ERYXIAS By a Platonic Imitator (see Appendix II) Translated by Benjamin Jowett APPENDIX II. The two dialogues which are translated in the second appendix are notmentioned by Aristotle, or by any early authority, and have no claimto be ascribed to Plato. They are examples of Platonic dialogues to beassigned probably to the second or third generation after Plato, whenhis writings were well known at Athens and Alexandria. They exhibitconsiderable originality, and are remarkable for containing severalthoughts of the sort which we suppose to be modern rather than ancient, and which therefore have a peculiar interest for us. The SecondAlcibiades shows that the difficulties about prayer which have perplexedChristian theologians were not unknown among the followers of Plato. The Eryxias was doubted by the ancients themselves: yet it may claim thedistinction of being, among all Greek or Roman writings, the one whichanticipates in the most striking manner the modern science of politicaleconomy and gives an abstract form to some of its principal doctrines. For the translation of these two dialogues I am indebted to my friendand secretary, Mr. Knight. That the Dialogue which goes by the name of the Second Alcibiades is agenuine writing of Plato will not be maintained by any modern critic, and was hardly believed by the ancients themselves. The dialectic ispoor and weak. There is no power over language, or beauty of style; andthere is a certain abruptness and agroikia in the conversation, whichis very un-Platonic. The best passage is probably that about thepoets:--the remark that the poet, who is of a reserved disposition, isuncommonly difficult to understand, and the ridiculous interpretation ofHomer, are entirely in the spirit of Plato (compare Protag; Ion; Apol. ). The characters are ill-drawn. Socrates assumes the 'superior person' andpreaches too much, while Alcibiades is stupid and heavy-in-hand. Thereare traces of Stoic influence in the general tone and phraseology of theDialogue (compare opos melesei tis. . . Kaka: oti pas aphron mainetai):and the writer seems to have been acquainted with the 'Laws' of Plato(compare Laws). An incident from the Symposium is rather clumsilyintroduced, and two somewhat hackneyed quotations (Symp. , Gorg. ) recur. The reference to the death of Archelaus as having occurred 'quitelately' is only a fiction, probably suggested by the Gorgias, where thestory of Archelaus is told, and a similar phrase occurs;--ta gar echtheskai proen gegonota tauta, k. T. L. There are several passages whichare either corrupt or extremely ill-expressed. But there is a moderninterest in the subject of the dialogue; and it is a good example ofa short spurious work, which may be attributed to the second or thirdcentury before Christ. INTRODUCTION. Much cannot be said in praise of the style or conception of the Eryxias. It is frequently obscure; like the exercise of a student, it is fullof small imitations of Plato:--Phaeax returning from an expedition toSicily (compare Socrates in the Charmides from the army at Potidaea), the figure of the game at draughts, borrowed from the Republic, etc. Ithas also in many passages the ring of sophistry. On the other hand, therather unhandsome treatment which is exhibited towards Prodicus is quiteunlike the urbanity of Plato. Yet there are some points in the argument which are deserving ofattention. (1) That wealth depends upon the need of it or demand forit, is the first anticipation in an abstract form of one of the greatprinciples of modern political economy, and the nearest approach to itto be found in an ancient writer. (2) The resolution of wealth intoits simplest implements going on to infinity is a subtle and refinedthought. (3) That wealth is relative to circumstances is a soundconception. (4) That the arts and sciences which receive payment arelikewise to be comprehended under the notion of wealth, also touches aquestion of modern political economy. (5) The distinction of post hocand propter hoc, often lost sight of in modern as well as in ancienttimes. These metaphysical conceptions and distinctions show considerablepower of thought in the writer, whatever we may think of his merits asan imitator of Plato. ERYXIAS PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Eryxias, Erasistratus, Critias. SCENE: The portico of a temple of Zeus. It happened by chance that Eryxias the Steirian was walking with me inthe Portico of Zeus the Deliverer, when there came up to us Critiasand Erasistratus, the latter the son of Phaeax, who was the nephew ofErasistratus. Now Erasistratus had just arrived from Sicily and thatpart of the world. As they approached, he said, Hail, Socrates! SOCRATES: The same to you, I said; have you any good news from Sicily totell us? ERASISTRATUS: Most excellent. But, if you please, let us first sit down;for I am tired with my yesterday's journey from Megara. SOCRATES: Gladly, if that is your desire. ERASISTRATUS: What would you wish to hear first? he said. What theSicilians are doing, or how they are disposed towards our city? To mymind, they are very like wasps: so long as you only cause them a littleannoyance they are quite unmanageable; you must destroy their nestsif you wish to get the better of them. And in a similar way, theSyracusans, unless we set to work in earnest, and go against them witha great expedition, will never submit to our rule. The petty injurieswhich we at present inflict merely irritate them enough to make themutterly intractable. And now they have sent ambassadors to Athens, andintend, I suspect, to play us some trick. --While we were talking, theSyracusan envoys chanced to go by, and Erasistratus, pointing to one ofthem, said to me, That, Socrates, is the richest man in all Italy andSicily. For who has larger estates or more land at his disposal tocultivate if he please? And they are of a quality, too, finer than anyother land in Hellas. Moreover, he has all the things which go to makeup wealth, slaves and horses innumerable, gold and silver without end. I saw that he was inclined to expatiate on the riches of the man; so Iasked him, Well, Erasistratus, and what sort of character does he bearin Sicily? ERASISTRATUS: He is esteemed to be, and really is, the wickedest ofall the Sicilians and Italians, and even more wicked than he is rich;indeed, if you were to ask any Sicilian whom he thought to be the worstand the richest of mankind, you would never hear any one else named. I reflected that we were speaking, not of trivial matters, but aboutwealth and virtue, which are deemed to be of the greatest moment, andI asked Erasistratus whom he considered the wealthier, --he who was thepossessor of a talent of silver or he who had a field worth two talents? ERASISTRATUS: The owner of the field. SOCRATES: And on the same principle he who had robes and bedding andsuch things which are of greater value to him than to a stranger wouldbe richer than the stranger? ERASISTRATUS: True. SOCRATES: And if any one gave you a choice, which of these would youprefer? ERASISTRATUS: That which was most valuable. SOCRATES: In which way do you think you would be the richer? ERASISTRATUS: By choosing as I said. SOCRATES: And he appears to you to be the richest who has goods of thegreatest value? ERASISTRATUS: He does. SOCRATES: And are not the healthy richer than the sick, since health isa possession more valuable than riches to the sick? Surely there is noone who would not prefer to be poor and well, rather than to have allthe King of Persia's wealth and to be ill. And this proves that men sethealth above wealth, else they would never choose the one in preferenceto the other. ERASISTRATUS: True. SOCRATES: And if anything appeared to be more valuable than health, hewould be the richest who possessed it? ERASISTRATUS: He would. SOCRATES: Suppose that some one came to us at this moment and were toask, Well, Socrates and Eryxias and Erasistratus, can you tell me whatis of the greatest value to men? Is it not that of which the possessionwill best enable a man to advise how his own and his friend's affairsshould be administered?--What will be our reply? ERASISTRATUS: I should say, Socrates, that happiness was the mostprecious of human possessions. SOCRATES: Not a bad answer. But do we not deem those men who are mostprosperous to be the happiest? ERASISTRATUS: That is my opinion. SOCRATES: And are they not most prosperous who commit the fewest errorsin respect either of themselves or of other men? ERASISTRATUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And they who know what is evil and what is good; what shouldbe done and what should be left undone;--these behave the most wiselyand make the fewest mistakes? Erasistratus agreed to this. SOCRATES: Then the wisest and those who do best and the most fortunateand the richest would appear to be all one and the same, if wisdom isreally the most valuable of our possessions? Yes, said Eryxias, interposing, but what use would it be if a man hadthe wisdom of Nestor and wanted the necessaries of life, food and drinkand clothes and the like? Where would be the advantage of wisdom then?Or how could he be the richest of men who might even have to go begging, because he had not wherewithal to live? I thought that what Eryxias was saying had some weight, and Ireplied, Would the wise man really suffer in this way, if he were soill-provided; whereas if he had the house of Polytion, and the housewere full of gold and silver, he would lack nothing? ERYXIAS: Yes; for then he might dispose of his property and obtain inexchange what he needed, or he might sell it for money with which hecould supply his wants and in a moment procure abundance of everything. SOCRATES: True, if he could find some one who preferred such a house tothe wisdom of Nestor. But if there are persons who set great store bywisdom like Nestor's and the advantages accruing from it, to sell these, if he were so disposed, would be easier still. Or is a house a mostuseful and necessary possession, and does it make a great difference inthe comfort of life to have a mansion like Polytion's instead of livingin a shabby little cottage, whereas wisdom is of small use and it isof no importance whether a man is wise or ignorant about the highestmatters? Or is wisdom despised of men and can find no buyers, althoughcypress wood and marble of Pentelicus are eagerly bought by numerouspurchasers? Surely the prudent pilot or the skilful physician, or theartist of any kind who is proficient in his art, is more worth than thethings which are especially reckoned among riches; and he who can advisewell and prudently for himself and others is able also to sell theproduct of his art, if he so desire. Eryxias looked askance, as if he had received some unfair treatment, andsaid, I believe, Socrates, that if you were forced to speak thetruth, you would declare that you were richer than Callias the son ofHipponicus. And yet, although you claimed to be wiser about things ofreal importance, you would not any the more be richer than he. I dare say, Eryxias, I said, that you may regard these arguments of oursas a kind of game; you think that they have no relation to facts, butare like the pieces in the game of draughts which the player can movein such a way that his opponents are unable to make any countermove. (Compare Republic. ) And perhaps, too, as regards riches you are ofopinion that while facts remain the same, there are arguments, no matterwhether true or false, which enable the user of them to prove that thewisest and the richest are one and the same, although he is in the wrongand his opponents are in the right. There would be nothing strange inthis; it would be as if two persons were to dispute about letters, onedeclaring that the word Socrates began with an S, the other that itbegan with an A, and the latter could gain the victory over the former. Eryxias glanced at the audience, laughing and blushing at once, as ifhe had had nothing to do with what had just been said, and replied, --No, indeed, Socrates, I never supposed that our arguments should be of akind which would never convince any one of those here present or be ofadvantage to them. For what man of sense could ever be persuaded thatthe wisest and the richest are the same? The truth is that we arediscussing the subject of riches, and my notion is that we shouldargue respecting the honest and dishonest means of acquiring them, and, generally, whether they are a good thing or a bad. Very good, I said, and I am obliged to you for the hint: in future wewill be more careful. But why do not you yourself, as you introduced theargument, and do not think that the former discussion touched the pointat issue, tell us whether you consider riches to be a good or an evil? I am of opinion, he said, that they are a good. He was about to addsomething more, when Critias interrupted him:--Do you really suppose so, Eryxias? Certainly, replied Eryxias; I should be mad if I did not: and I do notfancy that you would find any one else of a contrary opinion. And I, retorted Critias, should say that there is no one whom I couldnot compel to admit that riches are bad for some men. But surely, ifthey were a good, they could not appear bad for any one? Here I interposed and said to them: If you two were having an argumentabout equitation and what was the best way of riding, supposing that Iknew the art myself, I should try to bring you to an agreement. ForI should be ashamed if I were present and did not do what I couldto prevent your difference. And I should do the same if you werequarrelling about any other art and were likely, unless you agreed onthe point in dispute, to part as enemies instead of as friends. But now, when we are contending about a thing of which the usefulness continuesduring the whole of life, and it makes an enormous difference whether weare to regard it as beneficial or not, --a thing, too, which is esteemedof the highest importance by the Hellenes:--(for parents, as soon astheir children are, as they think, come to years of discretion, urgethem to consider how wealth may be acquired, since by riches the valueof a man is judged):--When, I say, we are thus in earnest, and you, who agree in other respects, fall to disputing about a matter of suchmoment, that is, about wealth, and not merely whether it is black orwhite, light or heavy, but whether it is a good or an evil, whereby, although you are now the dearest of friends and kinsmen, the most bitterhatred may arise betwixt you, I must hinder your dissension to the bestof my power. If I could, I would tell you the truth, and so put an endto the dispute; but as I cannot do this, and each of you supposes thatyou can bring the other to an agreement, I am prepared, as far as mycapacity admits, to help you in solving the question. Please, therefore, Critias, try to make us accept the doctrines which you yourselfentertain. CRITIAS: I should like to follow up the argument, and will ask Eryxiaswhether he thinks that there are just and unjust men? ERYXIAS: Most decidedly. CRITIAS: And does injustice seem to you an evil or a good? ERYXIAS: An evil. CRITIAS: Do you consider that he who bribes his neighbour's wife andcommits adultery with her, acts justly or unjustly, and this althoughboth the state and the laws forbid? ERYXIAS: Unjustly. CRITIAS: And if the wicked man has wealth and is willing to spend it, he will carry out his evil purposes? whereas he who is short of meanscannot do what he fain would, and therefore does not sin? In such acase, surely, it is better that a person should not be wealthy, if hispoverty prevents the accomplishment of his desires, and his desires areevil? Or, again, should you call sickness a good or an evil? ERYXIAS: An evil. CRITIAS: Well, and do you think that some men are intemperate? ERYXIAS: Yes. CRITIAS: Then, if it is better for his health that the intemperate manshould refrain from meat and drink and other pleasant things, but hecannot owing to his intemperance, will it not also be better that heshould be too poor to gratify his lust rather than that he should havea superabundance of means? For thus he will not be able to sin, althoughhe desire never so much. Critias appeared to be arguing so admirably that Eryxias, if he had notbeen ashamed of the bystanders, would probably have got up and struckhim. For he thought that he had been robbed of a great possession whenit became obvious to him that he had been wrong in his former opinionabout wealth. I observed his vexation, and feared that they wouldproceed to abuse and quarrelling: so I said, --I heard that very argumentused in the Lyceum yesterday by a wise man, Prodicus of Ceos; but theaudience thought that he was talking mere nonsense, and no one couldbe persuaded that he was speaking the truth. And when at last a certaintalkative young gentleman came in, and, taking his seat, began to laughand jeer at Prodicus, tormenting him and demanding an explanation of hisargument, he gained the ear of the audience far more than Prodicus. Can you repeat the discourse to us? Said Erasistratus. SOCRATES: If I can only remember it, I will. The youth began by askingProdicus, In what way did he think that riches were a good and in whatan evil? Prodicus answered, as you did just now, that they were a goodto good men and to those who knew in what way they should be employed, while to the bad and the ignorant they were an evil. The same is true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what theyare themselves. The saying of Archilochus is true:-- 'Men's thoughts correspond to the things which they meet with. ' Well, then, replied the youth, if any one makes me wise in that wisdomwhereby good men become wise, he must also make everything else good tome. Not that he concerns himself at all with these other things, but hehas converted my ignorance into wisdom. If, for example, a person teachme grammar or music, he will at the same time teach me all that relatesto grammar or music, and so when he makes me good, he makes things goodto me. Prodicus did not altogether agree: still he consented to what was said. And do you think, said the youth, that doing good things is likebuilding a house, --the work of human agency; or do things remain whatthey were at first, good or bad, for all time? Prodicus began to suspect, I fancy, the direction which the argumentwas likely to take, and did not wish to be put down by a mere striplingbefore all those present:--(if they two had been alone, he would nothave minded):--so he answered, cleverly enough: I think that doing goodthings is a work of human agency. And is virtue in your opinion, Prodicus, innate or acquired byinstruction? The latter, said Prodicus. Then you would consider him a simpleton who supposed that he couldobtain by praying to the Gods the knowledge of grammar or music orany other art, which he must either learn from another or find out forhimself? Prodicus agreed to this also. And when you pray to the Gods that you may do well and receive good, youmean by your prayer nothing else than that you desire to become good andwise:--if, at least, things are good to the good and wise and evil tothe evil. But in that case, if virtue is acquired by instruction, itwould appear that you only pray to be taught what you do not know. Hereupon I said to Prodicus that it was no misfortune to him if hehad been proved to be in error in supposing that the Gods immediatelygranted to us whatever we asked:--if, I added, whenever you go up tothe Acropolis you earnestly entreat the Gods to grant you good things, although you know not whether they can yield your request, it is asthough you went to the doors of the grammarian and begged him, althoughyou had never made a study of the art, to give you a knowledge ofgrammar which would enable you forthwith to do the business of agrammarian. While I was speaking, Prodicus was preparing to retaliate upon hisyouthful assailant, intending to employ the argument of which you havejust made use; for he was annoyed to have it supposed that he offered avain prayer to the Gods. But the master of the gymnasium came to him andbegged him to leave because he was teaching the youths doctrines whichwere unsuited to them, and therefore bad for them. I have told you this because I want you to understand how men arecircumstanced in regard to philosophy. Had Prodicus been present andsaid what you have said, the audience would have thought him raving, andhe would have been ejected from the gymnasium. But you have argued soexcellently well that you have not only persuaded your hearers, but havebrought your opponent to an agreement. For just as in the law courts, if two witnesses testify to the same fact, one of whom seems to be anhonest fellow and the other a rogue, the testimony of the rogue oftenhas the contrary effect on the judges' minds to what he intended, whilethe same evidence if given by the honest man at once strikes them asperfectly true. And probably the audience have something of the samefeeling about yourself and Prodicus; they think him a Sophist and abraggart, and regard you as a gentleman of courtesy and worth. For theydo not pay attention to the argument so much as to the character of thespeaker. But truly, Socrates, said Erasistratus, though you may be joking, Critias does seem to me to be saying something which is of weight. SOCRATES: I am in profound earnest, I assure you. But why, as you havebegun your argument so prettily, do you not go on with the rest? Thereis still something lacking, now you have agreed that (wealth) is a goodto some and an evil to others. It remains to enquire what constituteswealth; for unless you know this, you cannot possibly come to anunderstanding as to whether it is a good or an evil. I am ready toassist you in the enquiry to the utmost of my power: but first let himwho affirms that riches are a good, tell us what, in his opinion, iswealth. ERASISTRATUS: Indeed, Socrates, I have no notion about wealth beyondthat which men commonly have. I suppose that wealth is a quantity ofmoney (compare Arist. Pol. ); and this, I imagine, would also be Critias'definition. SOCRATES: Then now we have to consider, What is money? Or else lateron we shall be found to differ about the question. For instance, theCarthaginians use money of this sort. Something which is about the sizeof a stater is tied up in a small piece of leather: what it is, no oneknows but the makers. A seal is next set upon the leather, which thenpasses into circulation, and he who has the largest number of suchpieces is esteemed the richest and best off. And yet if any one among ushad a mass of such coins he would be no wealthier than if he had so manypebbles from the mountain. At Lacedaemon, again, they use iron by weightwhich has been rendered useless: and he who has the greatest mass ofsuch iron is thought to be the richest, although elsewhere it hasno value. In Ethiopia engraved stones are employed, of which aLacedaemonian could make no use. Once more, among the Nomad Scythians aman who owned the house of Polytion would not be thought richer than onewho possessed Mount Lycabettus among ourselves. And clearly those thingscannot all be regarded as possessions; for in some cases the possessorswould appear none the richer thereby: but, as I was saying, some one ofthem is thought in one place to be money, and the possessors of itare the wealthy, whereas in some other place it is not money, and theownership of it does not confer wealth; just as the standard of moralsvaries, and what is honourable to some men is dishonourable to others. And if we wish to enquire why a house is valuable to us but not to theScythians, or why the Carthaginians value leather which is worthless tous, or the Lacedaemonians find wealth in iron and we do not, can we notget an answer in some such way as this: Would an Athenian, who had athousand talents weight of the stones which lie about in the Agora andwhich we do not employ for any purpose, be thought to be any the richer? ERASISTRATUS: He certainly would not appear so to me. SOCRATES: But if he possessed a thousand talents weight of some preciousstone, we should say that he was very rich? ERASISTRATUS: Of course. SOCRATES: The reason is that the one is useless and the other useful? ERASISTRATUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And in the same way among the Scythians a house has no valuebecause they have no use for a house, nor would a Scythian set so muchstore on the finest house in the world as on a leather coat, because hecould use the one and not the other. Or again, the Carthaginian coinageis not wealth in our eyes, for we could not employ it, as we can silver, to procure what we need, and therefore it is of no use to us. ERASISTRATUS: True. SOCRATES: What is useful to us, then, is wealth, and what is useless tous is not wealth? But how do you mean, Socrates? said Eryxias, interrupting. Do we notemploy in our intercourse with one another speech and violence (?) andvarious other things? These are useful and yet they are not wealth. SOCRATES: Clearly we have not yet answered the question, What iswealth? That wealth must be useful, to be wealth at all, --thus much isacknowledged by every one. But what particular thing is wealth, if notall things? Let us pursue the argument in another way; and then we mayperhaps find what we are seeking. What is the use of wealth, and forwhat purpose has the possession of riches been invented, --in the sense, I mean, in which drugs have been discovered for the cure of disease?Perhaps in this way we may throw some light on the question. It appearsto be clear that whatever constitutes wealth must be useful, and thatwealth is one class of useful things; and now we have to enquire, Whatis the use of those useful things which constitute wealth? For allthings probably may be said to be useful which we use in production, just as all things which have life are animals, but there is a specialkind of animal which we call 'man. ' Now if any one were to ask us, Whatis that of which, if we were rid, we should not want medicine and theinstruments of medicine, we might reply that this would be the case ifdisease were absent from our bodies and either never came to them at allor went away again as soon as it appeared; and we may therefore concludethat medicine is the science which is useful for getting rid of disease. But if we are further asked, What is that from which, if we were free, we should have no need of wealth? can we give an answer? If we havenone, suppose that we restate the question thus:--If a man could livewithout food or drink, and yet suffer neither hunger nor thirst, wouldhe want either money or anything else in order to supply his needs? ERYXIAS: He would not. SOCRATES: And does not this apply in other cases? If we did not want forthe service of the body the things of which we now stand in need, andheat and cold and the other bodily sensations were unperceived by us, there would be no use in this so-called wealth, if no one, that is, had any necessity for those things which now make us wish for wealth inorder that we may satisfy the desires and needs of the body in respectof our various wants. And therefore if the possession of wealth isuseful in ministering to our bodily wants, and bodily wants were unknownto us, we should not need wealth, and possibly there would be no suchthing as wealth. ERYXIAS: Clearly not. SOCRATES: Then our conclusion is, as would appear, that wealth is whatis useful to this end? Eryxias once more gave his assent, but the small argument considerablytroubled him. SOCRATES: And what is your opinion about another question:--Would yousay that the same thing can be at one time useful and at another uselessfor the production of the same result? ERYXIAS: I cannot say more than that if we require the same thing toproduce the same result, then it seems to me to be useful; if not, not. SOCRATES: Then if without the aid of fire we could make a brazen statue, we should not want fire for that purpose; and if we did not want it, itwould be useless to us? And the argument applies equally in other cases. ERYXIAS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And therefore conditions which are not required for theexistence of a thing are not useful for the production of it? ERYXIAS: Of course not. SOCRATES: And if without gold or silver or anything else which we donot use directly for the body in the way that we do food and drink andbedding and houses, --if without these we could satisfy the wants of thebody, they would be of no use to us for that purpose? ERYXIAS: They would not. SOCRATES: They would no longer be regarded as wealth, because they areuseless, whereas that would be wealth which enabled us to obtain whatwas useful to us? ERYXIAS: O Socrates, you will never be able to persuade me that goldand silver and similar things are not wealth. But I am very strongly ofopinion that things which are useless to us are not wealth, and that themoney which is useful for this purpose is of the greatest use; not thatthese things are not useful towards life, if by them we can procurewealth. SOCRATES: And how would you answer another question? There are persons, are there not, who teach music and grammar and other arts for pay, andthus procure those things of which they stand in need? ERYXIAS: There are. SOCRATES: And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchangefor them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of goldand silver? ERYXIAS: True. SOCRATES: Then if they procure by this means what they want for thepurposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we notsay that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodilyneeds? ERYXIAS: We do. SOCRATES: Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the artsare wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found itdifficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are thewealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Supposethat we are asked, 'Is a horse useful to everybody?' will not our replybe, 'No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?' ERYXIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And so, too, physic is not useful to every one, but only tohim who knows how to use it? ERYXIAS: True. SOCRATES: And the same is the case with everything else? ERYXIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: Then gold and silver and all the other elements which aresupposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows howto use them? ERYXIAS: Exactly. SOCRATES: And were we not saying before that it was the business of agood man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used? ERYXIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: The good and gentle, therefore will alone have profit fromthese things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But ifso, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, thatwhere a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are uselessto him, if some one teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, forwhat was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving himknowledge he has also conferred riches upon him. ERYXIAS: That is the case. SOCRATES: Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit bythe argument. CRITIAS: No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do younot finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and otherthings which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have beenexceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just beenholding. SOCRATES: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you thesame kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode'srecitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has beensaid. But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certainthings useful to the builder when he is building a house? CRITIAS: They are. SOCRATES: And would you say that those things are useful which areemployed in house building, --stones and bricks and beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the builder built the house, thebeams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by whichthese were obtained? CRITIAS: It seems to me that they are all useful for building. SOCRATES: And is it not true of every art, that not only the materialsbut the instruments by which we procure them and without which the workcould not go on, are useful for that art? CRITIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: And further, the instruments by which the instruments areprocured, and so on, going back from stage to stage ad infinitum, --arenot all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out thework? CRITIAS: We may fairly suppose such to be the case. SOCRATES: And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the otherthings which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or anyother means by which he could procure that which he now has? CRITIAS: I do not think so. SOCRATES: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these thingsfor the use of the body? CRITIAS: Certainly not. SOCRATES: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not alwaysto appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle thatthings cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the sameprocess. CRITIAS: But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. Foryou maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never becomeuseless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results badthings are needed, and good for others. SOCRATES: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose? CRITIAS: I should say not. SOCRATES: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sakeof virtue? CRITIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted byword of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing? CRITIAS: Certainly not, I think. SOCRATES: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taughtby hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction? CRITIAS: Yes. SOCRATES: And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, thatart too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e. G. When hearing is procured by the aid of medicine. CRITIAS: Very likely. SOCRATES: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shallwe not regard wealth as useful for virtue? CRITIAS: True. SOCRATES: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured? CRITIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad anddisgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine whichenables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very facultyfor the acquisition of virtue? CRITIAS: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue? CRITIAS: No. SOCRATES: It is not therefore necessary that the means by which weobtain what is useful for a certain object should always be useful forthe same object: for it seems that bad actions may sometimes serve goodpurposes? The matter will be still plainer if we look at it in thisway:--If things are useful towards the several ends for which theyexist, which ends would not come into existence without them, how wouldyou regard them? Can ignorance, for instance, be useful for knowledge, or disease for health, or vice for virtue? CRITIAS: Never. SOCRATES: And yet we have already agreed--have we not?--that therecan be no knowledge where there has not previously been ignorance, norhealth where there has not been disease, nor virtue where there has notbeen vice? CRITIAS: I think that we have. SOCRATES: But then it would seem that the antecedents without which athing cannot exist are not necessarily useful to it. Otherwise ignorancewould appear useful for knowledge, disease for health, and vice forvirtue. Critias still showed great reluctance to accept any argument whichwent to prove that all these things were useless. I saw that it was asdifficult to persuade him as (according to the proverb) it is to boila stone, so I said: Let us bid 'good-bye' to the discussion, since wecannot agree whether these things are useful and a part of wealth ornot. But what shall we say to another question: Which is the happier andbetter man, --he who requires the greatest quantity of necessaries forbody and diet, or he who requires only the fewest and least? The answerwill perhaps become more obvious if we suppose some one, comparing theman himself at different times, to consider whether his condition isbetter when he is sick or when he is well? CRITIAS: That is not a question which needs much consideration. SOCRATES: Probably, I said, every one can understand that health is abetter condition than disease. But when have we the greatest and themost various needs, when we are sick or when we are well? CRITIAS: When we are sick. SOCRATES: And when we are in the worst state we have the greatest andmost especial need and desire of bodily pleasures? CRITIAS: True. SOCRATES: And seeing that a man is best off when he is least in need ofsuch things, does not the same reasoning apply to the case of any twopersons, of whom one has many and great wants and desires, and the otherfew and moderate? For instance, some men are gamblers, some drunkards, and some gluttons: and gambling and the love of drink and greediness areall desires? CRITIAS: Certainly. SOCRATES: But desires are only the lack of something: and those who havethe greatest desires are in a worse condition than those who have noneor very slight ones? CRITIAS: Certainly I consider that those who have such wants are bad, and that the greater their wants the worse they are. SOCRATES: And do we think it possible that a thing should be useful fora purpose unless we have need of it for that purpose? CRITIAS: No. SOCRATES: Then if these things are useful for supplying the needs of thebody, we must want them for that purpose? CRITIAS: That is my opinion. SOCRATES: And he to whom the greatest number of things are usefulfor his purpose, will also want the greatest number of means ofaccomplishing it, supposing that we necessarily feel the want of alluseful things? CRITIAS: It seems so. SOCRATES: The argument proves then that he who has great riches haslikewise need of many things for the supply of the wants of the body;for wealth appears useful towards that end. And the richest must be inthe worst condition, since they seem to be most in want of such things.