpolitical aims in order to repudiate the need of great sacrifices is sostrong that men are sure to succumb to it, especially at a period whenall political wisdom seems summed up in the maintenance of peace. Theycomfort themselves with the hope that the worst will not happen, although history shows that the misery produced by weakness has oftensurpassed all expectations. But even if the nation can hardly be expected to understand what isnecessary, yet the War Department must be asked to do their utmost toachieve what is possible, and not to stop short out of deference topublic opinion. When the future of a great and noble nation is at stakethere is no room for cowardice or inaction. Nothing must be done, asunhappily has too often been the case, which runs counter to theprinciples of a sound military organization. The threefold division of the larger formations could be effected invarious ways. Very divergent ideas may be entertained on this subject, and the difficulties of carrying out the scheme need extensiveconsideration. I will make a few proposals just by way of illustration. One way would be to split up the army corps into three divisions ofthree infantry regiments each, and to abolish the superfluousintermediate system of brigades. Another proposal would be to form inevery corps one of the present divisions of three brigades, so that theextra brigade combined with the light field howitzers and the Jägerbattalion would constitute in event of war a separate detachment in thehands of the commanding General. This last arrangement could be carriedout comparatively easily under our present system, but entails thedrawback that the system of twofold division is still in force withinthe brigades and divisions. The most sweeping reform, that of dividingthe corps into three divisions, would have the advantage of beingthorough and would allow the separate groups to be employed in many moreways. The relations between the infantry and the artillery can naturally onlybe improved gradually by the strengthening of the infantry through theenforcement of universal service. The assignment of a fifth brigade toeach army corps would produce better conditions than exist at present. But so soon as the strengthening of the infantry has gone so far thatnew army corps must be created, the artillery required for them can betaken from existing formations, and these can be diminished by thismeans. It will conduce to the general efficiency of the army if theartillery destined for each army corps is to some degree limited, without, however, reducing their total. Care must be taken that only thequantity of ammunition necessary for the first stages of the battleshould be habitually carried by the columns of the troops engaged. Allthat exceeds this must be kept in the rear behind the commissariatwaggons, and brought forward only on necessity--that is to say, when abattle is in prospect. The certainty of being able to feed the troopsand thus maintain the rapidity of the advance is far more important thanthe more or less theoretical advantage of having a large quantity ofammunition close at hand during the advance. The soldiers will beinclined to be sparing of ammunition in the critical stages of thefight, and will not be disposed to engage with an unseen enemy, who canonly be attacked by scattered fire; the full fire strength will bereserved for the deciding moments of the engagement. Then, however, therequired ammunition will be on the spot, in any event, if it is broughtforward by stages in good time. A suitable organization of the artillery would insure that each divisionhad an equal number of batteries at its disposal. The light fieldhowitzers, however, must be attached to a division in such a way thatthey may form an artillery corps, without necessarily breaking up theformations of the division. The strength of the artillery must beregulated according to that of the infantry, in such a way that theentire marching depth does not exceed some 25 kilometres. The heavyfield howitzers, on the other hand, must in peace be placed under theorders of the General commanding, and in event of war be combined as"army" artillery. It would, perhaps, be advisable if the cavalry were completely detachedfrom the corps formation, since the main body is absolutely independentin war as "army" cavalry. The regiments necessary for service with theinfantry could be called out in turn during peace-time for manoeuvreswith mixed arms, in order to be trained in the work of divisionalcavalry, for which purpose garrison training can also be utilized. Onthe other hand, it is, I know, often alleged that the _Truppenführer_are better trained and learn much if the cavalry are under their orders;but this objection does not seem very pertinent. Another way to adapt the organization better to the efficiency of thearm than at present would be that the four cavalry regiments belongingto each army corps should be combined into a brigade and placed underthe commanding General. In event of mobilization, one regiment would bewithdrawn for the two divisions, while the brigade, now three regimentsstrong, would pass over to the "army" cavalry. The regiment intended fordivisional cavalry would, on mobilization, form itself into sixsquadrons and place three of them at the service of each division. Ifthe army corps was formed into three divisions, each division would onlybe able to receive two squadrons. In this way, of course, a very weak and inferior divisional cavalrywould be formed; the service in the field would suffer heavily under it;but since it is still more important to have at hand a sufficient armycavalry than a divisional cavalry, quite competent for their difficulttask, there is, for the time being, no course left than to raise the oneto its indispensable strength at the cost of the other. The blame forsuch a makeshift, which seriously injures the army, falls upon those whodid not advocate an increase of the cavalry at the proper moment. Thewhole discussion shows how absolutely necessary such an increase is. Ifit were effected, it would naturally react upon the organization of thearm. This would have to be adapted to the new conditions. There arevarious ways in which a sound and suitable development of the cavalrycan be guaranteed. The absolutely necessary cyclist sections must in any case be attachedto the cavalry in peace, in order that the two arms may be drilled inco-operation, and that the cavalry commander may learn to makeappropriate use of this important arm. Since the cyclists are restrictedto fairly good roads, the co-operation presents difficulties whichrequire to be surmounted. The views which I have here tried to sketch as aspects of theorganization of the army can be combated from several standpoints. Inmilitary questions, particularly, different estimates of the individualfactors lead to very different results. I believe, however, that myopinions result with a certain logical necessity from the whole aspectof affairs. It is most essential, in preparing for war, to keep the mainleading idea fixed and firm, and not to allow it to be shaken byquestion of detail. Each special requirement must be regarded as part ofthat general combination of things which only really comes into view inactual warfare. The special standpoint of a particular arm must berejected as unjustified, and the departmental spirit must be silenced. Care must be taken not to overestimate the technical and material meansof power in spite of their undoubted importance, and to take sufficientaccount of the spiritual and moral factors. Our age, which has made suchprogress in the conquest of nature, is inclined to attach too muchimportance to this dominion over natural forces; but in the last resort, the forces that give victory are in the men and not in the means whichthey employ. A profound knowledge of generalship and a self-reliant personality areessential to enable the war preparations to be suitably carried out;under the shifting influence of different aims and ideas the "organizerof victory" will often feel doubtful whether he ought to decide this wayor that. The only satisfactory solution of such doubts is to deduce froma view of warfare in its entirety and its varied phases and demands theimportance of the separate co-operating factors. "For he who grasps the problem as a whole Has calmed the storm that rages in his soul" CHAPTER XI TRAINING AND EDUCATION Our first object, then, must be to organize and transform the Germanarmy into the most effective tool of German policy, and into a school ofhealth and strength for our nation. We must also try to get ahead of ourrivals by superiority of training, and at the same time to do fulljustice to the social requirements of the army by exerting all ourefforts towards raising the spiritual and moral level of the units andstrengthening their loyal German feelings. Diligence and devotion to military education are no longer at thepresent day sufficient to make our troops superior to the enemy's, forthere are men working no less devotedly in the hostile armies. If wewish to gain a start there is only one way to do it: the training mustbreak with all that is antiquated and proceed in the spirit of the warof the future, which will impose fresh requirements on the troops aswell as on the officers. It is unnecessary to go into the details about the training in the useof modern arms and technical contrivances: this follows necessarily fromthe introduction of these means of war. But if we survey the sphere oftraining as a whole, two phenomena of modern warfare will strike us aspeculiarly important with regard to it: the heightened demands whichwill be made on individual character and the employment of "masses" toan extent hitherto unknown. The necessity for increased individualization in the case of infantryand artillery results directly from the character of the modern battle;in the case of cavalry it is due to the nature of their strategicalduties and the need of sometimes fighting on foot like infantry; in thecase of leaders of every grade, from the immensity of the armies, the vastextent of the spheres of operation and fields of battle, and thedifficulty, inseparable from all these conditions, of giving directorders. Wherever we turn our eyes to the wide sphere of modern warfare, we encounter the necessity of independent action--by the private soldierin the thick of the battle, or the lonely patrol in the midst of theenemy's country, as much as by the leader of an army, who handles hugehosts. In battle, as well as in operations, the requisite uniformity ofaction can only be attained at the present time by independentco-operation of all in accordance with a fixed general scheme. The employment of "masses" requires an entirely altered method of movingand feeding the troops. It is one thing to lead 100, 000 or perhaps200, 000 men in a rich country seamed with roads, and concentrate themfor a battle--it is another to manoeuvre 800, 000 men on a scene of warstripped bare by the enemy, where all railroads and bridges have beendestroyed by modern explosives. In the first case the military empiricmay be equal to the occasion; the second case demands imperatively ascientifically educated General and a staff who have also studied andmastered for themselves the nature of modern warfare. The problems ofthe future must be solved in advance if a commander wishes to be able tooperate in a modern theatre of war with certainty and rapid decision. The necessity of far-reaching individualization then is universallyrecognized. To be sure, the old traditions die slowly. Here and there anundeserved importance is still attached to the march past as a method ofeducation, and drilling in close formation is sometimes practised morethan is justified by its value. The cavalry is not yet completelyawakened from its slumbers, and performs the time-honoured exercises onthe parade-grounds with great strain on the horses' strength, obliviousof the existence of long-range quick-firing guns, and as if they werestill the old arm which Napoleon or Frederick the Great commanded. Eventhe artillery is still haunted by some more or less antiquated notions;technical and stereotyped ideas still sometimes restrict the freedom ofoperations; in the practice of manoeuvres, artillery duels are still invogue, while sufficient attention is not given to concentration of firewith a definite purpose, and to co-operation with the infantry. Even intheory the necessity of the artillery duel is still asserted. Manyconservative notions linger on in the heavy artillery. Obsolete ideashave not yet wholly disappeared even from the new regulations andordinances where they block the path of true progress; but, on thewhole, it has been realized that greater individual responsibility andself-reliance must be encouraged. In this respect the army is on theright road, and if it continues on it and continually resists thetemptation of restricting the independence of the subordinate for thesake of outward appearance, there is room for hope that gradually thehighest results will be attained, provided that competent militarycriticism has been equally encouraged. In this direction a healthy development has started, but insufficientattention has been given to the fact that the main features of war havecompletely changed. Although in the next war men will have to be handledby millions, the training of our officers is still being conducted onlines which belong to a past era, and virtually ignore modernconditions. Our manoeuvres more especially follow these lines. Most ofthe practical training is carried out in manoeuvres of brigades anddivisions--i. E. , in formations which could never occur in the greatdecisive campaigns of the future. From time to time--financial groundsunfortunately prevent it being an annual affair--a corps manoeuvre isheld, which also cannot be regarded as training for the command of"masses. " Sometimes, but rarely, several army corps are assembled forcombined training under veteran Generals, who soon afterwards leave theservice, and so cannot give the army the benefit of any experience whichthey may have gained. It cannot, of course, be denied that present-day manoeuvres areextraordinarily instructive and useful, especially for the troopsthemselves', but they are not a direct training for the command ofarmies in modern warfare. Even the so-called "Imperial Manoeuvres" onlycorrespond, to a very slight extent, to the requirements of modern war, since they never take account of the commissariat arrangements, andseldom of the arrangements for sheltering, etc. , the troops which wouldbe essential in real warfare. A glance at the Imperial Manoeuvres of1909 is sufficient to show that many of the operations could never havebeen carried out had it been a question of the troops being fed underthe conditions of war. It is an absolute necessity that our officersshould learn to pay adequate attention to these points, which are therule in warfare and appreciably cramp the power of operations. Intheory, of course, the commissariat waggons are always taken intoaccount; they are conscientiously mentioned in all orders, and in theoryare posted as a commissariat reserve between the corps and thedivisions. That they would in reality all have to circulate with apendulum-like frequency between the troops and the magazines, that themagazines would have to be almost daily brought forward or sent fartherback, that the position of the field bakeries is of extremeimportance--these are all points which are inconvenient and troublesome, and so are very seldom considered. In great strategic war-games, too, even in a theatre of war selected inRussia which excludes all living upon the country, the commissariatarrangements are rarely worked out in detail; I should almost doubtwhether on such occasions the possibility of exclusive "magazinefeeding" has ever been entertained. Even smaller opportunities of beingacquainted with these conditions are given to the officer in ordinarymanoeuvres, and yet it is extremely difficult on purely theoreticallines to become familiar with the machinery for moving and feeding alarge army and to master the subject efficiently. The friction and the obstacles which occur in reality cannot be broughthome to the student in theory, and the routine in managing such thingscannot be learnt from books. These conditions, then, are a great check on the freedom of operations, but, quite apart from the commissariat question, the movements of anarmy present considerable difficulties in themselves, which it isobviously very hard for the inexperienced to surmount. When, in 1870, some rather complicated army movements were contemplated, as on theadvance to Sedan, it was at once seen that the chief commanders were notmasters of the situation, that only the fertility of the theatre of warand the deficient attacking powers of the French allowed the operationsto succeed, although a man like Moltke was at the head of the army. Allthese matters have since been thoroughly worked out by our GeneralStaff, but the theoretical labours of the General Staff are by no meansthe common property of the army. On all these grounds I believe that first and foremost our manoeuvresmust be placed on a new footing corresponding to the completely alteredconditions, and that we must leave the beaten paths of tradition. Thetroops must be trained--as formerly--to the highest tactical efficiency, and the army must be developed into the most effective machine forcarrying out operations; success in modern war turns on these twopivots. But the leaders must be definitely educated for that war on thegreat scale which some day will have to be fought to a finish. The pathswe have hitherto followed do not lead to this goal. All methods of training and education must be in accordance with theseviews. I do not propose to go further into the battle training of infantry andcavalry in this place, since I have already discussed the question atlength in special treatises. [A] In the case of the artillery alone, someremarks on the principles guiding the technical training of this armseem necessary. [Footnote A: v. Bernhardi: "Taktik und Ausbildung der Infanterie, " 1910"Unsere Kavallerie im nächsten Krieg, " 1899; "Reiterdienst, " 1910. ] The demands on the fighting-efficiency of this arm--as is partlyexpressed in the regulations--may be summed up as follows: allpreconceived ideas and theories as to its employment must be put on oneside, and its one guiding principle must be to support the cavalry orinfantry at the decisive point. This principle is universallyacknowledged in theory, but it ought to be more enforced in practice. The artillery, therefore, must try more than ever to bring theirtactical duties into the foreground and to make their special technicalrequirements subservient to this idea. The ever-recurring tendency tofight chiefly the enemy's artillery must be emphatically checked. On thedefensive it will, of course, often be necessary to engage the attackingartillery, if there is any prospect of success, since this is the mostdreaded enemy of the infantry on the defensive; but, on the attack, itschief duty always is to fire upon the enemy's infantry, where possible, from masked positions. The principle of keeping the artillery divisionsclose together on the battlefield and combining the fire in onedirection, must not be carried to an extreme. The artillery certainlymust be employed on a large plan, and the chief in command must see thatthere is a concentration of effort at the decisive points; but inparticular cases, and among the varying incidents of a battle, this ideawill be carried out less effectively by uniformity of orders than byexplaining the general scheme to the subordinate officers, and leavingto them the duty of carrying it out. Accordingly, it is important thatthe personal initiative of the subordinate officer should be recognizedmore fully than before; for in a crisis such independent action isindispensable. The great extent of the battlefields and the naturalendeavour to select wooded and irregular ground for the attack willoften force the artillery to advance in groups or in lines one behindthe other, and to attempt, notwithstanding, united action against thetactically most important objective. This result is hard to attain by acentralization of command, and is best realized by the independentaction of tactically trained subordinates. This is not the place to enter into technical details, and I will onlymention some points which appear especially important. The Bz shell _(Granatschuss)_ should be withdrawn as unsuitable, and itsuse should not form part of the training. It requires, in order toattain its specific effect against rifle-pits, such accurate aiming asis very seldom possible in actual warfare. No very great value should be attached to firing with shrapnel. It seemsto be retained in France and to have shown satisfactory results with us;but care must be taken not to apply the experiences of theshooting-range directly to serious warfare. No doubt its use, ifsuccessful, promises rapid results, but it may easily lead, especiallyin the "mass" battle, to great errors in calculation. In any case, practice with Az shot is more trustworthy, and is of the first importance. The Az fire must be reserved principally for the last stages of anoffensive engagement, as was lately laid down in the regulations. Care must be taken generally not to go too far in refinements andcomplications of strategy and devices. Only the simplest methods can besuccessfully applied in battle; this fact must never be forgotten. The important point in the general training of the artillery is thattext-book pedantries--for example, in the reports on shooting--should berelegated more than hitherto to the background, and that tactics shouldbe given a more prominent position. In this way only can the artillerydo really good service in action; but the technique of shooting must notbe neglected in the reports. That would mean rejecting the good and theevil together, and the tendency to abolish such reports as inconvenientmust be distinctly opposed. Under this head, attention must be called to the independent manoeuvresof artillery regiments and brigades in the country, which entail largeexpenditure, and, in fact, do more harm than good. They must, in myopinion, be abandoned or at least considerably modified, since theirpossible use is not in proportion to their cost and their drawbacks. They lead to pronounced tactics of position _(Stellungstaktik)_ whichare impracticable in war; and the most important lesson in actualwar--the timely employment of artillery within a defined space and for adefinite object without any previous reconnoitring of the country insearch of suitable positions for the batteries--can never be learnt onthese manoeuvres. They could be made more instructive if the tacticallimits were marked by troops; but the chief defect in thesemanoeuvres--viz. , that the artillery is regarded as the decisivearm--cannot be thus remedied. The usual result is that favourableartillery positions are searched for, and that they are then adhered tounder some tactical pretence. After all, only a slight shifting of the existing centre of gravity maybe necessary, so far as the development of the fighting _tactics_ of thevarious branches of the service is concerned, in order to bring theminto line with modern conditions. If, however, the troops are to beeducated to a higher efficiency in _operations_, completely new groundmust be broken, on which, I am convinced, great results and an undoubtedsuperiority over our opponents can be attained. Considerabledifficulties will have to be surmounted, for the crucial point is toamass immense armies on a genuine war footing; but these difficultiesare not, in my opinion, insurmountable. There are two chief points: first, the practice of marching andoperations in formations at war strength, fully equipped withwell-stocked magazines as on active service; and, secondly, areorganization of the manoeuvres, which must be combined with a morethorough education of the chief commanders. As regards the first point, practice on this scale, so far as I know, has never yet been attempted. But if we consider, firstly, how valuablemore rapid and accurate movements of great masses will be for the war ofthe future, and, secondly, what serious difficulties they involve, weshall be rewarded for the attempt to prepare the army systematically forthe discharge of such duties, and thus to win an unquestioned advantageover our supposed antagonist. The preparation for the larger manoeuvres of this sort can naturallyalso be carried out in smaller formation. It is, moreover, veryimportant to train large masses of troops--brigades and divisions--inlong marches across country by night and day with pioneer sections inthe vanguard, in order to gain experience for the technique of suchmovements, and to acquire by practice a certain security in them. Training marches with full military stores, etc. , in columns of 20 to 25kilometres depth would be still more valuable, since they correspond tothe daily needs of real warfare. Should it not be possible to assembletwo army corps in such manoeuvres, then the necessary depth of march canbe obtained by letting the separate detachments march with suitableintervals, in which case the intervals must be very strictly observed. This does not ever really reproduce the conditions of actual warfare, but it is useful as a makeshift. The waggons for the troops would haveto be hired, as On manoeuvres, though only partly, in order to saveexpense. The supplies could be brought on army transport trains, whichwould represent the pioneer convoys _(Verpflegungsstaffel)_, and wouldregulate their pace accordingly. Marching merely for training purposes in large formations, with foodsupplied from the field-kitchens during the march, would also be ofconsiderable value provided that care is taken to execute the march inthe shortest possible time, and to replace the provisions consumed bybringing fresh supplies forward from the rear; this process is onlyproperly seen when the march, with supplies as if in war, is continuedfor several days. It is naturally not enough to undertake thesemanoeuvres once in a way; they must be a permanent institution if theyare intended to develop a sound knowledge of marching in the army. Finally, flank marches must be practised, sometimes in separate columns, sometimes in army formation. The flank marches of separate columns will, of course, be useful only when they are combined with practice infeeding an army as if in war, so that the commissariat columns march onthe side away from the enemy, in a parallel line, and are thence broughtup to the troops at the close of the march. Flank marches in armyformation will have some value, even apart from any training in thecommissariat system, since the simultaneous crossing of several marchingcolumns on parallel by-roads is not an easy manoeuvre in itself. Butthis exercise will have its full value only when the regulationcommissariat waggons are attached, which would have to move with themand furnish the supplies. I also consider that operative movements in army formation extendingover several days are desirable. Practice must be given in movingbackwards and forwards in the most various combinations, in flankmovements, and in doubling back, the lines of communication in the rearbeing blocked when necessary. Then only can all the difficulties whichoccur on such movements be shown one by one, and it can be seen wherethe lever must be applied in order to remove them. In this way alone canthe higher commanders gain the necessary certainty in conducting suchoperations, so as to be able to employ them under the pressure of ahostile attack. An army so disciplined would, I imagine, acquire apronounced superiority over any opponent who made his first experimentsin such operations in actual war. The major strategic movements on bothsides in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 sufficiently showed that. I recognize naturally that all exercises on this scale would cost agreat deal of money and could never all be carried out systematicallyone after the other. I wished, however, to ventilate the subject, firstly, in order to recommend all officers in high command to study thepoints of view under consideration--a thing they much neglect to do;secondly, because it might be sometimes profitable and possible to carryout in practice one or other of them--at the Imperial Manoeuvres, forexample, or on some other occasion. How much could be saved in moneyalone and applied usefully to this purpose were the above-mentionedcountry manoeuvres of the artillery suspended? From reasons of economyall the commissariat waggons and columns need not actually be employedon such manoeuvres. It would be useful, however, if, in addition to onedetachment equipped on a war footing, the head waggons of the othergroups were present and were moved along at the proper distance fromeach other and from the detachment, which could mainly be fed from thekitchen waggon. It would thus be possible to get a sort of presentationof the whole course of the commissariat business and to acquire valuableexperience. It is, indeed, extraordinarily difficult to arrange suchmanoeuvres properly, and it must be admitted that much friction and manyobstacles are got rid of if only the heads of the groups are marked out, and that false ideas thus arise which may lead to erroneous conclusions;but under careful direction such manoeuvres would certainly not bewholly useless, especially if attention is mainly paid to the matterswhich are really essential. They would, at any rate, be far morevaluable than many small manoeuvres, which can frequently be replaced byexercises on the large drill-grounds, than many expensive trainings inthe country, which are of no real utility, or than many other militaryinstitutions which are only remotely connected with the object oftraining under active service conditions. All that does not directlypromote this object must be erased from our system of education at atime when the highest values are at stake. Even then exercise in operations on a large scale cannot often becarried out, primarily because of the probable cost, and next because itis not advisable to interrupt too often the tactical training of thetroops. It must be repeated in a definite cycle in each large formation, so thateventually all superior officers may have the opportunity of becomingpractically acquainted with these operations, and also that the troopsmay become familiarized with the modern commissariat system; but sincesuch practical exercises must always be somewhat incomplete, they mustalso be worked out beforehand theoretically. It is not at all sufficientthat the officers on the General Staff and the Intendants have a masteryof these subjects. The rank and file must be well up in them; butespecially the officers who will be employed on the supply service--thatis to say, the transport officers of the standing army and thoseofficers on the furlough establishment, who would be employed as columncommanders. The practical service in the transport battalions and the dutiesperformed by the officers of the last-mentioned category who areassigned to these battalions are insufficient to attain this object. They learn from these mainly practical duties next to nothing of thesystem as a whole. It would therefore be advisable that all theseofficers should go through a special preliminary course for thisservice, in which the whole machinery of the army movements would beexplained to them by the officers of the General Staff and the highertransport service officers, and they would then learn by practicalexamples to calculate the whole movement of the columns in the mostvaried positions with precise regard to distances and time. This wouldbe far more valuable for war than the many and often excessive trainingsin driving, etc. , on which so much time is wasted. The technicaldriver's duty is very simple in all columns and trains, but it is noteasy to know in each position what is the crucial point, in order to beable, when occasion arises, to act independently. While, therefore, on the one hand, driving instruction must bethoroughly carried out, on the other hand, the institution of ascientific transport service course, in which, by practical examples outof military history, the importance of these matters can be explained, is under present circumstances an absolute necessity. I have shownelsewhere how necessary it is to proceed absolutely systematically inthe arrangements for relays of supplies, since the operativecapabilities of the army depend on this system. Its nature, however, cannot be realized by the officers concerned like a sudden inspirationwhen mobilization takes place; knowledge of its principles must begained by study, and a proof of the complete misapprehension of theimportance which this service has attained under modern conditions isthat officers are supposed to be able to manage it successfully withouthaving made in peace-time a profound scientific study of the matter. The transport service has advanced to a place of extraordinaryimportance in the general system of modern warfare. It should beappreciated accordingly. Every active transport service officer ought, after some years' service, to attend a scientific course; all the seniorofficers on the furlough establishment intended for transport serviceought, as their first duty, to be summoned to attend such a course. Ifthese educational courses were held in the autumn in the training campsof the troops, they would entail little extra cost, and an inestimableadvantage would be gained with a very trifling outlay. The results of such a measure can only be fully realized in war, whenthe superior officers also thoroughly grasp these matters and do notmake demands contrary to the nature of the case, and thereforeimpossible to be met. They should therefore be obliged to undergo athorough education in the practical duties of the General Staff, and notmerely in leading troops in action. This reflection leads to the discussion of the momentous question how, generally, the training of the superior officers for the great warshould be managed, and how the manoeuvres ought to be reorganized with aview to the training. The essential contradiction between our obsoletemethod of training and the completely altered demands of a new eraappears here with peculiar distinctness. A large part of our superior commanders pass through the General Staff, while part have attended at least the military academy; but when thesemen reach the higher positions what they learnt in their youth has longbecome out of date. The continuation school is missing. It can bereplaced only by personal study; but there is generally insufficienttime for this, and often a lack of interest. The daily duties oftraining troops claim all the officer's energy, and he needs greatdetermination and love of hard work to continue vigorously his ownscientific education. The result is, that comparatively few of oursuperior officers have a fairly thorough knowledge, much less anindependently thought out view, of the conditions of war on the greatscale. This would cost dearly in real war. Experience shows that it isnot enough that the officers of the General Staff attached to the leaderare competent to fill up this gap. The leader, if he cannot himselfgrasp the conditions, becomes the tool of his subordinates; he believeshe is directing and is himself being directed. This is a far fromhealthy condition. Our present manoeuvres are, as already mentioned, only occasionally a school for officers in a strategical sense, and fromthe tactical point of view they do not meet modern requirements. Theminor manoeuvres especially do not represent what is the most importantfeature in present-day warfare--i. E. , the sudden concentration oflarger forces on the one side and the impossibility, from spaceconsiderations, of timely counter-movements on the other. The minormanoeuvres are certainly useful in many respects. The commanders learnto form decisions and to give orders, and these are two importantmatters; but the same result would follow from manoeuvres on the grandscale, which would also to some extent reproduce the modern conditionsof warfare. Brigade manoeuvres especially belong to a past generation, and merelyencourage wrong ideas. All that the soldiers learn from them--that is, fighting in the country--can be taught on the army drill-grounds. Divisional manoeuvres are still of some value even to the commanders. The principles of tactical leadership in detail can be exemplified inthem; but the first instructive manoeuvres in the modern sense are thoseof the army corps; still more valuable are the manoeuvres on a largerscale, in which several army corps are combined, especially when theoperating divisions are considered part of one whole, and are compelledto act in connection with one grand general scheme of operation. Thegreat art in organizing manoeuvres is to reproduce such conditions, foronly in this way can the strain of the general situation and thecollective mass of individual responsibility, such as exist in actualwarfare, be distinctly brought home. This is a most weightyconsideration. The superior officers must have clearly brought beforetheir eyes the limits of the possible and the impossible in modernwarfare, in order to be trained to deal with great situations. The requirements which these reflections suggest are the restriction ofsmall-scale manoeuvres in favour of the large and predominantlystrategical manoeuvres, and next the abolition of some less importantmilitary exercises in order to apply the money thus saved in thisdirection. We must subject all our resources to a single test--that theyconduce to the perfecting of a modern army. We must subject all ourresources to a single test--that they conduce to the perfecting of amodern army. If the military drill-grounds are suitably enlarged (arather difficult but necessary process, since, in view of the range ofthe artillery and the mass tactics, they have generally become toosmall) a considerable part of the work which is done in the divisionalmanoeuvres could be carried out on them. The money saved by this changecould be devoted to the large army manoeuvres. One thing is certain: agreat impulse must be given to the development of our manoeuvre systemif it is to fulfil its purpose as formerly; in organization andexecution these manoeuvres must be modern in the best sense of the word. It seems, however, quite impossible to carry out this sort of trainingon so comprehensive a scale that it will by itself be sufficient toeducate serviceable commanders for the great war. The manoeuvres canonly show their full value if the officers of every rank who take partin them have already had a competent training in theory. To encourage this preliminary training of the superior officers is thusone of the most serious tasks of an efficient preparation for war. Thesemust not regard their duty as lying exclusively in the training of thetroops, but must also be ever striving further to educate themselves andtheir subordinates for leadership in the great war. Strategic war gameson a large scale, which in the army corps can be conducted by thecommanding Generals, and in the army-inspections by the Inspectors, seemto me to be the only means by which this end can be attained. Allsuperior officers must be criticized by the standard of their efficiencyin superior commands. The threads of all this training will meet in thehands of the Chief of the General Army Staff as the strategicallyresponsible authority. It seems undesirable in any case to leave it more or less to chance todecide whether those who hold high commands will be competent or not fortheir posts. The circumstances that a man is an energetic commander ofa division, or as General in command maintains discipline in his armycorps, affords no conclusive proof that he is fitted to be the leader ofan army. Military history supplies many instances of this. No proof is required to show that under the conditions of modern warfarethe reconnoitring and screening units require special training. Thepossibility and the success of all operations are in the highest degreedependent on their activity. I have for years pointed out the absolutenecessity of preparing our cavalry officers scientifically for theirprofession, and I can only repeat the demand that our cavalryriding-schools should be organized also as places of scientificeducation. I will also once more declare that it is wrong that the bulkof the training of the army cavalry should consist in the divisionalcavalry exercises on the military drill-grounds. These exercises do notcorrespond at all to actual conditions, and inculcate quite wrongnotions in the officers, as every cavalry officer in high command findsout who, having been taught on the drill-ground, has to lead a cavalrydivision on manoeuvres. The centre of gravity of effectiveness in war rests on the directing ofoperations and on the skilful transition from strategical independenceto combination in attack; the great difficulty of leading cavalry liesin these conditions, and this can no more be learnt on the drill-groundsthan systematic screening and reconnaissance duties. The perpetualsubject of practice on the drill-grounds, a cavalry engagement betweentwo divisions in close formation, will hardly ever occur in war. Anyunprejudiced examination of the present conditions must lead to thisresult, and counsels the cavalry arm to adopt a course which may beregarded as a serious preparation for war. It is a truly remarkable fact that the artillery, which in fact, alwaysacts only in combination with the other arms, carries out annuallyextensive independent manoeuvres, as if it had by itself a definiteeffect on the course of the campaign, while the army cavalry, which_always_ takes the field independently, hardly ever trains by itself, but carefully practises that combination with infantry which is onlyrarely necessary in war. This clearly demonstrates the unsystematic andantiquated methods of all our training. Practice in reconnoitring and screening tactics, as well as raids on alarge scale, are what is wanted for the training of the cavalry. Co-operation with the air-fleet will be a further development, so soonas aviation has attained such successes that it may be reckoned as anintegral factor of army organization. The airship division and thecavalry have kindred duties, and must co-operate under the same command, especially for screening purposes, which are all-important. The methods for the training of pioneers which correspond fully tomodern requirements have been pointed out by General v. Beseler. Thisarm need only be developed further in the direction which thisdistinguished officer has indicated in order to satisfy the needs of thenext war. In the field war its chief importance will be found to be in the supportof the infantry in attacks on fortified positions, and in theconstruction of similar positions. Tactical requirements must, however, be insisted upon in this connection. The whole training must be guidedby considerations of tactics. This is the main point. As regards sieges, especial attention must be devoted to training the miners, since theobject is to capture rapidly the outlying forts and to take thefortresses which can resist the attack of the artillery. The duties of the Army Service Corps[B] are clear. They must, on the onehand, be efficiently trained for the intelligence department, especiallyfor the various duties of the telegraph branch, and be ready to giveevery kind of assistance to the airships; on the other hand, they mustlook after and maintain the strategical capacities of the army. Therapid construction of railroads, especially light railways, the speedyrepair of destroyed lines, the protection of traffic on militaryrailways, and the utilization of motors for various purposes, are theduties for which these troops must be trained. A thorough knowledge andmastery of the essential principles of operations are indispensablequalifications in their case also. They can only meet their many-sidedand all-important duties by a competent acquaintance with the methodsand system of army movements on every scale. It is highly important, therefore, that the officers of the Army Service Corps should bethoroughly trained in military science. [Footnote B: _Verkehrstruppen_. ] Thus in every direction we see the necessity to improve the intellectualdevelopment of the army, and to educate it to an appreciation of theclose connection of the multifarious duties of war. This appreciation isrequisite, not merely for the leaders and special branches of theservice; it must permeate the whole corps of officers, and to somedegree the non-commissioned officers also. It will bear good fruit inthe training of the men. The higher the stage on which the teacherstands, and the greater his intellectual grasp of the subject, the morecomplete will be his influence on the scholars, the more rapidly andsuccessfully will he reach the understanding of his subordinates, andthe more thoroughly will he win from them that confidence and respectwhich are the firmest foundations of discipline. All the means employedto improve the education of our establishment of officers in the scienceof war and general subjects will be richly repaid in efficient serviceon every other field of practical activity. Intellectual exercise givestone to brain and character, and a really deep comprehension of war andits requirements postulates a certain philosophic mental education andbent, which makes it possible to assess the value of phenomena in theirreciprocal relations, and to estimate correctly the imponderabilia. Theeffort to produce this higher intellectual standard in the officers'corps must be felt in their training from the military school onwards, and must find its expression in a school of military education of ahigher class than exists at present. A military academy as such was contemplated by Scharnhorst. To-day itassumed rather the character of a preparatory school for the GeneralStaff. Instruction in history and mathematics is all that remains of itsformer importance. The instruction in military history was entirelydivested of its scientific character by the method of applicationemployed, and became wholly subservient to tactics. In this way themeaning of the study of military history was obscured, and even to-day, so far as I know, the lectures on military history primarily servepurposes of directly professional education. I cannot say how far thelanguage teaching imparts the spirit of foreign tongues. At any rate, itculminates in the examination for interpreterships, and thus pursues adirectly practical end. This development was in a certain sensenecessary. A quite specifically professional education of the officersof the General Staff is essential under present conditions. I will notdecide whether it was therefore necessary to limit the broad and trulyacademical character of the institution. In any case, we need in thearmy of to-day an institution which gives opportunity for theindependent study of military science from the higher standpoint, andprovides at the same time a comprehensive general education. I believethat the military academy could be developed into such an institution, without any necessity of abandoning the direct preparation of theofficers for service on the General Staff. By the side of the militarysciences proper, which might be limited in many directions, lectures ongeneral scientific subjects might be organized, to which admissionshould be free. In similar lectures the great military problems might bediscussed from the standpoint of military philosophy, and the hearersmight gain some insight into the legitimacy of war, its relations topolitics, the co-operation of material and imponderable forces, theimportance of free personality under the pressure of necessaryphenomena, sharp contradictions and violent opposition, as well as intothe duties of a commander viewed from the higher standpoint. Limitation and concentration of the compulsory subjects, such as are nowarranged on an educational plan in three consecutive annual courses, andthe institution of free lectures on subjects of general culture, intended not only to educate officers of the General Staff, but to trainmen who are competent to discharge the highest military and civicduties--this is what is required for the highest military educationalinstitution of the German army. CHAPTER XII PREPARATION FOR THE NAVAL WAR "Germany's future lies on the sea. " A proud saying, which contains agreat truth. If the German people wish to attain a distinguished futureand fulfil their mission of civilization, they must adopt a world policyand act as a World Power. This task can only be performed if they aresupported by an adequate sea power. Our fleet must be so strong at leastthat a war with us involves such dangers, even to the strongestopponent, that the losses, which might be expected, would endanger hisposition as a World Power. Now, as proved in another place, we can only stake our forces safely ona world policy if our political and military superiority on thecontinent of Europe be immovably established. This goal is not yetreached, and must be our first objective. Nevertheless, we must now takesteps to develop by sea also a power which is sufficient for ourpretensions. It is, on the one hand, indispensably necessary for thefull security of our Continental position that we guard our coasts andrepel oversea attacks. On the other hand, it is an absolute economicnecessity for us to protect the freedom of the seas--by arms if needsbe--since our people depend for livelihood on the export industry, andthis, again, requires a large import trade. The political greatness ofGermany rests not least on her flourishing economic life and her overseatrade. The maintenance of the freedom of the seas must therefore bealways before our eyes as the object of all our naval constructions. Ourefforts must not be merely directed towards the necessary repulse ofhostile attacks; we must be conscious of the higher ideal, that we wishto follow an effective world policy, and that our naval power is destinedultimately to support this world policy. Unfortunately, we did not adopt this view at the start, when we firstventured on the open sea. Much valuable time was wasted in striving forlimited and insufficient objects. The Emperor William II. Was destinedto be the first to grasp this question in its bearing on the world'shistory, and to treat it accordingly. All our earlier naval activitymust be set down as fruitless. We have been busied for years in building a fleet. Most variedconsiderations guided our policy. A clear, definite programme was firstdrawn up by the great Naval Act of 1900, the supplementary laws of 1906, and the regulations as to the life of the ships in 1908. It is, ofcourse, improbable that the last word has been said on the subject. Theneeds of the future will decide, since there can be no certain standardfor the naval forces which a State may require: that depends on theclaims which are put forward, and on the armaments of the other nations. At first the only object was to show our flag on the sea and on thecoasts on which we traded. The first duty of the fleet was to safeguardthis commerce. Opposition to the great outlay thus necessitated was soonshown by a party which considered a fleet not merely superfluous forGermany, but actually dangerous, and objected to the plans of theGovernment, which they stigmatized as boundless. Another party wascontent with a simple scheme of coast-protection only, and thought thisobject attained if some important points on the coast were defended byartillery and cheap flotillas of gunboats were stationed at various places. This view was not long maintained. All discerning persons were convincedof the necessity to face and drive back an aggressive rival on the highseas. It was recognized that ironclads were needed for this, since theaggressor would have them at his disposal. But this policy, it wasthought, could be satisfied by half-measures. The so-called_Ausfallkorvetten_ were sanctioned, but emphasis was laid on the factthat we were far from wishing to compete with the existing large navies, and that we should naturally be content with a fleet of the second rank. This standpoint was soon recognized to be untenable, and there was afresh current of feeling, whose adherents supported the view that thecostly ironclads could be made superfluous by building in their place alarge number of torpedo-boats. These, in spite of their small fightingcapacity, would be able to attack the strongest ironclads by well-aimedtorpedoes. It was soon realized that this theory rested on afallacy--that a country like the German Empire, which depends on anextensive foreign trade in order to find work and food for its growingpopulation, and, besides, is hated everywhere because of its politicaland economic prosperity, could not forego a strong armament at sea andon its coasts. At last a standpoint had been reached which correspondedwith actual needs. The different abortive attempts to solve the navy question in the mostinexpensive manner have cost us much money and, above all, as alreadystated, much time; so that, at the present day, when we stand in themidst of a great crisis in the world's history, we must summon all ourstrength to make up for lost opportunities, and to build a thoroughlyeffective ocean-going fleet of warships in addition to an adequate guardfor our coasts. We have at last come to see that the protection of ourcommerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the onlyobject of such a fleet, but that it, like the land army, is aninstrument for carrying out the political ends of the State andsupporting its justifiable ambitions. There can be no question of suchlimited objects as protection of commerce and passive coast defence. Afew cruisers are enough to protect commerce in times of peace; but inwar the only way to safeguard it is to defeat and, where possible, destroy the hostile fleet. A direct protection of all trade lines isobviously impossible. Commerce can only be protected indirectly by thedefeat of the enemy. A passive defence of the coast can never count onpermanent success. The American War of Secession, amongst others, showedthat sufficiently. The object of our fleet, therefore, is to defeat our possible rivals atsea, and force them to make terms, in order to guarantee unimpededcommerce to our merchantmen and to protect our colonies. It is therefore an erroneous idea that our fleet exists merely fordefence, and must be built with that view. It is intended to meet ourpolitical needs, and must therefore be capable of being employedaccording to the exigencies of the political position; on the offensive, when the political situation demands it, and an attack promises success;on the defensive, when we believe that more advantages can be obtainedin this way. At the present day, indeed, the political grouping of theGreat Powers makes a strategical offensive by sea an impossibility. Wemust, however, reckon with the future, and then circumstances may arisewhich would render possible an offensive war on a large scale. The strength which we wish to give to our fleet must therefore becalculated with regard to its probable duties in war. It is obvious thatwe must not merely consider the possible opponents who at the moment areweaker than we are, but rather, and principally, those who are stronger, unless we were in the position to avoid a conflict with them under allcircumstances. Our fleet must in any case be so powerful that ourstrongest antagonist shrinks from attacking us without convincingreasons. If he determines to attack us, we must have at least a chanceof victoriously repelling this attack--in other words, of inflictingsuch heavy loss on the enemy that he will decline in his own intereststo carry on the war to the bitter end, and that he will see his ownposition threatened if he exposes himself to these losses. This conception of our duty on the sea points directly to the fact thatthe English fleet must set the standard by which to estimate thenecessary size of our naval preparations. A war with England is probablythat which we shall first have to fight out by sea; the possibility ofvictoriously repelling an English attack must be the guiding principlefor our naval preparations; and if the English continuously increasetheir fleet, we must inevitably follow them on the same road, evenbeyond the limits of our present Naval Estimates. We must not, however, forget that it will not be possible for us formany years to attack on the open sea the far superior English fleet. Wemay only hope, by the combination of the fleet with the coastfortifications, the airfleet, and the commercial war, to defendourselves successfully against this our strongest opponent, as was shownin the chapter on the next naval war. The enemy must be wearied out andexhausted by the enforcement of the blockade, and by fighting againstall the expedients which we shall employ for the defence of our coast;our fleet, under the protection of these expedients, will continuallyinflict partial losses on him, and thus gradually we shall be able tochallenge him to a pitched battle on the high seas. These are the linesthat our preparation for war must follow. A strong coast fortress as abase for our fleet, from which it can easily and at any moment take theoffensive, and on which the waves of the hostile superiority can breakharmlessly, is the recognized and necessary preliminary condition forthis class of war. Without such a trustworthy coast fortress, built witha view to offensive operations, our fleet could be closely blockaded bythe enemy, and prevented from any offensive movements. Mines alonecannot close the navigation so effectively that the enemy cannot breakthrough, nor can they keep it open in such a way that we should be ableto adopt the offensive under all circumstances. For this purposepermanent works are necessary which command the navigation and allowmines to be placed. I cannot decide the question whether our coast defence, which in theNorth Sea is concentrated in Heligoland and Borkum, corresponds to theserequirements. If it is not so, then our first most serious duty must beto fill up the existing gaps, in order to create an assured base for ournaval operations. This is a national duty which we dare not evade, although it demands great sacrifices from us. Even the furtherdevelopment of our fleet, important as that is, would sink into thebackground as compared with the urgency of this duty, because its onlyaction against the English fleet which holds out any prospect of successpresupposes the existence of some such fortress. But the question must be looked at from another aspect. The Morocco negotiations in the summer of 1911 displayed theunmistakable hostility of England to us. They showed that England isdetermined to hinder by force any real expansion of Germany's power. Only the fear of the possible intervention of England deterred us fromclaiming a sphere of interests of our own in Morocco, and, nevertheless, the attempt to assert our unquestionable rights in North Africa provokedmenacing utterances from various English statesmen. If we consider this behaviour in connection with England's militarypreparations, there can be no doubt that England seriously contemplatesattacking Germany should the occasion arise. The concentration of theEnglish naval forces in the North Sea, the feverish haste to increasethe English fleet, the construction of new naval stations, undisguisedlyintended for action against Germany, of which we have already spoken;the English _espionage_, lately vigorously practised, on the Germancoasts, combined with continued attempts to enlist allies against us andto isolate us in Europe--all this can only be reasonably interpreted asa course of preparation for an aggressive war. At any rate, it is quiteimpossible to regard the English preparations as defensive andprotective measures only; for the English Government knows perfectlywell that Germany cannot think of attacking England: such an attemptwould be objectless from the first. Since the destruction of the Germannaval power lies in the distinct interests of England and her schemesfor world empire, we must reckon at least with the possibility of anEnglish attack. We must make it clear to ourselves that we are not ableto postpone this attack as we wish. It has been already mentioned thatthe recent attitude of Italy may precipitate a European crisis; we mustmake up our minds, then, that England will attack us on some pretext orother soon, before the existing balance of power, which is veryfavourable for England, is shifted possibly to her disadvantage. Especially, if the Unionist party comes into power again, must we reckonupon a strong English Imperial policy which may easily bring about war. Under these circumstances we cannot complete our armament by sea and ourcoast defences in peaceful leisure, in accordance with theoreticalprinciples. On the contrary, we must strain our financial resources inorder to carry on, and if possible to accelerate, the expansion of ourfleet, together with the fortification of our coast. It would bejustifiable, under the conditions, to meet our financial requirements byloans, if no other means can be found; for here questions of thegreatest moment are at stake--questions, it may fairly be said, ofexistence. Let us imagine the endless misery which a protracted stoppage ordefinite destruction of our oversea trade would bring upon the wholenation, and, in particular, on the masses of the industrial classes wholive on our export trade. This consideration by itself shows theabsolute necessity of strengthening our naval forces in combination withour coast defences so thoroughly that we can look forward to thedecisive campaign with equanimity. Even the circumstance that we cannot, perhaps, find crews at once for the ships which we are building need notcheck the activity of our dockyards; for these ships will be valuable toreplace the loss in vessels which must occur in any case. The rapid completion of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal is of great importance, in order that our largest men-of-war may appear unexpectedly in theBaltic or in the North Sea. But it does not meet all militaryrequirements. It is a question whether it is not expedient to obtainsecure communication by a canal between the mouth of the Ems, the Bay ofJahde, and the mouth of the Elbe, in order to afford our fleet morepossibilities of concentration. All three waters form a sally-port inthe North Sea, and it would be certainly a great advantage if ourbattleships could unexpectedly unite in these three places. I cannotgive any opinion as to the feasibility of this scheme. If it isfeasible, we ought to shirk no sacrifices to realize it. Such a canalmight prove of decisive value, since our main prospect of successdepends on our ability to break up the forces of the enemy by continuousunexpected attacks, and on our thus finding an opportunity to inflictheavy losses upon him. As regards the development of the fleet itself, we must push on thecompletion of our battle-fleet, which consists of ships of the line andthe usual complement of large cruisers. It does not possess in itspresent condition an effective value in proportion to its numbers. Therecan be no doubt on this point. Five of the ships of the line, of theKaiser class, are quite obsolete, and the vessels of the Wittelsbachclass carry as heaviest guns only 24-centimetre cannons, which must beconsidered quite inadequate for a sea-battle of to-day. We are in aworse plight with regard to our large cruisers. The five ships of theHansa class have no fighting value; the three large cruisers of thePrince class (_Adalbert, Friedrich Karl, Heinrich_) fulfil their purposeneither in speed, effective range, armament, nor armour-plating. Eventhe armoured cruisers _Fürst Bismarck, Roon, York, Gneisenau, _ and_Scharnhorst_ do not correspond in any respect to modern requirements. If we wish, therefore, to be really ready for a war, we must shorten thetime allowed for building, and replace as rapidly as possible thesetotally useless vessels--nine large cruisers and five battleships--bynew and thoroughly effective ships. Anyone who regards the lowering thunder-clouds on the political horizonwill admit this necessity. The English may storm and protest ever sostrongly: care for our country must stand higher than all political andall financial considerations. We must create new types of battleships, which may be superior to the English in speed and fighting qualities. That is no light task, for the most modern English ships of the linehave reached a high stage of perfection, and the newest English cruisersare little inferior in fighting value to the battleships proper. Butsuperiority in individual units, together with the greatest possiblereadiness for war, are the only means by which a few ships can be madeto do, at any rate, what is most essential. Since the Krupp guns possessa certain advantage--which is not, in fact, very great--over the Englishheavy naval guns, it is possible to gain a start in this department, andto equip our ships with superior attacking power. A more powerfulartillery is a large factor in success, which becomes more marked themore it is possible to distribute the battery on the ship in such a waythat all the guns may be simultaneously trained to either side orstraight ahead. Besides the battle-fleet proper, the torpedo-boats play a prominent partin strategic offence and defence alike. The torpedo-fleet, therefore--especially having regard to the crushing superiority ofEngland--requires vigorous encouragement, and all the more so because, so far, at least, as training goes, we possess a true factor ofsuperiority in them. In torpedo-boats we are, thanks to the highstandard of training in the _personnel_ and the excellence ofconstruction, ahead of all other navies. We must endeavour to keep thisposition, especially as regards the torpedoes, in which, according tothe newspaper accounts, other nations are competing with us, by tryingto excel us in range of the projectile at high velocity. We must alsodevote our full attention to submarines, and endeavour to make thesevessels more effective in attack. If we succeed in developing thisbranch of our navy, so that it meets the military requirements in everydirection, and combines an increased radius of effectiveness withincreased speed and seaworthiness, we shall achieve great results withthese vessels in the defence of our coasts and in unexpected attacks onthe enemy's squadrons. A superior efficiency in this field would beextraordinarily advantageous to us. Last, not least, we must devote ourselves more energetically to thedevelopment of aviation for naval purposes. If it were possible to makeairships and flying-machines thoroughly available for war, so that theycould be employed in unfavourable weather and for aggressive purposes, they might render essential services to the fleet. The air-fleet wouldthen, as already explained in Chapter VIII. , be able to reportsuccessfully, to spy out favourable opportunities for attacks by thebattle-fleet or the torpedo-fleet, and to give early notice of theapproach of the enemy in superior force. It would also be able toprevent the enemy's airships from reconnoitring, and would thusfacilitate the execution of surprise attacks. Again, it could repulse orfrustrate attacks on naval depots and great shipping centres. If ourairships could only be so largely developed that they, on their side, could undertake an attack and carry fear and destruction to the Englishcoasts, they would lend still more effective aid to our fleet whenfighting against the superior force of the enemy. It can hardly bedoubted that technical improvements will before long make it possible toperform such services. A pronounced superiority of our air-fleet overthe English would contribute largely to equalize the difference instrength of the two navies more and more during the course of the war. It should be the more possible to gain a superiority in this fieldbecause our supposed enemies have not any start on us, and we cancompete for the palm of victory on equal terms. Besides the campaign against the enemy's war-fleet, preparations must becarefully made in peace-time for the war on commerce, which would beespecially effective in a struggle against England, as that countryneeds imports more than any other. Consequently great results wouldfollow if we succeeded in disturbing the enemy's commerce and harassinghis navigation. The difficulties of such an undertaking have beendiscussed in a previous chapter. It is all the more imperative toorganize our preparations in such a way that the swift ships intendedfor the commercial war should be able to reach their scene of activityunexpectedly before the enemy has been able to block our harbours. Theauxiliary cruisers must be so equipped in peace-time that when on theopen sea they may assume the character of warships at a moment's notice, when ordered by wireless telegraphy to do so. A rapid mobilization is especially important in the navy, since we mustbe ready for a sudden attack at any time, possibly in time of peace. History tells us what to expect from the English on this head. In the middle of peace they bombarded Copenhagen from September 2 toSeptember 5, 1807, and carried off the Danish fleet. Four hundred houseswere burnt, 2, 000 damaged, 3, 000 peaceful and innocent inhabitants werekilled. If some explanation, though no justification, of the conduct ofEngland is seen in the lawlessness of all conditions then existing, andin the equally ruthless acts of Napoleon, still the occurrence showsdistinctly of what measures England is capable if her command of theseas is endangered. And this practice has not been forgotten. On July 11and 12, 1882, exactly thirty years ago, Alexandria was similarlybombarded in peace-time, and Egypt occupied by the English under thehypocritical pretext that Arabi Pasha had ordered a massacre of theforeigners. The language of such historical facts is clear. It is wellnot to forget them. The Russo-Japanese War also is a warning how modern wars begin; so alsoItaly, with her political and military attack on Turkey. Turkish ships, suspecting nothing of war, were attacked and captured by the Italians. Now, it must not be denied that such a method of opening a campaign aswas adopted by Japan and Italy may be justified under certainconditions. The interests of the State may turn the scale. The brutalviolence shown to a weak opponent, such as is displayed in theabove-described English procedure, has nothing in common with a courseof action politically justifiable. A surprise attack, in order to be justified, must be made in the firstplace only on the armed forces of the hostile State, not on peacefulinhabitants. A further necessary preliminary condition is that thetension of the political situation brings the possibility or probabilityof a war clearly before the eyes of both parties, so that an expectationof, and preparations for, war can be assumed. Otherwise the attackbecomes a treacherous crime. If the required preliminary conditions aregranted, then a political _coup_ is as justifiable as a surprise attackin warfare, since it tries to derive advantage from an unwarrantablecarelessness of the opponent. A definite principle of right can never beformulated in this question, since everything depends on the views takenof the position, and these may be very divergent among the partiesconcerned. History alone can pass a final verdict on the conduct ofStates. But in no case can a formal rule of right in suchcases--especially when a question of life or death is depending on it, as was literally the fact in the Manchurian War as regards Japan--limitthe undoubted right of the State. If Japan had not obtained from thevery first the absolute command of the seas, the war with Russia wouldhave been hopeless. She was justified, therefore, in employing the mostextreme measures. No such interests were at stake for England either in1807 or 1882, and Italy's proceedings in 1911 are certainly doubtfulfrom the standpoint of political morality. These examples, however, show what we may expect from England, and wemust be the more prepared to find her using this right to attack withoutwarning, since we also may be under the necessity of using this right. Our mobilization preparations must therefore be ready for all sucheventualities, especially in the period after the dismissal of thereservists. Public policy forbids any discussion of the steps that must be taken tosecure that our fleet is ready for war during this time. Under allcircumstances, however, our coast defences must be continuously readyfor fighting, and permanently garrisoned in times of political tension. The mines must also be prepared for action without delay. The whole_matériel_ requisite for the purpose must be on the spot ready forinstant use. So, too, all measures for the protection of commerce at themouths of our rivers and in the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal must be put inforce directly the situation becomes strained. This is a mere simpleprecept of self-protection. We must also attach as much importance tothe observation and intelligence service on our coasts in peace-time asis done in England. When we realize in their entirety the mass of preparations which arerequired for the maintenance of our place among the Great Powers by thenavy, we see that extraordinarily exacting demands will be made on theresources of our people. These weigh the heavier for the moment, sincethe crisis of the hour forces us to quite exceptional exertions, and theexpenditure on the fleet must go hand-in-hand, with very energeticpreparations on land. If we do not possess the strength or theself-devotion to meet this twofold demand, the increase of the fleetmust be delayed, and we must restrict ourselves to bringing our coastdefences to such a pitch of completeness as will meet all ourrequirements. Any acceleration in our ship-building would have to beprovisionally dropped. In opposition to this view, it is urged from one quarter that we shouldlimit our fortification of the coast to what is absolutely necessary, devote _all_ our means to developing the fleet, and lay the greateststress on the number of the ships and their readiness for war, even incase of the reserve fleet. This view starts from the presuppositionthat, in face of so strong and well-equipped a fleet as the Naval Actcontemplates for Germany, England would never resolve to declare war onus. It is also safe to assume that a fleet built expressly on uniformtactical principles represents a more powerful fighting force than wehave to-day in an equal number of heterogeneous battleships. I cannot myself, however, endorse this view. On the one hand, it is tobe feared that the fighting strength of the hostile fleets increasesquicker than that of ours; on the other hand, I believe that the generalsituation makes war with England inevitable, even if our naval force inthe shortest time reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war. My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solidfoundation without which any successful action against the superiorforces of the enemy is unthinkable. Should the coast fortifications failto do what is expected from them, success is quite impossible. It is, however, all the more our duty to spare no sacrifices to carryout _both_ objects--the enlargement of the fleet, as well as whatevermay still be necessary to the perfecting of our coast defences. Thoughthis latter point calls for the first attention, the great necessity forthe navy admits of no doubt. If we do not to-day stake everything onstrengthening our fleet, to insure at least the possibility of asuccessful war, and if we once more allow our probable opponent to gaina start which it will be scarcely possible to make up in the future, wemust renounce for many years to come any place among the World Powers. Under these circumstances, no one who cherishes German sentiments andGerman hopes will advocate a policy of renunciation. On the contrary, wemust try not only to prosecute simultaneously the fortification of thecoast and the development of the fleet, but we must so accelerate thepace of our ship-building that the requirements of the Naval Act will bemet by 1914--a result quite possible according to expert opinion. The difficult plight in which we are to-day, as regards our readinessfor war, is due to two causes in the past. It has been produced in thefirst place because, from love of the pleasures of peace, we have in thelong years since the founding of the German Empire neglected to defineand strengthen our place among the Powers of Europe, and to win a freehand in world politics, while around us the other Powers were growingmore and more threatening. It was, in my opinion, the most seriousmistake in German policy that a final settling of accounts with Francewas not effected at a time when the state of international affairs wasfavourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peaceand renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in thisdifficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice betweenresigning all claim to world power or disputing this claim againstnumerically superior enemies. This policy somewhat resembles thesupineness for which England has herself to blame, when she refused herassistance to the Southern States in the American War of Secession, andthus allowed a Power to arise in the form of the United States of NorthAmerica, which already, although barely fifty years have elapsed, threatens England's own position as a World Power. But the consequencesof our peace policy hit us harder than England has suffered under herformer American policy. The place of Great Britain as a Great Power isfar more secured by her insular position and her command of the seasthan ours, which is threatened on all sides by more powerful enemies. Itis true that one cannot anticipate success in any war with certainty, and there was always the possibility during the past forty years that wemight not succeed in conquering France as effectually as we would havewished. This uncertainty is inseparable from every war. Neither in 1866nor in 1870 could Bismarck foresee the degree of success which wouldfall to him, but he dared to fight. The greatness of the statesman isshown when at the most favourable moment he has the courage to undertakewhat is the necessary and, according to human calculation, the bestcourse. Just Fate decides the issue. The second cause of our present position is to be seen in the fact thatwe started to build our fleet too late. The chief mistake which we havemade is that, after the year 1889, when we roused ourselves to vote theBrandenburg type of ship, we sank back until 1897 into a period ofdecadence, while complete lack of system prevailed in all mattersconcerning the fleet. We have also begun far too late to developsystematically our coast defences, so that the most essential dutieswhich spring out of the political situation are unfulfilled, since wehave not foreseen this situation nor prepared for it. This experience must be a lesson to us in the future. We must never letthe petty cares and needs of the moment blind us to the broad viewswhich must determine our world policy. We must always adopt in good timethose measures which are seen to be necessary for the future, eventhough they make heavy financial calls on our resources. This is the point of view that we must keep in mind with regard to ournaval armament. Even at the eleventh hour we may make up a little forlost time. It will be a heinous mistake if we do not perform this dutydevotedly. CHAPTER XIII THE ARMY AND POPULAR EDUCATION The policy of peace and restraint has brought us to a position in whichwe can only assert our place among the Great Powers and secure theconditions of life for the future by the greatest expenditure oftreasure and, so far as human conjecture can go, of blood. We shall becompelled, therefore, to adopt, without a moment's delay, specialmeasures which will enable us to be more or less a match for ourenemies--I mean accelerated ship-building and rapid increase of thearmy. We must always bear in mind in the present that we have to providefor the future. Apart from the requirements of the moment, we must never forget todevelop the elements on which not only our military strength, but alsothe political power of the State ultimately rest. We must maintain thephysical and mental health of the nation, and this can only be done ifwe aim at a progressive development of popular education in the widestsense, corresponding to the external changes in the conditions anddemands of existence. While it is the duty of the State to guide her citizens to the highestmoral and mental development, on the other hand the elements ofstrength, rooted in the people, react upon the efficiency of the State. Only when supported by the strong, unanimous will of the nation can theState achieve really great results; she is therefore doubly interestedin promoting the physical and mental growth of the nation. Her duty andher justification consist in this endeavour, for she draws from thefulfilment of this duty the strength and capacity to be in the highestsense true to it. It is, under present conditions, expedient also from the merely militarystandpoint to provide not only for the healthy physical development ofour growing youth, but also to raise its intellectual level. For whilethe demands which modern war makes have increased in every direction, the term of service has been shortened in order to make enlistment invery great numbers possible. Thus the full consummation of militarytraining cannot be attained unless recruits enter the army well equippedphysically and mentally, and bringing with them patriotic sentimentsworthy of the honourable profession of arms. We have already shown in a previous chapter how important it is to raisethe culture of the officers and non-commissioned officers to the best ofour power, in order to secure not only a greater and more independentindividual efficiency, but also a deeper and more lasting influence onthe men; but this influence of the superiors must always remain limitedif it cannot count on finding in the men a receptive and intelligentmaterial. This fact is especially clear when we grasp the claims whichmodern war will make on the individual fighter. In order to meet thesedemands fully, the people must be properly educated. Each individual must, in modern warfare, display a large measure ofindependent judgment, calm grasp of the facts, and bold resolution. Inthe open methods of fighting, the infantryman, after his appointed dutyhas been assigned him, is to a great degree thrown on his own resources;he may often have to take over the command of his own section if thelosses among his superiors are heavy. The artilleryman will have to workhis gun single-handed when the section leaders and gun captains havefallen victims to the shrapnel fire; the patrols and despatch-riders areoften left to themselves in the middle of the enemy's country; and thesapper, who is working against a counter-mine, will often find himselfunexpectedly face to face with the enemy, and has no resource leftbeyond his own professional knowledge and determination. But not only are higher claims made on the independent responsibility ofthe individual in modern warfare, but the strain on the physique willprobably be far greater in the future than in previous wars. This changeis due partly to the large size of the armies, partly to the greaterefficiency of the firearms. All movements in large masses are moreexacting in themselves than similar movements in small detachments, since they are never carried out so smoothly. The shelter and food ofgreat masses can never be so good as with smaller bodies; the depth ofthe marching columns, which increases with the masses, adds to thedifficulties of any movements--abbreviated rest at night, irregularhours for meals, unusual times for marching, etc. The increased range ofmodern firearms extends the actual fighting zone, and, in combinationwith the larger fronts, necessitates wide détours whenever the troopsattempt enveloping movements or other changes of position on thebattlefield. In the face of these higher demands, the amount of work done in the armyhas been enormously increased. The State, however, has done little toprepare our young men better for military service, while tendencies aremaking themselves felt in the life of the people which exercise a verydetrimental influence on their education. I specially refer to theever-growing encroachments of a social-democratic, anti-patrioticfeeling, and, hand-in-hand with this, the flocking of the populationinto the large towns, which is unfavourable to physical development. This result is clearly shown by the enlistment statistics. At thepresent day, out of all the German-born military units, over 6. 14 percent. Come from the large towns, 7. 37 per cent, from the medium-sizedtowns, 22. 34 per cent. From the small or country towns, and 64. 15 percent. From the rural districts; while the distribution of the populationbetween town and country is quite different. According to the census of1905, the rural population amounted to 42. 5 per cent. , the small orcountry towns to 25. 5 per cent. , the medium-sized towns to 12. 9 percent. , and the large towns to 19. 1 per cent. Of the entire number ofinhabitants. The proportion has probably changed since that year stillmore unfavourably for the rural population, while the large towns haveincreased in population. These figures clearly show the physicaldeterioration of the town population, and signify a danger to ournational life, not merely in respect of physique, but in the intellectand compact unity of the nation. The rural population forms part andparcel of the army. A thousand bonds unite the troops and the familiesof their members, so far as they come from the country; everyone whostudies the inner life of our army is aware of this. The interest feltin the soldier's life is intense. It is the same spirit, transmittedfrom one to another. The relation of the army to the population of thegreat cities which send a small and ever-diminishing fraction of theirsons into the army is quite different. A certain opposition existsbetween the population of the great cities and the country-folk, who, from a military point of view, form the backbone of the nation. Similarly, the links between the army and the large towns have loosened, and large sections of the population in the great cities are absolutelyhostile to the service. It is in the direct interests of the State to raise the physical healthof the town population by all imaginable means, not only in order toenable more soldiers to be enlisted, but to bring the beneficial effectof military training more extensively to bear on the town population, and so to help to make our social conditions more healthy. Nothingpromotes unity of spirit and sentiment like the comradeship of militaryservice. So far as I can judge, it is not factory work alone in itself whichexercises a detrimental effect on the physical development and, owing toits monotony, on the mental development also, but the general conditionsof life, inseparable from such work, are prejudicial. Apart from manyforms of employment in factories which are directly injurious to health, the factors which stunt physical development may be found in the housingconditions, in the pleasure-seeking town life, and in alcoholism. Thislatter vice is far more prevalent in the large cities than in the ruraldistricts, and, in combination with the other influences of the greatcity, produces far more harmful results. It is therefore the unmistakable duty of the State, first, to fightalcoholism with every weapon, if necessary by relentlessly taxing allkinds of alcoholic drinks, and by strictly limiting the right to sellthem; secondly, most emphatic encouragement must be given to all effortsto improve the housing conditions of the working population, and towithdraw the youth of the towns from the ruinous influences of a life ofamusements. In Munich, Bavarian officers have recently made apraiseworthy attempt to occupy the leisure time of the young men pastthe age of attendance at school with health-producing militaryexercises. The young men's clubs which Field-Marshal v. D. Goltz istrying to establish aim at similar objects. Such undertakings ought tobe vigorously carried out in every large town, and supported by theState, from purely physical as well as social considerations. Thegymnastic instruction in the schools and gymnastic clubs has anundoubtedly beneficial effect on physical development, and deservesevery encouragement; finally, on these grounds, as well as all others, the system of universal service should have been made an effectivereality. It is literally amazing to notice the excellent effect ofmilitary service on the physical development of the recruits. Theauthorities in charge of the reserves should have been instructed tomake the population of the great cities serve in larger numbers thanhitherto. On the other hand, a warning must, in my opinion, be issued against twotendencies: first, against the continual curtailing of the working hoursfor factory hands and artisans; and, secondly, against crediting sportwith an exaggerated value for the national health. As already pointedout, it is usually not the work itself, but the circumstances attendanton working together in large numbers that are prejudicial. The wish to shorten the working hours on principle, except to a moderatedegree, unless any exceptionally unfavourable conditions of work arepresent, is, in my opinion, an immoral endeavour, and a completemiscomprehension of the real value of work. It is in itself the greatestblessing which man knows, and ill betide the nation which regards it nolonger as a moral duty, but as the necessary means of earning alivelihood and paying for amusements. Strenuous labour alone producesmen and characters, and those nations who have been compelled to wintheir living in a continuous struggle against a rude climate have oftenachieved the greatest exploits, and shown the greatest vitality. So long as the Dutch steeled their strength by unremitting conflict withthe sea, so long as they fought for religious liberty against theSpanish supremacy, they were a nation of historical importance; now, when they live mainly for money-making and enjoyment, and lead apolitically neutral existence, without great ambitions or great wars, their importance has sunk low, and will not rise again until they take apart in the struggle of the civilized nations. In Germany that stockwhich was destined to bring back our country from degradation tohistorical importance did not grow up on the fertile banks of the Rhineor the Danube, but on the sterile sands of the March. We must preserve the stern, industrious, old-Prussian feeling, and carrythe rest of Germany with us to Kant's conception of life; we mustcontinuously steel our strength by great political and economicendeavours, and must not be content with what we have already attained, or abandon ourselves to the indolent pursuit of pleasure; thus only weshall remain healthy in mind and body, and able to keep our place in theworld. Where Nature herself does not compel hard toil, or where with growingwealth wide sections of the people are inclined to follow a life ofpleasure rather than of work, society and the State must vie in takingcare that work does not become play, or play work. It is work, regardedas a duty, that forges men, not fanciful play. Sport, which is spreadingmore and more amongst us too, must always remain a means of recreation, not an end in itself, if it is to be justified at all. We must neverforget this. Hard, laborious work has made Germany great; in England, onthe contrary, sport has succeeded in maintaining the physical health ofthe nation; but by becoming exaggerated and by usurping the place ofserious work it has greatly injured the English nation. The Englishnation, under the influence of growing wealth, a lower standard oflabour efficiency--which, indeed, is the avowed object of the Englishtrades unions--and of the security of its military position, has moreand more become a nation of gentlemen at ease and of sportsmen, and itmay well be asked whether, under these conditions, England will showherself competent for the great duties which she has taken on herself inthe future. If, further, the political rivalry with the great andambitious republic in America be removed by an Arbitration Treaty, thiscircumstance might easily become the boundary-stone where the roads toprogress and to decadence divide, in spite of all sports which developphysique. The physical healthiness of a nation has no permanent value, unless itcomes from work and goes hand-in-hand with spiritual development; while, if the latter is subordinated to material and physical considerations, the result must be injurious in the long-run. We must not therefore be content to educate up for the army a physicallyhealthy set of young men by elevating the social conditions and thewhole method of life of our people, but we must also endeavour topromote their spiritual development in every way. The means for doing sois the school. Military education under the present-day conditions, which are continually becoming more severe, can only realize its aimssatisfactorily if a groundwork has been laid for it in the schools, andan improved preliminary training has been given to the raw material. The national school is not sufficient for this requirement. The generalregulations which settle the national school system in Prussia date fromthe year 1872, and are thus forty years old, and do not take account ofthe modern development which has been so rapid of late years. It is onlynatural that a fundamental opposition exists between them and theessentials of military education. Present-day military educationrequires complete individualization and a conscious development of manlyfeeling; in the national school everything is based on teaching inclasses, and there is no distinction between the sexes. This is directlyprescribed by the rules. In the army the recruits are taught under the superintendence of thesuperiors by specially detached officers and selected experiencednon-commissioned officers; and even instruction is given them in quitesmall sections; while each one receives individual attention from thenon-commissioned officers of his section and the higher superiorofficers. In a school, on the contrary, the master is expected to teachas many as eighty scholars at a time; in a school with two teachers asmany as 120 children are divided into two classes. A separation of thesexes is only recommended in a school of several classes. As a rule, therefore, the instruction is given in common. It is certain that, undersuch conditions, no insight into the personality of the individual ispossible. All that is achieved is to impart more or less mechanicallyand inefficiently a certain amount of information in some branch ofknowledge, without any consideration of the special dispositions of boysand girls, still less of individuals. Such a national school can obviously offer no preparation for a militaryeducation. The principles which regulate the teaching in the two placesare quite different. That is seen in the whole tendency of the instruction. The military education aims at training the moral personality toindependent thought and action, and at the same time rousing patrioticfeelings among the men. Instruction in a sense of duty and in ournational history thus takes a foremost place by the side of professionalteaching. Great attention is given to educate each individual in logicalreasoning and in the clear expression of his thoughts. In the national school these views are completely relegated to thebackground--not, of course, as a matter of intention and theory, but asthe practical result of the conditions. The chief stress in such aschool is laid on formal religious instruction, and on imparting somefacility in reading, writing, and ciphering. The so-called _Realign_(history, geography, natural history, natural science) fall quite intothe background. Only six out of thirty hours of instruction weekly aredevoted to all the _Realien_ in the middle and upper standards; in thelower standards they are ignored altogether, while four to five hoursare assigned to religious instruction in every standard. There is noidea of any deliberate encouragement of patriotism. Not a word in theGeneral Regulations suggests that any weight is to be attached to this;and while over two pages are filled with details of the methods ofreligious instruction, history, which is especially valuable for thedevelopment of patriotic sentiments, is dismissed in ten lines. As forinfluencing the character and the reasoning faculties of the scholars toany extent worth mentioning, the system of large classes puts italtogether out of the question. While the allotment of subjects to the hours available for instructionis thus very one-sided, the system on which instruction is given, especially in religious matters, is also unsatisfactory. Beginning withthe lower standard onwards (that is to say, the children of six years), stories not only from the New Testament, but also from the Old Testamentare drummed into the heads of the scholars. Similarly every Saturday theportions of Scripture appointed for the next Sunday are read out andexplained to all the children. Instruction in the Catechism begins alsoin the lower standard, from the age of six onwards; the children mustlearn some twenty hymns by heart, besides various prayers. It is asignificant fact that it has been found necessary expressly to forbid"the memorizing of the General Confession and other parts of theliturgical service, " as "also the learning by heart of the Pericopes. "On the other hand, the institution of Public Worship is to be explainedto the children. This illustrates the spirit in which this instructionhas to be imparted according to the regulations. It is really amazing to read these regulations. The object ofEvangelical religious instruction is to introduce the children "to thecomprehension of the Holy Scriptures and to the creed of thecongregation, " in order that they "may be enabled to read the Scripturesindependently and to take an active part both in the life and thereligious worship of the congregation. " Requirements are laid down whichentirely abandon the task of making the subject suitable to thecomprehension of children from six to fourteen years of age, andpresuppose a range of ideas totally beyond their age. Not a word, however, suggests that the real meaning of religion--its influence, thatis, on the moral conduct of man--should be adequately brought intoprominence. The teacher is not urged by a single syllable to impressreligious ideas on the receptive child-mind; the whole course ofinstruction, in conformity with regulations, deals with a formalreligiosity, which is quite out of touch with practical life, and if notdeliberately, at least in result, renounces any attempt at moralinfluence. A real feeling for religion is seldom the fruit of suchinstruction; the children, as a rule, are glad after their Confirmationto have done with this unspiritual religious teaching, and so theyremain, when their schooling is over, permanently strangers to thereligious inner life, which the instruction never awakened in them. Nordoes the instruction for Confirmation do much to alter that, for it isusually conceived in the same spirit. All other subjects which might raise heart and spirit and present to theyoung minds some high ideals--more especially our own country'shistory--are most shamefully neglected in favour of this sort ofinstruction; and yet a truly religious and patriotic spirit is ofinestimable value for life, and, above all, for the soldier. It is themore regrettable that instruction in the national school, as fixed bythe regulations, and as given in practice in a still duller form, istotally unfitted to raise such feelings, and thus to do some realservice to the country. It is quite refreshing to read in the newregulations for middle schools of February 10, 1910, that by religiousinstruction the "moral and religious tendencies of the child" should beawakened and strengthened, and that the teaching of history should aimat exciting an "intelligent appreciation of the greatness of thefatherland. " The method of religious instruction which is adopted in the nationalschool is, in my opinion, hopelessly perverted. Religious instructioncan only become fruitful and profitable when a certain intellectualgrowth has started and the child possesses some conscious will. To makeit the basis of intellectual growth, as was evidently intended in thenational schools, has never been a success; for it ought not to bedirected at the understanding and logical faculties, but at the mysticalintuitions of the soul, and, if it is begun too early, it has aconfusing effect on the development of the mental faculties. Even themissionary who wishes to achieve real results tries to educate hispupils by work and secular instruction before he attempts to impart tothem subtle religious ideas. Yet every Saturday the appointed passagesof Scripture (the Pericopes) are explained to six-year-old children. Religious instruction proper ought to begin in the middle standard. Upto that point the teacher should be content, from the religiousstandpoint, to work on the child's imagination and feelings with thesimplest ideas of the Deity, but in other respects to endeavour toawaken and encourage the intellectual life, and make it able to grasploftier conceptions. The national school stands in total contradictionto this intellectual development. This is in conformity to regulations, for the same children who read the Bible independently are only to beled to "an approximate comprehension of those phenomena which are dailyaround them. " In the course of eight years they learn a smattering ofreading, writing, and ciphering. [A] It is significant of the knowledgeof our national history which the school imparts that out of sixty-threerecruits of one company to whom the question was put who Bismarck was, not a single one could answer. That the scholars acquire even a generalidea of their duties to the country and the State is quite out of thequestion. It is impossible to rouse the affection and fancy of thechildren by instruction in history, because the two sexes are taught incommon. One thing appeals to the heart of boys, another to those ofgirls; and, although I consider it important that patriotic feelingsshould be inculcated among girls, since as mothers they will transmitthem to the family, still the girls must be influenced in a differentway from the boys. When the instruction is common to both, the treatmentof the subject by the teacher remains neutral and colourless. It isquite incomprehensible how such great results are expected in thereligious field when so little has been achieved in every other field. This pedantic school has wandered far indeed from the ideal thatFrederick the Great set up. He declared that the duty of the State was"to educate the young generation to independent thinking andself-devoted love of country. " [Footnote A: Recently a boy was discharged from a well-known nationalschool as an exceptionally good scholar, and was sent as well qualifiedto the office of a Head Forester. He showed that he could not copycorrectly, to say nothing of writing by himself. ] Our national school of to-day needs, then, searching and thorough reformif it is to be a preparatory school, not only for military education, but for life generally. It sends children out into the world withundeveloped reasoning faculties, and equipped with the barest elementsof knowledge, and thus makes them not only void of self-reliance, buteasy victims of all the corrupting influences of social life. As amatter of fact, the mind and reasoning faculties of the nationalschoolboy are developed for the first time by his course of instructionas a recruit. It is obviously not my business to indicate the paths to such a reform. I will only suggest the points which seem to me the most important fromthe standpoint of a citizen and a soldier. First and foremost, the instruction must be more individual. The numberof teachers, accordingly, must be increased, and that of scholarsdiminished. It is worth while considering in this connection thefeasibility of beginning school instruction at the age of eight years. Then all teaching must be directed, more than at present, to the objectof developing the children's minds, and formal religious instructionshould only begin in due harmony with intellectual progress. Finally, the _Realien, _ especially the history of our own country, should claimmore attention, and patriotic feelings should be encouraged in everyway; while in religious instruction the moral influence of religionshould be more prominent than the formal contents. The training of thenational school teacher must be placed on a new basis. At present itabsolutely corresponds to the one-sided and limited standpoint of theschool itself, and does not enable the teachers to develop the minds andfeelings of their pupils. It must be reckoned a distinct disadvantagefor the upgrowing generation that all instruction ends at the age offourteen, so that, precisely at the period of development in which thereasoning powers are forming, the children are thrown back on themselvesand on any chance influences. In the interval between school life andmilitary service the young people not only forget all that they learnt, perhaps with aptitude, in the national school, but they unthinkinglyadopt distorted views of life, and in many ways become brutalized from alack of counteracting ideals. A compulsory continuation school is therefore an absolute necessity ofthe age. It is also urgently required from the military standpoint. Sucha school, to be fruitful in results, must endeavour, not only to preventthe scholar from forgetting what he once learnt, and to qualify him fora special branch of work, but, above all, to develop his patriotism andsense of citizenship. To do this, it is necessary to explain to him therelation of the State to the individual, and to explain, by reference toour national history, how the individual can only prosper by devotion tothe State. The duties of the individual to the State should be placed inthe foreground. This instruction must be inspired by the spirit whichanimated Schleiermacher's sermons in the blackest hour of Prussia, andculminated in the doctrine that all the value of the man lies in thestrength and purity of his will, in his free devotion to the greatwhole; that property and life are only trusts, which must be employedfor higher ideals; that the mind, which thinks only of itself, perishesin feeble susceptibility, but that true moral worth grows up only in thelove for the fatherland and for the State, which is a haven for everyfaith, and a home of justice and honourable freedom of purpose. Only if national education works in this sense will it train up men tofill our armies who have been adequately prepared for the school ofarms, and bring with them the true soldierly spirit from which greatdeeds spring. What can be effected by the spirit of a nation we havelearnt from the history of the War of Liberation, that never-failingsource of patriotic sentiment, which should form the backbone and centreof history-teaching in the national and the continuation schools. We can study it also by an example from most recent history, in theRusso-Japanese War. "The education of the whole Japanese people, beginning at home and continued at school, was based on a patriotic andwarlike spirit. That education, combined with the rapidly acquiredsuccesses in culture and warfare, aroused in the Japanese a marvellousconfidence in their own strength. They served with pride in the ranks ofthe army, and dreamed of heroic deeds. .. . All the thoughts of thenation were turned towards the coming struggle, while in the course ofseveral years they had spent their last farthing in the creation of apowerful army and a strong fleet. "[B] This was the spirit that led theJapanese to victory. "The day when the young Japanese enlisted wasobserved as a festival in his family. "[B] In Russia, on the contrary, the idea was preached and disseminated that"Patriotism was an obsolete notion, " "war was a crime and ananachronism, " that "warlike deeds deserved no notice, the army was thegreatest bar to progress, and military service a dishonourabletrade. "[B] Thus the Russian army marched to battle without anyenthusiasm, or even any comprehension of the momentous importance of thegreat racial war, "not of free will, but from necessity. " Already eatenup by the spirit of revolution and unpatriotic selfishness, withoutenergy or initiative, a mechanical tool in the hand of uninspiredleaders, it tamely let itself be beaten by a weaker opponent. [Footnote B: "The Work of the Russian General Staff, " from the Russian byFreiheu v. Tettau. ] I have examined these conditions closely because I attach greatimportance to the national school and the continuation school as a meansto the military education of our people. I am convinced that only thearmy of a warlike and patriotic people can achieve anything reallygreat. I understand, of course, that the school alone, however high itsefficiency, could not develop that spirit in our people which we, inview of our great task in the future, must try to awaken by every meansif we wish to accomplish something great. The direct influence of schoolends when the young generation begins life, and its effect must at firstmake itself felt very gradually. Later generations will reap the fruitsof its sowing. Its efficiency must be aided by other influences whichwill not only touch the young men now living, but persist throughouttheir lives. Now, there are two means available which can work uponpublic opinion and on the spiritual and moral education of the nation;one is the Press, the other is a policy of action. If the Governmentwishes to win a proper influence over the people, not in order to securea narrow-spirited support of its momentary policy, but to further itsgreat political, social, and moral duties, it must control a strong andnational Press, through which it must present its views and aimsvigorously and openly. The Government will never be able to count upon awell-armed and self-sacrificing people in the hour of danger ornecessity, if it calmly looks on while the warlike spirit is beingsystematically undermined by the Press and a feeble peace policypreached, still less if it allows its own organs to join in with thesame note, and continually to emphasize the maintenance of peace as theobject of all policy. It must rather do everything to foster a militaryspirit, and to make the nation comprehend the duties and aims of animperial policy. It must continually point to the significance and the necessity of waras an indispensable agent in policy and civilization, together with theduty of self-sacrifice and devotion to State and country. A parliamentary Government, which always represents merely a temporarymajority, may leave the party Press to defend and back its views; but aGovernment like the German, which traces its justification to the factthat it is superior to all parties, cannot act thus. Its point of viewdoes not coincide with that of any party; it adopts a middle course, conscious that it is watching the welfare of the whole community. Itmust therefore represent its attitude, on general issues as well as onparticular points, independently, and must endeavour to make its aims aswidely understood as possible. I regard it, therefore, as one of themost important duties of a Government like ours to use the Press freelyand wisely for the enlightenment of the people. I do not mean that a fewlarge political journals should, in the interests of the moment, be wellsupplied with news, but that the views of the Government should findcomprehensive expression in the local Press. It would be an advantage, in my opinion, were all newspapers compelled to print certainannouncements of the Government, in order that the reader might not havesuch a one-sided account of public affairs as the party Press supplies. It would be a measure of public moral and intellectual hygiene, asjustifiable as compulsory regulations in the interests of public health. Epidemics of ideas and opinions are in our old Europe more dangerous anddamaging than bodily illnesses, and it is the duty of the State topreserve the moral healthiness of the nation. More important, perhaps, than teaching and enlightenment by the Press isthe _propaganda of action. _ Nothing controls the spirit of the multitudeso effectually as energetic, deliberate, and successful action conceivedin a broad-minded, statesmanlike sense. Such education by a powerfulpolicy is an absolute necessity for the German people. This nationpossesses an excess of vigour, enterprise, idealism, and spiritualenergy, which qualifies it for the highest place; but a malignant fairylaid on its cradle the most petty theoretical dogmatism. In addition tothis, an unhappy historical development which shattered the national andreligious unity of the nation created in the system of small States andin confessionalism a fertile soil for the natural tendency toparticularism, on which it flourished luxuriantly as soon as the nationwas no longer inspired with great and unifying thoughts. Yet the heartof this people can always be won for great and noble aims, even thoughsuch aims can only be attended by danger. We must not be misled in thisrespect by the Press, which often represents a most one-sided, self-interested view, and sometimes follows international or evenAnti-German lines rather than national. The soul of our nation is notreflected in that part of the Press with its continual dwelling on thenecessity of upholding peace, and its denunciation of any bold andcomprehensive political measure as a policy of recklessness. On the contrary, an intense longing for a foremost place among thePowers and for manly action fills our nation. Every vigorous utterance, every bold political step of the Government, finds in the soul of thepeople a deeply felt echo, and loosens the bonds which fetter all theirforces. In a great part of the national Press this feeling has again andagain found noble expression. But the statesman who could satisfy thisyearning, which slumbers in the heart of our people undisturbed by theclamour of parties and the party Press, would carry all spirits withhim. He is no true statesman who does not reckon with these factors ofnational psychology; Bismarck possessed this art, and used k with amaster-hand. True, he found ready to hand one idea which was common toall--the sincere wish for German unification and the German Empire; butthe German nation, in its dissensions, did not know the ways which leadto the realization of this idea. Only under compulsion and after a hardstruggle did it enter on the road of success; but the whole nation wasfired with high enthusiasm when it finally recognized the goal to whichthe great statesman was so surely leading it. Success was the foundationon which Bismarck built up the mighty fabric of the German Empire. Evenin the years of peace he understood how to rivet the imagination of thepeople by an ambitious and active policy, and how, in spite of allopposition, to gain over the masses to his views, and make them servehis own great aims. He, too, made mistakes as man and as politician, andthe motto _Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto_ holds good of him;but in its broad features his policy was always imperial and ofworld-wide scope, and he never lost sight of the principle that nostatesman can permanently achieve great results unless he commands thesoul of his people. This knowledge he shared with all the great men of our past, with theGreat Elector, Frederick the Incomparable, Scharnhorst and Blücher; foreven that hoary marshal was a political force, the embodiment of apolitical idea, which, to be sure, did not come into the foreground atthe Congress of Vienna. The statesman who wishes to learn from history should above all thingsrecognize this one fact--that success is necessary to gain influenceover the masses, and that this influence can only be obtained bycontinually appealing to the national imagination and enlisting itsinterest in great universal ideas and great national ambitions. Such a policy is also the best school in which to educate a nation togreat military achievements. When their spirits are turned towards highaims they feel themselves compelled to contemplate war bravely, and toprepare their minds to it: "The man grows up, with manhood's nobler aims. " We may learn something from Japan on this head. Her eyes were fixed onthe loftiest aims; she did not shrink from laying the most onerousduties on the people, but she understood how to fill the soul of thewhole people with enthusiasm for her great ideals, and thus a nation ofwarriors was educated which supplied the best conceivable material forthe army, and was ready for the greatest sacrifices. We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilizationto perform than the Great Asiatic Power. We, like the Japanese, can onlyfulfil it by the sword. Shall we, then, decline to adopt a bold and active policy, the mosteffective means with which we can prepare our people for its militaryduty? Such a counsel is only for those who lack all feeling for thestrength and honour of the German people. CHAPTER XIV FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR WAR From the discussions in the previous chapter it directly follows thatthe political conduct of the State, while affecting the mental attitudeof the people, exercises an indirect but indispensable influence on thepreparation for war, and is to some degree a preparation for war itself. But, in addition to the twofold task of exercising this intellectual andmoral influence, and of placing at the disposal of the militaryauthorities the necessary means for keeping up the armaments, stillfurther demands must be made of those responsible for the guidance ofthe State. In the first place, financial preparations for war must bemade, quite distinct from the current expenditure on the army; thenational finances must be so treated that the State can bear thetremendous burdens of a modern war without an economic crash. Further, as already mentioned in another place, there must be a sort ofmobilization in the sphere of commercial politics in order to insureunder all eventualities the supply of the goods necessary for thematerial and industrial needs of the country. Finally, preparations forwar must also be made politically; that is to say, efforts must be madeto bring about a favourable political conjuncture, and, so far aspossible, to isolate the first enemy with whom a war is bound to come. If that cannot be effected, an attempt must he made to win allies, inwhom confidence can be reposed should war break out. I am not a sufficient expert to pronounce a definite opinion on thecommercial and financial side of the question. In the sphere ofcommercial policy especially I cannot even suggest the way in which thedesired end can be obtained. Joint action on the part of the Governmentand the great import houses would seem to be indicated. As regardsfinance, speaking again from a purely unprofessional standpoint, one maygo so far as to say that it is not only essential to keep the nationalhousehold in order, but to maintain the credit of the State, so that, onthe outbreak of war, it may be possible to raise the vast sums of moneyrequired for carrying it on without too onerous conditions. The credit of State depends essentially on a regulated financialeconomy, which insures that the current outgoings are covered by thecurrent incomings. Other factors are the national wealth, theindebtedness of the State, and, lastly, the confidence in its productiveand military capabilities. As regards the first point, I have already pointed out that in a greatcivilized World State the balancing of the accounts must never bebrought about in the petty-State fashion by striking out expenditure fornecessary requirements, more especially expenditure on the militaryforces, whose maintenance forms the foundation of a satisfactory generalprogress. The incomings must, on the contrary, be raised in proportionto the real needs. But, especially in a State which is so wholly basedon war as the German Empire, the old manly principle of keeping all ourforces on the stretch must never be abandoned out of deference to theeffeminate philosophy of the day. Fichte taught us that there is onlyone virtue--to forget the claims of one's personality; and only onevice--to think of self. Ultimately the State is the transmitter of allculture, and is therefore entitled to claim all the powers of theindividual for itself. [A] These ideas, which led us out of the deepestgloom to the sunlit heights of success, must remain our pole-star at anepoch which in many respects can be compared with the opening years ofthe last century. The peace-loving contentment which then prevailed inPrussia, as if the age of everlasting peace had come, still sways largesections of our people, and exerts an appreciable influence on theGovernment. Among that peaceful nation "which behind the rampart of its line ofdemarcation observed with philosophic calm how two mighty nationscontested the sole possession of the world, " nobody gave any thought tothe great change of times. In the same way many Germans to-day lookcontentedly and philosophically at the partition of the world, and shuttheir eyes to the rushing stream of world-history and the great dutiesimposed upon us by it. Even to-day, as then, the same "super-terrestrialpride, the same super-clever irresolution" spreads among us "which inour history follows with uncanny regularity the great epochs of audacityand energy. "[B] [Footnote A: Treitschke. ] [Footnote: B Treitschke, "Deutsche Geschichte. "] Under conditions like the present the State is not only entitled, but isbound to put the utmost strain on the financial powers of her citizens, since it is vital questions that are at stake. It is equally important, however, to foster by every available means the growth of the nationalproperty, and thus to improve the financial capabilities. This property is to a certain extent determined by the naturalproductiveness of the country and the mineral wealth it contains. Butthese possessions are utilized and their value is enhanced by the labourof all fellow-countrymen--that immense capital which cannot be replaced. Here, then, the State can profitably step in. It can protect and securelabour against unjustifiable encroachments by regulating the labourconditions; it can create profitable terms for exports and imports byconcluding favourable commercial agreements; it can help and facilitateGerman trade by vigorous political representation of German interestsabroad; it can encourage the shipping trade, which gains large profitsfrom international commerce;[C] it can increase agricultural productionby energetic home colonization, cultivation of moorland, and suitableprotective measures, so as to make us to some extent less dependent onforeign countries for our food. The encouragement of deep-sea fisherywould add to this. [D] [Footnote: C England earns some 70 millions sterling by internationalcommerce, Germany about 15 millions sterling. ] [Footnote D: We buy annually some 2 millions sterling worth of fish fromforeign countries. ] From the military standpoint, it is naturally very important to increasepermanently the supply of breadstuffs and meat, so that in spite of theannual increase in population the home requirements may for some time bemet to the same extent as at present; this seems feasible. Homeproduction now supplies 87 per cent, of the required breadstuffs and 95per cent, of the meat required. To maintain this proportion, theproduction in the next ten years must be increased by at most twodouble-centners per Hectare, which is quite possible if it is consideredthat the rye harvest alone in the last twenty years has increased by twomillion tons. A vigorous colonial policy, too, will certainly improve the nationalprosperity if directed, on the one hand, to producing in our owncolonies the raw materials which our industries derive in immensequantities from foreign countries, and so making us graduallyindependent of foreign countries; and, on the other hand, totransforming our colonies into an assured market for our goods byeffective promotion of settlements, railroads, and cultivation. The lesswe are tributaries of foreign countries, to whom we pay many milliards, [E] the more our national wealth and the financial capabilities of theState will improve. [Footnote E: We obtained from abroad in 1907, for instance, 476, 400 tonsof cotton, 185, 300 tons of wool, 8, 500, 000 tons of iron, 124, 000 tons ofcopper, etc. ] If the State can thus contribute directly to the increase of nationalproductions, it can equally raise its own credit by looking after thereduction of the national debt, and thus improving its financialposition. But payment of debts is, in times of high political tension, atwo-edged sword, if it is carried out at the cost of necessary outlays. The gain in respect of credit on the one side of the account may veryeasily be lost again on the other. Even from the financial aspect it isa bad fault to economize in outlay on the army and navy in order toimprove the financial position. The experiences of history leave nodoubt on that point. Military power is the strongest pillar of anation's credit. If it is weakened, financial security at once isshaken. A disastrous war involves such pecuniary loss that the Statecreditors may easily become losers by it. But a State whose army holdsout prospects of carrying the war to a victorious conclusion offers itscreditors far better security than a weaker military power. If ourcredit at the present day cannot be termed very good, our threatenedpolitical position is chiefly to blame. If we chose to neglect our armyand navy our credit would sink still lower, in spite of all possibleliquidation of our debt. We have a twofold duty before us: first toimprove our armament; secondly, to promote the national industry, and tokeep in mind the liquidation of our debts so far as our means go. The question arises whether it is possible to perform this twofold task. It is inconceivable that the German people has reached the limits ofpossible taxation. The taxes of Prussia have indeed, between 1893-94 and1910-11, increased by 56 per cent, per head of the population--from20. 62 marks to 32. 25 marks (taxes and customs together)--and the sameproportion may hold in the rest of Germany. On the other hand, there isa huge increase in the national wealth. This amounts, in the GermanEmpire now, to 330 to 360 milliard marks, or 5, 000 to 6, 000 marks perhead of the population. In France the wealth, calculated on the samebasis, is no higher, and yet in France annually 20 marks, in Germanyonly 16 marks, per head of the population are expended on the army andnavy. In England, on the contrary, where the average wealth of theindividual is some 1, 000 marks higher than in Germany and France, theoutlay for the army and navy comes to 29 marks per head. Thus our mostprobable opponents make appreciably greater sacrifices for theirarmaments than we do, although they are far from being in equal dangerpolitically. Attention must at the same time be called to the fact that the increaseof wealth in Germany continues to be on an ascending scale. Trades andindustries have prospered vastly, and although the year 1908 saw asetback, yet the upward tendency has beyond doubt set in again. The advance in trade and industry, which began with the founding of theEmpire, is extraordinary. "The total of imports and exports hasincreased in quantity from 32 million tons to 106 million tons in theyear 1908, or by 232 per cent. , and in value from 6 milliards to 141/2-16 milliards marks in the last years. Of these, the value of theimports has grown from 3 to 8-9 milliards marks, and the value of theexports from 3 1/2 to 6 1/2-7 milliards. .. . The value of the import ofraw materials for industrial purposes has grown from 1 1/2 milliards in1879 to 4 1/2 milliards marks lately, and the value of the export ofsuch raw materials from 850 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. The importof made goods had in 1879 a value of 600 million marks, and in 1908 avalue of 1 1/4 milliard marks, while the value of the export ofmanufactured goods mounted from 1 to 4 milliards. The value of theimport of food-stuffs and delicacies has grown from 1 to 2 1/2-2 1/3milliard marks, while the value of the export of articles of foodremained at about the same figure. The mineral output can also point to an undreamed-of extension inGermany during the last thirty years. The amount of coal raised amountedin 1879 to only 42 million tons; up to 1908 it has increased to 148 1/2million tons, and in value from 100 million to 1 1/2 milliard marks. Thequantity of brown coal raised was only 11 1/2 million tons in 1879; in1908 it was 66 3/4 million tons, and in value it has risen from 35million to 170 million marks. The output of iron-ore has increased from6 million tons to 27 million tons, and in value from 27 million to 119million marks. .. . From 1888 to 1908 the amount of coal raised in Germanyhas increased by 127 per cent. ; in England only by about 59 per cent. The raw iron obtained has increased in Germany from 1888 to 1908 by 172per cent. ; in England there is a rise of 27 per cent. Only. [F] [Footnote F: Professor Dr. Wade, Berlin. ] Similar figures can be shown in many other spheres. The financialposition of the Empire has considerably improved since the ImperialFinance reform of 1909, so that the hope exists that the Budget may verysoon balance without a loan should no new sacrifices be urgent. It was obvious that with so prodigious a development a continued growthof revenue must take place, and hand-in-hand with it a progressivecapitalization. Such a fact has been the case, and to a very markedextent. From the year 1892-1905 in Prussia alone an increase of nationalwealth of about 2 milliard marks annually has taken place. The number oftaxpayers and of property in the Property Tax class of 6, 000 to 100, 000marks has in Prussia increased in these fourteen years by 29 per cent. , from 1905-1908 by 11 per cent. ; in the first period, therefore, by 2 percent. , in the last years by 3 per cent. Annually. In these classes, therefore, prosperity is increasing, but this is so in much greaterproportion in the large fortunes. In the Property Tax class of 100, 000to 500, 000 marks, the increase has been about 48 per cent. --i. E. , onan average for the fourteen years about 3 per cent. Annually, while inthe last three years it has been 4. 6 per cent. In the class of 500, 000marks and upwards, the increase for the fourteen years amounts to 54 percent. In the taxpayers and 67 per cent. In the property; and, while inthe fourteen years the increase is on an average 4. 5 per cent. Annually, it has risen in the three years 1905-1908 to 8. 6 per cent. This meansper head of the population in the schedule of 6, 000 to 100, 000 marks anincrease of 650 marks, in the schedule of 100, 000 to 500, 000 marks anincrease per head of 6, 400 marks, and in the schedule of 500, 000 marksand upwards an increase of 70, 480 marks per head and per year. We see then, especially in the large estates, a considerable andannually increasing growth, which the Prussian Finance Minister hasestimated for Prussia alone at 3 milliards yearly in the next threeyears, so that it may be assumed to be for the whole Empire 5 milliardsyearly in the same period. Wages have risen everywhere. To give someinstances, I will mention that among the workmen at Krupp's factory atEssen the daily earnings have increased from 1879-1906 by 77 per cent. , the pay per hour for masons from 1885-1905 by 64 per cent. , and theannual earnings in the Dortmund district of the chief mining office from1886 to 1907 by 121 per cent. This increase in earnings is also shown bythe fact that the increase of savings bank deposits since 1906 hasreached the sum of 4 milliard marks, a proof that in the lower andpoorer strata of the population, too, a not inconsiderable improvementin prosperity is perceptible. It can also be regarded as a sign of ahealthy, improving condition of things that emigration and unemploymentare considerably diminished in Germany. In 1908 only 20, 000 emigrantsleft our country; further, according to the statistics of the workmen'sunions, only 4. 4 per cent, of their members were unemployed, whereas inthe same year 336, 000 persons emigrated from Great Britain and 10 percent. (in France it was as much as 11. 4 per cent. ) of members ofworkmen's unions were unemployed. Against this brilliant prosperity must be placed a very large nationaldebt, both in the Empire and in the separate States. The German Empirein the year 1910 had 5, 016, 655, 500 marks debt, and in addition thenational debt of the separate States on April 1, 1910, reached in-- MarksPrussia 9, 421, 770, 800Bavaria 2, 165, 942, 900Saxony 893, 042, 600Würtemberg 606, 042, 800Baden 557, 859, 000Hesse 428, 664, 400Alsace-Lorraine 31, 758, 100Hamburg 684, 891, 200Lübeck 666, 888, 400Bremen 263, 431, 400 Against these debts may be placed a considerable property in domains, forests, mines, and railways. The stock capital of the State railwaysreached, on March 31, 1908, in millions of marks, in-- Marks, Prussia (Hesse) 9, 888Bavaria 1, 694Saxony 1, 035Würtemburg 685Baden 727Alsace-Lorraine 724 --a grand total, including the smaller State systems, of 15, 062 milliardmarks. This sum has since risen considerably, and reached at the end of1911 for Prussia alone 11, 050 milliards. Nevertheless, the nationaldebts signify a very heavy burden, which works the more disadvantageouslybecause these debts are almost all contracted in the country, andpresses the more heavily because the communes are also often greatly indebt. The debt of the Prussian towns and country communes of 10, 000inhabitants and upwards alone amounts to 3, 000 million marks, in thewhole Empire to some 5, 000 million marks. This means that interestyearly has to be paid to the value of 150 million marks, so that manycommunes, especially in the east and in the western industrial regions, are compelled to raise additional taxation to the extent of 200, 300, oreven 400 per cent. The taxes also are not at all equally distributedaccording to capacity to pay them. The main burden rests on the middleclass; the large fortunes are much less drawn upon. Some sources ofwealth are not touched by taxation, as, for example, the speculativeincome not obtained by carrying on any business, but by speculations onthe Stock Exchange, which cannot be taxed until it is converted intoproperty. Nevertheless, the German nation is quite in a position to payfor the military preparations, which it certainly requires for theprotection and the fulfilment of its duties in policy and civilization, so soon as appropriate and comprehensive measures are taken and theopposing parties can resolve to sacrifice scruples as to principles onthe altar of patriotism. The dispute about the so-called Imperial Finance reform has shown howparty interests and selfishness rule the national representation; it wasnot pleasant to see how each tried to shift the burden to hisneighbour's shoulders in order to protect himself against financialsacrifices. It must be supposed, therefore, that similar efforts will bemade in the future, and that fact must be reckoned with. But aconsiderable and rapid rise of the Imperial revenue is required if wewish to remain equal to the situation and not to abandon the future ofour country without a blow. Under these conditions I see no other effectual measure but the speedyintroduction of the _Reichserbrecht_ (Imperial right of succession), inorder to satisfy the urgent necessity. This source of revenue wouldoppress no class in particular, but would hit all alike, and wouldfurnish the requisite means both to complete our armament and todiminish our burden of debt. If the collateral relations, with exception of brothers and sisters, depended on mention in the will for any claim--that is to say, if theycould only inherit when a testimentary disposition existed in theirfavour--and if, in absence of such disposition, the State stepped in asheir, a yearly revenue of 500 millions, according to a calculation basedon official material, could be counted upon. This is not the place toexamine this calculation more closely. Even if it is put at too high afigure, which I doubt, yet the yield of such a tax would be very largeunder any circumstances. Since this, like every tax on an inheritance, is a tax on capital--thatis to say, it is directly derived from invested capital--it is in thenature of things that the proceeds should be devoted in the firstinstance to the improvement of the financial situation, especially topaying off debts. Otherwise there would be the danger of acting like aprivate gentleman who lives on his capital. This idea is also to berecommended because the proceeds of the tax are not constant, but liableto fluctuations. It would be advisable to devote the proceedsprincipally in this way, and to allow a part to go towards extinguishingthe debt of the communes, whose financial soundness is extremelyimportant. This fundamental standpoint does not exclude the possibilitythat in a national crisis the tax may be exceptionally applied to otherimportant purposes, as for example to the completion of our armaments onland and sea. There are two objections--one economic, the other ethical--which may beurged against this right of the State or the Empire to inherit. It isargued that the proceeds of the tax were drawn from the national wealth, that the State would grow richer, the people poorer, and that in courseof time capital would be united in the hand of the State, that theindependent investor would be replaced by the official, and thus theideal of Socialism would be realized. Secondly, the requirement thatrelations, in order to inherit, must be specially mentioned in the will, is thought to be a menace to the coherence of the family. "According toour prevailing law, the man who wishes to deprive his family of hisfortune must do some positive act. He must make a will, in which hebequeathes the property to third persons, charitable institutions, or toany other object. It is thus brought before his mind that his naturalheirs are his relations, his kin, and that he must make a will if hewishes to exclude his legal heirs. It is impressed upon him that he isinterfering by testamentary disposition in the natural course of things, that he is wilfully altering it. The Imperial right of succession isbased on the idea that the community stands nearer to the individualthan his family. This is in its inmost significance a socialistic trait. The socialistic State, which deals with a society made up of atoms, inwhich every individual is freed from the bonds of family, while all arealike bound by a uniform socialistic tie, might put forward a claim ofthis sort. "[F] [Footnote F: Bolko v. Katte, in the _Kreuzzeitung_ of November 18, 1910. ] Both objections are unconvincing. So long as the State uses the proceeds of the inheritances in order toliquidate debts and other outgoings, which would have to be metotherwise, the devolution of such inheritances on the State is directlybeneficial to all members of the State, because they have to pay lesstaxes. Legislation could easily prevent any accumulation of capital inthe hands of the State, since, if such results followed, this right ofsuccession might be restricted, or the dreaded socialization of theState be prevented in other ways. The science of finance couldunquestionably arrange that. There is no necessity to push the scheme toits extreme logical conclusion. The so-called ethical objections are still less tenable. If a true senseof family ties exists, the owner of property will not fail to make awill, which is an extremely simple process under the present law. Ifsuch ties are weak, they are assuredly not strengthened by the right ofcertain next of kin to be the heirs of a man from whom they kept aloofin life. Indeed, the Crown's right of inheritance would produce probablythe result that more wills were made, and thus the sense of family tieswould actually be strengthened. The "primitive German sense of law, "which finds expression in the present form of the law of succession, andis summed up in the notion that the family is nearer to the individualthan the State, has so far borne the most mischievous results. It is theroot from which the disruption of Germany, the particularism and thedefective patriotism of our nation, have grown up. It is well that inthe coming generation some check on this movement should be found, andthat the significance of the State for the individual, no less than forthe family, should be thoroughly understood. These more or less theoretical objections are certainly not weightyenough to negative a proposal like that of introducing this Imperialright of succession if the national danger demands direct and rapid helpand the whole future of Germany is at stake. If, therefore, no other proposals are forthcoming by which an equallylarge revenue can be obtained; the immediate reintroduction of such alaw of succession appears a necessity, and will greatly benefit oursorely-pressed country. Help is urgently needed, and there would be goodprospects of such law being passed in the Reichstag if the Governmentdoes not disguise the true state of the political position. Political preparations are not less essential than financial. We seethat all the nations of the world are busily securing themselves againstthe attack of more powerful opponents by alliances or _ententes_, andare winning allies in order to carry out their own objects. Efforts arealso often made to stir up ill-feeling between the other States, so asto have a free hand for private schemes. This is the policy on whichEngland has built up her power in Europe, in order to continue her worldpolicy undisturbed. She cannot be justly blamed for this; for even ifshe has acted with complete disregard of political morality, she hasbuilt up a mighty Empire, which is the object of all policy, and hassecured to the English people the possibility of the most ambitiouscareers. We must not deceive ourselves as to the principles of thisEnglish policy. We must realize to ourselves that it is guidedexclusively by unscrupulous selfishness, that it shrinks from no meansof accomplishing its aims, and thus shows admirable diplomatic skill. There must be no self-deception on the point that political arrangementshave only a qualified value, that they are always concluded with a tacitreservation. Every treaty of alliance presupposes the _rebus sicstantibus_; for since it must satisfy the interests of each contractingparty, it clearly can only hold as long as those interests are reallybenefited. This is a political principle that cannot be disputed. Nothing can compel a State to act counter to its own interests, on whichthose of its citizens depend. This consideration, however, imposes onthe honest State the obligation of acting with the utmost caution whenconcluding a political arrangement and defining its limits in time, soas to avoid being forced into a breach of its word. Conditions may arisewhich are more powerful than the most honourable intentions. Thecountry's own interests--considered, of course, in the highest ethicalsense--must then turn the scale. "Frederick the Great was all his lifelong charged with treachery, because no treaty or alliance could everinduce him to renounce the right of free self-determination. "[A] The great statesman, therefore, will conclude political _ententes_ oralliances, on whose continuance he wishes to be able to reckon, only ifhe is convinced that each of the contracting parties will find such anarrangement to his true and unqualified advantage. Such an alliance is, as I have shown in another place, the Austro-German. The two States, from the military no less than from the political aspect, are in thehappiest way complements of each other. The German theatre of war in theeast will be protected by Austria from any attempt to turn our flank onthe south, while we can guard the northern frontier of Austria andoutflank any Russian attack on Galicia. Alliances in which each contracting party has different interests willnever hold good under all conditions, and therefore cannot represent apermanent political system. "There is no alliance or agreement in the world that can be regarded aseffective if it is not fastened by the bond of the common and reciprocalinterests; if in any treaty the advantage is all on one side and theother gets nothing, this disproportion destroys the obligation. " Theseare the words of Frederick the Great, our foremost political teacher_pace_ Bismarck. We must not be blinded in politics by personal wishes and hopes, butmust look things calmly in the face, and try to forecast the probableattitude of the other States by reference to their own interests. Bismarck tells us that "Illusions are the greatest danger to thediplomatist. He must take for granted that the other, like himself, seeks nothing but his own advantage. " It will prove waste labour toattempt to force a great State by diplomatic arrangements to actions oran attitude which oppose its real interests. When a crisis arises, theweight of these interests will irresistibly turn the scale. When Napoleon III. Planned war against Prussia, he tried to effect analliance with Austria and Italy, and Archduke Albert was actually inParis to conclude the military negotiations. [B] These probably weregoing on, as the French General Lebrun was in Vienna on the same errand. Both countries left France in the lurch so soon as the first Prussianflag flew victoriously on the heights of the Geisberg. A statesman lessbiassed than Napoleon would have foreseen this, since neither Austrianor Italy had sufficient interests at stake to meddle in such a warunder unfavourable conditions. [Footnote B: When Colonel Stoffel, the well-known French Military Attachéin Berlin, returned to Paris, and was received by the Emperor, andpointed out the danger of the position and the probable perfection ofPrussia's war preparations, the Emperor declared that he was betterinformed. He proceeded to take from his desk a memoir on theconditions of the Prussian army apparently sent to him by ArchdukeAlbert, which came to quite different conclusions. The Emperor hadmade the facts therein stated the basis of his political and militarycalculations. (Communications of Colonel Stoffel to the formerMinister of War, v. Verdy, who put them at the service of the author. )] France, in a similar spirit of selfish national interests, unscrupulously brushed aside the Conventions of Algeciras, which did notsatisfy her. She will equally disregard all further diplomaticarrangements intended to safeguard Germany's commercial interests inMorocco so soon as she feels strong enough, since it is clearly herinterest to be undisputed master in Morocco and to exploit that countryfor herself. France, when she no longer fears the German arms, will notallow any official document in the world to guarantee German commerceand German enterprise any scope in Morocco; and from the Frenchstandpoint she is right. The political behaviour of a State is governed only by its owninterests, and the natural antagonism and grouping of the differentGreat Powers must be judged by that standard. There is no doubt, however, that it is extraordinarily difficult to influence the politicalgrouping with purely selfish purposes; such influence becomes possibleonly by the genuine endeavour to further the interests of the State withwhich closer relations are desirable and to cause actual injury to itsopponents. A policy whose aim is to avoid quarrel with all, but tofurther the interests of none, runs the danger of displeasing everyoneand of being left isolated in the hour of danger. A successful policy, therefore, cannot be followed without takingchances and facing risks. It must be conscious of its goal, and keepthis goal steadily in view. It must press every change of circumstancesand all unforeseen occurrences into the service of its own ideas. Aboveall things, it must he ready to seize the psychological moment, and takebold action if the general position of affairs indicates the possibilityof realizing political ambitions or of waging a necessary war underfavourable conditions. "The great art of policy, " writes Frederick theGreat, "is not to swim against the stream, but to turn all events toone's own profit. It consists rather in deriving advantage fromfavourable conjunctures than in preparing such conjunctures. " Even inhis Rheinsberg days he acknowledged the principle to which he adheredall his life: "Wisdom is well qualified to keep what one possesses; butboldness alone can acquire. " "I give you a problem to solve, " he said tohis councillors when the death of Emperor Charles VI. Was announced. "When you have the advantage, are you to use it or not?" Definite, clearly thought out political goals, wise foresight, correctsumming up alike of one's own and of foreign interests, accurateestimation of the forces of friends and foes, bold advocacy of theinterests, not only of the mother-country, but also of allies, anddaring courage when the critical hour strikes--these are the great lawsof political and military success. The political preparation for war is included in them. He who is blindedby the semblance of power and cannot resolve to act, will never be ableto make political preparations for the inevitable war with any success. "The braggart feebleness which travesties strength, the immoral claimwhich swaggers in the sanctity of historical right, the timidity whichshelters its indecision behind empty and formal excuses, never were moredespised than by the great Prussian King, " so H. V. Treitschke tells us. "Old Fritz" must be our model in this respect, and must teach us withremorseless realism so to guide our policy that the position of thepolitical world may be favourable for us, and that we do not missthe golden opportunity. It is an abuse of language if our unenterprising age tries to stigmatizethat energetic policy which pursued positive aims as an adventuristpolicy. That title can only be given to the policy which sets uppersonal ideals and follows them without just estimation of the realcurrent of events, and so literally embarks on incalculable adventures, as Napoleon did in Mexico, and Italy in Abyssinia. A policy taking all factors into consideration, and realizing thesegreat duties of the State, which are an historical legacy and are basedon the nature of things, is justified when it boldly reckons with thepossibility of a war. This is at once apparent if one considers theresult to the State when war is forced on it under disadvantageouscircumstances. I need only instance 1806, and the terrible catastropheto which the feeble, unworthy peace policy of Prussia led. In this respect the Russo-Japanese War speaks a clear language. Japanhad made the most judicious preparations possible, political as well asmilitary, for the war, when she concluded the treaty with England andassured herself of the benevolent neutrality of America and China. Herpolicy, no less circumspect than bold, did not shrink from beginning atthe psychological moment the war which was essential for the attainmentof her political ends. Russia was not prepared in either respect. Shehad been forced into a hostile position with Germany from her alliancewith France, and therefore dared not denude her west front in order toplace sufficient forces in the Far East. Internal conditions, moreover, compelled her to retain large masses of soldiers in the western part ofthe Empire. A large proportion of the troops put into the field againstJapan were therefore only inferior reserves. None of the preparationsrequired by the political position had been made, although the conflicthad long been seen to be inevitable. Thus the war began with disastrousretreats, and was never conducted with any real vigour. There is nodoubt that things would have run a different course had Russia maderesolute preparations for the inevitable struggle and had opened thecampaign by the offensive. England, too, was politically surprised by the Boer War, andconsequently had not taken any military precautions at all adequate toher aims or suited to give weight to political demands. Two points stand out clearly from this consideration. First of all there is a reciprocal relation between the military andpolitical preparations for war. Proper political preparations for warare only made if the statesman is supported by a military force strongenough to give weight to his demands, and if he ventures on nothingwhich he cannot carry through by arms. At the same time the army must bedeveloped on a scale which takes account of the political projects. Theobligation imposed on the General to stand aloof from politics in peaceas well as in war only holds good in a limited sense. The War Ministerand the Head of the General Staff must be kept _au courant_ with theall-fluctuating phases of policy; indeed, they must be allowed a certaininfluence over policy, in order to adapt their measures to its needs, and are entitled to call upon the statesman to act if the militarysituation is peculiarly favourable. At the same time the Minister whoconducts foreign policy must, on his side, never lose sight of what isin a military sense practicable; he must be constantly kept informed ofthe precise degree in which army and navy are ready for war, since hemust never aim at plans which cannot, if necessary, be carried out bywar. A veiled or open threat of war is the only means the statesman hasof carrying out his aims; for in the last resort it is always therealization of the possible consequences of a war which induces theopponent to give in. Where this means is renounced, a policy ofcompromise results, which satisfies neither party and seldom produces apermanent settlement; while if a statesman announces the possibility ofrecourse to the arbitrament of arms, his threat must be no empty one, but must be based on real power and firm determination if it is not toend in political and moral defeat. The second point, clearly brought before us, is that a timid andhesitating policy, which leaves the initiative to the opponent andshrinks from ever carrying out its purpose with warlike methods, alwayscreates an unfavourable military position. History, as well as theory, tells us by countless instances that a far-seeing, energetic policy, which holds its own in the face of all antagonism, always reactsfavourably on the military situation. In this respect war and policy obey the same laws; great results canonly be expected where political and military foresight and resolutionjoin hands. If we regard from this standpoint the political preparation for the nextwar which Germany will have to fight, we must come to this conclusion:the more unfavourable the political conjuncture the greater thenecessity for a determined, energetic policy if favourable conditionsare to be created for the inevitably threatening war. So long as we had only to reckon on the possibility of a war on twofronts against France and Russia, and could count on help in this warfrom all the three parties to the Triple Alliance, the position wascomparatively simple. There were, then, of course, a series of variousstrategical possibilities; but the problem could be reduced to a smallcompass: strategical attack on the one side, strategical defence on theother, or, if the Austrian army was taken into calculation, offensiveaction on both sides. To-day the situation is different. We must consider England, as well as France and Russia. We must expectnot only an attack by sea on our North Sea coasts, but a landing ofEnglish forces on the continent of Europe and a violation of Belgo-Dutchneutrality by our enemies. It is also not inconceivable that England mayland troops in Schleswig or Jutland, and try to force Denmark into warwith us. It seems further questionable whether Austria will be in aposition to support us with all her forces, whether she will not ratherbe compelled to safeguard her own particular interests on her south andsouth-east frontiers. An attack by France through Switzerland is alsoincreasingly probable, if a complete reorganization of the grouping ofthe European States is effected. Finally, we should be seriously menacedin the Baltic if Russia gains time to reconstruct her fleet. All these unfavourable conditions will certainly not occursimultaneously, but under certain not impossible political combinationsthey are more or less probable, and must be taken into account from themilitary aspect. The military situation thus created is veryunfavourable. If under such uncertain conditions it should be necessary to place thearmy on a war footing, only one course is left: we must meet thesituation by calling out strategic reserves, which must be all thestronger since the political conditions are so complicated and obscure, and those opponents so strong on whose possible share in the war we mustcount. The strategic reserve will be to some extent a political onealso. A series of protective measures, necessary in any case, would haveto be at once set on foot, but the mass of the army would not bedirected to any definite point until the entire situation was clear andall necessary steps could be considered. Until that moment the troops ofthe strategic reserve would be left in their garrisons or collectedalong the railway lines and at railway centres in such a way that, whenoccasion arose, they could be despatched in any direction. On the sameprinciple the rolling-stock on the lines would have to be kept inreadiness, the necessary time-tables for the different transportarrangements drawn up, and stores secured in safe depots on as manydifferent lines of march as possible. Previous arrangements forunloading at the railway stations must be made in accordance with themost various political prospects. We should in any case be forced toadopt a waiting policy, a strategic defensive, which under presentconditions is extremely unfavourable; we should not be able to preventan invasion by one or other of our enemies. No proof is necessary to show that a war thus begun cannot hold out goodprospects of success. The very bravest army must succumb if led againsta crushingly superior force under most unfavourable conditions. Amilitary investigation of the situation shows that a planof campaign, such as would be required here on the inner line, presents, under the modern system of "mass" armies, tremendous difficulties, andhas to cope with strategic conditions of the most unfavourable kind. The disadvantages of such a situation can only be avoided by a policywhich makes it feasible to act on the offensive, and, if possible, tooverthrow the one antagonist before the other can actively interfere. Onthis initiative our safety now depends, just as it did in the days ofFrederick the Great. We must look this truth boldly in the face. Ofcourse, it can be urged that an attack is just what would produce anunfavourable position for us, since it creates the conditions on whichthe Franco-Russian alliance would be brought into activity. If weattacked France or Russia, the ally would be compelled to bring help, and we should be in a far worse position than if we had only one enemyto fight. Let it then be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle thecards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would bereasonable prospect that Russia for a time would remain neutral. This view undoubtedly deserves attention, but we must not hope to bringabout this attack by waiting passively. Neither France nor Russia norEngland need to attack in order to further their interests. So long aswe shrink from attack, they can force us to submit to their will bydiplomacy, as the upshot of the Morocco negotiations shows. If we wish to bring about an attack by our opponents, we must initiatean active policy which, without attacking France, will so prejudice herinterests or those of England, that both these States would feelthemselves compelled to attack us. Opportunities for such procedure areoffered both in Africa and in Europe, and anyone who has attentivelystudied prominent political utterances can easily satisfy himself onthis point. In opposition to these ideas the view is frequently put forward that weshould wait quietly and let time fight for us, since from the force ofcircumstances many prizes will fall into our laps which we have now tostruggle hard for. Unfortunately such politicians always forget to stateclearly and definitely what facts are really working in their owninterests and what advantages will accrue to us therefrom. Suchpolitical wisdom is not to be taken seriously, for it has no solidfoundation. We must reckon with the definitely given conditions, andrealize that timidity and _laissez-aller_ have never led to greatresults. It is impossible for anyone not close at hand to decide what steps andmeasures are imposed upon our foreign policy, in order to secure afavourable political situation should the pending questions so momentousto Germany's existence come to be settled by an appeal to arms. Thisrequires a full and accurate knowledge of the political and diplomaticposition which I do not possess. One thing only can be justly said:Beyond the confusion and contradictions of the present situation we mustkeep before us the great issues which will not lose their importance astime goes on. Italy, which has used a favourable moment in order to acquiresettlements for her very rapidly increasing population (487, 000 personsemigrated from Italy in 1908), can never combine with France and Englandto fulfil her political ambition of winning the supremacy in theMediterranean, since both these States themselves claim this place. Theeffort to break up the Triple Alliance has momentarily favoured theItalian policy of expansion. But this incident does not alter in theleast the fact that the true interest of Italy demands adherence to theTriple Alliance, which alone can procure her Tunis and Biserta. Theimportance of these considerations will continue to be felt. Turkey also cannot permanently go hand-in-hand with England, France, andRussia, whose policy must always aim directly at the annihilation ofpresent-day Turkey. Islam has now as ever her most powerful enemies inEngland and Russia, and will, sooner or later, be forced to join theCentral European Alliance, although we committed the undoubted blunderof abandoning her in Morocco. There is no true community of interests between Russia and England; inCentral Asia, in Persia, as in the Mediterranean, their ambitions clashin spite of all conventions, and the state of affairs in Japan and Chinais forcing on a crisis which is vital to Russian interests and to somedegree ties her hands. All these matters open out a wide vista to German statesmanship, if itis equal to its task, and make the general outlook less gloomy thanrecent political events seemed to indicate. And, then, our policy cancount on a factor of strength such as no other State possesses--on anarmy whose military efficiency, I am convinced, cannot be sufficientlyvalued. Not that it is perfect in all its arrangements and details. Wehave amply shown the contrary. But the spirit which animates the troops, the ardour of attack, the heroism, the loyalty which prevail amongstthem, justify the highest expectations. I am certain that if they aresoon to be summoned to arms, their exploits will astonish the world, provided only that they are led with skill and determination. The Germannation, too--of this I am equally convinced--will rise to the height ofits great duty. A mighty force which only awaits the summons sleeps inits soul. Whoever to-day can awaken the slumbering idealism of thispeople, and rouse the national enthusiasm by placing before its eyes aworthy and comprehensible ambition, will be able to sweep this people onin united strength to the highest efforts and sacrifices, and willachieve a truly magnificent result. In the consciousness of being able at any time to call up these forces, and in the sure trust that they will not fail in the hour of danger, our Government can firmly tread the path which leads to a splendid future;but it will not be able to liberate all the forces of Germany unless itwins her confidence by successful action and takes for its motto thebrave words of Goethe: "Bid defiance to every power! Ever valiant, never cower! To the brave soldier open flies The golden gate of Paradise. " EPILOGUE After I had practically finished the preceding pages, the Franco-Germanconvention as to Morocco and the Congo Compensation were published; theTurko-Italian War broke out; the revolution in China assumed dimensionswhich point to the probability of new disorders in Eastern Asia; and, lastly, it was known that not merely an _entente cordiale, _ but a realoffensive and defensive alliance, aimed at us, exists between France andEngland. Such an alliance does not seem to be concluded permanentlybetween the two States, but clearly every possibility of war has beenforeseen and provided for. I have been able to insert all the needful references to the two firstoccurrences in my text; but the light which has lately been cast on theAnglo-French conventions compels me to make a few concluding remarks. The German Government, from important reasons which cannot be discussed, have considered it expedient to avoid, under present conditions, acollision with England or France at any cost. It has accomplished thisobject by the arrangement with France, and it may be, of course, assumedthat no further concessions were attainable, since from the first it wasdetermined not to fight at present. Only from this aspect can theattitude of the Government towards France and England be consideredcorrect. It is quite evident from her whole attitude that Great Britainwas resolved to take the chance of a war. Her immediate preparations forwar, the movements of her ships, and the attack of English high financeon the foremost German banking establishments, which took place at thiscrisis, exclude all doubt on the point. We have probably obtained theconcessions made by France only because she thought the favourablemoment for the long-planned war had not yet come. Probably she will waituntil, on the one hand, the Triple Alliance is still more loosened andRussia's efficiency by sea and land is more complete, and until, on theother hand, her own African army has been so far strengthened that itcan actively support the Rhine army. This idea may sufficiently explain the Morocco policy of the Government, but there can be no doubt, if the convention with France be examined, that it does not satisfy fully our justifiable wishes. It will not be disputed that the commercial and political arrangement asregards Morocco creates favourable conditions of competition for ourmanufacturers, _entrepreneurs_ and merchants; that the acquisition ofterritory in the French Congo has a certain and perhaps notinconsiderable value in the future, more especially if we succeed inobtaining the Spanish _enclave_ on the coast, which alone will make thepossession really valuable. On the other hand, what we obtained cannever be regarded as a sufficient compensation for what we werecompelled to abandon. I have emphasized in another place the fact that the commercialconcessions which France has made are valuable only so long as our armedforce guarantees that they are observed; the acquisitions in the Congoregion must, as the Imperial Chancellor announced in his speech ofNovember 9, 1911, be regarded, not only from the point of view of theirpresent, but of their future value; but, unfortunately, they seem fromthis precise point of view very inferior to Morocco, for there can be nodoubt that in the future Morocco will be a far more valuable possessionfor France than the Congo region for Germany, especially if that Spanish_enclave_ cannot be obtained. The access to the Ubangi and the Congo hasat present a more or less theoretical value, and could be barred in caseof war with us by a few companies of Senegalese. It would be mere self-deception if we would see in the colonialarrangement which we have effected with France the paving of the way fora better understanding with this State generally. It certainly cannot beassumed that France will abandon the policy of _revanche_, which she hascarried out for decades with energy and unflinching consistency, at amoment when she is sure of being supported by England, merely becauseshe has from opportunist considerations come to terms with us about adesolate corner of Africa. No importance can be attached to this idea, in spite of the views expounded by the Imperial Chancellor, v. Bethmann-Hollweg, in his speech of November 9, 1911. We need not, therefore, regard this convention as definitive. It is as liable torevision as the Algeciras treaty, and indeed offers, in this respect, the advantage that it creates new opportunities of friction with France. The acquisition of territory in the Congo region means at first anactual loss of power to Germany; it can only be made useful by theexpenditure of large sums of money, and every penny which is withdrawnfrom our army and navy signifies a weakening of our political position. But, it seems to me, we must, when judging the question as a whole, notmerely calculate the concrete value of the objects of the exchange, butprimarily its political range and its consequences for our policy in itsentirety. From this standpoint it is patent that the whole arrangementmeans a lowering of our prestige in the world, for we have certainlysurrendered our somewhat proudly announced pretensions to uphold thesovereignty of Morocco, and have calmly submitted to the violentinfraction of the Algeciras convention by France, although we hadweighty interests at stake. If in the text of the Morocco treaty suchaction was called an explanation of the treaty of 1909, and thus thenotion was spread that our policy had followed a consistent line, suchexplanation is tantamount to a complete change of front. An additional political disadvantage is that our relations with Islamhave changed for the worse by the abandonment of Morocco. I cannot, ofcourse, judge whether our diplomatic relations with Turkey havesuffered, but there can be little doubt that we have lost prestige inthe whole Mohammedan world, which is a matter of the first importancefor us. It is also a reasonable assumption that the Morocco conventionprecipitated the action of Italy in Tripoli, and thus shook profoundlythe solidity of the Triple Alliance. The increase of power which Franceobtained through the acquisition of Morocco made the Italians realizethe importance of no longer delaying to strengthen their position in theMediterranean. The worst result of our Morocco policy is, however, undoubtedly the deeprift which has been formed in consequence between the Government and themass of the nationalist party, the loss of confidence among largesections of the nation, extending even to classes of society which, inspite of their regular opposition to the Government, had heartilysupported it as the representative of the Empire abroad. In thisweakening of public confidence, which is undisguisedly shown both in thePress and in the Reichstag (although some slight change for the betterhas followed the latest declarations of the Government), lies the greatdisadvantage of the Franco-German understanding; for in the criticaltimes which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empiremust be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is toride the storm. The unveiling of the Anglo-French agreement as to warremoves all further doubt on this point. The existence of such relations between England and France confirms theview of the political situation which I have tried to bring out in thevarious chapters of this book. They show that we are confronted by afirm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to hinderany further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they havedone their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left nodoubt on this point. [A] [Footnote A: Cf. Speech of Sir E. Grey on November 27, 1911. ] The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of allpacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy leadin the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressiveintentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England wouldsupport her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define thelimits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war withEngland. The meaning of the English Minister's utterances is not alteredby his declaration that England would raise no protest against newacquisitions by Germany in Africa. England knows too well that every newcolonial acquisition means primarily a financial loss to Germany, andthat we could not long defend our colonies in case of war. They formobjects which can be taken from us if we are worsted. Meanwhile a clearcommentary on the Minister's speech may be found in the fact that oncemore the Budget includes a considerable increase in the naval estimates. In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to counton any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a_rapprochement_ must not blind us as to the real situation. We may atmost use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we mayfairly imagine we have some prospect of success. If the Imperial Government was of the opinion that it was necessary inthe present circumstances to avoid war, still the situation in the worldgenerally shows there can only be a short respite before we once moreface the question whether we will draw the sword for our position in theworld or renounce such position once and for all. We must not in anycase wait until our opponents have completed their arming and decidethat the hour of attack has come. We must use the respite we still enjoy for the most energetic warlikepreparation, according to the principles which I have already laid down. All national parties must rally round the Government, which has torepresent our dearest interests abroad. The willing devotion of thepeople must aid it in its bold determination and help to pave the way tomilitary and political success, without carrying still further thedisastrous consequences of the Morocco policy by unfruitful andfrequently unjustified criticism and by thus widening the gulf betweenGovernment and people. We may expect from the Government that it willprosecute the military and political preparation for war with the energywhich the situation demands, in clear knowledge of the dangersthreatening us, but also, in correct appreciation of our national needsand of the warlike strength of our people, and that it will not let anyconventional scruples distract it from this object. Repeal of the Five Years Act, reconstruction of the army on an enlargedbasis, accelerated progress in our naval armaments, preparation ofsufficient financial means--these are requirements which the situationcalls for. New and creative ideas must fructify our policy, and lead itto the happy goal. The political situation offers many points on which to rest our lever. England, too, is in a most difficult position. The conflict of herinterests with Russia's in Persia and in the newly arisen Dardanellesquestion, as well as the power of Islam in the most important parts ofher colonial Empire, are the subjects of permanent anxiety in GreatBritain. Attention has already been called to the significance anddifficulty of her relations with North America. France also hasconsiderable obstacles still to surmount in her African Empire, beforeit can yield its full fruits. The disturbances in the Far East willprobably fetter Russia's forces, and England's interests will suffer insympathy. These are all conditions which an energetic and far-sightedGerman policy can utilize in order to influence the general politicalsituation in the interests of our Fatherland. If people and Government stand together, resolved to guard the honour ofGermany and make every sacrifice of blood and treasure to insure thefuture of our country and our State, we can face approaching events withconfidence in our rights and in our strength; then we need not fear tofight for our position in the world, but we may, with Ernst MoritzArndt, raise our hands to heaven and cry to God: "From the height of the starry sky May thy ringing sword flash bright; Let every craven cry Be silenced by thy might!"