CHINA, JAPAN AND THE U. S. A. 

 Present-day Conditions in the Far East and Their Bearing on the Washington Conference

 _by_

 JOHN DEWEY

 Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University

 _New Republic Pamphlet No. 1_

 Published by the REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO. , INC. 421 West Twenty-first Street _New York City_ 1921

 Copyright 1921 REPUBLIC PUBLISHING CO. INC. 

_Introductory Note_

_The articles following are reprinted as they were written in spite ofthe fact that any picture of contemporary events is modified bysubsequent increase of knowledge and by later events. In the main, however, the writer would still stand by what was said at the time. Afew foot notes have been inserted where the text is likely to giverise to misapprehensions. The date of writing has been retained as aguide to the reader. _

I

On Two Sides of the Eastern Seas

It is three days' easy journey from Japan to China. It is doubtfulwhether anywhere in the world another journey of the same lengthbrings with it such a complete change of political temper and belief. Certainly it is greater than the alteration perceived in journeyingdirectly from San Francisco to Shanghai. The difference is not one incustoms and modes of life; that goes without saying. It concerns theideas, beliefs and alleged information current about one and the samefact: the status of Japan in the international world and especiallyits attitude toward China. One finds everywhere in Japan a feeling ofuncertainty, hesitation, even of weakness. There is a subtle nervoustension in the atmosphere as of a country on the verge of change butnot knowing where the change will take it. Liberalism is in the air, but genuine liberals are encompassed with all sorts of difficultiesespecially in combining their liberalism with the devotion totheocratic robes which the imperialist militarists who rule Japan haveso skilfully thrown about the Throne and the Government. But what onesenses in China from the first moment is the feeling of theall-pervading power of Japan which is working as surely as fate to itsunhesitating conclusion--the domination of Chinese politics andindustry by Japan with a view to its final absorption. It is not myobject to analyze the realities of the situation or to inquire whetherthe universal feeling in China is a collective hallucination or isgrounded in fact. The phenomenon is worthy of record on its ownaccount. Even if it be merely psychological, it is a fact which mustbe reckoned with in both its Chinese and its Japanese aspects. In thefirst place, as to the differences in psychological atmosphere. Everybody who knows anything about Japan knows that it is the land ofreserves and reticences. The half-informed American will tell you thatthis is put on for the misleading of foreigners. The informed knowthat it is an attitude shown to foreigners only because it is deeplyengrained in the moral and social tradition of Japan; and that, ifanything, the Japanese are more likely to be communicative--about manythings at least--to a sympathetic foreigner, than to one another. Thehabit of reserve is so deeply embedded in all the etiquette, convention and daily ceremony of living, as well as in the ideals ofstrength of character, that only the Japanese who have subjectedthemselves to foreign influences escape it--and many of them revert. To put it mildly, the Japanese are not a loquacious people; they havethe gift of doing rather than of gab. 

When accordingly a Japanese statesman or visiting diplomatist engagesin unusually prolonged and frank discourse setting forth the aims andprocedures of Japan, the student of politics who has been long in theEast at once becomes alert, not to say suspicious. A recentillustration is so extreme that it will doubtless seem fantasticbeyond belief. But the student at home will have to take these seemingfantasies seriously if he wishes to appreciate the present atmosphereof China. Cables have brought fragmentary reports of some addresses ofBaron Goto in America. Doubtless in the American atmosphere these havethe effect of reassuring America as to any improper ambitions on thepart of Japan. In China, they were taken as announcements that Japanhas about completed its plans for the absorption of China, and thatthe lucubration preliminary to operations of swallowing are about tobegin. The reader is forgiven in advance any scepticism he feels aboutboth the fact itself and the correctness of my report of the belief inthe alleged fact. His scepticism will not surpass what I should feelin his place. But the suspicion aroused by such statements as this andthe recent interview of Foreign Minister Uchida and Baron Ishii mustbe noted as evidences of the universal belief in China that Japan hasone mode of diplomacy for the East and another for the West, and thatwhat is said in the West must be read in reverse in the East. 

China, whatever else it is, is not the land of privacies. It is aproverb that nothing long remains secret in China. The Chinese talkmore easily than they act--especially in politics. They are adepts inrevealing their own shortcomings. They dissect their own weaknessesand failures with the most extraordinary reasonableness. One of thedefects upon which they dwell is the love of finding substitutes forpositive action, of avoiding entering upon a course of action whichmight be irrevocable. One almost wonders whether their power ofself-criticism is not itself another of these substitutes. At allevents, they are frank to the point of loquacity. Between the oppositecamps there are always communications flowing. Among official enemiesthere are "sworn friends. " In a land of perpetual compromise, etiquette as well as necessity demands that the ways for lateraccommodations be kept open. Consequently things which are spoken ofonly under the breath in Japan are shouted from the housetops inChina. It would hardly be good taste in Japan to allude to the reportthat influential Chinese ministers are in constant receipt of Japanesefunds and these corrupt officials are the agencies by which politicaland economic concessions were wrung from China while Europe andAmerica were busy with the war. But in China nobody even takes thetrouble to deny it or even to discuss it. What is psychologically mostimpressive is the fact that it is merely taken for granted. When it isspoken of, it is as one mentions the heat on an unusually hot day. 

In speaking of the feeling of weakness current in Japan about Japanitself, one must refer to the economic situation because of itsobvious connection with the international situation. In the firstplace, there is the strong impression that Japan is over-extended. Even in normal times, Japan relies more upon production for foreignmarkets than is regarded in most countries as safe policy. And thereis the belief that Japan _must_ do so, because only by large foreignsellings--large in comparison with the purchasing power of a peoplestill having a low standard of life--can it purchase the rawmaterials--and even food--it has to have. But during the war, thedependence of manufacturing and trade at home upon the foreign marketwas greatly increased. The domestic increase of wealth, though verygreat, is still too much in the hands of the few to affect seriouslythe internal demand for goods. Item one, which awakens sympathy forJapan as being in a somewhat precarious situation. 

Another item concerns the labor situation. Japan seems to feel itselfin a dilemma. If she passes even reasonably decent factory laws (orrather attempts their enforcement) and regulates child and women'slabor, she will lose that advantage of cheap labor which she nowcounts on to offset her many disadvantages. On the other hand, strikes, labor difficulties, agitation for unions, etc. , areconstantly increasing, and the tension in the atmosphere isunmistakable. The rice riots are not often spoken of, but their memorypersists, and the fact that they came very near to assuming a directlypolitical aspect. Is there a race between fulfillment of theaspirations of the military clans who still hold the reins, and thegrowth of genuinely democratic forces which will forever terminatethose aspirations? Certainly the defeat of Germany gave a blow tobureaucratic militarism in Japan which in time will go far. Will ithave the time required to take effect on foreign policy? The hope thatit will is a large factor in stimulating liberal sympathy for a Japanwhich is beginning to undergo the throes of transition. 

As for the direct international situation of Japan, the feeling inJapan is that of the threatening danger of isolation. Germany is gone;Russia is gone. While those facts simplify matters for Japan somewhat, there is also the belief that in taking away potential allies, theyhave weakened Japan in the general game of balance and counter-balanceof power. Particularly does the removal of imperialistic Russiarelieve the threat on India which was such a factor in the willingnessof Great Britain to make the offensive-defensive alliance. Therevelation of the militaristic possibilities of America is anotherserious factor. Certainly the new triple entente cordiale of Japan, Italy and France is no adequate substitute for a realignment ofinternational forces in which a common understanding between GreatBritain and America is a dominant factor. This factor explains, if itdoes not excuse, some of the querulousness and studied discourtesieswith which the Japanese press for some months treated PresidentWilson, the United States in general and its relation to the League ofNations in particular, while it also throws light on the ardor withwhich the opportune question of racial discrimination was discussed. (The Chinese have an unfailing refuge in a sense of humor. It wasinteresting to note the delight with which they received the utteranceof the Japanese Foreign Minister, after Japanese success at Paris, that "his attention had recently been called" to various press attackson America which he much deprecated). In any case there is nomistaking the air of tension and nervous overstrain which now attendsall discussion of Japanese foreign relations. In all directions, thereare characteristic signs of hesitation, shaking of old beliefs andmovement along new lines. Japan seems to be much in the same mood asthat which it experienced in the early eighties before, toward theclose of that decade, it crystallized its institutions throughacceptance of the German constitution, militarism, educational system, and diplomatic methods. So that, once more, the observer gets theimpression that substantially all of Japan's energy, abundant as thatis, must be devoted to her urgent problems of readjustment. 

Come to China, and the difference is incredible. It almost seems as ifone were living in a dream; or as if some new Alice had venturedbehind an international looking-glass wherein everything is reversed. That we in America should have little idea of the state of things andthe frame of mind in China is not astonishing--especially in view ofthe censorship and the distraction of attention of the last few years. But that Japan and China should be so geographically near, and yetevery fact that concerns them appear in precisely oppositeperspective, is an experience of a life time. Japanese liberalism?Yes, it is heard of, but only in connection with one form which thelonging for the miraculous _deus ex machina_ takes. Perhaps arevolution in Japan may intervene to save China from the fate whichnow hangs over her. But there is no suggestion that anything less thana complete revolution will alter or even retard the course which isattributed to Japanese diplomacy working hand in hand with Japanesebusiness interests and militarism. The collapse of Russia and Germany?These things only mean that Japan has in a few years fallen completeheir to Russian hopes, achievements and possessions in Manchuria andOuter Mongolia, and has had opportunities in Siberia thrown into herhands which she could hardly have hoped for in her most optimisticmoments. And now Japan has, with the blessing of the great Powers atParis, become also the heir of German concessions, intrigues andambitions, with added concessions, wrung (or bought) from incompetentand corrupt officials by secret agreements when the world was busywith war. If all the great Powers are so afraid of Japan that theygive way to her every wish, what is China that she can escape the doomprepared for her? That is the cry of helplessness going up all overChina. And Japanese propagandists take advantage of the situation, pointing to the action of the Peace Conference as proof that theAllies care nothing for China, and that China must throw herself intothe arms of Japan if she is to have any protection at all. In short, Japan stands ready as she stood ready in Korea to guarantee theintegrity and independence of China. And the fear that the lattermust, in spite of her animosity toward Japan, accept this fate inorder to escape something worse swims in the sinister air. It is theexact counterpart of the feeling current among the liberals in Japanthat Japan has alienated China permanently when a considerate andslower course might have united the two countries. If the economicstraits of Japan are alluded to, it is only as a reason why Japan hashurried her diplomatic coercion, her corrupt and secret bargainingswith Chinese traitors and her industrial invasion. While the westernworld supposes that the military and the industrial party in Japanhave opposite ideas as to best methods of securing Japanese supremacyin the East, it is the universal opinion in China that they two areworking in complete understanding with one another, and thedifferences that sometimes occur between the Foreign Office in Tokyoand the Ministry of War (which is extra-constitutional in its status)are staged for effect. 

These are some of the aspects of the most complete transformationscene that it has ever been the lot of the writer to experience. Mayit turn out to be only an extraordinary psychological experience! Butin the interests of truth it must be recorded that every resident ofChina, Chinese or American, with whom I have talked in the last fourweeks has volunteered the belief that all the seeds of a future greatwar are now deeply implanted in China. To avert such a calamity theylook to the League of Nations or to some other force outside theimmediate scene. Unfortunately the press of Japan treats every attemptto discuss the state of opinion in China or the state of facts asevidence that America, having tasted blood in the war, now has itseyes on Asia with the expectation later on of getting its hands onAsia. Consequently America is interested in trying to foster ill-willbetween China and Japan. If the pro-American Japanese do not enlightentheir fellow-countrymen as to the facts, then America ought to returnsome of the propaganda that visits its shores. But every American whogoes to Japan ought also to visit China--if only to complete hiseducation. 

May, 1919. 

II

Shantung, As Seen From Within

1. 

American apologists for that part of the Peace Treaty which relates toChina have the advantage of the illusions of distance. Most of thearguments seem strange to anyone who lives in China even for a fewmonths. He finds the Japanese on the spot using the old saying aboutterritory consecrated by treasure spent and blood shed. He reads inJapanese papers and hears from moderately liberal Japanese that Japanmust protect China, as well as Japan, against herself, against her ownweak or corrupt government, by keeping control of Shantung to preventChina from again alienating that territory to some other power. 

The history of European aggression in China gives this argument greatforce among the Japanese, who for the most part know nothing moreabout what actually goes on in China than they used to know aboutKorean conditions. These considerations, together with the immenseexpectations raised among the Japanese during the war concerning theircoming domination of the Far East and the unswerving demand of excitedpublic opinion in Japan during the Versailles Conference for thesettlement that actually resulted, give an ironic turn to thestatement so often made that Japan may be trusted to carry out herpromises. Yes, one is often tempted to say, that is precisely whatChina fears, that Japan will carry out her promises, for then China isdoomed. To one who knows the history of foreign aggression in China, especially the technique of conquest by railway and finance, the ironyof promising to keep economic rights while returning sovereignty liesso on the surface that it is hardly irony. China might as well beoffered Kant's Critique of Pure Reason on a silver platter as beoffered sovereignty under such conditions. The latter is equallymetaphysical. 

A visit to Shantung and a short residence in its capital city, Tsinan, made the conclusions, which so far as I know every foreigner in Chinahas arrived at, a living thing. It gave a vivid picture of the manyand intimate ways in which economic and political rights areinextricably entangled together. It made one realize afresh that onlya President who kept himself innocent of any knowledge of secrettreaties during the war, could be naïve enough to believe that thepromise to return complete sovereignty retaining _only_ economicrights is a satisfactory solution. It threw fresh light upon thecontention that at most and at worst Japan had only taken over Germanrights, and that since we had acquiesced in the latter's arrogationswe had no call to make a fuss about Japan. It revealed the hollownessof the claim that pro-Chinese propaganda had wilfully misled Americansinto confusing the few hundred square miles around the port ofTsing-tao with the Province of Shantung with its thirty millions ofChinese population. 

As for the comparison of Germany and Japan one might suppose that theobjects for which America nominally entered the war had made, in anycase, a difference. But aside from this consideration, the Germansexclusively employed Chinese in the railway shops and for all theminor positions on the railway itself. The railway guards (thedifference between police and soldiers is nominal in China) were allChinese, the Germans merely training them. As soon as Japan invadedShantung and took over the railway, Chinese workmen and Chinesemilitary guards were at once dismissed and Japanese imported to taketheir places. Tsinan-fu, the inland terminus of the ex-German railway, is over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao. When the Japanese took overthe German railway business office, they at once built barracks, andtoday there are several hundred soldiers still there--where Germanykept none. Since the armistice even, Japan has erected a powerfulmilitary wireless within the grounds of the garrison, against ofcourse the unavailing protest of Chinese authorities. No foreigner canbe found who will state that Germany used her ownership of port andrailway to discriminate against other nations. No Chinese can be foundwho will claim that this ownership was used to force the Chinese outof business, or to extend German economic rights beyond thosedefinitely assigned her by treaty. Common sense should also teach eventhe highest paid propagandist in America that there is, from thestandpoint of China, an immense distinction between a national menacelocated half way around the globe, and one within two days' sail overan inland sea absolutely controlled by a foreign navy, especially asthe remote nation has no other foothold and the nearby one alreadydominates additional territory of enormous strategic and economicvalue--namely, Manchuria. 

These facts bear upon the shadowy distinction between the Tsing-taoand the Shantung claim, as well as upon the solid distinction betweenGerman and Japanese occupancy. If there still seemed to be a thin wallbetween Japanese possession of the port of Tsing-tao and usurpation ofShantung, it was enough to stop off the train in Tsinan-fu to see thewall crumble. For the Japanese wireless and the barracks of the armyof occupation are the first things that greet your eyes. Within a fewhundred feet of the railway that connects Shanghai, via the importantcenter of Tientsin, with the capital, Peking, you see Japanesesoldiers on the nominally Chinese street, guarding their barracks. Then you learn that if you travel upon the ex-German railway towardsTsing-tao, you are ordered to show your passport as if you wereentering a foreign country. And as you travel along the road(remembering that you are over two hundred miles from Tsing-tao) youfind Japanese soldiers at every station, and several garrisons andbarracks at important towns on the line. Then you realize that at theshortest possible notice, Japan could cut all communications betweensouthern China (together with the rich Yangste region) and thecapital, and with the aid of the Southern Manchurian Railway at thenorth of the capital, hold the entire coast and descend at its goodpleasure upon Peking. 

You are then prepared to learn from eye-witnesses that when Japan madeits Twenty-one Demands upon China, machine guns were actually inposition at strategic points throughout Shantung, with trenches dugand sandbags placed. You know that the Japanese liberal spoke thetruth, who told you, after a visit to China and his return to protestagainst the action of his government, that the Japanese already hadsuch a military hold upon China that they could control the countrywithin a week, after a minimum of fighting, if war should arise. Youalso realize the efficiency of official control of information anddomestic propaganda as you recall that he also told you that thesethings were true at the time of his visit, under the Terauchi cabinet, but had been completely reversed by the present Hara ministry. For Ihave yet to find a single foreigner or Chinese who is conscious of anydifference of policy, save as the end of the war has forced thenecessity of caution, since other nations can now look China-wards asthey could not during the war. 

An American can get an idea of the realities of the present situationif he imagines a foreign garrison and military wireless in Wilmington, with a railway from that point to a fortified sea-port controlled bythe foreign power, at which the foreign nation can land, withoutresistance, troops as fast as they can be transported, and with basesof supply, munitions, food, uniforms, etc. , already located atWilmington, at the sea-port and several places along the line. Reversethe directions from south to north, and Wilmington will stand forTsinan-fu, Shanghai for New York, Nanking for Philadelphia with Pekingstanding for the seat of government at Washington, and Tientsin forBaltimore. Suppose in addition that the Pennsylvania road is the solemeans of communication between Washington and the chief commercial andindustrial centers, and you have the framework of the Shantung pictureas it presents itself daily to the inhabitants of China. Upon secondthought, however, the parallel is not quite accurate. You have to addthat the same foreign nation controls also all coast communicationsfrom, say, Raleigh southwards, with railway lines both to the nearbycoast and to New Orleans. For (still reversing directions) thiscorresponds to the position of Imperial Japan in Manchuria with itsrailways to Dairen and through Korea to a port twelve hours sail froma great military center in Japan proper. These are not remotepossibilities nor vague prognostications. They are accomplished facts. 

Yet the facts give _only_ the framework of the picture. What isactually going on within Shantung? One of the demands of the"postponed" group of the Twenty-one Demands was that Japan shouldsupply military and police advisers to China. They are not so muchpostponed but that Japan enforced specific concessions from Chinaduring the war by diplomatic threats to reintroduce their discussion, or so postponed that Japanese advisers are not already installed inthe police headquarters of the city of Tsinan, the capital city ofShantung of three hundred thousand population where the ProvincialAssembly meets and all the Provincial officials reside. Within recentmonths the Japanese consul has taken a company of armed soldiers withhim when he visited the Provincial Governor to make certain demandsupon him, the visit being punctuated by an ostentatious surrounding ofthe Governor's yamen by these troops. Within the past few weeks, twohundred cavalry came to Tsinan and remained there while Japaneseofficials demanded of the Governor drastic measures to suppress theboycott, while it was threatened to send Japanese troops to police theforeign settlement if the demand was not heeded. 

A former consul was indiscreet enough to put into writing that if theChinese Governor did not stop the boycott and the students' movementby force if need be, he would take matters into his own hands. Thechief tangible charge he brought against the Chinese as a basis of hisdemand for "protection" was that Chinese store-keepers actuallyrefused to accept Japanese money in payment for goods, not ordinaryJapanese money at that, but the military notes with which, so as tosave drain upon the bullion reserves, the army of occupation is paid. And all this, be it remembered, is more than two hundred miles fromTsing-tao and from eight to twelve months after the armistice. Today'spaper reports a visit of Japanese to the Governor to inform him thatunless he should prevent a private theatrical performance from beinggiven in Tsinan by the students, they would send their own forces intothe settlement to protect themselves. And the utmost they might needprotection from, was that the students were to give some playsdesigned to foster the boycott!

Japanese troops overran the Province before they made any seriousattempt to capture Tsing-tao. It is only a slight exaggeration to saythat they "took" the Chinese Tsinan before they took the GermanTsing-tao. Propaganda in America has justified this act on the groundthat a German railway to the rear of Japanese forces would have been amenace. As there were no troops but only legal and diplomatic paperswith which to attack the Japanese, it is a fair inference that the"menace" was located in Versailles rather than in Shantung, andconcerned the danger of Chinese control of their own territory. Chinese have been arrested by Japanese gendarmes in Tsinan andsubjected to a torturing third degree of the kind that Korea has madesickeningly familiar. The Japanese claim that the injuries werereceived while the men were resisting arrest. Considering that therewas no more legal ground for arrest than there would be if Japanesepolice arrested Americans in New York, almost anybody but the pacifistChinese certainly would have resisted. But official hospital reportstestify to bayonet wounds and the marks of flogging. In the interiorwhere the Japanese had been disconcerted by the student propagandathey raided a High School, seized a school boy at random, and took himto a distant point and kept him locked up several days. When theJapanese consul at Tsinan was visited by Chinese officials in protestagainst these illegal arrests, the consul disclaimed all jurisdiction. The matter, he said, was wholly in the hands of the militaryauthorities in Tsing-tao. His disclaimer was emphasized by the factthat some of the kidnapped Chinese were taken to Tsing-tao for"trial. "

The matter of economic rights in relation to political domination willbe discussed later in this article. It is no pleasure for one withmany warm friends in Japan, who has a great admiration for theJapanese people as distinct from the ruling military and bureaucraticclass, to report such facts as have been stated. One might almost say, one might positively say from the standpoint of Japan itself, that theworst thing that can be charged against the policy of Japan in Chinafor the last six years is its immeasurable stupidity. No nation hasever misjudged the national psychology of another people as Japan hasthat of China. The alienation of China is widespread, deep, bitter. Even the most pessimistic of the Chinese who think that China is toundergo a complete economic and political domination by Japan do notthink it can last, even without outside intervention, more than half acentury. 

Today, at the beginning of a new year, (1920) the boycott is much morecomplete and efficient than in the most tense days of last summer. Unfortunately, the Japanese policy seems to be under a truly Greekfate which drives it on. Concessions that would have produced arevulsion of feeling in favor of Japan a year ago will now merelysalve the surface of the wound. What would have been welcomed eveneight months ago would now be received with contempt. There is but oneway in which Japan can now restore herself. It is nothing less thancomplete withdrawal from Shantung, with possibly a strictly commercialconcession at Tsing-tao and a real, not a Manchurian, Open Door. 

According to the Japanese-owned newspapers published in Tsinan, theJapanese military commander in Tsing-tao recently made a speech tovisiting journalists from Tokyo in which he said: "The suspicions ofChina cannot now be allayed merely by repeating that we have noterritorial ambitions in China. We must attain complete economicdomination of the Far East. But if Chino-Japanese relations do notimprove, some third party will reap the benefit. Japanese residing inChina incur the hatred of the Chinese. For they regard themselves asthe proud citizens of a conquering country. When the Japanese go intopartnership with the Chinese they manage in the greater number ofcases to have the profits accrue to themselves. If friendship betweenChina and Japan is to depend wholly upon the government it will cometo nothing. Diplomatists, soldiers, merchants, journalists shouldrepent the past. The change must be complete. " But it will not becomplete until the Japanese withdraw from Shantung leaving theirnationals there upon the footing of other foreigners in China. 

2. 

In discussing the return to China by Japan of a metaphysicalsovereignty while economic rights are retained, I shall not repeat thedetails of German treaty rights as to the railway and the mines. Thereader is assumed to be familiar with those facts. The German seizurewas outrageous. It was a flagrant case of Might making Right. As vonBuelow cynically but frankly told the Reichstag, while Germany did notintend to partition China, she also did not intend to be the passengerleft behind in the station when the train started. Germany had theexcuse of prior European aggressions, and in turn her usurpation wasthe precedent for further foreign rape. If judgments are made on acomparative basis, Japan is entitled to all of the white-washing thatcan be derived from the provocations of European imperialistic powers, including those countries that in domestic policy are democratic. Andevery fairminded person will recognize that, leaving China out of thereckoning, Japan's proximity to China gives her aggressions the colorof self-defence in a way that cannot be urged in behalf of anyEuropean power. 

It is possible to look at European aggressions in, say, Africa asincidents of a colonization movement. But no foreign policy in Asiacan shelter itself behind any colonization plea. For continental Asiais, for practical purposes, India and China, representing two of theoldest civilizations of the globe and presenting two of its densestpopulations. If there is any such thing in truth as a philosophy ofhistory with its own inner and inevitable logic, one may well shudderto think of what the closing acts of the drama of the intercourse ofthe West and East are to be. In any case, and with whatever comfortmay be derived from the fact that the American continents have nottaken part in the aggression and hence may act as a mediator to avertthe final tragedy, residence in China forces upon one the realizationthat Asia is, after all, a large figure in the future reckoning ofhistory. Asia is really here after all. It is not simply a symbol inwestern algebraic balances of trade. And in the future, so to speak, it is going to be even more here, with its awakened nationalconsciousness of about half the population of the whole globe. 

Let the agreements of France and Great Britain made with Japan duringthe war stand for the measure of western consciousness of the realityof only a small part of Asia, a consciousness generated by thepatriotism of Japan backed by its powerful army and navy. The sameagreement measures western unconsciousness of the reality of that partof Asia which lies within the confines of China. An even bettermeasure of western unconsciousness may be found perhaps in such atrifling incident as this:--An English friend long resident inShantung told me of writing indignantly home concerning the Britishpart in the Shantung settlement. The reply came, complacently statingthat Japanese ships did so much in the war that the Allies could notproperly refuse to recognize Japan's claims. The secret agreementsthemselves hardly speak as eloquently for the absence of China fromthe average western consciousness. In saying that China and Asia areto be enormously significant figures in future reckonings, the spectreof a military Yellow Peril is not meant nor even the more crediblespectre of an industrial Yellow Peril. But Asia has come toconsciousness, and her consciousness of herself will soon be such amassive and persistent thing that it will force itself upon thereluctant consciousness of the west, and lie heavily upon itsconscience. And for this fact, China and the western world areindebted to Japan. 

These remarks are more relevant to a consideration of the relationshipof economic and political rights in Shantung than they perhaps seem. For a moment's reflection will call to mind that all political foreignaggression in China has been carried out for commercial and financialends, and usually upon some economic pretext. As to the immediate partplayed by Japan in bringing about a consciousness which will from thepresent time completely change the relations of the western powers toChina, let one little story testify. Some representatives of anEnglish missionary board were making a tour of inspection throughChina. They went into an interior town in Shantung. They were receivedwith extraordinary cordiality by the entire population. Some timeafterwards some of their accompanying friends returned to the villageand were received with equally surprising coldness. It came out uponinquiry that the inhabitants had first been moved by the rumor thatthese people were sent by the British government to secure the removalof the Japanese. Later they were moved by indignation that they hadbeen disappointed. 

It takes no forcing to see a symbol in this incident. Part of itstands for the almost incredible ignorance which has rendered China soimpotent nationally speaking. The other part of it stands for the newspirit which has been aroused even among the common people in remotedistricts. Those who fear, or who pretend to fear, a new Boxermovement, or a definite general anti-foreign movement, are, I think, mistaken. The new consciousness goes much deeper. Foreign policiesthat fail to take it into account and that think that relations withChina can be conducted upon the old basis will find this newconsciousness obtruding in the most unexpected and perplexing ways. 

One might fairly say, still speaking comparatively, that it is part ofthe bad luck of Japan that her proximity to China, and the opportunitythe war gave her to outdo the aggressions of European powers, havemade her the first victim of this disconcerting change. Whatever themotives of the American Senators in completely disassociating theUnited States from the peace settlement as regards China, their actionis a permanent asset to China, not only in respect to Japan but withrespect to all Chinese foreign relations. Just before our visit toTsinan, the Shantung Provincial Assembly had passed a resolution ofthanks to the American Senate. More significant is the fact that theypassed another resolution to be cabled to the English Parliament, calling attention to the action of the American Senate and invitingsimilar action. China in general and Shantung in particular feels thereinforcement of an external approval. With this duplication, itsnational consciousness has as it were solidified. Japan is simply thefirst object to be affected. 

The concrete working out of economic rights in Shantung will beillustrated by a single case which will have to stand as typical. Po-shan is an interior mining village. The mines were not part of theGerman booty; they were Chinese owned. The Germans, whatever theirulterior aims, had made no attempt at dispossessing the Chinese. Themines, however, are at the end of a branch line of the new Japaneseowned railway--owned by the government, not by a private corporation, and guarded by Japanese soldiers. Of the forty mines, the Japanesehave worked their way, in only four years, into all but four. Different methods are used. The simplest is, of course, discriminationin the use of the railway for shipping. Downright refusal to furnishcars while competitors who accepted Japanese partners got them, is onemethod. Another more elaborate method is to send but one car when alarge number is asked for, and then when it is too late to use cars, send the whole number asked for or even more, and then charge a largesum for demurrage in spite of the fact the mine no longer wants themor has cancelled the order. Redress there is none. 

Tsinan has no special foreign concessions. It is, however, a "treatyport" where nationals of all friendly powers can do business. ButPo-shan is not even a treaty port. Legally speaking no foreigners canlease land or carry on any business there. Yet the Japanese haveforced a settlement as large in area as the entire foreign settlementin the much larger town of Tsinan. A Chinese refused to lease landwhere the Japanese wished to relocate their railway station. Nothinghappened to him directly. But merchants could not get shipping space, or receive goods by rail. Some of them were beaten up by thugs. Aftera time, they used their influence with their compatriot to lease hisland. Immediately the persecutions ceased. Not all the land has beensecured by threats or coercion; some has been leased directly byChinese moved by high prices, in spite of the absence of any legalsanction. In addition, the Japanese have obtained control of theelectric light works and some pottery factories, etc. 

Now even admitting that this is typical of the methods by which theJapanese plant themselves, a natural American reaction would be to saythat, after all, the country is built up industrially by theseenterprises, and that though the rights of some individuals may havebeen violated, there is nothing to make a national, much less aninternational fuss about. More or less unconsciously we translateforeign incidents into terms of our own experience and environment, and thus miss the entire point. Since America was largely developed byforeign capital to our own economic benefit and without politicalencroachments, we lazily suppose some such separation of the economicand political to be possible in China. But it must be remembered thatChina is not an open country. Foreigners can lease land, carry onbusiness, and manufacture only in accord with express treatyagreements. There are no such agreements in the cases typified by thePo-shan incident. We may profoundly disagree with the closed economicpolicy of China, or we may believe that under existing circumstancesit represents the part of prudence for her. That makes no difference. _Given the frequent occurrence of such economic invasions, with thebacking of soldiers of the Imperial Army, with the overt aid of theImperial Railway, and with the refusal of Imperial officials tointervene, there is clear evidence of the attitude and intention ofthe Japanese government in Shantung. _

Because the population of Shantung is directly confronted with animmense amount of just such evidence, it cannot take seriously theprofessions of vague diplomatic utterances. What foreign nation isgoing to intervene to enforce Chinese rights in such a case asPo-shan? Which one is going effectively to call the attention of Japanto such evidences of its failure to carry out its promise? Yet theaccumulation of precisely such seemingly petty incidents, and not anysingle dramatic great wrong, will secure Japan's economic andpolitical domination of Shantung. It is for this reason thatforeigners resident in Shantung, no matter in what part, say that theysee no sign whatever that Japan is going to get out; that, on thecontrary, everything points to a determination to consolidate herposition. How long ago was the Portsmouth treaty signed, and what wereits nominal pledges about evacuation of Manchurian territory?

Not a month will pass without something happening which will give apretext for delay, and for making the surrender of Shantungconditional upon this, that and the other thing. Meantime thepenetration of Shantung by means of railway discrimination, railwaymilitary guards, continual nibblings here and there, will be going on. It would make the chapter too long to speak of the part played bymanipulation of finance in achieving this process of attrition ofsovereignty. Two incidents must suffice. During the war, Japanesetraders with the connivance of their government gathered up immenseamounts of copper cash from Shantung and shipped it to Japan againstthe protests of the Chinese government. What does sovereignty amountto when a country cannot control even its own currency system? InManchuria the Japanese have forced the introduction of several hundredmillion dollars of paper currency, nominally, of course, based on agold reserve. These notes are redeemable, however, only in Japanproper. And there is a law in Japan forbidding the exportation ofgold. And there you are. 

Japan itself has recently afforded an object lesson in the actualconnection of economic and political rights in China. It is sobeautifully complete a demonstration that it was surely unconscious. Within the last two weeks, Mr. Obata, the Japanese minister in Peking, has waited upon the government with a memorandum saying that theFoochow incident was the culminating result of the boycott; that ifthe boycott continues, a series of such incidents is to beapprehended, saying that the situation has become "intolerable" forJapan, and disavowing all responsibility for further consequencesunless the government makes a serious effort to stop the boycott. Japan then immediately makes certain specific demands. China must stopthe circulation of handbills, the holding of meetings to urge theboycott, the destruction of Japanese goods that have become Chineseproperty--none have been destroyed that are Japanese owned. Volumescould not say more as to the real conception of Japan of theconnection between the economic and the political relations of the twocountries. Surely the pale ghost of "Sovereignty" smiled ironically ashe read this official note. President Wilson after having made in thecase of Shantung a sharp and complete separation of economic andpolitical rights, also said that a nation boycotted is within sight ofsurrender. Disassociation of words from acts has gone so far in hiscase that he will hardly be able to see the meaning of Mr. Obata'scommunication. The American sense of humor and fair-play may howeverbe counted upon to get its point. 

January, 1920. 

III

Hinterlands in China

One of the two Presidents of China--it is unnecessary to specifywhich--recently stated that a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliancemeant a partition of China. In this division, Japan would take thenorth and Great Britain the south. Probably the remark was not meantto be taken literally in the sense of formal conquest or annexation, but rather symbolically with reference to the tendency of policies andevents. Even so, the statement will appear exaggerated or wild topersons outside of China, who either believe that the Open Door policyis now irrevocably established or that Japan is the only foreign Powerwhich China has to fear. But a recent visit to the south revealed thatin that section, especially in Canton, the British occupy much thesame position of suspicion and dread which is held by the Japanese inthe north. 

Upon the negative side, the Japanese menace is negligible in theprovince of Kwantung, in which Canton is situated. There are said tobe more Americans in Canton than Japanese, and the American colony isnot extensive. Upon the positive side the history of the Cassellcollieries contract is instructive. It illustrates the cause of thepopular attitude toward the British, and quite possibly explains thebitterness in the remark quoted. The contract is noteworthy fromwhatever standpoint it is viewed, whether that of time, of theconditions it contains or of the circumstances which accompany it. 

Premising that the contract delivers to a British company a monopolyof the rich coal deposits of the province for a period of ninety yearsand--quite incidentally of course--the right to use all means oftransportation, water or rail, wharves and ports now in existence, andalso to "construct, manage, superintend and work other roads, railwayswaterways as may be deemed advisable"--which reads like a monopoly ofall further transportation facilities of the province--first take upthe time of the making of the contract. It was drawn in April, 1920and confirmed a few months later. It was made, of course, with theauthorities of the Kwantung province, subject to confirmation atPeking. During this period, Kwantung province was governed by militarycarpet-baggers from the neighboring province of Kwangsei, which waspractically alone of the southern provinces allied with the northerngovernment, then under the control of the Anfu party. It was matter ofcommon knowledge that the people of Canton and of the province werebitterly hostile to this outside control and submitted to it onlybecause of military coercion. Civil strife for the expulsion of theoutsiders was already going on, continually gaining headway, and a fewmonths later the Kwangsei troops were defeated and expelled from theprovince by the forces of General Chen, now the civil governor ofKwantung, who received a triumphal ovation upon his entrance intoCanton. At this time the present native government was established, achange which made possible the return of Sun Yat Sen and his followersfrom their exile in Shanghai. It is evident, then, that the collieriescontract giving away the natural resources of the people of theprovince, was knowingly made by a British company with a governmentwhich no more represented the people of the province than the militarygovernment of Germany represented the people of Belgium during thewar. 

As to the terms of the contract, the statement that it gave theBritish company a monopoly of all the coal mines in the province, wasnot literally accurate. Verbally, twenty-two districts are enumerated. But these are the districts along the lines of the only railways inthe province and the only ones soon to be built, including the as yetuncompleted Hankow-Canton railway. Possibly this fact accounts for theanxiety of the British partners in the Consortium that the completionof this line be the first undertaking financed by the Consortium. Thedocument also includes what is perhaps a novelty in legal documentshaving such a momentous economic importance, namely, the words "etc. "after the districts enumerated by name. 

For this concession, the British syndicate agreed to pay theprovincial government the sum of $1, 000, 000 (silver of course). Thismillion dollars is to bear six per cent interest to the company, andcapital and interest are to be paid back to the company by theprovincial government out of the dividends (if any) it is to receive. The nature of these "dividends" is set forth in an article whichshould receive the careful attention of promoters elsewhere as a modelof the possibilities of exploiting contracts. The ten million capitalis divided equally into "A" shares and "B" shares. The "A" shares gounreservedly to the directors of the company, and three millions ofthe "B" shares are to be allotted by the directors of the company attheir discretion. The other two million are again divided into equalportions, one portion representing the sum advanced by the company tothe province and to be paid back as just specified, while the othermillion--one-tenth of the capitalization--is to be a trust fund thedividends of which are to go for the "benefit of the poor people ofthe province" and for an educational fund for the province. But beforeany dividends are paid upon the "B" shares, eight per cent dividendsare to be paid upon the "A" shares and a _dollar a ton royalty_ uponall coal mined. Those having any familiarity with the coal businesswith its usual royalty of about ten cents a ton can easily calculatethe splendid prospects of the "poor people" and the schools, prospectswhich represent the total return to the provinces of a concession ofuntold worth. The contract also guarantees to the company theassistance of the provincial government in expropriating the owners ofall coal mines which have been granted to other companies but not yetworked. These technical details make dry reading, but they throw lightupon the spirit with which the British company undertook its predatorynegotiations with a government renounced by the people it professed togovern. In comparison with the relatively crude methods of Japan inShantung, they show the advantages of wide business experience. 

As for the circumstances and context which give added menace to thecontract, the following facts are significant. Hong Kong, a Britishcrown colony, lies directly opposite the river upon which Canton issituated. It is the port of export and import for the vast districtsserved by the mines and railways of the province. It is unnecessary topoint out the hold upon all economic development which is giventhrough a monopolistic control of coal. It is hardly too much to saythat the enforcement of the contract would enable British interests inHong Kong to control the entire industrial development of the mostflourishing of the provinces of China. It would be a comparativelyeasy and inexpensive matter to provide the main land with a firstclass modern harbor and port near Canton. But such a port would tendto reduce the assets of Hong Kong to the possession of the mostbeautiful scenery in the world. There is already fear that a newharbor will be built. Many persons think that the concession ofbuilding such railways etc. , "as are deemed advisable for the purposeof the business of the company and to improve those now existing" isthe object of the contract, even more than the coal monopoly. For theBritish already own a considerable part of the mainland, includingpart of the railway connecting the littoral with Canton. By building across-cut from the British owned portion of this railway to theHankow-Canton line, the latter would become virtually the Hankow-HongKong line, and Canton would be a way-station. With the advantages thussecured, the project for building a new port could be indefinitelyblocked. 

During the period in which the contract was being secured, a congressof British Chambers of Commerce was held in Shanghai. Resolutions werepassed in favor of abolishing henceforth the whole principle ofspecial nationalistic concessions, and of cooperating with the Chinesefor the upbuilding of China. At the close of the meeting the Chairmanannounced that a new era for China had finally dawned. All of theBritish newspapers in China lauded the wise action of the Chambers. Atthe same time, Mr. Lamont was in Peking, and was setting forth thatthe object of the Consortium was the abolition of further concessions, and the uniting of the financial resources of the banks in theConsortium for the economic development of China itself. By anironical coincidence, the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank, which is thefinancial power behind the contract and the new company, is theleading British partner in the Consortium. It is difficult to see howthe British can henceforth accuse the Japanese of bad faith if any ofthe banking interests of that country should enter upon independentnegotiations with any government in China. 

By the time the scene of action was transferred to Peking in order tosecure the confirmation of the central government, the Anfu regime wasno more, and as yet no confirmation has been secured. The newgovernment at Canton has declined to recognize the contract as havingany validity. An official of the Hong Kong government has told anofficial of the Canton government that the Hong Kong government standsbehind the enforcement of the contract, and that Kwantung province isa British Hinterland. Within the last few weeks the Governor of HongKong and a leading Chinese banker of Hong Kong who is a Britishsubject have visited Peking. Rumors were rife in the south as to theobject of the visit. British sources published the report that oneobject was to return Weihaiwei to China--in case Peking agreed to turnover more of the Kwantung mainland to Hong Kong as a quid pro quo. Chinese opinion in the south was that one main object was to securethe Peking confirmation of the Cassell contract, in which case$900, 000 more would be forthcoming, $100, 000 having been paid downwhen the contract was signed with the provincial government. Pekingdoes not recognize the present Canton government but regards it as anoutlaw. The crowd that signed the contract is still in control of theneighboring province of Kwangsei and they are relied upon by the northto effect the military subjugation of the seceded province. Fightinghas already, indeed, begun, but the Kwangsei militarists are badly inneed of money; if Peking ratifies the contract, a large part of thefunds will be paid over to them--all that isn't lost by the wayside tothe northern militarists. [1] Meantime British news agencies keep up aconstant circulation of reports tending to discredit the Kwantunggovernment, although all impartial observers on the spot regard it asaltogether the most promising one in China. 

 [1] Since the text was written, the newspapers have stated that the Peking Government has officially refused to validate the agreement. 

These considerations not only throw light on some of the difficultiesof the functioning of the Consortium, but they give an indispensablebackground for judging the actual effect of the renewal of theAnglo-Japanese alliance. By force of circumstances each government, even against its own wish, will be compelled to wink at the predatorypolicies of the other; and the tendency will be to create a divisionof spheres of influence between the north and south in order to avoidmore direct conflicts. The English liberals who stand for the renewalof the alliance on the ground that it will enable England to exercisea check on Japanese policies, are more naïve than was Mr. Wilson withhis belief in the separation of the economic and political control ofShantung. 

It cannot be too often repeated that the real point of frictionbetween the United States and Japan is not in California but in China. It is silly--unless it is calculated--for English authorities to keeprepeating that under no circumstances does the alliance mean thatGreat Britain would support Japan in a war with the United States. Theday the alliance is renewed, the hands of the militarists in Japanwill be strengthened and the hands of the liberals--already weakenough--be still further weakened. In consequence, all the sources offriction in China between the United States and Japan will beintensified. I do not believe in the predicted war. But should itcome, the first act of Japan--so everyone in China believes--will beto seize the ports of northern China and its railways in order to makesure of an uninterrupted supply of food and raw materials. The actwould be justified as necessary to national existence. Great Britainin alliance with Japan would be in no position to protest in anythingbut the most perfunctory way. The guarantee of such abstinence wouldbe for Japan the next best thing to open naval and financial support. Without the guarantee they would not dare the seizure of Chineseports. In recent years diplomatists have shown themselves capable ofunlimited stupidity. But it is not possible that the men in theBritish Foreign Office are not aware of these elementary facts. Ifthey renew the alliance they knowingly take the responsibility for theconsequences. 

May 24, 1921. 

IV

A Political Upheaval in China

Even in America we have heard of one Chinese revolution, that whichthrust the Manchu dynasty from the throne. The visitor in China getsused to casual references to the second revolution, that whichfrustrated Yuan Shi Kai's aspirations to be emperor, and the third, the defeat in 1917 of the abortive attempt to put the Manchu boyemperor back into power. And within the last few weeks the (September1920) fourth upheaval has taken place. It may not be dignified by thename of the fourth revolution, for the head of the state has not beenchanged by it. But as a manifestation of the forces that shape Chinesepolitical events, for evil and for good, perhaps this last disturbancesurpasses the last two "revolutions" in significance. 

Chinese politics in detail are highly complicated, a mess ofpersonalities and factions whose oscillations no one can follow whodoes not know a multitude of personal, family and provincialhistories. But occasionally something happens which simplifies thetangle. Definite outlines frame themselves out of the swirlingcriss-cross of strife, intrigue and ambition. So, at present, thecomplete collapse of the Anfu clique which owned the centralgovernment for two years marks the end of that union of internalmilitarism and Japanese foreign influence which was, for China, themost marked fruit of the war. When China entered the war a "WarParticipation" army was formed. It never participated; probably it wasnever meant to. But its formation threw power wholly into the hands ofthe military clique, as against the civilian constitutionalists. Andin return for concessions, secret agreements relating to Manchuria, Shantung, new railways, etc. , Japan supplied money, munitions, instructors for the army and a benevolent supervision of foreign anddomestic politics. The war came to an unexpected and untimely end, butby this time the offspring of the marriage of the militarism of YuanShi Kai and Japanese money and influence was a lusty youth. Bolshevismwas induced to take the place of Germany as a menace requiring thekeeping up of the army, and loans and teachers. Mongolia was persuadedto cut her strenuous ties with Russia, to renounce her independenceand come again under Chinese sovereignty. 

The army and its Japanese support and instruction was, accordingly, continued. In place of the "War Participation" army appeared the"Frontier Defense" army. Marshal Tuan, the head of the military party, remained the nominal political power behind the presidential chair, and General Hsu (commonly known as little Hsu, in distinction from oldHsu, the president) was the energetic manager of the Mongolianadventure which, by a happy coincidence, required a bank, landdevelopment companies and railway schemes, as well as an army. Aboutthis military centre as a nucleus gathered the vultures who fed on thecarrion. This flock took the name of the Anfu Club. It did not controlthe entire cabinet, but to it belonged the Minister of Justice, whomanipulated the police and the courts, persecuted the students, suppressed liberal journals and imprisoned inconvenient critics. Andthe Club owned the ministers of finance and communications, the twocabinet places that dispense revenues, give out jobs and make loans. It also regulated the distribution of intelligence by mail andtelegraph. The reign of corruption and despotic inefficiency, temperedonly by the student revolt, set in. In two years the Anfu Club gotaway with two hundred millions of public funds directly, to saynothing of what was wasted by incompetency and upon the army. TheAllies had set out to get China into the war. They succeeded ingetting Japan into control of Peking and getting China, politicallyspeaking, into a seemingly hopeless state of corruption and confusion. 

The militaristic or Pei-Yang party was, however, divided into twofactions, each called after a province. The Anwhei party gatheredabout little Hsu and was almost identical with the Anfus. The Chilifaction had been obliged, so far as Peking was concerned, to contentitself with such leavings as the Anfu Club tossed to it. Apparently itwas hopelessly weaker than its rival, although Tuan, who waspersonally honest and above financial scandal, was supported by bothfactions and was the head of both. About three months ago there were afew signs that, while the Anfu Club had been entrenching itself inPeking, the rival faction had been quietly establishing itself in theprovinces. A league of Eight Tuchuns (military governors of theprovinces) came to the assistance of the president against someunusually strong pressure from the Anfu Club. In spite of the factthat the military governor of the three Manchurian provinces, ChangTso Lin, popularly known as the Emperor of Manchuria, lined up withthis league, practically nobody expected anything except somemanoeuvering to get a larger share of the spoils. 

But late in June the president invited Chang Tso Lin to Peking. Thelatter saw Tuan, told him that he was surrounded by evil advisers, demanded that he cut loose from little Hsu and the Anfu Club, anddeclared open war upon little Hsu--the two had long and notoriouslybeen bitter enemies. Even then people had great difficulty inbelieving that anything would happen except another Chinesecompromise. The president was known to be sympathetic upon the wholewith the Chili faction, but the president, if not a typical Chinese, is at least typical of a certain kind of Chinese mandarin, non-resistant, compromising, conciliating, procrastinating, coveringup, evading issues, face-saving. But finally something happened. Amandate was issued dismissing little Hsu from office, military andcivil, dissolving the frontier defense corps as such, and bringing itunder the control of the Ministry of War (usually armies in Chinabelong to some general or Tuchun, not to the country). For almostforty-eight hours it was thought that Tuan had consented to sacrificelittle Hsu and that the latter would submit at least temporarily. Thenwith equally sensational abruptness Tuan brought pressure to bear onthe president. The latter was appointed head of a national defensearmy, and rewards were issued for the heads of the chiefs of the Chilifaction, nothing, however, being said about Chang Tso Lin, who hadmeanwhile returned to Mukden and who still professed allegiance toTuan. Troops were mobilized; there was a rush of officials and of thewealthy to the concessions of Tientsin and to the hotels of thelegation quarter. 

This sketch is not meant as history, but simply as an indication ofthe forces at work. Hence it is enough to say that two weeks afterTuan and little Hsu had intimidated the president and proclaimedthemselves the saviors of the Republic, they were in hiding, theirenemies of the Chili party were in complete control of Peking, andrewards from fifty thousand dollars down were offered for the arrestof little Hsu, the ex-ministers of justice, finance andcommunications, and other leaders of the Anfu Club. The politicalturnover was as complete as it was sensational. The seeminglyimpregnable masters of China were impotent fugitives. The carefullybuilt up Anfu Club, with its military, financial and foreign support, had crumbled and fallen. No country at any time has ever seen apolitical upheaval more sudden and more thoroughgoing. It was not somuch a defeat as a dissolution like that of death, a totaldisappearance, an evaporation. 

Corruption had worked inward, as it has a way of doing. Japanese-bought munitions would not explode; quartermasters vanishedwith the funds with which stores were to be bought; troops wentwithout anything to eat for two or three days; large numbers, including the larger part of one division, went over to the enemy enmasse; those who did not desert had no heart for fighting and ran awayor surrendered on the slightest provocation, saying they were willingto fight for their country but saw no reason why they should fight fora faction, especially a faction that had been selling the country to aforeign nation. In the manner of the defeat of the Anfu clique at theheight of its supremacy, rather than in the mere fact of its defeat, lies the credit side of the Chinese political balance sheet. It is astriking exhibition of the oldest and best faith of the Chinese--thepower of moral considerations. Public opinion, even that of the coolieon the street, was wholly against the Anfu party. It went down not somuch because of the strength of the other side as because of its ownrottenness. 

So far the results are to all appearances negative. The most marked isthe disappearance of Japanese prestige. As one of the leading men inthe War Office said: "For over a year now the people have beenstrongly opposed to the Japanese government on account of Shantung. But now even the generals do not care for Japan any more. " It ishardly logical to take the easy collapse of the Japanese-supportedAnfu party as a proof of the weakness of Japan, but prestige is alwaysa matter of feeling rather than of logic. Many who were intimidated tothe point of hypnotism by the idea of the irresistible power of Japanare now freely laughing at the inefficiency of Japanese leadership. Itwould not be safe to predict that Japan will not come back as a forceto be reckoned with in the internal as well as external politics ofChina, but it is safe to say that never again will Japan figure assuperman to China. And such a negation is after all a positive result. 

And so in its way is the overthrow of the Anwhei faction of themilitarist party. The Chinese liberals do not feel very optimisticabout the immediate outcome. They have mostly given up the idea thatthe country can be reformed by political means. They are scepticalabout the possibility of reforming even politics until a newgeneration comes on the scene. They are now putting their faith ineducation and in social changes which will take some years toconsummate themselves visibly. The self-styled southern republicanconstitutional party has not shown itself in much better light thanthe northern militarist party. In fact, its old leader Sun Yat Sen nowcuts one of the most ridiculous figures in China, as shortly beforethis upheaval he had definitely aligned himself with Tuan and littleHsu. [2]

 [2] This was written of course several months before Sun Yat Sen was reinstated in control of Canton by the successful revolt of his local adherents against the southern militarists who had usurped power and driven out Sun Yat Sen and his followers. But up to the time when I left China, in July of this year, it was true that the liberals of northern and central China who were bitterly opposed to the Peking Government, did not look to the Southern Government with much hope. The common attitude was a "plague upon both of your houses" and a desire for a new start. The conflict between North and South looms much larger in the United States than it did in China. 

This does not mean, however, that democratic opinion thinks nothinghas been gained. The demonstration of the inherent weakness of corruptmilitarism will itself prevent the development of any militarism ascomplete as that of the Anfus. As one Chinese gentleman said to me:"When Yuan Shi Kai was overthrown, the tiger killed the lion. Now asnake has killed the tiger. No matter how vicious the snake maybecome, some smaller animal will be able to kill him, and his lifewill be shorter than that of either lion or tiger. " In short, eachsuccessive upheaval brings nearer the day when civilian supremacy willbe established. This result will be achieved partly because of therepeated demonstrations of the uncongeniality of military despotism tothe Chinese spirit, and partly because with every passing yeareducation will have done its work. Suppressed liberal papers arecoming to life, while over twenty Anfu subsidized newspapers and twosubsidized news agencies have gone out of being. The soldiers, including many officers in the Anwhei army, clearly show the effectsof student propaganda. And it is worth while to note down the name ofone of the leaders on the victorious side, the only one whose troopsdid any particular fighting, and that against great odds in numbers. The name is Wu Pei Fu. He at least has not fought for the Chilifaction against the Anwhei faction. He has proclaimed from the firstthat he was fighting to rid the country of military control of civilgovernment, and against traitors who would sell their country toforeigners. He has come out strongly for a new popular assembly, toform a new constitution and to unite the country. And although ChangTso Lin has remarked that Wu Pei Fu as a military subordinate couldnot be expected to intervene in politics, he has not as yet found itconvenient to oppose the demand for a popular assembly. Meanwhile theliberals are organizing their forces, hardly expecting to win avictory, but resolved, win or lose, to take advantage of theopportunity to carry further the education of the Chinese people inthe meaning of democracy. 

August, 1920. 

V

Divided China

1. 

In January 1920 the Peking government issued an edict proclaiming theunification of China. On May 5th Sun Yat Sen was formally inauguratedin Canton as president of all China. Thus China has within six monthsbeen twice unified, once from the northern standpoint and once fromthe southern. Each act of "unification" is in fact a symbol of thedivision of China, a division expressing differences of language, temperament, history, and political policy as well as of geography, persons and factions. This division has been one of the outstandingfacts of Chinese history since the overthrow of the Manchus ten yearsago and it has manifested itself in intermittent civil war. Yet thereare two other statements which are equally true, although they flatlycontradict each other and the one just made. One statement is that sofar as the people of China are concerned there is no real division ongeographical lines, but only the common division occurring everywherebetween conservatives and progressives. The other is that instead oftwo divisions in China, there are at least five, two parties in boththe north and south, and another in the central or Yangtse region, [3]each one of the five splitting up again more or less on factional andprovincial lines. And so far as the future is concerned, probably thislast statement is the most significant of the three. That all threestatements are true is what makes Chinese politics so difficult tounderstand even in their larger features. 

 [3] Since the writing of this and the former chapter there are some signs that Wu Pei Fu wants to set up in control of the middle districts. 

By the good fortune of circumstances we were in Canton when theinauguration occurred. Peking and Canton are a long way apart in morethan distance. There is little exchange of actual news between the twoplaces; what filters through into either city and gets publishedconsists mostly of rumors tending to discredit the other city. InCanton, the monarchy is constantly being restored in Peking; and inPeking, Canton is Bolshevized at least once a week, while every otherweek open war breaks out between the adherents of Sun Yat Sen, andGeneral Chen Kwang Ming, the civil governor of the province. There isnothing to give the impression--even in circles which accept thePeking government only as an evil necessity--that the pretensions ofSun Yat Sen represent anything more than the desires of a small anddiscredited group to get some slight power for themselves at theexpense of national unity. Even in Fukien, the province next north ofKwantung, one found little but gossip whose effect was to minimize theimportance of the southern government. In foreign circles in the northas well as in liberal Chinese circles upon the whole, the feeling isgeneral that bad as the de facto Peking government may be, itrepresents the cause of national unity, while the southern governmentrepresents a perpetuation of that division of China which makes herweak and which offers the standing invitation to foreign intrigue andaggression. Only occasionally during the last few months has somereturned traveller timidly advanced the opinion that we had the "wrongdope" on the south, and that they were really trying "to do somethingdown there. "

Consequently there was little preparation on my part for the spectacleafforded in Canton during the week of May 5th. This was the onlydemonstration I have seen in China during the last two years whichgave any evidence of being a spontaneous popular movement. New Yorkersare accustomed to crowds, processions, street decorations andaccompanying enthusiasm. I doubt if New York has ever seen ademonstration which surpassed that of Canton in size, noise, color orspontaneity--in spite of tropical rains. The country people flocked inin such masses, that, being unable to find accommodation even in theriver boats, they kept up a parade all night. Guilds and localitieswhich were not able to get a place in the regular procession organizedminor ones on their own account on the day before and after theofficial demonstration. Making all possible allowance for theintensity of Cantonese local loyalty and the fact that they might becelebrating a Cantonese affair rather than a principle, the scene wassufficiently impressive to revise one's preconceived ideas and to makeone try to find out what it is that gives the southern movement itsvitality. 

A demonstration may be popular and still be superficial insignificance. However one found foreigners on the ground--at leastAmericans--saying that in the last few months the men in power inCanton were the only officials in China who were actually doingsomething for the people instead of filling their own pockets andmagnifying their personal power. Even the northern newspapers had notentirely omitted reference to the suppression of licensed gambling. Onthe spot one learned that this suppression was not only genuine andthorough, but that it meant a renunciation of an annual revenue ofnearly ten million dollars on the part of a government whose chiefdifficulty is financial, and where--apart from motives of personalsqueeze--it would have been easy to argue that at least temporarilythe end justified the means in retaining this source of revenue. English papers throughout China have given much praise to thegovernment of Hong Kong because it has cut down its opium revenue fromeight to four millions annually with the plan for ultimate extinction. Yet Hong Kong is prosperous, it has not been touched by civil war, andit only needs revenue for ordinary civil purposes, not as a means ofmaintaining its existence in a crisis. 

Under the circumstances, the action of the southern government washardly less than heroic. This renunciation is the most sensational actof the Canton government, but one soon learns that it is theaccompaniment of a considerable number of constructive administrativeundertakings. Among the most notable are attempts to reform the localmagistracies throughout the province, the establishment of municipalgovernment in Canton--something new in China where local officials areall centrally appointed and controlled--based upon the AmericanCommission plan, and directed by graduates of schools of politicalscience in the United States; plans for introducing localself-government throughout the province; a scheme for introduction ofuniversal primary education in Canton to be completed in three steps. 

These reforms are provincial and local. They are part of a generalmovement against centralization and toward local autonomy which isgaining headway all over China, a protest against the appointment ofofficials from Peking and the management of local affairs in theinterests of factions--and pocketbooks--whose chief interest in localaffairs is what can be extracted in the way of profit. For the onlyanalogue of provincial government in China at the present time is thecarpet bag government of the south in the days following our civilwar. These things explain the restiveness of the country, includingcentral as well as southern provinces, under Peking domination. Butthey do not explain the setting up of a new national, or federalgovernment, with the election of Mr. Sun Yat Sen as its president. Tounderstand this event it is necessary to go back into history. 

In June, 1917, the parliament in Peking was about to adopt aconstitution. The parliament was controlled by leaders of the oldrevolutionary party who had been at loggerheads with Yuan and with theexecutive generally. The latter accused them of being obstructionists, wasting time in discussing and theorizing when the country neededaction. Japan had changed her tactics regarding the participation ofChina in the war, and having got her position established through theTwenty-one Demands, saw a way of controlling Chinese arsenals andvirtually amalgamating the Chinese armies with her own throughsupervising China's entrance into the war. The British and French werepressing desperately for the same end. Parliament was slow to act, andTang Shao Yi, Sun Yat Sen and other southern leaders were averse, since they regarded the war as none of China's business and were uponthe whole more anti-British than anti-German--a fact which partlyaccounts for the share of British journals in the present presspropaganda against the Canton government. But what brought matters toa head was the fact that the constitution which was about to beadopted eliminated the military governors or tuchuns of the provinces, and restored the supremacy of civil authority which had been destroyedby Yuan Shi Kai, in addition to introducing a policy ofdecentralization. Coached by members of the so-called progressiveparty which claimed to be constitutionalist and which had afactionalist interest in overthrowing the revolutionaries whocontrolled the legislative branch if not the executive, the militarygovernors demanded that the president suspend parliament and dismissthe legislators. This demand was more than passively supported by allthe Allied diplomats in Peking with the honorable exception of theAmerican legation. The president weakly yielded and issued an edictdispelling parliament, virtually admitting in the document theillegality of his action. Less than a month afterwards he was arefugee in the Dutch legation on account of the farce of monarchicalrestoration staged by Chang Shun--who at the present time is againcoming to the front in the north as adjutant to the plans of Chang TsoLin, the present "strong man" of China. Later, elections were held anda new parliament elected. This parliament has been functioning as thelegislature of China at Peking and elected the president, Hsu ShiChang, the head of the government recognized by the foreign Powers--inshort it is the Chinese government from an international standpoint, the Peking government from a domestic standpoint. 

The revolutionary members of the old parliament never recognized thelegality of their dispersal, and consequently refused to admit thelegal status of the new parliament, called by them the bogusparliament, and of the president elected by it, especially as the newlegislative body was not elected according to the rules laid down bythe constitution. Under the lead of some of the old members, the oldparliament, called by its opponents the defunct parliament, has led anintermittent existence ever since. Claiming to be the sole authenticconstitutional body of China, it finally elected Dr. Sun president ofChina and thus prepared the act of the fifth of May, already reported. 

Such is the technical and formal background of the present southerngovernment. Its attack upon the legality of the Peking government isdoubtless technically justified. But for various reasons its ownpositive status is open to equally grave doubts. The terms "bogus" and"defunct, " so freely cast at each other, both seem to an outsider tobe justified. It is less necessary to go into the reasons which appearto invalidate the position of the southern parliament because of thebelated character of its final action. A protest which waits fouryears to assert itself in positive action is confronted not with legaltechnicalities but with accomplished facts. In my opinion, legalityfor legality, the southern government has a bare shade the better ofthe technical argument. But in the face of a government which hasforeign recognition and which has maintained itself after a fashionfor four years, a legal shadow is a precarious political basis. It iswiser to regard the southern government as a revolutionary government, which in addition to the prestige of continuing the revolutionarymovement of ten years ago has also a considerable sentimental asset asa protest of constitutionalism against the military usurpations of thePeking government. 

It is an open secret that the southern movement has not received theundivided support of all the forces present in Canton which areopposed to the northern government. Tang Shao Yi, for example, wasnotable for his absence at the time of the inauguration, having foundit convenient to visit the graves of his ancestors at that time. Theprovincial governor, General Chen Kwang Ming, was in favor ofconfining efforts to the establishment of provincial autonomy and theencouragement of similar movements in other provinces, looking forwardto an eventual federal, or confederated, government of at least allthe provinces south of the Yangtse. Many of his generals wanted topostpone action until Kwantung province had made a military alliancewith the generals in the other southwestern provinces, so as to beable to resist the north should the latter undertake a militaryexpedition. Others thought the technical legal argument for the newmove was being overworked, and while having no objections to an outand out revolutionary movement against Peking, thought that the timefor it had not yet come. They are counting on Chang Tso Lin'sattempting a monarchical restoration and think that the popularrevulsion against that move would create the opportune time for such amovement as has now been prematurely undertaken. However in spite ofreports of open strife freely circulated by British and Pekinggovernment newspapers, most of the opposition elements are now loyallysuppressing their opposition and supporting the government of Sun YatSen. A compromise has been arranged by which the federal governmentwill confine its attention to foreign affairs, leaving provincialmatters wholly in the hands of Governor Chen and his adherents. Thereis still room for friction however, especially as to the control ofrevenues, since at present there are hardly enough funds for oneadministration, let alone two. 

2. 

The members of the new southern government are strikingly different intype from those one meets elsewhere whether in Peking or theprovincial capitals. The latter men are literally mediaeval when theyare not late Roman Empire, though most of them have learned a littlemodern patter to hand out to foreigners. The former are educated men, not only in the school sense and in the sense that they have had somespecial training for their jobs, but in the sense that they think theideas and speak the language current among progressive folk all overthe world. They welcome inquiry and talk freely of their plans, hopesand fears. I had the opportunity of meeting all the men who are mostinfluential in both the local and federal governments; theseconversations did not take the form of interviews for publication, butI learned that there are at least three angles from which the totalsituation is viewed. 

Governor Chen has had no foreign education and speaks no English. Heis distinctively Chinese in his training and outlook. He is a man offorce, capable of drastic methods, straightforward intellectually andphysically, of unquestioned integrity and of almost Spartan life in acountry where official position is largely prized for the luxuries itmakes possible. For example, practically alone among Chineseprovincial officials of the first rank he has no concubines. Not onlythis, but he proposed to the provincial assembly a measure todisenfranchise all persons who have concubines. (The measure failedbecause it is said its passage would have deprived the majority of theassemblymen of their votes. ) He is by all odds the most impressive ofall the officials whom I have met in China. If I were to select a manlikely to become a national figure of the first order in the future, it would be, unhesitatingly, Governor Chen. He can give and alsocommand loyalty--a fact which in itself makes him almost unique. 

His views in gist are as follows: The problem of problems in China isthat of real unification. Industry and education are held back becauseof lack of stability of government, and the better elements in societyseclude themselves from all public effort. The question is how thisunification is to be obtained. In the past it has been tried by forceused by strong individuals. Yuan Shi Kai tried and failed; Feng KuoChang tried and failed; Tuan Chi Jui tried and failed. That methodmust be surrendered. China can be unified only by the peoplethemselves, employing not force but the methods of normal politicalevolution. The only way to engage the people in the task is todecentralize the government. Futile efforts at centralization must beabandoned. Peking and Canton alike must allow the provinces themaximum of autonomy; the provincial capitals must give as muchauthority as possible to the districts, and the districts to thecommunities. Officials must be chosen by and from the local districtsand everything must be done to encourage local initiative. GovernorChen's chief ambition is to introduce this system into Kwantungprovince. He believes that other provinces will follow as soon as themethod has been demonstrated, and that national unity will then be apyramid built out of the local blocks. 

With extreme self-government in administrative matters, Governor Chenwill endeavor to enforce a policy of centralized economic control. Hesays in effect that the west has developed economic anarchy along withpolitical control, with the result of capitalistic domination andclass struggle. He wishes to avert this consequence in China by havinggovernment control from the first of all basic raw materials and allbasic industries, mines, transportation, factories for cement, steel, etc. In this way the provincial authorities hope to secure an equableindustrial development of the province, while at the same timeprocuring ample revenues without resorting to heavy taxation. Sincealmost all the other governors in China are using their power, incombination with the exploiting capitalists native and foreign, tomonopolize the natural resources of their provinces for privateprofit, it is not surprising that Governor Chen's views are felt to bea menace to privilege and that he is advertised all over China as adevout Bolshevist. His views have special point in view of Britishefforts to get an economic stranglehold upon the province--effortswhich are dealt with in a prior chapter. 

Another type of views lays chief stress upon the internal politicalcondition of China. Its adherents say in effect: Why make such a fussabout having two governments for China, when, in point of fact, Chinais torn into dozens of governments? In the north, war is sure to breakout sooner or later between Chang Tso Lin and his rivals. Eachmilitary governor is afraid of his division generals. The brigadegenerals intrigue against the division leaders, and even colonels aredoing all they can to further their personal power. The Pekinggovernment is a stuffed sham, taking orders from the militarygovernors of the provinces, living only on account of jealousies amongthese generals, and by the grace of foreign diplomatic support. It isactually bankrupt, and this actual state will soon be formallyrecognized. The thing for us to do is to go ahead, maintain in goodfaith the work of the revolution, give this province the best possiblecivil administration; then in the inevitable approaching débâcle, thesouthern government will be ready to serve as the nucleus of a genuinereconstruction. Meantime we want, if not the formal recognition offoreign governments, at least their benevolent neutrality. 

Dr. Sun still embodies in himself the spirit of the revolution of1911. So far as that was not anti-Manchu it was in essencenationalistic, and only accidentally republican. The day after theinauguration of Dr. Sun, a memorial was dedicated to the seventy-twopatriot heroes who fell in an abortive attempt in Canton to throw offthe Manchu yoke, some six months before the successful revolt. Themonument is the most instructive single lesson which I have seen inthe political history of the revolution. It is composed of seventy-twogranite blocks. Upon each is engraved: Given by the Chinese NationalLeague of Jersey City, or Melbourne, or Mexico, or Liverpool, orSingapore, etc. Chinese nationalism is a product of Chinese migrationto foreign countries; Chinese nationalism on foreign shores financedthe revolution, and largely furnished its leaders and provided itsorganization. Sun Yat Sen was the incarnation of this nationalism, which was more concerned with freeing China--and Asia--from allforeign domination than with particular political problems. And inspite of the movement of events since that day, he remains essentiallyat that stage, being closer in spirit to the nationalists of theEuropean irredentist type than to the spirit of contemporary youngChina. A convinced republican, he nevertheless measures events and menin the concrete by what he thinks they will do to promote theindependence of China from foreign control, rather than by what theywill do to promote a truly democratic government. This is the soleexplanation that can be given for his unfortunate coquetting a yearago with the leaders of the now fallen Anfu Club. He allowed himselfto be deceived into thinking that they were ready to turn against theJapanese if he would give them his support; and his nationalistimagination was inflamed by the grandiose schemes of little Hsu forthe Chinese subjugation of Mongolia. 

More openly than others, Dr. Sun admits and justifies the new southerngovernment as representing a division of China. If, he insists, it hadnot been for the secession of the south in 1917, Japan would now be invirtually complete control of all China. A unified China would havemeant a China ready to be swallowed whole by Japan. The secessionlocalized Japanese aggressions, made it evident that the south wouldfight rather than be devoured, and gave a breathing spell in whichpublic opinion in the north rallied against the Twenty-one Demands andagainst the military pact with Japan. Thus it saved the independenceof China. But, while it checked Japan, it did not checkmate her. Shestill expects with the assistance of Chang Tso Lin to make northernChina her vassal. The support which foreign governments in general andthe United States in particular are giving Peking is merely playinginto the hands of the Japanese. The independent south affords the onlyobstacle which causes Japan to pause in her plan of making northernChina in effect a Japanese province. A more than usually authenticrumor says that upon the occasion of the visit of the Japanese consulgeneral to the new president (no other foreign official has made anofficial visit), the former offered from his government the officialrecognition of Dr. Sun as president of all China, if the latter wouldrecognize the Twenty-one Demands as an accomplished fact. From theJapanese standpoint the offer was a safe one, as this acceptance ofJapanese claims is the one thing impossible to the new government. Butmeantime the offer naturally confirms the nationalists of Dr. Sun'stype in their belief that the southern split is the key to maintainingthe political independence of China; or, as Dr. Sun puts it, that adivided China is for the time being the only means to an ultimatelyindependent China. 

These views are not given as stating the whole truth of the situation. They are ex parte. But they are given as setting forth in good faiththe conceptions of the leaders of the southern movement and asrequiring serious attention if the situation of China, domestic andinternational, is to be understood. Upon my own account, and notsimply as expressing the views of others, I have reached a conclusionquite foreign to my thought before I visited the south. While it isnot possible to attach too much importance to the unity of China as apart of the foreign policy of the United States, it is possible toattach altogether too much importance to the Peking government as asymbol of that unity. To borrow and adapt the words of one southernleader, while the United States can hardly be expected to do otherthan recognize the Peking as the de facto government, there is no needto coddle that government and give it face. Such a course maintains anominal and formal unity while in fact encouraging the military andcorrupt forces that keep China divided and which make for foreignaggression. 

In my opinion as the outcome of two years' observation of the Chinesesituation, the real interests of both China and the United Stateswould be served if, in the first place, the United States should takethe lead in securing from the diplomatic body in Peking the serving ofexpress notice upon the Peking government that in no case would arestoration of the monarchy be recognized by the Powers. This may seemin America like an unwarranted intervention in the domestic affairs ofa foreign country. But in fact such intervention is already a fact. The present government endures only in virtue of the support offoreign Powers. The notice would put an end to one kind of intrigue, one kind of rumor and suspicion, which is holding industry andeducation back and which is keeping China in a state of unrest andinstability. It would establish a period of comparative quiet in whichwhatever constructive forces exist may come to the front. The secondmeasure would be more extreme. The diplomacy of the United Statesshould take the lead in making it clear that unless the promises aboutthe disbanding of the army, and the introduction of generalretrenchment are honestly and immediately carried out, the Powers willpursue a harsh rather than a benevolent policy toward the Pekinggovernment, insisting upon immediate payment of interest and loans asthey fall due and holding up the government to the strictest meetingof all its obligations. The notification to be effective might wellinclude a virtual threat of withdrawal of recognition in case thegovernment does not seriously try to put its profuse promises intoexecution. It should also include a definite discouragement of anyexpenditures designed for military conquest of the south. 

Diplomatic recognition of the southern government is out of thequestion at present. It is not out of the question to put on thefinancial screws so that the southern government will be allowed spaceand time to demonstrate what it can do by peaceful means to give oneor more provinces a decent, honest and progressive civiladministration. It is unnecessary to enumerate the obstacles in theway of carrying out such a policy. But in my judgment it is the onlypolicy by which the Great Powers will not become accomplices inperpetuating the weakness and division of China. It is the moststraightforward way of meeting whatever plans of aggression Japan mayentertain. 

May, 1921. 

VI

Federalism in China

The newcomer in China in observing and judging events usually makesthe mistake of attaching too much significance to current happenings. Occurrences take place which in the western world would portendimportant changes--and nothing important results. It is not easy toloosen the habit of years; and so the visitor assumes that an eventwhich is striking to the point of sensationalism must surely be partof a train of events having a definite trend; some deep-laid plan mustbe behind it. It takes a degree of intellectual patience added to timeand experience to make one realize that even when there is a rhythm inevents the tempo is so retarded that one must wait a long time tojudge what is really going on. Most political events are like dailychanges in the weather, fluctuations back and forth which mayseriously affect individuals but which taken one by one tell littleabout the movement of the seasons. Even the occurrences which are dueto human intention are usually sporadic and casual, and the observererrs by reading into them too much plot, too comprehensive a scheme, too farsighted a plan. The aim behind the event is likely to be onlysome immediate advantage, some direct increase of power, the overthrowof a rival, the grasping at greater wealth by an isolated act, withoutany consecutive or systematic looking ahead. 

Foreigners are not the only ones who have erred, however, in judgingthe Chinese political situation of the last few years. Beginning twoyears ago, one heard experienced Chinese with political affiliationssaying that it was impossible for things to go on as they were formore than three months longer. Some decisive change must occur. Yetoutwardly the situation has remained much the same not only for threemonths but for two years, the exception being the overthrow of theAnfu faction a year ago. And this occurrence hardly marked a definiteturn in events, as it was, to a considerable extent, only a shiftingof power from the hands of one set of tuchuns to another set. Nevertheless at the risk of becoming a victim of the fallacy which Ihave been setting forth, I will hazard the remark that the last fewmonths _have_ revealed a definite and enduring trend--that through thediurnal fluctuations of the strife for personal power and wealth aseasonal political change in society is now showing itself. Certainlines of cleavage seem to show themselves, so that through the welterof striking, picturesque, sensational but meaningless events, adefinite pattern is revealed. 

This pattern is indicated by the title of this chapter--a movementtoward the development of a federal form of government. In calling themovement one toward federalism, there is, however, more of a jump intothe remote future than circumstances justify. It would be moreaccurate, as well as more modest, to say that there is a well definedand seemingly permanent trend toward provincial autonomy and localself-government accompanied by a hope and a vague plan that in thefuture the more or less independent units will recombine into theUnited or Federated States of China. Some who look far into the futureanticipate three stages; the first being the completion of the presentsecessionist movement; the second the formation of northern andsouthern confederations respectively; the third a reunion into asingle state. 

To go into the detailed evidence for the existence of a definite andlasting movement of this sort would presume too much on the reader'sknowledge of Chinese geography and his acquaintance with specificrecent events. I shall confine myself to quite general features of thesituation. The first feature is the new phase which has been assumedby the long historic antagonism of the north and the south. Roughlyspeaking, the revolution which established the republic and overthrewthe Manchus represented a victory for the south. But thetransformation during the last five years of the nominal republic intoa corrupt oligarchy of satraps or military governors or feudal lordshas represented a victory for the north. It is a significant fact, symbolically at least, that the most powerful remaining tuchun ormilitary governor in China--in some respects the only powerful one whohas survived the vicissitudes of the last few years--namely Chang TsoLin, is the uncrowned king of the three Manchurian provinces. Theso-called civil war of the north and south is not, however, to beunderstood as a conflict of republicanism located in the south andmilitarism in the north. Such a notion is directly contrary to facts. The "civil war" till six or eight months ago was mainly a conflict ofmilitary governors and factions, part of that struggle for personalpower and wealth which has been going on all over China. 

But recently events have taken a different course. In four of thesouthern provinces, tuchuns who seemed all powerful have toppled over, and the provinces have proclaimed or tacitly assumed theirindependence of both the Peking and the former military Cantongovernments--the province in which Canton situated being one of thefour. I happened to be in Hunan, the first of the southerly provincesto get comparative independence, last fall, not long after theoverthrow of the vicious despot who had ruled the province with theaid of northern troops. For a week a series of meetings were held inChangsha, the capital of the province. The burden of every speech was"Hunan for the Hunanese. " The slogan embodies the spirit of two powerseach aiming at becoming the central authority; it is a conflict of theprinciple of provincial autonomy, represented by the politically moremature south, with that of militaristic centralization, represented byPeking. 

As I write, in early September (1921), the immediate issue is obscuredby the fight which Wu Pei Fu is waging with the Hunanese who withnominal independence are in aim and interest allied with the south. If, as is likely, Wu Pei Fu wins, he may take one of two courses. Hemay use his added power to turn against Chang Tso Lin and the northernmilitarists which will bring him into virtual alliance with thesoutherners and establish him as the antagonist of the federalprinciple. This is the course which his earlier record would call for. Or he may yield to the usual official lust for power and money and tryonce more the Yuan Shi Kai policy of military centralization withhimself as head, after trying out conclusions with Chang Tso Lin ashis rival. This is the course which the past record of militaryleaders indicates. But even if Wu Pei Fu follows precedent and goesbad, he will only hasten his own final end. This is not prophecy. Itis only a statement of what has uniformly happened in China just atthe moment a military leader seemed to have complete power in hisgrasp. In other words, a victory for Wu Pei Fu may either accelerateor may retard the development of provincial autonomy according to thecourse he pursues. It cannot permanently prevent or deflect it. 

The basic factor that makes one sure that this trend toward localautonomy is a reality and not merely one of those meaninglessshiftings of power which confuse the observer, is that it is in accordwith Chinese temperament, tradition and circumstance. Feudalism ispast and gone two thousand years ago, and at no period since has Chinapossessed a working centralized government. The absolute empires whichhave come and gone in the last two millenniums existed by virtue ofnon-interference and a religious aura. The latter can never berestored; and every episode of the republic demonstrates that Chinawith its vast and diversified territories, its population of betweenthree hundred and fifty and four hundred million, its multitude oflanguages and lack of communications, its enormous local attachmentssanctified by the family system and ancestral worship, cannot bemanaged from a single and remote centre. China rests upon a network oflocal and voluntary associations cemented by custom. This fact hasgiven it its unparallelled stability and its power to progress evenunder the disturbed political conditions of the past ten years. Isometimes think that Americans with their own traditional contempt forpolitics and their spontaneous reliance upon self-help and localorganization are the ones who are naturally fitted to understandChina's course. The Japanese with their ingrained reliance upon thestate have continually misjudged and misacted. The British understandbetter than we do the significance of local self-government; but theyare misled by their reverence for politics so that they cannot readilyfind or see government when it does not take political form. 

It is not too much to say that one great cause for the overthrow ofthe Manchus was the fact that because of the pressure of internationalrelations they attempted to force, especially in fiscal matters, acentralization upon the provinces wholly foreign to the spirit of thepeople. This created hostility where before there had beenindifference. China may possibly not emerge from her troubles aunified nation, any more than a much smaller and less populous Europeemerged from the break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, a single state. Indeed one often wonders, not that China is divided, but that she isnot much more broken up than she is. But one thing is certain. Whatever progress China finally succeeds in making will come from avariety of local centres, not from Peking or Canton. It will beeffected by means of associations and organizations which even thoughthey assume a political form are not primarily political in nature. 

Criticisms are passed, especially by foreigners, upon the presenttrend of events. The criticisms are more than plausible. It is evidentthat the present weakness of China is due to her divided condition. Hence it is natural to argue that the present movement being one ofsecession and general disintegration will increase the weakness of thecountry. It is also evident that many of China's troubles are due tothe absence of any efficient administrative system; it is reasonableto argue that China cannot get even railways and universal educationwithout a strong and stable central government. There is no doubtabout the facts. It is not surprising that many friends of Chinadeeply deplore the present tendency while some regard it as the finalaccomplishment of the long predicted breakup of China. But remediesfor China's ills based upon ignoring history, psychology and actualconditions are so utopian that it is not worth while to argue whetheror not they are theoretically desirable. The remedy of China'stroubles by a strong, centralized government is on a par with curingdisease by the expulsion of a devil. The evil of sectionalism is real, but since it is real it cannot be dealt with by trying a method whichimplies its non-existence. If the devil is really there, he will notbe exorcized by a formula. If the trouble is internal, not due to anexternal demon, the disease can be cured only by using the factors ofhealth and vigor which the patient already possesses. And in Chinawhile these factors of recuperation and growth are numerous, they allexist in connection with local organizations and voluntaryassociations. The increasing volume of the cry that the "tuchuns mustgo" comes from the provincial and local interests which have beeninsulted and violated by a nominally centralized but actually chaoticsituation. After this negative work is completed, the constructiverebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests andabilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that whichoccurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre. 

Another objection to the present tendency has force especially fromthe foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchudynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due tointernational pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were acapital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meetforeign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result wasdisaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre whichmay be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, thisdesire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationalsto the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going totake a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantimewhere and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomaticrelations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing ofconcessions?

In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herselfas well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate thedesire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China's domesticaffairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues andfrom which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is alsodanger that one foreign nation may line up with one group ofprovinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so thatinternational friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sourcesand even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young's JapanChronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantoneseexperiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalistsin the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for asinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation that maycome into existence if there are several political centres in Chinaand one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another. 

The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attemptingthe impossible--namely checking the movement toward local autonomy, even though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The dangeronly emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation;that its essence is time. The evils and troubles of China are realenough, and there is no blinking the fact that they are largely of herown making, due to corruption, inefficiency and absence of populareducation. But no one who knows the common people doubts that theywill win through if they are given time. And in the concrete thismeans that they be left politically alone to work out their owndestiny. There will doubtless be proposals at the Pacific Conferenceto place China under some kind of international tutelage. This chapterand the events connected with the tendency which it reports will becited as showing this need. Some of the schemes will spring frommotives that are hostile to China. Some will be benevolently conceivedin a desire to save China from herself and shorten her period of chaosand confusion. But the hope of the world's peace, as well as ofChina's freedom, lies in adhering to a policy of Hands Off. Give Chinaa chance. Give her time. The danger lies in being in a hurry, inimpatience, possibly in the desire of America to show that we are apower in international affairs and that we too have a positive foreignpolicy. And a benevolent policy of supporting China from without, instead of promoting her aspirations from within, may in the end doChina about as much harm as a policy conceived in malevolence. 

July, 1921. 

VII

A Parting of the Ways for America

1

The realities of American policy in China and toward China are goingto be more seriously tested in the future than they ever have been inthe past. Japanese papers have been full of protests against anyattempt by the Pacific Conference to place Japan on trial. Would thatAmerican journals were full of warnings that America is on trial atthe Conference as to the sincerity and intelligent goodwill behind heramiable professions. The world will not stop with the PacificConference; the latter, however important, will not arrest futuredevelopments, and the United States will continue to be on trial tillshe has established by her acts a permanent and definite attitude. Forthe realities of the situation cannot be exhausted in any formula orin any set of diplomatic agreements, even if the Conference confoundsthe fears of pessimists and results in a harmonious union of thepowers in support of China's legitimate aspirations for free politicaland economic growth. 

The Conference, however, stands as a symbol of the larger situation;and its decisions or lack of them will be a considerable factor in thedetermination of subsequent events. Sometimes one is obliged to fallback on a trite phrase. We are genuinely at a parting of the ways. Even if we should follow in our old path, there would none the less bea parting of the ways, for we cannot consistently tread the old pathunless we are animated by a much more conscious purpose and a moregeneral and intelligent knowledge of affairs than have controlled ouractivities in the past. 

The ideas expressed by an English correspondent about the fear thatAmerica is soon to be an active source of danger in the Far East arenot confined to persons on foreign shores. The prevailing attitude insome circles of American opinion is that called by President Hibbencynical pessimism. All professed radicals and many liberals believethat if our course has been better in the past it has been due togeographical accidents combined with indifference and with ourundeveloped economic status. Consequently they believe that since wehave now become what is called a world-power and a nation whichexports instead of importing capital, our course will soon be as badas that of any of the rest of them. In some quarters this opinion isclearly an emotional reaction following the disillusionments ofVersailles. In others, it is due to adherence to a formula: nothing ininternational affairs can come out of capitalism and America isemphatically a capitalistic country. Whether or not these feelings arecorrect, they are not discussable; neither an emotion nor an absoluteformula is subject to analysis. 

But there are specific elements in the situation which give groundsfor apprehension as to the future. These specific elements are capableof detection and analysis. An adequate realization of their naturewill be a large factor in preventing cynical apprehensions frombecoming actual. This chapter is an attempt at a preliminary listing, inadequate, of course, as any preliminary examination must be. Whilean a priori argument based on a fatalistic formula as to how a"capitalistic nation" must conduct itself does not appeal to me, thereare nevertheless concrete facts which are suggested by that formula. Part of our comparatively better course in China in the past is due tothe fact that we have not had the continuous and close alliancebetween the State Department and big banking interests which is foundin the case of foreign powers. No honest well-informed history ofdevelopments in China could be written in which the Russian AsiaticBank, the Foreign Bank of Belgium, the French Indo-China Bank andBanque Industrielle, the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Hongkong-ShanghaiBank, etc. , did not figure prominently. These banks work in theclosest harmony, not only with railway and construction syndicates andbig manufacturing interests at home, but also with their respectiveforeign offices. It is hardly too much to say that legations and bankshave been in most important matters the right and left hands of thesame body. American business interests have complained an the pastthat the American government does not give to American traders abroadthe same support that the nationals of other states receive. In thepast these complaints have centred largely about actual wrongssuffered or believed to have been suffered by American businessundertakings carried on in a foreign country. With the presentexpansion of capital and of commerce, the same complaints and demandsare going to be made not with reference to grievances suffered, butwith reference to furthering, to pushing American commercial interestsin connection with large banking groups. It would take a credulousperson to deny the influence of big business in domestic politics. Aswe become more interested in commerce and banking enterprises whatassurance have we that the alliance will not be transferred tointernational politics?

It should be noted that the policy of the open door as affirmed by thegreat powers--and as frequently violated by them--even if it behenceforth observed in good faith, does not adequately protect us fromthis danger. The open door policy is not primarily a policy aboutChina herself but rather about the policies of foreign powers towardone another with respect to China. It demands equality of economicopportunity for different nations. Were it enforced, it would preventthe granting of monopolies to any one nation: there is nothing in itto render impossible a conjoint exploitation of China by foreignpowers, an organized monopoly in which each nation has its due sharewith respect to others. Such an organization might conceivably reducefriction among the great powers, and thereby reduce the danger offuture wars--as long as China herself is impotent to go to war. Theagreement might conceivably for a considerable time be of benefit toChina herself. But it is clear that for the United States to become apartner in any such arrangement would involve a reversal of ourhistoric policy in the Far East. It might be technically consistentwith the open door policy, but it would be a violation of the largersense in which the American people has understood and praised thatideal. He is blind who does not see that there are forces making forsuch a reversal. And since we are all more or less blind, an openingof our eyes to the danger is one of the conditions of its not beingrealized. 

One of the forces which is operative is indicated by the phrase thatan international agreement on an economic and financial basis might beof value to China herself. The mere suggestion that such a thing ispossible is abhorrent to many, especially to radicals. There seems tobe something sinister in it. So it is worth explaining how and why itmight be so. In the first place, it would obviously terminate theparticularistic grabbing for "leased" territory, concessions andspheres of influence which has so damaged China. At the present time, the point of this remark lies in its implied reference to Japan, as atone time it might have applied to Russia. Fear of Japan's aims inChina is not confined to China; the fear is widespread. Aninternational economic arrangement may therefore be plausiblypresented as the easiest and most direct method of relieving China ofthe Japanese menace. For Japan to stay out would be to give herselfaway; if she came in, it would subject Japanese activities to constantscrutiny and control. There is no doubt that part of the fear of Japanregarding the Pacific Conference is due to a belief that some sucharrangement is contemplated. The case is easily capable of suchpresentation as to make it appeal to Americans who are really friendlyto China and who haven't the remotest interest in her economicexploitation. 

The arrangement would, for example, automatically eliminate theLansing-Ishii agreement with its embarrassing ambiguous recognition ofJapan's _special_ interests in China. 

The other factor is domestic. The distraction and civil wars of Chinaare commonplaces. So is the power exercised by the military governorsand generals. The greater one's knowledge, the more one perceives howintimately the former evil is dependent upon the latter. The financialplight of the Chinese government, its continual foreign borrowingswhich threaten bankruptcy in the near future, depend upon militaristicdomination and wild expenditure for unproductive purposes and squeeze. Without this expense, China would have no great difficulty henceforthin maintaining a balance in her budget. The retardation of publiceducation whose advancement--especially in elementary schools--isChina's greatest single need is due to the same cause. So is thegrowth in official corruption which is rapidly extending into businessand private life. 

In fact, every one of the obstacles to the progress of China isconnected with the rule of military factions and their struggles withone another for complete mastery. An economic international agreementamong the great powers can be made which would surely reduce andpossibly eliminate the greatest evils of "militarism. " Many liberalChinese say in private that they would be willing to have a temporaryinternational receivership for government finance, provided they couldbe assured of its nature and the exact date and conditions of itstermination--a proviso which they are sensible enough to recognizewould be extremely difficult of attainment. American leadership informing and executing any such scheme would, they feel, afford thebest reassurance as to its nature and terms. Under such circumstancesa plausible case can be made out for proposals which, under the guiseof traditional American friendship for China, would in fact commit usto a reversal of our historic policy. 

There are radicals abroad and at home who think that our entrance intoa Consortium already proves that we have entered upon the road ofreversal and who naturally see in the Pacific Conference the nextlogical step. I have previously stated my own belief that our StateDepartment proposed the Consortium primarily for political ends, as ameans of checking the policy pursued by Japan of making unproductiveloans to China in return for which she was getting an immediate gripon China's natural resources and preparing the way for directadministrative and financial control when the day of reckoning andforeclosure should finally come. I also said that the Consortium wasbetween two stools, the financial and the political and that up to thepresent its chief value had been negative and preventive, and thatjealousy or lack of interest by Japan and Great Britain in anyconstructive policy on the part of the Consortium was likely tomaintain the same condition. I have seen no reason thus far to changemy mind on this point, nor in regard to the further belief thatprobably the interests of China in the end will be best served by thecontinuation of this deterrent function. But the question is bound toarise: why continue the Consortium if it isn't doing anything? Thepressure of foreign powers interested in the exploitation of China andof impatient American economic interests may combine to put an end tothe present rather otiose existence led by the Consortium. The twostools between which the past action of the American government hasmanaged to swing the Consortium may be united to form a single solidbench. 

At the risk of being charged with credulous gullibility, or somethingworse, I add that up to the present time the American phase of theConsortium hasn't shown perceptible signs of becoming a club exercisedby American finance over China's economic integrity and independence. I believe the repeated statements of the American representative thathe himself and the interests he represents would be glad if Chinaproved her ability to finance her own public utilities withoutresorting to foreign loans. This belief is confirmed by the firstpublic utterance of the new American minister to China who in hisreference to the Consortium laid emphasis upon its deterrent functionand upon the stimulation it has given to Chinese bankers to financepublic utilities. And it is the merest justice to Mr. Stevens, theAmerican representative, to say that he represents the conservativeinvestment type of banker, not the "promotion" type, and that thus farhis great concern has been the problem of protecting the buyer of suchsecurities as are passed on by the banks to the ultimate investor--somuch so that he has aroused criticism from American business interestsimpatient for speedy action. But there is a larger phase of theConsortium concerning which I think apprehensions may reasonably beentertained. 

Suppose, if merely by way of hypothesis, that the American governmentis genuinely interested in China and in making the policy of the opendoor and Chinese territorial and administrative integrity a reality, not merely a name, and suppose that it is interested in doing so froman American self-interest sufficiently enlightened to perceive thatthe political and economic advancement of the United States is bestfurthered by a policy which is identical with China's ability todevelop herself freely and independently: what then would be the wiseAmerican course? In short, it would be to view our existing Europeaninterests and issues (due to the war) and our Far Eastern interestsand issues as parts of one and the same problem. If we are actuated bythe motive hypothetically imputed to our government and we fail in itsrealization, the chief reason will be that we regard the Europeanquestion and the Asiatic problem as two different questions, orbecause we identify them from the wrong end. 

Our present financial interest in Europe is enormous. It involves notmerely foreign governmental loans but a multitude of private advancesand commitments. These financial entanglements affect not merely ourindustry and commerce but our politics. They involve much moreimmediately pressing concerns than to our Asiatic relations, and theyinvolve billions where the latter involve millions. The danger undersuch conditions that our Asiatic relations will be sacrificed to ourEuropean is hardly fanciful. 

To make this abstract statement concrete, the firm of bankers, J. P. Morgan & Co. , which is most heavily involved in European indebtednessto the United States, is the firm which is the leading spirit in theConsortium for China. It seems almost inevitable that the Asiaticproblem should look like small potatoes in comparison with theEuropean one, especially as our own industrial recuperation is soclosely connected with European relations, while the Far East cuts anegligible figure. To my mind the real danger to set out upon selfishexploitation of China: intelligent self-interest, tradition and thefact that our chief asset in China is our past freedom from apredatory course, dictate a course of cooperation with China. Thedanger is that China will be subordinated and sacrificed because ofprimary preoccupation with the high finance and politics of Europe, that she will be lost in the shuffle. 

The European aspect of the problem can be made more concrete byreference to Great Britain in particular. That country suffers fromthe embarrassment of the Japanese alliance. She has already made itsufficiently clear that she would like to draw America into thealliance, making it tripartite, since that would be the easiest way ofmaintaining good relations with both Japan and the United States. There is no likelihood that any such step will be consummated. ButBritish diplomacy is experienced and astute. And by force ofcircumstances our high finance has contracted a sort of economicalliance with Great Britain. There is no wish to claim superior virtuefor America or to appeal to the strong current of anti-Britishsentiment. But the British foreign office exists and operates apartfrom the tradition of liberalism which has mainly actuated Englishdomestic politics. It stands peculiarly for the _Empire_ side of theBritish Empire, no matter what party is in the saddle in domesticaffairs. Every resource will be employed to bring about a settlementat the Pacific Conference which, even though it includes some degreeof compromise on the part of Great Britain, will bend the Asiaticpolicy of the United States to the British traditions in the Far East, instead of committing Great Britain to combining with the UnitedStates in making a reality of the integrity of China to which bothcountries are nominally committed. It does not seem an extremestatement to say that the immediate issues of the Conference dependupon the way in which our financial commitments in Europe are treated, either as reasons for our making concessions to European policy or onthe other hand as a means of securing an adherence of the Europeanpowers to the traditional American policy. 

A publicist in China who is of British origin and a sincere friend ofChina remarked in private conversation that if the United States couldnot secure the adherence of Great Britain to her Asiatic policy bypersuasion (he was deploring the Japanese alliance) she might do so bybuying it--through remission of her national debt to us. It is notnecessary to resort to the measure so baldly suggested. But the remarkat least suggests that our involvement in European, especiallyBritish, finance and politics may be treated in either of two ways foreither of two results. 

2

That the Chinese people generally speaking has a less antagonisticfeeling toward the United States than towards other powers seems to mean undoubted fact. The feeling has been disturbed at divers times bythe treatment of the Chinese upon the Pacific coast, by the exclusionact, by the turning over of our interest in the building of thePeking-Canton (or Hankow) railway to a European group, by theLansing-Ishii agreement, and finally by the part played by PresidentWilson in the Versailles decision regarding Shantung. Thosedisturbances in the main, however, have made them dubious as to ourskill, energy and intelligence rather than as to our good-will. Americans, taken individually and collectively, are to the Chinese--atleast such was my impression--a rather simple folk, taking the word inits good and its deprecatory sense. In noting the Chinese reaction tothe proposed Pacific Conference, it was interesting to see thecombination of an almost unlimited hope that the United States was tolead in protecting them from further aggressions and in rectifyingexisting evils, with a lack of confidence, a fear that the UnitedStates would have something put over on it. 

Friendly feeling is of course mainly based upon a negative fact, thefact that the United States has taken no part in "leasing"territories, establishing spheres and setting up extra-nationalpost-offices. On the positive side stands the contribution made byAmericans to education, especially medical, and that of girls andwomen, and to philanthropy and relief. Politically, there are theearly service of Burlinghame, the open door policy of John Hay (thoughfailure to maintain it in fact while securing signatures to it onpaper is a considerable part of the Chinese belief in our defectiveenergy) and the part played by the United States in moderating theterms of the settlement of the Boxer outbreak, in addition to aconsiderable number of minor helpful acts. China also remembers thatwe were the only nation to take exception to the treaties embodyingthe Twenty-one Demands. While our exception was chiefly made on thebasis of our own interests which these treaties might injuriouslyaffect, a sentiment exists that the protest was a pledge of assistanceto China when the time should be opportune for raising the wholequestion. And without doubt the reservation made on May 16, 1915, byour State Department is a strong card at the forthcoming Conference ifthe Department wishes to play it. 

From an American standpoint, the open door principle represents one ofthe only two established principles of American diplomacy, the otherbeing, of course, the Monroe Doctrine. In connection with sentimentalor idealistic associations which have clustered about it, itconstitutes us in some vague fashion in both the Chinese and Americanpublic opinion a sort of guardian or at least spokesman of theinterests of China in relation to foreign powers. Although, as waspointed out in a former chapter, the open door policy directlyconcerns other nations in their relation to China rather than Chinaherself, yet the violation of the policy by other powers has been sofrequent and so much to the detriment of China, that Americaninterest, prestige and moral sentiment are now implicated in such anenforcement of it as will redound to the advantage of China. 

Citizens of other countries are often irritated by a suggestion ofsuch a relationship between the United States and China. It presentsitself as a proclamation of superior national virtue under cover ofwhich the United States aims to establish its influence in China atthe expense of other countries. The irritation is exasperated by thefact that the situation as it stands is an undoubted economic andpolitical asset of the United States in China. We may concede withoutargument any contention that the situation is not due to any superiorvirtue but rather to contingencies of history and geography--in whichrespect it is not unlike many things that pass for virtues withindividuals. The contention may be admitted without controversybecause it is not pertinent to the main issue. The question is not somuch how the state of affairs came about as what it now is, how it isto be treated and what consequences are in flow from it. It is a factthat up to the present an intelligent self-interest of America hascoincided with the interests of a stable, independent and progressiveChina. It is also a fact that American traditions and sentiments havegathered about this consideration so that now there is widespreadconviction in the American people of moral obligations of assistanceand friendly protection owed by us to China. At present, no policy canbe entered upon that does not bear the semblance of fairness andgoodwill. We have at least so much protection against the dangersdiscussed in the prior chapter. 

Among Americans in China and presumably at home there is a strongfeeling that we should adopt for the future stronger and more positivepolicies than we have maintained in the past. This feeling seems to mefraught with dangers unless we make very clear to ourselves in justwhat respects we are to continue and make good in a more positivemanner our traditional policy. To some extent our past policy has beenone of drifting. Radical change in this respect may go further thanappears upon the surface in altering other fundamental aspects of ourpolicy. What is condemned as drifting is in effect largely the samething that is also praised as non-interference. A detailed settledpolicy, no matter how "constructive" it may appear to be, can hardlyhelp involving us in the domestic policies of China, an affair offactions and a game which the Chinese understand and play much betterthan any foreigners. Such an involvement would at once lessen apresent large asset in China, aloofness from internal intrigues andstruggles. 

The specific protests of Chinese in this country--mainlyCantonese--against the Consortium seem to me mainly based onmisapprehension. But their _general_ attitude of oppositionnevertheless conveys an important lesson. It is based on a belief thatthe effect of the Consortium will be to give the Peking government afactitious advantage in the internal conflict which is waging inChina, so that to all intents and purposes it will mark a taking ofsides on our part. It is well remembered that the effect of the"reorganization" loan of the prior Consortium--in which the UnitedStates was _not_ a partner--was to give Yuan Shi Kai the funds whichseated him and the militarist faction after him, firmly in thegovernmental saddle. Viewing the matter from a larger point of viewthan that of Canton vs. Peking, the most fundamental objection I heardbrought by Chinese against the Consortium was in effect as follows:The republican revolution in China has still to be wrought out; thebeginning of ten years ago has been arrested. It remains to fight itout. The inevitable effect of increased foreign financial and economicinterest in China, even admitting that its industrial effect wasadvantageous to China, would be to create an interest in _stabilizing_China politically, which in effect would mean to sanctify the statusquo, and prevent the development of a revolution which cannot beaccomplished without internal disorders that would affect foreigninvestments unfavorably. These considerations are not mentioned forthe sake of throwing light on the Consortium: they are cited as anillustration of the probability that a too positive and constructivedevelopment of our tradition of goodwill to China would involve us inan interference with Chinese domestic affairs injurious to China'swelfare, to that free and independent development in which we professsuch interest. 

But how, it will be asked, are we to protect China from foreigndepredations, particularly those of Japan, how are we to change ournominal goodwill into a reality, if we do not enter much more positiveand detailed policies? If there was in existence at the present timeany such thing as a diplomacy of peoples as distinct from a diplomacyof governments, the question would mean something quite different fromwhat it now means. As things now stand the people should profoundlydistrust the _politicians'_ love for China. It is too frequently thereverse side of fear and incipient hatred of Japan, colored perhaps byanti-British feeling. 

There should be no disguising of the situation. The aggressiveactivities of other nations in China, centering but not exhausted atthis time in Japan, are not merely sources of trouble to China butthey are potential causes of trouble in our own internationalrelationships. We are committed by our tradition and by the presentactualities of the situation to attempting something positive forChina as respects her international status, to live up to ourresponsibility is a most difficult and delicate matter. We have on theone side to avoid getting entangled in quasi-imperialistic Europeanpolicies in Asia, whether under the guise of altruism, of puttingourselves in a position where we can exercise a more effectivesupervision of their behavior, or by means of economic expansion. Onthe other side, we have to avoid drifting into that kind of covert oravowed antagonism to European and Japanese imperialism which will onlyincrease friction, encourage a combination especially of Great Britainand Japan---or of France and Japan--against us, and bring warappreciably nearer. 

We need to bear in mind that China will not be saved from outsideherself. Even if by a successful war we should relieve China fromJapanese encroachments, from all encroachments, China would not ofnecessity be brought nearer her legitimate goal of orderly andprosperous internal development. Apart from the question of how farwar can now settle any fundamental issues without begetting others asdangerous, China of all countries is the one where settlement byforce, especially by outside force, is least applicable, and mostlikely to be enormously disserviceable. China is used to taking timeto deal with her problems: she can neither understand not profit byimpatient methods of the western world which are profoundly alien toher genius. Moreover a civilization which is on a continental scale, which is so old that the rest of us are parvenus in comparison, whichis thick and closely woven, cannot be hurried in its developmentwithout disaster. Transformation from within is its sole way out, andwe can best help China by trying to see to it that she gets the timeshe needs in order to effect this transformation, whether or not welike the particular form it assumes at any particular time. 

A successful war in behalf of China would leave untouched her problemsof education, of factional and sectional forces, of politicalimmaturity showing itself in present incapacity for organization. Itwould affect her industrial growth undoubtedly, but in all humanprobability for the worse, increasing the likelihood that she wouldenter upon an industrialization which would repeat the worst evils ofwestern industrial life, without the immunities, resistances andremedial measures which the West has evolved. The imagination cannotconceive a worse crime than fastening western industrialism upon Chinabefore she has developed within herself the meaning of coping with theforces which it would release. The danger is great enough as it is. War waged in China's behalf by western powers and western methodswould make the danger practically irresistible. In addition we shouldgain a permanent interest in China which is likely to be of the mostdangerous character to ourselves. If we were not committed by it tofuture imperialism, we should be luckier than we have any right tohope to be. These things are said against a mental protest toadmitting even by implication the prospect of war with Japan, but itseems necessary to say them. 

These remarks are negative and vague as to our future course. Theyimply a confession of lack of such wisdom as would enable me to makepositive definite proposals. But at least I have confidence in thewisdom and goodwill of the American and other peoples to deal with theproblem, if they are only called into action. And the first conditionof calling wisdom and goodwill into effective existence is torecognize the seriousness of the problem and the utter futility oftrying to force its solution by impatient and hurried methods. Pro-Japanese apologetics is dangerous; it obscures the realities ofthe situation. An irritated anti-Japanism that would hasten thesolution of the Chinese problem merely by attacking Japan is equallyfatal to discovering and applying a proper method. 

More specifically and also more generically, proper publicity is thegreatest need. If, as Secretary Hughes has intimated, a settlement ofthe problems of the Pacific is made a condition of arriving at anagreement regarding reduction and limitation of armaments, it islikely that the Conference might better never be held. In eagerness todo something which will pass as a settlement, either China's--andSiberia's--interests will be sacrificed in some unfair compromise, orirritation and friction will be increased--and in the end so willarmaments. In any literal sense, it is ridiculous to suppose that theproblems of the Pacific can be settled in a few weeks, or months--oryears. Yet the discussion of the problems, in separation from thequestion of armament, may be of great use. For it may further thatpublicity which is a pre-condition of any genuine settlement. Thisinvolves the public in diplomacy. But it also involves a widerpublicity, one which will enlighten the world about the facts of Asia, internal and international. 

Scepticism about Foreign Offices, as they are at present conducted, isjustified. But scepticism about the power of public opinion, if it canbe aroused and instructed, to reshape Foreign Office policies meanshopelessness about the future of the world. Let everything possible bedone to reduce armament, if only to secure a naval holiday on the partof the three great naval powers, and if only for the sake of lesseningtaxation. Let the Conference on Problems devote itself to discussingand making known as fully and widely as possible the element and scopeof those problems, and the fears--or should one call them hopes?--ofthe cynics will be frustrated. It is not so important that a decisionin the American sense of the Yap question be finally and foreverarrived at, as it is that the need of China and the Orient in generalfor freer and fuller communications with the rest of the world be madeclear--and so on, down or up the list of agenda. The commercial opendoor is needed. But the need is greater that the door be opened tolight, to knowledge and understanding. If these forces will not createa public opinion which will in time secure a lasting and justsettlement of other problems, there is no recourse save despair ofcivilization. Liberals can do something better than predicting failureand impugning motives. They can work for the opened door of opendiplomacy, of continuous and intelligent inquiry, of discussion freefrom propaganda. To shirk this responsibility on the alleged groundthat economic imperialism and organized greed will surely bring theConference to failure is supine and snobbish. It is one of the factorsthat may lead the United States to take the wrong course in theparting of the ways. 

October, 1921.