ENGLAND'S CASE AGAINST HOME RULE

by

A. V. DICEY

The Richmond Publishing Co. Ltd. Orchard Road, Richmond, Surrey, England

1886

PREFACE. 

An author who publishes a book having any reference to Irish affairsmay, not unnaturally, be supposed either to possess some specialknowledge of Ireland, or else to be the advocate of some new specificfor the cure of Irish discontent. Of neither of these suppositions can Iclaim the benefit. My knowledge of Ireland is merely theknowledge--perhaps it were better to say the ignorance--of an educatedEnglishman. It is derived from conversation with better informedfriends, from careful attention to the discussions on Irish policy whichfor the last eighteen years have engrossed public attention, and frombooks accessible to ordinary readers. If I can claim no specialacquaintance with Ireland, still less have I the presumption or thefolly to come forward as the inventor of any political nostrum. Myjustification for publishing my thoughts on Home Rule is that themovement in favour of the Parliamentary independence of Irelandconstitutes, whether its advocates recognise the fact or not, a demandfor fundamental alterations in the whole Constitution of the UnitedKingdom; and while I may without presumption consider myself moderatelyacquainted with the principles of Constitutional law, I entertain thefirmest conviction that any scheme for Home Rule in Ireland involvesdangerous if not fatal innovations on the Constitution of Great Britain. 

To set forth the reasons for this opinion is the object of this work. The opinion itself, whatever its worth, is not the growth of recentcontroversy; it has been entertained for years, and has been expressedby me in various publications. This book is much more than a reprint;its contents are, however, in part made up of articles which havealready been published. My thanks are due to the owners of the_Contemporary Review_ and of the New York _Nation_ for their permissionto make free use of my contributions to the pages of their periodicals;it is a pleasure to acknowledge the exceptional liberality with which myfriend, Mr. E. L. Godkin, has allowed me to publish on my ownresponsibility in the columns of the _Nation_, opinions of which he ishimself the strenuous and most able opponent. 

Nor are my acknowledgments due only to the living. Gustave de Beaumont's'_Irelande sociale et politique_' was placed in my hands by a friendafter the plan of my argument was complete, and the writing of this bookwas in fact begun. From De Beaumont I learnt more than from any otherwriter on the subject of Ireland with whose works I am acquainted, and Ifound to my great satisfaction that his speculations curiously confirmthe objections I was prepared to urge against the policy of Home Rule. It is a duty to insist upon the debt I owe to De Beaumont, because atthe present moment no greater service can be rendered to Englishmen andto Irishmen alike than to press upon them the study of an author whosewritings are far better known on the Continent than in England, andwhose thoughts, though they may seem a little out of date, are full notonly of profound wisdom but of practical guidance. 

A. V. DICEY. 

OCTOBER, 1886. 

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT

CHAPTER II. 

MEANING OF HOME RULE

CHAPTER III. 

STRENGTH OF THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND

CHAPTER IV. 

ENGLISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOME RULE. 

Argument I. --From Foreign Experience " II. --From the Will of the Irish People " III. --From the Lessons of Irish History " IV. --From the Virtues of Self-Government " V. --From the Necessity for Coercion Acts " VI. --From the Inconvenience to England of Refusing Home Rule

CHAPTER V. 

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION

CHAPTER VI. 

SEPARATION

CHAPTER VII. 

HOME RULE--ITS FORMS. 

 I. --Home Rule as Federalism II. --Home Rule as Colonial Independence III. --Home Rule as the Revival of Grattan's Constitution IV. --Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution

CHAPTER VIII. 

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX

CHAPTER I. 

NATURE OF THE ARGUMENT. 

[Sidenote: Aim and line of argument]

My aim is to criticise from a purely English point of view the policy ofHome Rule, or the proposal to create a more or less independentParliament in Ireland; and as a result of such criticism to establishthe truth, and develop the consequences, of this proposition--namely, that any system of Home Rule, whatever be the form it takes, is lessbeneficial to Great Britain, or (to use popular language) to England, than is the maintenance of the Union, and is at least as much opposed tothe vital interests of England as would be the national independence ofIreland. 

The train of reasoning by which it is sought to establish thisprinciple, and the consequences which the principle involves, consistsof the following steps: first, an examination into the causes which givestrength to the Home Rule movement in England, and the nature of thearguments in its support used by English Home Rulers; secondly, astatement of the advantages and disadvantages, from an English point ofview, on the one hand of maintaining the Union, and on the other ofseparation from Ireland; thirdly, a criticism of each of the principalforms[1] under which Home Rule has been actually presented to theattention of the public, the aim of such criticism being in each case todetermine how far the particular form of Home Rule can compete asregards the interests of England with the alternative policies ofUnionism and of Irish independence; and, fourthly, a summary of theconclusions arrived at by this survey of the policy of Home Rule. Myendeavour will be to make this survey without any appeal to prejudice, passion, or sentiment, and with the calmness and fairness which ascientific constitutionalist should display in weighing the merits ofany other proposed alteration in our form of government, such forexample as the introduction of life peers into the House of Lords, or inestimating the value of some foreign constitutional invention, such forexample as the Swiss Referendum or the Dual system which links togetherHungary and the Austrian Empire. No citizen of the United Kingdom indeedcan pretend to be an impartial critic of a policy which divides thewhole nation into opposing parties. But during a period of revolutionaryexcitement it is well to remember that any legislative innovation, however keen the feelings of partisanship which it may arouse, is alwaysin itself capable of being looked at from a logical or abstract point ofview, and ought to be so looked at by jurists. To one class indeed amongthe advocates of Home Rule the fundamental principle contended for inthese pages will appear irrelevant to the points at issue between suchHome Rulers and their opponents. Nationalists, who still occupy theposition held in 1848 by Sir Gavan Duffy and his friends, and who eitheropenly contend for the right of Ireland to be an independent nation, oraccept Home Rule (as they may with perfect fairness) simply as a steptowards the independence of their country, are naturally and rightlyunaffected by reasoning which shows, however conclusively, that HomeRule may be as injurious to England as a complete severance of thepolitical connection between England and Ireland. A Nationalist may saywith justice that he is no more bound to consider whether England willor will not be damaged by Ireland's becoming a nation, than an Italianpatriot was bound, in 1859, to show that Austria would not suffer bybeing deprived of Lombardy or of Venetia; he accepts Home Rule on themaxim that half a loaf is better than no bread, but a starving man isnot required to refuse the offer of food because the donor cannot makethe gift without getting into debt; nor does the acceptance of half aloaf afford the least presumption that the recipient would not prefer awhole loaf if he could get it. Some indeed of the considerations whichtell in the eyes of an Englishman against Home Rule may indirectly leadan Irish Nationalist to the belief that the boon of legislativeindependence, if granted to Ireland, would prove the present of a stonein reply to a prayer for bread. But should a Nationalist be convincedthat no form of Home Rule would benefit Ireland, he would cling all themore firmly to the faith that her salvation depends upon her taking herplace among independent states. To Nationalists, therefore, even thoughat present they may be fighting the cause of Irish nationality behindthe vizor of Home Rule, these pages are not addressed; the position theyoccupy is one of which no man has any cause to feel ashamed. The opinionthat, considering the misery which has marked the connection betweenEngland and Ireland, the happiest thing for the weaker country would becomplete separation from the United Kingdom, is one which in common withmost Englishmen, and, it may be added, in common with the wisest foreignobservers, I do not share; but fairness requires the admission that itis an opinion which a man may hold and may act upon, without incurringthe charge either of folly or of wickedness. To Nationalists, however, these pages, as I have said, are not addressed. The persons for whomthey are intended are either Home Rulers, whether in Great Britain or inIreland, who _bonâ fide_ advocate the policy of Home Rule as a policygood and wise in itself and for its own sake; or else Unionists, whofirmly believe that the whole State will suffer by any attempt to tearup the Treaty of Union, but yet are unable to give for the faith that isin them as strong grounds of reason as they would desire. To suchpersons the importance of the principle (if true) which is contended forthroughout these pages must appear undeniable; it strikes at the root ofmore than one half of the arguments by which Home Rulers from the timeof Mr. Butt to the days of Mr. Parnell have attempted, fairly enough, and latterly with great success, to win over English opinion to theircause, and it undermines the whole position occupied by Mr. Gladstoneand his English followers. They assume with undeniable truth that theEnglish people will not at the present moment, except under compulsion, acquiesce in Irish independence; they further assume, and must from thenature of the case assume, that Home Rule under one shape or anotherpresents a fair prospect at least of advantages not derivable from themaintenance of the Union, and is at the very worst so much lessinjurious to British interests than would be separation from Ireland, asto offer to England a reasonable compromise between the just claims ofEnglishmen to secure the prosperity of Great Britain and the greatnessof the British Empire, and the legitimate desire of Irishmen fornational independence. If the proposition which it is my object tomaintain turn out to be sound, all these assumptions fall to the ground, together with a host of fallacies for which these assumptions form thenecessary basis. The principle, in short, which it is my object toenforce--that Home Rule in Ireland is more dangerous to England thanIrish independence--lies at the bottom of all the rational oppositionmade by Unionists to the creation of an Irish Parliament, and, togetherwith the arguments by which the principle is maintained, and theconclusions to which it leads, forms the true and just and reasonablecase of England against Home Rule. 

[Sidenote: Possible objections to method. ]

The whole spirit and method of my argument is open to at least threeplausible objections, which deserve examination, both because if leftunnoticed they are certain to occur to and perplex any intelligentreader, and because their removal brings into relief the strength of myline of reasoning. 

[Sidenote: 1. Too abstract. ]

_First objection. _--To deal with a burning controversy in the abstractand logical manner suitable to the discussion of the problems ofjurisprudence savours, it may be objected, of theoretic, academic, orpedantic disquisition more fit for a University class-room than for theliving world of contemporary politics. 

The force of this criticism does not admit of denial. My method oftreating the question of Home Rule is necessarily lifeless whencompared with the vehement rhetoric or heated eloquence whichcharacterises public or parliamentary discussion; it is also true thatthe argumentative treatment of matters affecting actual life alwaysbears about it a certain air of unreality. 

If, however, systematic argument lacks the animation of politicaldiscussion or dispute, it possesses its own counterbalancing merits, andthe mode of treating Home Rule purposely adopted in these pages has, itis conceived, two not inconsiderable advantages. The first of theseadvantages is that it diverts the mind from a crowd of personal, temporary, and in themselves trivial considerations, which, though theypossess not only an apparent but also a real significance, are at bottomirrelevant to the final decision of the true points at issue. Whether, for example, Mr. Gladstone ought to have proclaimed himself a Home Rulerbefore the elections of 1885, whether Lord Salisbury's reference, oralleged reference, to twenty years of coercion was or was not judicious, and did or did not receive a fair interpretation from his opponents;whether Lord Carnarvon misled Mr. Parnell, or whether the Irish leaderwas a dupe to his own astuteness; whether Mr. Chamberlain ought to havejoined the late Ministry, or, having gone into the Cabinet, ought neverto have left it; what have been the motives consciously or unconsciouslyaffecting Mr. Gladstone's course of action--these and a hundred otherenquiries of the like sort, which engage the attention and distract thejudgment of the public, possess, in the eyes of any serious thinkeroccupied in estimating the strength of the arguments for and againstHome Rule, no material importance whatever. His concern is the merit ordemerit of a legislative enactment. He is not concerned at all with theconduct or the character of legislators. Mr. Gladstone's motives may bethe highest which can be ascribed to the Premier by the voice ofadmiring friendship, or the basest which can be imputed to him by theunfairness of political rancour. In any case they are irrelevant to thematter in hand. An unwise measure will not become a beneficial lawbecause its author is a saint or a patriot; a statesmanlike law will notturn out a curse to the country because its defender is an intriguer ora traitor. We all see that this is so if we carry our view back to thecontroversies of the last generation; the personalities of fifty orsixty years ago are reduced before our eyes into their real pettiness. The first Reform Bill still retains its importance for as a measurewhich for good or bad revolutionised the constitution; its beneficial orpernicious effects are still traceable in the England of to-day; but itsevils are not lessened by the acknowledged virtues of Lord Althorpe, norare its good effects marred by the ambition of Brougham or the violenceof O'Connell. It is no slight recommendation of any mode of reasoning ifit suggests to us the prudence of judging the policy of 1886 in thespirit and by the standards which every man of sense applies to thepolicy of 1832. Academic disquisition has its faults, but ought toproduce academic calmness; a class-room is after all a better place forquiet reflection than the House of Commons or the hustings. 

The second of the advantages which marks the proposed mode of argumentis that a line of thought which fixes a reader's attention all butexclusively upon the probable effects of Home Rule is a preservativeagainst the errors which arise from introducing into a dispute, bitterenough in itself, all the poisonous venom of historical recrimination, and all the delusions which are the offspring of the misleading tendencyto personify nations. The massacres of 1641, the sack of Drogheda, theviolated treaty of Limerick, the follies strangely mingled with thepatriotism of Grattan's Parliament, the outrages which discredited therebellion of 1798, and the cruelties which disgraced its suppression;the corruption which carried the Union, and the broken pledges whichturned political union into a source of fresh sectarian discord; thecalamities, the mistakes and the crimes which mark each scene in thetragedy of Irish history, afford to Protestants and to Catholics alikean exhaustless supply of recriminatory invective. But to evoke thespectres of past ages is not the way to assuage the animosities of thepresent day. The crimes of bygone generations are subjects for curiousinvestigation, but the determination of historical problems, even whenconducted in the spirit of the calmest enquiry, never removes thedifficulties of practical statesmanship. Apologies, at any rate, ordiatribes produced by the necessity for palliating or for denouncingthe misdeeds of other times, only add a new element of confusion to theturmoil of political warfare. Whether the insurgents of 1641 massacredevery Protestant on whom they could lay their hands, or bear only anindirect responsibility for the death of eight or nine thousand men andwomen ruthlessly expelled from the lands of which in Irish eyes theywere wrongful occupiers, is a question to be settled by Mr. Froude, Mr. Lecky, and Mr. Gardiner; but the barbarities of insurgent Catholics, andthe retaliatory severity of Protestant victors, which mark the fury ofan internecine conflict removed from us by the lapse of more than twocenturies have little to do with the practical question whether it beexpedient at the present day that the local affairs of Ulster should bedealt with by a Parliament sitting at Dublin, or whether members fromIreland should have seats at Westminster. Recrimination, while it addsnothing to knowledge, disturbs the judgment of statesmen and ofelectors; but not even the reckless resuscitation of bitter memories, which ought to be forgotten, adds so much to the confusion of the day asdoes the habit fostered by the illusions of language, and by the falselyapplied historical method, of speaking and thinking of England andIreland as though they were two human beings, who, on closing alife-long quarrel, might be expected to entertain towards one anotherthose sentiments of regret, generosity, or gratitude which are proper tomen and women, but can only by the boldest of fictions be supposed toenter into the relations between classes or nations. To this delusion ofpersonification is due the notion that Englishmen of to-day ought tomake compensation and feel personal shame for the cruelties of Cromwell, or for Pitt's corruption of Irish patriots; that we are in some wayliable and should feel compunction for crimes committed by (possibly)the ancestors of the very men to whom we are now supposed to owereparation. To the same cause is to be attributed the absurd demand thatthe Irish Catholics should put on ashes and sackcloth for the massacresof 1641, or that living Irishmen should be grateful for the well-meantthough most unsuccessful efforts made by the Parliament of the UnitedKingdom to govern one-third of the United Kingdom on sound principles ofjustice. A Sovereign's plainest duty is to rule his subjects for theirgood according to the best of his power and of his knowledge, and themere discharge of duty does not entitle a ruler to gratitude from thepersons who are benefited by his justice. A Parliamentary Sovereignbeing the representative and agent of its (so-called) subjects, is _àfortiori_ if there can be degrees in such matters--bound to govern forthe benefit of the people whom it represents and ought to serve; andthere is something strictly preposterous in the idea that Irishelectors, who in common with the rest of the United Kingdom sendrepresentatives to Westminster, should glow with gratitude when theParliament of the United Kingdom so far performs its duty as to enactlaws from which Ireland derives benefit No one suggests that Englishmenor Scotchmen should feel grateful either to Parliament or to their Irishfellow-citizens for the maintenance of good government throughoutEngland and Scotland. And it would puzzle the wit of man to show whyone-third of the United Kingdom should be expected to entertain feelingsnever demanded from the other two-thirds thereof. 

[Sidenote: 2. Too much reference to interest. ]

_Second objection_. --The habitual reference made throughout these pagesto national interest as the test or standard of national policy has (itmay be suggested) a touch of sordidness and selfishness, and impliesthat statesmanship has nothing to do with morality. 

This impression may it is possible be conveyed to a careless reader bythe form in which the case against Home Rule is stated; but nosuggestion can in reality be more unfounded. It will be seen to beunfounded by any one who notes for a moment the meaning of the term"interest" as applied to matters of national policy. The interest or thewelfare of a nation comprises many things which have nothing to do withtrade or with wealth, and the value of which does not admit of beingmeasured in money. The interest, welfare, or prosperity of Englandincludes the maintenance of her honour, the performance of all herobligations, and, above all, the strict discharge of every engagementwhich she has undertaken towards countries or to individuals. Theprotection, for example, of law-abiding citizens in the enjoyment ofrights secured to them by law; the maintenance of peace throughout thelength and breadth of the Empire; the suppression of lawlessness; thestrict performance of every promise which the State has made to everyman or body of men, whether poor or rich, whether belonging to the classof labourers, of farmers, or even of landlords--the rendering, in short, to every man of his due--are things which without any improper extensionof the term interest fall under the head of national interests. Utilitarianism, in truth, being a body of principles applicableprimarily to legislation and only secondarily to ethics, its doctrineshold far more obviously true in the field of politics than in the fieldof morals. On any wide view of large public questions expediency will befound to be only another name for justice. It can be neither theinterest nor the duty of any nation to legislate in a way which producesmore of suffering than of happiness. A policy opposed to the interestsor the welfare of the United Kingdom as a whole, even though it mayappear for a moment to favour some particular portion of the State, is, we may be well assured, a policy opposed not only to wisdom, but tojustice. 

[Sidenote: 3. Exclusively English point of view. ]

_Third objection. _--To look at Home Rule mainly from an English point ofview, to criticise it because of its bearing on the interests or welfareof England, is, it may perhaps be thought, to treat the whole matterfrom the wrong side, and to betray an indifference to the welfare ofIreland. Home Rule, the objector may say, is a scheme for the governmentof Ireland. It therefore concerns the people of Ireland alone, it shouldbe subjected to examination from an Irish, not from an English point ofview, and to consider it in any other light is to exhibit in a new formthat callous disregard by England of Ireland's claims which hasprevented the two countries from blending into one community. 

It is of primary importance that this objection should be stated withall the force which can be given to it, for were it valid it wouldassuredly be, in the judgment of all just persons, fatal to the line ofreasoning which my readers are invited to pursue. The objection is, however, so far from being valid as to present my whole method ofreasoning in a false light. A main reason why an Englishman does well tolook at Home Rule from an English point of view is, that this mode ofdealing with the adjustment of the possibly opposed interests of Englandand Ireland is (paradoxical though the assertion may sound) both theleast irritating and in itself the fairest method of meeting the demandsof Irish Home Rulers; though--and this is the one certainly good resultwhich has arisen from the changed attitude towards Home Rule of Mr. Gladstone and his followers--these demands may now happily be dealt withas claims put forward not specially by Irishmen, but by a politicalparty which includes large numbers of Scotchmen and Englishmen. Theassertion, however, that to look at Home Rule from an English point ofview is the way to minimise irritation, and to deal fairly with a topicspecially requiring fair treatment, requires some explanation. 

Experience of the world teaches every man that in complicated affairs ofprivate life, involving questions, say, both of money and of sentiment, nothing so surely prevents quarrels as to separate in the clearestmanner possible matters of business from matters of feeling. Indetermining a dispute between _A. _ and _B. _, a great step is gained whena friend induces each of the parties first to state clearly his exactlegal rights and his exact pecuniary interest, and only when these factsare made clear to consider what are the concessions fairly to bedemanded from him as a matter, not of right, but of liberality. Nothing, again, is plainer in the conduct of controversies between man and man, than that if _A. _ intends to exact his full legal rights from _B. _, themost irritating defence of _A. 's_ conduct is his pretence of actingsolely with a view to _B. 's_ own good; and that, on the other hand, nomanner of enforcing _A. 's_ claims against _B. _ causes so littleunnecessary vexation to _B. _ as for _A. _ to say openly that he demandshis rights because they are his rights, and because to demand them ishis interest. Here, if nowhere else, the rules which apply to privatedisputes apply also to political controversies. If millions ofEnglishmen refuse a request made by millions of Irishmen, by far theleast irritating form of refusal is open avowal that the reason fordenying a separate Parliament to Ireland is the irreparable injury whichHome Rule will work both to Great Britain and to the British Empire. This assertion has the merit, which even in politics is not small, oftruth. If the Parliamentary independence of Ireland threatened as littledamage to England as the Parliamentary independence of Victoria, anIrish legislature would meet in Dublin before the end of the year. Englishmen, it is true, do not believe that Ireland would in the longrun gain by the possession of legislative independence. It is not, however, the doubt as to the reality of the blessing to be conferred onIreland, but the certainty as to the injury to be done to England, whichcauses their opposition to Home Rule. To base this opposition upon theprobable inconsistency between a Home Rule policy and the true interestsof Ireland, involves the assumption that Englishmen are better judges ofwhat makes for the true interest of Ireland than are the majority ofIrishmen. The soundness of this assumption must seem to any man, whoeither recalls the most obvious facts of Irish history, or notes thedepth of ignorance as to all things Irish which prevails even among oureducated classes, to be open to reasonable question. What is notquestionable is that the assertion, in whatever form it be made, thatthree millions of Irishmen do not understand what is good for themselvesmust arouse in their hearts deep and natural anger. If indeed the claimof Great Britain to look in this matter of Home Rule solely to theeffect of Home Rule on British interests, were equivalent to theassertion that because England is strong she ought wherever her owninterests are at stake to reck nothing of justice, such cynical scornfor all considerations except the possession of superior power wouldkindle just resentment in the soul of every man, whether in Ireland orin England, who believes that national morality is more than a merephrase, though even in this case the open cynicism might excite lessdisgust than cynicism veiling itself under the mask of benevolence. Happily, however, there is in the present instance no opposition betweentruth and justice. Home Rule is no doubt primarily a scheme for thegovernment of Ireland, but it is also much more than this: it is a planfor revolutionising the constitution of the whole United Kingdom. Thereis no unfairness, therefore, in insisting that the proposed change mustnot take place if it be adverse to the interests of Great Britain. Thisis merely to assert that the welfare of thirty millions of citizensmust, if a conflict of interest arise, be preferred to the interest offive millions of citizens. Home Rulers, it must again and again berepeated, demand not the national independence of Ireland, but themaintenance of the connection between England and Ireland on termsdifferent from the conditions contained in the Act of Union. To keepone's mind clear on this point is of importance, because the resultfollows that, as already intimated, a whole series of arguments orclaims which may fairly be put forward by a Nationalist are notavailable to a Home Ruler. A Nationalist, for example, may urge thatthe will of the Irish people to be independent is decisive of theirmoral right to independence, and that the perils which a free Irelandmay bring upon England need not in any way concern him or his country. Whether indeed the principle of "nationality, " or the contention thatany portion of a State which deems itself conscious of distinct nationalsentiment may, as a matter of absolute right, claim to become a separatenation, can be maintained, is an enquiry not so easily answered in theaffirmative as is often assumed by modern democrats. What, however, ishere insisted upon is not that the principle of nationality is unsound, but that this principle does not cover the demand for Home Rule. A HomeRuler asks not for the political separation, but for the politicalpartnership of England and Ireland. He wishes not that the firm shouldbe dissolved, but that the Articles of Association should be revised. There is not then the least unfairness in the answer that nomodification can be allowed which in the judgment of his associates isfatal to the prosperity of the concern. To crowds excited by pictures ofpast greatness or of past struggles, by the hope of future prosperity tobe brought about by miracles wrought by substituting the rule of lovefor the rule of law, there may appear to be something prosaic, not tosay repulsive, in the comparison of the relation between Great Britainand Ireland to the relation between shareholders in a trading company. But at a period when a fundamental change in the constitution isadvocated on grounds of faith, benevolence, or generosity, a good dealis gained by bringing into relief the business aspect of constitutionalreforms. It can never be amiss to be reminded that, in the words of oneof the most thoughtful among the advocates of Home Rule, "Government isa very practical business, and that those succeed best in it who bringleast of sentiment or enthusiasm to the conduct of their affairs. " It isat moments of revolutionary fervour, when men measure proposed policiesrather by their wishes than by their experience, that every citizenneeds to have impressed upon his mind that government and legislationare matters of reason and judgment, and not of inclination. Nor let anyone imagine that the expression of the belief constantly avowed orimplied throughout these pages, that Home Rule would be as great an evilto England as Irish independence, shows a reckless and mostunbusinesslike indifference to the perils and losses of separation. Myconviction is unalterable that separation would be to England, as alsoto Ireland, a gigantic evil. This position is fully compatible with thebelief that there are other evils as great, or greater. If a man saysthat he prefers the loss of his right hand to the loss of his life, hecannot reasonably be charged with making light of amputation. It ishowever perfectly true that the line of argument pursued in this workmust, if it be sound, drive those to whom it is addressed to a choicebetween the maintenance of the Union and the concession to Ireland ofnational independence. 

FOOTNOTES:

[1]

These are--

i. Home Rule as Federalism. 

ii. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. 

iii. Home Rule as the Restoration of Grattan's Constitution. 

iv. Home Rule under the Government of Ireland Bill, or, to use aconvenient name, under the Gladstonian constitution. Chap. Vii. 

CHAPTER II. 

MEANING OF HOME RULE. 

"Home Rule" is a term which, like all current and popular phrases, is, though intelligible, wanting in precision. Hence it is well, before weinvestigate the different forms which schemes of Home Rule may assume, to fix in our minds precisely what Home Rule does mean and what it doesnot mean. 

[Sidenote: What Home Rule means. ]

"Home Rule"--or, to speak more accurately, the policy of HomeRule--means, if we may use language with which we are all familiar inrelation to the Colonies, the endowment of Ireland with representativeinstitutions and responsible government. 

It means, therefore, the creation of an Irish Parliament which shallhave legislative authority in matters of Irish concern, and of an Irishexecutive responsible (in general) for its acts to the Irish Parliamentor the Irish people. Hence every scheme of Home Rule which merits thatname is marked by three features--_first_, the creation of an IrishParliament; _secondly_, the right of the Irish Parliament to legislatewithin its own sphere (however that sphere may be defined) with habitualfreedom from the control of the Imperial or British Parliament; and_thirdly_, the habitual responsibility of the Irish executive for itsacts to the Irish people or to their representatives. 

These three characteristics, which I do not attempt to define withanything like logical precision, constitute the essence of Home Rule. Other things, however important in themselves, are matters ofsubordinate detail, and open to discussion or compromise. Thelimitations to the sphere within which the Irish Parliament is to exertindependent authority, the definition of the term "Irish concerns, " theconstitution of the Irish Parliament, the nature and appointment of theIrish executive (which, though it is no doubt generally assumed to be aCabinet chosen in effect like the Victorian Ministry, by the localParliament, might well, and indeed far better, be a President or Councilelected, like the Governor of New York, by popular vote), the occasionson which the British Parliament should retain the legal or moral rightof legislation for Ireland--these and a score of other subjects which atonce suggest themselves to a critic of constitutions are of supremeimportance, but in whatever way they may be determined, they do nottouch the principle of Home Rule. A scheme, on the other hand, howeverwise its provisions, which lacked the essential characteristics alreadyenumerated, would not meet the demand for Home Rule; an Act which didnot constitute a Parliament for Ireland could not possibly satisfy thesentiment of Irish nationality; an Irish Parliament which did nothabitually, at any rate, legislate with independence of the Parliamentat Westminster could not divest the law in Ireland of its "foreigngarb"; an executive not responsible directly or indirectly to the Irishpeople could not give full effect to the legislation of an IrishParliament, and the existence of such an executive would (if the trueground why law is hated in Ireland be its alien character) only divertpopular hostility from the law to the government. 

[Sidenote: What Home Rule does not mean. ]

Home Rule does not mean Local Self-Government; Home Rule does not meanNational Independence. 

Local Self-Government means the delegation by the Sovereign, and inEngland therefore by Parliament, to local bodies, say town councils, county boards, vestries, and the like, of strictly subordinate powers oflegislation for definite localities. The authority possessed by suchlocal bodies extends over definite and limited areas, (which themselvesare often created by legislation); exists for definite purposes; isdirectly conferred or tolerated by Parliament; has no capacity ofindefinite extension; and neither comes into competition with norrestrains, either legally or morally, the legislative authority ofParliament. Logically, indeed, there may be difficulty in drawing theprecise line of demarcation between a plan for conferring on Ireland theminimum of legislative independence which could without absurdity bedignified with the name of Home Rule, and a plan for giving to theboroughs and counties of Ireland the maximum of law-making power whichcould, without fraud upon the intelligence of the English people, becomprehended within the elastic phrase "extension of LocalSelf-Government. " But this logical puzzle need give us no trouble; it isbased on the fact that every non-sovereign law-making body, whether itbe the French National Assembly, the American Congress, or the London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co. , belongs to one and the same genus. [2] Thecasuists of jurisprudence may quibble for ever over the confines betweenHome Rule and Local Self-Government; men of sense engaged in theconsideration of affairs thrust aside such inopportune logomachy, andcontent themselves with the knowledge that were the Town Council, say, of Birmingham or of Belfast endowed with tenfold its present powers, itwould differ essentially from any Irish Parliament which, even thoughdenied the Parliamentary title, should represent the people of Ireland, and should have received the very smallest amount of authority whichcould by any possibility satisfy Mr. Parnell. Nor are differences whichmay not admit of easy definition difficult for a candid enquirer todiscern. A town council, whatever its powers, does not represent anation, and derives no prestige from the principle of nationality; thefeeblest legislative assembly meeting at Dublin would rightly claim tospeak for the Irish people. A town council, whether of Birmingham or ofBelfast, springs from and is kept alive by the will of Parliament, andcannot pretend that its powers, however extensive, compete with theauthority of its creator. Should a town council use even its strictlylegal rights in a way not conducive to the public interest, Parliamentwould without scruple override the bye-laws of the council by the forceof Parliamentary enactment. The authority of an Irish representativeassembly would from the necessity of things be, if not a legal, at anyrate a moral check, I will not say on Parliamentary sovereignty, butassuredly on Parliamentary legislation. Extended rights ofself-government, though given to every local body in Ireland, would notaffect the relation between the people of Ireland and the Parliament atWestminster. The very aim of Home Rule, even under its least pretentiousform, is to introduce a new relation between the people of Ireland andthe Parliament at Westminster. The matter may be summed up in onephrase: Local Self-Government however extended means the delegation, Home Rule however curtailed means the surrender, of Parliamentaryauthority. 

[Sidenote: Local Self-Government. ]

The distinction here insisted upon is of practical importance, for it isconnected with a question so pressing as to excuse an apparent, thoughnot more than an apparent, digression. 

English Radicals, and many politicians who are not Radicals, hold, whether rightly or not, that the sphere of Local Self-Government maywith benefit to the nation be greatly extended in England. The soundnessof this view in no way concerns us, and it is a matter upon which thereis no reason, for our present purpose, to form or express an opinion;they also hope that by a similar extension of Local Self-Government toIreland they may satisfy the demand for Home Rule. They conceive, inshort, that it is possible to confer a substantial benefit upon theIrish people, and to close a dangerous agitation, by giving to Belfastand to Cork the same municipal privileges which they wish to extend toBirmingham or to Liverpool. The reasons for this belief are threefold:that Local Self-Government is itself a benefit; that Ireland ought, asof right, to have the same institutions as England; that Local orMunicipal Self-Government will meet the real if not the nominal wish ofthe Irish people. This hope I believe to be delusive. The reasons onwhich it is grounded are--one of them probably, and two of themcertainly--unsound. 

Local Self-Government is one of those arrangements which, like mostpolitical institutions, cannot be called absolutely good or bad. It is agood thing, I suppose, at Birmingham, and was some fifty years ago agood thing in Massachusetts, and it may prove (though this isspeculation) a good thing in an English county. Local Self-Government isnot admirable at New York; it works less well than it once did in NewEngland; it does not produce very happy effects in London parishes; wemay well doubt whether it be really suited for modern France. LocalSelf-Government where it flourishes is quite as much a result as a causeof a happy social condition; the eulogies bestowed upon it contain acurious mixture of truth and falsehood. What is true is, that whereself-government flourishes, society is in a sound state; what is falseis, that Local Self-Government produces a sound state of society. Theprimary condition necessary for the success of self-government isharmony between different classes. The rich must be the guides of thepoor, the poor must put trust in the rich. Men who are placed abovecorruption must interest themselves in the laborious but importantdetails of local administration; men who might be corrupted themselves, must desire to place power in the hands of leaders who are as a classincorruptible. High public spirit, a detestation of jobbery, trust andgoodwill between rich and poor, are the feelings which make good localor municipal government possible. There are certain parts of England, there are larger parts of the United States, where these admirable andrare conditions exist. Do they exist in Ireland? I need not answer thequestion, for if they existed our difficulties in Ireland would be at anend. If, indeed, there were a genuine desire for Local Self-Government, expressed by Irishmen themselves, every sensible man would at oncesurrender _à priori_ theories in favour of the conclusions drawn bypractical experience. But no such wish has been expressed, and until itis expressed, a thoughtful observer may fairly believe that LocalSelf-Government will not flourish in a country where are presented noneof the conditions on which its prosperity depends, and he may conjecturethat in Ireland, as in France, an honest centralised administration ofimpartial officials, and not Local Self-Government, would best meet thereal wants of the people. [3]

The notion that Ireland or any one part of the United Kingdom ought, orhas a claim, to have the same institutions as every other part rests ona confusion of ideas, and is a false deduction from democraticprinciples. It is founded on the feeling which has caused half theerrors of democracy, that a fraction of a nation has a right to speakwith the authority of the whole, and that the right of each portion ofthe people to make its wishes heard involves the right to have themgranted. This delusion has once and again made Paris the ruler ofFrance, and the Parisian mob the master of Paris. The sound principle ofdemocratic government--and England must, under the present state ofthings, be ruled on democratic principles--is, that all parts of thecountry must be governed in the way which the whole of the State asrepresented by the majority thereof deems expedient for each part, andthat while every part should be allowed a voice to make known its wants, the decision how these wants are to be met must be given by the wholeState, that is (in the particular instance) by the majority of theelectors of Great Britain and Ireland. From this principle it does notfollow either that every part of the kingdom should have thoseinstitutions which that part prefers, (though in so far as this end canbe attained its attainment is desirable, ) or, still less, that everypart of the kingdom should have the same institutions as every otherpart. That this is so everybody in a general way admits. No one supposesthat because the people of Leicester abominate vaccination theVaccination Acts are not to be extended to that borough, or that thewish of the people of Birmingham in favour of free schools is decisivein favour of making education in Birmingham gratuitous. The will of alocality is admitted not to be the expression of the will of the nation. No one, again, fancies that the legal institutions of England ought ofnecessity to be extended to Scotland, or the law of Scotland to England. In Ireland recent legislation has, and with general approval, established institutions which no one alleges must, because they existin Ireland, be applied of necessity or as a matter of justice toEngland. English tenants might in many cases, it is likely enough, thinkthe provisions of the Irish Land Acts a boon, but no one would listen tothe argument that simply because under the special circumstances ofIreland special privileges are given to Irish tenants, similarprivileges ought to be conferred upon every English tenant farmer. Theidea therefore that because English boroughs or counties receive anincreased measure of self-government the same measure ought to beextended to Ireland, though it sounds plausible, is neither conformableto democratic principle nor to our habitual practice, grounded as thatpractice is on considerations of common sense and expediency. The truewatchwords which should guide English democrats in their dealings withIreland, as in truth with every other part of the United Kingdom, arenot "equality, " "similarity, " and "simultaneity, " but "unity ofgovernment, " "equality of political rights, " "diversity ofinstitutions. " Unless English democrats see this they will commit adouble fault: they will not in reality deal with Ireland as withEngland, for to deal with societies in essentially different conditionsin the same manner is in truth to treat them differently; they willnot--and this is of even more importance--perform the true function ofthe democracy, which is to remove by special legislation, mainly in ademocratic direction, the peculiar evils which are the result ofIreland's peculiar and calamitous history. 

Once realise that Local Self-Government is essentially different fromHome Rule, and it becomes patent that the idea of satisfying the wishfor Home Rule by increasing the municipal franchises of every townshipin Ireland is a dangerous delusion. Local Self-Government may be anexcellent thing in its way--it is possibly (though I do not say it is)the thing which the inhabitants of Ireland ought to wish for; but it isnot the thing which they do wish for, and it has not the qualitieswhich, if Home Rule be really desired by the Irish people, make HomeRule desirable. It does not meet the feeling of nationality; it does notgive the popular leaders authority to settle the land question; it doesnot free the law from its alien aspect. The very reasons which makeEnglish reformers favour the extension of Local Self-Government inIreland prove that Local Self-Government, whatever its merits, is nosubstitute for Parliamentary independence. Englishmen recommend LocalSelf-Government because it does not check on the authority of theImperial Parliament; Home Rulers desire Home Rule because it does checkImperial legislation. Brandy is good, and water is good; but when aneighbour asks for a glass of spirits, it is mockery to tender a glassof water on the ground that both spirits and water are drink. Thebenevolent person who makes the offer must not wonder if he receives nothanks. 

[Sidenote: National Independence. ]

Home Rule does not mean National Independence. This proposition needs noelaboration. Any plan of Home Rule whatever implies that there arespheres of national life in which Ireland is not to act with the freedomof an independent State. Mr. Parnell and his followers accept inprinciple Mr. Gladstone's proposals, and therefore are willing to acceptfor Ireland restrictions on her political liberty absolutelyinconsistent with the principle of nationality. Under the Gladstonianconstitution her foreign policy is to be wholly regulated by a BritishParliament in which sit no Irish representatives; she is not to have theright either of raising an army or of endowing a church; she is in factto surrender any claim to the rights of a nation in consideration ofreceiving a certain number of State-rights. In all this there is nothingunreasonable and nothing blameworthy. One part of the United Kingdom isprepared to accept new terms of partnership. But this acceptance, though reasonable and fair enough, is quite inconsistent with any claimfor national independence. A nation is one thing, a state forming partof a federation is quite another. To ask for the position of a dependentcolony like Victoria, or of a province such as Ontario, is to renouncethe demand to be a nation. A _bonâ fide_ Home Ruler cannot be a _bonâfide_ Nationalist. This point deserves attention, not for the sake ofthe miserable and ruinous advantage which is obtained by taunting anadversary in controversy with inconsistency till you drive him toimprove his logical position by increasing the exactingness of hisdemands, but because the advocates of Home Rule (honestly enough, nodoubt) confuse the matter under discussion by a strange kind ofintellectual shuffle. When they wish to minimise the sacrifice toEngland of establishing a Parliament in Ireland, they bring Home Ruledown nearly to the proportions of Local Self-Government; when they wishto maximise--if the word may be allowed--the blessings to Ireland of aseparate legislature, they all but identify Home Rule with NationalIndependence. Yet you have no more right to expect from any form ofState-rights the new life which sometimes is roused among a people bythe spirit and the responsibilities of becoming a nation, than you haveto suppose that municipal councils will satisfy the feelings whichdemand an Irish Parliament. 

FOOTNOTES:

[2] See Dicey, Law of the Constitution (2nd ed. ), p. 80. 

[3] De Beaumont's opinions on this point are perfectly clear: theyrepresent the judgment of an extremely able thinker, who approaches theproblems presented by Irish society with an impartiality which from thenature of things is unattainable by any Englishman or Irishman. Hisutterances will moreover command the more respect from the considerationthat De Beaumont, belonging as he did to the school of his intimatefriend De Tocqueville, was inclined rather to overrate than to underratethe virtues of self-government; whilst as a Frenchman he possessed aknowledge which cannot fall to any Englishman of the benefits conferredupon the people by a good administration of the French type. Thefollowing extracts from a chapter too long for complete citation, whichis written to show that Ireland needs a centralised government, deservethe most careful attention. The whole chapter, and indeed the whole workto which it belongs, ought at the present moment to be familiar to everyEnglish Liberal:--

"_Pour détruire le pouvoir politique de l'aristocratie, il faudrait luiôter l'application quotidienne des lois, comme on l'a privéeprécédemment àdu pouvoir de les faire. Il faudrait, par conséquent, modifier profondément le système administratif et judiciaire qui reposesur l'institution des juges de paix et sur l'organisation des grandsjurys, tels qu'ils sont constitués aujourd'hui. Et d'abord, pourexécuter cette réforme, il faudrait centraliser le pouvoir_. 

 * * * * *

"_Plus on considère l'état de l'Irlande, et plus il semble qu'à toutprendre un gouvernement central fortement constitué serait, du moinspour quelque temps, le meilleur que puisse avoir ce pays. Unearistocratie existe, qu'on veut réformer. Mais à qui remettre le pouvoirqu'on va retirer de ses mains? Aux classes moyennes?--Elles ne font quede naître en Irlande. L'avenir leur appartient; mats necompromettront-elles pas cet avenir, si la charge de mener la sociétéest confiée dès aujourd'hui à leurs mains inhabiles et à leurs ardentespassions?_

_"Telle est aujourd'hui en Irlande la situation des partis, que l'on nepeut obtenir quelque justice des pouvoirs politiques, si on les laisse àl'aristocratie protestante, et que l'on ne saurait guere en espérerdavantage, si on les donne aussitôt à la classe moyenne catholique quis'élève. _

_"Ce qu'il faudrait à l'Irlande, ce serait une administration supérieureaux partis, à l'ombre de laquelle les classes moyennes pussent grandir, se développer et s'instruire, pendant que l'aristocratie perdrait sonpouvoir. _

 * * * * *

_"Il n'entre, du reste, ni dans mon désir, ni dans mon plan, d'expliquerla forme et le mécanisme de la centralisation qui conviendrait àl'Irlande, et dont je me borne à reconnaître en principe l'utilitépassagère pour ce pays; je ne hasarderai, sur ce sujet, qu'une seuleidée pratique. _

_"C'est que, pour organiser en Irlande un gouvernement central puissant, il faudrait de plus en plus resserrer le lien d'union qui attachel'Irlande à l'Angleterre, rapprocher le plus possible Dublin de Londres, et faire de l'Irlande un comté anglais. _

 * * * * *

_"On ne conteste point que l'Irlande ait besoin d'un gouvernementspécial; et s'il y a nécessité de la soumettre à un régime législatifautre que celui de l'Angleterre, il faut bien aussi des agentsparticuliers pour appliquer des règles différentes d'administration. Mais, ceci étant admis, l'on ne voit pas ce qui aujourd'hui empêcheraitde placer le siége du gouvernement irlandais dans la première ville del'empire britannique. _

 * * * * *

_"La réforme de la vice-royauté et l'abolition des administrationslocales d'Irlande ne sont, sans doute, que des changements de forme. Mais ce sont des moyens pratiques indispensables pour exécuter lesréformes politiques dont ce pays a besoin. Il faut que, pendant lapériode de transition où se trouve l'Irlande, ceux qui la gouvernentsoient placés absolument en dehors d'elle, de ses moeurs, de sespassions; il faut que son gouvernement cesse complétement d'êtreirlandais; il faut qu'il soit entièrement, non pas anglais, mais remis àdes Anglais. "_--2 De Beaumont, _l'Irlande, Sociale, Politique etReligieuse_, pp. 124-129

CHAPTER III. 

STRENGTH OF THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT IN ENGLAND. 

[Sidenote: Strength of movement. ]

A dispassionate observer will easily convince himself that in GreatBritain the movement in favour of Home Rule is stronger than is believedby its opponents. Patent facts show that this is so. In 1880 no singleEnglish statesman had avowed himself its supporter; not fifty English orScotch members of Parliament could have been found to vote for anenquiry into the admissibility of Mr. Parnell's policy. It may well bedoubted whether at that date ten British constituencies would havereturned to Parliament representatives pledged to grant Ireland aseparate legislature. Contrast this state of things with the presentcondition of affairs. England has indeed pronounced decisively againstany tampering with the Act of Union, but the leading statesman of theday has avowed himself a Home Ruler; he is supported by eminentcolleagues, and by nearly two hundred representatives of Britishconstituencies. Scotland and Wales on the whole favour the policy ofseparation, and if, as has been roughly computed, of the electors ofthe United Kingdom, 1, 316, 327 have voted in support of the Union, thesame computation shows that 1, 238, 342 are, to say the least, indifferentto its maintenance. These are facts which tell their own tale. The HomeRule movement has waxed strong. What is in England the source of itsstrength, and what are the arguments in its support relied upon by itsEnglish advocates?

[Sidenote: Source of its strength. ]

Nine persons out of ten will reply that the Home Rule movement inEngland owes its origin and force to the patronage of Mr. Gladstone. Noone who has watched the ebb and flow of popular feeling will underratethat statesman's influence, and few persons, whatever their politicalbias, will deny that but for Mr. Gladstone's conversion Mr. Parnell'steaching would not at this moment have gained for him as many as fiftydisciples among English politicians. It may even be conceded that butfor Mr. Gladstone's action no English party would, during his lifetime, have adopted the Parliamentary independence of Ireland as a watchword. But here, as in other instances, there is grave danger of mistaking theoccasion for the cause of events, and if Mr. Gladstone's conversion hasdetermined the form and increased the momentum of the Home Rulemovement, it would be an error to hold that the prevalence of doctrinesunfavourable to the maintenance of the Union between England and Irelandwere wholly or even in the main due to his conduct. His conversionitself remains to be accounted for. This would (except to those criticswho ascribe the most important acts of public statesmanship to thepettiest forms of private selfishness) remain almost unaccountableunless it were regarded in the light, in which it ought no doubt to belooked upon, of an example of the facility with which a leader guided bykeen sympathy with the real or supposed opinions or emotions of themoment follows, while apparently he guides, the phases of publicopinion. Candour moreover compels the admission that, if Mr. Gladstone'saction has led some politicians to "find salvation"--according to themiserable cant of the day--in the adoption of opinions which cannot bedignified with the name of convictions, many honest men both within andwithout the sphere of public life have under the countenance of a greatname been encouraged to avow publicly sympathies with the demand forHome Rule which have been slowly matured, and have hitherto scarcelybeen acknowledged even in the convert's own mind. To any one whoperceives that the force of a movement opposed to the traditions ofEnglish statesmanship must be attributed to some cause beyond thepersonal influence of a leader, the idea naturally suggests itself thatthe prevalence of conversions to the policy of Home Rule is due to thepower of argument, and that the English people have been brought to seethe expediency of conceding a legislature to Ireland by the same methodswhich induced them to abolish the policy of Protection. This notion doesnot correspond with known facts. Till a recent date hardly an argumentwas addressed to the English public in favour of Home Rule; no greatwriter or speaker even aimed at proving to the nation that a reform orinnovation which has been rejected again and again as repeal had more torecommend it under a new name. Great changes in our institutions orpolicy have hitherto been preceded by lengthy, in general by toolengthy, discussion. The doctrines of Free Trade were established byAdam Smith seventy years before the abolition of the Corn Laws, andProtection was not vanquished till Cobden and Bright had, by laboriouscontroversy, exposed its fallacies in every corner of Great Britain. Thereasons in favour of Catholic Emancipation were stated in their fullforce by Burke more than forty years before a Roman Catholic wasadmitted to Parliament, and the whole case in favour of the Catholicshad been argued out in the presence of the nation long before thepassing of the Catholic Relief Bill. No movement ever appealed to keenerpopular sympathies than the movement for the abolition of slavery. Yetthe Abolitionists made their case out--proved it, as lawyers say, "up tothe very hilt, " before a single slave was released from bondage. TheIrish Church (it may be suggested) was abolished off-hand. This apparentexception to the regular course of long argumentative controversy whichin England marks all great innovations has misled Home Rulers, yet theexception is only apparent. Long before 1869 the intelligence ofEngland--one might say of the civilised world--had been convinced bythe power of reason that the maintenance in a Roman Catholic country, and at the expense of a Roman Catholic population, of a Protestantecclesiastical establishment was an indefensible anomaly. The walls fellat the first blast which sounded attack, because the foundations hadbeen argumentatively sapped and undermined for more than a generation. With the cause of Home Rule it is far otherwise. Its sudden progress hasbeen characterised by a singular absence of systematic discussion. Noone supposes that its English advocates are deficient in talent or inzeal. Mr. Gladstone, Mr. John Morley, Mr. Bryce--to name no others--areas competent apologists for any opinion they entertain as can well befound. They have been put upon their mettle; they have addressed thenation in Parliament and out of Parliament; they have produced a certainnumber of reasons, which deserve respectful consideration, in support oftheir favourite innovation. But no candid critic can feel that theseeminent men, and other less distinguished labourers in the same cause, have put forward arguments of strength enough to account for theundoubted conviction of the reasoners. Appeals to trust in the people, to confidence in human nature, to the strength of love as contrastedwith the weakness of law, to shame for our past misgovernment of theIrish, to sanguine expectations of terminating a secular feud which hascaused wretchedness to Ireland and has lessened the power of England, would appear in the judgment of orators addressing English electorslikely to have much more weight with their audience than any attempt toprove that the establishment of a Parliament at Dublin will be conduciveto the benefit of the Empire. Nor is this wonderful. The plain truth isthat the strength of the Home Rule movement depends, as far as Englandis concerned, on a peculiar, though not of necessity a transitory, stateof opinion. The arguments of Home Rulers, whatever their worth (and Ihave not the remotest intention of denying that they have weight), derive at least half their power from their correspondence with dominantsentiments. That this is so is admitted by the now celebrated appealfrom the classes to the masses. It is in its nature an appeal from averdict likely to be pronounced by the understanding or the prejudice ofeducated men, to the emotions of the uneducated crowd. The appeal may ormay not be justifiable. This is not the point for discussion; but themaking of such an appeal necessarily implies that the existence ofcertain widespread feelings is a condition requisite for fullappreciation of the reasoning in support of Home Rule. The reasons maybe good, but it is faith which gives them convincing power. They derivetheir cogency from a favouring atmosphere of opinion or feeling. Twofeatures of recent controversy suffice of themselves (if proof wereneeded) to establish the truth of this assertion. The rhetoricalemphasis laid by Home Rulers on the baseness of the arts which carriedthe Act of Union is, as an argument in favour of repealing the Act, little else than irrational. The assumed infamy of Pitt does not provethe alleged wisdom of Gladstone; and to urge the repeal of an Act whichhas stood for nearly a century, because it was carried by corruption, isin the eye of reason as absurd as to question the title of modern Frenchlandowners because of the horrors of the Reign of Terror. Even aLegitimist would not now base a moral claim to an estate on the groundthat his grandfather was deprived of it through confiscation and murder. But rhetoric is not governed by the laws of logic, and insistence on thecorruption or the criminality by which the Act of Union was carried isan effective method of conciliating popular sentiment to the cause ofrepeal. No notion again has been more widely circulated or put forwardon higher authority than that past reforms have been due in the main tothe enthusiasm of the masses. But no notion is more directly at variancewith the lessons of history. In the eighteenth century the enlightenmentof the Whig aristocracy was England's safeguard against the Jacobitismand the bigotry of the crowd. Every effort in favour of religiousliberty was till recently the work of an educated minority who opposedpopular prejudice. In the last century popular sentiment would havedenied all rights to Jews; in 1780 Lord George Gordon was the hero ofthe people of England, and even more emphatically of the people ofScotland. And Burke was forced to present an elaborate defence to hisconstituents at Bristol for taking part in an attempt to mitigate thepenal laws against the Roman Catholics. There is every reason to supposethat even in 1829 a _plébiscite_, had one been possible, would havenegatived the Catholic Relief Bill. The mitigation again of the CriminalLaw was the work of thinkers like Romilly and Bentham. These eminentreformers would have been much surprised to have been told that theuneducated masses were their staunch supporters. One of the greatestimprovements ever effected by legislation was the reform in theadministration of parochial relief. The new poor law was essentiallyunpopular; its principles were established by economists; its enactmentwas due to the Whigs, supported, as it should always be remembered tohis credit, by the Duke of Wellington. It may be conjectured from recentlegislation that at this very moment an indiscriminate renewal ofoutdoor relief would command the approval of the agricultural voters. Protection in the form of the corn laws was unpopular in England; this, however, cannot with fairness be put down to the moral or intellectualcredit of the multitude. The corn laws were disliked because theyenhanced the price of bread. Even as it was, the Chartists used tointerrupt the meetings of the Anti-Corn Law League, and it is an idlefancy that the dangers of a protective tariff are in themselves morepatent to the electors of England than to the democracy of France or ofAmerica. Trades Unionism is in many of its features a form ofprotectionism. If again we turn to foreign policy, we must read historywith a strangely perverted eye if we hold that the people have ingeneral condemned wars, whether just or unjust. There is hardly to benamed a great war in which England has been engaged which has notengaged popular support. In the struggle with the American Colonies thewarlike sentiment of the people was undoubtedly opposed to the prudenceand justice of a small body of enlightened men, who found theirrepresentative in Burke. In England, it is true, no great change of lawor of policy can in general be effected until it has in some sort beensanctioned by popular approval. But to attribute every advance, or evenmost advances, along the path of progress to the masses by whom a stepforward is finally sanctioned, is hardly a more patent fallacy than thenotion that because every statute is passed with the assent of theCrown, to the Queen may be ascribed the glory of every beneficial Actpassed in her name. To maintain, as every man versed in history mustmaintain, that ignorance must from the necessity of the case be the allyof prejudice, is not to deny to the people their merits or virtues. Ifignorance were wisdom as well as bliss, every effort in favour ofpopular education were folly. No doubt the rich or educated classes areslaves to delusions from which the crowd are free. This concession fallsfar short of the doctrine that legislative progress is mainly due to thesoundness of popular feeling. That this doctrine should in one shape oranother have been promulgated, and have formed the basis of an argumentfor a complicated change in the constitution, is a sign that theadvocates of the innovation or reform feel instinctively that thestrength of their case lies in its coincidence with dominant sentiment. Nor is it hard to see what is the condition of sentiment or opinionwhich favours the doctrine of Home Rule. The matter, however, is of suchimportance as well to repay careful examination. 

For the first time in the course of English history, national policy haspassed under the sway, not so much of democratic convictions, but of afar stronger power--democratic sentiment. Every idea which can rightlyor wrongly be called popular, commands, even among persons who deemthemselves Conservatives, ready assent or superstitious deference. Henceflow (be it at once conceded) some of the best characteristics of theage, such as the detestation of inhumanity; the distrust in violentmethods of government; the dislike to anything which savours ofindifference to the wishes, or callousness to the wants, of the people. Hence the growth of the conviction that property has at least as manyduties as rights, and of the faith inspired, rather by compassion thanby reason, that the toiling multitudes can and must be made to share inthe prosperity and the luxuries created in great part by their ceaselesslabour. From the same source--from the prevalence of the democraticspirit--arise a crowd of dubious not to say ignoble ideas, as that thevoice of the majority is the voice of God; that it is a folly, if not acrime, to resist any widespread phase of belief or of passion; that anybody of persons claiming to be united by a sense of nationalitypossesses an inherent and divine right to be treated as an independentcommunity. Many of these notions are radically inconsistent with oneanother. The dogma, for example, of the supremacy of the majority, orthe conviction that legislation ought to aim at the greatest happinessof the greatest number, each belong to a different order of ideas fromthe principle of nationality, and may easily come into conflict with it. This inconsistency does not lessen the influence exerted by the mass ofdemocratic feeling. We may, however, well note that democratic ideas atthe present day produce their effect far less by exciting enthusiasm(for they now kindle nothing like the fiery fervour which the doctrinesof popular sovereignty or of human equality excited a century agothroughout the length and breadth of Europe), than by their singularcapacity for dissolving the convictions which oppose the claims ofrevolutionists. Of this solvent power recent events have given us morethan enough examples. One may suffice. The argument that because Irishhouseholders have received votes therefore the majority of the electorsof the United Kingdom must concede to the majority of Irish householdersanything whatever having reference to Ireland which Irish householdersdesire, is logically absurd. But (combined, no doubt, with other causes)it convinced the Conservative Government of 1885 that the executive inIreland was bound to bow to the will of the Irish people, and wasrelieved from the obligation of enforcing at all costs the law of theland. Popular sympathies, moreover, blend in the minds of modernEnglishmen with feelings of a much less generous and much lessrespectable order. Dislike of trouble, hatred to the performance ofarduous public duties, a growing indifference to ordinary commonplaceideas of law and justice, contempt for the legal rights of individualswhenever these rights clash for a moment with the ease or interest ofthe public, exert an incalculable influence on the conduct, and in truthupon the convictions, both of Members of Parliament and of electors. Itis not too much to say that the favour or acquiescence with whichso-called practical politicians are prepared to accept Home Rule isgrounded to a far greater extent than any one who respects the characterof England likes to confess upon the _naïve_ but intense conviction thatit is too much to expect from five hundred and more English gentlementhat they should take the trouble of withstanding the continuouspressure exerted by eighty-six Parnellites. Cowardice masks itself underthe show of compromise, and men of eminent respectability yield to theterror of being bored concessions which their forefathers would haverefused to the threat of armed rebellion. It is unnecessary to explainhow this condition of opinion, under which the best and the lowestfeelings of human nature are blended in a current of democraticsentiment, predisposes large bodies of Englishmen towards acquiescencein the Home Rule movement. My aim is not so much to analyse withprecision the mode in which the cause of Home Rule is fostered by themoral atmosphere of the day, as to insist upon the all-importantconsideration that the progress of the Home Rule movement is due ratherto the encouragement it derives from prevailing sentiment than to anyintellectual conviction on the part of Englishmen that it is dictated byconsiderations of sound policy. 

CHAPTER IV. 

ENGLISH ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF HOME RULE. 

[Sidenote: Arguments by which Home Rule policy defended. ]

To lay stress upon the consideration that the Home Rule movement inEngland derives its force from the condition of public feeling is not, be it remarked, equivalent to showing that the policy of Home Rule isunwise; still less that the policy of defended. Home Rule is unlikely tobe adopted by the nation. Masses of human beings must generally, asindividuals must often, trust to the guidance of feeling. The differencebetween the sentiment which ought and the sentiment which ought not todetermine national conduct is, that the one admits and the other doesnot admit of justification on grounds of reason or experience. Reasoningis the test, not the source of wise action. Slavery was abolished, theabuses of the _ancien regime_ were destroyed, Italian unity was createdunder the stress of emotions which carried away thousands who could nothave logically defended the impulse which governed their acts. But inthese, as in other cases in which humanity has been carried forwardalong the path of progress by the force of emotion, the enthusiasm ofthe time could, in so far as it worked for good, be justified ongrounds of reason. Man is (difficult though it often be to believe thefact) a rational being, in so far at least that he is constrained todefend on argumentative grounds courses of action dictated by feeling. From this law of human nature Home Rulers have neither the power nor, infairness be it added, the wish to escape. Their influence is due to thecondition of public sentiment, but they justify their policy byarguments which are the intellectual equivalents for the moral feelingswhich go to constitute the opinion of the day. Of these arguments, thosewhich require statement and examination can be conveniently summed upunder six heads--the argument from foreign experience, the argument fromthe will of the Irish people, the argument from the lessons of Irishhistory, the argument from the virtues of self-government, the argumentfrom the necessity for Coercion Acts, the argument from theinconvenience to England of refusing Home Rule to Ireland. 

[Sidenote: Argument 1. Foreign experience. ]

_The argument from foreign experience_. --Home Rule under one shape oranother has been tried in a large number of foreign countries, and has(it is alleged) been found everywhere to solve the problem of combininginto one State communities which, like England and Ireland, were notready to coalesce into one united nation. Each State throughout theAmerican Union, each Canton of Switzerland, has something like sovereignindependence. Yet the United States are strong and prosperous, and theSwiss Confederacy, which was a land at one time torn by religiousanimosities, and divided by differences of race, is now a country socompletely at harmony with itself that without a regular army itmaintains its independence in the face of the armed powers of Europe. Canada or Victoria have more complete liberty of action than any onedreams of claiming for Ireland. Yet Canada and Victoria are loyal, andunder the guidance of men who, it may be, were yesterday rebels inIreland, support the supremacy of the British Parliament and contributeto the splendour of the English Crown. The German Empire contains notonly separate States, but separate kingdoms, such as Bavaria, ruled bykings or princes who certainly value highly the independence of theircountries and the dignity of their thrones. The despotism of Turkey hasnot forbidden the local independence of Crete, and self-government has, it is hinted, produced acquiescence in Turkish rule. The autocracy ofthe Czar is found compatible with Home Rule in Finland, and Finland isthe most contented portion of Russia. Norway and Sweden are united infeeling because they are not by law a "united kingdom, " and act inharmony just because each country has a different constitution, and eachis governed by its own Parliament. Denmark has, with benefit to herself, given local independence to Iceland, and Iceland is content. Austria andHungary, after centuries of misunderstanding and twenty years of bitterconflict, have finally composed the feud of ages by a compromise, whichgives to the two parts of the Empire the practical blessings ofParliamentary independence, and concedes to Hungary at least thesentimental blessing of acknowledged nationality. The argument, in fact, from foreign experience, professes to be an induction based upon afoundation of instances as large as can support any conclusion of socialscience. In one land after another the existence of Home Rule, or, touse the curiously inaccurate phraseology of the day, of "autonomy, " inone part of the State has been found consistent with the unity of thewhole. An experiment which has succeeded in one set of cases ought tosucceed in another, and England has no reason to dread a scheme ofgovernment which has been tried with success in other portions of thecivilized world. Nor does the zealous advocate of Home Rule pause at theconclusion that the measure he recommends may, on the strength offoreign experience, be regarded as a tolerable evil or as a probablecure for a chronic disease. He suggests that it is a good in itself, andlaments that ignorance led our ancestors to fuse Scotland and Englandinto an United Kingdom, when they might, had they understood theprinciples of federalism, have left to each country the blessings ofState sovereignty. 

[Sidenote: Criticism on argument. ]

There is some difficulty in treating with perfect seriousness a line ofreasoning which, proceeding from the quarter whence it comes, holds upfor our admiration the wisdom or lenity of Turkish rule in Crete, andextols the supreme justice of the system upon which rests theAustro-Hungarian monarchy, which implies that the arts of government maybe learnt from the Russian administration of Finland, and omits allreference to the disastrous results of the attempt to endow Poland withsome sort of independence, which bases weighty inferences as to theproper relation between England and Ireland on the concession by Denmarkto the scanty inhabitants of a desolate island lying 1100 miles from hercoast of as much autonomy (if that be the right term) as under the Crownof England has been enjoyed for generations by Jersey or Man, and whichsuggests lamentations over the splendid triumph of constructivestatesmanship embodied in the treaty of Union with Scotland. _De minimisnon curat lex_ is a maxim of judicial procedure which in spirit appliesto proposals for legislation. Arguments from Iceland and the like may beset aside as the ornaments or curiosities of debate, and may be allowedas much weight and no more as would be given to an argument in favour ofpetty states from the flourishing condition of Monaco, or to reasoningsin support of Republicanism from the condition of Andorre. Though thereis something slightly ridiculous in the zeal with which the advocates ofHome Rule, using at least as much industry as discrimination, havescraped together every instance they can lay their hands upon ofconstitutions under which something which can be called Home Rule existswithout producing palpable injury to the State, it would be unfair todeny some real weight to a kind of induction, which, if not convincingas argument, yet possesses undoubtedly a good deal of rhetoricaleffectiveness. Nor ought the concession to be refused that if there beany man dull or ill-informed enough to suppose that countries cannot bepolitically united unless they are subject to a common legislativepower, the slightest knowledge of lands outside England is sufficient tomake manifest his ignorance. When, however, the instances on which theinduction is supposed to be founded are carefully scrutinised, it willbe discovered that those examples which deserve attention are far lessnumerous than might be supposed from a glance over the lists now wellknown to the public of what may be termed successful experiments in HomeRule, and, further, that this limited number of instances do not go farto make out the conclusion in favour of which they are adduced. 

At the present stage of my argument I purposely omit all minuteexamination of the applicability to the relations between England andIreland, either of the English Colonial system or of federalism as itexists in the United States or in Switzerland. Any scheme of Home Rulemust follow in some degree one or other of these models. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider in subsequent chapters how fareither of them may admit with advantage of imitation. Two observations, however, may even at this point not be out of place. An English colony, such as Victoria, is a virtually independent country, attached toEngland mainly by ties of loyalty or of well-understood interests, butplaced at such a distance from the mother country that England couldwithout inconvenience, and would without hesitation, concede to it fullnational independence when once it was clear that Victoria desired to bea nation. Victoria, in short, is a land which might at any moment beindependent, but which desires to retain or strengthen the connectionwith England. Ireland, on the other hand, is a country lying so near tothe English coast that, according to the views of most statesmen, England could not with safety tolerate her independence, and also acountry, which, to put the matter in the least exaggerated language, feels the connection with England so burdensome that the greater part ofher population desire at least the amount of independence conceded to aself-governing colony. The case of Victoria and the case of Ireland eachconstitute, so to speak, the antithesis to the other. There is, therefore, at any rate no _a priori_ ground for the assumption that thesystem which successfully regulates the relation of England to Victoriais equally adapted for regulating the relation between England andIreland. The federalism, again, of America or of Switzerland is theconsequence of the existence of the States which make up the Federation. The United Kingdom does not consist of States. The world has heard ofthe difficulty of forming a republic without republicans: this featwould appear to be easy of performance in comparison with theachievement of erecting federation without the States which form itsnatural members. In America or in Switzerland federalism has developedbecause existing States wished to be combined into some kind of nationalunity. Federalism in England would necessarily mean the breaking up of anation in order to form a body of States. To the question constantlyraised in one form or another, "Why should not the federalism whichsuits the United States suit England?" the true answer is suggested bythe counter-inquiry, "Why should not the constitutionalism of Englandsuit the United States?" The obvious and conclusive reply to both theseinquiries is, that the circumstances of the two countries are totallydifferent. There is, in short, no ground in the nature of things topresume that constitutional arrangements, which are well adapted for thecondition of America, are well adapted for the totally differentcondition of the United Kingdom. To say this, be it noted, is not toprejudge the question reserved for subsequent consideration, whethersome kind of federalism may not supply the solution of the problem howto adjust the political connection between England and Ireland. It is nomore than noting the often-overlooked fact that the admitted success offederal government in the United States gives no presumption in favourof its suitability for Great Britain and Ireland. 

The experience of foreign countries to which Home Rulers confidentlyappeal resolves itself, if the matter be carefully sifted, and if thecolonial system of England and the federalism of America be left for themoment out of account, into the fact that two powerful continentalEmpires maintain Imperial unity, and yet (as it is alleged withoutlessening their strength) contain within their limits States each ofwhich enjoys a large amount of independence. That neither the GermanEmpire nor the Austro-Hungarian monarchy suffer inconvenience from thelooseness of the connection between the States which they each containis one of those assertions more easily made than proved to be true; butsupposing its truth to be, for the moment and purely for the sake ofargument, admitted, there will still be found considerable difficulty inshowing that either German Imperialism or the Dual system ofAustria-Hungary contains lessons of practical value for the guidance ofEnglish statesmen. 

What indeed is the precise inference which one is to draw from the factthat the constitution of the German Empire leaves, for example, toBavaria a large amount of independence it is not very easy tounderstand. The whole circumstances of the German Empire are asdifferent from the circumstances of Great Britain as the position of onecivilised European country can well be from the situation of another. The salient characteristic of German history is that Germany consists ofStates which until quite recently have never been politicallyconsolidated into a nation. The United Kingdom has for nearly a centuryformed a political unit, and has now for something nearly approachingtwo centuries been subject in reality if not in name to one sovereignParliament. The whole scheme of the Empire, with its independent orsemi-independent sovereigns, with its kings, princes, and free towns, issomething to which there is absolutely nothing to correspond in thepresent condition or in the historical development of England. TheGerman Empire is the natural though strange growth of a special andstrange history. The sober English statesmen who advocate Home Ruleassuredly never dreamt any dream so wild as that the Imperial Federalismof Germany could in any way be reproduced in the United Kingdom. But ifthis be so, it is a little difficult to understand references to thelessons to be drawn from the position of such countries as Bavaria. Forthe difficulty of applying German precedents to proposed innovations inthe English constitution lies far deeper than the unsuitability toEngland of the forms of German Imperialism. The condition which hasgiven birth to the present German Empire is that in Germany thesentiment of nationality has overridden the political divisions whichbroke up Germany into almost disconnected and often hostile States. InGermany the popular passion for unity has compelled the formation of aUnited Empire. This sentiment, and not the cumbersome device of anill-arranged constitution, prevents Bavaria from using her independencein a manner inconsistent with the unity of the Empire. The force whichtends towards unity is constantly on the increase. The Empire has thelegal means of diminishing or indeed of destroying the independence ofthe States, and should the independence of a State ever come intoconflict with the unity of the nation State rights will not, we may besure, win the day. Nor, further, is it any accident that Bismarck whilsttolerating the existence of Parliaments will not tolerate theintroduction of Parliamentary government. The acquiescence of Liberalsin the evils of personal rule is due to the consciousness that the realauthority of the Emperor is necessary for the unity of the Empire. Contrast all this with the condition of things under which Englishmenare adjured to concede a Parliament to Ireland. The leading features ofthe case, according at any rate to Home Rulers, are that Parliament istoo weak to withstand the pressure exercised by eighty-six obstructives, and that Ireland, no less, as we are now at last frankly told, thanScotland and Wales, desires to relax the bonds of national unity. We areadvised to dissolve the United Kingdom into a confederacy becauseGermany, through a clumsy form of confederacy, is growing into a unitedempire. This counsel confuses the stages of imperfect development withthe stage of incipient decay; it ascribes to the childishness ofapproaching senility the hopes which are proper to the childishness ofearly youth. The point is worth pressing. The considerations whichgovern a confederacy as it is developing into a nation are verydifferent from the considerations applicable to a full grown nationwhen threatened with dismemberment into a confederacy. 

Deak's statesmanship undoubtedly found at any rate a temporary solutionof the questions which kept Austria and Hungary at variance in acompromise which bears some analogy to the arrangement by which HomeRulers propose at once to loosen and to maintain the connection betweenEngland and Ireland. In the case of Austria-Hungary, the union whichexists is not, on the face of it at least, a step towards unity, butrather the surrender of the endeavour to mould the two parts of themonarchy into a united empire. The Dual system is therefore the instanceof the blessings attending Home Rule which is most sedulously thrustupon English attention. Let us see, then, what in outline this systemis, and what are the causes which favour its existence. [4]

German jurisprudence has taxed hard its boundless stores of ingenuityand obscurity in the endeavour to find a proper scientific definition ofthe nature of the anomalous union which binds together the monarchy ofAustria-Hungary. With the inquiry, however, what may be the preciseclass of constitutions under which we ought to bring a politicalarrangement which is "singular" in the strictest sense of that word, English inquirers need not concern themselves. The broad outlines ofthe Dual system, invented by the ingenuity of Deák, and accepted underthe stress of necessity by the sagacity of the Emperor, may, for ourpresent purpose, be roughly sketched in short, and it is hoped in notunintelligible terms. 

The Dual system is a permanent alliance rather than a union between thekingdom of Hungary and the countries now represented in the AustrianImperial Parliament, or (to use convenient though not quite accurateterms) between Austria and Hungary. 

The essential features of this alliance or compromise, which is in itsnature a treaty far more than an act of legislation, may be thus summedup. 

At the head of the whole monarchy stands the Emperor-King. The rules forthe succession to the throne indeed secure that the Imperial and theHungarian Crown shall always devolve upon the same person. The Crowns, however, are distinct, the monarch on whose head they rest governs twodistinctly different peoples, bound to him by different ties ofallegiance. He has Hungarian subjects and Austrian subjects, but he canclaim authority over no man as a subject or citizen of Austria-Hungary. The monarch (and this is a matter of supreme importance) is not only thenominal, but the real link connecting the two halves of his dominions. He is moreover a true ruler. Englishmen hear of a Parliament at Viennaand of a Diet in Hungary, of Austrian ministers and of Hungarianministers, and they fancy that Francis Joseph is a constitutional kingafter the type of Queen Victoria of England, or King Humbert of Italy. No idea is more erroneous. He is the actual head of the State; he is thereal commander of the army. In the Austrian Empire he exercises apredominant influence on the Government, and observers who look at thepast exertions of Imperial prerogative, and who weigh well the immensepower of temporary legislation reserved under the Imperial constitutionto the Emperor, suspect that in his Austrian dominions, Francis Josephmight if he chose as easily suspend constitutional government, as he didin fact suspend it (though for a most legitimate object) in 1886. InHungary the parliamentary constitution is a reality, but the King ofHungary's authority is a good deal more than nominal. The transactionsbetween Deák and the Emperor become incomprehensible unless you allowfor the influence conferred by Hungarian loyalty upon the King ofHungary. 

This real monarch rules the monarchy with the co-operation of what mightroughly be called three Parliaments. 

The first Parliament is the Hungarian Diet sitting at Pesth, whichconstitutes the real and true legislature for Hungary, and which, inspite of the powers retained by or conferred upon the local legislatureof Croatia, makes laws for the whole domain of the Hungarian Crown. TheKing of Hungary appoints the Hungarian ministers, who are responsible tothe Hungarian Diet, and are kept in office by the Diet's support. 

The second Parliament is the Imperial Parliament, or _Reichsrath_, sitting at Vienna, legislating for the territories of the AustrianEmpire which do not belong to the Hungarian Crown. The Emperor appointsthe Austrian or Imperial Ministry, who are responsible to the ImperialParliament, and need the support of the _Reichsrath_; it may wellhowever be doubted whether an Austrian Premier does not depend for hisauthority far more on the will of the Emperor than on the votes of_Reichsrath_; the authority of the _Reichsrath_ is, moreover, considerably restricted by the powers conferred upon the subordinateassemblies of the different countries, e. G. Bohemia or the Tyrol, whichmake up the Empire. [5]

Englishman should note that the Hungarian Diet has as such nolegislative authority in Austria, and the _Reichsrath_ has nolegislative authority in Hungary. 

The third Parliament consists of the so-called Delegations. 

These Delegations are two committees of sixty members each, elected byand from the members of the Hungarian Diet and the Imperial Parliamentrespectively, but though I have termed them "committees" they arecommittees which within their sphere have an authority independent ofthe bodies by whom they are appointed. 

The function of the Delegations is to determine the "common affairs" ofthe monarchy, that is to say a strictly limited number of matters, namely, common finance, common military matters, and foreign affairs. Onthese three topics, and on these alone, the Hungarian and the AustrianDelegations are (acting of course with the Emperor) supreme. Theydetermine the common Budget of the whole Austro-Hungarian Empire; theydetermine as far as legislation is required all questions affecting theImperial army as a whole; they also determine, as far as theirintervention is required, questions of foreign policy. The function inshort of the Delegations is to deal with matters, and with those mattersonly, which affect the Austro-Hungarian State as a united body, and inits relation to foreigners. Hence three Ministers, the Minister of War, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who actfor the whole monarchy, constitute what is called the Common Ministry, and are appointed by the Emperor-King, and are responsible neither tothe Hungarian Parliament nor to the Imperial Parliament, but simply tothe Delegations. It is natural for Englishman to conclude that theDelegations regulate matters, such for example as questions regardingcustoms, &c. , which must affect every portion of the State, and must, ifthe two divisions of it are to be united at all, be regulated on commonprinciples. But this is not so. The economical relations of the twoparts of the Empire are determined by laws identical in substance, passed by the Hungarian and Imperial Parliaments respectively. Theselaws are enacted from ten years to ten years. It is therefore possibleunder the present arrangement that in '88 the existing customs unionbetween Austria and Hungary may come to an end. [6] The position furtherof the Delegations is in reality that of two separate committees eachrepresenting a separate Parliament. Infinite pains have been taken toplace the Hungarian and the Austrian Delegations on exactly equalfooting. The Delegations meet alternately at Vienna and at Pesth, theydebate in general separately, and come to an agreement through writtennegotiations; they may have a common meeting. In this case the number ofdeputies present on each side must be equal, and by a vote of themajority at such common meeting, any question in dispute is finallydetermined. 

The Austro-Hungarian system is therefore briefly this. Two separateStates, each having a separate administration, a separate Parliament, and separate bodies of subjects or citizens, are each ruled by one andthe same monarch; the two portions of the monarchy are linked togethermainly as regards their relation to foreign powers by an assembly ofdelegates from each Parliament and by a Ministry which is responsible tothe Delegations alone, and which acts in regard to a limited number ofmatters which are of absolute necessity the common concern of themonarchy. This is the Dual system held up for our imitation. Picture itfor a moment as actually existing in what is still the United Kingdom. We should have an English Ministry and an English Parliament atWestminster which had not the least authority in Ireland; we should havean Irish Ministry and an Irish Parliament at Dublin which had not theleast authority in England. Each Parliament would in point say offoreign policy be hampered by the superior authority of a thirdParliament consisting of sixty English and sixty Irish members who satalternately at Westminster and at Dublin to transact or perplex orobstruct the affairs common to the whole Empire. To imagine such anarrangement, to sketch out in one's fancy, for example, how the commonbudget decreed by the Delegations would be provided for by taxationimposed by the Irish Parliament, is enough to show that the Dual systemis absolutely inapplicable to our circumstances. It could not last for ayear, and if by any miracle it did last for that time, the whole BritishEmpire would be reduced to confusion or ruin. The advocates ofinnovation exhibit the most singular mixture of despair and hopefulness. The presence in Parliament of eighty-six Parnellites makes them despairof the British constitution, which has existed for centuries. They hopeor expect that three Parliaments, in two of which these veryParnellites, or men like them, would reappear, would harmoniouslylegislate for England, Ireland, and the British Empire, and this hope isbased on the alleged success of that Dual system which has not withoutdifficulty been kept going for not quite twenty years. The alliance ofscepticism and credulity, of which we have often heard in the sphere oftheology, is a startling phenomenon in the province of politics. TheDual system, however, it will be urged by its admirers, has workedwell. Admit the fact, the success is clearly due to circumstancesnegative and positive totally absent in the case of England and Ireland. The bodies united by means of the compromise do not, like the UnitedKingdom, constitute the centre of a world-wide Empire. Hungary has takenup arms against the Austrian Emperor, yet there has never been instrictness a feud between the Hungarians and the other subjects of theEmperor. The compromise or alliance manifestly met the interest of bothportions of the monarchy: it restored to Hungary a constitution whichfor eighteen years or more had been suppressed, but which had never beengiven up; it secured, or went far to secure, the new constitutionalliberties of the Austrian Empire. Hungary could not stand alone, and sheknew it. The compromise was in reality a politic alliance between thetwo leading races among the many races governed by Francis Joseph. TheGermans and the Magyars came to terms; the alliance strengthened themeach against other foes. But with every political advantage the Dualsystem, of which the permanence is not as yet at all secure, might haveproved as undurable as Grattan's Constitution of 1782 but for onecircumstance, to which I have already directed attention. At the head ofAustria-Hungary stands not an absolute, but a powerful monarch. Theauthority of the Emperor is the spring which makes the cumbersomemachinery of a complicated constitution keep going. The matter is worthattention The power of the Emperor William holds together the States ofthe German Empire; the power of Francis Joseph keeps alive the Dualsystem; where the Crown has a real authority trial may be made ofexperiments in the way of local independence, which are impossible in aState where, as in England, the true sovereign is an elective assembly. 

Foreign experience then affords but a very tottering foundation on whichto raise pleas for Home Rule in Ireland. It may no doubt be read bythose who are already convinced that Home Rule is desirable in favour oftheir views. It may confirm a faith based on other grounds, more itcannot do. Fairly looked at, foreign experience tells rather againstthan for the doctrines of Home Rule. If appealed to at all, it must betaken as a whole. It then shows that Federalism is when nourishing astage towards, not a stage away from, national unity; it shows that astrong central power above Parliamentary control is almost a conditionto the successful combination in one body of semi-independent States. [7]It shows that the whole tendency of modern civilization flows towardsthe creation of great States; national unity is, so to speak, thewatchword of the age; this is scarcely a reason for breaking up theUnited Kingdom. The sagacity of Italian statesmanship rejected theplausible scheme of an Italian Federation. If Englishmen are to takelessons from foreigners they need not be ashamed of being instructed byCavour. 

[Sidenote: Argument 2. Will of Irish people]

_The argument from the will of the Irish people_. --Eighty-sixrepresentatives of the Irish people represent the wish of Ireland forHome Rule. We cannot under a Parliamentary system of government gobehind the result of an election. It must be taken therefore thatIreland wishes for Home Rule; and since popular government as it existsin England means nothing else than government in accordance with thewishes of the people, the wish of the Irish people for the Parliamentaryindependence of their country proves their right to an Irish Parliament, and terminates, or ought to terminate, all opposition to Home Rule. 

[Sidenote: Criticism on argument]

This simple argument, that because three millions of Irishmen, or forthat matter three millions of Englishmen, wish for a thing, they aretherefore absolutely entitled to have it, is not often put forward inits naked simplicity, but is constantly presented under variousrhetorical disguises, such for example as the assertion that Irishmenhave a right to manage their own affairs, that Ireland only wants to beleft to herself, and the like; and impresses both the imagination andthe conscience of the masses. There is a good deal to be said about thetruth of the alleged fact on which the argument is based, namely thewish of the Irish people. It might be worth while to note that the"people" in this case meant only a majority of the electors, whose wishis notoriously opposed to the ardent desire of a respectable minority;and it might be well to suggest that the constitutional pedantry whichrefuses to "go behind an electoral return, " _i. E. _, to see things asthey are, is not the same thing as either good sense or statesmanship. But for the present purpose it is better to admit that the majority ofthe inhabitants of Ireland would, if a fair vote were taken, expresstheir wish for Home Rule, as they might, probably, under similarconditions express their wish for separation. The argument in hand, however, even when its basis is conceded, allows, according to thedifferent meanings which it may bear, of different answers. If taken inits most obvious sense, as asserting the absolute right of a majorityamong Irish electors to any concession with regard to Ireland which theyare pleased to claim, it may be met by another formula of equal cogencyor of equal weakness. "The vast majority of the United Kingdom, including by the way a million or more of the inhabitants of Ireland, have expressed their will to maintain the Union. Popular governmentmeans government in accordance with the will of the majority, andtherefore according to all the principles of popular government themajority of the United Kingdom have a right to maintain the Union. Theirwish is decisive, and ought to terminate the whole agitation in favourof Home Rule. " To any sensible person who has passed beyond the age ofearly manhood (for youths may without blame treat politics as a form oflogic) neither of these formulas can present a sound ground from whichto defend or impugn legislation which involves the welfare of millions. The contradiction however between two formulas each of which ifpropounded alone would command the assent of a democratic audience isnoteworthy. This contradiction brings into prominence the considerationthat the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereigncannot, whether true or false in itself, be invoked to determine adispute turning upon the enquiry which of two bodies is the body themajority of which has a right to sovereignty. The majority of thecitizens of the United States were opposed to Secession, the majority ofthe citizens of the Southern States were in favour of Secession; theattempt to determine which side had right on its side by an appeal tothe "sovereignty of the majority" involved in this case, as it must inevery case, a _petitio principii_, for the very question at issue waswhich of two majorities ought, as regarded the matter in hand, to beconsidered the majority. 

It would however be doing injustice to the argument from the will of thepeople to dispose of it by dwelling upon the logical inconsistenciesinevitably involved in every attempt to determine a question ofpractical politics by the application to it of _à priori_ dogmatism. Formulas such as "the sovereignty of the people" often contain muchsolid truth hidden under an inaccurate and a too absolute form ofexpression. The assertion that the wish of the Irish people is decisiveas to the form of constitution to be maintained in Ireland covers twogenuine and in themselves rational convictions. The first is, that abody of human beings who feel themselves, in consequence of theirinhabiting a common country, of their sharing a common history and thelike, inspired with a feeling of common nationality, have, if not aright, at lowest a strong claim to be governed as a separate nation. This is the doctrine of nationality which, be it noted, though oftenconfused with, is at bottom different from, the dogma of the supremacyof the majority. That the doctrine of nationality is, when reasonablyput, conformable with obvious principles of utility may be readilyadmitted; but it is a doctrine which can only be accepted withconsiderable qualifications. Its validity was denied both theoreticallyand practically, and, in the judgment of most English democrats, not tosay of most European Liberals, denied justly and righteously by theNorthern States of America, when the Southern States claimed the benefitof its application. The argument moreover from the principle ofnationality in reference to the present controversy proves too much. Ifthe Irish people are a nation, this may give them a right toindependence, but it can never in itself give them a moral claim todictate the particular terms of union with England. The secondconviction which underlies the argument from the will of the people isof far more serious import than any reasoning drawn from even sorespectable a formula as the doctrine of nationality. The dogma that thewill of the people must be obeyed often expresses the rational beliefthat under all polities, and especially under the system of populargovernment, institutions derive their life, and laws their constrainingpower, not from the will of the law-giver, or from the strength of thearmy, but from their correspondence with the permanent wishes and habitsof the people. Home Rule, to put this matter in its strongest form, means, it may be said, the application to Ireland of the very principleon which the English constitution rests--that a people must be ruled inaccordance with their own permanent ideas of right and of justice, andthat unless this be done, law, because it commands no loyalty, ensuresno obedience. The whole history of the connection between the twoislands which make up the United Kingdom is a warning of thewretchedness, the calamities, the wickedness and the ruin which followupon the attempt to violate this fundamental principle not only ofpopular, but of all good and just government. Home Rule may appear to bean innovation. It is in this point of view simply a return to theessential ideas of English constitutionalism, it is an attempt to escapefrom the false path which has been pursued for centuries, and to returnto the broad highway of government in accordance with popular sympathy. At this point, however, the argument from the will of the people mergesin the much stronger and more serious train of reasoning derived fromthe teaching of history. 

[Sidenote: 3. Argument from Irish history. ]

_The argument from Irish history. _--Appeals to the lessons of the pastare at times in the mouths of Home Rulers, as also of their opponents, anoxious revival of ancient passions, or (it may be) nothing better thanthe use of an unreal form of rhetoric; yet a supporter of Home Rule mayuse the argument from Irish history in a way which is at once legitimateand telling. 

On one point alone (it may be urged) all men of whatever party, or ofwhatever nation, who have seriously studied the annals of Ireland areagreed--the history of the country is a record of incessant failure onthe part of the Government, and of incessant misery on the part of thepeople. On this matter, if on no other, De Beaumont, Froude and Leckyare at one. As to the guilt of the failure or the cause of the misery, men may and do differ; that England, whether from her own fault or fromthe fault of the Irish people, or from the perversity of circumstances, has failed in Ireland of achieving the elementary results of goodgovernment, is as certain as any fact of history or of experience. Everyscheme has been tried in turn, and no scheme has succeeded, or has even(it may be suggested) produced its natural effects. Oppression of theCatholics has increased the adherents and strengthened the hold ofCatholicism. Protestant supremacy while it lasted did not lead even toProtestant contentment, and the one successful act of resistance toEnglish dominion was effected by a Protestant Parliament supported by anarmy of volunteers led by a body of Protestant officers. Theindependence gained by a Protestant Parliament led, after eighteenyears, to a rebellion so reckless and savage, that it caused if it didnot justify the destruction of the Parliament, and the carrying of theUnion. The Act of Union did not lead to national unity, and a measurewhich appeared on the face of it (though the appearance it must beadmitted was delusive) to be a copy of the law which turned England andScotland into a common country inspired by common patriotism, producedconspiracy and agitation, and has at last placed England and Irelandfurther apart morally than they stood at the beginning of the century. The Treaty of Union, it was supposed, missed its mark because it was notcombined with Catholic Emancipation. The Catholics were emancipated, butemancipation instead of producing loyalty brought forth the cry forrepeal. The repeal movement ended in failure, but its death gave birthto the attempted rebellion of 1848. Suppressed rebellion begotFenianism, to be followed in its turn by the agitation for Home Rule. The movement relies, it is said, and there is truth in the assertion, onconstitutional methods for obtaining redress. But constitutional methodsare supplemented by boycotting, by obstruction, by the use of dynamite. A century of reform has given us Mr. Parnell instead of Grattan, and itis more than possible that Mr. Parnell may be succeeded by leaders inwhose eyes Mr. Davitt's policy may appear to be tainted with moderation. No doubt in each case the failure of good measures admits, like everycalamity either in private or in public life, of explanation, and afterthe event it is easy to see why, for example, the Poor Law when extendedto Ireland did not produce even the good effects, such as they are, which in England are to be set against its numerous evils; or why anemigration of unparalleled proportions has diminished population withoutmuch diminishing poverty; why the disestablishment of the AnglicanChurch has increased rather than diminished the hostility to England ofthe Catholic priesthood; or why two Land Acts have not contented Irishfarmers. It is easy enough, in short, and this without having recourseto any theory of race, and without attributing to Irishmen either moreor less of original sin than falls to the lot of humanity, to see how itis that imperfect statesmanship--and all statesmanship it should beremembered is imperfect--has failed of obtaining good results at allcommensurate with its generally good intentions. Failure, however, isnone the less failure because its causes admit of analysis. It is nodefence to bankruptcy that an insolvent can, when brought before theCourt, lucidly explain the errors which resulted in disastrousspeculations. The failure of English statesmanship, explain it as youwill, has produced the one last and greatest evil which misgovernmentcan cause. It has created hostility to the law in the minds of thepeople. The law cannot work in Ireland, because the classes whoseopinion in other countries supports the action of the Courts are inIreland, even when not law-breakers, in full sympathy with law-breakers. This fact, a Home Ruler may add, is for this purpose all the moreinstructive, if it be granted that the errors of British policy do notarise from injustice or ill-will to Irishmen. The inference, heinsists, to be drawn from the lesson of history is, that it isimpossible for the Parliament of the United Kingdom to understand or toprovide for Irish needs. The law is hated and cannot be executed inIreland because, as we are told on high authority, it comes before theIrish people in a foreign garb. The law is detested, in short, notbecause it is unjust, but because it is English. The reason why judgessoldiers or policemen strive in vain to cope with lawlessness is, thatthey are in fact trying to enforce not so much the rule of justice asthe supremacy of England. The Austrian administration in Lombardy wasnever deemed to be bad--it was very possibly better than any which theItalian kingdom can supply; the Austrian rule was hated not because theAustrians were bad rulers, but because they were foreigners. In Ireland, as in Lombardy, permanent discontent is caused by the outraged sentimentof nationality. Meet this sentiment, argues the friend of Home Rule, bythe concession to Ireland of an independent Parliament. The law whichcomes from Ireland's own legislature will be obeyed because it is herown law, and will be enforced throughout Ireland by Irish officialssupported by the sympathy of the Irish population. Let Ireland manageher own affairs, and England will be freed from a task which she oughtnever to have taken up because she cannot perform it, and you will layupon Ireland duties which she can perform but which she has never yetbeen either allowed or compelled to take up. Irishmen for the firsttime will feel the full responsibility, because for the first time theyhave received the full power, of self-government. The argument, inshort, on the Home Rule view stands thus: the miseries of Ireland flowhistorically from political causes, and are to be met by politicalchanges. At the bottom of Irish disorder lies the sentiment of Irishnationality. The change, therefore, that is needed is such a concessionto that sentiment as is involved in giving Ireland an Irish legislature. This is the reform by which the result of curing Irish discontent can beachieved, and it is a reform not incompatible with the interests ofGreat Britain. 

This is (in my judgment) a fair statement of the historical argumentrelied upon by the advocates of Home Rule, though, of course, it allowsof infinite variety as to its form of expression. It is a line ofreasoning which rests on premisses many of which (as any candid criticmust admit) contain a large amount of truth. It is logically by far thestrongest of the Home Rule arguments. It is one, moreover, in whichauthorities who on other points differ from each other are in agreement. Mr. Parnell asserts with emphasis that Ireland is a "nation, " andapparently holds that the passing of a good law by the Parliament of theUnited Kingdom is less desirable than the existence of an IrishParliament, even should that Parliament delay good legislation. Mr. Gladstone attributes the inefficacity of laws passed by the ImperialParliament to their coming before Irishmen in a "foreign garb, " and anauthor who is not in any way a supporter of the Liberal leader does notapparently on this point disagree with Mr. Gladstone. "If there was ahope that anything which we could give would make the Irish contentedand loyal subjects of the British Empire, no sacrifice would be toogreat for such an object. But there is no such hope. The land tenure isnot the real grievance: it is merely the pretext. The real grievance isour presence in Ireland at all. If there was a hope that by buying upthe soil and distributing it among the tenantry we could make them, ifnot loyal, yet orderly and prosperous, even so the experiment would beworth trying; but, again, there is no such hope. The Land Bill of 1870gave the tenants a proprietary right in their holdings. They haveborrowed money on the security of that right at ruinous interest, andthe poorest of them are already sinking under their debts to the localbanker or tradesman. If we make them proprietors to-morrow, their farmsin a few years will be sold or mortgaged. We shall have destroyed oneset of landlords to create another who will not be more merciful. "[8]

[Sidenote: Criticism]

The only way of meeting the historical argument, containing as it doesadmitted truth, and supported as it is by high authorities, is to surveythe broad phenomena of Irish history, and see what are the inferenceswhich they warrant. [9] Whoever wishes to derive instruction from themelancholy history of the kingdom of Ireland must, as has already beenintimated, rid himself from the delusions caused in the domain ofhistory by personification. He must dismiss the notion that England andIreland are persons to be charged with individual and continuousresponsibility for the crimes or follies of past ages. He must check thenatural but misguiding tendency of the human mind to imagine that innational affairs when anything goes wrong you can always, or indeedgenerally, lay your finger upon some definite assignable wrong-doer, that is, upon some man or some men who can be held responsible forpolitical calamities or errors, as a murderer may be held guilty ofmurder, or a robber of theft. A calm critic should also reflect on theprofound truth of the dictum (attributed by the way to an Irishman) that"history is at best but an old almanack, " and, while not entertainingany great hope that antiquarian research can afford much direct guidanceas to the proper mode of arranging the future relations between Englandand Ireland, remember that the most salutary function of the study ofthe past is to tone down those historical animosities which derive theirbitterness from the ignorant habit of trying the actors in bygone scenesby moral laws to which they are not justly amenable. The moral functionof an historian is to diminish the hatreds which divide nation fromnation and class from class; such as at the present moment do more toprevent real unity between the inhabitants of the two islands making upthe United Kingdom than do unjust laws or vicious institutions. To astudent who regards with philosophic calmness a topic which has mainlybeen dealt with by politicians or agitators, it easily becomes apparentthat the crimes or failures of England, no less than the vices ormiseries of England, have to a great extent flowed from causes toogeneral to be identified with the intentional wrong-doing either ofrulers or of subjects. 

One fact thrusts itself upon the attention of any serious studentEngland and Ireland have from the commencement of their ill-starredconnection been countries standing on different levels or at differentstages of civilization; they have moreover been countries impelled bythe force of circumstances towards a different development. Englishmenforget, or (more strictly speaking) have never understood, howexceptional has been the path pursued by English civilization; they donot realise to themselves that the gradual transformation of anaristocratic and feudal society into a modern industrial State whichstill retains the forms, and in many points of view the spirit offeudalism is a process which, although owing to the most specialcircumstances it has been accomplished with success in England, hashardly a parallel in any other European country. Ireland on the otherhand has, despite the deviations from her natural course caused by herconnection with a powerful nation, tended to follow the lines ofprogress pursued by continental countries, and notably by France. Aforeign critic like De Beaumont finds it far easier than could anyEnglishman to enter into the condition of Ireland, and this not onlybecause he is as a foreigner delivered from the animosities orpartialities which must in one way or another warp every Englishjudgment, but mainly because the phenomena which puzzle an Englishman, as for example the passion of Irish peasants for the possession ofland, [10] are from his own experience familiar and appear natural to aFrenchman. What to the mind of a foreign observer needs explanation isthe social condition of England rather than of Ireland. He at any ratecan see at a glance that the relation between the two countries hasplanted and maintained in Ireland an aristocracy, aristocraticinstitutions, and above all an aristocratic land law, foreign to thetraditions and opposed to the interests of the mass of the people. Letan observer for a moment take up the point of view natural to acontinental critic, and admit, in the language of De Beaumont, that theprimary radical and permanent cause of Irish misery has been themaintenance in Ireland by England of a "bad aristocracy, "[10] or, to putthe same thing more generally, and it may be more fairly that the viceof the connection between the two countries has consisted in its being arelation of peoples standing at different stages of civilization andtending towards different courses of development. Here you find theoriginal source of a thousand ills, and hence especially have originatedfour potent causes of the condition of things which now tries thepatience and overtaxes the resources of English statesmanship. 

First, --The English constitution has both from its form and from itsspirit caused in past times, and even at the present day causes as muchevil to Ireland as it has conferred, or does confer, benefit uponEngland. [11]

The assailants of popular government point to the misrule of Ireland asa proof that the Parliamentary system is radically vicious. They do notprove their point, because the calamities of Ireland afford no evidencewhatever that England, which has been more prosperous for a greaterlength of time than any other nation in Europe, has essentially sufferedfrom the power of the English Parliament. What these critics do prove isthat a representative assembly is a bad form of government for anynation or class whom it does not represent, and they establish todemonstration that a parliamentary despotism may well be a worsegovernment for a dependency than a royal despotism. This is so for tworeasons. The rule of Parliament has meant in England government byparties; and whatever be the merits of party spirit in a free, self-governed country, its calamitous defects, when applied to theadministration of a dependency, are patent. Down to 1782 Ireland wasavowedly subject to the despotism or sovereignty of the BritishParliament, and at every turn the interest of the country was sacrificedto the exigencies of English politics Between 1782 to 1800 the nominalindependence of Ireland placed a check on the power of the EnglishParliament, yet in substance the English executive, controlled as it wasby the Parliament at Westminster, remained the ultimate sovereign of thekingdom of Ireland. If Pitt could have carried the King and the EnglishParliament with him, he would, in spite of any opposition at Dublin bythe adherents of Ascendancy, have emancipated the Catholics, just as, when backed by the King and the English Parliament, he did, in the faceof strenuous opposition in Ireland, pass the Act of Union. And even atthe present day the most plausible charge which can be brought againstthe working of the Act of Union is that Ireland under it fails to obtainthe full benefit of the British constitution, and that in spite of herhundred representatives she is not for practical purposes represented atWestminster in the same sense as is Middlesex or Midlothian. AParliament again is less capable than a King of compensating for theevils of tyranny by the benefit of good administration, and here we comeacross a matter hardly to be understood by any one who has not with somecare compared the action and the spirit of English and of continentaladministrative systems. It is hardly an exaggeration to assert that evennow we have in the United Kingdom nothing like what foreigners mean byan administration. We know nothing of that official hierarchy which onthe Continent represents the authority of the State. [12] Englishmen areaccustomed to consider that institutions under which the business of thecountry is carried on by unconnected local bodies, such as themagistrates in quarter session, or the corporations of boroughs, controlled in the last resort only by the law courts, ought to be thesubject of unqualified admiration. Foreign observers might, even asregards England itself, have something to set off against the merits ofa system which is, if the apparent contradiction of terms may beexcused, no system at all, and might point out that in continentalcountries the administration may often be the intelligent guide andprotector of the weak and needy. The system complimented by the name ofself-government, even if as beneficial for England as Englishmen areinclined without absolute proof to believe, is absolutely unsuitable fora country harassed by religious and social feuds, where the owners ofland are not and cannot be the trusted guides of the people. Animpartial official is a better ruler than a hostile or distrustedlandowner, and any one who bears in mind the benefits conferred by thehumanity and justice of Turgot on a single province of France may, without being any friend of despotism, hold that in the last centuryIreland suffered greatly from a scheme of government which did not allowof administration such as Turgot's. In some respects the virtues ofEnglishmen have been singularly unfavourable to their success inconciliating the goodwill of Ireland. It will always remain a paradoxthat the nation which has built up the British Empire (with vast help, it may be added, from Ireland) has combined extraordinary talent forlegislation with a singular incapacity for consolidating subject racesor nations into one State. The explanation of the paradox lies in thearistocratic sentiment which has moulded the institutions of England. Anaristocracy respects the rights of individuals, but an aristocracyidentifies right with privilege, and is based on the belief in theinequality of men and of classes. Privilege is the keynote of Englishconstitutionalism; the respect for privileges has preserved Englishfreedom, but it has made England slower than any other civilized countryto adopt ideas of equality. This love of privilege has vitiated theEnglish administration in Ireland in more ways than one. The wholeadministration of the country rested avowedly down to 1829, andunavowedly to a later period, on the inequality of Catholics andProtestants, and Protestant supremacy itself meant (except during theshort rule of Cromwell)[13] not Protestant equality, but Anglicanprivilege. The spirit which divided Ireland into hostile factionsprevented Englishmen who dwelt in England from treating as equalsEnglishmen who settled in Ulster. When the Volunteers claimed Irishindependence, and the American colonists renounced connection with themother country, similar effects were produced by the same cause. In eachcase English colonists revolted against England's sovereignty, becauseit meant the privilege of Englishmen who dwelt in Great Britain tocurtail the rights and hamper the trade of Englishmen who dwelt abroad. For the iniquitous restrictions on the trade of Ireland, which aremorally by far the most blameworthy of the wrongs inflicted by Englandupon Irishmen, were not precisely the acts of deliberate selfishnesswhich they seem to modern critics. The grievance under which Irelandsuffered was in character the same as the grievances in respect of tradeinflicted on the American colonies. Yet but for the insane attempt tosubject the colonists to direct taxation by the English Parliament theWar of Independence might have been long deferred. Even the sufferersfrom a vicious commercial policy did not see its essential iniquity, andit is hardly a subject for wonder that a generation of Englishmen whosupposed themselves to gain greatly by controlling or extinguishing thecolonial or the Irish trade should not have recognised the full iniquityof a policy which in itself hardly seemed intolerable to many of thosecolonists who endured the wrong. Still less can we be surprised thatEnglishmen a century ago, amid a world where the idea of human equalitywas not as yet recognised, should have failed to perceive what manyEnglishmen it may be suspected will hardly admit at present, that tomost men equality, i. E. The treatment of all subjects by theirgovernment on similar principles, seems a form of justice, and that themultitude will tolerate restrictions on their freedom far more easilythan offences against their sense of equality. No one will care to denythat French Governments have at all periods been far more despotic thanthe Government of England; but few persons who have given the matter athought can deny that France has shown a power quite unknown toEnglishmen of attaching to herself by affection countries which she hasannexed by force. Strasburg was stolen from Germany, yet Strasburg soonbecame French in heart. Belgium and the Rhine Provinces would gladlyhave remained parts of the Napoleonic Empire. Savoy annexed in 1859showed no disposition to separate from France in 1870. The explanationof these facts is not far to seek. When France annexes a country she maygovern it well or ill, but she governs it on the same principles as therest of the French dominions. Englishmen found it for centuriesimpossible to govern Englishmen in Ireland or Englishmen inMassachusetts exactly as if they were Englishmen in Middlesex. It is notuninstructive that every French Assembly since the Revolution hasincluded Deputies from the colonies; no colony has ever sent a member tothe Parliament at Westminster. 

Secondly, --The English connection has inevitably, and therefore withoutblame to anyone, brought upon Ireland the evils involved in theartificial suppression of revolution. 

The crises called revolutions are the ultimate and desperate cures forthe fundamental disorganisation of society. The issue of a revolutionarystruggle shows what is the true sovereign power in the revolutionisedstate. So strong is the interest of mankind, at least in any Europeancountry, in favour of some sort of settled rule, that civil disturbancewill, if left to itself, in general end in the supremacy of some powerwhich by securing the safety, at last gains the attachment, of thepeople. The Reign of Terror begets the Empire; even wars of religion atlast produce peace, albeit peace may be nothing better than the ironuniformity of despotism. Could Ireland have been left for any lengthenedperiod to herself, some form of rule adapted to the needs of the countrywould in all probability have been established. Whether Protestants orCatholics would have been the predominant element in the State; whetherthe landlords would have held their own, or whether the English systemof tenure would long ago have made way for one more in conformity withnative traditions; whether hostile classes and races would at last haveestablished some _modus vivendi_ favourable to individual freedom, orwhether despotism under some of its various forms would have beensanctioned by the acquiescence of its subjects, are matters of uncertainspeculation. A conclusion which, though speculative, is far lessuncertain is, that Ireland if left absolutely to herself would havearrived like every other country at some lasting settlement of herdifficulties. To the establishment of such a reign of order the Britishconnection has been fatal; revolution has been suppressed at the priceof permanent disorganisation, the descendants of colonists and nativeshave not coalesced into a nation, and a country which has never knownindependence has never borne the burdens or learnt the lessons ofnational responsibility. Disastrous as this result has been, it isimpossible to say who it was that at any given point was to blame forit. Had France been attached to and dependent upon a powerful neighbour, this sovereign state must have checked the cruelties and the injusticeof the Reign of Terror. But the forcible extinction of Jacobinism by anexternal power would, we can hardly doubt, have arrested the progressand been fatal to the prosperity of France. Ireland, in short, whichunder English rule has lacked good administration, has by the same rulebeen inevitably prevented from attempting the cure of deeply rootedevils by the violent though occasionally successful remedy ofrevolution. 

Thirdly, --From the original flaw in the connection between the twocountries has resulted, almost as it were of necessity, the religiousoppression, which, recorded as it has been in the penal laws, has becomethe opprobrium of English rule in Ireland. 

The monstrosity of imposing Anglican Protestantism upon a people who hadnot reached the stage of development which is essential for even theunderstanding of Protestant dogma, and who if left to themselves wouldhave adhered to Catholicism, conceals from us the strength of the pleasto be urged in excuse of a policy which to critics of the nineteenthcentury seems at least as absurd as it was iniquitous. Till towards theclose of the seventeenth century all the best and wisest men of themost civilised nations in Europe, believed that the religion of acountry was the concern of the Government, and that a king who neglectedto enforce the "truth"--that is, his own theological beliefs--failed inhis obligations to his subjects and incurred the displeasure of Heaven. From this point of view the policy of the Tudors must appear to us asnatural as to themselves it appeared wise and praiseworthy. That thepeople of England should have been ripe for Protestantism at a time whenthe people of Ireland had hardly risen to the level of Roman Catholicismwas to each country a grievous misfortune. That English Protestants ofthe sixteenth and seventeenth centuries should in common with the wholeChristian world have believed that the toleration of religious error wasa sin, and should have acted on the belief, was a cause of immensecalamities. But inevitable ignorance is not the same thing aswickedness. [14]

Fourthly, --To the same source as religious persecution are due the wholecrop of difficulties connected with the tenure of land. 

When James I. Determined that the old Brehon law was to be abolished, and an appeal to the law of England to be brought within the reach ofevery Irishman, he and his ministers meant to introduce a beneficialreform. They hoped that out of the old tribal customs a regular systemof landowning according to the English tenure would be developed. Inforcing on this change, English statesmen felt convinced not only thatthey were reformers, but that they were promoters of justice. To ageneration trained under the teaching of lawyers like Coke, andaccustomed to regard the tenure which prevailed in England as good initself, it must have appeared that to pass from the irregular dominionof uncertain customs to the rule of clear, definite law, was little lessthan a transition from anarchy and injustice to a condition of order andequity. They acted in precisely the spirit of their descendants, who areabsolutely assured that the extension of English maxims of governmentthroughout India must be a blessing to the population of the country, and shape their Egyptian policy upon their unwavering faith in thebenefits which European control must of necessity confer on Egyptianfellahs. If, however, it is probable that King James meant well to hisIrish subjects, it is absolutely certain that his policy worked grosswrong. His scheme only provided for the more powerful members of thetribes, and took no account of the inferior members, each of whom intheir degree had an undeniable if somewhat indefinite interest in thetribal land. Sir John Davis, who carried out the plan, seems to havethought that he had gone quite far enough in erecting the sub-chiefsinto freeholders. It never occurred to him that the humblest member ofthe tribe should, if strict justice were done, have received hisallotment out of the common territory; and the result of his settlementaccordingly was that the tribal land was cut up into a number of largefreehold estates which were given to the most important personages amongthe native Irish, and the bulk of the people were reduced to thecondition of tenants at will. [15] An intended reform produced injustice, litigation, misery, and discontent. The case is noticeable, for it is atype of a thousand subsequent English attempts to reform and improveIreland. The rulers of the country were influenced by ideas differentfrom those of their subjects. Ignorance and want of sympathy producedall the evils of cruelty and malignity. 

Bad administration, religious persecution, above all a thoroughlyvicious system of land tenure, accompanied by such sweepingconfiscations as to make it at any rate a plausible assertion that allthe land in Ireland has during the course of Irish history beenconfiscated at least thrice over, [16] are admittedly some of the causes, if they do not constitute the whole cause, of the one immediatedifficulty which perplexes the policy of England. This is nothing elsethan the admitted disaffection to the law of the land prevailing amonglarge numbers of the Irish people. The existence of this disaffection, whatever be the inference to be drawn from it, is undeniable. A seriesof so-called Coercion Acts passed both before and since the Act of Uniongive undeniable evidence, if evidence were wanted, of the ceaseless, andas it would appear almost irrepressible, resistance in Ireland offeredby the people to the enforcement of the law. I have not the remotestinclination to underrate the lasting and formidable character of thisopposition between opinion and law, nor can any jurist who wishes todeal seriously with a serious and infinitely painful topic question fora moment that the ultimate strength of law lies in the sympathy, or atlowest the acquiescence, of the mass of the population. Judges, constables and troops become almost powerless when the conscience of thepeople permanently opposes the execution of the law. Severity produceseither no effect or bad effects, executed criminals are regarded asheroes or martyrs, and jurymen or witnesses meet with the execration, and often with the fate, of criminals. On such a point it is best totake the judgment of a foreigner unaffected by prejudices or passions, from which no Englishman or Irishman has a right to suppose himselffree:

"_Quand vous en êtes arrivés à ce point, croyez bien que dans cette voiede rigueurs tous vos efforts pour rétablir l'ordre et la paix serontinutiles. En vain, pour réprimer des crimes atroces, vous appellerez àvotre aide toutes les sévérités du code de Dracon; en vain vous ferezdes lois cruelles pour arrêter le cours de révoltantes cruautés;vainement vous frapperez de mort le moindre délit se rattachant à cesgrands crimes; vainement, dans l'effroi de votre impuissance, voussuspendrez le cours des lois ordinaires, proclamerez des comtés entiersen état de suspicion légale, violerez le principe de la libertéindividuelle, créerez des cours martiales, des commissionsextraordinaires, et pour produire de salutaires impressions de terreur, multiplierez à l'excès les exécutions captiales. _"[17]

No advocate of Home Rule can find a clearer statement of the conditionof things with which on his view the Imperial Parliament is morallyincompetent to deal than in these words of De Beaumont's; but before wehastily draw any inference from an undoubted fact, let us examine intothe exact nature of the fact. The opposition of Irish opinion to the lawof the land is undoubted, but the opposition is not now, and if weappeal (as under the present argument we are appealing) to the teachingof history never has been general opposition to law, or even generalopposition to English law. The statistics of ordinary crime are (it issaid) no higher in Ireland than in other parts of the United Kingdom. Apickpocket or a burglar is as easily convicted in Ireland as elsewhere;the persons who lamentably enough are either left unpunished, or ifpunished may count on popular sympathy, are criminals whose offences, atrocious and cruel as they constantly are, are connected in popularopinion with political, and at bottom, it must be added, with agrarianquestions. For more than a century there has existed an hereditaryconspiracy against the rights of the landowners. The White Boys of 1760, the Steel Boys of 1772, the Right Boys of 1785, the Rockites of a fewyears later, the Thrashers of 1806, the White Boys who re-appear in1811, 1815, 1820, the Terralts of 1831, the White Feet of 1833, theBlack Feet of 1837;[18] later Ribbon men under different names, theBoycotters or the assassins who have added a terrible sanction to thecommands of the Land League or of the National League, have each andall been, in most cases avowedly and in every case in fact, thevindicators or asserters of the just or unjust popular aversion to therights of landlords given by the law and enforced by the courts of theland. It would be folly to assert that all popular opposition to the lawin Ireland had been connected with agrarian questions. But if we lookeither to the experience of past generations, or to the transactionspassing before our eyes, we can hardly be mistaken in holding that themain causes of disaffection have been either questions connected withreligion, or rather with the position of Roman Catholics, or disputesconnected with the possession of land. 

The feeling of nationality has played a very subordinate part infomenting or keeping alive Irish discontent. The Repeal agitation, inspite of O'Connell's legitimate influence, collapsed. No one can readSir Gavan Duffy's most interesting account of the Young Ireland movementwithout perceiving that just because it was strictly a nationalistmovement it took very little hold upon the people. The Home Rulemovement never showed great strength till it became avowedly a LandLeague, of which the ultimate result should be, by whatever means, tomake the tenants of Ireland owners of their land. To this add that inthe judgment of foreign critics, and of thinkers like Mill, the popularprotest against the maintenance in Ireland of a tenure combining theevils both of large estates and of minute subdivision of farms isfounded upon justice. De Beaumont at any rate teaches that to transformIrish tenants into peasant proprietors would be the salvation of thecountry:--

_"Plus on considère l'Irlande, ses besoins et ses difficultés de toutessortes, et plus on est porté à penser que ce changement dans l'état desa population agricole serait le vrai remède à ses maux.... 

"J'aurais mille autres raisons pour appuyer cette opinion; je m'arrêtecependant. Un lecteur anglais trouvera mes arguments incomplets. Toutautre qu'un Anglais les jugera peut-être surabondants. "_[19]

This opinion may be well-founded or ill-founded; but no wise statesmanwill reject it without the maturest consideration. 

History, then, if fairly interrogated, gives this result: Historicalcauses have generated in Ireland a condition of opinion which in allmatters regarding the land impedes that enforcement of law which is theprimary duty of every civilized government. 

From this fact Home Rulers draw the inference that the law is hatedbecause it is foreign, and that England should surrender to Irishmen theeffort to enforce legal rights, since this duty is one which can beperformed by a native and cannot be performed by any English or foreignauthority. 

This conclusion is clearly not supported by the premises. If the sourceof popular discontent be agrarian, then the right course is to amend theland laws while improving the administrative system, and enforcingjustice between man and man. 

A Home Ruler may, however, if hard driven, say that my interpretation ofhistory is erroneous, and that a hatred to English law, and to allthings English, and not a special dislike to the land law, is thesentiment which prevails over every other feeling of the Irish people. It is difficult to me to see how this view can be seriously maintained. Let us grant however for a moment that Home Rulers are right, and thatmillions of Irishmen are inspired with the passion of nationality. Evenon this supposition the Home Rule doctrine stands in a bad way. If thedemand of the Irish people be like that of the Italian people--a demandfor recognised nationality--then the demand must be satisfied, if atall, not by Home Rule, but by independence. The most eminent amongEnglish Home Rulers believes that the law is hated in Ireland because itcomes before the Irish people in a foreign garb. Mr. Froude in substanceagrees in this matter with Mr. Gladstone, since he holds that "the realgrievance is our presence in Ireland at all. " But the eminent statesmanand the distinguished historian draw a different inference from the samepremises. Mr. Gladstone infers that Ireland can be satisfied bysemi-independence. Mr. Froude infers that if we are to meet Irish wisheswe must let Ireland be free. Mr. Froude's logic will be to most personsfar more intelligible than the logic of the Liberal leader. Here, atany rate, we come to the true issue suggested by the phenomena of Irishhistory. Is Irish discontent due in the main to agrarian or to politicalcauses? On the answer to this enquiry depends, as far as the argument wehave in hand goes, the line of right policy in Ireland. But neitheranswer favours the contention of Home Rulers. [20]

The argument from Irish history gives rise to, or, more properlyspeaking, contains in itself two further distinct lines of reasoning infavour of Home Rule, each of which supplements the other. The first ofthese aims at showing that to leave Ireland to herself is the onlymethod by which to restore order throughout the country. This I havetermed "the argument from the good effects of self-government, " theother deduces from the necessity for Coercion Acts the conclusion thatEngland cannot maintain order in Ireland: this I have termed "theargument from the necessity for Coercion Acts. " These two lines ofreasoning are simply an amplification of points suggested by the HomeRule argument from Irish history, and are of necessity therefore opento the same criticisms to which that argument is obnoxious. They have, however, each a certain value of their own, and have made an impressionon the English public: they can each also be met by more or less specialreplies. The argument, therefore, from the good effects ofself-government and the argument from the necessity for Coercion Actseach deserve separate statement and consideration. 

[Sidenote: 4. Argument from self-government. ]

_The argument from the virtues of self-government. _--Self-dependence isthe source of self-reliance and of self-help. Leave Ireland to herself, and Ireland will (it is argued) develop the sense of responsibility andthe power of self-government. Mr. Parnell or Mr. Davitt as Irish PrimeMinister will be able to perform with ease feats beyond the reach of anyEnglish Cabinets. He will dare to be strong because he knows he ispopular: he will punish conspirators with a severity unknown to modernEnglish governments; he will feel that anarchy is the bane of hiscountry, and he will not tolerate disorder. Boycotters, Moonlighters, Dynamiters or Assassins will find that they are called upon to meet aforce of which they have had before no experience. They will discoverthat they are engaged in a contest with the will of the people, anddeprived, as they will be, of the moral sympathy which has hithertogiven them comfort and encouragement, will yield obedience to a lawwhich is the expression of the national will. Self-government inIreland means strong government, and strong government is the one curefor Irish misery. 

This train of reflection has, unless I am mistaken, convinced manyEnglish Radicals that the installation of an Irish Ministry at Dublinwill be the dissolution of every secret society throughout Ireland, andthus gained over to the cause of Home Rule men who detest anarchy evenmore than they love liberty. 

This belief in the virtues of self-government is confirmed by theteaching of American critics, who hold that the recent experience of theUnited States presents a clue by which Englishmen may find a path out ofthe labyrinth of their present perplexities. Transactions known to everycitizen of the States show conclusively that the hatred of law which inIreland fills Englishmen with amazement has arisen among a people who, whatever their faults, cannot be charged with those inherited viceswhich English opinion freely and gratuitously imputes to Irish nature. In Connecticut, in New York, in Georgia, throughout all the SouthernStates, open or secret combinations, supported by public opinion andenforcing its decrees by violence and murder, have with success defiedthe law courts. Social conditions, and not the perversities of Irishcharacter, are seen to be the true cause of phenomena which, if they arenow a feature of Irish life, have appeared in countries where not anIrishman was to be found, and where the Irish had no appreciableinfluence. To this fact, which appears to me not to admit of question, Americans add the consideration that lawlessness when supported bypublic opinion has in America been successfully met, not by coercion, but by yielding to public sentiment. Hence they draw the conclusion thatthe proper mode of terminating the conflict between law and widespreadsentiment is to yield to opinion, and, by conceding something of thenature of Home Rule, to turn law-breakers into law-makers. Theapplication of this dogma to Ireland is obvious: the crucial instance bywhich its truth is supposed to be established is the treatment of theconquered South by the victorious North. From the termination of the Warof Secession up to 1876 the fixed policy of the Northern Republicans wasto maintain order in the South by the use of Federal troops. This policybegan and ended in failure: in 1876 the troops were withdrawn; theendeavour to enforce law by means of the Federal armies was given up--asif by magic chaos gave place to order. Local self-government has givenpeace to the United States, why should it not restore concord to theUnited Kingdom?[21]

[Sidenote: Criticism. ]

It has been freely admitted in the foregoing pages[22] that thehistorical connection between England and Ireland has brought upon theweaker country the evils involved in the suppression of internalrevolution by external force. This admission contains the main groundfor the argument in favour of Home Rule drawn from the good effects ofself-government, but is not in reality a sound foundation on which toplace the suggested conclusion. 

For the argument under consideration, even after the concession thatIreland has suffered from not having been left to herself, is vitiatedby more than one flaw. 

Home Rule, as it is again and again necessary to point out, is notnational independence, nor anything like independence. Home Rule givesIreland at most semi-independence--that is to say, it leaves Ireland atleast half dependent upon England. It is vain to argue that the positionof the member of a confederacy or of a colonial dependency will give toIrishmen the sense of independence and responsibility which belongs to aself-governing nation. 

Grant, however (though the assumption is a hazardous one), that thecreation of an Irish government and an Irish Parliament would of itselfgive to Ireland, even though she were still in many respects dependenton England, such a new sense of power and of responsibility as wouldenable her to create for herself a strong executive. This concession isnot enough to make out the argument in favour of Home Rule. Laws oughtto be not only strong but just, and Englishmen must consider whetherrulers who had come to the head of affairs solely because theyrepresented the strongest among many Irish factions or parties would heable to rule with justice. The "Jacobin Conquest" installed a strongexecutive in power, but England could not be an accomplice ininaugurating a reign of terror. The connection which under any form ofHome Rule would bind together the parts of the present United Kingdomwould be, it may be suggested, a guarantee against the supremacy of anIrish Robespierre or Danton. Granted: but if so, Home Rule wouldrestrain an Irish revolution. The strongest, in other words the mostreckless leaders, would be prevented from coming to the front. Irelandwould not follow her own course, and since she would not be in truthself-governed, she would not reap the good fruits of self-government. 

Nor in truth does the American version of our argument give much help toHome Rulers. 

In more than one instance popular sentiment has in the United Statesdefied the law of the land. Nothing can be a better example of suchdefiance than the anti-rent war which raged in New York between 1839 and1846. [23] The struggle exhibited all the recklessness of a no-rentagitation in Ireland with none of the excuses which can be urged inpalliation of outrage by half-starving tenants; it produced a "reign ofterror which for ten years practically suspended the operations of lawand the payment of rent throughout the district" which was the field ofthe anti-rent movement; it ended in a nominal compromise which was areal victory for the anti-renters. In this instance, be it remarked, nosentiment of nationality or State right came into play. The law washated, not because it was "foreign, " but because it enforced theobligation of an unpopular contract. Landlords, it is now all butadmitted, are not entitled to the full rights of citizens. The triumphtherefore of the anti-renters at New York may command a certain amountof sympathy. The popular sentiment which in 1833 induced the people ofConnecticut to boycott Miss Prudence Crandall cannot be brought underthe sanction of any "higher law. " Her crime was that she chose, obeyingthe dictates of her conscience, to open a school for negro girls inConnecticut. She was subjected to every annoyance and insult which themost reckless boycotter could invent. Legislation itself was turnedagainst her, and the State failed utterly in the duty of protecting oneof the most meritorious, and now, one is happy to think, one of the mosthonoured among the women of America. The Lyman Riots at Boston, asindeed every stage in the noble struggle of the American Abolitionistsagainst popular injustice, tell the same tale, namely, that law in theUnited States has once and again failed to assert its due supremacy overinjustice backed by public approval. This melancholy failure maypossibly support the proposition that England cannot enforce the law inIreland. It far more conclusively shows that even in countries deeplyimbued with the spirit of legality self-government has no necessarytendency to produce just government or just legislation. 

Let us, however, examine with care the lessons to be drawn from thetreatment of the Southern States of America by the North. 

The natural and most obvious moral of modern American history is thatthe majority of a nation have both the right and power to coerce aminority who claim to break up the unity of the State. The mostdistinguished English Liberals, such as Bright and Mill, held, and as Iconceive on sound grounds of reason and justice, that the SouthernStates were neither legally nor morally justified in their claim tosecede from the Union; but no fair-minded man can deny that a plausibleconstitutional case could be made out in favour of Secession, nor thatthe citizens of the Southern confederacy demonstrated their wish anddetermination to secede by far more cogent evidence than the return ofeighty-six Secessionists to Congress. The primâ facie arguments whichmay be alleged in favour of Secession were tenfold stronger--unfoundedas I hold them to have been--than the primâ facie arguments in favour ofIreland's right to Home Rule. Moreover, in studying the history of theUnited States, an Englishman is at the present moment more concernedwith the results than with the justification of the suppression of theSouthern rebellion. The policy of the North attained its object: theUnion was restored, and its existence is now placed beyond the reach ofperil. The abolition of slavery took away the source of disagreementbetween the Northern and Southern States, and the tremendous exhibitionof the power of the Republic has finally, it is supposed, destroyed thevery idea of Secession. There is certainly nothing in all this whichdiscourages the attempt to maintain the political unity of Great Britainand Ireland. We are told, however, to forget the force employed tosuppress Secession, and to recollect only the policy of the Republicansafter the close of the Civil War. That policy was a failure as long asit involved the denial to the Southern States of their State autonomy, and became a success from the moment when it recognised to the full thesacredness of State rights. This, or some statement like this, represents the mode in which the annals of the Union must be read ifthey are to be interpreted in favour of Home Rule. The reading is astrained interpretation of events which are known to every one. TheNorth, once and for all, settled that the matters which lay at thebottom of the Civil War should be settled in the manner which conform toNorthern notions of justice and of expediency. The abolition of slavery, and the final disposal of the alleged right to Secession, gave to theNorth, all the requisite securities against attacks on the unity of theRepublic. The Republicans, influenced in part by considerations ofparty, but partly (it must in fairness be admitted) by the feeling thatit was a duty to secure for Negro citizens the full enjoyment of thecivil and political rights given them, under the constitutionalamendments supported for years the so-called Carpet Bag Governments, that is to say, the rule of Northern adventurers who were kept in officethroughout the South by the Negro vote. The Federal Government, inshort, up to 1876 gave by its arms authority in the South to theunscrupulosity of Northern scoundrelism supported by the votes of Negroignorance. Such a policy naturally produced bitter irritation among theSouthern Whites. Its reversal as naturally restored to the Whites atonce power and contentment. Whether this reversal was as satisfactory tothe Blacks is less clear. In any case it is hard to see how therestoration of the Southern States to their natural place in the Uniontells in favour of giving Ireland a position quite inconsistent with theexisting constitution of the United Kingdom. The case stands thus:Northern Republicans insisted that every State in the South shouldsubmit to the supremacy of the United States on every point whichdirectly or indirectly concerned the national and political unity of theAmerican people. Having secured this submission the Republican partyrestored to the Southern States the reality as well as the name of Staterights; and allowed the same and no more than the same independence toSouth Carolina as is allowed to New York. No doubt something wassacrificed; this "something" was a matter which did not greatly concernthe citizens of the North. It was the attempt to secure to the Blackcitizens of the South the political rights given them by theconstitution. The sacrifice may have been necessary; many of the wisestAmericans hold that it was so. But we may suspect that even amongstthose who, as a matter of policy, approve the course pursued by theFederal Government in the South since 1876, qualms are occasionally feltas to some of its results. The able writer who sets American Home Rulebefore Englishmen as an example for imitation says with the candourwhich marks his writings: "I do not propose to defend or explain the wayin which" the Native Whites "have since then" (1876) kept the Government"in their hands by suppressing or controlling the Negro vote. This isnot necessary to my purpose. "[24] It is however necessary for thepurpose of weighing the effect of American experience to bear this"suppression" constantly in mind; it has deprived the Negroes ofpolitical rights which possibly they had better never have received, andhas falsified the result of Presidential elections. When we are toldthat the South votes solid for a Democratic President, we must rememberthat in the Southern States the Negro vote is "controlled"; and that inreckoning the number of votes to which a State is entitled in virtue ofits population, the Negro voters of the South are counted for as much asthe uncontrolled White voters of the North. Whether this state of thingswill always be contentedly borne by the Northern States is a matter onwhich a foreigner can form no opinion. It is a condition of affairswhich does not conduce to respect for law, and the satisfaction withwhich thoughtful Americans regard a policy founded on the tolerance ofillegality confirms the belief suggested by other circumstances, thatdeference to opinion tends in the United States to undermine respect forlaw; it certainly does not tend to show that self-government has muchconnection with justice. 

The argument, in short, from the good effects of self-governmentappears, when examined, either to be an argument which tells far morestrongly in favour of Separation than of Home Rule, or else to be anargument which shows only that England might gain some immediateadvantage from shutting her eyes to injustice committed by an Irishgovernment. 

[Sidenote: 5. Argument from Coercion Acts. ]

_The argument from the necessity for Coercion Acts_. --Coercion Acts are(according to popular apprehension) enactments suspending the operationof the ordinary law, and conflicting therefore with the principles ofthe English Constitution. Order has been maintained in Ireland since theUnion (we are told) mainly by means of Coercion Acts. The Englishdemocracy, it is argued, cannot acquiesce any longer in these violationsof the Constitution; but since order must somehow be maintained inIreland, and Coercion Acts must no longer be passed, the Englishdemocracy must surrender the duty of maintaining the law into the handsof the Irish people, who, as is assumed by Home Rulers, can exactobedience to the law of Ireland without the use of exceptionallegislation. 

[Sidenote: Criticism. ]

A lawyer irritated by the folly of popular declamation is tempted todismiss all objections to Coercion Acts, together with all argumentsfounded upon such objections, with one peremptory remark--namely, thatsince a law is merely a rule which men are compelled to obey by thepower of the State, and Coercion is but another name for compulsoryobedience to the law, to object to Coercion is in reality to object tolaw itself, or in effect to the existence of political society. Thetemptation to cut down a popular delusion by some such summary criticismas this is great, but it is a temptation which at all costs must beresisted. Vague ideas, which have obtained general currency, are, inspite of their inaccuracy, the outgrowth for the most part of reasonablefeeling. Whoever wishes to meet, and, if need be, dispel the antipathyto Coercion Acts, must try to understand what is the meaning whichsensible men attach to the word "Coercion, " what is the convictionrepresented by the dislike to Coercion Acts, how this dislike may belessened, and, for the purpose with which these pages are written, howfar the disapproval of Coercion Acts provides a reason in favour of HomeRule. 

Of all the terms which at the present moment confuse public judgment, none is more vague and misleading than the word "Coercion" when appliedto every stringent attempt to enforce in Ireland obedience to the law ofthe land. 

Coercion means and includes two different though closely connected ideaswhich the laxity of popular thought fails to distinguish. 

_First_. --Coercion means any attempt to enforce a law among people whosemoral sympathies are at variance with the law itself. In this senseCoercion is opposed to that enforcement of ordinary law with which weare all familiar. Thus, to punish a Ritualist for not conforming to thejudgment of the Privy Council, to enforce vaccination at Leicester, tocompel a Quaker to pay tithes, to eject an Irish tenant from the farm hehas occupied, to drag him into Court and seize his goods if he does notpay his rent, to punish severely resistance to the Sheriff's officer, orto the bailiff who gives effect to the rights of an Irish landlord, arein popular estimation proceedings which according to the nature of thelaw put in force are stigmatised as persecution or Coercion. Theycertainly differ from the compulsion by which common debtors arecompelled to pay their debts, or thieves are prevented from pickingpockets or breaking into houses. The difference lies in this. Where theenforcement of the law is called "Coercion, " not only does the criminalthink himself in the right, or at any rate think the law a wrongfullaw, but also the society to which he belongs holds that the law-breakeris maintaining a moral right against an immoral law. The anti-vaccinatoris deemed a martyr at Leicester, the farmer who will not pay his rent isthought a patriot at Cork. Where the enforcement of the law is notpopularly deemed coercion the law-breaker does not suppose himself to bein the right, and still less do his associates think him morallypraiseworthy. A thief does not in general hold any theory about therightness of larceny, and there is no society in the United Kingdom atleast who deny the moral validity of the Eighth Commandment. 

_Secondly_. --Coercion means the enforcement of law by arbitrary andexceptional methods which tend to diminish the securities for freedompossessed by ordinary citizens. Thus the suspension of the Habeas CorpusAct, the abolition of trial by jury, the introduction of peculiar rulesof evidence to facilitate convictions for a particular class of crimes, a suspension (speaking generally) of what would be called in foreigncountries "constitutional guarantees, " in order to secure obedience toparticular laws, would be called coercion. 

An enactment, then, which in ordinary language is called a Coercion Act, has one or both of the two following characteristics. [25] It is an Actwhich either enforces some rule of law (e. G. , the law that tenants mustpay their rent, or that trades unionists must not molest artisans whoaccept lower wages than the scale prescribed by the union), which doesnot command the moral assent of the society or people among whom it isenforced, or else constrains obedience to law by some exceptional andarbitrary mode of procedure. Now the general prejudice against an Actwhich has either or both of these characteristics is within certainlimits justifiable on grounds of good sense. Laws derive three-fourthsof their force not from the fears of law-breakers, but from the assentof law-keepers; and legislation should, as a rule, correspond with themoral sentiment of the people. The maxim _quid leges sine moribus_, though it should always be balanced by the equally important maxim _quidmores sine legibus_, is one which no legislator dares neglect withimpunity, and a law permanently at variance with wide moral feelingneeds repeal or modification. It is also true that exceptional andarbitrary legislation is, simply because it is exceptional andarbitrary, open to suspicion. If it be desirable that personal libertyshould be protected by the writ of Habeas Corpus, a suspension of theHabeas Corpus Act is on the face of it an evil. If it is not desirablethat officers of the army should suddenly and without legal trainingexercise the power of judges, the establishment of martial law is initself a great, though it may be a necessary calamity. Legislation, which has received the odious name of coercion, has frequently (thoughnot always) exhibited one or both of the characteristics which render itfairly obnoxious to that designation. The objection, therefore, toCoercion Acts is on the face of it not unreasonable. What are theinferences which the objection supports is, of course, quite a differentmatter, and shall be considered in its due place. 

It is most important, however, to note that the valid opposition toso-called Coercion Acts may and ought to be greatly mitigated by carefuladherence to two maxims which are obvious, but are often neglected. 

A Coercion Act in the first place, should be aimed, not at the directenforcement of rules opposed to popular opinion, but at the punishmentof offences which, though they may be indirectly connected with dislikeof an unpopular law or with opposition to rights (for instance, oflandowners) not sanctioned by popular opinion, are deeds in themselvescondemned by the human conscience. Deliberate breaches of contract, insults to women and children, the murder or torture of witnesses whohave given truthful evidence in support of a conviction for crime, brutal cruelty to cattle, may be methods of popular vengeance, or thesanctions which enforce an agrarian code; but one may feel certain thatthe man who breaks his word, who tortures or murders his neighbour orwho huffs cattle, knows himself to be not only a criminal, but a sinner, and that the law, which condemns him to punishment, though it may excitetemporary outcry, can rely on the ultimate sanction of the popularconscience. 

A Coercion Act, in the second place, should as far as possible beneither a temporary nor an exceptional piece of legislation. 

An Act which increases the efficiency of the criminal law should, likeother statutes, be a permanent enactment. The temporary character ofCoercion Acts has needlessly increased their severity, for members ofParliament have justified to themselves carelessness in fixing thelimits of powers conferred upon the executive under the insufficientplea that these powers were intended to last but for a short time. Ithas also deprived them of moral weight. An Act which is a law in 1881, but will cease to be a law in 1882, has neither the impressiveness northe certainty which gives dignity to the ordinary law of the land. Coercion Acts, again, should be general--that is, should apply, not toone part, but to the whole, of the United Kingdom. Powers needed by theGovernment for constant use in Ireland must occasionally be wanted inEngland, or, if they do not exist there, in Scotland. It were thestrangest anomaly for the law to sanction a mode of procedure whichconvicts a dynamiter in Dublin, and not to give the Government the samemeans for the conviction of the same criminal for the same offence if hehas crossed to Liverpool. The principle forbidding exceptional orextraordinary legislation suggests that Coercion Acts should in the maingive new stringency to the criminal procedure, and should not invadethe liberties of ordinary citizens. The object of a Coercion Act is tofacilitate the punishment of wrongdoers, not to restrict the liberty ofcitizens who have not broken the law. This is a point legislators areapt to neglect. The distinction insisted upon will be understood by anyone who compares the Act for the Better Protection of Person andProperty in Ireland, 44 Vict. C. 4, of 1881, with the Prevention ofCrime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. C. 25. They were each denouncedas Coercion Acts: the earlier enactment was in many ways the morelenient of the two; yet in principle the Act of 1881 was thoroughlyvicious, whilst in principle the Act of 1882 was, as regards its mosteffective sections, thoroughly sound. The Act of 1881 in effect gave theIrish executive an unlimited power of arrest: it established in theorydespotic government. The Act of 1882 was in principle an Act forincreasing the stringency of criminal procedure. The one could not bemade permanent, and applied to the whole United Kingdom, withoutdepriving every citizen of security for his personal freedom. The mainenactments of the other might extend through the whole of Great Britainand Ireland, and produce only the not undesirable effect of making thewhole United Kingdom a less pleasant residence than at present forcriminals or conspirators. 

An Act which should be permanent, which should apply to the whole UnitedKingdom, which should deal, not indeed exclusively but in the main, with criminal procedure, could hardly contain injudicious, harsh ortyrannical provisions. The passing of one such good Criminal LawAmendment Act would, though its discussion occupied a whole Session, save our representatives in Parliament an infinite waste of time, andwould make unnecessary half-a-dozen Coercion Acts for Ireland. Toenlarge the power of examining persons suspected of connection with acrime, even though no man is put upon his trial; to get rid of everydifficulty in changing the venue; to give the Courts the right undercertain circumstances of trying criminals without the intervention of ajury; to organise much more thoroughly than it is organised at presentin England the whole system of criminal prosecutions; to enable theexecutive to prohibit public meetings which might provoke a breach ofthe peace, would in many cases be an improvement on the criminal law ofEngland itself, and would in several instances be simply an extension tothe whole United Kingdom of laws which exist without exciting anydisapproval in some one division of it. [26] Without special experienceit would be presumptuous to assert that these or similar changes incriminal procedure would suffice for the enforcement of the law inIreland during a period of disturbance. That such improvements inprocedure would go a good way to make special Coercion Acts unnecessary, is in the highest degree probable. There is, moreover, nothingobjectionable or anomalous in increasing as time goes on the stringencyof criminal procedure. The law against crimes is the protection of menwho are not criminals. Civilisation raises our estimate of theprotection which good citizens ought to receive from the State; it alsoplaces new means of attack in the hands of cheats and ruffians. Anelaborate criminal code is as necessary for a civilised society as areelaborately trained armies and scientific arms both of defence andoffence. 

No adherence, however, to sound maxims of criminal jurisprudence would, it must be frankly admitted, entirely take away, though it might greatlymitigate, the justifiable distaste for Coercion Acts. The necessity forthese Acts points to discord in Ireland between the law of the land andthe law of the people; they are the outward and visible sign of internaldiscontent and disloyalty; they give good ground for supposing that thelaw or some part of it requires amendment, and to many persons lawswhich admit the existence of a bad social condition will appear to bethemselves odious. But the necessity for amending bad laws or viciousinstitutions is no reason why just laws, or any law which cannot rightlybe repealed, should not be enforced. The fallacies of protectionafforded no reason for not punishing smugglers, though the existence ofsmuggling gave good ground for considering whether the customs law didnot require revision. There seems to the thoughtless crowd--whether richor poor, and all men are thoughtless about most things, and many menabout all things--to be a certain inconsistency between reform andcoercion; there is something absurd in the policy of "cuffs and kisses. "But the inconsistency or absurdity is only apparent. The necessity forcarrying through by legal means an agrarian revolution--and the passingof the Irish Land Act was in effect an admission by the EnglishParliament, that this necessity exists--is a solid reason for the strictenforcement of justice. Reform tends, as its immediate result, toproduce lawlessness. A wise driver holds his reins all the tighterbecause he is compelled to drive along the brink of a precipice. WhetherCoercion Acts, which it must be remembered have been known before now inEngland, and were known in Ireland during the era of her Parliamentaryindependence, and which are the sign of the difficulty of enforcing thelaw, are or are not to be tolerated as a necessary evil, depends on theanswer to the inquiry, whether the Government of the United Kingdom canby just administration, and by just legislation, remove the source ofIrish opposition to the law? Answer the question affirmatively, and theoutcry against coercion becomes unmeaning; answer the questionnegatively, and you produce an argument which tells with crushing powerin favour not of Home Rule, but of Separation. 

[Sidenote: 6. The argument from inconvenience. ]

_The argument from the inconvenience to England. _[27]--Apologies forHome Rule drawn from foreign experience, deference due to the popularwill, from the historical failure of England to govern Ireland withsuccess and the like, have about them when employed by English membersof Parliament a touch of unreality; they are reasons meant to satisfythe hearer, but do not convince the speaker. When however we come to theargument for Home Rule drawn from the inconvenience of the present stateof things to England generally, and to English members of Parliament inparticular, we know at once that we are at any rate dealing with a realtangible serious plea which has (if anything) only too much weight withthe person who employs it. There is nothing in the whole relation ofEngland to Ireland about which politicians are so well assured, as thatthe presence of a body of Parnellites at Westminster is an unutterablenuisance, and works intolerable evil. Of the reality of their convictionwe have the strongest proof. The sufferings of Irish tenants, thedifficulties or the wrongs of Irish landlords, the evils of coercion, the terror of assassination, but slightly ruffled the composure withwhich English statesmen faced the perplexities of the Irish problem. They first began to think that the demand for Home Rule might havesomething in it when the refusal to erect a Parliament at Dublin meantthe continuance of obstruction in the Parliament at Westminster. Theterror of obstruction has to speak the plain truth, done more to effectthe _bonâ fide_ conversion of English M. P. 's into advocates of Home Rulethan any other single influence. 

What then is the harm which a body of eighty or ninety Irish members canwork in Parliament? This is the answer. They may (it is said) in thefirst place delay, obstruct, and render impossible the carrying throughof important measures; London may go without a municipality; widowersmay wait for years without being able to marry their deceased wives'sisters; we may not during this generation get the blessing of a goodcriminal code, if Mr. Parnell and his followers sit in Parliamentprepared to practice all the arts of obstruction. The Irish members, inthe second place, perturb and falsify the whole system of partygovernment. The majority of Great Britain wish to be ruled say by LordSalisbury; the Parnellites do not care whether Lord Salisbury or Mr. Gladstone is Premier, but they do care for making the English executivefeeble, and ridiculous. They can, therefore, by the practice of a verylittle art, seize some opportunity of putting Lord Salisbury in aminority, and turning him out of office. Mr. Gladstone comes back intowhat is ironically called power. The same game begins again. TheParnellites coalesce with the Tories, we have a change of Cabinet, andpossibly a dissolution. Nor are changes of Ministry the whole of theevil. The high tone of party politics is degraded. English or Scottishmembers of Parliament are but men; they are liable to be tempted; theParnellites have the means of offering temptation; and temptation, members of Parliament intimate to us, will in the long run be too greatfor their virtue. The presence, in short, at Westminster of eighty-sixgentlemen who do not respect the dignity or care for the efficiency ofParliament is absolutely fatal to the success of Parliamentarygovernment, and to the character of Parliamentary statesmanship. Wemust, it is inferred, let the Parnellites have a Parliament of their ownin Ireland, or else we shall soon cease to have any Parliament worthkeeping in England. 

[Sidenote: Criticism. ]

The force of this line of argument, as far as it goes, cannot be denied. The presence in the House of Commons of politicians disloyal toParliament causes immense inconvenience; but to anyone not a member ofthe House of Commons, it appears singular that men of sense should thinkthe inconveniences of obstruction a sufficient ground for breaking upthe Constitution. The whole thing is a question of proportion. Thenation suffers a good deal from obstruction, but the suffering is not ofa kind to justify revolution. A toothache is a bad thing, but a severetoothache hardly suggests suicide; and though life might not be worthhaving, if toothache were to last for years, the thoughts of putting anend to one's existence are removed by the knowledge that an aching toothcan be drawn by a dentist. Now the more obvious evils of obstruction canclearly be removed by changes of procedure. Members of Parliament appearto think that to alter the rules of the House of Commons; to curtail andlimit the power of debate; to confer, if necessary, upon the Speaker, orupon the bare majority of members present, authority to bring everydebate summarily to a close, is something like overthrowing themonarchy, a thing not to be dreamt of by the wildest of innovators. Plain men outside the walls of Parliament can assure ourrepresentatives, that the world would bear with infinite calmness theimposition of stringent restrictions on the overflow of Parliamentaryeloquence. If even the great debate on Home Rule had been finished sayin a week, the outer world would have been well pleased; and measuressuch as the Government of Ireland Bill happily do not come beforeParliament every year. The more subtle evils arising in part at leastfrom the presence of the Irish members must be met by more searchingremedies. Parnellite obstruction has revealed rather than caused theweakness of government by Parliament. The experience, not of Englandonly, but of other countries, shows the great difficulty of working ourpresent party system of government in a representative assembly which isdivided into more than two parties. The essential difficulty lies inthe immediate dependence of a modern ministry for its existence on everyvote of the House of Commons. If you see the difficulty, you can alsosee various means by which it may be removed. In more than one country, and notably in the United States and in Switzerland--states, be itremarked, in which popular government flourishes--the executive, thoughin the long run amenable to the voice of the people, and though inSwitzerland actually appointed by the legislature, is not like anEnglish Cabinet dependent on the fluctuating will of a legislativeassembly. If it were necessary to choose between modifications in therelation of the executive to Parliament, and the repeal of the Act ofUnion, most Englishmen would think that to increase the independence ofthe executive--a change probably desirable in itself--was a less evilthan a disruption of the United Kingdom, which not only is in itself agigantic evil, but may well lead to others. A modification, however, inthe practice would, for the moment at least, save the real principles ofParliamentary government. Were it once understood that a Ministry wouldnot retire from office except in consequence of a direct vote of want ofconfidence in the House of Commons, the political power of theParnellite, or of any other minority, would be greatly diminished. Meanwhile, members of Parliament may be reminded that it is on them thatthe duty lies of removing the obstacles which from time to time impedethe working of Parliamentary machinery, and that the existence oftemptation to political turpitude is not an admitted excuse for yieldingto it. In one way or another a majority of 584 members must, if theychoose, be able to make head against the minority of 86. Their failurealready excites astonishment; the time is coming when it will excitecontempt. The English people, moreover, have the remedy in their ownhands. By giving to either of the great parties an absolute majoritythey can terminate all the inconveniences threatened by Parnelliteobstruction. The remedy is in their hands, and recent experiencesuggests that they will not be slow to use it. 

 * * * * *

A survey of the arguments in favour of Home Rule suggests the followingreflections:

The arguments, taken as a whole, do undoubtedly show that the presentstate of things is accompanied by considerable evils or inconveniences. They show what no one who has given a thought to the matter everdoubted, that the relation between England and Ireland isunsatisfactory. They are, as far as they go, objections to themaintenance of the Union, but neither the feelings which favour HomeRule, nor the reasons by which they are supported, tell in reality infavour of Home Rule policy. They scarcely tend to show that Home Rulewould cure the evils complained of; they certainly do not show, theyonly assume, that Home Rule in Ireland would not be injurious toEngland. They are, in short, arguments in favour of Irish independence;every one of them would be seen in its true character if the Irishdemand should take the form of a claim that Ireland should becomean independent nation. Meanwhile, even on the Home Rule view, thecase stands thus: the present condition of things excites Irishdiscontent, and involves great evils. We have before us but threecourses:--Maintenance of the Union; the concession of Irishindependence; the concession of Home Rule to Ireland. The Home Rulerurges that the last is the best course left open to us. To decidewhether this be so or not requires a fair examination of thepossibilities which each course presents to England. 

FOOTNOTES:

[4] For the constitution of Austria-Hungary see Ulbrich's_Oesterreich-Ungarn_ in Marquardsen's _Handbuch des OeffentlichenRechts_; Francis Deák, with preface by M. E. Grant Duff; Home Rule inAustria-Hungary, by David King, in the _Nineteenth Century_, January1886, p. 35. 

[5] Ulbrich, pp. 15, 76, 77. 

[6] See Marquardsen, 28-30. 

[7] This is, in my judgment, true even of such federations as the UnitedStates or the Swiss confederacy. 

[8] Froude's 'English in Ireland, ' vol. 3, pp. 581, 582. 

[9] See especially on this subject 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande, ' PartieHistorique, pp. 15-207. 

[10] "On ne saurait considérer attentivement l'Irlande, étudier sonhistoire et ses révolutions, observer ses moeurs et analyser ses lois, sans reconnaître que ses malheurs, auxquels ont concouru tantd'accidents funestes, ont eu et ont encore de nos jours, pour causeprincipale, une cause _première_, radicale, permanente; et qui dominetoutes les autres; cette cause, c'est une mauvaise _aristocratie_. " 1 DeBeaumont, 'L'Irlande, ' deuxième partie, p. 228. The only objection whichmay be fairly taken to De Beaumont's language, though not to hisessential meaning, is, that the words he uses occasionally suggest theidea that he attributes some special vice of nature, so to speak, to thelanded classes in Ireland, whilst there is, of course, no reason tosuppose that the original Norman invaders of Ireland were a whit worsethan the Normans they left behind them in England, or that theCromwellian settlers did not possess the virtues which distinguishedPuritan soldiers. What De Beaumont really means is that the aristocracy, or landed gentry, have been from first to last placed in a falseposition, which has led to their exhibiting the vices, with few of thevirtues, of aristocratic government. 

[11] Compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, ' &c. , pp. 253-256. 

[12] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution' (Second Edition), pp. 181-210;and compare 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, ' &c. , pp. 253-299. 

[13] Cromwell's reputation as a statesman suffers even more than that ofmost great men from the indiscriminating eulogy of admirers. The meritof his Irish policy was not his severity to Catholics, but his equity toProtestants. If he did not acknowledge the equality of man, he at anyrate acknowledged what English statesmanship before and after his timerefused to admit--the equality of Englishmen, at least when Protestants. His policy handed down to us a legacy of justifiable hatred on the partof Irish Catholics. But it is the fault not of the Protector, but of hissuccessors, that his policy did not ensure to England the loyalty ofevery Protestant in Ireland. 

[14] The penal laws against the Catholics in England were as severe asthose in Ireland. Their practical effect and working was however verydifferent in the two countries. See 1 Lecky, 'History of England, ' pp. 268-310. 

[15] See Walpole, 'Short History of the Kingdom of Ireland, ' p. 176. 

[16] See a speech of Lord Clare made in defence of the Bill forEstablishing the Union with England, and republished by the Irish Loyaland Patriotic Union. 

[17] 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, ' p. 251. It is of primaryconsequence that Englishmen should realise the undoubted fact, thatagrarian conspiracies and agrarian outrages, such as those which bafflethe English Government in Ireland, are known to foreign countries. Forcenturies the question of tenant-right, in a form very like that inwhich it arises in Ireland, has been known in the parts of France nearSaint-Quentin under the name of the _droit de marché_. In France, as inIreland, tenants have claimed a right unknown to the law, and haveenforced the right by outrage, by boycotting, by murder. The_Dépointeur_ is the land grabber, and is treated by French peasantsprecisely as the Irish land grabber is treated by Irish peasants. SeeCalonne, 'La Vie Agricole, sous l'Ancien Régime, ' pp. 66-69. Preciselythe same phenomena have appeared in parts of Belgium, where forcenturies there has been, in respect of land, the conflict to which weare accustomed in Ireland, between the law of the Courts and the law ofthe people. "From the commencement of the year 1836 to the end of 1842there had been" [in consequence of this conflict] "forty-three acts ofincendiarism, eleven assassinations, and seven agrarian outragesentailing capital punishment, " all within a limited part of Belgium. SeeParliamentary Reports on Tenure of Land in Countries of Europe, 1869, p. 118-123. In Belgium decisive measures of punishment at last put an endto agrarian outrages. What should be specially noted is that in Franceand Belgium crimes in character exactly resembling the agrarian outrageswhich take place in Ireland had, it is admitted, no connection whateverwith national, or even it would seem with general political feeling. 

[18] See 1 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, ' &c. , p. 251. 

[19] 2 De Beaumont, 'L'Irlande Sociale, Politique et Religeuse. 'Septième édition, pp. 135 and 137. 

[20] A Home Ruler may in this matter take up one position which isconsistent. He may say that England can allow to be carried out throughthe agency of an Irish Parliament a policy which no English Parliamentcould itself adopt. To put the matter plainly, an English Parliamentwhich cannot for very shame rob Irish landlords of their property may, it is suggested, create an Irish Parliament with authority to rob them. This position is consistent, but it is disgraceful. To ascribe it to afair opponent would be gross controversial unfairness. 

[21] A reader who wishes to see the American view put in its best andstrongest form should read Mr. E. L. Godkin's article on "American HomeRule, " _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 793. I entirely disagreewith the general conclusion to which the article is intended to lead, but I am anxious to acknowledge the importance of the information andthe arguments which it contains. 

[22] See pp. 87-89, _ante. _

[23] See 'American Home Rule, ' _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, pp. 793, 803, 804. 

[24] _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, p. 801. 

[25] Contrast the Coercion Acts of 1881 and 1882 respectively. For listof Coercion Acts see "Federal Union with Ireland, " by R. B. O'Brian, _Nineteenth Century_, No. 107, p. 35. 

[26] In England the Courts can change the venue for the trial of acriminal. In Scotland the Lord Advocate can always (I am told) bring anycase he chooses to trial before the High Court of Justiciary inEdinburgh, and the same thing could be done by the Court on theapplication of the prisoner. In Scotland, again, any Sheriff or ChiefMagistrate of a Burgh could prohibit a meeting, however lawful, which hethought likely to endanger the peace. The provisions of the last IrishCoercion Act, Prevention of Crime (Ireland) Act, 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. C. 25, s. 16, giving power to a magistrate where an offence had beencommitted to summon and examine witnesses, even though no person ischarged with the offence, formed, I believe, part of the draft criminalcode for England. 

[27] See for an admirable statement of this argument, "AlternativePolicies in Ireland, " in the _Nineteenth Century_ for February, 1886. 

CHAPTER V. 

THE MAINTENANCE OF THE UNION. 

[Sidenote: The failure of the Union; its nature. ]

Eighty-six years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty ofUnion between England and Ireland. The two countries do not yet form anunited nation. The Irish people are, if not more wretched (for the wholeEuropean world has made progress, and Ireland with it), yet moreconscious of wretchedness; and Irish disaffection to England is, if notdeeper, more wide-spread than in 1800. An Act meant by its authors to bethe source of the prosperity and concord which, though slowly, followedupon the union with Scotland, has not made Ireland rich, has not put anend to Irish lawlessness, has not terminated the feud betweenProtestants and Catholics, has not raised the position of Irish tenants, has not taken away the causes of Irish discontent, and has therefore notremoved Irish disloyalty. This is the indictment which can fairly bebrought against the Act of Union. It is, however, of importance tonotice that the main charges to which the Act of Union is liable arenegative. It has not removed (its foes, say that it has not mitigated)great evils; but the mass of ills for which the Union is constantly madechargeable were in existence before the days of Pitt or Cornwallis. Destitution, sectarian animosities, harsh evictions, met by savageoutrages, the terror of secret societies, the stern enforcement of lawwhich to the people represented anything but justice, are phenomena ofIrish society, which, as they existed before the Volunteers establishedthe Parliamentary independence of the country, and continued to existwhen Ireland was subject to no laws but those passed by an IrishParliament, cannot be attributed to the Act of Union. That enactmentintroduced a purely political change. It could not, except veryindirectly, either increase or remove evils which it did not affect totouch. To two charges its authors are indeed, with more or less ofjustice, liable; they committed the intellectual error of supposing thata change or improvement in the form of the Constitution would removeevils due to social and economical causes; they committed the moralerror of thinking that a beneficial enactment might allowably be passedby means which outraged all the best moral feeling of Ireland. Theirmistakes are worth notice. England is again told that a Constitutionalchange is the remedy for Irish misery. Ethical considerations (in thiscase the moral rights of a loyal minority and the legal rights of Irishlandlords) are, it is again intimated, to be held of slight accountcompared with the benefit to Ireland and to England which is to beexpected from an experiment in Constitution-making. To impartialobservers it may appear that the proposed policy of 1886 threatens toreproduce in its essence the errors and the vices of the policy of 1800. Be this as it may, the reflection that the ill results of the Act ofUnion are mainly negative suggests the conclusion that the good results(if any) of its repeal would probably be negative also, and clears theway for the question with which we are immediately concerned, namely, What are the actual and undoubted evils to England of maintaining alegislative union with Ireland?

[Sidenote: The evils of maintaining the Union]

The nature and extent of these evils has been considered in criticisingthe arguments in favour of Home Rule. A bare enumeration of themtherefore may here suffice. 

[Sidenote: 1. Complication of English policy. ]

_First. _--The Union hampers and complicates English policy, and thiseven independently of the existing agitation for Home Rule. The tenacityof England during the war with America, her triumphant energy during therevolutionary struggle, were due to a unity of feeling on the part, atany rate, of her governing classes, which even under the most favourablecircumstances can hardly exist in a Parliament containing, as theParliament of the United Kingdom always must contain, a large body ofIrish Roman Catholics. If it be urged that the presence of RomanCatholics is due to the Catholic Emancipation Act, and not to the Act ofUnion, the remark is true but irrelevant. No maintainer or assailant ofthe Union is insane enough to propose the repeal of the EmancipationAct. 

[Sidenote: 2. Obstruction]

_Secondly_. --The refusal of Home Rule involves a long, tedious, anddemoralising contest with opponents will use, and from their own pointof view have a right to use, all the arts of obstruction and ofParliamentary intrigue. The battle of the Constitution must be foughtout in Parliament, and if it is to be won, Englishmen may be compelledto forego for a time much useful legislation, to modify the rules ofparty government, and, it is possible, even the forms of theConstitution. 

[Sidenote: 3. Strict government in Ireland. ]

_Thirdly_. --If the Union is to be maintained with advantage to any partof the United Kingdom, the people of the United Kingdom must make themost strenuous, firm, and continuous effort, lasting, it may well be, for twenty years or more, to enforce throughout every part of the UnitedKingdom obedience to the law of the land. This effort can only bejustified by the equally strenuous determination (which must involve aninfinity of trouble) to give ear to every Irish complaint, and to seethat the laws which the Irish people obey are laws of justice, and (whatis much the same thing) laws which in the long run the people of Irelandwill feel to be just. To carry out this course of action is difficultfor all governments, is perhaps specially difficult for a democraticgovernment. To maintain the Union is no easy task, though it has yet tobe proved that any form of Home Rule will give more ease to the peopleof England; nor can the difficulty be got rid of, though it may besomewhat changed, by abolishing the Irish representation in Parliament, or by treating Ireland as a Crown colony. Such steps, which could hardlybe termed maintenance of the Union, might, as expedients for carryingthrough safely a course of reform, be morally and for a timejustifiable. Their adoption is, however, liable to an almost insuperableobjection. Democracy in Great Britain does not comport with officialautocracy in Ireland. Every government must be true to its principles, and a democracy which played the benevolent despot would sufferdemoralisation. 

[Sidenote: Good results of the Union. ]

The Act of Union has been the aim of so much random invective that itsgood fruits (for it has borne good no less than evil fruits) are indanger of being forgotten. It ended once and for all an intolerablecondition of affairs, and its scope will never be understood unless itsenactments are read in the lurid light cast upon them by the rebellionof 1798. The hateful means used to obtain an apparently good end havecast a slur on the reputation of more than one high-toned statesman. Humanity, in the case of Cornwallis at least, had far more share thanambition in his determination to abolish the Irish Parliament. Hisanxiety in 1798 to save Catholics and rebels from oppression was as keenand as noble as the anxiety of Canning in 1858 to protect the natives ofIndia from the resentments excited by the Mutiny. Every reason which inour own day after the Gordon riots made it necessary to abolish theancient constitution of Jamaica told in 1800 in favour of abolishing thestill more ancient Parliament of Ireland. If statesmen, bent onrestoring at least the rule of law and peace in a distracted country, fancied that the corruption of the legislature might be counted a lowprice to pay for protecting the mass of the population from the rule orthe vengeance of a faction, they committed a grave moral error. Buttheir mistake was more pardonable than it seems to modern critics, andthe lesson which it teaches--that you cannot base a just policy upon afoundation of iniquity--is one which the modern censors of Pitt may welllay to heart. However this may be, the transactions which discreditedthe passing of the Act of Union give no ground for repealing it, and, except to a rhetorician in want of an _argumentum ad hominem_, it willnever appear that the philosophic historian who maintains that theTreaty of Union was ill-conceived and premature, contradicts thepolitical philosopher who contends that to repeal the Union would be notto cancel but to aggravate the evils of an historical error. Theconsiderations which recommend or require the maintenance of the Unionare often forgotten, but are obvious. 

[Sidenote: Reasons for maintaining the Union. ]

The support of the Union is, after all, let controversialists say whatthey like, the policy which in fact holds the field, and it is (strangethough the assertion may appear) on the advocates of innovation, not onthe supporters of things as they are, that lies the burden of making outtheir case. A fundamental alteration in the constitution of the realm isin itself no light matter, and any man who has eyes to see or ears tohear may easily convince himself that the creation of an IrishParliament must be the beginning, not the end, of a revolution. Dublinis not the only city in the United Kingdom which has contained anAssembly which not only occasionally denied, but during the whole of itsexistence never admitted, the sovereignty of the Parliament atWestminster; and in the present state of the world it is inconceivablethat Irish autonomy--if such be the proper term--should not excite orjustify claims for local independence which would unloose the ties whichbind together the huge fabric of the British Empire. 

[Sidenote: Strengthens the English Crown. ]

The Union again of England and Ireland has increased, as its relaxationwould of necessity diminish, the power of the central government. Thatthe Treaty of Union has, disappointing and even harmful as some of itsresults have been, formed a guarantee against successful rebellion, hardly admits of question. The difference between the abortive revolt of1848 or the Fenian disturbances of 1866, and the desperate insurrectionof 1798, affords some measure of the strength which the legislativeunity of the kingdom has added to the English Crown. If it be suggestedthat the disloyalty which has prompted sedition during this century wasless deep than the animosities which armed the insurgents of '98, thesuggestion may be true, but it incidentally shows that under the Unionsome progress, however slight, has been made towards national harmony, and recalls the important fact that at the present day the wealth andthe energy of Protestant Ireland firmly support the legislative unity ofthe kingdom. Consider again what are the facilities possessed, say, bythe State of New York, by the kingdom of Bavaria, or by the Cape Colonyfor interfering with or arresting the action of the central power towhich the State, kingdom, or dependency is subject, and you perceive atonce how ample must, from the very necessity of the case, be theopportunities possessed by a semi-independent Irish executiverepresenting a semi-independent Irish Parliament for embarrassing theaction of the Government in London. This will appear more clearly from adetailed examination of the different forms which may be assumed by HomeRule. One remark, however, may with advantage be made at this point ofour argument, since it holds good of every possible scheme for repealingor modifying the Union. Powers conferred upon an executive and aParliament at Dublin must from the nature of things be a deduction fromthe powers which can be exercised by the Parliament and Ministry atWestminster. This is a principle the truth of which is independent ofthe wishes or fancies either of Englishmen or of Irishmen. "The more youhave of the more, " runs a quaint Spanish proverb, "the less you have ofthe less. " The saying is of mathematical certainty, but the depth andvariety of its application are constantly forgotten in the excitement ofcontroversy. 

[Sidenote: Enables it to maintain freedom. ]

To the existence of the Union and to the power which it confers upon theexecutive, is due the possibility of curbing the violence of religiousand political zealots by the interposition of an authority endowed atonce with overpowering strength and obvious impartiality. In Belfasteven a Nationalist must, if he is a peaceable citizen, feel that thewithdrawal of the Queen's troops would not conduce to his comfort. Undera system of Home Rule, it will perhaps be said, one body of fanatics orthe other would, with or without the aid of the army, gain the upperhand and restore order. Grant the truth, which may perhaps be a littledoubtful of this suggestion, it is at best a plea not for Home Rule butfor separation, since no civilised government could, whilst England andIreland formed under any terms whatever parts of the same politicalcommunity, suffer Belfast to become the scene of a free fight whichshould decide by the ordeal of battle whether Protestants shouldtyrannise over Catholics, or Catholics coerce Protestants by a reign ofterror. A reign of order moreover is not equivalent to the reign ofjustice. Still less is it equivalent to the establishment of thatpersonal freedom which can only exist under the equal rule of equallaw, and is the blessing which every government worthy the name is boundto confer upon its subjects. 

An impartial foreigner again would probably hold, as indeed De Beaumont(unless I misunderstand his teaching) did to the end of his lifeactually hold, that the existing connection between England and Irelandis dictated by the state of the world, by the circumstances of thetimes, by the very nature of things. We are living in 1886, not in 1782:the nineteenth century is not the age for small States or for weakStates. Such an observer, however, would also see much that is hidden bythe dust of battle from the combatants in a desperate political conflictWhat is really needed to meet the real wants of which the cry for HomeRule is a more or less factitious expression is, he would note, muchmore a change in the spirit of Englishmen than an alteration in theconstitution of England. If Englishmen could learn to speak and think ofIrishmen with the respect and consideration due to fellow-citizens, ifthey could cease to jeer at Irishmen now as not much more than a centuryago they used to jeer at Scotchmen, the Union would soon becomesomething more than a mere work of legal ingenuity. A change of feelingwould make it easy for English politicians and English voters toperceive that the local affairs of Ireland ought to be managed in theParliament of the United Kingdom in accordance with the opinion of theParliamentary representatives of Ireland, just as Scotch affairs aremanaged at Westminster in accordance with the opinions of Parliamentaryrepresentatives of Scotland. Towards this reform in the practice whichneed not change anything in the law of our constitution, Mr. Bright hasalready pointed the way, and Mr. Bright's moral intuitions have morethan once given him a power denied to our other statesmen of propheticinsight into the future of English policy. Meanwhile those who urge themaintenance of the Union have a right to insist upon the possibilitieswhich it contains of reconciling the strength of the Empire with dueregard to the local interests and local sentiment of Ireland. 

[Sidenote: And carry out just reforms. ]

The Union, lastly, whilst it increases the power of the whole UnitedKingdom, provides the means of carrying out, and of carrying out withdue regard to justice, any reform, innovation, or if you pleaserevolution, required for the prosperity of the Irish people. The duty, it has been laid down, of an English Minister is to effect by his policyall those changes in Ireland which a revolution would effect by force. The maxim comes from a strange quarter, but the doctrine of Disraelisums up on this matter the teaching of Mill and De Beaumont, and it isabsolutely sound if you add to it the implied condition that an EnglishMinister, whilst aiming at the ends of a wise revolutionist, must pay arespect to the demands of justice not always evinced by therevolutionary spirit. But to put in force a policy of just revolution, nothing is so necessary as the combination of resistless power withinfinite wealth. This is exactly what the government of the UnitedKingdom can, and no Irish government could, supply. Mr. Gladstone andhis followers fully admit this, and the Land Purchase Bill was the signof their conviction that the policy of Home Rule itself needs for itssuccess and justification the power to draw upon the wealth of theUnited Kingdom. Let the United Kingdom, it is said in effect, pay fiftymillions, that without any injustice to Irish landlords Irish tenantsmay be turned into landowners, and may then enjoy the blessings of HomeRule, freed from all temptation to use legislative power for purposes ofconfiscation. The advice may in one sense be sound, but prudencesuggests that if the fifty millions are to be expended, it were bestfirst to settle the agrarian feud, and then to see whether the demandfor Home Rule would not die a natural death. French peasants wereJacobins until the revolution secured to them the soil of France. Thesame men when transformed into landed proprietors became the staunchopponents of Jacobinism. It is in any case the interest of England tosee whether, say in a generation, the existing or further changes in thetenure of land may not avert all necessity or demand for changes in theconstitution. Interest here coincides with duty. No scheme whether ofHome Rule or of Irish independence has been proposed, nor, it may besaid with confidence, ever can be proposed, which, disguise the matteras you will, does not savour of treachery to thousands of Irishmen whohave performed the duties and claim to retain the rights of citizens ofthe United Kingdom. The worst delusion of the revolutionary spirit isthe notion that justice to the people may be based upon injustice toindividuals. Protestants have not more, but neither have they less, claim to protection from the State than Catholics. Even landowners arenot of necessity wrong-doers. Rent is a debt, and it may occasionally bethe duty, even of a tenant, to pay his creditor. An insolvent debtorhas, however excusable or pitiable his position, no absolute moral rightto improve his own position by torturing or murdering any solventneighbour who may be inclined to pay his own debts. To maintain theUnion is to maintain the effort to perform the obligations of thecountry, and to compel all citizens of the country to perform the dutiesimposed by law. The effort is an arduous one, the more so since it mustbe combined with the equally strenuous endeavour to see that in Ireland, as in every part of the United Kingdom, the demands of the law be madeto coincide with the demands of morality and of humanity. Still _pactumserva_ is a good maxim for nations no less than for individuals: theremay be a higher law than the rule of keeping one's promise, but before aman or a government incurs even the appearance of bad faith, it werewell to see whether the so-called higher law of conscience may not inreality be the lower dictates of indolence or cowardice. Neither nationsnor individuals are bound in duty to do impossibilities. The limit ofpower is the limit of responsibility, but if England can no longerenforce justice in Ireland, there will still be the grave questionwhether this fearful result of past misdoing or error does not suggestand justify Separation rather than Home Rule. 

CHAPTER VI. 

SEPARATION. 

[Sidenote: Evils of Separation]

Englishmen are so firmly and with such good reason convinced that theindependence of Ireland would be fatal to the greatness and security ofGreat Britain, that they rarely attempt to weigh accurately the groundsof reason which may be adduced in support of a conviction which hasacquired the character of a political instinct. The evils, however, toEngland which may be reasonably anticipated from the politicalseparation of the two countries may be summed up under three heads. 

_First_. --The acquiescence by England in Irish independence would be adeliberate and complete surrender of the objects at which Englishstatesmanship has, under one form or another, aimed for centuries. Sucha surrender would, in addition to its material effects, inflict anamount of moral discredit on England which would itself be the cause ofserious dangers. That a powerful nation should (except under the forceof crushing defeat) assent to an arrangement which would decrease itsresources and authority must inevitably appear to all the world to be, and probably would be in reality, such a sign either of decliningstrength or of declining spirit as would in a short time provoke theaggression of rivals and enemies. Abdication of royal or imperialauthority is with States no less than with individuals the precursor ofdeath. Loss of territory, indeed, in consequence of defeat, is in itselfonly in so far damaging as defeat may imply a want of capacity to resistattack, or as the diminution of territory may involve loss of resources. Thus the surrender of Lombardy by Austria, of Alsace by France, ofSchleswig-Holstein by Denmark, the acquiescence of Holland in theindependence of Belgium; or, to come nearer home, the treaty by whichEngland acknowledged that the struggle to retain her American colonieshad ended in failure, each and all of them brought only such discreditupon the defeated country as is the direct consequence of want ofsuccess. None, of these transactions had anything like the disastrousresults which the concession of Irish independence would entail onEngland. The Austrians, the French, the Danes, and the Dutch had, as thewhole world admitted, struggled manfully to maintain their power. Theywere beaten as one party or other to a fight must be beaten, but theydid not betray any of those failings which encourage further attack. Theclose of the conflict with our colonies assuredly did not leave Englanddisgraced before the world. The obstinacy of George III. , the splendidresistance made by a nation assailed at once by a combination ofenemies, any one of whom alone would have seemed a formidable foe, thevictories of Rodney, the defence of Gibraltar, not only saved butincreased the renown of England, and were warnings which no foreignercould disregard, that the loss of the American colonies, though it mightdiminish the Empire, had not quenched the spirit or undermined thestrength of Great Britain. No one can suppose that a peaceful retreatfrom the difficulties and responsibility of providing for the Governmentof Ireland would leave to England that reputation for courage andendurance which, even in the midst of defeat, was retained by thegeneration who acknowledged the independence of America. Peaceablesurrender may avert material loss; it cannot maintain moral character. One thing only would render the concession of Irish independencecompatible with Englishmen's respect for themselves, or with the respectof other nations for England. This condition would be the obvious, and, so to speak, patent conviction on the part of the whole English people, that the grant of independence to Ireland was the fulfilment of a dutydemanded by justice. No such conviction exists, nor is it ever likely tocome into existence. Even were so great a change of English sentiment totake place that a majority of the people became ready, on grounds ofexpediency, to break up the connection between Great Britain and theneighbouring island, it would still be hard to persuade the nation thatthere was not vile treachery in refusing to stand by and support thatpart of the Irish people which wished to retain the connection withEngland. The treachery would approach to infamy if it should appear thatEngland, for the sake of her own comfort, left English subjects who hadalways obeyed the law and relied on the honourable protection of theUnited Kingdom at the mercy of conspirators whose lawlessness had takenthe form of cruelty and tyranny, and whose vindictiveness was certain topunish as criminality former acts of loyalty or obedience to Englishsovereignty. High-toned self-sacrifice which results in breach of faithto associates is considered by the world at large as a particularlyodious form of hypocrisy. Nothing in the treaty between England and theAmerican Colonies involved more just bitterness of feeling than thepartial, and probably inevitable, desertion of the Loyalists. Thenational conscience would condemn rather than approve the prudentialconsiderations which might, under certain circumstances, induceEnglishmen to consent to see Ireland an independent nation; such consentwould imply the adoption of views of national interest fundamentallyinconsistent with the maintenance of Imperial power; the damageresulting from loss of character is difficult to estimate, but is nonethe less real because it does not admit of computation in the terms ofthe multiplication table. 

_Secondly_, the independence of Ireland means loss to Great Britain bothin money and in men. The pecuniary loss is, indeed, not quite soserious as might at first sight be looked for. [28] The provisions of therejected Government of Ireland Bill imply, it would seem, that thepecuniary gain of the United Kingdom from Ireland in the way of taxationmay, in Mr. Gladstone's judgment, be estimated at about three and a halfmillions per annum, and this may presumably be taken as a not unfairestimate. The sacrifice of a seventh part of the population of theUnited Kingdom is no slight matter. Its importance is enhanced by thecircumstance, never to be forgotten, that Great Britain is the centre ofan Empire. The brutal and stupid jests by which respectable Englishmenoften hint that the bravery, the capacity, and the genius of Irishmenare of little service to the Empire, and that their value is more thancounterbalanced by the ill results of Irish discontent and sedition, conceal from unreflecting minds the extent to which every part of theUnited Kingdom has severally contributed to the fortune and power of thecountry. Irish labourers, Irish soldiers, Irish generals, and Irishstatesmen have assuredly rendered no trifling services to the BritishCrown. There is, however, one valid ground for rating the loss in men toEngland, which would result from separation from Ireland somewhat lowerthan one would on first thoughts be inclined to place it. Even wereIreland an independent country there is nothing to prevent England fromleaving all the advantages of English citizenship open to theinhabitants of the Irish State. In this matter much is to be learnt fromGermany. Neither Stein, nor Niebuhr, nor Moltke, were by birth subjectsof Prussia, yet Prussia did not lose the inestimable gains to be derivedfrom their talents. A generous, a liberal, and a just extension of theprivileges of citizenship might fill the English army and the Englishcivil service with men drawn from a State independent of Great Britain. If the independence of Ireland were proclaimed to-morrow, there wouldnot be a hundred Irish labourers the fewer in Liverpool or in London. Connections and relations depending upon community of language, community of interest, community of feeling, the ties of kindred, ofbusiness, of friendship, or of affection cannot, happily, be dissolved, or to any great extent affected, by political revolutions. In any case, it would depend on the wisdom of Great Britain whether separation fromIreland should or should not mean the estrangement of Irishmen. 

_Thirdly_, the independence of Ireland would give England a foreign, andpossibly a hostile, neighbour along the western coast of Great Britain. We should, for the first time since the accession of the Stuarts, occupya position something like that of a Continental nation, and know what itwas to have a foe, or at best a very cold friend, upon our borders. Intime of war Ireland would be the abettor or the open ally of, say, theUnited States, or of France; Dublin would, unless reconquered, be theoutpost of the French Republic or of the American Union. In times ofpeace things would not stand much better; our diplomacy would beconstantly occupied with the intrigues carried on in Dublin; thepossibility of attack from Ireland would necessitate the increase of ourforces; increased taxation would be drawn from a diminished population;we should be compelled to double our army when we had lost that part ofthe kingdom which used to form our best recruiting-ground. Sooner orlater England would be driven, like every Continental State, to acceptthe burden of conscription, and with conscription would come essentialchanges in the whole habits of English life. Nor can we count upon thisbeing the end of our calamities. The burden of conscription woulddeprive us of our one great advantage over competitors in the strugglefor trade; an overtaxed and overburdened people could not long maintaintheir mercantile pre-eminence. This is the picture which is constantlydrawn, in one shape or another, of the ruinous results to England of thefree development of Irish nationality. No one can undertake to say thatits main features are false. Still, it must be admitted that theprophets of evil neglect to notice several facts which ought not to beoverlooked. Ireland is a poor country of about the population ofBelgium; it is occupied by a people far less wealthy than theinhabitants of England; and, moreover, by a people divided amongthemselves by marked differences of race, religion, and historicaltradition. Is it really to be feared that such a neighbour could, evenif both independent and hostile, be half the peril to England thatGermany is to France, or France to Italy? Money constitutes now moretruly than ever the sinews of war, and it will be a long time beforeIreland is a country abounding in money. There is, to say the least, something ignominious in the dread that Englishmen could not hold theirown in the face of an Irish Republic, which would certainly be poor, andwould probably be a prey to violent factions. Grant again--and this isgranting a good deal--that Ireland might become a province of France, there is still some difficulty in seeing why Englishmen can live withoutfear within sight of Boulogne, and yet must tremble at the thought ofFrench regiments assembling in Dublin. The command of the sea moreoverwould, whether Ireland were or were not aided by foreign allies, be acomplete protection for England against invasion. If England's navalsupremacy were lost, the power of the British Empire would in any casebe gone. The vital matter for us is to retain command of the seas. Ourcapacity for doing this would not be greatly affected by Irishindependence. America, further, and France are the only allies to whomIreland could look for aid. The notion that the United States wouldconsent to receive Ireland under any terms into the Union must appear toany one who has studied American politics the wildest of dreams. Itsupposes that the Americans would, without any gain to themselves, disarrange the whole balance of their constitution, and by involvingthemselves in all the complexities of European politics depart from thepath which they have continuously pursued, and which is marked out tothem by the plainest rules of common sense, and, it is hardly anexaggeration to say, by the laws of nature. A people who decline toannex Cuba, and are fully willing to wait till circumstances bringCanada into the Union and give America possession of Mexico, are notlikely to incorporate Ireland. The alliance of France is a differentmatter. Reflection, however, mitigates the dread of its occurrence. Active alliance with Ireland would mean war with England, and now forseventy years France and England have been at peace. This state ofthings is the more remarkable because there have during that periodarisen occasions for discord, and because no feeling of sentimentalfriendship forbids warfare. The true guarantee for peace between nationswhich were long deemed hereditary foes is the immense interest whicheach has in abstaining from war. Could the state of things which existedat the beginning of the century be revived, thousands of Englishmen andFrenchmen would be ruined. The security for peace depending uponnational interest would not be diminished were Ireland to-morrowproclaimed an independent republic. That this independence wouldfacilitate French attack is undeniable, but attack would not be the morelikely to occur. Add to all this that Irish discontent or seditionwould, during a war, help France as much as Irish independence. Irelandis no doubt the weak point in the defences of Great Britain. This noone denies. The only question is whether and to what extent theindependence of that country would widen the breach in England'sdefensive system. 

[Sidenote: Possible advantages of Separation]

Any one who attempts to forecast the probable evils to England of Irishindependence should keep one recollection constantly before his mind. The wisest thinkers of the eighteenth century (including Burke) heldthat the independence of the American Colonies meant the irreparableruin of Great Britain. There were apparently solid grounds for thisbelief; experience has proved it to be without foundation. 

A calm observer can even now see that the complete dissolution of theconnection between Great Britain and Ireland, disastrous as in manyrespects such an event would undoubtedly be, holds out to the largercountry the possibility of two advantages. 

Loss of territory might be equivalent in some aspects to increase ofpower. 

There exists in Europe no country so completely at unity with itself asGreat Britain. Fifty years of reform have done their work, and haveremoved the discontents, the divisions, the disaffection, and theconspiracies which marked the first quarter or the first half of thiscentury. Great Britain, if left to herself, could act with all theforce, consistency, and energy given by unity of sentiment and communityof interests. The distraction and the uncertainty of our politicalaims, the feebleness and inconsistency with which they are pursued, arise, in part at least, from the connection with Ireland. NeitherEnglishmen nor Irishmen are to blame for the fact that it is difficultfor communities differing in historical associations and in politicalconceptions to keep step together in the path of progress. For otherevils arising from the connection the blame must rest on EnglishStatesmen. All the inherent vices of party government, all theweaknesses of the Parliamentary system, all the evils arising from theperverse notion that reform ought always to be preceded by a period oflengthy and more than half-factitious agitation met by equallyfactitious resistance, have been fostered and increased by theinter-action of Irish and English politics. No one can believe that theinveterate habit of ruling one part of the United Kingdom on principleswhich no one would venture to apply to the government of any other partof it, can have produced anything but the most injurious effect on thestability of our Government and the character of our public men. Theadvocates of Home Rule find by far their strongest arguments forinfluencing English opinion, in the proofs which they produce thatEngland, no less than Ireland, has suffered from a political arrangementunder which legal union has failed to secure moral unity; thesearguments, whatever their strength, are, however, it must be noted, farmore available to a Nationalist than to an advocate of Federalism. English authority in Ireland would be increased by the possession ofthat freedom of action which every powerful State exercises in itsdealings with a weaker though an independent nation. There is somethingso repulsive to the best feelings of citizenship in even thehypothetical contemplation of the advantages (such as they are) whichwould accrue to Great Britain from the transformation of thousands ofour fellow-countrymen into aliens, that it is painful to trace out inclear language the strength of the position which England would occupytowards the Irish Republic. But in argument the strict following out ofthe conclusions flowing from facts is a form of honesty, and howeverrepulsive these conclusions may be, their statement is a matter of duty. Were Ireland independent, England would possess three means far moreeffective for enforcing her will upon her weaker neighbour than arecoercion acts, courts, or constables. England could deal not withindividuals, but with the State, and she could compel respect fortreaties or due regard to English interests by invasion, by a pacificblockade, or by a hostile tariff. There is a special reason for dwellingon the facility with which England could compel the observance ofengagements. Morally the most serious of all the objections to England'sconceding Irish independence is the indelible disgrace which wouldrightly fall upon any country which did not provide for the protectionof men who had been loyal and faithful citizens. Now the point to benoted is that England's authority, resulting not from law but frompower in an independent Ireland, would greatly enhance her capacity forensuring the fair treatment of Irish Protestants. The treaty ofindependence would provide guarantees for their rights, and any breachof these guarantees would be a _casus belli_. The mere threat of ahostile tariff would of itself be a stronger sanction than the moststrenuous provisions of an Act of Parliament backed only by the veryhypothetical power of compelling a half-independent executive to obeythe judgments of, say, the Privy Council The guarantees of a treaty are, it may be said, often worthless. This is so; but their worthlessnessarises from the weakness of the country in whose favour they are made. In any event they may be worth a good deal more than provisions of anAct of Parliament. The deriders of a paper Union which has lasted for acentury have no right to count on the validity of a paper Federationwhich still awaits creation. 

It is, again, possible that the severance of all political connectionmight open the way to friendship or alliance. 

This assertion is no unmeaning paradox. If one could anticipate with anyconfidence that the acknowledgment of Irish nationality would bring toIreland happiness and prosperity, it would not be a very bold conjecturethat as Ireland flourished and prospered, ill-will to England mightrapidly decrease. With nations, as with individuals, to remove allcauses of mutual irritation is much the same thing as removing thedisposition to quarrel. Not twelve years have passed since the lastAustrian soldier marched out of Italy, yet Austria is at this momentless unpopular with the Italians than France, and Garibaldi's deathevoked tributes of respect at Vienna. For fifteen years the whole forceof European law was employed to keep Belgium united to Holland; theobvious interests, moreover, of all the inhabitants of the kingdom ofthe Netherlands told in favour of union. Yet year by year the twodivisions of one country became more and more hostile to each other. Fifty years of separation have, as far as appearances go, restored, orfor the first time created, feelings of friendliness between theBelgians and the Dutch. There are to be found Belgian statesmen whoregret the proclamation of Belgian independence. When in 1881 theAmericans celebrated at Yorktown the centenary of British defeat, theywent out of their way to display their goodwill towards Great Britain. Plaudits and toasts, it may be said, prove nothing except the existenceof a sentiment which, even if it be genuine, is certain to beevanescent. This is true; but the matter for consideration is notwhether the feeling of friendliness towards Great Britain which foundexpression daring the festivities at Yorktown would survive a conflictof interest between England and America, but whether a condition offeeling which allows the two nations to look calmly after their owninterests, unblinded by passion or animosity, could possibly have beenproduced by the continuance of that connection between England andAmerica which was terminated by the surrender of Cornwallis. There is atleast no absurdity in the supposition that this question ought to beanswered in the negative, and that Americans and Englishmen are at anyrate not enemies just because a hundred years ago they ceased to befellow-citizens. 

Let not, however, the gist of my argument be misunderstood. The possibleincrease of English power, and the possible growth of goodwill betweenEngland and Ireland, are not used as anything like reasons in favour ofSeparation. They are set down simply as deductions from the immenseevils of a policy which no Englishman can regard as other than mostinjurious to the whole United Kingdom. The reason why it is wise todwell on this kind of set-off against the ill effects of Separation isthat Home Rule, while involving almost all the evils of Separation, willbe found on examination not to hold out anything like the same hopes ofcompensating advantages. 

FOOTNOTES:

[28] See 'Economic Value of Ireland to Great Britain, ' by Robert Giffen, _The Nineteenth Century_, March, 1886, p. 229. 

CHAPTER VII. 

HOME RULE--ITS FORMS. 

[Sidenote: Forms of Home Rule. ]

The proposals for giving Ireland Home Rule, in so far as they have takenany definite shape whatever, have assumed four forms:--

I. Home Rule as Federalism. 

II. Home Rule as Colonial Independence. 

III. Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution. 

IV. Home Rule under the proposed Gladstonian Constitution. 

[Sidenote: Conditions to be satisfied by plan of Home Rule. ]

How far Home Rule under these forms, or any one of them, is compatiblewith the interests of the English people must be determined byconsidering what are the conditions which an acceptable plan of HomeRule must fulfil, and by then examining how far any given form of HomeRule satisfies them. 

Any scheme of Home Rule which can conceivably be accepted by Englandmust, it is admitted, satisfy the following conditions. [29]

It must in the first place be consistent with the ultimate supremacy ofthe British Parliament. [30]

It must in the second place be just; it must provide that each part ofthe United Kingdom take a fair share of Imperial burdens; that thecitizens of each part have equality of rights; that the rights both ofindividuals and of minorities be safely guarded. [31]

It must in the third place promise finality; it must be in the nature ofa final settlement of the demands made on behalf of Ireland, and not bea mere provocation to the revival of fresh demands. 

It must, in short, to sum up the whole matter, be, as already insistedupon, a scheme which promises to England at least not greater evils thanthe maintenance of the Union or than Irish independence. 

These conditions constitute the touchstone by which any given plan ofHome Rule must be tested. No scheme, however ingenious, can be acceptedwhich lacks any of these characteristics, namely, the maintenance ofParliamentary sovereignty--justice--finality. 

[Sidenote: General character of Federalism. ]

I. _Home Rule as Federalism. _--Federal government is the latestinvention of constitutional science. Several circumstances confer uponit at the present moment extraordinary prestige. It is a piece ofpolitical mechanism which has been found to work with success in threenotorious instances. In its favour is engaged the pride--may we not sayvanity?--of one of the leading nations of the earth. Americans regardFederalism with pardonable partiality. They are the original inventorsof the best Federal system in the world, and Federalism has made themthe greatest of all free communities. A polity under which the UnitedStates has grown up and flourished, and fought the biggest war which hasbeen fought during the century, and come out of it victorious, and withrenewed strength, must, it is felt, be a constitution suited for allnations who aspire to freedom. There is nothing therefore surprising inthe fact that Federalism is supposed to be the panacea for all socialevils, and all political perplexities, or that it should be thrust uponour attention as the device for bringing England and her colonies intocloser connection, and (not perhaps quite consistently) for relaxing theconnection and terminating the feud between England and Ireland. Weshould do well, therefore, to recollect what is the true nature ofFederalism. Federal government, whatever be its merits, is a merearrangement for the distribution of political power. It is anarrangement which requires for its application certain well-definedconditions. [32]

There must, in the first place, exist a body of countries; such, forexample, as the cantons of Switzerland, or the colonies of America, orthe provinces of Canada, so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing in the eyes of theirinhabitants an impress of common nationality. There must, in the secondplace, be found among the people of the countries which it is proposedto unite in Federal union, a very peculiar state of sentiment. They mustdesire union; they must not desire unity. Federalism, in short, is inits nature a scheme for bringing together into closer connection a setof states, each of which desires, whilst retaining its individuality, toform together with its neighbours one nation. It is not, at any rate asit has hitherto been applied, a plan for disuniting the parts of aunited state. It may possibly be capable of this application;experience, however, gives no guidance on this point, [33] and loyalty tothe central government is to the working of a Federal system asnecessary as loyalty on the part of individual citizens to their ownseparate State. When, therefore, it is suggested that Federalism mayestablish a satisfactory relation between England and Ireland, a doubtnaturally suggests itself whether the United Kingdom presents theconditions necessary for the success of the Federal experiment. Whetherin the case of two countries, of which the one has no desire for Staterights and the other has no desire for union, the bases of a Federalscheme are not wanting, is an inquiry which deserves consideration. Politicians, however, may reject references to abstract theory, and thebest way of testing the application of Federalism to the relationsbetween England and Ireland, is to make clear to ourselves what are theaims proposed to himself by a genuine Home Ruler, and then trace inoutline the characteristics of Federalism, and consider how the Federalsystem would work in reference to the interests of England. 

[Sidenote: Aim of Home Rule. ]

"My plan of Home Rule for Ireland, " writes an eminent Home Ruler, "wouldestablish between Ireland and the Imperial Parliament the same relationsin principle that exist between a State of the American Union and theFederal Government, or between any State of the Dominion of Canada andthat Central Canadian Parliament which meets in Ottawa. "

This statement exhibits both laxity of language and laxity of thought, but it gives a definition of the objects proposed to himself by agenuine Home Ruler which is sufficiently definite, for the ends of myargument. Home Rule is, for our present purpose, Federalism. We maytherefore, assume that it involves the adoption throughout the presentUnited Kingdom of a constitution in principle, though not in detail, like that of the United States. The United Kingdom would, if Mr. McCarthy's proposals were adopted, be transformed into a confederacy;the different States, say Great Britain and Ireland, or England, Scotland, and Ireland, would bear to the whole union the same relationwhich Virginia and New York bear to the United States; they would beartowards each other the same relation which Virginia bears to New York, or which they both bear towards Massachusetts. Such a constitution has, it must be at once admitted, no necessary connection with Republicanism. The King or Queen of England for the time being would occupy theposition of a hereditary president; this arrangement would, as Mr. Buttseems to have perceived, increase rather than diminish the authority ofthe Crown. It must, on the other hand, be noted that Federalismnecessarily involves the formation of a new constitution, not forIreland only, but for the whole of the United Kingdom. It is necessaryto insist upon this point. For half the fallacies of the arguments forHome Rule rest upon the idea that Home Rule is a matter affectingIreland alone. 'Irish Federalism, ' the title of a pamphlet by Mr. Butt, is a term involving something like self-contradiction. The misnomer iscurious and full of instruction. 

Whoever wishes to understand the relation of Federalism to the EnglishConstitution and to English interests must give some attention to thenature of a Federal Union. 

[Sidenote: Characteristics of Federalism. ]

A Federal constitution must, from its very nature, be marked by thefollowing characteristics. 

It must, at any rate in modern days, be a written constitution, for itsvery foundation is the "Federal pact" or contract; the constitution mustdefine with more or less precision the respective powers of the centralgovernment, and of the State governments of the central legislature andof the local legislatures; it must provide some means (e. G. , referenceto a popular vote) for bringing into play that ultimate sovereign powerwhich is able to modify or reform the constitution itself; it mustprovide some arbiter, be it Council, Court, or Crown, with authority todecide whether the Federal pact has been observed; it must institutesome means by which the principles of the constitution may be upheld, and the decrees of the arbiter or Court be enforced against theresistance (if need be) of one or more of the separate States. These arenot the accidents but the essential features of any Federalconstitution; and are found under the constitution of the CanadianDominion and of the Swiss Confederacy, no less than under theconstitution of the United States. They all depend on the simple, butoften neglected fact, that a Federal constitution implies an elaboratedistribution and definition of political powers; that it is from itsvery nature a compromise between the claims of rival authorities, theConfederacy and the States, and that behind all the mechanism andartifices of the constitution there lies, however artfully concealed, some sovereign power which must have the means both to support theprinciples of the constitution and, when occasion requires, to modifyits terms. Hence almost of necessity flow some further results. Under afederation the law of the land must be divided into constitutional laws(or, in other words, articles of the constitution), which can bechanged, if at all, only with special difficulty, say by an appeal tothe popular vote or by a constituent assembly, and ordinary laws whichmay be changed by the central Congress or by the separate assemblies ofthe States. The powers both of the central Parliament and of the localparliaments, depending as they do upon the constitutional compact, mustbe limited. Neither the National Assembly of Switzerland nor theCongress of the United States have anything like the sovereign power ofthe British Parliament: the same thing is obviously true of the Cantonalor State Assemblies. Such are, under one form or another, the essentialcharacteristics of a Federal Government. A confederation of whichEngland and Ireland formed a part would further of necessity exhibit afeature not to be found in the United States. The authority of theConfederacy would in reality mean the power of one State--namely, GreatBritain. No artificial distribution of the whole country into separateStates would get rid of a fact depending upon laws or facts of naturebeyond the reach of constitutional arrangements. 

[Sidenote: Advantages of Federalism to England. ]

It is now possible to perceive pretty clearly the relation of Federalismto British or English interests. It would, as compared with theindependence of Ireland, present three advantages. There would not bethe same obvious and patent failure in the efforts of Britishstatesmanship to unite all the British isles into one country; thecontinuity of English history would be to a certain extent preserved;the break with the past would be lessened. The Federal Union might, inthe eyes of foreign powers, be simply the United Kingdom under anotherform. The loss, again, to England in material resources would besomewhat less than that involved in separation. Ireland might possiblycontinue to contribute her share to the Federal Exchequer, though acritic who reflects upon the expectations expressed by Home Rulers ofbenefit to Ireland from the expenditure of Irish taxes on Irish objects, will wonder how, unless the taxation of a poverty-stricken country is tobe greatly increased, the Irish people could support the expense both ofthe central and of the local governments. American experience hardlyjustifies the notion that Federalism is an economical form ofGovernment. It would, and this is no small advantage, make it possibleto guarantee, at any-rate in appearance, that the executive andlegislative authority of the Irish Government should be exercised withdue regard to justice. The Federal compact might, and probably would, contain articles which forbade any State Government or legislature tosuspend the Habeas Corpus Act, to bestow political privileges upon anychurch, to pass laws which infringe the obligation of contracts, todeprive any man of his property without due compensation. The TenCommandments, in short, and the obvious applications thereof, might beembodied in the fundamental law of the land. Federalism would at lowestpreserve a formal respect for justice, and if the system workedefficiently, would protect individuals and minorities from grossoppression at the hands of the Irish State Government. 

These are the benefits of Home Rule to Great Britain. Let us now examinewhat are the evils to Great Britain of the proposed constitutionalrevolution. For whoever either will meditate for a short time on thenature of Federalism, or will examine the mode in which the constitutionof the United States--the most successful federation which the world hasseen--actually works, will soon perceive that what is miscalled "IrishFederalism" is in reality "British Federalism, " and amounts, as I amforced to reiterate again and again, to a proposal for changing thewhole constitution of the United Kingdom It is, in fact, the most"revolutionary" proposal, if the word "revolutionary" be used in itsstrict sense, which has ever been submitted to an English Parliament, the abolition of the House of Lords, the disestablishment of theChurch, the abolition of the monarchy, might leave the Englishconstitution far less essentially changed than would the adoption ofFederalism even in that apparently moderate form in which it waspresented by Mr. Butt to the consideration of the English public. 

[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Federalism to England. ]

The definite disadvantages to England of the proposed revolution may besummed up under three heads:--First, the sovereignty of the ImperialParliament would be destroyed and all English constitutionalarrangements would be dislocated; secondly, the power of Great Britainwould be diminished; thirdly, the chance of further disagreement withIreland would certainly not be diminished, and would probably beincreased. 

_First. _--Under all the formality, the antiquarianism, the shams of theBritish constitution, there lies latent an element of power which hasbeen the true source of its life and growth. This secret source ofstrength is the absolute omnipotence, [34] the sovereignty, ofParliament. As to the mode in which King, Lords, and Commons were todivide the sovereign power between themselves there have been atdifferent times disputes leading to civil war; but that Parliament--thatis, the Crown, the Peers, and the Commons acting together--is absolutelysupreme, has never been doubted. Here constitutional theory andconstitutional practice are for once at one. Hence, it has been wellsaid by the acutest of foreign critics that the merit of the Englishconstitution is that it is no constitution at all. The distinctionbetween fundamental articles of the constitution and laws, betweenstatutes which can only be touched (if at all) by a constituentassembly, and statutes which can be repealed by an ordinaryParliament--the whole apparatus, in short, of artificialconstitutionalism--is utterly unknown to Englishmen. Thus freedom has inEngland been found compatible at crises of danger with an energy ofaction generally supposed to be peculiar to despotism. The source ofstrength is, in fact, in each case the same. The sovereignty ofParliament is like the sovereignty of the Czar. It is like allsovereignty at bottom, nothing else but unlimited power; and, unlikesome other forms of sovereignty, can be at once put in force by theordinary means of law. This is the one great advantage of ourconstitution over that of the United States. In America, every ordinaryauthority throughout the Union is hampered by constitutionalrestrictions; legislation must be slow, because the change of anyconstitutional rule is impeded by endless difficulties. The vigour whichis wanting to Congress, is indeed to a certain extent to be found in theextensive executive power left in the hands of the President; but ittakes little acuteness to perceive that in point of pliability, power ofdevelopment, freedom of action, English constitutionalism far excelsthe Federalism of the United States. Nor is it less obvious that thevery qualities in which the English constitution excels that of theUnited States are essential to the maintenance by England of the BritishEmpire. Home Rulers, whether they know it or not, touch the mainspringof the British constitution. For from the moment that Great Britainbecomes part of a federation, the omnipotence of Parliament is gone. TheFederal Congress might be called by the name of the Imperial Parliament. It might possibly be made up of the same elements, be elected by thesame electors, and even in the main consist of the very same persons asthe existing Parliament of the United Kingdom; but its nature would bechanged, and its power would be limited on all sides. It might deal withImperial expenditure, with foreign affairs, with peace and war, withother matters placed within its competence; on every other point theBritish Congress would, like the American Congress, be powerless. Norwould all the powers taken from the Congress be necessarily given to thelocal assemblies. Every analogy points the other way. If the example ofthe United States is to be followed, articles of the constitution wouldlimit the power both of the Imperial Congress and of the localrepresentative assemblies. This limitation of authority could not bemeasured by what appears on the face of the constitution. Some council, tribunal, or other arbiter--let us, for the sake of simplicity, call itthe Federal Court--would have authority to determine whether a law wasor was not constitutional, or, in other words, whether it was or wasnot a law. Let no one fancy that the restraint placed on the power ofordinary legislation by the authority of a Federal Court; which alonecan interpret the constitution, is a mere form which has no practicaleffect. The history of the United States is on this point decisive. DeTocqueville, Story, and Kent are far safer and better instructed guidesthan authors who "cannot conceive how any conflict of authority couldarise which could not be easily settled by argument, by conference, bygradual experience;" and who seem to hold that to deny the existence ofa difficulty is the same thing as providing for its removal Thefollowing are a few of the instances in which the American judiciaryhave in fact determined the limits which bound the powers, either ofCongress or of the State legislatures. The judiciary have ruled that aState is liable to be sued in the Federal Courts; that Congress hasauthority to incorporate a bank; that a tax imposed by Congress was anindirect tax, and therefore valid; that the control of the militiareally and truly belongs to Congress, and not, as in effect contended byConnecticut and Massachusetts, to the governors of the separate States. The Federal judiciary have determined the limits to their ownjurisdiction and to that of the State Courts. The judiciary havepronounced one law after another invalid, as contrary to some article ofthe constitution--e. G. , either by being tainted with the vice of _expost facto_ legislation, or by impairing the obligation of contracts. These are a few samples of the mode in which a Federal Court limits alllegislative authority. If any one wishes to see the extent to which thepower of such a Court has gone in fact, he should study the decisions onthe Legal Tender Act, which all but overset or nullified the financiallegislation of Congress during the War of Secession. If he wishes to seethe effect of applying the constitution of the United States, oranything like that constitution, to Great Britain and Ireland, he shouldconsider what is implied in the undoubted fact that the Land Act of 1870and the Land Act of 1881 would, whether passed by the central or by anylocal legislature under such a constitution, be at once treated as void, as impairing the obligation of contracts. If I am told that we mightadopt Federalism without adopting the details of the Americanconstitution, my reply is, not only that the remark comes awkwardly frominnovators who wish to place Ireland in the position of Massachusetts, but that the very gist of my argument is that the existence of somearbiter (whether it be named Crown, Council, or Court), who may decidewhether the constitution has or has not been violated, is of the essenceof Federalism, while the existence of such an arbiter absolutelydestroys the sovereignty of Parliament. Nor do the inferences to bedrawn from the action of the Federal Court, and a study of the Americanconstitution as it actually exists, end here. In the decisions of theCourt we may trace the rise of question after question--that is, ofconflict after conflict--as to the respective rights of the Federationand the individual States. From the history and from the immobility ofthe constitution, we may perceive the extent to which the existence of aFederal pact checks change, or, in other words, reform. Everyinstitution which can lay claim to be based upon an organic law acquiresa sort of sacredness. Under a system of Federalism, the Crown, the Houseof Peers, the Imperial Parliament itself, when transformed into aFederal Assembly, would be almost beyond the reach of change, reform, orabolition. Nor is it the Legislature of Great Britain alone which wouldsuffer a fundamental change. The relations between the Executive and thecountry would undergo immense modification. The authority of the Crownmight be enhanced by the establishment of a Federal Union. The Kingwould become, in a very special sense, the representative of national orImperial unity, and the weakening of Parliament might lead to thestrengthening of the monarch. However this might be, it has, it issubmitted, been now shown that Federalism would dislocate every Englishconstitutional arrangement. 

_Secondly. _--The changes necessitated by Federalism would all tend toweaken the power of Great Britain. That this is so has been already to agreat degree established, in considering the mode in which Federalismdestroys the sovereignty of Parliament. But a system of Federalism wouldassuredly weaken the Government quite as much as the Legislature. TheExecutive, as the organ of the Federal Union, would be hampered by newconditions utterly unknown to an English Ministry. The language ofFederalists exhibits a curious and ominous silence or ambiguity as tothe disposal of the armed forces. Is the army to be a British army, withauthority at the will of the Federal Government to enter every part ofthe new Union, or is Ireland to have an independent force of her own?This, again--and every specific criticism is open to the sameretort--may be called a detail, but it is a detail which touches theroot of the whole matter. If the Federal, that is in effect the English, Government is to retain the same control over the whole army as atpresent--if Ireland is not to have a local force under the control oflocal authorities--then the language as to Irish independence used byIrish Nationalists is singularly misleading. If, on the other hand, order is to be maintained, or not maintained, by a native army under theguidance of Irish commanders, then it passes the wit of man to see bywhat means the rights of the central government are to be enforced inany case of disagreement between the Imperial and the Irish Parliament. With the memory of the Irish volunteers before his mind, an historian, such, for example, as Mr. McCarthy, will hardly assert that thedifficulty raised is one of which he cannot conceive the existence. Formy part, I heartily join in the admiration he, no doubt, feels for thepatriots of 1782, but no man in his senses will maintain that the moralof that year is that a local Irish army can, under no circumstances, prove an embarrassment to the central Government. The general tone, even more than the precise language of Irish Federalists, all butforbids the supposition that they are prepared to secure the supremacyof the Federal Government by giving it the sole control of the onlyarmed force which is to exist in any part of the Union. They probablyhope that some sort of compromise may be found with regard to a matterin which, as theory and experience alike prove, compromise is all butimpossible. Under certain circumstances, and in certain cases, andsubject to certain conditions, the use of the armed force throughoutGreat Britain and Ireland is, we may suppose, to be left in the hands ofthe Federal Executive; under other circumstances, and under otherconditions, the local forces are probably to be controlled by the localor State Government. Whether such an arrangement would continue inworking order for a year, is more than doubtful. Assume, however, thatsomehow it could be got to work, the fact still remains that a scheme, intended to secure local liberty, would certainly ensure Imperialweakness. The need, moreover, for bestowing some element of strength ona Federal Executive as a counterpoise to its many elements of weaknessleads almost of necessity to a result which has scarcely received duenotice. The executive authority must be placed beyond the control of arepresentative assembly. Neither in the United States, nor inSwitzerland, nor in the German Empire, can the Federal administration bedisplaced by the vote of an assembly. Federalism is in effectincompatible with Parliamentary government as practised in England. TheCanadian Ministry, it may be urged, can be changed at the will of theDominion Parliament, and the common Ministry of Austria-Hungary isresponsible to the Delegations. This is true; but these exceptions areprecisely of the class which prove the rule which they are cited toinvalidate. The Cabinet system of the Dominion is a defect in theCanadian Constitution, and could not work were not Canada, by itsposition as a dependency, under the guidance of a power beyond the reachof the Dominion Parliament. What may be the real responsibility to theDelegations of the common ministry of Austria-Hungary, admits of a gooddeal of doubt. No one, who will not be deceived by words, believes theresponsibility to be at all like the liability of Mr. Gladstone or LordSalisbury to be dismissed from office by a vote of the House of Commons. The Emperor-King is, as regards the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, thepermanent and unchangeable head of the State. Turn the United Kingdominto a Federal State, and Parliamentary Government, as Englishmen nowknow it, is at an end. This may or may not be an evil, but it is arevolution which ought to give pause to innovators who deem it aslighter danger to innovate on the Act of Union than to remodel theprocedure of the House of Commons. 

The central Government would again, merely from that division of powerswhich is of the essence of Federalism, be as feeble against foreignaggression as against local resistance. Home Rule, it is constantlysaid, has at least this advantage, as compared with Irish independence, that it prevents any alliance between Ireland and a foreign enemy. Thisgain might turn out rather nominal than real. Neither the United Statesnor France could, of course, send an Embassy to any State comprisedwithin the British Union; but, if war impended, they might and wouldattempt to gain the favour of the Irish Ministry, or the Irish party whocontrolled the Irish Parliament, or exercised the authority of the localGovernment of Ireland. Suppose that when war was about to be proclaimedbetween the British Federation and France, the Irish Parliament objectedto hostilities with the French Republic. Can it be denied that the localParliament and the local executive could, by protests, by action, oreven by inaction, give aid or comfort to the foreign enemy? The locallegislature would, in the supposed case, be aided by a minority of thecentral Parliament or Congress. Obstruction would go hand in hand withsedition. Loyalty to the Union was strong throughout the Northern Statesduring the War of Secession; but the tale used certainly to be told thathad Meade been defeated at Gettysburg, the leaders of the New Yorkdemocracy would have attempted "to carry the State out of the Union. "Moreover, Great Britain would perhaps find it easier to control theaction of an independent than of a confederated Ireland. Blockades andembargoes are, as already pointed out, modes of persuasion applicableto foreigners, but inapplicable to citizens; the Government of the Unionfound it harder to check the latent disloyalty of South Carolina than itwould have found it to deal with the open enmity of Canada. This topicis too odious and too far removed from the realm of practical politics, to need more than the allusion required for the completeness of myargument. 

Federalism, in short, would mean the weakness of Great Britain, both athome and abroad. As the head of a Confederacy, England, as the head alsoof the British Empire, would meet undiminished responsibilities withgreatly diminished power. 

_Thirdly. _--Federalism is at least as likely to stereotype and increasethe causes of division between England and Ireland as to remove them. 

A Federal Government is, of all constitutions, the most artificial. Ifsuch a government is to be worked with anything like success, there mustexist among the citizens of the confederacy a spirit of genuine loyaltyto the Union. The "Unitarian" feeling of the people must distinctlypredominate over the sentiment in favour of "State rights. " To requirethis is to require a good deal more than the mere general submission tothe Government which is requisite for the prosperity of every State, whatever be the nature of its polity. In a Federation every citizen isinfluenced by a double allegiance. He owes fealty to the centralGovernment; he owes fealty also to his Canton or State. Nationalallegiance and local allegiance divide and perplex the feelings even ofloyal citizens. Unless the national sentiment predominate, theFederation will go to pieces at any of those crises when the interest orwishes of any of the States conflict with the interest or wishes of theUnion. So keen an observer and profound a critic as De Tocquevillebelieved that both the American and the Swiss Federations would makeshipwreck on this rock. He was mistaken; he did not allow for the rapiddevelopment of national sentiment. But his error was pardonable. Theleaders of the Sonderbund did prefer the interest of Lucerne to theunity of Switzerland. Lee and Jackson were disloyal to the Union, because they were loyal to Virginia. Leading officers of the UnitedStates army, soldiers educated at Westpoint, trained the armies of theConfederates. They were men of unblemished honour; they were, some ofthem, not originally zealous in the cause of secession, but theybelieved that their duty to their State--to Virginia, to South Carolina, or to Georgia--was paramount over their duty to the Government atWashington. If Virginia had stood by the Union, General Lee might, inall probability, have been the conqueror of the Confederate States, ofwhich he was the hero. Ireland has had far graver causes fordisaffection towards the English Government than any of the reasonsalleged for the secession of Virginia; but Irish officers and Irishsoldiers have always been perfectly loyal to England. The reason of thedifference is obvious; the officers of the English army have never beendistracted by the difficulties of divided allegiance. Make Ireland oneof the States of a Confederacy, and these difficulties will at oncearise. Irish officers and Irish soldiers, members of the IrishState--paid by and to a certain extent under the command of the IrishGovernment--can hardly be blamed if in times of civil differences, leading it may be to civil war, they should feel more loyalty to theirState than to the Union. This Union, be it remembered, would in such acase be nothing but Great Britain under a new and less impressive title. 

The existence and nature of the Federal bond is calculated to supplyboth the causes and occasions of such differences. 

Home Rulers, it is clear, form already most exaggerated hopes of thebenefits to be conferred on Ireland by Home Rule; and, further, in theirown minds (naturally enough) confound Federalism with nationalindependence. 

"Give Ireland, " writes Mr. Finch, [35] "the management of her ownaffairs, and you will see called into her service the ablest and mostcapable of her sons; while, as things now stand, the intellect ofIreland is shut out from all share in the administration. With careersat home worthy of the best and ablest of the people, much of the wealthwhich is now drained off from Ireland without any return, will beexpended in developing the industrial resources of the country;industry will revive, and with the revival of industry will comeemployment for the people. 'It is the difficulty of living by wages inIreland, ' says Sir G. C. Lewis, 'which makes every man look to the landfor maintenance. ' With employment for the people, half the difficulty ofthe land question will be solved. If, then, we wish to promote the moraland material welfare of the Irish people, let us make them masters oftheir own affairs. "

"I have indicated what I believe, " writes Mr. O'Neill Daunt, [36] "to bethe radical disease of Ireland: the want of a domestic legislature racyof the soil, and acting in harmony with the national sentiment. God hascreated Ireland with the needs of a separate nation, and with the needsare associated the rights. 'Our patent to be a State, not a shire, ' saidGoold in 1799, 'comes direct from Heaven. The Almighty has in majesticcharacters signed the great charter of our independence. The greatCreator of the world has given our beloved country the gigantic outlinesof a kingdom. '

"If Ireland had been left the unfettered use of the natural materials ofwealth in her soil and in her people, and of the facilities of internaland external commerce supplied by her physical configuration and hergeographical position--if her interests were protected by a Parliamentsitting in her capital, securing the expenditure at home of her annualrevenue, both public and private, rendering impossible that destructivehæmorrhage of her income by which she is impoverished, aiding thedevelopment of her industries, and resisting all aggression on hercommercial and political rights--in a word, if the Irish Constitutionhad not been treacherously undermined and overthrown, we should now havebeen the best support of the Empire, instead of being its scandal andits weakness. "

Politicians who write thus expect far more from national independencethan nationality itself can give. More than fifty years have elapsedsince Spain expelled the foreign invader; but Spain has not yetsucceeded in expelling ignorance, prejudice, superstition, oroppression. But whatever be the miracles of nationality, Ireland wouldnot, under Federalism, be a nation. Rhode Island has all the freedomdemanded for his country by an eminent Home Ruler, whose expressions Ihave cited. He surely does not consider the inhabitants of Rhode Islandto be a nation. 

Whatever else Home Rule might give to Ireland, one gift it assuredlywould not bring with it. It would not endow the country with wealth. ToIrish enthusiasm and patriotism illusions on this matter are pardonable. In the English advocate of Home Rule they are unpardonable. Ireland is, and must, under any form of government conceivable, for a length of timeremain a poor country. Capital knows nothing of patriotism or sentiment. Commerce has no partiality for the masses. Credit cherishes no trusttowards the people. The one prediction which we may make with confidenceis that a measure of Home Rule would not increase Irish capital, andwould shake Irish credit. The rumour of Home Rule has already, it issaid, disturbed the course of business in Ireland. From the nature ofthings, then, the establishment of Federalism would lead to bitterdisappointment. The country would not enjoy the dignity of independence;it would not enjoy the comfort of wealth. Every Irishman would feel thathe had been cheated of his hopes, and this not because he is anIrishman, but because he is a man. It is human to expect far more fromeven the most beneficial of revolutions than any political change canbring. The unity of Italy was well worth all the price it cost. Theunity of Germany gave intense gratification to natural feelings ofnational pride. Yet there are probably many even in the Italian Kingdomwho sigh for the light taxes of the Bourbon or Papal rule, and Germanswho glory in the greatness of the Empire flee by thousands to the UnitedStates that they may escape the burden of conscription. Thedisappointment which naturally attends a great change would in the caseof Ireland be specially bitter. To what cause would the disappointmentbe attributed? The answer is easy to find. If taxation increased--as itprobably would; if wealth did not increase--as it certainly would not;if the sense of semi-independence did not produce the hope, the energy, the new life, the regeneration which enthusiasts consider to be thenatural result of nationality--if anything, in short, failed to goaccording to the hopes of men who had formed hopes which a miracleitself could hardly satisfy--the blame for the non-fulfilment ofgroundless anticipations would rest upon the Confederacy--that is inother words, upon England. To suppose this, is not to attribute specialunreasonableness to Irishmen. If Italy had been forced to accept, instead of her longed-for independence, the local self-government whichmight be conceded to the State of an Austrian Federation, we may bequite sure that the Grist Tax, the Sicilian Banditti, the intrigues ofFrance in Tunis, the perversity of the Pope, the poverty of Italianworkmen, the factiousness of Italian politicians, every evil, in short, real or imaginary, under which Italy now suffers, or has suffered since1870--would have been attributed to her connection with a Union presidedover by the Austrian Emperor. National independence, like every otherform of independence, has at least this merit, that it compels men totake their fate into their own hands, and to feel that they themselvesor the circumstances of the world are the causes of their misfortunes. Semi-independence makes it easy for men to attribute every mishap to theabsence of absolute freedom. 

If the existence of a Federal constitution would of itself supply thecause for discontent, it is of the very nature of such a constitution tosupply the occasions of dispute. Nothing can prevent the rise of burningquestions about Federal and State rights. Is nullification or secession, or the refusal to pay Federal taxes a State right? If these questionsarise, by whom are they to be settled? Suppose they are referred to aFederal Court, say the Privy Council, is it reasonable to fancy thatIrishmen or Englishmen, for that matter, will acquiesce in the decisionof grave political issues (say the right of the Federal Government toproclaim martial law at Dublin, or the validity of the Land Act) by anytribunal? For when political issues are referred to the decision of aCourt the difficulty is great of enlisting public opinion in favour ofits decrees. The theory of the constitution and the expectation of thepeople is that references to the judges will be events of rareoccurrence, and that the Bench, when it acts at all, will act only asinterpreter of the constitutional pact. Things are certain to turn outfar otherwise. The intervention of the tribunals will in one form oranother be constantly evoked, and will be evoked to determine the mostburning questions of the day. The Constitution of the United Stateswould be unintelligible without reference to a long line of determinedcases; its principles are to be found quite as much in the decisions ofthe Supreme Court as in its Articles. Swiss Constitutionalists havegreatly increased as years have gone on the originally limited powers ofthe Federal tribunal. The statesmen who drafted the Act constituting theCanadian Dominion fancied they could in effect avoid the necessity forjudicial interpretation, but a long series of reports proves thefutility of their expectation. Each day increases the mass, and it mustbe added the importance, of the judgments by which the Privy Councildetermines questions of constitutional law for the Colonies. Moreover, even laymen soon perceive that interpretation means legislation. It istechnically correct to say that the Supreme Court of the United Statesacts only as interpreter of the Constitution, but we must not bedeceived by fictions. The Supreme Court has legislated as truly, andperhaps more effectively than Congress. It has achieved, and from thenature of things was compelled to achieve, a feat forbidden to Congress;it has added to or enlarged the Articles of the Constitution. The goodfortune of the United States gave to them in Judge Marshall a profoundand statesmanlike lawyer, and the judgments of the great Chief Justicehave built up the existing Constitution. He may be counted, if not amongits founders, at any rate as its main architect. In this instancejudicial authority was combined with political wisdom, and Marshall'sopinion was, it is said, rejected by the Court in but two cases, and hadit in these instances been followed, would have improved theConstitution. Unfortunately, while one may often secure the fairness onecannot ensure the wisdom of the Bench. Judges err; a final Court ofAppeal must often give decisions which are or are supposed to beerroneous, i. E. , not a just deduction from the facts and principleswhich the Court is called upon to consider. No historian will, it islikely, now defend the doctrine of the House of Lords about marriagelaid down in _Reg. _ v. _Millis_. Competent authorities question some ofthe most important ecclesiastical judgments given by the JudicialCommittee of the Privy Council. The decision in the _Dred Scott Case_, whether right or wrong, did not approve itself to eminent lawyers in theUnited States. One of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the _LegalTender Cases_ must have been wrong; whether the last was sound is opento debate. It is when a Court gives what is thought to be an erroneousdecision on matters exciting the feelings of large classes that thedifficulty of obtaining acquiescence in its judgments is palpable. Thejudges decided, and it is quite possible decided rightly, that ShipMoney was a legal exaction, and that the Crown's dispensing power wasauthorized by law. Popular opinion branded the judges as sycophants andtraitors. Chief Justice Taney and his colleagues decided in effect, andfrom a legal point of view may have been right in deciding, that slaverywas recognised by the Constitution of the United States. Their decisionwas denounced by the best men in the Union as infamous. The PrivyCouncil have laid down doctrines on matters of ritual which are held tobe erroneous by a large body of the clergy, and Ritualists have gone toprison rather than treat the judgment of the Privy Council as of moralvalidity. Clergymen are not perhaps the most reasonable of mankind, butthey are not more unreasonable than political enthusiasts. How then isit possible to expect that a Federal tribunal would command an obediencenot yielded willingly to the laws of the Imperial Parliament?Englishmen, indeed, might, it is possible, acquiesce in the ruling ofFederal judges, and this for two reasons: they are a legally-mindednation; and (what is of far more consequence) a Federal Court mustrepresent in the main the opinions of the Federal Government--that is, of Great Britain. But it is idle to suppose that Mr. Parnell and Mr. Parnell's followers would find it easier to respect an Imperial orFederal tribunal than to bow to the will of the Imperial Parliament. 

Home Rulers would, moreover, soon discover a reason for resistance tothe Federal Court or the Federal Government, which from their point ofview would be a perfectly valid reason. The Federal Government would, ineffect, be the Government of England; the Federal Court would in effectbe a Court appointed by the English Government. In a Confederacy wherethere are many States, the Government of the Federation cannot beidentified with even the most powerful of the States; it were ridiculousto assert that the Government at Washington is only the Government ofNew York under another name. Where a Confederacy consists in reality, ifnot in name, of two States only, of which the one has at least four orfive times the power of the other, the authority of the Confederacymeans the authority of the powerful State. "Irish Federalism, " if inreality established, would soon generate a demand from Ireland, notunreasonable in itself, under the circumstances of the case, that thewhole British Empire should be turned into a Confederacy, under theguidance of a general Congress. Thus alone could Ireland become a realState, the member of a genuine Confederation. Hence arises a new danger. Apply Federalism to Ireland and you immediately provoke demands forautonomy in other parts of the United Kingdom, and for constitutionalchanges in other parts of the British Empire. Federalism, which in otherlands has been a step towards Union, would, it is likely enough, be inour case the first stage towards a dissolution of the United Kingdominto separate States, and hence towards the breaking-up of the BritishEmpire. This is no future or imaginary peril; the mere proposal of HomeRule, under something like a Federal form, has already made it animmediate and pressing danger. Sir Gavan Duffy, by far the ablest amongthe Irish advocates of Home Rule, predicts that before ten years haveelapsed there will be a Federation of the Empire. [37] A majority ofScotch electors support the policy of Mr. Gladstone, and forthwith amost respectable Scotch periodical puts forward a plan of Home Rule forScotland. Canon MacColl already suggests that we should make tentativelyan experiment capable of development into a permanent system on thelines of the American Constitution, and make it not only in Ireland, butalso perhaps gradually in Scotland, and even in Wales. [38] It isunnecessary to discuss Canon MacColl's argument at length. When hetells his readers that "the Constitution which Mr. Gladstone desires tocreate in Ireland is modelled on the system existing in the greatcolonies of the Empire; there are certain variations and some noveltiesin the Irish scheme, but these are the lines on which it is drawn;" heventures a statement on which, as a lawyer, I need make but one comment. It is a statement as erroneous and misleading as can be any assertionmade in good faith by a writer who must be presumed to have studied themeasure of which he is speaking. When the same authority asks why shoulda system which imparts strength to America, to Austria, and to Germany, disintegrate and ruin the British Empire, he raises an inquiry whichdoes not admit of an answer, since it assumes the identity of thingswhich are radically different. The system which may or may not impartstrength to Austria is no more the system which imparts strength toAmerica, than the system which imparts strength to England is the sameas the system which does or does not impart strength to Russia. To lumpunder one head every policy which can by any straining of the terms bebrought under the heads of "Federalism" or "Home Rule, " is neither morenor less absurd than to classify together every Constitution which canbe called a monarchy. 

But while I write these pages a more significant indication of thisdanger has appeared. Mr. Gladstone's own method of interpreting his ownpast utterances makes it the duty of his critics to weigh well not onlyhis direct statements, but his suggestions; and there is, I think, nopossible unfairness in construing the language of his pamphlet on theIrish Question as an intimation that he already entertains, if he doesnot favour, the idea of applying the Federal principle to Scotland andto Wales. [39] Federalism is the solvent which, if applied to one part ofthe United Kingdom, will undo the work not only of Pitt, but of Somers, of Henry VIII. , and of Edward I. Meanwhile, the one prediction which maybe made with absolute confidence is that Federalism would not generatethat goodwill between England and Ireland which, could it be produced, would, in my judgment at least, be an adequate compensation even for theevils and the inconveniences of the Federal system. 

To the view of Federalism here maintained there exist one or twoobjections, so obvious that without some reference to them my argumentwould lack completeness. 

Federalism, it is urged, has succeeded in Switzerland and in America; itmay, therefore, succeed in the United Kingdom. 

If the general drift of my argument does not sufficiently answer thisobjection, two special replies lie near at hand. In the case both ofSwitzerland and of America, a Federal Constitution supplied the means bywhich States, conscious of a common national feeling, have approached topolitical unity. It were a rash inference from this fact, that when twoparts of one nation are found (as must be asserted by any Home Ruler)not to be animated by a common feeling of nationality, a FederalConstitution is the proper means by which to keep them in union. Themore natural deduction from the general history of Federalism is, that aconfederation is an imperfect political union, transitory in its nature, and tending either to pass into one really united State, or to break upinto the different States which compose the Federation. 

If, again, the example either of America or of Switzerland is to teachus anything worth knowing, the history of those countries must be readas a whole. It will then be seen that the two most successfulconfederacies in the world have been kept together only by the decisivetriumph through force of arms of the central power over real or allegedState rights. General Dufour in Switzerland, General Grant and GeneralSherman in America, were the true interpreters and preservers of theconstitutional pact. This undoubted fact hardly suits the theories ofIrish Federalists. 

Nor ought we to stop at this point. Citizens of the Union filled withjustifiable pride at the success of the American Constitution assumethat a Federal Government is in itself absolutely the best form ofgovernment, that in any country where it can be adopted it must be animprovement on the existing institutions of the land, and that ascompared with the constitutional monarchy of England federalismexhibits no special faults from which English constitutionalism is free. This assumption is perfectly natural; it resembles that absolute faithin the virtues of the British Constitution which reached its culminatingpoint when Burke's intimate friend and pupil, Gilbert Elliott, himselfno mean statesman, went to Corsica to establish a miniature copy ofEnglish Parliamentary institutions. But in each case a faith which isnatural will also be pronounced by any candid judge to be unfounded. Federalism has in its very essence, and even as it exists in America, atleast two special faults. It distracts the allegiance of citizens, andwhat is even more to the present point, it does not provide sufficientprotection for the legal rights of unpopular minorities. There is not, and never was, a word in the Articles of the Constitution forbiddingAmerican citizens to criticise the institutions of the State. AnAmerican Abolitionist had as much right to denounce slavery at Boston, or for that matter at Charlestown, as an English Abolitionist had todenounce slavery in London or Liverpool. It were ridiculous to maintainthat the right was one which either Lloyd Garrison or his disciples wereable to exercise. Mr. Godkin[40] has repeated with perfect fairness thetale of the persecutions suffered by Prudence Crandall in Connecticutbecause she chose in exercise of her legal and moral rights to educateyoung women of colour. Mr. Godkin apparently draws, as I have alreadypointed out, from the fact an inference--which I confess myself not wellable to follow--against all attempts to enforce an unpopular law. Themore natural conclusion is that the Federal Government was not able toprotect the rights of individuals against strong local sentiment. Thismoral at any rate has an obvious application to any scheme of Federalismfor Ireland. 

The experience of Canada, again, is adduced to prove that a Federalconstitution is compatible with loyalty to the British Crown. Why shouldan arrangement which produces peace, prosperity, and loyalty across theAtlantic not be applied to Ireland?

The answer is, that the case of Canada is as regards Federalismirrelevant. Canada is not part of a British Federation. The Dominion asa whole is simply a colony, standing essentially in the same relation toEngland as Victoria or New South Wales. The laws of the Parliament thatmeets at Ottawa need the Royal sanction, or, in other words, may bevetoed, or rather not approved, by the English Ministry of the day. TheAct itself on which the existence of the Canadian constitution dependsis an Act of the British Parliament, and cannot be modified by any otherauthority. The British Parliament is supreme in Canada as throughout theBritish dominions; and Canada sends no representatives to the BritishParliament. The provinces, no doubt, which compose the Dominion areunder an Act of Parliament a Federation; but the dangers anddifficulties of Federalism are to a great extent avoided by thesupremacy of the British Crown. These difficulties, however, do arise. If any one will study the "Letellier case, " he will soon perceive thatCanada has exhibited the germ of the conflict between the centralauthority of the Dominion and the "State right" of the provinces; hewill also perceive that the conflict was determined by a reference tothe English Ministry, who in effect gave judgment in favour of theDominion. The example of Canada suggests, if anything, that Irishdifficulties might be solved by turning Ireland into a colony withoutrepresentatives in the Imperial Parliament. 

We have now the materials for comparing, as regards the interests ofEngland, the effects of Irish independence with the effects of Home Ruleas Federalism. The case as between the two stands thus:--

The national independence of Ireland entails on England three greatevils--the deliberate surrender of the main object at which Englishstatesmanship has aimed for centuries, together with all the moral lossand disgrace which such surrender entails; the loss of considerablematerial resources in money, and still more in men; the incalculableevil of the existence in the neighbourhood of Great Britain of a new, aforeign, and, possibly, a hostile State. For these evils there are, indeed, to be found two real though inadequate compensations--namely, the probability that loss of territory might restore to England a unityand consistency of action equivalent to an increase of strength, and thepossibility that separation might be the first step towards gaining thegoodwill, and ultimately the alliance of Ireland. It is, however, hardlyworth while to calculate what might be the extent of the possibledeductions from evils which no English statesman would knowingly bringon Great Britain. By men of all parties and of all views it ispractically conceded that England neither will nor can, except undercompulsion, assent to Irish independence. 

Federalism, on the other hand, has the appearance of a compromise. Itdoes not avowedly break up the unity of Great Britain and Ireland; itdoes not wholly deprive England of Irish resources; it does not, directly at least, lay Great Britain open to foreign attack. Federalismhas, however, special evils of its own. It revolutionizes the wholeConstitution of the United Kingdom; by undermining the sovereignty ofParliament, it deprives English institutions of their elasticity, theirstrength, and their life; it weakens the Executive at home, and lessensthe power of the country to resist foreign attack. The revolution whichworks these changes holds out no hope of reconciliation with Ireland. Anattempt, in short, to impose on England and Scotland a constitutionwhich they do not want, and which is quite unsuited to the historicaltraditions and to the genius of Great Britain, offers to Ireland aconstitution which Ireland is certain to dislike, which has none of thereal or imaginary charms of independence, and ensures none of the solidbenefits to be hoped for from a genuine union with England. 

If this be the true state of the case, thus much at least isargumentatively made out: Federalism offers to England not aconstitutional compromise, but a fundamental revolution, and thisrevolution, however moderate in its form or in the intention of itsadvocates, does not offer that reasonable chance of reconciliation withthe mass of the Irish people which might be a compensation for a repealof the Union, and is as much opposed to the interests of Great Britainas would be the national independence of Ireland. This conclusion is apurely negative one, but it is, as far as English statesmen areconcerned, the _reductio ad impossibile_ of the case in favour of HomeRule in so far as Home Rule takes the form of Federalism. 

 * * * * *

II. _Home Rule as Colonial Independence. _--The modern Colonial policy ofEngland has, or is thought to have, achieved two results which impresspopular imagination:--it has relieved English statesmanship from anunbearable burden of worry and anxiety; it has (as most people believe)changed Colonial unfriendliness or discontent into enthusiastic orostentatious loyalty. Some politicians, therefore, who are anxious toterminate the secular feud between England and Ireland, and to freeParliament from the presence, and therefore from the obstructiveness, ofthe Home Rulers, readily assume that the formula of "Colonialindependence" contains the solution of the problem how to satisfy atonce the demand of Ireland for independence and the resolution of GreatBritain to maintain the integrity of the Empire. This assumption restson no sure foundation, but derives such plausibility as it possessesfrom the gross ignorance of the public as to the principles and habitswhich govern the English State system. A mere account of theconstitutional relations existing between England and a self-governedcolony is almost equivalent to a suggestion of the reasons which forbidthe hope that the true answer to the agitation for Home Rule is to befound in conceding to Ireland institutions like those which satisfy theinhabitants of New South Wales or Victoria. To render such a statementat once brief and intelligible is no easy matter, for, among all thepolitical arrangements devised by the ingenuity of statesmen, none canbe found more singular, more complicated, or more anomalous than theposition of combined independence and subordination occupied by thelarge number of self-governing colonies which are scattered throughoutthe British Empire. Victoria, which may be taken as a type of the wholeclass, is, for most purposes of local and internal administration, andfor some purposes which go beyond the sphere usually assigned to localgovernment, an independent, self-governing community. Victoria is at thesame time, for all purposes in theory and for many purposes in fact, amerely subordinate portion of the British Empire, and as truly subjectto the British Parliament as is Middlesex or the Isle of Wight. 

Let us try in the first place to realize--for this is the essentialmatter as regards my present argument--the full extent of Victorianindependence. 

Victoria enjoys a Constitution after the British model. The Governor, the two Houses, the Ministry, reproduce the well-known features of ourlimited monarchy. The Victorian Parliament further possesses in Victoriathat character of sovereignty which the British Parliament possessesthroughout the dominions of the Crown, and is (subject, of course, tothe authority of the British Parliament itself) as supreme at Melbourneas are Queen, Lords, and Commons at Westminster. It makes and unmakesCabinets; it controls the executive action of the Ministry; who, intheir turn, are the authorized advisers of that sham constitutionalmonarch, the Colonial Governor. The Parliament, moreover, recognizes norestrictions on its legislative powers; it is not, as is the Congress ofthe United States, restrained within a very limited sphere of action; itis not, as are both the Congress and the State Legislatures of theUnion, bound hand and foot by the articles of a rigid Constitution; itis not compelled to respect any immutable maxims of legislation. Hencethe Victorian Parliament--in this resembling its creator, the BritishParliament--exercises an amount of legislative freedom unknown to mostforeign representative assemblies. It can, and does, legislate oneducation, on ecclesiastical topics, on the tenure of land, on finance, on every subject, in short, which can interest the Colony. It providesfor the raising of Colonial forces; it may levy taxes or impose dutiesfor the support of the Victorian administration, or for the protectionof Colonial manufactures. It is not forbidden to tax goods imported fromother parts of the Empire; it is not bound to abstain from passing _expost facto_ laws, to respect the sanctity of contracts, or to pay anyregard to the commercial interests of the United Kingdom. It may alterthe Constitution on which its own powers depend, and, for example, extend the franchise or remodel the Upper House. To understand the fullextent of the authority possessed by the Victorian Parliament and theVictorian Ministry--which is, in fact, appointed by the Parliament--itshould be noted that, while every branch of the administration (thecourts, the police, and the Colonial forces) is, as in England, more orless directly under the influence or the control of the Cabinet, theColonies have, since 1862, provided for their own defence, and, exceptin time of war, or peril of war, are not garrisoned by Britishtroops. [41] It is, therefore, no practical exaggeration to assert thatVictoria is governed by its own Executive, which is appointed by its ownParliament, and which maintains order by means of the Victorian police, supported, in case of need, by Victorian soldiers. An intelligentforeigner, therefore, might reside for years in Melbourne, and conceivethat the supremacy of the British Government was little more thannominal. In this he would be mistaken. But should he assert that, as toall merely Colonial matters, Victoria was in practice a self-governedand independent country, his language would not be accurate, yet hisassertion would not go very wide of the truth. 

The local independence, however, of an English colony is hardly morenoteworthy than are the devices by which a colony is retained in itsplace as a subordinate portion of the British Empire, and anyone whowould understand the English Colonial system must pay hardly lessattention to the subordination than to the independence of a countrylike Victoria. 

The foundation of the whole scheme is the admission of the complete andunquestioned supremacy of the British Parliament throughout everyportion of the royal dominions. No Colonial statesman, judge, or lawyerever dreams of denying that Crown, Lords, and Commons can legislate forVictoria, and that a statute of the Imperial Parliament overrides everylaw or custom repugnant thereto, by whomsoever enacted, in every part ofthe Crown dominions. The right, moreover, of Imperial legislation hasnot fallen into disuse. Mr. Tarring[42] enumerates from sixty to seventyImperial statutes, extending from 7 Geo. III. C. 50 to 44 & 45 Vict. C. 69, which apply to the Colonies generally, and to this list, which mightnow be lengthened, must be added a large number of statutes applying toparticular colonies. The sovereignty of Parliament, moreover, isformally recorded in the Colonial Laws Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. Cap. 63), which itself may well be termed the charter of Colonial legislativeauthority. This essential dogma of parliamentary sovereignty, moreover, is not proclaimed as a merely abstract principle--it is enforced by twodifferent methods. Every court, in the first place, as well in Victoriaas elsewhere throughout the British dominions, is bound to hold void, and in fact does hold void, enactments which contravene an Imperialstatute, and from Colonial courts there is an appeal to the PrivyCouncil. The Colonial Governor, in the second place, though from onepoint of view he is a constitutional monarch acting under the advicegiven him by his Ministers, bears also another and a differentcharacter. He is an Imperial official appointed by the Crown--that is, by the English Cabinet, which represents the wishes of the ImperialParliament--and he is, as such representative of the Imperial power, bound if possible to avert the passing of any Bill, and when he cannotavert the passing, then to veto any Act of the Colonial Legislature, which is disapproved of by the Home Government as opposed either toImperial law or to Imperial policy. Thus, a Victorian Act, even whensanctioned by the Governor, must pass through another stage before itfinally becomes law. It must receive the assent of the Crown, or, inother words, the assent of the English Secretary of State for theColonies, and unless this assent be either actually or constructivelygiven it does not come into force. [43] The matter to be carefully notedis that the Crown, or in other words the English Ministry, whichrepresents the House of Commons, has, as far as law goes, completepower of controlling the legislation even of colonies like Victoria. This power is both positive and negative. If the Victorian Parliamentfails to pass some enactment necessary in the opinion of the BritishParliament for the safety of the Empire, then the Parliament atWestminster can pass an Act for Victoria supplying the needfulprovisions. If on the other hand the Victorian Legislature passes abill, (e. G. Expelling Chinese from the Colony, ) which the HomeGovernment representing the British Parliament deems opposed to Imperialinterests, then the Government can either direct the Governor to refusehis assent to the law, or cause the Crown to disallow it, and thus inany case make it void. When we add to all this that there are manyoccasions, which we can here only allude to, on which a ColonialGovernor can, and does, act so as to hinder courses of action whichconflict with English interests or policy, it becomes clear enough that, as far as constitutional arrangements can secure the reality ofsovereignty, the Imperial Parliament maintains its supremacy throughoutthe length and breadth of the British Empire. It is of course perfectlytrue that Parliament having once given representative institutions to acolony, does not dream of habitually overriding or thwarting Coloniallegislation. But it were a gross error to suppose that Colonialrecognition of British sovereignty is a mere form. It is in the maincheerfully acquiesced in by the people of Victoria, because they gainconsiderable prestige and no small material advantage from forming partof the Empire. They have no traditional hostility with the mothercountry; they have every reason to deprecate separation, and--a matterof equal consequence--they believe that if they wished for independenceit would not be refused them. England stands, in short, as regardsVictoria, in a position of singular advantage. She could suppress localriot, or cause it to be suppressed, and she would not try to oppose anational demand for separation. Hence a complicated politicalarrangement is kept in tolerable working order by a series ofunderstandings and of mutual concessions. If either England or Victoriawere not willing to give and take, the connection between England andthe Colony could not last a month. The policy, in short, of Colonialindependence is, like most of our constitutional arrangements, based onthe assumption that the parties to it are willing to act towards oneanother in a spirit of compromise and good-will, and though at thepresent moment the pride of England in her Colonial empire, and theappreciation on the part of our colonies of the benefits, moral andmaterial, of the supremacy of Great Britain, keep our scheme of Colonialgovernment in working order, it is well to realize that this system isnot so invariably successful as might be inferred from the optimismwhich naturally colours official utterances. The names of Sir CharlesDarling and Sir George Bowen recall transactions which show that acommunity as loyal as Victoria may adopt a course of policy which meetswith the disapproval of English statesmen. The recent and deliberaterefusal of the citizens of Melbourne to endure the landing on theirshores of informers whose evidence had procured the punishment of anoutrageous crime, combined with the fact that the populace of Melbournewere abetted in a gross, indubitable, patent breach of law by ColonialMinisters who were after all, technically speaking, servants of theCrown, gives rise to serious reflection, and suggests that, even underfavourable circumstances, Colonial independence is hardly consistentwith that enforcement throughout the Crown's dominions of due respectfor law which is the main justification for the existence of the BritishEmpire. [44] A student, moreover, who turns his eyes towards dependenciesless favourably situated than Victoria soon perceives how great may atany moment become the difficulty of working an artificial andcomplicated system of double sovereignty. In Jamaica the hostility ofthe whites and blacks led to riot on the part of the blacks, followed bylawless suppression of riot on the part of the Governor, who representedthe feelings of the whites, and the restoration of peace and orderultimately entailed the abolition of representative government. At theCape the pressure of war at once exposed the weak part of theconstitutional machine. The pretensions of the Cape Ministry to snatchfrom the hands of the Governor the control of the armed forces met withsuccessful resistance; but the question then raised as to the properrelation between the Colonial Ministry and the army, though for a timeevaded, is certain sooner or later to re-appear, and will not alwaysadmit of an easy or peaceable answer. [45]

Any reader interested in my argument should supplement this briefstatement of the relation actually existing between England and herself-governing colonies by a perusal of Mr. Todd's most instructive'Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies. ' But the statement, brief and colourless though it be, is sufficient for its purpose; itshows that the proposal to give to Ireland the institutions of a colonyis open to two fatal objections. 

1st. --The concession to Ireland of Colonial independence would entailupon England probable peril and certain disgrace. 

The peril is obvious. An Irish Cabinet armed with the authoritypossessed by a Victorian Ministry would at once provide for theself-defence of Ireland, and an Irish army, obeying an Irish Executiveand commanded by Irish officers, would be none the less formidablebecause it might in name be identified with an armed police, or, likethe troops raised at the Cape or in Victoria, enjoy the ominous title ofVolunteers. If the Colonial precedent were strictly carried out, Britishtroops ought, from the time Ireland obtained an independent Parliament, to be withdrawn from the country. The acknowledged danger of foreigninvasion, and the unavowed probability of Irish insurrection, would makethe retirement of the English army impossible. But the presence ofBritish forces--and forces, be it remarked, intended in reality as acheck on the action of the local Government--would of itself placeIreland in a position utterly unlike the situation of Victoria, andwould also involve both the Imperial and the local Government in endlessdifficulties and controversies. If any one doubts this, let him read thecorrespondence between Mr. Molteno[46] and Sir Bartle Frere, andsubstitute for the Premier of the Cape Colony the name of Mr. Parnell, and for Sir Bartle Frere the name of any Lord-Lieutenant who might beunfortunate enough to hold office in Ireland after Mr. Parnell becamePremier of an Irish Cabinet. Suppose, however, that by some miracle ofmanagement or good luck the Irish and English forces acted welltogether, and that the satisfaction given by a state of thingsapproaching to independence prevented for the moment all attempts atseparation, England might escape peril, but she would assuredly notavoid deserved disgrace. An Irish Parliament, returned in the main bythe very men who support the National League, would assuredly pass lawswhich every man in England, and many men throughout Ireland, would holdto be unjust, and which, whether in themselves unjust or not, wouldcertainly set aside Imperial legislation, which England is bound byevery consideration of honour and justice to uphold. There is no need todemonstrate here what has been demonstrated by one writer after another, and, indeed, hardly needs proof, that at the present day an IrishParliament would certainly deprive Irish landlords, and possibly depriveIrish Protestants, of rights which the Imperial Parliament would nevertake away, and which the Imperial Government is absolutely bound toprotect. [47] If the English Government were to be base enough toacquiesce in legislation which the Imperial Parliament would neveritself have countenanced, then England would be dishonoured; if Billafter Bill passed by the Irish Legislature were prevented from becominglaw by veto after veto, then English honour might be saved, but theself-government of Ireland would be at an end, nor would England gainmuch in credit. The English Ministry can, as long as the connection witha colony endures, arrest Colonial legislation. But the Home Governmentcannot for any effective purpose interfere with the administrativeaction of a Colonial Executive. Given courts, an army, and a policecontrolled by the leaders of the Land League, and it is easy to see howrents might be abolished and landlords driven into exile without thepassing by the Irish Parliament of a single Act which a ColonialSecretary could reasonably veto, or which even an English court couldhold void under the provisions of the Colonial Laws Act. It is indeedprobable that wild legislation at Dublin might provoke armed resistancein Ulster. But a movement which, were Ireland an independent nation, might ensure just government for all classes of Irishmen would, ifIreland were a colony, only add a new element of confusion to an alreadyintolerable state of affairs. Imagine for a moment what would have beenthe position of England if Englishmen had been convinced that Riel, though technically a rebel, was in reality a patriot, resisting theintolerable oppression of the Dominion Parliament, and you may form someslight idea of the feeling of shame and disgrace with which Englishmenwould see British soldiers employed to suppress the revolt of Ulsteragainst a Government which, without English aid, would find it difficultto resist or punish the insurgents. The most painful and leastcreditable feature in the history of the United States is the apathywith which for thirty years the Northern States tolerated Southernlawlessness, and even now indirectly support Southern oppression. 

2nd. --If Colonial independence would be found in Ireland inconsistentwith the protection of England's interests and with the discharge ofEngland's duties, it would also fail to produce the one result whichwould be an adequate compensation for many probable or certainevils--namely, the extinction of Irish discontent. 

It is by no means certain, indeed, that Colonial independence would beaccepted with genuine acquiescence by any class of Irishmen. Certainlythe demand for Grattan's Parliament lends no countenance to thesupposition that the people of Ireland would accept with satisfaction apolitical arrangement which is absolutely opposed in its character tothe Constitution of 1782. [48] Suppose, however, for the sake ofargument, that the Irish leaders and the Irish people accepted the offerof Colonial independence; we may be well assured that this acceptancewould not produce good-will towards England, and this not from theperversity of the Irish nature, of which we hear a great deal too much, but from difficulties in the nature of things, of which we hear a greatdeal too little. The restrictions on the authority of the IrishParliament would, one cannot doubt, be, as safeguards for the authorityof the Imperial Government, absolutely illusory. But they would beintensely irritating. Irish leaders would wish, and from their own pointof view rightly wish, to carry through a revolutionary policy. TheImperial Government would attempt, and from an English point of viewrightly attempt, to arrest revolution. Every considerable legislativemeasure would give ground for negotiation and for understandings--thatis, for dissatisfaction and for misunderstanding. There would bedisputes about the land laws, disputes about the army, disputes aboutthe police, disputes about the authority of Imperial legislation, disputes about the validity of Irish enactments, disputes about appealsto the Privy Council. To say that all these sources of irritation mightembitter the relation between England and Victoria, and that, as they donot habitually do so, one may infer that they will not embitter therelation between England and Ireland, is to argue that institutionsnominally the same will work in the same way when applied to totallydifferent circumstances. Victoria is prosperous; Ireland is in distress. Victoria takes pride in the Imperial connection; the difficulty indealing with Ireland consists in the fact that large bodies of Irishmendetest the British Empire. Victoria has never aspired to be a nation;the best side of Irish discontent consists in enthusiasm for Irishnationality. Above all this, there has never been any lasting feudbetween England and her Australian dependencies; the main ground infavour of a fundamental change in the constitutional relations ofIreland and England is the necessity of putting an end at almost anycost to traditional hatred and misunderstanding generated by centuriesof misgovernment and misery. If, as already pointed out, the source ofthis misery, so far as it can be touched by law at all, is a vicioussystem of land tenure, it is in vain to imagine that the misfortunes ofIreland can be cured by any mere change of constitutional forms. Grant, however, for the sake of argument, that the passion of nationality isthe true ground of the demand for Home Rule; grant, also, in defiance ofpatent facts, that the autonomy of a dependency satisfies thesensibilities of a nation; still it is idle to fancy that a systembased, like our scheme of Colonial government, on friendlyunderstandings and the habitual practice of compromise, can regulate therelations of two countries which are kept apart mainly because theycannot understand one another, and can neither of them admit thenecessity of mutual concessions. Moreover, a scheme of nominalsubjection combined with real independence has the one great defect thatit does not teach the lessons which men and nations learn by dependingon their own unassisted and uncontrolled efforts. No one learnsself-control who fancies he is controlled by a master. [49]

The scheme, in short, of Colonial independence, though less absolutelyimpracticable than any form of Federalism, [50] has, as a solution of ourIrish difficulties, two fatal defects: it gives Ireland a degree ofindependence more dangerous to England than would be the existence ofIreland as a separate nation; it bestows on Ireland a kind ofself-government which presents neither the material advantages derivedfrom the Union, nor the possible, though hypothetical, gains which mightaccrue to her from the self-control and energy supposed to flow from theinspiring sentiment of nationality. Still the Colonial system is, inspite of its immense defects as a scheme of Home Rule for Ireland, outand out the least objectionable of the models which have been proposedto us for our imitation, and this for several reasons. To grant toIreland, if she be prepared to accept it, the position of Victoria isnot to impair the supremacy of Parliament; if we copied faithfully theVictorian polity, every Irish member of Parliament would permanentlydepart from Westminster; there would be no more need for having atWestminster a representative of Dublin than there is for having arepresentative of Melbourne; the Irish Parliament would depend for itsvery existence on an Act of the Imperial Parliament, and the BritishParliament would be able without consulting any Irish representative tomodify, override, or abolish all or any part of the Act constituting theIrish Parliament. In this there would be no breach of faith, for theConstitution would bear on its face that the Act of Parliament on whichit depended could be changed by the British Parliament as lawfully ascan the Act 18 & 19 Vict. C. 55, which calls into existence theVictorian legislature. The undoubted legal authority and ease with whichthe British Parliament could suspend or abolish the Irish Constitutionwould have two good results: the one that Great Britain would have asanction by which to enforce the adherence of the Irish government tojust principles of legislation and of administration; the other that thereadiness with which this sanction could be applied would, it is notunlikely, make its application needless. England, again, would not bythe concession of Colonial independence dislocate her own Constitution:she would only be extending to Ireland a scheme of government alreadyexisting in other parts of the Empire, and would find herself possessedof officials accustomed to make a Colonial Constitution work. Nothingwould be changed: there would only be one Colony the more, and theColonial Office would find no insuperable difficulty in undertaking thegovernment of Ireland in the same sense in which the Office undertakesthe government of Victoria. The position, it may be objected, would be avery poor one for Ireland. With this objection I entirely agree: my verycontention is that for Ireland, no less than for England, it is bestthat Ireland shall form part of the United Kingdom. Home Rulers thinkotherwise: they prefer the local autonomy of Victoria to a share in theUnited Kingdom. They may probably, however, say that taxation involvesrepresentation, and that if Ireland is to take the disadvantages shemust also have the immunities of a colony. Here fair-minded men willhold that the Home Rulers are right. The maxim, indeed, that taxationinvolves representation need not deeply impress any one who remembersthat throughout the United Kingdom the property of every woman is taxed, and that no woman has a share in Parliamentary representation. But aformula which is not logically defensible may yet be the embodiment of ajust claim. If the very hazardous experiment of placing Ireland in theposition of Victoria is to be tried, it must be tried fairly and withevery circumstance which may increase its chances of success. Ireland onassuming the position of a colony should, like other colonies, be freedfrom Imperial taxation. England can afford the sacrifice of three orfour millions a year, and she would obtain a valuable _quid pro quo_ inthe increased homogeneity of the British Parliament. Ireland too wouldgain something. A country impoverished, in part at least through badgovernment, might think it no hard bargain to gain at once localindependence and exemption from a heavy weight of taxation. The absenceof anything like a tribute to Great Britain would be an immenseadvantage, for it would remove one cause of certain discontent, andwould for once place England before the Irish people at any rate in thelight of a liberal ally. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not recommendHome Rule under any form whatever: what I do assert is that of all itsforms the Colonial form is the least injurious to British interests, andthat the experiment of placing Ireland in the situation of Victoria canbe carried out neither with fairness nor with any chance of success, unless Englishmen let Ireland, like Victoria, be exempt from Imperialtaxation. If any English taxpayer says that the price is too high to payfor the success of an experiment of which I do not myself recommend thetrial, I am not concerned to consider whether he is right. My onlyconcern is to insist that the sacrifice of three or four millions perannum is an essential feature of this particular scheme of Home Rule, and that persons who say the sacrifice is too great have only added oneto the many arguments which lead to the conclusion that under no formwhatever can Irish Home Rule be accepted by England. 

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: Objection to Constitution of 1782, not faults of IrishParliament. ]

III. _Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution. _--The cry forHome Rule sometimes takes the form of a demand that Ireland shouldreacquire the Constitution of 1782. The true answer to this demand isnot to be found where Englishmen often seek for it, in attacks onGrattan's Parliament. That body exhibited some grave defects common tothe English Parliament of the day; it had also many faults of its own toanswer for; but it had with all its demerits virtues which still cast ahalo round its memory in the eyes of Irish patriotism, and which serveto redeem many of its admitted faults in the judgment of impartialhistory. It produced great men. Flood, Grattan, Curran, and Fitzgibbonwere none of them faultless statesmen, but they were leaders of whom anypeople have a right to be proud. Grattan's Parliament, moreover, thoughit represented a class, represented a class of Irishmen, and we may evensay the best class of Irishmen. It was lastly, with all its defects, aParliament of men who knew and belonged to Ireland, and after itslights cared for the country. It was in a true sense a nationalParliament. When we consider further that the Parliament was abolishedagainst the wish of the best men in Ireland, that it was abolished byarts which have brought lasting and just discredit on the men whocarried through the Act of Union, we can well understand why as calm andas well-informed judges as Mr. Lecky hold to the belief--certainly innowise in itself unreasonable--that the Treaty of Union was, to say theleast, premature, and that England and Ireland would have gained much iffor a generation or two more the interest and repute of Ireland had beenguarded by an Irish Parliament. The argument that the Irish Parliamentbecause it was corrupt, or because it represented a class, was rightlyabolished, proves too much. The English Parliament under Walpole was atleast as open as the Irish Parliament in the time of Grattan to each ofthese charges, yet long before legislation had removed the flagrantanomalies of the unreformed House of Commons the English Parliament hadcast off its worst vices, and few persons will maintain that Englandwould have gained if during the time of Walpole Parliamentary governmenthad been abolished. Be this as it may, vituperation of Grattan'sParliament is for our present purpose as irrelevant as it is unjust andinjudicious. 

[Sidenote: True objection, restoration impossible. ]

The true reason for declining to consider the demand for theConstitution of 1782 is, that to concede it is in the strictest sense ofthe word an impossibility. Grattan's Constitution not only is dead, butcan look for no resurrection. The social, the political, the religious, we might almost say the physical conditions under which Grattan'sParliament existed have vanished, never to return. "It cannot be tooclearly understood, " writes Mr. Lecky, "that the real meaning of theseparate Irish Parliament of the eighteenth century was that theefficient government of the country was placed in the hands of itsProtestant gentry, qualified by the fact that the English Governmentpossessed a sufficient number of nomination boroughs to exercise aconstant controlling influence over their proceedings. The existingGrand Juries and the Synod of the disestablished Church are the bodieswhich now represent most faithfully the independent elements inGrattan's Parliament. That Parliament consisted exclusively of men whowere bound to the English connection by the closest ties of interest andsentiment [and] who were pre-eminently the representatives ofproperty. "[51] We may deplore that such a Parliament was doomed todestruction when it might possibly have been saved by reform. But to anyone who has eyes to see it is as clear as day that with Protestantascendancy, with the prestige of the Established Church, with theleading position of Irish landlords, with the submission of Irishtenants, with the power of control exercised by the English Government, with the necessary dependence of the English Colony upon the connectionwith England, Grattan's Constitution with all its possibilities orimpossibilities has vanished for ever. You can no more restore theParliament of 1782 in Ireland than you can restore the unreformedParliament of 1832 in England. In either case to reproduce the formwould not renew the spirit, and the attempted revival of an anomalywould turn out the creation of a monstrosity. 

One consideration suggested by the memory of Grattan's Parliament iswell worth attention. With the curious laxity of thought aboutconstitutional changes which marks modern British statesmanship, language is often used which implies that to ask for Grattan'sParliament is equivalent to asking for Colonial self-government as inVictoria. No two things are in reality more different. It is noexaggeration to say that the Constitution of 1782 presented in itsprinciples the exact antithesis to the modern Constitution of Victoria. Grattan's Constitution rested on the absolute denial of BritishParliamentary sovereignty. The keynote of his policy was theParliamentary independence of Ireland; its aim was to make Ireland anindependent nation connected with England only by goodwill, by commoninterest, and by what has been called the "golden link" of the Crown. The statement indeed that between the date of Irish Parliamentaryindependence and the date of the Union England and Ireland were governedunder two crowns, is not much better than a piece of rhetoricalantiquarianism. [52] It is, however, undoubtedly true that from 1782 to1800 the British Parliament had no more right to legislate for Irelandthan at the present day it has to legislate for New York, and no appeallay from any Irish Court to any English tribunal. But if under theConstitution of 1782 Ireland was in one sense an independent nation, shecould not under that Constitution be called a self-governed country. TheIrish Executive was controlled by George the Third and his EnglishMinisters, and the passing of the Act of Union was proof, if evidencewere needed, that England possessed potent though unavowed means forcontrolling the decision of the Irish Legislature. The Constitution, itmay be added, bore exactly the fruit to be expected from its anomalouscharacter. It stimulated national feeling; this was its saving merit. Itdid not secure supremacy to the will of the Irish nation; this, asappeared in 1800, was its fatal flaw. Compare with this theConstitution of Victoria. The Victorian Constitution is based oncomplete acknowledgment of English Parliamentary sovereignty. But theamplest recognition of British authority is balanced by the unrestrictedenjoyment of local self-government. Hence Victoria manages her ownaffairs, but Victorians are not inspired with the sense of constitutinga nation. 

 * * * * *

[Sidenote: Gladstonian Constitution--its character. ]

IV. _Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution_[53]--No legislativeproposal submitted to Parliament has ever received harder measure thanthe Government of Ireland Bill. Its introduction aroused the keenestpolitical battle which during half a century has been fought in England. The Bill therefore became at once the mark of hostile and (what isnearly the same thing) of unfair criticism at the hands of opponents. This was to be expected; it is the necessary result of the system whichmakes tenure of office depend on success in carrying through orresisting proposed legislation. What did take place but was not to beexpected was, that the Government of Ireland Bill met with harshcriticism at the hands of its friends. The Opposition wished to provethat the principle of the Bill was bad, by showing that it led todisastrous and absurd results. They therefore directed their assaultsupon the details of a measure which they disliked in reality not becauseof the special provisions which they attacked, but because of theprinciple to which these provisions gave effect. Ministeralists on theother hand were only too ready to surrender any clause in the Bill as amatter of detail, provided only they could persuade Parliament tosanction the principle of the measure, and thereby affirm the policy ofgiving Ireland an Irish Executive and an Irish Parliament. Nor was thiscourse of action dictated solely by the exigencies of Parliamentarystrategy. Ministerialists saw the flaws in the Bill as plainly as didthe Opposition, and no man (it may be conjectured), from the Premier whodevised, down to the draughtsman who drew, the Government of IrelandBill, would have wished it to become an Act in the form in which itstood on the 7th day of June, 1886. The supporters, moreover, of theGovernment emphasized their dislike to the details of the particularmeasure, because to attack a detail of the machinery by which it wasproposed to give Ireland Home Rule countenanced in the critic's own mindthe assumption that some mechanism could be invented which might carryout the principle of creating an Irish Parliament without violating theconditions on which alone the idea of any such measure could beentertained by any English statesman. Opponents, in short, of theGovernment of Ireland Bill attacked its details out of hostility to itsprinciple; its defenders tried to win approval for its principle byconceding or insisting upon the defects of its details. [54] The resultwas unfortunate. The Bill was never either by its opponents or itsfriends regarded in the light in which it ought to be viewed by aconstitutional lawyer. It was never criticised as a whole; it nevertherefore received full justice. Whoever examines the now celebratedBill in the spirit of a jurist will see that it constitutes, in spite ofmany obvious blots both in its special provisions and in its language, amost ingenious attempt to solve the problem of giving to Ireland alegislature which shall be at once practically independent, andtheoretically dependent, upon the Parliament of Great Britain; whichshall have full power to make laws and appoint an executive for Ireland, and yet shall not use that power in a way opposed to English interestsor sense of justice. The problem (it may be said) admits of no solution. This may be so, and is indeed my own conviction. But this convictionought not to prevent the acknowledgment that the Bill is the roughoutline of an ingeniously attempted solution. If the Bill fails inachieving its object, the failure arises not from mistakes of detail, but from the unsoundness of the principle on which the Bill rests, andshows that the conditions on which Englishmen can wisely give Home Ruleto Ireland are conditions which no scheme of Home Rule can satisfy. Theidea which lies at the basis of the plan sketched out in the Governmentof Ireland Bill is the combination of the Federal system and theColonial system of Home Rule. The right mode of criticising thiscombination is first to trace in the barest outline the leading featuresof the Bill, treating it much as if it had become an Act, and had givento Ireland an actual Constitution; and next to examine how far thisConstitution, which may with no unfairness be called the "GladstonianConstitution, " satisfies the conditions which a scheme of Home Rule isbound to fulfil. 

The Gladstonian Constitution establishes a new form of government inIreland; it also modifies, or, to use plain and accurate language, repeals the main provisions of the Act of Union, and thus introduces afundamental change into the existing Constitution of England. [55]

The following are for our present purpose its principal features. 

[Sidenote: Its features as regards government of Ireland. ]

As regards the government of Ireland--

The Executive Government of Ireland is vested in the Queen, but iscarried on by the Lord-Lieutenant and a Council. [56] Though theformation and powers of the Executive are under the Constitution leftvery much at large, we may fairly assume that the authors of theConstitution intend that the Lord-Lieutenant should occupy the positionin substance of Colonial Governor, and rule Ireland through a ministryappointed nominally by the Lord-Lieutenant, but in reality selected bythe Irish legislative body. In this manner the Irish Constitution is, like that of Victoria, a copy of the English original. 

There is created--and this, of course, is the vital provision of theConstitution--an Irish legislature, which I shall take leave hereafterto call by its proper name, the "Irish Parliament, " consisting of theQueen and an Irish legislative body, which we may call a House ofParliament or a Chamber, made up itself of two orders. [57]

The Irish Parliament, subject to certain restrictions, has authority tomake or repeal any laws for the peace, order, and good government ofIreland; it is in fact in the strictest sense what I have termed it, anIrish Parliament. It is the body which indirectly appoints and controlsthe Executive, and directly legislates for Ireland. It can repeal lawswhich have been passed by the existing Parliament of the United Kingdomin so far as they are in force in Ireland. 

The powers of the Irish Parliament are, it should be noted, indefinite. The Parliament, that is to say, may pass any law which it is not, underthe Constitution, forbidden to pass. In this respect it stands in theposition not like that of the American Congress, which can legislateonly on certain topics, which are expressly placed within the competenceof Congress, but in a position like that occupied by the Parliament ofthe Canadian 1 Dominion, which can legislate on all topics not expresslyexcepted from its competence. The difference between a legislature ofdefinite and a legislature of indefinite powers is important. In the onecase changes of circumstances may diminish but cannot increase theauthority of the legislature; in the other case changes of circumstancesmay increase but cannot diminish that authority. The Irish Parliament isa body whose authority will, from the necessity of things, tendconstantly to increase. 

If the authority given to the Irish Parliament is indefinite, it is notunlimited. A large number of exceptions and restrictions are imposedupon its freedom of action. It is hard to point to any clear principleon which they rest. Their object undoubtedly is to guard againstlegislation about subjects such as the armed forces, the coinage, andthe like, which are of Imperial rather than of local concern. But wecan hardly say that the line between the things which the IrishParliament can do, and the things which it cannot do, exactly coincideswith the line which divides Imperial from local legislation. The IrishParliament might lawfully pass laws opposed to the whole tenour ofBritish legislation, such, for instance, as an Act preventing particularclasses of foreigners, or even of Englishmen, from settling in Ireland. The Irish Parliament could not, on the other hand, pass any law for theestablishment or the endowment of religion. Hence Ireland could not, inimitation of England and Scotland, provide herself with an establishedChurch, nor could she again pass any law relating to volunteers. Shecould not therefore take steps for the defence of the country, which arepermissible to Victoria or Canada. 

The observance of these limitations on the Parliament's power oflegislation is enforced by a twofold method: first, by the veto of theLord-Lieutenant;[58] secondly, by the special authority given to theJudicial Committee of the English Privy Council. [59]

The Lord-Lieutenant can, after the manner of a Colonial Governor, refusethe Royal assent to any bill passed by the Irish House ofParliament. [60] It would rather appear (though this is by no meanscertain) that a Bill passed by the Irish Parliament might, even thoughthe Lord-Lieutenant assented thereto, be like the Bill of a Coloniallegislature, disallowed by the Crown, or in effect by the EnglishMinistry. [61]

The Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council, with the additionof certain members, who must be, or have been, Irish Judges, exercisesunder the Gladstonian Constitution a very peculiar authority in respectof Irish legislation. It becomes both an administrative and a judicialbody. 

As an administrative body it can give a decision as to theconstitutional validity of any Bill brought before or Act passed by, theIrish Parliament. In its judicial character it is a court of finalappeal, with exclusive power to pronounce a decision upon the validityof an Act of the Irish Parliament whenever the validity thereof comes inquestion in the course of an action. [62] The decisions of the PrivyCouncil are final; their twofold character as opinions and judgmentsdeserve special attention. The result is that the Judicial Committee ofthe English Privy Council can always in one way or another pronouncevoid the proposed or actual legislation of the Irish Parliament if it isin the judgment of the Privy Council unconstitutional. 

Ireland in return for the advantages gained by her under the GladstonianConstitution gives up the representation which she now has in each ofthe two Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. No Irishrepresentative, either Peer or Commoner, sits under that Constitution atWestminster. [63] The present Parliament of the United Kingdom underwhatever name it be described, and whatever be its powers, becomestherefore on the withdrawal of the Irish representatives a BritishParliament, and is hereinafter termed by me, for the sake ofdistinction, the British Parliament. Ireland also contributes annuallyto the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom a sum of over fourmillions. The Irish customs and excise are made the security for thepayment of this contribution; they are, if I understand the Governmentof Ireland Bill rightly, to be collected by British officials and paidinto the British Treasury, but the details of the financial arrangementsintended to exist under the Gladstonian Constitution are not within thescope of this work. 

The Irish Parliament has no power to modify or alter the provisions ofthe Constitution under which it exists, [64] except in one or two casesprovided for by the Constitution itself. The Constitution is alterablein a particular manner therein pointed out, namely by the co-operationof the British Parliament and the Irish Parliament. If we omit certaincomplications of detail, this co-operation takes place by the Irishrepresentatives being summoned back, and thus added to the BritishParliament. The body thus constituted for the alteration of theGladstonian Constitution is formed of much the same elements as theexisting Parliament of the United Kingdom, and is hereinafter called theImperial Parliament. [65]

[Sidenote: As regards the English Constitution. ]

As regards the Constitution of England--

The Gladstonian Constitution, as it will now be seen, does, whatever theintention of its authors, as a matter of fact seriously affect theConstitution of England, and this in more points than one. 

_First. _--The withdrawal of the Irish representation from the Parliamentof the United Kingdom constitutes in effect a new body, which in itscomposition is different from the present Parliament of the UnitedKingdom, and which since (allowing for changes introduced by thedifferent Reform Acts which have been passed during the century) itcorresponds with the Parliament of Great Britain as it existed beforethe Union with Ireland, may be rightly described by the name I haveapplied to it, of the British Parliament. This British Parliament hasadmittedly authority to legislate on every matter which comes within thecompetence neither of the Irish Parliament, nor of the body which I havedistinguished as the Imperial Parliament, which, it will be remembered, consists of the British Parliament with the Irish representativessummoned thereto. Whether the British Parliament has or has not anyfurther powers is a moot question which I purposely leave for the momentuntouched. What is admitted on all hands is that a Parliament in whichIrish representatives have no voice whatever can legislate on everymatter affecting England, Scotland, or the British Empire, and also onthe topics specially excluded from the competence of the IrishParliament unless they belong to the one topic, namely, the alterationof the Gladstonian Constitution, reserved for the Imperial Parliament. 

_Secondly. _--The British Parliament, whatever be its theoreticalauthority, will cease under the Gladstonian Constitution to pass lawsfor Ireland, and will not impose any taxation on Ireland in addition tothe contribution which Ireland is compelled to pay under theConstitution. 

Hence, _Thirdly_, --and as a result of the various features in theGladstonian Constitution which have been already noted, there existunder it three bodies with different functions which, by whatever namethey may be each called, ought to be carefully distinguished. They are--

(i. ) The British Parliament at Westminster, in which sit no Irishmembers, which legislates for Great Britain, and for the whole of theBritish Empire, except Ireland, but which does not in general at anyrate legislate for Ireland. 

(ii. ) The Irish Parliament at Dublin, in which sit no Britishrepresentatives, which legislates for Ireland, but does not legislatefor England, Scotland, or for any other part of the British Empire, anddoes not have any voice whatever in the general policy of the Empire. 

(iii. ) The Imperial Parliament also sitting at Westminster, andcomprising both the British and the Irish Parliament. This body, whichin composition corresponds nearly if not exactly with the existingParliament of the United Kingdom, comes together only on specialoccasions and only for a special purpose, namely the revision oralteration of the Gladstonian Constitution. 

That the existence of these three bodies, each normally exercising thedifferent functions or powers I have attributed to them, constitutes anunmistakable, and I should myself say a fundamental, change in theexisting English Constitution with its one sovereign Parliament of theUnited Kingdom, hardly in my judgment requires or admits of proof. Ifthe change be denied, I have no course but to leave the decision of thequestion whether such a change can be fairly ignored to the intelligenceof my readers. [66]

The Gladstonian Constitution, if it worked in the way contemplated byits authors--if everything, that is to say, went exactly as it waswished, and everybody acted exactly in the manner in whichconstitutionally they ought to act--would provide a complicated but, asI have already said, most ingenious solution of the problem before us. The British Parliament would sit at Westminster undisturbed by any Irishobstructives, and legislate for Great Britain and the whole BritishEmpire in accordance with the wishes of the people of England andScotland. Not only would Irish obstruction vanish, but what is evenbetter, the necessity of considering Irish questions at all woulddisappear. English legislators would not be called upon to pay moreattention to the affairs of Ireland than to the affairs of Canada or ofNew Zealand. The Irish Parliament would take the whole burden oflegislation for Ireland off our hands, and Irishmen if they did not likeIrish laws would have nobody to complain of but Irish legislators. Butthe Irish Parliament whilst it saved England from all trouble would, ifthe Constitution worked properly, give England no trouble whatever. IfBills were proposed or Acts passed at Dublin in violation of theConstitution they would be pronounced void by the Privy Council, and allIreland would at once acquiesce in the final decisions of that exaltedtribunal. If on the other hand the Irish House of Parliament were topass enactments which though not unconstitutional were inexpedient, thenfoolish proposals would be nullified by the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant. The contribution from Ireland would be duly collected and be paid up tothe day, since its collection would lie in the hands of Britishofficials; and should any difficulty arise, the collectors would beaided by the Irish Court of Exchequer, the Judges of which would beappointed by the English Government, and the judgments of the Court ofExchequer could, if need were, be enforced by the British Army. Thispaper federation, in short, looks as promising as paper Constitutionsgenerally do. It appears at first sight to combine the merits ofAmerican Federalism and of Colonial independence. To see, however, whether the Gladstonian Constitution gives any real promise offulfilling the hopes which it seems to hold out, let us examine how farit really fulfils the conditions on which alone, as we have alreadypointed out, Home Rule can possibly be accepted by the people of GreatBritain. 

[Sidenote: 1st Question. --Is sovereignty of Parliament preserved?]

_1st Question. _--Is the Gladstonian Constitution consistent with thesovereignty or ultimate legislative supremacy of the BritishParliament?[67]

It is well to make clear to ourselves the precise meaning of thisenquiry. It is nothing else than this: Do or do not the provisions ofthe Gladstonian Constitution either legally or morally impair the rightof the British Parliament when sitting at Westminster without havingsummoned a single representative from Ireland to legislate (e. G. Pass aCoercion Act) for Ireland, and if need be to repeal of its own authorityall or any of the provisions of the Gladstonian Constitution, includingthe very provision under which it is declared in substance that theConstitution shall not be alterable except by the Imperial Parliament, which consists, as already noted, of the British Parliament and theIrish Parliament? To put the same matter in another shape, the enquiryis whether, under the Gladstonian Constitution, the British Parliamentdoes or does not retain the sovereignty now admittedly possessed by theParliament of the United Kingdom. [68]

Let us first consider the matter as a pure question of constitutionallaw. 

[Sidenote: As a question of constitutional law. ]

The inquiry then is whether a Judge in England or Ireland resolved to dohis duty would or would not be bound to treat as invalid an Act passedby the British Parliament either inconsistent with or, to put the mattermore strongly, actually repealing of such Parliament's own authority theprovisions of the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other words of theGovernment of Ireland Bill, which would then, as we are assuming theGladstonian Constitution to be in existence, have become the IrishGovernment Act. 

Such a Judge would have to consider a question to which English Courtsare now quite unaccustomed as regards Acts passed by the Parliament ofthe United Kingdom. The reason why they are unused to solve theparticular kind of question supposed to arise under the new IrishConstitution is, that as the Parliament of the United Kingdom isundoubtedly a sovereign body, the validity of its enactments is in anyBritish Court beyond dispute. The reason why the problem might under theGladstonian Constitution require an answer is, that the question mightarise whether the British Parliament were or were not a sovereign body. 

Our Judge would find the question more difficult to answer than isreadily admitted by English lawyers not versed in any constitutionexcept their own. He would have to consider the language and effect ofthe Irish Government Act in the light of certain propositions which arenow, and at the supposed passing of that Act must have been, true of theParliament of the United Kingdom. 

These propositions may be thus stated, roughly indeed, but withsufficient accuracy for our purpose:--

The Parliament of the United Kingdom is admittedly the sovereign of thewhole British Empire. 

The Parliament of the United Kingdom because it is a sovereign body canmake laws for every part of the British Empire, and can legally make orunmake any law, and establish, alter, or abolish any institution(including in that term the Constitution of the Canadian Dominion or ofVictoria) existing within the limits of any country subject to theBritish Crown. 

The Parliament of the United Kingdom just because it is a sovereign bodycannot, whilst retaining its position as sovereign of the BritishEmpire, be itself bound by any Act of Parliament whatever. 

To recur to an instance which is pre-eminently instructive, Parliamentconferred in 1867 upon the Dominion of Canada as large a measure ofindependence as is compatible with a colony's maintaining its positionas part of the British Empire. Yet the Parliament of the United Kingdomretains now, as ever, the indisputable legal power to change or abolishthe Constitution of the Dominion. 

The Parliament of the United Kingdom, just because it is a sovereignbody, though it cannot remain a sovereign and place a legal limit on itsown powers, can, like any other sovereign, e. G. The Czar of Russia, abdicate its sovereignty in reference to the whole, or it may be topart of the Crown's dominions; and the Parliament of the United Kingdomcan, just because it is a sovereign body, do what is at bottom the samething as abdicate, namely, merge its own powers in those of anothersovereign body, or, in other words, form, or aid in forming, a newsovereign for the British Empire. 

This proposition has during the Home Rule controversy been occasionally, in words at least, disputed or questioned by the supporters of Mr. Gladstone's policy, and language has been used which seems to imply thata sovereign power such as the Parliament of the United Kingdom can neverby its own act divest itself of sovereignty. I can hardly think that theable controversialists who seem to maintain this doctrine really meantto contend for more than the admitted principle that a sovereign cannotwhile remaining a sovereign limit his sovereign powers. If, however, itbe seriously suggested that the Parliament of the United Kingdom cannotdivest itself of sovereignty, the suggestion is as a matter of argumentuntenable, and this for more than one reason. 

An autocrat, such as the Russian Czar, can undoubtedly abdicate; butsovereignty, whether it be the sovereignty of the Czar or of Parliament, is always one and the same quality. If the Czar can abdicate, so canParliament. The Czar again could, instead of abdicating in the ordinarysense of the term, constitute a new sovereign body for the government ofRussia, of which he might himself be a part. Thus he may undoubtedlygive Russia a constitution like that of England, under which the Czarand two Houses of Parliament might together become the sovereign of theRussian State, and no constitutionalist would dream of maintaining thatthe new power thus constituted was the less supreme owing to the factthat one of its members, namely the Czar, had at one time been himselfthe real sovereign of Russia. Here again what is true of the Czar istrue of Parliament. The Parliament of the United Kingdom certainly mightbecome a part of another sovereign body, or might join in constituting asovereign power supreme throughout the British Empire of whichParliament itself did not form a part. There is nothing in the theory ofsovereignty to prevent the Parliament of the United Kingdom from forminga constitution for the whole British Empire under which the Parliamentof the United Kingdom, the Victorian Parliament, the Parliament of theCanadian Dominion and so forth should become simply State Parliaments, whilst the whole British Empire was ruled by some Imperial Congresssitting, say, either in London or in Victoria. Nor need we in thismatter have recourse to theory. The present Parliament of the UnitedKingdom is itself a monument of the historical fact that sovereignParliaments can divest themselves of sovereignty. For the Parliament ofthe United Kingdom is itself the result of the abdication of supremepower by sovereign Parliaments. The Union with Scotland was not, asEnglishmen often, I suspect, fancy, the absorption of the Parliament ofScotland in the Parliament of England. The transaction bears, whencarefully looked at, a quite different character. Up to the year 1707there existed an English Parliament sovereign in England, and thereexisted a Scotch Parliament sovereign in Scotland. These two sovereignbodies in negotiating the Treaty of Union acted with scrupulous, and onthe Scotch side with punctilious, independence. Neither sovereign bodywould consent to be absorbed in the other. What they did agree to was toconstitute a new State, namely, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, andeach to surrender their separate sovereignty in favour of a newsovereign, namely, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. TheEnglish Parliament no more became supreme in Scotland than the ScotchParliament became supreme in England. The old Parliament of each countryabdicated and lost its identity in the New Parliament of Great Britain. In theory the Treaty of Union between Great Britain and Ireland boreexactly the same character as the Treaty of Union between England andScotland. But on this point I do not care strongly to insist, because atthe present moment every part of Irish history excites controversy. When, however, the excitement of the day has passed by, no one willdispute that 22 Geo. III. C. 53 and 23 Geo. III. C. 28 constituted therenunciation by the British Parliament of sovereignty over Ireland. Thedifference between the limitation of sovereignty and the surrender ofsovereignty has been pressed far enough for my present purpose; noprinciple of jurisprudence is more certain than that sovereigntyimplies the power of abdication, and no fact of history is more certainthan that a sovereign Parliament has more than once abdicated or sharedits powers. To argue or imply that because sovereignty is not limitable(which is true), it cannot be surrendered (which is palpably untrue) isto confuse together two distinct ideas, and is like arguing that becauseno man can while he lives give up, do what he will, his freedom ofvolition, therefore no man can commit suicide. 

The Parliament of the United Kingdom, further, whilst because it is asovereign body it cannot impose any legal limit to the exercise of itsown power, may so express an intention to use or not to use its power ina particular way as to excite expectations which it will be extremelydifficult or hazardous to disappoint, and so may find itself morallyfettered as to its subsequent legislative action. 

A notorious instance, taken from our constitutional history, illustratesthis proposition. The statute 18 Geo. III. C. 12 declares in substancethat Parliament will not impose any tax on any colony in North Americaor in the West Indies. The history of the statute is told by itsdate--1778. Now no constitutional lawyer will contend that theParliament of the United Kingdom is legally bound by this Act. IfParliament were to impose an income tax on Jamaica to-morrow the impostwould be legal, and could, no doubt, be enforced. But the DeclaratoryAct of 1778 makes it morally impossible for Parliament to tax anycolony. That the impossibility does not arise from a law is clear, because it applies with as much strength to colonies which do not fallas to colonies which do fall within the terms of 18 Geo. III. C. 12. Victoria is not a colony in North America or in the West Indies, butVictoria is at least as well protected from Imperial taxation as isBarbadoes. The so-called Act establishes not a rule of law, but aprecept of constitutional morality. It does not theoretically limit, butit practically impedes and interferes with the legislative sovereigntyof Parliament. 

Our Judge with these propositions fully before his mind would scan theterms of the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other words of the IrishGovernment Act. He would certainly come to the conclusion that the pointfor his decision was one of great nicety. Against the validity of anyAct passed by the British Parliament in contravention of the provisionsof the Constitution could be adduced the precise and formal enactment, passed, be it noted, by the undoubtedly sovereign Parliament of theUnited Kingdom, that the Constitution should be alterable in one way, and in one way only;[69] and if it were said that the body which passedthis enactment could also repeal it, then the Judge might consider thatthat body, namely the Parliament of the United Kingdom, had in effectceased to exist, and that the successor to its sovereign powers, if any, was not the British Parliament, but the Imperial Parliament, the bodywhich, under any view, had legal authority to alter the Constitution. No doubt there would be a great deal to be urged on the other side. Theattention of the Judge would be called to the singular and ambiguous usethroughout the Constitution of the term Imperial Parliament, which itmight be argued was meant to show that what I have called the BritishParliament was to be identified with the Parliament of the UnitedKingdom. Reference would also be made to the ambiguous saving of powerscontained in the 37th section of the Irish Government Act. The high andall-important enquiry as to the authority of the British Parliamentsitting at Westminster would come to turn upon the studied ambiguitiesof one ill-drawn section of an Act of Parliament. There the legalquestion of the sovereignty of the British Parliament under theGladstonian Constitution may well be left. It is not within the scope ofthis work to deal with the draughtsmanship of the Government of IrelandBill. It is easy to anticipate what would be the practical result ofthat Bill's ambiguities if it passed into an Act. Irish Judges wouldhonestly take one view, English Judges would as honestly take another. The Courts of Ireland would maintain that the Constitution could bealtered only in the method provided by the Constitution, namely, by theImperial Parliament. The English Courts would maintain that theConstitution could also be altered by the British Parliament, which wasitself the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and possessed thesovereignty inherent in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. No Courtin either country could satisfactorily terminate the dispute. Forcewould no doubt settle what law had left undecided, but to interpret aConstitution by power of arms is in reality to substitute revolutionaryviolence for constitutional discussion. [70]

Let us next consider the matter before us, not as a question ofconstitutional law, but as a question of public morality. 

[Sidenote: As question of public morality. ]

The enquiry then is whether under the Gladstonian Constitution thelegislative supremacy of the British Parliament is or is not morally andin fact impaired? It is extremely difficult to see how any candid personcan answer this question except by the admission that for all practicalpurposes, and except on possible but very extreme occasions, the rightof the British Parliament to legislate for Ireland is morally not onlyimpaired but destroyed. The supporters of the Government of Ireland Billhave admitted again and again that it constitutes what they term aParliamentary compact; it embodies, in other words, a solemn contractbetween Great Britain and the people of Ireland that the BritishParliament, whatever be its legal power, shall not legislate about Irishaffairs without summoning Irish representatives to share in itsdeliberations. This covenant is made for great and valuableconsideration, namely, the withdrawal of the Irish representatives fromthe Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the consequent acquisition bythe British Parliament of power to legislate not only on every Britishbut on every Imperial concern without consulting the wishes of the Irishpeople. This is in a moral point of view little less than a treaty; itis an engagement which England could not break, or incur the imputationof breaking, without dishonour. With all this every man of sense and ofhonour agrees; but if this be so, it is impossible to see how any onecan maintain that this Parliamentary compact does not morally impair, asfar as Ireland is concerned, the sovereignty or legislative supremacy ofthe British Parliament. It may be doubted whether the most earnestGladstonian really and seriously maintains that under the GladstonianConstitution the British Parliament sitting at Westminster could or everwould legislate for Ireland in contravention at any rate of the patentand apparent meaning of the Constitution. All that is really maintainedis that the British Parliament would retain a legal power of doing thatwhich would never be done by it. There is, however, it is suggested, convenience in retaining a nominal sovereignty which is not intended forreal use. Convenience there may be, but there is also immense danger. The Irish Parliament we will suppose acts in a way which is mostannoying to England, but the Irish Parliament at the same time takescare not to violate a line of the Constitution. The temptation to useour sovereign authority is great, and likely enough may proveirresistible; yet if we use it every Irishman, and many Englishmen forthat matter, will accuse England of bad faith. No doubt a breach of theConstitution by the Irish Parliament might be remedied by the use of thesovereignty reserved to the British Parliament. But it is difficult eventhen to see the great advantage of this reservation. In any case inwhich England would be morally justified in setting aside the terms ofthe high Parliamentary contract, she would be equally justified insuspending the Constitution by the use of force. The employment of powerbecomes the more not the less odious because it is allied, or seems tobe allied, with fraud. The miserable tale of the transactions whichcarried the Treaty of Union teaches at least one indisputablelesson--the due observance of legal formalities will not induce a peopleto pardon what they deem to be acts of tyranny, made all the morehateful by their combination with deceit. For the British Parliament torenounce the exercise whilst retaining the name of sovereignty is thevery course by which to run a great risk of damaging the characterwithout any certainty of increasing the power of Parliament. 

The plain answer then to the enquiry on which we have been engaged isthis:--

Under the Gladstonian Constitution, as foreshadowed in the Government ofIreland Bill, the sovereignty of the British Parliament is legallyrendered doubtful, and is morally reduced to nothing. 

[Sidenote: Does Constitution secure justice?]

_2nd Question. _--Does the Gladstonian Constitution secure justice?

The justice which the Constitution ought to secure is twofold--justiceto Great Britain, and justice to all classes, including minorities, ofIrishmen. 

The just claims of Great Britain may roughly be summed up under the oneclaim, that Ireland should contribute her fair share to Imperialexpenditure. 

The Gladstonian Constitution, nominally at least, makes fair provisionthat this claim should be satisfied. But any one who looks into thematter with care will find reason to think that as regards the exactionof payments from Ireland, which are already known by the hateful name of"tribute, " Great Britain will find herself involved in this dilemma. Either she must surrender the tribute, or else surrender all hope ofattaining the main object for the sake of which it is proposed to grantHome Rule to Ireland. If the tribute is exacted, we may be sure that itwill have to be exacted in the long run by British officials supportedby a British army. Laws, we are told, which are otherwise just are hatedin Ireland because they bear a foreign aspect, and come before the Irishpeople in a foreign garb. If this assertion be not true, then the wholecase for Home Rule falls to the ground. If this assertion possess evenpartial truth, then it applies with far greater force to tribute thanto law. It is almost an absurdity to suppose that people who hate goodlaws because they may be termed English will not detest a heavy taxwhich not only may be called, but in reality is, a tribute to England. It is well to remember that a "publican" was a tax-gatherer, and thatRoman publicans were far more hated than Roman Judges or Roman law. IfEngland gives Ireland semi-independence, and at the same time makesIreland pay tribute, all the conciliatory effects of Home Rule will belost. If Home Rule is to have even a bare chance of producing in Irelandthe contentment of Victoria, Ireland, the poorest of all civilizedcountries, must be freed from Imperial taxation, which would not betolerated by the richest of our colonies. To this conclusion theadvocates and the opponents of Home Rule may, I think, both come withoutgrave dissatisfaction. Of all the sacrifices by which Ireland might bebenefited, that sacrifice which England should make with the leastregret is sacrifice of revenue. If, however, it be assumed, as thesupporters of the Government of Ireland Bill must assume, that justicerequires the contribution by Ireland of three or four millions annuallyto Imperial expenditure, then the Gladstonian Constitution, if itprovides for the satisfaction of the claims of Great Britain, does so atthe cost of keeping alive Irish discontent. Nor is it at all certainthat the payment of the tribute could in effect be easily secured. Thepractical working of the Constitution might well be that Great Britainwere impoverished and Ireland were angered. 

Justice to individuals and to unpopular minorities is a matter of fargreater importance and far more difficult to secure than the regularpayment of Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure. 

The Gladstonian Constitution ought to provide securities againstexecutive and legislative oppression. 

To provide however against the possible oppression of classes orindividuals by an Irish Ministry and Irish officials is all but animpossibility, though, as every one knows, the grossest oppression mayin any country arise from the wrongful action or inaction of theexecutive power. The assumption, indeed, is constantly made, though itstruth is very hard to prove, that if Ireland were self-governed the lawof the land would be enforced. In one sense this assumption may perhapsbe well founded. A strong government, or, to put matters plainly, apopular despotism when installed in office at Dublin would, it may besuspected, stringently compel obedience to such laws as the Governmentapproved. The Jacobin Club was no friend to anarchy when anarchy meantdefiance of the mandates issued by the Club. But the energy of a strongGovernment in carrying out laws which it approves is a different matterfrom the zealous maintenance of even-handed justice. An Irish executivewill immediately on coming into existence be called upon to deal withcases which will severely test its sense of justice. Landlords cannotat once be banished like vermin from Ireland; landlords, as long asthey exist, must, I presume, have some rights. Is there any securityunder the Gladstonian Constitution, that the rights--rights, be itremembered, of British subjects, which ought to be neither more nor lesssacred than the rights of a British subject in London or Calcutta--willbe protected by an executive of Land Leaguers? There is, I answer, nonewhatever. To distrust the justice of an Irish Government is not, be itremarked, to show any special distrust of Irish nature. The Irishleaders are of necessity revolutionists, and, it must be added, revolutionists of no high character. Revolutionists on accession topower do not lay aside the revolutionary temperament, and thistemperament may have every other virtue, but it knows nothing of thevirtue of justice. The Gladstonian Constitution withdraws Ireland fromthe control of the Government of the United Kingdom, which with all itsfaults must of necessity possess more impartiality than can a Ministryformed out of the leaders of any Irish faction. The GladstonianConstitution therefore does leave unpopular classes or individualsexposed to considerable risks of injustice at the hands of the IrishGovernment. 

[Sidenote: Methods for securing just government. ]

Though it is from the nature of things almost impossible to takeeffective steps for ensuring that an Irish executive shall make a rightuse of its powers, it is an essential feature of the GladstonianConstitution that the Irish Parliament shall so far at least use itsauthority justly as to keep within the limits placed upon itscompetence. Whether these limitations have been wisely drawn, andwhether they may not be in some respects too wide and in others toonarrow, are inquiries which, though important in themselves, need hardlydetain us. The question in comparison with which all matters of detailsink into insignificance is not what are the limitations which theConstitution imposes on the competence of the Irish Parliament, but whatis the efficacity of the means provided by the Constitution forcompelling the Irish Parliament to respect these limitations? This isthe one vital inquiry, for upon the answer to it depends the reality ofthe constitutional provisions for the maintenance of just legislation. These methods are, as already pointed out, twofold. 

[Sidenote: 1. Veto of Lord-Lieutenant. ]

The first is the veto of the Lord-Lieutenant. Let us assume, though thetruth of the assumption is not quite clear, that this veto is combined, as in the case of the colonies, with a further power of disallowance onthe part of the Crown, or in effect of the British Ministry. The resultis that the British Ministry, or, to put the thing plainly, the BritishHouse of Commons, can put a check on such Irish legislation as may beopposed to the letter or to the spirit of the Constitution. The check isin one sense real, but it must, as in the case of the colonies, be butrarely employed. Its constant use, or its use on occasions of greatimportance, would seem to Irishmen, and with good reason, to nullifythe concession of Home Rule. Suppose, for example, the Irish Ministrycarry a measure for artificially stimulating Irish commerce, and theCrown disallows it on the ground that it is contrary to the provision ofthe Constitution forbidding the Irish Parliament to make any lawrelating to trade. The Irish Cabinet thereupon resigns. What course isthe Lord-Lieutenant to take? If he uses the veto he reintroduces in themost awkward form the interference of the British Parliament with Irishlegislation. If he does not use the veto, or, what is in its effect thesame thing, if the Act is not disallowed, then the right of veto comesto little or nothing. We may be quite sure that in general neither theLord-Lieutenant nor the Crown will refuse assent to Bills approved of bythe Irish Parliament. The veto in its different forms will, in short, bebut a very slight check on unconstitutional or unjust legislation. 

[Sidenote: 2. Action of Privy Council. ]

The second method by which it is endeavoured to check unconstitutionallegislation is the use of the authority vested in the English PrivyCouncil. Privy This method is borrowed from Federalism, as theLord-Lieutenant's veto is borrowed from the Colonial system. The PrivyCouncil, it should be remembered, may nullify the effect of Irishlegislation in two ways:--It may as an administrative body give adecision that a Bill or Act is void. It must, however, be hoped andexpected that the Privy Council will rarely adopt this mode ofexercising its powers, for such exercise would at once give rise to adirect conflict between the Irish Parliament and the English PrivyCouncil. That body may, however, act simply as a Court of final appeal, and as a tribunal decide whether an enactment Of the Irish Parliament isor is not void. This, we may suppose, is the mode in which the PrivyCouncil will usually put forth its authority. It is easy, bearing theexperience of America and Canada in mind, to see how the wholearrangement will, in theory at least, work. _A. _ sues _X. _ in an IrishCourt, _X. _ bases his defence on some Act passed by the IrishParliament. The Privy Council pronounce the Act void, as being opposedto some provision of the Constitution, and give a judgment in favour of_A. _, under which he has a right to recover £10, 000 against _X. _ Here itwill be said the whole matter is settled. The law was unconstitutional;the law has been treated as void; _A. _ has obtained judgment; _A. 's_rights are secured. This would be all that was required, but for oneconsideration. The object of the plaintiff in an action is to obtain notjudgment, but payment or execution. What are the means by whichjudgments of the Privy Council may be put in force where they happen notto be supported by Irish opinion, and are opposed, it may be, to thedecisions of the Irish Courts? The answer is simple: the Constitutionprovides no means whatever. The Federal tribunals of America possess inevery State officials of their own, and are supported in the main byAmerican opinion. The Americans are, moreover, to use their ownexpression, "a law-abiding people. " Yet for all this the judgment ofthe Supreme Court may be worth little if it runs across State sentiment, and if the President should happen to sympathise with State rights. Acitizen of colour was unlawfully imprisoned in Georgia; he applied for ahabeas corpus. The application ultimately came before Chief JusticeMarshall, and the writ was granted. The traditional comment of PresidentJackson is noteworthy: "John Marshall has given his judgment, let himenforce it if he can. " The Executive would not assist the Court, and theSupreme Court was powerless. Switzerland, again, has a Federal tribunal:it is a Court, as would be the Privy Council, which cannot commandofficials of its own to execute its process; it depends for aid on theCantonal authorities. This state of things, I am told on good authority, produces its natural result. The judgments of the Federal tribunal canbe rendered almost ineffective by the opposition of a Canton. 

At this moment the statutes of the Imperial Parliament bind every manthroughout the United Kingdom. The Courts in Ireland are bound to giveeffect to every statute, and the Irish Courts are supported by theSheriff and his officers, and in the last resort by the power of theUnited Kingdom. Yet the very difficulty of the day is enforcingjudgments which run against Irish popular opinion. Is it common sense toimagine that opposition which defies, often with success, the authorityof the Irish Queen's Bench Division, or ultimately of the House ofLords, would not easily nullify the judgments of the Privy Council whennot only unpopular in Ireland, but in contradiction to a law devised bythe Irish Executive, passed by the Irish Parliament, supported by theIrish Judges? The truth must be spoken: the Gladstonian Constitutionwill, as regards the restrictions placed under it on the powers of theIrish Parliament, inevitably turn out a mere paper Constitution. Themethods for compelling the observance of these limitations have neitherof them any real efficacity. The veto can with difficulty and but rarelybe used; the judgments or opinions of the Privy Council may have aspeculative interest, but will possess no coercive power. 

If this be so the guarantees afforded by the Constitution for justlegislation are nugatory; they are worth neither more nor less than thepompous securities for every kind of inalienable right which haveadorned the most splendid and the most transitory among theConstitutions which have during a century been in turn created anddestroyed in France--that is, they are worth nothing; nor is it unfairto conjecture that on this point my opinion agrees with the opinion ofmany English Home Rulers. They think the limitations on the independenceof the Irish Parliament useless and destined to disappear; for theiravowed belief is that legislation by an Irish Parliament will in themain be just, and that the laws of the Irish Parliament, because theyrepresent the wishes of the Irish people, will obtain easy obedience inIreland. If this conviction be sound--and it is the almost necessarybasis for a policy of Home Rule--let us act upon it, and not imposerestrictions which, if needless, must certainly be noxious. Meanwhile inany case let us dismiss the delusion that restrictions which cannot beenforced are any guarantee for justice. The Gladstonian Constitutionadmits on the face of it that guarantees are wanted. Most Englishmenagree in the opinion implied in this admission. But if I am right inasserting that the guarantees for justice are illusory, then theGladstonian Constitution does not secure justice, and is therefore notjust. 

[Sidenote: Does Constitution possess finality?]

_3rd Question_. --Does the Gladstonian Constitution hold out fair hopesof finality?

This is an enquiry which may be answered with some confidence. 

To any one who surveys the Constitution, not as a politician, but as alegist; to any one moderately versed in the study of comparativeconstitutionalism, few statements which savour of prediction will appearmore certain than the assertion that the Gladstonian Constitution cannotbe a final or even a lasting settlement of the constitutional relationsbetween England and Ireland. 

The grounds of this opinion are, briefly, that the proposed Constitutionwill, while leaving alive elements of discord, cause disappointment andinconvenience to both countries, and that the mechanism of theConstitution, framed as it is upon a combination of Federalism and ofColonialism, has some of the defects of each system, and promises inits working to produce something like the maximum of irritation andfriction. 

The two grounds for believing that the Gladstonian Constitution bears nopromise of finality run into one another, but they admit of separateexamination, and each requires explanation or justification. 

[Sidenote: Constitution will cause disappointment to England. ]

The Constitution will cause disappointment and inconvenience both toEngland and to Ireland, Englishmen will on the Gladstonian Constitutioncoming into operation find to their great disappointment that they havenot attained the object which from an English point of view was theprincipal inducement to grant Home Rule to the Irish people, that is, freedom from the difficulty of governing Ireland. The difficulty nodoubt will be diminished, or rather shifted; but the dream is vain thatunder the new Constitution Englishmen would be able to troublethemselves no more about the concerns of Ireland than they do about theaffairs of Canada. Ireland would still be our immediate neighbour. Irishmen would still be divided by differences of class and religion, and England would still, disguise the fact as you may, be ultimatelyresponsible for good government in Ireland. Home Rule is not Separation, and nothing short of Irish independence would greatly lessen Englishresponsibility. This would be true under whatever form Home Rule wereestablished, but it is emphatically true of Home Rule under theparticular form contemplated by the Gladstonian Constitution. The armyin Ireland--and no one supposes that England can withdraw her soldiersfrom the country--will be the British Army under the control of theBritish Government. But the power of the sword is, though we oftenforget the fact, the sanction by which law is maintained. Hence itfollows that the British Ministry remains at bottom responsible for themaintenance of peace and order throughout Ireland. Note the results. Ifthere are riots at Belfast; if unpopular officials are assassinated inDublin; if evictions give rise to murder in Kerry, the British Army mustin the last resort be called in to restore peace or punish crime. If thearmy are not under the control of the Irish Executive, then the EnglishCabinet become directly responsible for the government of Ireland. IfBritish soldiers are placed at the disposal of the Irish Ministry, stillthe English Government must, shift the thing as you will, share theresponsibility of the Irish Cabinet. During a riot at Belfast a hundredProtestants or Catholics are shot by British soldiers whilst restoringorder. If any one fancies that such slaughter can take place without theEnglish Ministry being called upon in the British Parliament forexplanation and defence, he shows utter ignorance of English, or indeedof human nature. Nor is it for the action only of the troops that theEnglish Executive will incur liability. If British subjects are killedby a mob in Belfast or in Dublin whilst British troops stand quietly byand under the direction of an Irish Home Secretary take no steps toprevent murder, we may rest assured that the Queen's Government inEngland will be asked whether it is decent that the Queen's forcesshould be trained to stand as indifferent spectators of outrageousbreaches of the Queen's peace. 

Take again the question of pardoning crime. Suppose that the first IrishMinistry on their accession to power propose to inaugurate the new eraby a free pardon of all the political offenders, dynamiters and others, whose misguided zeal placed them within the gripe of the law, but alsoin no small measure contributed to achieve the Parliamentaryindependence of Ireland. If the request is not granted, then the IrishAdministration are refused the means of carrying on the government ofthe country after their own notions of sound polity. If the request isgranted, can the English Government be held entirely irresponsible forthe mode in which the Crown exercises its prerogative? Let it be settledthat the prerogative of mercy must in Ireland be exercised in accordancewith the wishes of the Irish Ministry. Even then the English Governmentwill not really escape responsibility. British soldiers put down a riotat Belfast; they are indicted for the murder of a Catholic rioter, before a Catholic grand jury, convicted by a Catholic jury under thedirection of a Catholic judge who has just been appointed by the newIrish Ministry. Popular opinion demands the execution of the convictedmurderers, the Irish Ministry advise that the law should take itscourse. The general belief in England, shared we will suppose by theEnglish Home Office, is that the convicted soldiers are about to becapitally punished for having simply discharged their duty. Is anEnglish Minister to abstain from advising a pardon? The dilemma isdifficult. If he recommends a pardon, the Irish Government are preventedby England from governing Ireland. If the soldiers are hanged, theEnglish Ministry will not keep long in office, the British Army willhardly maintain its habit of absolute obedience to the civil power. 

Englishmen, in the next place, will soon discover that the creation of astatutory constitution for Ireland curiously hampers the working of ourown institutions. Questions must arise whether Acts of the BritishParliament do or do not trench upon the provisions of the IrishConstitution. Few persons are aware of the number of Imperial Acts whichtouch the Colonies. To such statutes there is no legal or moralobjection, because the principle embodied in the Colonial Laws Act, 1865, that enactments passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdomoverride any Colonial law with which they conflict, is universallyadmitted; but, as already pointed out, it is questionable as a matter oflaw whether the statutes of the British Parliament can repeal Acts dulypassed by the Irish Parliament, and it is quite beyond question that forthe British Parliament to infringe upon the province of the Irishlegislature would involve a breach of good faith. Changes again in theformation of the British Parliament might under the GladstonianConstitution become difficult. The abolition of the House of Lords wouldbe hard to reconcile with the right of the Irish Peers to be summoned onoccasion to the Imperial Parliament. An increase in the number ofBritish representatives in the House of Commons would be objected to byIrishmen because it diminished the relative importance of the membersfrom Ireland when recalled to take part in the deliberations of theImperial Parliament. The reduction of the number of members of the Houseof Commons, though one of the most salutary reforms which could becarried out, would be opposed by every person interested in maintainingthe present excessive number of the Lower House, on the ground that toreduce the numbers of the House of Commons, to say 400, would involve anincrease in the authority of the Irish members whenever they reappearedon the scene. The moot question whether the British Parliament could onan emergency repeal of its own authority the articles of the IrishConstitution; the extent to which Ireland should be represented on theJudicial Committee of the Privy Council; above all, the vital questionwhether the reassembled Imperial Parliament were not the truerepresentative of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the ultimatesovereign power in the State, would in periods of excitement give riseto disputes hitherto quite alien to English politics, and involvingelements of unknown danger. 

Ambiguity and obscurity, since they help to pass Bills, are in thejudgment of Parliamentary draughtsmen and Parliamentary statesmencharacteristics which promote the easy working of Acts. Knives which aremade to sell are not knives which are made to cut. No delusion is moredangerous. The founders of the American Union knew their own minds, andwere not well acquainted with the advantages to be derived from theobscurities of modern draughtsmanship. But on two points they tried theexperiment of keeping real perils out of sight by omitting to refer tothem. "Slave" and "slavery" are words not to be found in theConstitution of the United States. What (if any) was the right of aState to retire from the Union, was a matter purposely left open for theinterpretation of future generations. The Abolition movement, theFugitive Slave Law, the War of Secession tell the result of trying toignore perils or problems which it is not easy to face or to solve. 

[Sidenote: And to Ireland. ]

The last disappointment of Englishmen would be to find that Home Rulehad not satisfied Ireland. For to Irishmen no less than to Englishmenthe Constitution must bring disappointment and inconvenience. 

That the Gladstonian Constitution cannot satisfy Ireland is all butcertain. 

To say this is not to imply that its acceptance by Irish Home Rulers isdishonest. In their eyes it is a move in the right direction; theyexaggerate, as their English allies underrate, the freedom of actionwhich the Constitution offers to Ireland. It cannot, as already pointedout, by any possibility remove the admitted causes of Irish discontent. It cannot tempt capital towards Ireland, but it may easily drive capitalaway from her shores; it cannot diminish poverty; it cannot in itsdirect effect assuage religious bigotry; it cannot of itself removeagrarian discontent. The Land Purchase Bill, even when discarded, remains an involuntary exposure of the futility of the GladstonianConstitution, and of the unsoundness of the principle on which thedemand for Home Rule rests. No friend of Italy ever suggested thatItalian independence should be accompanied by a loan from Austria to theItalian Kingdom. For the principle of nationality was the true source ofItalian disaffection. If in dealing with Ireland we must calm agrarianmisery before satisfying national aspirations, this necessity is all buta confession that Irish unrest is due far more to desire for a change inthe land laws than to passionate longing for national independence. I donot doubt that the spirit of nationality has some, though probably asmall, part in the production of Irish discontent. But the GladstonianConstitution is unfortunately so devised as to outrage quite as much asit soothes national sentiment. The tribute will affect every Irishman inhis pride no less than in his purse. Can any one suppose thatNortherners indignant at recent treachery, and Catholics mindful ofancient oppression, will not join, and justly join, in denouncing as atonce ignominious and ruinous the payment of a tribute raised forImperial purposes at the moment when Ireland ceases to have any voice inthe direction of Imperial policy? Irishmen again will find to theirsurprise that the Constitution intended to give them independenceimposes annoying fetters on their freedom of action. They wish for aprotective tariff, and they come across the prohibition to make lawsaffecting trade; they desire that the country shall defend herself, andthey discover that they cannot raise even a body of volunteers; theywish to try the plan of concurrent endowment, and they are thwarted bythe article of the Constitution prohibiting the endowment of religion. These restrictions are the more annoying because none of them areimposed upon the Colonies. Irishmen will further discover that greatachievements of constructive legislation require for their success thecommand of large pecuniary resources, and that exemption from Britishcontrol involves the withdrawal of all assistance from the BritishTreasury. 

[Sidenote: Constitution will cause friction. ]

The Constitution will produce irritation and friction. 

Every scheme for uniting into a political whole States which areintended to retain, even when connected together, a certain amount ofindependence, aims at minimising the opportunities for constitutionalcollision, or for friction between the different States which areconnected together, and also between any State and the Central power. If we compare the mode in which this end is attained, either under theFederal system or under the Colonial system, with the arrangements ofthe Gladstonian Constitution, we shall easily see how little its authorshave attended to the necessity for avoiding occasions of constitutionalfriction. 

Where Federalism, as in America, appears in its best form, the skillwith which opportunities for collision or friction have been minimisedis almost above praise. The Federal or Central power is so constructedas to represent the whole nation; its authority cannot by anymisrepresentation be identified with the power of one State more thananother. The Federal Government acts through its own officers, isrepresented by its own Judiciary, and levies its own taxes withoutrecourse to State authorities. Every device which could be thought ofhas been taken to make it unnecessary for the National Government tocome into direct collision with any State. It deals in general with theindividual citizens of the United States; it does not deal with theparticular States. The result is that on the one hand, whatever may besaid against the taxes imposed by Congress, they cannot by any stretchof imagination be looked upon as tribute paid by one State to another, say by Massachusetts to New York, or by New York to Massachusetts. It isagain unnecessary for the Federal Government to issue commands to aState. There is, therefore, little opportunity for a contest between aState and the National Executive. Whoever wishes to understand theelaborate devices necessary to make Federalism work smoothly shouldcompare the clumsiness of the arrangements by which the SwissConfederacy has at times been compelled to enforce obedience of theCantons to the will of the Confederation, with the ingenuity of themethods by which the Federal authorities of the United States exerttheir authority over American citizens. 

The English Colonial system on the other hand, though far less elaboratethan any form of Federalism, does, as a matter of fact, reduce withinvery narrow limits the chances of collision between England and hercolonies. The system, however, succeeds, not because it is a model ofconstructive art, but because it attempts very little, and can, owing tofavourable circumstances, leave to nominal dependencies something littleshort of complete self-government. Where collisions do arise they aredisposed of by the habit of the Imperial Government always to give way. 

The Gladstonian Constitution is, as we have already pointed out, acombination between Federalism and Colonialism; it may possess some ofthe merits, but it much more certainly displays some of the demerits ofeach system. From Federalism is borrowed the idea of leaving thesettlement of constitutional questions to a Court. But the conception isspoilt in the borrowing. All the difficulties which under a Federalsystem beset the enforcement of judgments pronounced by a Federal Courtaffect in an aggravated form the attempt to enforce in Irelandjudgments affecting the validity of Irish Acts, which judgments arepronounced by a Committee of the English Privy Council sitting inEngland. The Privy Council, moreover, while it has every weakness of theSupreme Court of America, has more than one special weakness of its own. It lacks moral authority, for it is an English Court sitting in Englandand representing English opinion; it lacks jurisdiction, because whileit can pronounce on the validity of Irish, it cannot pronounce on thevalidity of British Acts of Parliament; it does not possess a strictlyjudicial character, because it is not only a Court called upon to givejudgments, but is also an administrative body called upon to deliveropinions upon the validity of Irish Bills and of Irish Acts. Hence itsdecrees come into direct collision with the proposals or enactments ofthe Irish Parliament, and the Privy Council is made to appear not as abody of Judges deciding cases between man and man, but as a body ofofficials whose duty it is to oppose any unconstitutional action on thepart of the Irish Parliament. From Federalism again is borrowed thecontribution by Ireland towards meeting the expenses of the Empire. Butimposts which under a Federal system are a tax towards the payment ofcommon expenditure are under the Gladstonian Constitution a tribute to aforeign power. From the Federal system again is taken that restrictionof legislative authority which hardly affects Parliaments such as thatof Victoria, and which under any circumstances is a source ofirritation. From the Colonial system, on the other hand, is derived thetheoretical supremacy of the British Parliament, the right of veto, andthe fatal dependence of the Irish executive on every vote of the Irishlegislature. From the colonies we therefore bring to Ireland sources ofdispute, of friction, and of irritation, which are unknown to a truesystem of Federalism, whilst we do not give Ireland that practicalindependence, and that immunity from taxation, which prevent ourill-arranged connection with the colonies from causing realdissatisfaction. Federalism has its merits and its defects; EnglishColonialism works well enough; the sham Federalism and the shamColonialism of the Gladstonian Constitution must create between GreatBritain and Ireland all the causes of discontent which have from time totime tried the strength of the American Union, and all the causes ofdisturbance which from time to time reveal the weakness of the tie whichbinds together our Colonial Empire. 

Among the hypothetical virtues of the Gladstonian Constitution cannotassuredly be numbered the merit of finality. 

The Gladstonian Constitution therefore fails entirely to fulfil for anypractical purpose the conditions it is meant to satisfy. It neithermaintains the sovereignty of Parliament, nor makes adequate securitiesfor justice, nor offers a prospect of finality. 

A criticism of Home Rule in its four forms gives then this result:--

[Sidenote: Result of criticism. 1. Home Rule as Federalism. ]

Home Rule as Federalism means the immediate dislocation and the ultimaterebuilding of the whole English Constitution; it involves thetransformation of an old and tried polity which centuries of experiencehave admirably adapted to the wants of the English people, and which hasfostered the growth of the British Empire, into a form of government initself not free from defects, and successful where it has succeeded onlyunder conditions which the United Kingdom does not present. 

[Sidenote: 2. Home Rule as Colonial independence. ]

Home Rule in the form of Colonial independence involves far less changein the institutions of Great Britain or in the complex arrangements ofthe British Empire than does Federalism. It appears at first sight to bean application to Ireland of institutions which, as they have been foundto answer their purpose in such countries as Canada and Victoria, mayalso prove successful in Ireland. The appearance is delusive. The truereasons why the Colonial system, self-contradictory as it is in theoryand unsatisfactory as it sometimes is in practice, has produced harmonybetween England and her dependencies, are that the colonies are fardistant and are prosperous, that they feel pride in their relation tothe mother-country, that whilst contributing not a penny towards meetingImperial burdens they derive valuable and valued benefits from theconnection with the Empire, and lastly that they are not in realitydependencies; the colonies willingly acquiesce in the supremacy ofEngland, because England protects them gratis and does not govern themat all. It is not the Colonial system, but the conditions which makethat system succeed, which ought to engross our attention. Theseconditions will not be found in any arrangement whatever between Englandand Ireland. It is in the strictest sense impossible that Ireland whilstforming part of the United Kingdom, or even of the British Empire, should enjoy or endure the independence of Victoria. If the Act whichgives Victoria her constitution were reenacted with the necessary verbalchanges for Ireland, the constitution which satisfies the Victorianswould not satisfy the Irish, and for a good reason: the form would bethe same, but the effect would be different. A suffering anddiscontented people will not accept words for facts. 

One condition indeed, which more perhaps than any other ensures thesuccess of our Colonial system, Great Britain has in the case of Irelandthe power to reproduce. Immunity from Imperial taxation is one source ofColonial loyalty to the Empire. If Ireland is to accept or to receivethe mixed independence and subordination of a colony, she ought to enjoythe substantial advantage of a theoretically inferior position. TheColonial system, as I have already insisted, involves the renunciationof Imperial taxation. 

[Sidenote: 3. Home Rule as Constitution of 1782. ]

Home Rule as the revival of Grattan's Constitution is an impossibility. The Constitution of 1782 belongs to a past age, and cannot by anymiracle of political art be at the present day restored to life. 

[Sidenote: 4. Home Rule as Gladstonian Constitution. ]

Home Rule under the Gladstonian Constitution means an artificialcombination of Federalism and Colonialism. Its aim is to secure theadvantages of two opposite systems; its result is to combine andintensify the disadvantages of both systems. It inevitably tends towardsthe dissolution of the United Kingdom into a Federation; it immediatelydisturbs the bases of the Constitution by creating the artificial bondof something like a Federal legislature between England and Ireland; itintroduces into the relations between each of the different divisions ofthe United Kingdom elements of conflict which are all but inherent inFederalism; it requires that absolute deference for the judicialdecisions of a Federal Court which if it exist anywhere can exist onlyamong a people like the Americans, imbued with legal notions, and as itwere born with innate respect for law. That this sentiment cannot existin Ireland is certain; whether it exist in the required intensity evenin England is problematical. The Gladstonian Constitution, again, because it contains some institutions borrowed from the Colonial systemwithout the conditions requisite for their proper working so to speakfalsifies them. The Imperial supremacy of Great Britain, the Imperialcontrol over the army, the occasional interference with the Irishexecutive and the veto of the Crown on Irish legislation, are each andall of them under the Gladstonian Constitution certain to be the sourceof justifiable dissatisfaction. To the ingenuity of the plan proposed byMr. Gladstone's Ministry hostile critics have given insufficient praise. But the essential unreality which this ingenuity has concealed has noteven yet met with due condemnation. Since the day when the NationalAssembly of France presented the brand-new French Constitution to theacceptance of Louis XVI. No form of government has ever been seriouslyproposed for adoption by an intelligent people so radically unworkableas that Gladstonian Constitution which has been instinctively rejectedby the good sense of the British Parliament. The Constitution of Francelasted out two years; to a jurist it may appear conceivable, thoughhardly probable, that by the vigorous aid of the British Parliament thenew Constitution for the United Kingdom might have lasted for as long aperiod. 

FOOTNOTES:

[29] Compare Mr. Gladstone's speech of 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_Parliamentary Debates, ' pp. 130, 131; and Mr. Gladstone's speech of 13thApril, _ibid. _, pp. 255, 256. 

[30] Compare _ibid. _, pp. 130, 132. 

[31] Compare the following expressions in Mr. Gladstone'sspeeches:--"The essential conditions of any plan that Parliament can beasked or could be expected to entertain are, in my opinion, these:--Theunity of the Empire must not be placed in jeopardy; the safety andwelfare of the whole--if there is an unfortunate conflict, which I donot believe--the welfare and security of the whole must be preferred tothe security and advantage of the part. The political equality of thethree countries must be maintained. They stand by statute on a footingof absolute equality, and that footing ought not to be altered orbrought into question. There should be what I will at present term anequitable distribution of Imperial burdens. Next I introduce a provisionwhich may seem to be exceptional, but which in the peculiarcircumstances of Ireland, whose history unhappily has been one longchain of internal controversies as well as of difficulties external, isnecessary in order that there may be reasonable safeguards for theminority. I am asked why there should be safeguards for the minority. 

 * * * * *

"I have spoken now of the essential conditions of a good plan forIreland, and I add only this--that in order to be a good plan it must bea plan promising to be a real settlement of Ireland. (Speech of Mr. Gladstone, 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates, ' pp. 130, 131. )

"I laid down, I say, five essential conditions, from which it appearedto me we could under no circumstances depart. These were the essentialconditions under which in our opinion the granting of a domesticLegislature to Ireland would be justifiable and wise--first, that itmust be consistent with Imperial unity; secondly, that it must befounded upon the political equality of the three nations; thirdly, thatthere must be an equitable distribution of Imperial burdens; fourthly, that there should be safeguards for the minority; and, fifthly, that itshould be in the nature of a settlement, and not of a mere provocationto the revival of fresh demands, which, according to the right hon. Gentleman, exceeded all reasonable expectation and calculation. " (Speechof Mr. Gladstone, 13th April, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates, 'p. 256. ) Let it be observed that when Mr. Gladstone speaks of the unityof the Empire he means the sovereignty of Parliament, for in the samespeech from which these extracts are taken he says, "The unity of theEmpire rests upon the supremacy of Parliament and on considerations muchhigher than considerations merely fiscal. " ('_The Times_ ParliamentaryDebates, ' p. 132. )

[32] Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution, ' lecture iv. ParliamentarySovereignty and Federalism. 

[33] A singular instance of the attempt to dissolve a country intoStates deserves notice. In 1852 a constitution was devised for NewZealand, under which the country was to be governed by a centrallegislature and subordinate provincial governments and councils. Thisartificial federation was of short duration; the provincial governmentswere in 1875 abolished by an Act of the General Assembly. --Todd, 'Parliamentary Government, ' pp. 320-322. 

[34] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution, ' 2nd ed. , pp. 35-79. 

[35] _Contemporary Review_, vol. Xii. , p. 908. 

[36] _Contemporary Review_, vol. Xli. , p. 921. 

[37] 'Mr. Gladstone's Irish Constitution, ' _Contemporary Review_, May, 1886, p. 616. 

[38] 'Arguments for and against Home Rule, ' by the Rev. Malcolm MacColl, M. A. , p. 71. 

[39] 'The Irish Question, ' by the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, pp. 36, 37. 

[40] 'American Home Rule, ' by E. L. Godkin, _Nineteenth Century_, June, 1886, pp. 793, 802. 

[41] See Todd, 'Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, ' pp. 274-303, and especially p. 281, as to the position of the colonialtroops in Victoria. 

[42] See Tarring, 'Chapters on the Law relating to the Colonies, ' pp. 79-85. 

[43] See Dicey, 'Law of the Constitution, ' pp. 105, 106. 

The somewhat complicated principles which govern what is popularlycalled the right of veto on Bills passed by Colonial Legislatures, arethus stated in the 'Rules and Regulations' published for the use of theColonial Office, Chapter III. , Legislative Councils and Assemblies, Rules 48-55:--

"48. In every Colony the Governor has authority either to give or towithhold his assent to laws passed by the other branches or members ofthe Legislature, and until that assent is given no such law is valid orbinding. 

"49. Laws are in some cases passed with suspending clauses; that is, although assented to by the Governor they do not come into operation ortake effect in the Colony until they shall have been specially confirmedby Her Majesty, and in other cases Parliament has for the same purposeempowered the Governor to reserve Laws for the Crown's assent, insteadof himself assenting or refusing his assent to them. 

"50. Every Law which has received the Governor's assent (unless itcontains a suspending clause) comes into operation immediately or at thetime specified in the Law itself. But the Crown retains power todisallow the Law; and if such power be exercised at any time afterwards, the Law ceases to have operation from the date at which suchdisallowance is published in the Colony. 

"51. In Colonies having Representative Assemblies the disallowance ofany Law, or the Crown's assent to a reserved Bill, is signified by Orderin Council. The confirmation of an Act passed with a suspending clauseis not signified by Order in Council unless this mode of confirmation isrequired by the terms of the suspending clause itself, or by somespecial provision in the constitution of the Colony. 

"52. In Crown Colonies the allowance or disallowance of any Law isgenerally signified by despatch. 

"53. In some cases a period is limited, after the expiration of whichLocal Enactments, though not actually disallowed, cease to have theauthority of Law in the Colony, unless before the lapse of that time HerMajesty's confirmation of them shall have been signified there; but thegeneral rule is otherwise. 

"54. In Colonies possessing Representative Assemblies, Laws purport tobe made by the Queen or by the Governor on Her Majesty's behalf orsometimes by the Governor alone, omitting any express reference to HerMajesty, with the advice and consent of the Council and Assembly. Theyare almost invariably designated as Acts. In Colonies not having suchAssemblies, Laws are designated as Ordinances, and purport to be made bythe Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council (orin British Guiana of the Court of Policy). 

"55. In West Indian Islands or African Settlements which form part ofany general Government, every Bill or Draft Ordinance must be submittedto the Governor-in-Chief before it receives the assent of theLieutenant-Governor or Administrator. If the Governor-in-Chief shallconsider any amendment indispensable, he may either require thatamendment to be made before the Law is brought into operation, or he mayauthorize the officer administering to assent to the Bill or Draft onthe express engagement of the Legislature to give effect to theGovernor-in-Chief's recommendation by a supplementary Enactment. "

The effect of these Regulations may be best understood by taking thefollowing supposed case as an example of their operation. 

The Houses of the Victorian Parliament pass a Bill legalising themarriage of a widower with his deceased wife's sister. 

i. The Governor refuses his assent. The Bill is lost and never becomeslaw. 

ii. The Governor assents to the Bill on the 1st of January. It thereuponbecomes an Act, and law in Victoria. 

iii. The Crown disallows the Act on the 1st of April. The disallowanceis published in Victoria on the 1st of May. From the 1st of May the Actceases to be law in any part of the British Dominions, but marriagesmade under it between the 1st of January and the 1st of May are valid. 

iv. The Crown allows the Bill. It thereupon becomes an Act whichcontinues in force in Victoria until it be repealed either by theBritish Parliament or by the Victorian Parliament. 

v. The Bill contains a clause that it shall not come into force unlessand until allowed by the Crown within two years of its passing. It isnot so allowed, it never comes into force, or in other words neverbecomes law. 

The point to be noted is that the Crown, or in reality the ColonialOffice, has and often exercises the power of placing a veto upon anyColonial law whatever. 

[44] Compare 'Victorian Parliamentary Paper, ' 1883, 2 S. , No. 22, andthe _Times_ of September 27, October 2, 5, 10, 12, 15 and 18, 1883. 

[45] See Todd, 'Parliamentary Government in the Colonies, ' p. 283. 

[46] Todd, p. 283. 

[47] See, e. G. , a letter by Mr. Lecky in the _Times_ of January 13, 1886. 

[48] See pp. 221, 222, _post. _

[49] See a letter in the _Spectator_ of January 2, 1886, on 'Home Ruleor Separation, ' by Mr. J. Cotter Morison. 

[50] See p. 197, _ante. _

[51] _The Times_, May 5, 1886. 

[52] Under the political arrangements connecting the two countries, itwas practically impossible that the two crowns could by legal means beseparated without the assent of the English Parliament. George III. Wasnecessarily a member both of the English and of the Irish Parliaments;and it is inconceivable that as King of Ireland he should have assentedto a bill passed by the Irish Houses of Parliament which was strenuouslyopposed by the English Houses of Parliament. The madness of the Kingraised a case not provided for by the Constitution, and the accidentaldifference of opinion between the English and Irish Houses ofParliament, as to the Regency, has been treated as possessing moreimportance than from a constitutional point of view belonged to it. 

[53] See Appendix for the Government of Ireland Bill. It is thereprinted in extenso. The clauses which mainly concern the pointsdiscussed in the following pages are printed in italics. Readers whowish to understand my comments on the Gladstonian Constitution, shouldstudy the Bill itself. I am anxious to call attention to its words, because I am quite aware that on more than one point the interpretationput by me upon its provisions will be disputed by supporters of Mr. Gladstone's policy. My interpretation is, I believe, sound, but it wouldbe unfair not to give my readers the opportunity of judging forthemselves as to its soundness. 

[54] Criticism of particular provisions was made the easier by the factthat hesitations of statesmanship betrayed themselves throughout theBill in blunders of draughtsmanship. The very heading of the Bill is amisdescription, and involves confusion of ideas. The expressions "statusof the Crown, " "Executive Government, " "Imperial Parliament, " are from alegal point of view open to severe criticism; and the substitution ofthe name "Irish legislature" or "Legislature of Ireland" for the plainintelligible term Irish Parliament, involves something like politicalcowardice. For errors of this kind, though in one sense errors ofdraughtsmanship, official draughtsmen are, it must in fairness beremembered, no more responsible than is an amanuensis for the erasuresand blots which mar a letter written or re-written to suit thecontradictory views of a writer who does not quite know his own meaningand is not anxious to put his meaning into plain words. (See for someexcellent criticisms on the Government of Ireland Bill two letters inthe _St. James's Gazette_ of 20th and 22nd April, 1880 signed II. )

[55] My statement that the Government of Ireland Bill repeals the mainprovisions of the Act of Union is made, not because I anticipate thatthe Bill if passed would lead to a repeal of the Union, but because itis my opinion that the Bill if passed would, as a matter of law, repealthe provisions of that Act, under which the United Kingdom isrepresented in one and the same Parliament to be styled the Parliamentof Great Britain and Ireland. The effect of the Bill would be in verygeneral terms that Ireland would be represented in a Parliament whichcontained no English or Scotch representatives, and Great Britain wouldbe represented in a Parliament which contained no Irish representatives. Occasionally and for one definite purpose, and no other, namely for thepurpose of modifying the terms of the Gladstonian Constitution, aParliament might be convened which contained representatives fromEngland, Scotland, and Ireland. By what name any one of these assembliesmight be called is a matter of indifference; but that either the BritishParliament which contained no Irish representatives, or the IrishParliament which contained no English or Scotch representatives, or theexceptional and only occasionally convoked body whose one function is tomodify a single Act of Parliament, could be considered by any lawyer the"one and the same Parliament" in which the United Kingdom is nowrepresented, is in my judgment all but incredible. If, however, the term"repeal" causes offence or misunderstanding, let us substitute the word"modify, " which, however, I believe to be less accurate. The lay readerought to be reminded that "Statutes may be repealed either by expresswords contained in later Acts of Parliament, or by implication, " andthat "a repeal by implication is effected when the provisions of a laterenactment are so inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the provisions ofan earlier enactment that the two cannot stand together" (Wilberforce, 'Statute Law, ' p. 310). My contention is that the Government of IrelandBill would on becoming law be so inconsistent with portions of 39 & 40Geo. III. Cap. 67, as to amount to a repeal thereof. (For a statement ofan opposite opinion, see Mr. Gladstone's pamphlet on the Irish Questionpp. 38, 39. )

[56] The Government of Ireland Bill, clause 7. 

[57] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 1, 9. 

[58] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 7. 

[59] _Ibid_. , clause 25. 

[60] _Ibid_. , clause 7. 

[61] As to the disallowance of Colonial bills, see pp. 202-5, _ante_. 

[62] See the Government of Ireland Bill, clause 25, sub-clause (_a), (b_) and (_c_). 

[63] Government of Ireland Bill, clause 24. 

[64] Government of Ireland Bill, clauses 37, 39. On the whole questionas to the mode in which the Gladstonian Constitution, or in other wordsthe Government of Ireland Bill, is intended to be altered, readers arespecially referred to the terms of the Bill itself. The whole matter isinvolved in so much controversy that one can hardly make any statementabout it which an opponent will not question. The parts of the Bill tobe studied are clauses 37 and 39. 

[65] See Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. 

[66] I am quite aware that the account I have given of the proposedGladstonian Constitution is likely not to be accepted as correct by someof the supporters of the Government of Ireland Bill. That measure bydesignating both what I have termed the British Parliament and theImperial Parliament by the one name Imperial Parliament, conceals in myjudgment the extent of the alteration which the Bill contemplates. Forthe sake of clearness of thought I must request my readers todistinguish carefully four different bodies:--

1. The Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. This is the actually existing Parliament constituted by the Act of Unionwith Ireland. 

2. The British Parliament; that is, the Parliament of the United Kingdomwith the Irish representatives removed from it. This body is calledunder the Government of Ireland Bill the Imperial Parliament. It is adistinctly different body from the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Whether it does or does not inherit the legal powers of the Parliamentof the United Kingdom is a separate question afterwards to beconsidered. All that I now insist upon is that it is a different body. 

3. The Irish Parliament, a body admittedly constituted or to beconstituted under the Government of Ireland Bill, and therein called theIrish Legislature. 

4. The Imperial Parliament, a body in effect consisting of the BritishParliament with the addition of the Irish representatives, or in otherwords of the British Parliament combined with the Irish Parliament. Thisbody is convoked, as I have pointed out, only for the special purpose ofaltering the Gladstonian Constitution. It is termed in the Government ofIreland Bill the Imperial Parliament. 

What I am most anxious my readers should note is that the bodies 2 and 4are each termed in the Bill the Imperial Parliament, and thereby notonly confused together, but as far as possible each identified with theexisting Parliament of the United Kingdom, with which neither reallycorresponds. The British Parliament differs from the Parliament of theUnited Kingdom certainly in constitution, if not also in authority. 

The so-called Imperial Parliament nearly corresponds with the Parliamentof the United Kingdom in constitution, but differs from it in functionand authority. 

[67] In reference to the legal effect of the Government of Ireland Billon the sovereignty of Parliament, see on the one side the speeches ofSir Henry James of 13th May, 1886, '_The Times_ Parliamentary Debates, 'p. 468; of Mr. Finlay, 21st May, 1886, '_The Times_ ParliamentaryDebates, ' p. 614; and an article by Sir William Anson on the Governmentof Ireland Bill and the Sovereignty of Parliament in the _Law QuarterlyReview_ for October, 1886. See on the other side Mr. Gladstone'sspeeches in Parliament of 8th April, 1886, '_The Times_ ParliamentaryDebates, ' p. 125; of 13th April, 1886, _ibid. _ 255; of 10th May, 1886, _ibid. _ 404; and of 7th June, 1886, _ibid. _ p. 861; of Mr. Parnell of7th June, _ibid. _ p. 847; and 'The Government of Ireland Bill, ' being aspeech delivered by Mr. James Bryce, M. P. , on 17th May, 1886, andpublished as a pamphlet. My disagreement with Mr. Bryce's conclusionsmakes me anxious to express my great admiration for his speech, which isby far the best statement I have read of the view undoubtedly held byMr. Gladstone and his followers, that the Bill did not affect thesovereignty of Parliament. The reader should notice that the questionthroughout between the late Government and its opponents was as to theeffect of the Bill on the sovereignty of what I have called the "BritishParliament, " _i. E. _ the body, by whatever name it be called, whichconsists of the representatives of England and Scotland only, and doesnot include representatives of Ireland. 

[68] As to the sovereignty of Parliament, see Dicey, 'Law of theConstitution, ' pp. 35-79. 

[69] Government of Ireland Bill, clause 39. 

[70] I do not, of course, deny for a moment that an Act could be sodrawn as to give Ireland an Irish Parliament, to remove the Irishmembers from the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and at the same timeto reserve to the residue of the United Parliament, or Rump, the fullsovereignty now possessed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. WhatI do insist upon is, that it is open to question whether the Governmentof Ireland Bill was so drawn as to achieve these results. Nor is thequestion unimportant. The fundamental ambiguity of the Bill obviouslyarose from the fact that its authors, whilst wishing to promise inappearance to Ireland that the new Irish constitution should not bechanged by a body in which Ireland had no representatives, also wishedto soothe the apprehensions of England by tacitly reserving to theBritish Parliament the power of altering or repealing the Irishconstitution without recalling the representatives of Ireland. Theconsequence is that the Bill proclaims in so many words that itsprovisions shall be altered in one way only, but by implication, as itsauthors suppose, provides that its provisions may be altered in anotherand quite different way. If this is the intended effect of the Bill itought to have been made patent on its face. In constitutional matters, as indeed in all the serious concerns of life, ambiguity and uncertaintyof expression is the source both of misunderstanding and of danger. 

The question of the sovereignty of the British Parliament might, itshould be noted, arise in another and more perplexing form, whichreceived, unless I am mistaken, no attention during the debates on theIrish Government Bill. Admit for the sake of argument that the BritishParliament can legislate for Ireland; is it equally certain that theImperial Parliament (i. E. The British Parliament with the addition ofIrish representatives) cannot claim to legislate for England or for thewhole British Empire? No doubt the Gladstonian Constitution proposesthat the Imperial Parliament should be convened only for a limiteddefinite purpose; but is it certain that the Imperial Parliament, whichwould in its constituent parts be in effect the reunited Parliament ofthe United Kingdom, might not when convened claim to reassume sovereignpower? The addition of a hundred Irish members might turn a minority inthe British Parliament into a majority in the Imperial Parliament; canwe feel sure that the English minority in the British Parliament wouldresist the temptation to exalt the authority of a body in which theywould be supreme? The enquiry sounds to Englishmen a strange one; butthe annals of foreign constitutions suggest that an assembly which, though convoked for a particular purpose, is able from any point of viewto consider itself sovereign is with difficulty restrained fromasserting supreme power. From this side the Gladstonian Constitutionmight prove a menace to the supremacy of the British Parliament. 

CHAPTER VIII. 

CONCLUSION. 

[Sidenote: Survey of argument. ]

Let us here review and summarise our argument. The demand for Home Ruleis a demand for a change in the Constitution so fundamental as to amountto a legal and pacific revolution; such a demand requires for itssupport cogent, we may almost say conclusive, reasons. 

The positive arguments in favour of Home Rule are not easy to grasp. Their strength lies in their correspondence with the prevailing opinionsof the day. But though public opinion under any form of government, andespecially under the system of what is called popular government, deserves great consideration, still the value of a prevailing belief orconviction cannot be determined without examining the elements whichhave gone to its production. The state of opinion which favours HomeRule is found to result from various and even self-contradictoryfeelings, some of which belong to the highest and some to the lowestparts of human nature; humanity and a sense of justice are in thisinstance curiously combined with indolence and impatience. Thearguments again for Home Rule rest upon one dubious assumption and oneundoubted fact. The dubious assumption is that the root of Irishdiscontent is the outraged feeling of nationality. The undoubted fact isthat in Ireland, on all matters either directly or even remotelyconnected with the tenure of land, the law of the Courts is opposed tothe customs, to the moral sentiment, we may say to the law of thepeople; hence the Queen's tribunals are weak because they are notsupported by that popular assent whence judges derive half theirauthority; the tribunals of the League are strong because theirdecisions commend themselves to the traditional feeling of the people. But the doubtful hypothesis and the undoubted fact, though one or otherof them lies at the basis of all the strongest arguments in favour ofHome Rule, each invalidate almost as much as they support the contentionthat an Irish Parliament will prove the specific for the diseases (duein the first instance to the original vice of the connection betweenEngland and Ireland) under which Irish society now suffers. If thepassion of nationality is the cause of the malady, then the proposedcure is useless, for Home Rule will not turn the people of Ireland intoa nation. If a vicious system of land tenure is the cause oflawlessness, then the restoration or re-creation of an Irish Parliamentis needless, for the Parliament of the United Kingdom can reform, andought to reform, the land system of Ireland, and ought to be able tocarry through a final settlement of agrarian disputes with lessinjustice to individuals than could any Parliament sitting at Dublin. 

Reasoning, however, which fails to establish the expediency of creatingan Irish Parliament may prove, and in fact does amply prove, that thetask of maintaining peace order and freedom in Ireland is at the presentjuncture a matter of supreme difficulty. Any possible course, moreover, open to English statesmanship involves gigantic inconvenience, not tosay tremendous perils. A man involved practically in the conduct ofpublic affairs may easily bring himself to believe that the policy whichhe recommends is not only the best possible under the circumstances, butis also open to no serious objection. Outsiders, who in this matter arebetter because more impartial judges than the ablest of politicians, know that this is not so. We have nothing before us but a choice ofdifficulties or of evils. Every course is open to valid criticism. 

The maintenance of the Union must necessarily turn out as severe a taskas ever taxed a nation's energies, for to maintain the Treaty of Unionwith any good effect means that while refusing to accede to the wishesof millions of Irishmen, we must sedulously do justice to every fairdemand from Ireland, must strenuously and without either fear or favourassert the equal rights of landlords and tenants, of Protestants andCatholics, and must at the same time put down every outrage and reformevery abuse. 

To carry out by peaceful means the political separation of countrieswhich for good and for evil have for centuries been bound together byposition and by history, is an operation so critical that in thejudgment of statesmen it involves dangers too vast for seriouscontemplation. 

How, lastly, to devise a scheme of Home Rule which, while giving toIreland as much of legislative independence as may satisfy her wants orwishes, shall leave to England as much supremacy as may be necessary forthe prosperity of the United Kingdom, or for the continued existence ofthe British Empire, is a problem which jurists would find it hard tosolve as a matter of speculative science, and which politicians may notwithout reason hold to admit of no practical solution. 

Yet Maintenance of the Union, Separation, Home Rule, are names whichdesignate the only paths open to us. To one of these three courses weare absolutely tied down. Each path is arduous. To complain about thenature of things is childish. The course of wisdom is obvious. We mustall of us look facts in the face. "Things and actions are what they are, and the consequences of them will be what they will be. Why then shouldwe desire to be deceived?"[71] We must calmly compare the advantages ofthe three steep roads which lie open to the nation, and then on thestrength of this comparison determine the course which the nation isbound to follow by motives of expediency and of justice. 

Such a comparison we have already instituted:[72] its results to anyreader who assents to my train of reasoning must be obvious. 

The maintenance of the Union involves at the outset a strenuous and mostregrettable conflict with the will of the majority of the Irish people. It necessitates at once the strict enforcement of law, combined with theresolute effort to strip law of all injustice. It may require largepecuniary sacrifices, and it certainly will require a constancy in justpurpose which is supposed, and not without reason, to be speciallydifficult to a democracy. The difficulties on the other hand which meetus are not unprecedented, though some of them have assumed a new form. We have some advantages unknown to our forefathers: we can, more easilythan they could, remodel the practices of the Constitution, modify therules of party government, or, incredible as it may seem to members ofParliament, touch with profane hands the venerable procedure of theHouse of Commons. The English democracy, further, just because it is ademocracy, may, like the democracy of America, enforce with unflinchingfirmness laws which, representing the deliberate will of the people, aresupported by the vast majority of the citizens of the United Kingdom. The English democracy, because it is a democracy, may also with a goodconscience destroy the remnants of feudal institutions, and all systemsof land tenure found unsuitable to the wants of the Irish people. Nor, though the crisis be difficult, are there features lacking in thetendencies of the modern world which in the United Kingdom as in theUnited States and in the Swiss Confederacy favour every effort to upholdthe political unity of the State. Whatever be the difficulties (and theyare many) of maintaining the Union, not in form only but in reality, thepolicy is favoured no less by the current of English history, than bythe tendencies of modern civilization. It preserves that unity of theState which is essential to the authority of England and to themaintenance of the Empire. It provides, as matters now stand, the onlymeans of giving legal protection to a large body of loyal Britishsubjects. It is the refusal not only to abdicate legitimate power, but(what is of far more consequence) to renounce the fulfilment ofimperative duties. Nor does Union imply uniformity. Unity ofGovernment--equality of rights--diversity of institutions, --these arethe watchwords for all Unionists. To attain these objects may be beyondour power, and the limit to power is the limit to responsibility. Still, whatever may be the difficulties, or even the disadvantages, ofmaintaining the Union, it undoubtedly has in its favour not only all therecommendations which must belong to a policy of rational conservatism, but also these two decisive advantages--that it does sustain thestrength of the United Kingdom, and that it does not call for anydereliction of duty. 

Separation, or in other words the national independence of Ireland, isan idea which has not entered into the practical consideration ofEnglishmen. The evils which it threatens are patent: it at the samemoment diminishes the means of Great Britain and increases the callsupon her resources. It lowers the fame of the country, and plants by theside of England a foreign, it may be a hostile, neighbour; it involvesthe desertion of loyal fellow-citizens who have trusted in the goodfaith of England. Yet, on the other hand, the material losses andperhaps the dangers involved in the independence of Ireland are liableto exaggeration. Great Britain might find in her complete freedom ofaction and in restored unity of national sentiment elements of powerwhich might balance the obvious damage resulting from Separation; shemight also find it possible to make for the protection of Loyaliststerms more efficacious than any guarantees contained in the articles ofa statutory constitution. If, further, the spirit of nationality has thevivifying power ascribed to it by its votaries, then Ireland might gainfrom it blessings which cannot be conferred by any scheme of merelyParliamentary independence, since no form of Home Rule can transformIreland into a nation. 

For Home Rule it may be pleaded that it offers two obvious advantages:it satisfies the immediate wish of millions of Irishmen, and itfacilitates the adaptation of Irish institutions to Irish wants. Theseadvantageous results are the best that can be hoped for from Home Rule. They are real, and to underrate them is folly; the moral gain indeed ofmeeting the wishes of the body of the Irish people is so incalculable, that did Home Rule involve no intolerable evils a rational man mightthink it wise to venture on the experiment. Home Rule, it may besuggested, has the further gain of lessening English responsibility forthe government of Ireland. What it really might effect is to lightenEngland's sense of responsibility for misrule in Ireland. But this, sofar from being a blessing, would in truth be one of the greatest ofevils. The distinguished author of the Gladstonian Constitution deniesin his recent pamphlet that the Government of Ireland Bill would, ifpassed, repeal the Act of Union. To follow the reasoning by which thisdenial is made good is beyond my powers. But there is one aspect inwhich the statement, paradoxical though it be, that the Union is notdissolved by the existence of an Irish Parliament, has a most seriousmeaning, which ought to command hearty and general assent. Under theGladstonian Constitution, as under any form of Home Rule, the Governmentof the United Kingdom must still remain in the last resort responsiblefor the administration of justice throughout the whole realm. Admit forthe sake of argument that the Act of Union, though affected in everysection, is not repealed, then assuredly if men be wrongfully deprivedof their property, if they be denied their lawful freedom, if theysuffer unlawful injury to life or limb in any part of the UnitedKingdom, the responsibility for seeing that right be done falls on theexecutive, and in the last resort on the Parliament, of the UnitedKingdom. The delegated authority of a subordinate legislature will notfree the principal from the liability inherent in the delegation ofpower; and if Home Rule in Ireland fosters, as it must foster, thenotion that the United Kingdom is not as a whole responsible formisdeeds done in Ireland, this is one of the worst results of theproposed constitutional change. 

But putting this matter aside, an examination into the various formswhich Home Rule may assume leads to the conclusion that whatever be itshypothetical benefits it threatens more than countervailing loss toEngland. There is no need to do more than refer in most general terms toevils which have already been set forth in detail. Home Rule under twoof its three possible forms dislocates and weakens the whole EnglishConstitution. Under its least objectionable form--that of Colonialindependence--it brings upon England many of the perils which wouldfollow upon the national independence of Ireland; it involves, if theexperiment is to have a fair chance of success, large pecuniarysacrifice, and it does not present a reasonable hope of creating realharmony of feeling between Great Britain and Ireland. Home Rule, lastly, under whatever form, whilst not freeing England from moralresponsibility for protecting the rights of every British subject, doesvirtually give up the attempt to ensure to these rights more than anominal existence, and thus gives up the endeavour to enforce legal andequal justice between man and man. It must also be considered that anexamination into the different forms of Home Rule, while it shows thatno scheme of legislative independence for Ireland offers any promise offinality, also suggests that the form of Home Rule least injurious toEngland is the form which gives Ireland most independence. The inferencefrom these facts cannot be missed. Home Rule is the half-way house toSeparation. Grant it, and in a short time Irish independence will becomethe wish of England. If any thorough-paced Home Ruler admit thisconclusion, and suggest that Home Rule is a desirable transition towardsSeparation, the answer is that Home Rule is such a transition, butassuredly that such a transition is not to be desired. If one country isdestined to become independent of another it is better for each not toexperience the disappointment and the heartburning which accompany aperiod of unwilling connection. 

This is the result of the comparison we have instituted between thethree possible courses open to England. If the comparison be just theconclusion to which its leads is obvious. The maintenance of the Unionis at this moment to England a matter of duty even more than ofinterest. If the time should come when the effort to maintain the unityof the State is too great for the power of Great Britain, or the onlymeans by which it is found maintainable are measures clearly repugnantto the humanity or the justice or the democratic principles of theEnglish people, --if it should turn out that after every effort toenforce just laws by just methods our justice itself, from whatevercause, remains hateful to the mass of the Irish people, --then it will beclear that the Union must for the sake of England, no less than ofIreland, come to an end. The alternative policy will then be not HomeRule but Separation. We shall save the unity at the expense of lesseningthe territory of the State; we shall escape self-reproach because havingreached the limit of our powers we shall also have filled up the measureof our obligations. But if (as there is every reason to suppose)agrarian misery is the source of Irish discontent, and agrarian miserysprings in part from bad administration, and in part from the lawgoverning the tenure of land; if, in general terms, the undoubted illsof Ireland are curable by justice, even though justice proceed from theParliament of the United Kingdom--an assembly, be it noted, in which thevoice of Ireland is freely heard--then there is no need to indulge inspeculations, always dangerous, upon a possible remedy which may neverbe necessary, and which, while the inhabitants of England and Irelandare still fellow-citizens of one State, it is painful even tocontemplate. On the whole, then, it appears that whatever changes orcalamities the future may have in store, the maintenance of the Union isat this day the one sound policy for England to pursue. It is soundbecause it is expedient; it is sound because it is just. 

[Sidenote: Character of England's case]

This is the case of England against Home Rule; it is a case which, however feebly stated--and I may well have failed to state it withforce--is founded on argument. It is a case which makes and need make noappeal to rhetoric; it is a case which indeed, like all sound views ofnational policy, is grounded on the interest of the greater number ofthe citizens of the State, but it is a case not grounded on any merepride of power, a case not based on any disregard of justice, a casewhich above all involves no unfriendliness to Irishmen, and noassumption, either tacit or express, that there has fallen to Irishmen agreater amount of either original or acquired sin than falls to otherhuman beings, it is a case which does not assume that real or supposeddifferences of race are a legitimate ground for inequality of rights. Any one, indeed, after having to the best of his power tried to statewhat can be said with fairness on one side of a question such as thatnow at issue between the majority and the minority of the citizens ofthe United Kingdom, may well call to mind the conclusion of the nobleststatement ever made by genius of a case involving momentous nationalinterests:--

"It would be presumption in me to do more than to make a case. Manythings occur. But as they, like all political measures, depend ondispositions, tempers, means, and external circumstances for all theireffect, not being well assured of these, I do not know how to let looseany speculations of mine on the subject. The evil is stated in myopinion as it exists. The remedy must be where power, wisdom, andinformation, I hope, are more united with good intentions than they canbe with me. I have done with this subject, I believe for ever. It hasgiven me many anxious moments for the two last years. If a great changeis to be made in human affairs, the minds of men will be fitted to it;the general opinions and feelings will draw that way. Every fear, everyhope, will forward it; and then they who persist in opposing this mightycurrent in human affairs will appear rather to resist the decrees ofProvidence itself, than the mere designs of men. They will not beresolute and firm, but perverse and obstinate. "[73]

The sentiment of these words is one of eternal application. Still atthis great crisis in the fortunes of our country, when every course isinvolved in undeniable perplexity, and surrounded by admitted danger, there are two principles to which we may confidently appeal; for it isby habitual adherence to them that England has grown to greatness. Thesetwo principles are the maintenance of the supremacy of the whole State, and the use of that supremacy for the purpose of securing to everycitizen, whether rich or poor, the rights of liberty and of propertyconferred upon him by law. To maintain that any policy, howeverplausible, by which these principles are violated, must undermine themoral basis of the Constitution, and must therefore lead the nation tocalamity and to disgrace, is at any rate to plead a cause which restsupon a firm foundation of plain morality. The case may be ill-stated, the arguments by which it is defended may admit of reply, but it is acase which a just man may put forward without shame, and a humane manmay support without compunction. 

FOOTNOTES:

[71] Butler's Sermons; vii. , p. 136, ed. 1726. 

[72] See Chapters V. , VI. , & VII. , _ante. _

[73] Burke's Works, vol. Vii. , pp. 84, 85. 

APPENDIX. 

GOVERNMENT OF IRELAND BILL. [74]

ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES. 

PART I. 

_Legislative Authority_. 

CLAUSE. 

1. Establishment of Irish Legislature. 

2. Powers of Irish Legislature. 

3. Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. 

4. Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. 

5. Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body. 

6. Duration of the Irish Legislative Body. 

_Executive Authority_. 

7. Constitution of the Executive Authority. 

8. Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. 

_Constitution of Legislative Body_. 

9. Constitution of Irish Legislative Body. 

10. First order. 

11. Second order. 

_Finance_. 

12. Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund. 

13. Annual contributions from Ireland to Consolidated Fund of UnitedKingdom. 

14. Collection and application of customs and excise duties in Ireland. 

15. Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund. 

16. Irish Church Fund. 

17. Public loans. 

18. Additional aid in case of war. 

19. Money bills and votes. 

20. Exchequer divisions and revenue actions. 

_Police_. 

21. Police. 

 * * * * *

PART II. 

SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS. 

_Powers of Her Majesty_. 

22. Powers over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty. 

_Legislative Body_. 

23. Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled. 

24. Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament. 

_Decision of Constitutional Questions_. 

25. _Constitutional questions to be submitted to Judicial Committee_. 

_Lord-Lieutenant. _

26. Office of Lord-Lieutenant. 

_Judges and Civil Servants_. 

27. Judges to be removable only on address. 

28. Provision as to judges and other persons having salaries charged onthe Consolidated Fund. 

29. As to persons holding civil service appointments. 

30. Provision for existing pensions and superannuation allowances. 

_Transitory Provisions_. 

31. Transitory provisions in Schedule. 

_Miscellaneous_. 

32. Post Office and savings banks. 

33. Audit. 

34. Application of parliamentary law. 

35. Regulations for carrying Act into effect. 

36. Saving of powers of House of Lords. 

37. Saving of Rights of Parliament. 

38. Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, &c. 

39. Mode of alteration of Act. 

40. Definitions. 

41. Short title of Act. 

SCHEDULES. 

 * * * * *

_A Bill to amend the provision for the future Government of Ireland_. 

[Sidenote: A. D. 1886]

Be it enacted by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with theadvice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, inthis present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, asfollows:

PART I. 

_Legislative Authority_. 

[Sidenote: Establishment of Irish Legislature. ]

1. _On and after the appointed day there shall be established inIreland a Legislature consisting of Her Majesty the Queen and an IrishLegislative Body. _

[Sidenote: Powers of Irish Legislature. ]

2. _With the exceptions and subject to the restrictions in this Actmentioned, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty the Queen, by and with theadvice of the Irish Legislative Body, to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland, and by any such law to alter and repealany law in Ireland. _

[Sidenote: Exceptions from powers of Irish Legislature. ]

3. _The Legislature of Ireland shall not make laws relating to thefollowing matters or any of them:--_

 (1. ) _The status or dignity of the Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency;_

 (2. ) _The making of peace or war;_

 (3. ) _The army, navy, militia, volunteers, or other military or naval forces, or the defence of the realm;_

 (4. ) _Treaties and other relations with foreign States, or the relations between the various parts of Her Majesty's dominions;_

 (5. ) _Dignities or titles of honour;_

 (6. ) _Prize or booty of war;_

 (7. ) _Offences against the law of nations; or offences committed in violation of any treaty made, or hereafter to be made, between Her Majesty and any foreign State; or offences committed on the high seas;_

 (8. ) _Treason, alienage, or naturalization;_

 (9. ) _Trade, navigation, or quarantine;_

 (10. ) _The postal and telegraph service, except as hereafter in this Act mentioned with respect to the transmission of letters and telegrams in Ireland;_

 (11. ) _Beacons, lighthouses, or sea marks;_

 (12. ) _The coinage; the value of foreign money; legal tender; or weights and measures; or_

 (13. ) _Copyright, patent rights, or other exclusive rights to the use or profits of any works or inventions. _

Any law made in contravention of this section shall be void. 

[Sidenote: Restrictions on powers of Irish Legislature. ]

4. _The Irish Legislature shall not make any law--_

 (1. ) _Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or_

 (2. ) _Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on account of religious belief; or_

 (3. ) _Abrogating or derogating from the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity; or_

 (4. ) _Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money without attending the religious instruction at that school; or_

 (5. ) _Impairing, without either the leave of Her Majesty in Council first obtained on an address presented by the Legislative Body of Ireland, or the consent of the corporation interested, the rights, property, or privileges of any existing corporation incorporated by royal charter or local and general Act of Parliament; or_

 (6. ) _Imposing or relating to duties of customs and duties of excise, as defined by this Act, or either of such duties, or affecting any Act relating to such duties or either of them; or_

 (7. ) _Affecting this Act, except in so far as it is declared to be alterable by the Irish Legislature. _

[Sidenote: Prerogatives of Her Majesty as to Irish Legislative Body. ]

5. _Her Majesty the Queen shall have the same prerogatives withrespect to summoning, proroguing, and dissolving the Irish LegislativeBody as Her Majesty has with respect to summoning, proroguing, anddissolving the Imperial Parliament. _

[Sidenote: Duration of the Irish Legislative Body. ]

6. _The Irish Legislative Body whenever summoned may have continuancefor five years and no longer, to be reckoned from the day on which anysuch Legislative Body is appointed to meet. _

_Executive Authority_. 

[Sidenote: Constitution of the Executive Authority. ]

7. --(1. ) _The Executive Government of Ireland shall continue vested inHer Majesty, and shall be carried on by the Lord-Lieutenant on behalf ofHer Majesty with the aid of such officers and such Council as to HerMajesty may from time to time seem fit. _

(2. ) _Subject to any instructions which may from time to time be givenby Her Majesty, the Lord-Lieutenant shall give or withhold the assent ofHer Majesty to Bills passed by the Irish Legislative Body, and shallexercise the prerogatives of Her Majesty in respect of the summoning, proroguing, and dissolving of the Irish Legislative Body, and anyprerogatives the exercise of which may be delegated to him by HerMajesty. _

[Sidenote: Use of Crown lands by Irish Government. ]

8. _Her Majesty may, by Order in Council, from time to time placeunder the control of the Irish Government, for the purposes of thatGovernment, any such lands and buildings in Ireland as may be vested inor held in trust for Her Majesty. _

_Constitution of Legislative Body. _

[Sidenote: Constitution of Irish Legislative Body. ]

9. --(1. ) _The Irish Legislative Body shall consist of a first andsecond order. _

(2. ) _The two orders shall deliberate together, and shall vote together, except that, if any question arises in relation to legislation or to theStanding Orders or Rules of Procedure or to any other matter in thatbehalf in this Act specified, and such question is to be determined byvote, each order shall, if a majority of the members present of eitherorder demand a separate vote, give their votes in like manner as if theywere separate Legislative Bodies; and if the result of the voting of thetwo orders does not agree the question shall be resolved in thenegative. _

[Sidenote: First order. ]

10. --(1. ) The first order of the Irish Legislative Body shall consistof one hundred and three members, of whom seventy-five shall be electivemembers and twenty-eight peerage members. 

(2. ) Each elective member shall at the date of his election and duringhis period of membership be bonâ fide possessed of property which--

 (_a. _) if realty, or partly realty and partly personalty, yields two hundred pounds a year or upwards, free of all charges; or

 (_b. _) if personalty yields the same income, or is of the capital value of four thousand pounds or upwards, free of all charges. 

(2. ) For the purpose of electing the elective members of the first orderof the Legislative Body, Ireland shall be divided into the electoraldistricts specified in the First Schedule to this Act, and each suchdistrict shall return the number of members in that behalf specified inthat Schedule. 

(3. ) The elective members shall be elected by the registered electors ofeach electoral district, and for that purpose a register of electorsshall be made annually. 

(4. ) An elector in each electoral district shall be qualified asfollows, that is to say, he shall be of full age, and not subject to anylegal incapacity, and shall have been during the twelve months nextpreceding the _twentieth day of July_ in any year the owner or occupierof some land or tenement within the district of a net annual value oftwenty-five pounds or upwards. 

(5. ) The term of office of an elective member shall be _ten years_. 

(6. ) In every fifth year thirty-seven or thirty-eight of the electivemembers, as the case requires, shall retire from office, and theirplaces shall be filled by election; the members to retire shall be thosewho have been members for the longest time without re-election. 

(7. ) The offices of the peerage members shall be filled as follows; thatis to say, --

 (_a. _) Each of the Irish peers who on the appointed day is one of the twenty-eight Irish representative peers, shall, on giving his written assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, become a peerage member of the first order of the Irish Legislative Body; and if at any time within _thirty years_ after the appointed day any such peer vacates his office by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled by the election to that office by the Irish peers of one of their number in manner heretofore in use respecting the election of Irish representative peers, subject to adaptation as provided by this Act, and if the vacancy is not so filled within the proper time it shall be filled by the election of an elective member. 

 (_b. _) If any of the twenty-eight peers aforesaid does not within _one month_ after the appointed day give such assent to be a peerage member of the first order, the vacancy so created shall be filled up as if he had assented and vacated his office by resignation. 

(8. ) A peerage member shall be entitled to hold office during his life, or until the expiration of _thirty years_ from the appointed day, whichever period is the shortest. At the expiration of such _thirtyyears_ the offices of all the peerage members shall be vacated as ifthey were dead, and their places shall be filled by elective membersqualified and elected in manner provided by this Act with respect toelective members of the first order, and such elective members may bedistributed by the Irish Legislature among the electoral districts, so, however, that care shall be taken to give additional members to the mostpopulous places. 

(9. ) The offices of members of the first order shall not be vacated bythe dissolution of the Legislative Body. 

(10. ) The provisions in the Second Schedule to this Act relating tomembers of the first order of the Legislative Body shall be of the sameforce as if they were enacted in the body of this Act. 

[Sidenote: Second order. ]

11. --(1. ) Subject as in this section hereafter mentioned, the secondorder of the Legislative body shall consist of two hundred and fourmembers. 

(2. ) The members of the second order shall be chosen by the existingconstituencies of Ireland, two by each constituency, with the exceptionof the city of Cork, which shall be divided into two divisions in mannerset forth in the Third Schedule to this Act, and two members shall bechosen by each of such divisions. 

(3. ) Any person who, on the appointed day, is a member representing anexisting Irish constituency in the House of Commons shall, on giving hiswritten assent to the Lord-Lieutenant, become a member of the secondorder of the Irish Legislative Body as if he had been elected by theconstituency which he was representing in the House of Commons. Each ofthe members for the city of Cork, on the said day, may elect for whichof the divisions of that city he wishes to be deemed to have beenelected. 

(4. ) If any member does not give such written assent within _one month_after the appointed day, his place shall be filled by election in thesame manner and at the same time as if he had assented and vacated hisoffice by death. 

(5. ) If the same person is elected to both orders, he shall, within_seven days_ after the meeting of the Legislative Body, or if the Bodyis sitting at the time of the election, within _seven days_ after theelection, elect in which order he will serve, and his membership of theother order shall be void and be filled by a fresh election. 

(6. ) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for theLegislature of Ireland at any time to pass an Act enabling the RoyalUniversity of Ireland to return not more than two members to the secondorder of the Irish Legislative Body in addition to the number of membersabove mentioned. 

(7. ) Notwithstanding anything in this Act, it shall be lawful for theIrish Legislature, after the first dissolution of the Legislative Bodywhich occurs, to alter the constitution or election of the second orderof that body, due regard being had in the distribution of members to thepopulation of the constituencies; provided that no alteration shall bemade in the number of such order. 

_Finance. _

[Sidenote: Taxes and separate Consolidated Fund. ]

12. --(1. ) For the purpose of providing for the public service ofIreland the Irish Legislature may impose taxes, other than duties ofcustoms or excise as defined by this Act, which duties shall continue tobe imposed and levied by and under the direction of the ImperialParliament only. 

(2. ) On and after the appointed day there shall be an Irish ConsolidatedFund separate from the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 

(3. ) All taxes imposed by the Legislature of Ireland and all otherpublic revenues under the control of the Government of Ireland shall, subject to any provisions touching the disposal thereof contained in anyAct passed in the present session respecting the sale and purchase ofland in Ireland, be paid into the Irish Consolidated Fund, and beappropriated to the public service of Ireland according to law. 

[Sidenote: Annual contributions from Ireland to Consolidated Fund ofUnited Kingdom. ]

13. --(1. ) Subject to the provisions for the reduction or cesserthereof in this section mentioned, there shall be made on the part ofIreland to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom the followingannual contributions in every financial year; that is to say, --

 (_a. _) The sum of _one million four hundred and sixty-six, thousand pounds_ on account of the interest on and management of the Irish share of the National Debt:

 (_b. _) The sum of _one million six hundred and sixty-six thousand pounds_ on account of the expenditure on the army and navy of the United Kingdom:

 (_c. _) The sum _of one hundred and ten thousand pounds_ on account of the Imperial civil expenditure of the United Kingdom:

 (_d. _) The sum of _one million pounds_ on account of the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police. 

(2. ) During the period of _thirty_ years from this section taking;effect the said annual contributions shall not be increased, but may bereduced or cease as hereinafter mentioned. After the expiration of thesaid _thirty years_ the said contributions shall, save as otherwiseprovided by this section, continue until altered in manner provided withrespect to the alteration of this Act. 

(3. ) The Irish share of the National Debt shall be reckoned at_forty-eight million pounds_ Bank annuities, and there shall be paid inevery financial year on behalf of Ireland to the Commissioners for theReduction of the National Debt an annual sum of _three hundred and sixtythousand pounds_, and the permanent annual charge for the National Debton the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall be reduced by thatamount, and the said annual sum shall be applied by the saidCommissioners as a sinking fund for the redemption of the National Debt, and the Irish share of the National Debt shall be reduced by the amountof the National Debt so redeemed, and the said annual contribution onaccount of the interest on and management of the Irish share of theNational Debt shall from time to time be reduced by a sum equal to theinterest upon the amount of the National Debt from time to time soredeemed, but that last-mentioned sum shall be paid annually to theCommissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt in addition to theabove-mentioned annual sinking fund, and shall be so paid and be appliedas if it were part of that sinking fund. 

(4. ) As soon as an amount of the National Debt equal to the said Irishshare thereof has been redeemed under the provisions of this section, the said annual contribution on account of the interest on andmanagement of the Irish share of the National Debt, and the said annualsum for a sinking fund shall cease. 

(5. ) If it appears to Her Majesty that the expenditure in respect of thearmy and navy of the United Kingdom, or in respect of Imperial civilexpenditure of the United Kingdom, for any financial year has been lessthan _fifteen_ times the amount of the contributions above-named onaccount of the same matter, a sum equal to _one fifteenth_ part of thediminution shall be deducted from the current annual contribution forthe same matter. 

(6. ) The sum paid from time to time by the Commissioners of HerMajesty's Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues to the Consolidated Fund ofthe United Kingdom on account of the hereditary revenues of the Crown inIreland shall be credited to the Irish Government, and go in reductionof the said annual contribution payable on account of the Imperial civilexpenditure of the United Kingdom, but shall not be taken into accountin calculating whether such diminution as above mentioned has or has nottaken place in such expenditure. 

(7. ) If it appears to Her Majesty that the expenditure in respect of theRoyal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Metropolitan Police for anyfinancial year has been less than the contribution above named onaccount of such constabulary and police, the current contribution shallbe diminished by the amount of such difference. 

(8. ) This section shall take effect from and after the _thirty-first dayof March, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven_. 

[Sidenote: Collection and application of customs and excise duties inIreland. ]

14. --(1. ) On and after such day as the Treasury may direct all moneysfrom time to time collected in Ireland on account of the duties ofcustoms or the duties of excise as defined by this Act shall, under suchregulations as the Treasury from time to time make, be carried to aseparate account (in this Act referred to as the customs and exciseaccount) and applied in the payment of the following sums in priority asmentioned in this section; that is to say, --

 First, of such sum as is from time to time directed by the Treasury in respect of the costs, charges, and expenses of and incident to the collection and management of the said duties in Ireland not exceeding four per cent. Of the amount collected there;

 Secondly, of the annual contributions required by this Act to be made to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom;

 Thirdly, of the annual sums required by this Act to be paid to the Commissioners for the Reduction of the National Debt;

 Fourthly, of all sums by this Act declared to be payable out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account;

 Fifthly, of all sums due to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom for interest or sinking fund, in respect of any loans made by the issue of bank annuities or otherwise to the Government of Ireland under any Act passed in the present session relating to the purchase and sale of land in Ireland, so far as such sums are not defrayed out of the moneys received under such Act;

(2. ) So much of the moneys carried to a separate account under thissection as the Treasury consider are not, and are not likely to be, required to meet the above-mentioned payments, shall from time to timebe paid over and applied as part of the public revenues under thecontrol of the Irish Government. 

[Sidenote: Charges on Irish Consolidated Fund. ]

15. --(1. ) There shall be charged on the Irish Consolidated Fund inpriority as mentioned in this section:--

 First, such portion of the sums directed by this Act to be paid out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account in priority to any payment for the public revenues of Ireland, as those moneys are insufficient to pay;

 Secondly, all sums due in respect of any debt incurred by the Government of Ireland, whether for interest, management, or sinking fund;

 Thirdly, all sums which at the passing of this Act are charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom in respect of Irish services other than the salary of the Lord-Lieutenant;

 Fourthly, the salaries of all judges of the Supreme Court of Judicature or other superior court in Ireland, or of any county or other like court, who are appointed after the passing of this Act, and the pensions of such judges;

 Fifthly, any other sums charged by this Act on the Irish Consolidated Fund. 

(2. ) It shall be the duty of the Legislature of Ireland to impose allsuch taxes, duties, or imposts as will raise a sufficient revenue tomeet all sums charged for the time being on the Irish Consolidated Fund. 

[Sidenote: Irish Church Fund. ]

16. --(1. ) Until all charges which are payable out of the Churchproperty in Ireland, and are guaranteed by the Treasury, have been fullypaid, the Irish Land Commission shall continue as heretofore to exist, with such Commissioners and officers receiving such salaries as theTreasury may from time to time appoint, and to administer the Churchproperty and apply the income and other moneys receivable therefrom; andso much of the salaries of such Commissioners and officers and expensesof the office as is not paid out of the Church property shall be paidout of moneys carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, and if those moneys are insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund ofIreland, and if not so paid, shall be paid out of moneys provided byParliament. 

Provided as follows:--

 (_a. _) All charges on the Church property for which a guarantee has been given by the Treasury before the passing of this Act shall, so far as they are not paid out of such property, be paid out of the moneys carried to the Customs and Excise account under this Act, and if such moneys are insufficient, the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, without prejudice nevertheless to the guarantee of the Treasury;

 (_b. _) All charges on the Church property, for which no guarantee has been given by the Treasury before the passing of this Act shall be charged on the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, but shall not be guaranteed by the Treasury nor charged on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 

(2. ) Subject to any existing charges on the Church property, suchproperty shall belong to the Irish Government and any portion of theannual revenue thereof which the Treasury, on the application of theIrish Government, certify at the end of any financial year not to berequired for meeting charges, shall be paid over and applied as part ofthe public revenues under the control of the Irish Government. 

(3. ) As soon as all charges on the Church property guaranteed by theTreasury have been paid, such property may be managed and administered, and subject to existing charges thereon disposed of, and the income orproceeds thereof applied, in such manner as the Irish Legislature mayfrom time to time direct. 

[Sidenote: 32 & 33 Vict. C. 42, 44 & 45 Vict. C. 71. ]

(4. ) "Church property" in this section means all property accruing underthe Irish Church Act, 1869, and transferred to the Irish Land Commissionby the Irish Church Act Amendment Act, 1881. 

[Sidenote: Public loans. ]

17. --(1. ) All sums due for principal or interest to the Public WorksLoan Commissioners or to the Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland inrespect of existing loans advanced on any security in Ireland shall onand after the appointed day be due to the Government of Ireland insteadof the said Commissioners, and such body of persons as the Government ofIreland may appoint for the purpose shall have all the powers of thesaid Commissioners or their secretary for enforcing payment of suchsums, and all securities for such sums given to such Commissioners ortheir secretary shall have effect as if the said body were thereinsubstituted for those Commissioners or their secretary. 

(2. ) For the repayment of the said loans to the Consolidated Fund of theUnited Kingdom, the Irish Government shall pay annually into that fundby half-yearly payments on the _first day of January_ and _the first dayof July_, or on such other days as may be agreed on, such instalments ofthe principal of the said loans as will discharge all the loans within_thirty years_ from the appointed day, and shall also pay interesthalf-yearly on so much of the said principal as from time to timeremains unpaid at the rate of _three_ per cent. Per annum, and suchinstalments of principal and interest shall be paid out of the moneyscarried to the customs and excise account under this Act, and if thoseare insufficient, out of the Consolidated Fund of Ireland. 

[Sidenote: Additional aid in case of war. ]

18. If Her Majesty declares that a state of war exists and is pleasedto signify such declaration to the Irish Legislative Body by speech ormessage, it shall be lawful for the Irish Legislature to appropriate afurther sum out of the Consolidated Fund of Ireland in aid of the armyor navy, or other measures which Her Majesty may take for theprosecution of the war and defence of the realm, and to provide andraise money for that purpose; and all moneys so provided and raised, whether by loan, taxation, or otherwise, shall be paid into theConsolidated Fund of the United Kingdom. 

[Sidenote: Money bills and votes. ]

19. --(1. ) It shall not be lawful for the Irish Legislative Body toadopt or pass any vote, resolution, address, or Bill for the raising orappropriation for any purpose of any part of the public revenue ofIreland, or of any tax, duty, or impost, except in pursuance of arecommendation from Her Majesty signified through the Lord-Lieutenant inthe session in which such vote, resolution, address, or Bill isproposed. 

(2. ) Notwithstanding that the Irish Legislature is prohibited by thisAct from making laws relating to certain subjects, that Legislature may, with the assent of Her Majesty in Council first obtained, appropriateany part of the Irish public revenue, or any tax, duty, or impostimposed by such Legislature, for the purpose of, or in connection with, such subjects. 

[Sidenote: Exchequer Division and revenue actions. ]

20. --(1. ) On and after the appointed day, the Exchequer Division ofthe High Court of Justice shall continue to be a Court of Exchequer forrevenue purposes under this Act, and whenever any vacancy occurs in theoffice of any judge of such Exchequer Division, his successor shall beappointed by Her Majesty on the joint recommendation of theLord-Lieutenant of Ireland and the Lord High Chancellor of GreatBritain. 

(2. ) The judges of such Exchequer Division appointed after the passingof this Act shall be removable only by Her Majesty on address from thetwo Houses of the Imperial Parliament, and shall receive the samesalaries and pensions as those payable at the passing of this Act to theexisting judges of such division, unless with the assent of Her Majestyin Council first obtained, the Irish Legislature alters such salaries orpensions, and such salaries and pensions shall be paid out of the moneyscarried to the customs and excise account in pursuance of this Act, andif the same are insufficient shall be paid out of the Irish ConsolidatedFund, and if not so paid shall be paid out of the Consolidated Fund ofthe United Kingdom. 

(3. ) An alteration of any rules relating to the procedure in such legalproceedings as are mentioned in this section shall not be made exceptwith the approval of the Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, and thesittings of the Exchequer division and the judges thereof shall beregulated with the like approval. 

(4. ) All legal proceedings instituted in Ireland by or against theCommissioners or any officers of customs or excise, or the Treasury, shall, if so required by any party to such proceedings, be heard anddetermined before the judges of such Exchequer division, or some or oneof them, and any appeal from the decision in any such legal proceeding, if by a judge, shall lie to the said division, and if by the Exchequerdivision, shall lie to the House of Lords, and not to any othertribunal; and if it is made to appear to such judges, or any of them, that any decree or judgment in any such proceeding as aforesaid, has notbeen duly enforced by the sheriff or other officer whose duty it is toenforce the same, such judges or judge shall appoint some officer toenforce such judgment or decree; and it shall be the duty of suchofficer to take proper steps to enforce the same, and for that purposesuch officer and all persons employed by him shall be entitled to thesame immunities, powers, and privileges as are by law conferred on asheriff and his officers. 

(5. ) All sums recovered in respect of duties of Customs and Excise, orunder any Act relating thereto, or by an officer of Customs or Excise, shall, notwithstanding anything in any other Act, be paid to theTreasury, and carried to the Customs and Excise account under this Act. 

_Police_. 

21. The following regulations shall be made with respect to Police, police in Ireland;

(_a. _) The Dublin Metropolitan Police shall continue and be subject asheretofore to the control of the Lord-Lieutenant as representing HerMajesty for a period of _two years_ from the passing of this Act, andthereafter until any alteration is made by Act of the Legislature ofIreland, but such Act shall provide for the proper saving of all thenexisting interests, whether as regards pay, pensions, superannuationallowances, or otherwise. 

(_b. _) The Royal Irish Constabulary shall, while that force subsists, continue and be subject as heretofore to the control of theLord-Lieutenant as representing Her Majesty. 

(_c. _) The Irish Legislature may provide for the establishment andmaintenance of a police force in counties and boroughs in Ireland underthe control of local authorities, and arrangements may be made betweenthe Treasury and the Irish Government for the establishment andmaintenance of police reserves. 

 * * * * *

PART II. 

SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS. 

_Powers of Her Majesty_. 

[Sidenote: Power over certain lands reserved to Her Majesty. ]

22. On and after the appointed day there shall be reserved to HerMajesty--

(1. ) The power of erecting forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, andother buildings for military or naval purposes;

(2. ) The power of taking waste land, and, on making due compensation, any other land, for the purpose of erecting such forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, or other buildings as aforesaid, and for any othermilitary or naval purpose, or the defence of the realm. 

_Legislative Body. _

[Sidenote: Veto by first order of Legislative Body, how over-ruled. ]

23. If a Bill or any provision of a Bill is lost by disagreementbetween the two orders of the Legislative Body, and after a periodending with a dissolution of the Legislative Body, or the period of_three years_, whichever period is longest, such Bill, or a Billcontaining the said provision, is again considered by the LegislativeBody, and such Bill or provision is adopted by the second order andnegatived by the first order, the same shall be submitted to the wholeLegislative Body, both orders of which shall vote together on the Billor provision, and the same shall be adopted or rejected according to thedecision of the majority of the members so voting together. 

[Sidenote: Cesser of power of Ireland to return members to Parliament. ]

24. On and after the appointed day Ireland shall cease, except in theevent hereafter in this Act mentioned, to return representative peers tothe House of Lords or members to the House of Commons, and the personswho on the said day are such representative peers and members shallcease as such to be members of the House of Lords and House of Commonsrespectively. 

_Decision of Constitutional Questions. _

[Sidenote: Constitutional questions to be submitted to JudicialCommittee. ]

25. _Questions arising as to the powers conferred on the Legislatureof Ireland under this Act shall be determined as follows_:--

 (a. ) _If any such question arises on any Bill passed by the Legislative Body, the Lord-Lieutenant may refer such question to Her Majesty in Council;_

 (b. ) _If, in the course of any action or other legal proceeding, such question arises on any Act of the Irish Legislature, any party to such action or other legal proceeding may, subject to the rules in this section mentioned, appeal from a decision on such question to Her Majesty in Council;_

 (c. ) _If any such question arises otherwise than as aforesaid on any Act of the Irish Legislature, the Lord-Lieutenant or one of Her Majesty's principal Secretaries of State may refer such question to Her Majesty in Council;_

 (d. ) _Any question referred or appeal brought under this section to Her Majesty in Council shall be referred for the consideration of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council;_

 (e. ) _The decision of Her Majesty in Council on any question referred or appeal brought under this section shall be final, and a Bill which may be so decided to be, or contain a provision, in excess of the powers of the Irish Legislature shall not be assented to by the Lord-Lieutenant; and a provision of any Act which is so decided to be in excess of the powers of the Irish Legislature shall be void;_

 (f. ) _There shall be added to the Judicial Committee when sitting for the purpose of considering questions under this section, such members of Her Majesty's Privy Council, being or having been Irish judges, as to Her Majesty may seem, meet. _

 (g. ) _Her Majesty may, by Order in Council from time to time, make rules as to the cases and mode in which and the conditions under which, in pursuance of this section, questions may be referred and appeals brought to Her Majesty in Council, and as to the consideration thereof by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and any rules so made shall be of the same force as if they were enacted in this Act. _

 (h. ) _An appeal shall not lie to the House of Lords in respect of any question in respect of which an appeal can be had to Her Majesty in Council in pursuance of this section_. 

_Lord-Lieutenant. _

[Sidenote: Office of Lord-Lieutenant. ]

26. --(1. ) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in anyAct of Parliament, every subject of Her Majesty shall be eligible tohold and enjoy the office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland, withoutreference to his religious belief. 

(2. ) The salary of the Lord-Lieutenant shall continue to be charged onthe Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, and the expenses of hishousehold and establishment shall continue to be defrayed out of moneysto be provided by Parliament. 

(3. ) All existing powers vested by Act of Parliament or otherwise in theChief Secretary for Ireland may, if no such officer is appointed, beexercised by the Lord-Lieutenant until other provision is made by Act ofthe Irish Legislature. 

(4. ) The Legislature of Ireland shall not pass any Act relating to theoffice or functions of the Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. 

_Judges and Civil Servants_. 

[Sidenote: Judges to be removable only on address. ]

27. A Judge of the Supreme Court of Judicature or other superior courtof Ireland, or of any county court or other court with a likejurisdiction in Ireland, appointed after the passing of this Act, shallnot be removed from his office except in pursuance of an address to HerMajesty from both orders of the Legislative Body voting separately, norshall his salary be diminished or right to pension altered during hiscontinuance in office. 

[Sidenote: Provisions as to judges and other persons having salariescharged on the Consolidated Fund. ]

28. --(1. ) All persons who at the passing of this Act are judges of theSupreme Court of Judicature or county court judges, or hold any otherjudicial position in Ireland, shall, if they are removable at present onaddress to Her Majesty of both Houses of Parliament, continue to beremovable only upon such address from both Houses of the ImperialParliament, and if removable in any other manner shall continue to beremovable in like manner as heretofore; and such persons, and also allpersons at the passing of this Act in the permanent civil service of theCrown in Ireland whose salaries are charged on the Consolidated Fund ofthe United Kingdom, shall continue to hold office and to be entitled tothe same salaries, pensions, and superannuation allowances asheretofore, and to be liable to perform the same or analogous duties asheretofore; and the salaries of such persons shall be paid out of themoneys carried to the customs and excise account under this Act, or ifthese moneys are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, andif the same are not so paid, shall continue charged on the ConsolidatedFund of the United Kingdom. 

(2. ) _If any of these said persons retires from office with theapprobation of Her Majesty before he has completed the period of serviceentitling him to a pension, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty, if shethinks fit, to grant to that person such pension, not exceeding thepension to which he would have been entitled if he had completed thesaid period of service, as to Her Majesty seems meet. _

[Sidenote: As to persons holding civil service appointments. ]

29. --(1. ) All persons not above provided for and at the passing ofthis Act serving in Ireland in the permanent civil service of the Crownshall continue to hold their offices and receive the same salaries, andto be entitled to the same gratuities and superannuation allowances asheretofore, and shall be liable to perform the same duties as heretoforeor duties of similar rank, but any of such persons shall be entitled atthe expiration of _two years_ after the passing of this Act to retirefrom office, and at any time if required by the Irish Government shallretire from office, and on any such retirement shall be entitled toreceive such payment as the Treasury may award to him in accordance withthe provisions contained in the Fourth Schedule to this Act. 

(2. ) The amount of such payment shall be paid to him out of the moneyscarried to the customs and excise account under this Act, or, if thosemoneys are insufficient, out of the Irish Consolidated Fund, _and so faras the same are not so paid shall be paid out of moneys provided byParliament_. 

[Sidenote: 34 & 35 Vict. C. 36. ]

(3. ) The Pensions Commutation Act, 1871, shall apply to all persons who, having retired from office, are entitled to any annual payment underthis section in like manner as if they had retired in consequence of theabolition of their offices. 

(4. ) This section shall not apply to persons who are retained in theservice of the Imperial Government. 

[Sidenote: Provision for existing pensions and superannuationallowances. ]

30. Where before the passing of this Act any pension or superannuationallowance has been granted to any person on account of service as ajudge of the Supreme Court of Judicature of Ireland or of any courtconsolidated into that court, or as a county court judge, or in anyother judicial position, or on account of service in the permanent civilservice of the Crown in Ireland otherwise than in some office, theholder of which is, after the passing of this Act, retained in theservice of the Imperial Government, such pension or allowance, whetherpayable out of the Consolidated Fund or out of moneys provided byParliament, shall continue to be paid to such person, and shall be sopaid out of the moneys carried to the customs and excise account underthis Act, or, if such moneys are insufficient, out of the IrishConsolidated Fund, and so far as the same is not so paid, shall be paidas heretofore out of the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom ormoneys provided by Parliament. 

_Transitory Provisions. _

[Sidenote: Transitory provisions in schedule. ]

31. The provisions contained in the Fifth Schedule to this Actrelating to the mode in which arrangements are to be made for setting inmotion the Irish Legislative Body and Government and for the transfer tothe Irish Government of the powers and duties to be transferred to themunder this Act, or for otherwise bringing this Act into operation, shallbe of the same effect as if they were enacted in the body of this Act. 

_Miscellaneous. _

[Sidenote: Post Office and savings banks. ]

32. Whenever an Act of the Legislature of Ireland has provided forcarrying on the postal and telegraphic service with respect to thetransmission of letters and telegrams in Ireland, and the post-officeand other savings banks in Ireland, and for protecting the officers thenin such service, and the existing depositors in such post-office savingsbanks, the Treasury shall make arrangements for the transfer of the saidservice and banks, in accordance with the said Act, and shall givepublic notice of the transfer, and shall pay all depositors in such postoffice savings bank who request payment within _six months_ after thedate fixed for such transfer, and after the expiration of such _sixmonths_ the said depositors shall cease to have any claim against thePostmaster-General or the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom, butshall have the like claim against the Consolidated Fund of Ireland, andthe Treasury shall cause to be transferred in accordance with the saidAct the securities representing the sums due to the said depositors inpost office savings banks and the securities held for other savingsbanks. 

[Sidenote: Audit. ]

33. Save as otherwise provided by the Irish Legislature, --

 (_a. _) The existing law relating to the Exchequer and the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom shall apply to the Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund, and an officer shall from time to time be appointed by the Lord-Lieutenant to fill the office of the Comptroller General of the receipt and issue of Her Majesty's Exchequer and Auditor-General of public accounts so far as respects Ireland; and

[Sidenote: 29 & 30 Vict. C. 39. ]

 (_b. _) The accounts of the Irish Consolidated Fund shall be audited as appropriation accounts in manner provided by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, by or under the direction of the holder of such office. 

[Sidenote: Application of parliamentary law. ]

34. --(1. ) The privileges, immunities, and powers to be held, enjoyed, and exercised by the Irish Legislative Body, and the members thereof, shall be such as are from time to time defined by Act of the IrishLegislature, but so that the same shall never exceed those at thepassing of this Act held, enjoyed, and exercised by the House ofCommons, and by the members thereof. 

(2. ) Subject as in this Act mentioned, all existing laws and customsrelating to the members of the House of Commons and their election, including the enactments respecting the questioning of elections, corrupt and illegal practices, and registration of electors, shall, sofar as applicable, extend to elective members of the first order and tomembers of the second order of the Irish Legislative Body. 

Provided that--

 (_a. _) The law relating to the offices of profit enumerated in Schedule H. To the Representation of the People Act, 1867, shall apply to such offices of profit in the government of Ireland not exceeding ten, as the Legislature of Ireland may from time to time direct;

 (_b. _) After the first dissolution of the Legislative Body, the Legislature of Ireland may, subject to the restrictions in this Act mentioned, alter the laws and customs in this section mentioned. 

[Sidenote: Regulations for carrying Act into effect. ]

35. --(1. ) The Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland may make regulations for thefollowing purposes:--

 (_a. _) The summoning of the Legislative Body and the election of a Speaker, and such adaptation to the proceedings of the Legislative Body of the procedure of the House of Commons as appears to him expedient for facilitating the conduct of business by that body on their first meeting;

 (_b. _) The adaptation of any law relating to the election of representative peers;

 (_c. _) The adaptation of any laws and customs relating to the House of Commons or the members thereof to the elective members of the first order and to members of the second order of the Legislative Body; and

 (_d. _) The mode of signifying their assent or election under this Act by representative peers or Irish members of the House of Commons as regards becoming members of the Irish Legislative Body in pursuance of this Act. 

(2. ) Any regulations so made shall, in so far as they concern theprocedure of the Legislative Body, be subject to alteration by StandingOrders of that Body, and so far as they concern other matters, besubject to alteration by the Legislature of Ireland, but shall, untilalteration, have the same effect as if they were inserted in this Act. 

[Sidenote: Saving of powers of House of Lords. ]

36. Save as is in this Act provided with respect to matters to bedecided by Her Majesty in Council, nothing in this Act shall affect theappellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords in respect of actions andsuits in Ireland, or the jurisdiction of the House of Lords to determinethe claims to Irish peerages. 

[Sidenote: Saving of rights of Parliament. ]

37. _Save as herein expressly provided all matters in relation towhich it is not competent for the Irish Legislative Body to make orrepeal laws shall remain and be within the exclusive authority of theImperial Parliament, whose power and authority in relation thereto, saveas aforesaid, shall in nowise be diminished or restrained by anythingherein contained. _[75]

[Sidenote: Continuance of existing laws, courts, officers, &c. ]

38. --(1. ) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, all existing lawsin force in Ireland, and all existing courts of civil and criminaljurisdiction, and all existing legal commissions, powers, andauthorities, and all existing officers, judicial, administrative, andministerial and all existing taxes, licence, and other duties, fees, andother receipts in Ireland shall continue as if this Act had not beenpassed; subject, nevertheless, to be repealed, abolished, or altered inmanner and to the extent provided by this Act; provided that, subject tothe provisions of this Act, such taxes, duties, fees, and other receiptsshall, after the appointed day, form part of the public revenues ofIreland. 

(2. ) The Commissioners of Inland Revenue and the Commissioners ofCustoms, and the officers of such Commissioners respectively, shall havethe same powers in relation to any articles subject to any duty ofexcise or customs, manufactured, imported, kept for sale, or sold, andany premises where the same may be, and to any machinery, apparatus, vessels, utensils, or conveyance used in connexion therewith, or theremoval thereof, and in relation to the person manufacturing, importing, keeping for sale, selling, or having the custody or possession of thesame as they would have had if this Act had not been passed. 

[Sidenote: Mode of alteration of Act. ]

39. --(1. ) _On and after the appointed day this Act shall not, exceptsuch provisions thereof as are declared to be alterable by theLegislature of Ireland, be altered except--_

 (a. ) _by Act of the Imperial Parliament and with the consent of the Irish Legislative Body testified by an address to Her Majesty, or_

 (b. ) _by an Act of the Imperial Parliament, for the passing of which there shall be summoned to the House of Lords the peerage members of the first order of the Irish Legislative Body, and if there are no such members then twenty-eight Irish representative peers elected by the Irish peers in manner heretofore in use, subject to adaptation as provided by this Act; and there shall be summoned to the House of Commons such one of the members of each constituency, or in the case of a constituency returning four members such two of those members, as the Legislative Body of Ireland may select, and such peers and members shall respectively be deemed, for the purpose of passing any such Act, to be members of the said Houses of Parliament respectively. _

(2. ) _For the purposes of this section it shall be lawful for HerMajesty by Order in Council to make such provisions for summoning thesaid peers of Ireland to the House of Lords and the said members fromIreland to the House of Commons as to Her Majesty may seem necessary orproper, and any provisions contained in such Order in Council shall havethe same effect as if they had been enacted by Parliament. _

[Sidenote: Definitions. ]

40. In this Act--

The expression "the appointed day" shall mean such day after the_thirty-first day of March in the year one thousand eight hundred andeighty-seven_ as may be determined by order of Her Majesty in Council. 

The expression "Lord-Lieutenant" includes the lords justices or anyother chief governor or governors of Ireland for the time being. 

The expression "Her Majesty the Queen, " or "Her Majesty" or "the Queen, "includes the heirs and successors of Her Majesty the Queen. 

The expression "Treasury, " means the Commissioners of Her Majesty'sTreasury. 

The expression "Treaty" includes any convention or arrangement. 

The expression "existing" means existing at the passing of this Act. 

The expression "existing constituency" means any county or borough, ordivision of a county or borough, or a University returning at thepassing of this Act a member or members to serve in Parliament. 

The expression "duties of excise" does not include a duty received inrespect of any license whether for the sale of intoxicating liquors orotherwise. 

The expression "financial year" means the twelve months ending on the_thirty-first day of March_. 

[Sidenote: Short title of Act. ]

41. This Act may be cited for all purposes as the Irish GovernmentAct, 1886. 

 * * * * *

FIRST SCHEDULE. 

 * * * * *

FIRST ORDER OF THE IRISH LEGISLATIVE BODY. 

----------------------+---------------------+------------Electoral Districts. | Number of Members. | Rotation. ----------------------+---------------------+------------ | | | | | | | |----------------------+---------------------+------------

 * * * * *

SECOND SCHEDULE. 

 * * * * *

PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE FIRST ORDER OF THE IRISHLEGISLATIVE BODY. 

 * * * * *

THIRD SCHEDULE. 

 * * * * *

BOUNDARIES OF DIVISIONS OF THE CITY OF CORK FOR THE PURPOSE OFRETURNING MEMBERS TO THE SECOND ORDER OF THE LEGISLATIVEBODY. 

 * * * * *

FOURTH SCHEDULE. 

 * * * * *

PROVISIONS AS TO SUPERANNUATION ALLOWANCES OF PERSONS IN THEPERMANENT CIVIL SERVICE. 

 * * * * *

FIFTH SCHEDULE. 

 * * * * *

TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. 

FOOTNOTES:

[74] The clauses printed in italics are the clauses of the Bill whichare specially referred to in the foregoing pages. 

[75] This clause is printed as I am informed that it ought to have beenoriginally printed in the Bill.