Transcriber's note: Minor typographical errors in the original text have been corrected and footnotes moved to the end of the book. 

BOLSHEVISM

The Enemy of Political and Industrial Democracy

by

JOHN SPARGO

Author of"Social Democracy Explained" "Socialism, a Summary and Interpretation ofSocialist Principles" "Applied Socialism" etc. 

Harper & Brothers PublishersNew York and London

1919

 * * * * * * *

 BOOKS BY

 JOHN SPARGO

 BOLSHEVISM AMERICANISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY SOCIAL DEMOCRACY EXPLAINED

 HARPER & BROTHERS, NEW YORK

 ESTABLISHED 1817

 * * * * * * *

CONTENTS

 PREFACE

 I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

 II. FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION

 III. THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE

 IV. THE SECOND REVOLUTION

 V. FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI

 VI. THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY

 VII. BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

 POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT

APPENDICES:

 I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' COUNCIL

 II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

 III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM

PREFACE

In the following pages I have tried to make a plain and easilyunderstandable outline of the origin, history, and meaning of Bolshevism. Ihave attempted to provide the average American reader with a fair andreliable statement of the philosophy, program, and policies of the RussianBolsheviki. In order to avoid confusion, and to keep the matter as simpleand clear as possible, I have not tried to deal with the numerousmanifestations of Bolshevism in other lands, but have confined myselfstrictly to the Russian example. With some detail--too much, some of myreaders may think!--I have sketched the historical background in order thatthe Bolsheviki may be seen in proper perspective and fairly judged inconnection with the whole revolutionary movement in Russia. 

Whoever turns to these pages in the expectation of finding a sensational"exposure" of Bolshevism and the Bolsheviki will be disappointed. It hasbeen my aim to make a deliberate and scientific study, not an _ex-parte_indictment. A great many lurid and sensational stories about the Bolshevikihave been published, the net result of which is to make the leaders of thisphase of the great universal war of the classes appear as brutal anddepraved monsters of iniquity. There is not a crime known to mankind, apparently, of which they have not been loudly declared to be guilty. Mylong experience in the Socialist movement has furnished me with too muchunderstanding of the manner and extent to which working-class movements areabused and slandered to permit me to accept these stories as gospel truth. That experience has forced me to assume that most of the terrible storiestold about the Bolsheviki are either untrue and without any foundation infact or greatly exaggerated. The "rumor factories" in Geneva, Stockholm, Copenhagen, The Hague, and other European capitals, which were so busyduring the war fabricating and exploiting for profit stories of massacres, victories, assassinations, revolutions, peace treaties, and other momentousevents, which subsequent information proved never to have happened at all, seem now to have turned their attention to the Bolsheviki. 

However little of a cynic one may be, it is almost impossible to refrainfrom wondering at the fact that so many writers and journals that in thequite recent past maintained absolute silence when the czar and his minionswere committing their infamous outrages against the working-people andtheir leaders, and that were never known to protest against the many crimescommitted by our own industrial czars against our working-people and theirleaders--that these writers and journals are now so violently denouncingthe Bolsheviki for alleged inhumanities. When the same journals thatdefended or apologized for the brutal lynchings of I. W. W. Agitators and thesavage assaults committed upon other peaceful citizens whose only crime wasexercising their lawful and moral right to organize and strike for betterwages, denounce the Bolsheviki for their "brutality" and their"lawlessness" and cry for vengeance upon them, honest and sincere menbecome bitter and scornful. 

I am not a Bolshevik or a defender of the Bolsheviki. As a Social Democratand Internationalist of many years' standing--and therefore loyal toAmerica and American ideals--I am absolutely opposed to the principles andpractices of the Bolsheviki, which, from the very first, I have regardedand denounced as an inverted form of Czarism. It is quite clear to my mind, however, that there can be no good result from wild abuse or frommisrepresentation of facts and motives. I am convinced that the stupidcampaign of calumny which has been waged against the Bolsheviki has won forthem the sympathy of many intelligent Americans who love fairness and hateinjustice. In this way lying and abuse react against those who indulge inthem. 

In this study I have completely ignored the flood of newspaper stories ofBolshevist "outrages" and "crimes" which has poured forth during the pastyear. I have ignored, too, the remarkable collection of documents editedand annotated by Mr. Sisson and published by the United States Committee onPublic Information. I do not doubt that there is much that is true in thatcollection of documents--indeed, there is some corroboration of some ofthem--but the means of determining what is true and what false are not yetavailable to the student. So much doubt and suspicion is reasonably andproperly attached to some of the documents that the value of the whole massis greatly impaired. To rely upon these documents to make a case againstthe Bolsheviki, unless and until they have been more fully investigated andauthenticated than they appear to have been as yet, and corroborated, wouldbe like relying upon the testimony of an unreliable witness to convict aman serious crime. 

That the Bolsheviki have been guilty of many crimes is certain. Ampleevidence of that fact will be found in the following pages. They havecommitted many crimes against men and women whose splendid service to theRussian revolutionary movement serves only to accentuate the crimes inquestion. But their worst crimes have been against political and socialdemocracy, which they have shamefully betrayed and opposed with as littlescruple, and as much brutal injustice, as was ever manifested by theRomanovs. This is a terrible charge, I know, but I believe that the mostsympathetic toward the Bolsheviki among my readers will, if they arecandid, admit that it is amply sustained by the evidence. 

Concerning that evidence it is perhaps necessary to say that I haveconfined myself to the following: official documents issued by theBolshevist government; the writings and addresses of accredited Bolshevikleaders and officials--in the form in which they have been published by theBolsheviki themselves; the declarations of Russian Socialist organizationsof long and honorable standing in the international Socialist movement; thestatements of equally well-known and trusted Russian Socialists, and ofresponsible Russian Socialist journals. 

While I have indicated the sources of most of the evidence against theBolsheviki, either in the text itself or in the foot-notes and references, I have not thought it advisable to burden my pages with such foot-notes andreferences concerning matters of general knowledge. To have givenreferences and authorities for all the facts summarized in the historicaloutlines, for example, would have been simply a show of pedantry and servedonly to frighten away the ordinary reader. 

I have been deeply indebted to the works of other writers, among which Imay mention the following: Peter Kropotkin's _Memoirs of a Revolutionist_and _Ideals and Realities of Russian Literature_; S. Stepniak's_Underground Russia_; Leo Deutsch's _Sixteen Years in Siberia_; AlexanderUlar's _Russia from Within_; William English Walling's _Russia's Message_;Zinovy N. Preev's _The Russian Riddle_; Maxim Litvinov's _The BolshevikRevolution: Its Rise and Meaning_; M. J. Olgin's _The Soul of the RussianRevolution_; A. J. Sack's _The Birth of Russian Democracy_; E. A. Ross's_Russia in Upheaval_; Isaac Don Levine's _The Russian Revolution_; BessieBeatty's _The Red Heart of Russia_; Louise Bryant's _Six Red Months inRussia_; Leon Trotzky's _Our Revolution_ and _The Bolsheviki and WorldPeace_; Gabriel Domergue's _La Russe Rouge_; Nikolai Lenine's _The Sovietsat Work_; Zinoviev and Lenine's _Sozialismus und Krieg_; EmileVandervelde's _Trois Aspects de la Révolution Russe_; P. G. Chesnais's _LaRévolution et la Paix_ and _Les Bolsheviks_. I have also freely availedmyself of the many admirable translations of official Bolshevist documentspublished in _The Class Struggle_, of New York, a pro-Bolshevist magazine;the collection of documents published by _The Nation_, of New York, ajournal exceedingly generous in its treatment of Bolshevism and theBolsheviki; and of the mass of material published in its excellent"International Notes" by _Justice_, of London, the oldest Socialistnewspaper in the English language, I believe, and one of the most ablyedited. 

Grateful acknowledgment is hereby made of friendly service rendered andvaluable information given by Mr. Alexander Kerensky, former Premier ofRussia; Mr. Henry L. Slobodin, of New York; Mr. A. J. Sack, Director of theRussian Information Bureau in the United States; Dr. Boris Takavenko, editor of _La Russia Nuova_, Rome, Italy; Mr. William English Walling, NewYork; and my friend, Father Cahill, of Bennington. 

Among the Appendices at the end of the volume will be found some importantdocuments containing some contemporary Russian Socialist judgments ofBolshevism. These documents are, I venture to suggest, of the utmostpossible value and importance to the student and general reader. 

 JOHN SPARGO, "NESTLEDOWN, " OLD BENNNIGTON, VERMONT, _End of January, 1919_. 

BOLSHEVISM

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

I

For almost a full century Russia has been the theater of a greatrevolutionary movement. In the light of Russian history we read withcynical amusement that in 1848, when all Europe was in a revolutionaryferment, a German economist confidently predicted that revolutionaryagitation could not live in the peculiar soil of Russian civilization. August Franz von Haxthausen was in many respects a competent and even aprofound student of Russian politics, but he was wrong in his belief thatthe amount of rural communism existing in Russia, particularly the _mir_, would make it impossible for storms of revolutionary agitation to arise andstir the national life. 

As a matter of historical fact, the ferment of revolution had appeared inthe land of the Czars long before the German economist made his remarkablyill-judged forecast. At the end of the Napoleonic wars many young officersof the Russian army returned to their native land full of revolutionaryideas and ideals acquired in France, Italy, and Germany, and intent uponaction. At first their intention was simply to make an appeal to AlexanderI to grant self-government to Russia, which at one time he had seemeddisposed to do. Soon they found themselves engaged in a secret conspiratorymovement having for its object the overthrow of Czarism. The story of thefailure of these romanticists, the manner in which the abortive attempt atrevolution in December, 1825, was suppressed, and how the leaders werepunished by Nicholas I--these things are well known to most students ofRussian history. The Decembrists, as they came to be called, failed, asthey were bound to do, but it would be a mistake to suppose that theirefforts were altogether vain. On the contrary, their inspiration was feltthroughout the next thirty years and was reflected in the literature of theperiod. During that period Russian literature was tinged with the faith insocial regeneration held by most of the cultured intellectual classes. TheDecembrists were the spiritual progenitors of the Russian revolutionarymovement of our time. In the writings of Pushkin--himself aDecembrist--Lermontoff, Gogol, Turgeniev, Dostoyevsky, and many others lesswell known, the influence of the Decembrist movement is clearly manifested. 

If we are to select a single figure as the founder of the modern socialrevolutionary movement in Russia, that title can be applied to AlexanderHerzen with greater fitness than to any other. His influence upon themovement during many years was enormous. Herzen was half-German, his motherbeing German. He was born at Moscow in 1812, shortly before the Frenchoccupation of the city. His parents were very rich and he enjoyed theadvantages of a splendid education, as well as great luxury. At twenty-twoyears of age he was banished to a small town in the Urals, where he spentsix years, returning to Moscow in 1840. It is noteworthy that the offensefor which he had been sent into exile was the singing of songs in praise ofthe Decembrist martyrs. This occurred at a meeting of one of the "Students'Circles" founded by Herzen for the dissemination of revolutionary Socialistideals among the students. 

Upon his return to Moscow in 1840 Herzen, together with Bakunin and otherfriends, again engaged in revolutionary propaganda and in 1842 he was againexiled. In 1847, through the influence of powerful friends, he receivedpermission to leave Russia for travel abroad. He never again saw his nativeland, all the remaining years of life being spent in exile. After a tour ofItaly, Herzen arrived in Paris on the eve of the Revolution of 1848, joining there his friends, Bakunin and Turgeniev, and many otherrevolutionary leaders. It was impossible for him to participate actively inthe 1848 uprising, owing to the activity of the Paris police, but hewatched the Revolution with the profoundest sympathy. And when it failedand was followed by the terrible reaction his distress was almostunbounded. For a brief period he was the victim of the most appallingpessimism, but after a time his faith returned and he joined with Proudhonin issuing a radical revolutionary paper, _L'Ami du Peuple_, of which, Kropotkin tells us in his admirable study of Russian literature, "almostevery number was confiscated by the police of Napoleon the Third. " Thepaper had a very brief life, and Herzen himself was soon expelled fromFrance, going to Switzerland, of which country he became a citizen. 

In 1857 Herzen settled in London, where he published for some years aremarkable paper, called _Kolokol (The Bell)_, in which he exposed theiniquities and shortcomings of Czarism and inspired the youth of Russiawith his revolutionary ideals. The paper had to be smuggled into Russia, ofcourse, and the manner in which the smuggling was done is one of the mostabsorbing stories in all the tragic history of the vast land of the Czars. Herzen was a charming writer and a keen thinker, and it is impossible toexaggerate the extent of his influence. But when the freedom of the serfs, for which he so vigorously contended, was promulgated by Alexander II, andother extensive reforms were granted, his influence waned. He died in 1870in Switzerland. 

II

Alexander II was not alone in hoping that the Act of Liberation would usherin a new era of prosperity and tranquillity for Russia. Many of the mostradical of the Intelligentsia, followers of Herzen, believed that Russiawas destined to outstrip the older nations of western Europe in itsdemocracy and its culture. It was not long before disillusionment came: theserfs were set free, but the manner in which the land question had beendealt with made their freedom almost a mockery. As a result there werenumerous uprisings of peasants--riots which the government suppressed inthe most sanguinary manner. From that time until the present the landquestion has been the core of the Russian problem. Every revolutionarymovement has been essentially concerned with giving the land to thepeasants. 

Within a few months after the liberation of the serfs the revolutionaryunrest was so wide-spread that the government became alarmed and instituteda policy of vigorous repression. Progressive papers, which had sprung up asa result of the liberal tendencies characterizing the reign of AlexanderII thus far, were suppressed and many of the leading writers wereimprisoned and exiled. Among those thus punished was that brilliant writer, Tchernyshevsky, to whom the Russian movement owes so much. His_Contemporary Review_ was, during the four critical years 1858-62 theprincipal forum for the discussion of the problems most vital to the lifeof Russia. In it the greatest leaders of Russian thought discussed the landquestion, co-operation, communism, popular education, and similar subjects. This served a twofold purpose: in the first place, it brought to the studyof the pressing problems of the time the ablest and best minds of thecountry; secondly, it provided these Intellectuals with a bond of union andstimulus to serve the poor and the oppressed. That Alexander II had beeninfluenced to sign the Emancipation Act by Tchernyshevsky and his friendsdid not cause the authorities to spare Tchernyshevsky when, in 1863, heengaged in active Socialist propaganda. He was arrested and imprisoned in afortress, where he wrote the novel which has so profoundly influenced twogenerations of discontented and protesting Russians--_What is to Be Done?_In form a novel of thrilling interest, this work was really an elaboratetreatise upon Russian social conditions. It dealt with the vexed problemsof marriage and divorce, the land question, co-operative production, andother similar matters, and the solutions it suggested for these problemsbecame widely accepted as the program of revolutionary Russia. Few books inany literature have ever produced such a profound impression, or exerted asmuch influence upon the life of a nation. In the following year, 1864, Tchernyshevsky was exiled to hard labor in Siberia, remaining there until1883, when he returned to Russia. He lived only six years longer, dying in1889. 

The attempt made by a young student to assassinate Alexander II, on April4, 1866, was seized upon by the Czar and his advisers as an excuse forinstituting a policy of terrible reaction. The most repressive measureswere taken against the Intelligentsia and all the liberal reforms which hadbeen introduced were practically destroyed. It was impossible to restoreserfdom, of course, but the condition of the peasants without land was evenworse than if they had remained serfs. Excessive taxation, heavy redemptioncharges, famine, crop failures, and other ills drove the people todesperation. Large numbers of students espoused the cause of the peasantsand a new popular literature appeared in which the sufferings of the peoplewere portrayed with fervor and passion. In 1868-69 there were numerousdemonstrations and riots by way of protest against the reactionary policyof the government. 

It was at this time that Michael Bakunin, from his exile in Switzerland, conspired with Nechaiev to bring about a great uprising of the peasants, through the Society for the Liberation of the People. Bakunin advised thestudents to leave the universities and to go among the people to teach themand, at the same time, arouse them to revolt. It was at this time, too, that Nicholas Tchaykovsky and his friends, the famous Circle ofTchaykovsky, began to distribute among students in all parts of the Empirebooks dealing with the condition of the peasants and proposing remediestherefor. This work greatly influenced the young Intelligentsia, but theimmediate results among the peasants were not very encouraging. Even thereturn from Switzerland, by order of the government, of hundreds ofstudents who were disciples of Bakunin and Peter Lavrov did not produce anygreat success. 

Very soon a new organization appeared. The remnant of the CircleTchaykovsky, together with some followers of Bakunin, formed a societycalled the Land and Freedom Society. This society, which was destined toexert a marked influence upon revolutionary Russia, was the most ambitiousrevolutionary effort Russia had known. The society had a constitution and acarefully worked out program. It had one special group to carry onpropaganda among students; another to agitate among the peasants; and athird to employ armed force against the government and against those guiltyof treachery toward the society. The basis of the society was theconviction that Russia needed an economic revolution; that only an economicrevolution, starting with the producers, could overthrow Czarism andestablish the ideal state of society. 

The members of this Land and Freedom Society divided their work into fourmain divisions: (1) Agitation--passive and active. Passive agitationincluded strikes, petitions for reforms, refusal to pay taxes, and so on. Active agitation meant riots and uprisings. (2) Organization--the formationof a fighting force prepared to bring about a general uprising. (3)Education--the spreading of revolutionary knowledge and ideas, acontinuation of the work of the Tchaykovsky Circle. (4) Secularization--thecarrying on of systematic work against the Orthodox Church through specialchannels. One of the early leaders of this society was George Plechanov, who later founded the Russian Social Democracy and gave to the Russianrevolutionary movement its Marxian character, inspiring such men as NikolaiLenine and Leon Trotzky, among many others. The society did not attain anyvery great amount of success in its efforts to reach the peasants, and itwas that fact more than any other which determined Plechanov's futurecourse. 

III

When the failure of the Land and Freedom methods became evident, and thegovernment became more and more oppressive, desperate individuals andgroups resorted to acts of terrorism. It was thus that Vera Zasulichattempted the assassination of the infamous Chief of Police Trepov. Themovement to temper Czarism by assassination systematically pursued wasbeginning. In 1879 the Land and Freedom Society held a conference for thepurpose of discussing its program. A majority favored resorting toterroristic tactics; Plechanov and a few other well-known revolutionistswere opposed--favoring the old methods. The society split, the majoritybecoming known as the Will of the People and adopting a terroristicprogram. This organization sentenced Czar Alexander II to death and severalunsuccessful attempts were made to carry out the sentence. The leadersbelieved that the assassination of the Czar would give rise to a generalrevolution throughout the whole of Russia. In February, 1880, occurred thefamous attempt to blow up the Winter Palace. For a time it seemed that theCzar had learned the lesson the Will of the People sought to teach him, andthat he would institute far-reaching reforms. Pursuing a policy ofvacillation and fear, however, Alexander II soon fell back into the oldattitude. On March 1, 1881, a group of revolutionists, among them SophiaPerovskaya, made another attempt upon his life, succeeding, at first, onlyin damaging the bottom of the Czar's carriage and wounding a number ofCossack soldiers. "Thank God, I am untouched, " said the Czar, in responseto the inquiry of an officer of his guard. "It's too soon to thank God!"cried N. I. Grinevitsky, hurling a bomb at the Czar. Within a short timeAlexander II and his assailant were both dead. 

The assassination of Alexander II was a tragic event for Russia. On thevery morning of his death the ill-fated monarch had approved a plan forextensive reforms presented by the liberal Minister, Loris-Melikoff. It hadbeen decided to call a conference three days later and to invite a numberof well-known public men to co-operate in introducing the reforms. Thesereforms would not have been far-reaching enough to satisfy therevolutionists, but they would certainly have improved the situation andgiven Russia a new hope. That hope died with Alexander II. His son, Alexander III, had always been a pronounced reactionary and had advised hisfather against making any concessions to the agitators. It was notsurprising, therefore, that he permitted himself to be advised against theliberals by the most reactionary bureaucrats in the Empire, and to adoptthe most oppressive policies. 

The new Czar was greatly influenced by his former tutor, the reactionarybureaucrat Pobiedonostzev. At first it was believed that out of respect forhis father's memory Alexander III would carry out the program of reformsformulated by Loris-Melikoff, as his father had promised to do. In aManifesto issued on the 29th of April, 1881, Alexander III promised to dothis, but in the same document there were passages which could only beinterpreted as meaning that all demands for constitutional reform would beresisted and Absolutism upheld at all cost. Doubtless it was due to theinfluence of Pobiedonostzev, Procurator of the Holy Synod, that AlexanderIII soon abandoned all intention of carrying out his father's wishes in thematter of reform and instituted such reactionary policies that the peasantsfeared that serfdom was to be restored. A terrible persecution of the Jewswas begun, lasting for several years. The Poles, too, felt the oppressivehand of Pobiedonostzev. The latter was mastered by the Slavophil philosophythat the revolutionary unrest in Russia was traceable to the diversity ofraces, languages, and religions. He believed that Nihilism, Anarchism, andSocialism flourished because the people were cosmopolitan rather thannationalistic in experience and feeling, and that peace and stability couldcome only from the persistent and vigorous development of the threeprinciples of Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy as the basis of thestate. 

In this doctrine we have the whole explanation of the reactionary policy ofAlexander III. In the Manifesto of April 29th was announced the Czar'sdetermination to strengthen and uphold autocracy. That was the foundationstone. To uphold orthodoxy was the next logical necessity, for autocracyand orthodoxy were, in Russia, closely related. Hence the non-orthodoxsects--such as the Finnish Protestants, German Lutherans, Polish RomanCatholics, the Jews, and the Mohammedans--were increasingly restricted inthe observance of their religion. They might not build new places ofworship; their children could not be educated in the faith of theirparents. In many cases children were taken away from their parents in orderto be sent to schools where they would be inculcated with the orthodoxfaith. In a similar way, every attempt was made to suppress the use oflanguages other than Russian. 

Along with this attempt to force the whole population into a single moldwent a determined resistance to liberalism in all its forms. All this wasaccompanied by a degree of efficiency in the police service quite unusualin Russia, with the result that the terroristic tactics of the Will of thePeople party were unavailing, except in the cases of a few minor officials. Plots to assassinate the Czar were laid, but they were generally betrayedto the police. The most serious of these plots, in March, 1887, led to thearrest of all the conspirators. 

In the mean time there had appeared the first definite Marxian SocialDemocratic group in Russia. Plechanov, Vera Zasulich, Leo Deutsch, andother Russian revolutionists in Switzerland formed the organization knownas the Group for the Emancipation of Labor. This organization was basedupon the principles and tactics of Marxian Socialism and sought to create apurely proletarian movement. As we have seen, when revolutionary terrorismwas at its height Plechanov and his disciples had proclaimed its futilityand pinned their faith to the nascent class of industrial wage-workers. Inthe early 'eighties this class was so small in Russia that it seemed tomany of the best and clearest minds of the revolutionary movement quitehopeless to rely upon it. Plechanov was derided as a mere theorist andcloset philosopher, but he never wavered in his conviction that Socialismmust come in Russia as the natural outcome of capitalist development. Bymeans of a number of scholarly polemics against the principles and tacticsof the Will of the People party, Plechanov gathered to his side of thecontroversy a group of very brilliant and able disciples, and so laid thebasis for the Social Democratic Labor party. With the relatively rapidexpansion of capitalism, beginning with the year 1888, and the inevitableincrease of the city proletariat, the Marxian movement made great progress. A strong labor-union movement and a strong political Socialist movementwere thus developed side by side. 

At the same time there was a revival of terrorism, the one available replyof the oppressed to brutal autocracy. While the Marxian movement madeheadway among the industrial workers, the older terroristic movement madeheadway among the peasants. Various groups appeared in different parts ofthe country. When Alexander III died, at the end of 1894, both movementshad developed considerable strength. Working in secret and subject toterrible measures of repression, their leaders being constantly imprisonedand exiled, these two wings of the Russian revolutionary movement weregathering strength in preparation for an uprising more extensive andserious than anything that had hitherto been attempted. 

Whenever a new Czar ascended the throne in Russia it was the fashion tohope for some measure of reform and for a degree of liberality. Frequently, as in the case of Alexander III, all such hopes were speedily killed, butrepeated experiences of the kind did not prevent the birth of new hopeswith the death of successive Czars. When, therefore, Alexander III wassucceeded by his son, Nicholas II, liberal Russia expectantly awaited thepromulgation of constitutional reforms. In this they were doomed todisappointment, just as they had been on the occasion of the accession ofthe new Czar's immediate predecessor. Nicholas II was evidently going to bequite as reactionary as his father was. This was made manifest in a numberof ways. When a deputation from one of the zemstvos, which congratulatedhim upon his ascension to the throne, expressed the hope that he wouldlisten to "the voice of the people and the expression of its desires, " thereply of the new Czar was a grim warning of what was to come. Nicholas IItold the zemstvos that he intended to follow the example of his father anduphold the principles of Absolutism, and that any thought of participationby the zemstvos or other organizations of the people in state affairs was asenseless dream. More significant still, perhaps, was the fact that thehated Pobiedonostzev was retained in power. 

The revolutionists were roused as they had not been for a decade or more. Some of the leaders believed that the new reign of reaction would prove tobe the occasion and the opportunity for bringing about a union of all therevolutionary forces, Anarchists and Socialists alike, peasants andindustrial workers. This hope was destined to fail, but there was anunmistakable revolutionary awakening. In the latter part of January, 1895, an open letter to Nicholas II was smuggled into the country fromSwitzerland and widely distributed. It informed the Czar that theSocialists would fight to the bitter end the hateful order of things whichhe was responsible for creating, and menacingly said, "It will not be longbefore you find yourself entangled by it. "

IV

In one respect Nicholas II differed from Alexander III--he was by naturemore humane and sentimental. Like his father, he was thoroughly dominatedby Pobiedonostzev's theory that Russia, in order to be secure and stable, must be based upon Nationality, Orthodoxy, and Autocracy. He wanted to seeHoly Russia homogeneous and free from revolutionary disturbances. But hissensitive nature shrank from the systematic persecution of the non-orthodoxsects and the Jews, and he quietly intimated to the officials that he wouldnot approve its continuance. At the same time, he was not willing to facethe issue squarely and openly announce a change of policy or restorereligious freedom. That would have meant the overthrow of Pobiedonostzevand the Czar's emancipation from his sinister influence, and for thatNicholas II lacked the necessary courage and stamina. Cowardice andweakness of the will characterized his reign from the very beginning. 

When the officials, in obedience to their ruler's wishes, relaxed theseverity which had marked the treatment of the Jews and the non-orthodoxChristian sects, the change was soon noted by the victims and once morethere was a revival of hope. But the efforts of the Finns to secure amodification of the Russification policy were quite fruitless. When adeputation was sent from Finland to represent to the Czar that the rightsand privileges solemnly reserved to them at the time of the annexation werebeing denied to the people of Finland, Nicholas II refused to grant thedeputation an audience. Instead of getting relief, the people of Finlandsoon found that the oppression steadily increased. It was evident thatFinnish nationality was to be crushed out, if possible, in the interest ofRussian homogeneity. 

It soon became apparent, moreover, that Pobiedonostzev was to enjoy evenmore power than he had under Alexander III. In proportion as the characterof Nicholas II was weaker than that of his father, the power of theProcurator of the Holy Synod was greater. And there was a superstitiouselement in the mentality of the new Czar which Pobiedonostzev played uponwith infinite cunning. He ruled the weak-willed Czar and filled theministries with men who shared his views and upon whom he could rely. Notwithstanding the Czar's expressed wishes, he soon found ways and meansto add to the persecutions of the Jews and the various non-orthodoxChristian sects. In his determination to hammer the varied racial groupsinto a homogeneous nation, he adopted terrible measures and so roused thehatred of the Finns, Armenians, Georgians, and other subject peoples, stirring among them passionate resentment and desire for revolutionaryaction. It is impossible to conceive of a policy more dangerous to thedynasty than was conceived and followed by this fanatical Russophil. ThePoles were persecuted and forced, in sheer despair, and by self-interest, into the revolutionary movement. Armenians were persecuted and their churchlands and church funds confiscated; so they, too, were forced into therevolutionary current. 

Worse than all else was the cruel persecution of the Jews. Not only werethey compelled to live within the Pale of Settlement, but this was soreduced that abominable congestion and poverty resulted. Intolerablerestrictions were placed upon the facilities for education in the secondaryschools, the gymnasia, and in the universities. It was hoped in this way todestroy the intellectual leadership of the Jews. Pogroms were instigated, stirring the civilized world to protest at the horrible outrages. TheMinister of the Interior, Von Plehve, proclaimed his intention to "drownthe Revolution in Jewish blood, " while Pobiedonostzev's ambition was "toforce one-third of the Jews to conversion, another third to emigrate"--toescape persecution. The other third he expected to die of hunger andmisery. When Leo Tolstoy challenged these infamies, and called upon thecivilized world on behalf of the victims, the Holy Synod denounced Tolstoyand his followers as a sect "especially dangerous for the Orthodox Churchand the state. " Later, in 1900, the Holy Synod excommunicated Tolstoy fromthe Orthodox Church. 

The fatal logic of fanatical fury led to attacks upon the zemstvos. Theselocal organizations had been instituted in 1864, by Alexander II, in theliberal years of his reign. Elected mainly by the landlords and thepeasants, they were a vital part of the life of the nation. Possessing nopolitical powers or functions, having nothing to do with legislation, theywere important agencies of local government. The representatives of eachcounty constituted a county-zemstvo and the representatives elected by allthe county-zemstvos in a province constituted a province-zemstvo. Bothtypes concerned themselves with much the same range of activities. Theybuilt roads and telegraph stations; they maintained model farms andagricultural experiment stations similar to those maintained by our stategovernments. They maintained schools, bookstores, and libraries:co-operative stores; hospitals and banks. They provided the peasants withcheap credit, good seeds, fertilizers, agricultural implements, and soforth. In many cases they provided for free medical aid to the peasants. Insome instances they published newspapers and magazines. 

It must be remembered that the zemstvos were the only representative publicbodies elected by any large part of the people. While the suffrage wasquite undemocratic, being so arranged that the landlords were assured amajority over the peasants at all times, nevertheless they did perform agreat democratic service. But for them, life would have been well-nighimpossible for the peasant. In addition to the services already enumerated, these civic bodies were the relief agencies of the Empire, and when cropfailures brought famine to the peasants it was always the zemstvos whichundertook the work of relief. Hampered at every point, denied the right tocontrol the schools they created and maintained, inhibited by law fromdiscussing political questions, the zemstvos, nevertheless, became thenatural channels for the spreading of discontent and opposition to therégime through private communication and discussion. 

To bureaucrats of the type of Pobiedonostzev and Von Plehve, with theirfanatical belief in autocracy, these organizations of the people were somany plague spots. Not daring to suppress them altogether, they determinedto restrict them at every opportunity. Some of the zemstvos were suspendedand disbanded for certain periods of time. Individual members were exiledfor utterances which Von Plehve regarded as dangerous. The power of thezemstvos themselves was lessened by taking from them such importantfunctions as the provisioning of famine-stricken districts and by limitingin the most arbitrary manner the amount of the budget permitted to eachzemstvo. Since every decision of the zemstvos was subject to veto by thegovernors of the respective provinces, the government had at all times aformidable weapon at hand to use in its fight against the zemstvos. Thisweapon Von Plehve used with great effect; the most reasonable actions ofthe zemstvos were vetoed for no other reason than hatred of any sort ofrepresentative government. 

V

The result of all this was to drive the zemstvos toward the revolutionarymovements of the peasants and the city workers. That the zemstvos were notnaturally inclined to radicalism and revolution needs no demonstration. Economic interest, tradition, and environment all conspired to keep thesepopular bodies conservative. Landowners were always in the majority and ingeneral the zemstvos reflected the ideas and ideals of the enlightenedwealthy and cultivated classes. The peasant representatives in the zemstvoswere generally peasants of the most successful and prosperous type, hatingthe revolutionists and all their works. By means of a policy incrediblyinsane these conservatively inclined elements of the population were goadedto revolt. The newspapers and magazines of the zemstvos became more andmore critical of the government, more and more outspoken in denunciation ofexisting conditions. Presently, the leaders of the zemstvos followed theexample of the revolutionists and held a secret convention at which aprogram for common action was agreed upon. Thus they were resorting toillegal methods, exactly as the Socialists had done. Finally, many of theliberal zemstvo leaders formed themselves into a political party--the Unionof Liberation--with a special organ of its own, called _Emancipation_. Thisorgan, edited by the brilliant and courageous Peter Struve, was publishedin Stuttgart, Germany, and, since its circulation in Russia was forbidden, it had to be smuggled into the country and secretly circulated, just as therevolutionary Socialist journals were. Thus another bond was establishedbetween two very different movements. 

As was inevitable, revolutionary terrorism enormously increased. In thecities the working-men were drawn mainly into the Social DemocraticWorking-men's party, founded by Plechanov and others in 1898, but thepeasants, in so far as they were aroused at all, rallied around thestandard of the Socialist-Revolutionists, successors to the Will of thePeople party. This party was peculiarly a party of the peasants, just asthe party of Plechanov was peculiarly a party of industrial workers. Itemphasized the land question above all else. It naturally scorned the view, largely held by the Marxists in the other party, that Russia must waituntil her industrial development was perfected before attempting to realizeSocialism. It scorned the slow, legalistic methods and resolutely answeredthe terrorism of Czarism by a terrorism of the people. It maintained aspecial department for carrying on this grim work. Its Central Committeepassed sentences of death upon certain officials, and its decrees werecarried out by the members of its Fighting Organization. To thisorganization within the party belonged many of the ablest and mostconsecrated men and women in Russia. 

A few illustrations will suffice to make clear the nature of thisterroristic retaliation: In March, 1902, Sypiagin, the Minister of theInterior, was shot down as he entered his office by a member of theFighting Organization, Stephen Balmashev, who was disguised as an officer. Sypiagin had been duly sentenced to death by the Central Committee. He hadbeen responsible for upward of sixty thousand political arrests and for thesuffering of many exiles. Balmashev went to his death with heroicfortitude. In May, 1903, Gregory Gershuni and two associates executed thereactionary Governor of Ufa. Early in June, 1904, Borikov, Governor-Generalof Finland, was assassinated by a revolutionist. A month later, July 15th, the infamous Von Plehve, who had been judged by the Central Committee andheld responsible for the Kishinev pogrom, was killed by a bomb thrown underthe wheels of his carriage by Sazanov, a member of the Fighting Force. Thedeath of this cruel tyrant thrilled the world. In February, 1905, IvanKaliaiev executed the death sentence which had been passed upon theruthless Governor-General of Moscow, the Grand-Duke Serghei Alexandrovich. 

There was war in Russia--war between two systems of organized terrorism. Sometimes the Czar and his Ministers weakened and promised concessions, butalways there was speedy reaction and, usually, an increased vigor ofoppression. The assassination of Von Plehve, however, for the first timereally weakened the government. Czarism was, in fact, already toppling. Thenew Minister of the Interior, Von Plehve's successor, PrinceSvyatpolk-Mirski, sought to meet the situation by a policy of compromise. While he maintained Von Plehve's methods of suppressing the radicalorganizations and their press, and using provocative agents to entraprevolutionary leaders, he granted a certain degree of freedom to themoderate press and adopted a relatively liberal attitude toward thezemstvos. By this means he hoped to avert the impending revolution. 

Taking advantage of the new conditions, the leaders of the zemstvosorganized a national convention. This the government forbade, but it hadlost much of its power and the leaders of the movement ignored the orderand proceeded to hold the convention. At this convention, held at St. Petersburg, November 6, 1904, attended by many of the ablest lawyers, doctors, professors, scientists, and publicists in Russia, a resolution wasadopted demanding that the government at once call representatives of thepeople together for the purpose of setting up a constitutional governmentin Russia. It was a revolutionary act, a challenge to the autocracy, whichthe latter dared not accept. On the contrary, in December the Czar issuedan ambiguous ukase in which a number of concessions and reforms werepromised, but carefully avoiding the fundamental issues at stake. 

VI

Meanwhile the war with Japan, unpopular from the first, had proved to be anunbroken series of military defeats and disasters for Russia. From theopening of the war in February to the end of the year the press had beenpermitted to publish very little real news concerning it, but it was notpossible to hide for long the bitter truth. Taxes mounted higher andhigher, prices rose, and there was intense suffering, while the loss oflife was enormous. News of the utter failure and incompetence of the armyand the navy seeped through. Here was Russia with a population three timesas large as that of Japan, and with an annual budget of two billions asagainst Japan's paltry sixty millions, defeated at every turn. What didthis failure signify? In the first place, it signified the weakness andutter incompetence of the régime. It meant that imperialist expansion, witha corresponding strengthening of the old régime, was out of the question. Most intelligent Russians, with no lack of real patriotism, rejoiced at thesuccession of defeats because it proved to the masses the unfitness of thebureaucracy. 

It signified something else, also. There were many who remembered thescandals of the Turkish War, in 1877, when Bessarabia was recovered. Atthat time there was a perfect riot of graft, corruption, and treachery, much of which came under the observation of the zemstvos of the border. High military officials trafficked in munitions and food-supplies. Foodintended for the army was stolen and sold--sometimes, it was said, to theenemy. Materials were paid for, but never delivered to the army at all. Thearmy was demoralized and the Turks repulsed the Russians again and again. Now similar stories began to be circulated. Returning victims told storiesof brutal treatment of the troops by officers; of wounded and dying menneglected; of lack of hospital care and medical attention. They told worsestories, too, of open treachery by military officials and others; of armysupplies stolen; of shells ordered which would fit no guns the Russian armyever had, and so on. It was suggested, and widely believed, that Germanyhad connived at the systematic corruption of the Russian bureaucracy andthe Russian army, to serve its own imperialistic and economic ends. 

Such was the state of Russia at the end of the year 1904. Then came thetragic events of January, 1905, which marked the opening of the Revolution. In order to counteract the agitation of the Social Democrats among the cityworkers, and the formation by them of trades-unions, the government hadcaused to be formed "legal" unions--that is, organizations of workmenapproved by the government. In order to give these organizations somesemblance to real labor-unions, and thereby the better to deceive theworkers, strikes were actually inspired by agents of the government fromtime to time. On more than one occasion strikes thus instigated by thegovernment spread beyond control and caused great alarm. The Czar and hisagents were playing with fire. 

Among such unions was the Gathering of Industrial Working-men of St. Petersburg, which had for its program such innocent and non-revolutionaryobjects as "sober and reasonable pastimes, aimed at physical, intellectual, and moral improvement; strengthening of Russian national ideas; developmentof sensible views concerning the rights and duties of working-men andimprovement of labor conditions and mutual assistance. " It was founded byFather Gapon, who was opposed to the revolutionary movement, and wasregarded by the Socialists as a Czarist tool. 

On January 3d--Russian calendar--several thousand men belonging to theGathering of Industrial Workin-gmen of St. Petersburg went out on strike. By the 6th the strike had assumed the dimensions of a general strike. Itwas estimated that on the latter date fully one hundred and forty thousandmen were out on strike, practically paralyzing the industrial life of thecity. At meetings of the strikers speeches were made which had as much todo with the political demands for constitutional government as with theoriginal grievances of the strikers. The strike was fast becoming arevolution. On the 9th Father Gapon led the hosts to the Winter Palace, topresent a petition to the Czar asking for reforms. The text of the petitionwas widely circulated beforehand. It begged the Czar to order immediately"that representatives of all the Russian land, of all classes and groups, convene. " It outlined a moderate program which had the support of almostthe entire nation with the exception of the bureaucracy:

 Let every one be equal and free in the right of election; order to this end that election for the Constituent Assembly be based on general, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. This is our main request; in it and upon it everything is founded; this is the only ointment for our painful wounds; and in the absence of this our blood will continue to flow constantly, carrying us swiftly toward death. 

 But this measure alone cannot remedy all our wounds. Many others are necessary, and we tell them to you, Sire, directly and openly, as to our Father. We need:

 _I. Measures to counteract the ignorance and legal oppression of the Russian people_:

 (1) Personal freedom and inviolability, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of assemblage, freedom in religious affairs;

 (2) General and compulsory public education at the expense of the state;

 (3) Responsibility of the Ministers to the people, and guaranties of lawfulness in administration;

 (4) Equality before the law for all without exemption;

 (5) Immediate rehabilitation of those punished for their convictions. 

 (6) Separation of the Church from the state. 

 _II. Measures against the poverty of the people_:

 (1) Abolition of indirect taxes and introduction of direct income taxes on a progressive scale;

 (2) Abolition of the redemption payments, cheap credit, and gradual transferring of the land to the people;

 (3) The orders for the naval and military Ministers should be filled in Russia and not abroad;

 (4) The cessation of the war by the will of the people. 

 _III. Measures against oppression of labor by capital_:

 (1) Protection of labor by legislation;

 (2) Freedom of consumers' and producers' leagues and trades-unions;

 (3) An eight-hour workday and a regulation of overtime;

 (4) Freedom of struggle against capital (freedom of labor strikes);

 (5) Participation of labor representatives in the framing of a bill concerning state insurance of working-men;

 (6) Normal wages. 

 Those are, Sire, the principal wants with which we have come to you. Let your decree be known, swear that you will satisfy them, and you will make Russia happy and glorious, and your name will be branded in our hearts and in the hearts of our posterity for ever and ever. If, however, you will not reply to our prayer, we shall die here, on the place before your palace. We have no other refuge and no other means. We have two roads before us, one to freedom and happiness, the other to the grave. Tell us, Sire, which, and we will follow obediently, and if it be the road of death, let our lives be a sacrifice for suffering-wearied Russia. We do not regret the sacrifice; we bring it willingly. 

Led on by the strange, hypnotic power of the mystical Father Gapon, who wasclad in the robes of his office, tens of thousands of working-peoplemarched that day to the Winter Palace, confident that the Czar would seethem, receive their petitions, and harken to their prayers. It was not arevolutionary demonstration in the accepted sense of that term; themarchers did not carry red flags nor sing Socialist songs of revolt. Instead, they bore pictures of the Czar and other members of the royalfamily and sang "God Save the Czar" and other well-known religious hymns. No attempt was made to prevent the procession from reaching the square infront of the Winter Palace. Suddenly, without a word of warning, troopsappeared from the courtyards, where they were hidden, and fired into thecrowded mass of human beings, killing more than five hundred and woundingnearly three thousand. All who were able to do so turned and fled, amongthem Father Gapon. 

Bloody Sunday, as the day is known in Russian annals, is generally regardedas the beginning of the First Revolution. Immediately people began to talkof armed resistance. On the evening of the day of the tragedy there was ameeting of more than seven hundred Intellectuals at which the means forcarrying on revolution was the topic discussed. This was the first of manysimilar gatherings which took place all over Russia. Soon the Intellectualsbegan to organize unions, ostensibly for the protection of theirprofessional interests, but in reality for political purposes. There wereunions of doctors, writers, lawyers, engineers, professors, editors, and soon. Quietly, and almost without design, there was being effected anotherand more important union, namely, the union of all classes againstautocracy and despotism. 

The Czar gave from his private purse fifty thousand rubles for the reliefof the families of the victims of Bloody Sunday. On the 19th of January hereceived a deputation of carefully selected "loyal" working-men anddelivered to them a characteristic homily, which infuriated the masses byits stupid perversion of the facts connected with the wanton massacre ofBloody Sunday. Then, at the end of the month, he proclaimed the appointmentof a commission to "investigate the causes of labor unrest in St. Petersburg and its suburbs and to find means of avoiding them in thefuture. " This commission was to consist of representatives of capital andlabor. The working-men thereupon made the following demands:

(1) That labor be given an equal number of members in the commission withcapital;

(2) That the working-men be permitted to freely elect their ownrepresentatives;

(3) That the sessions of the commission be open to the public;

(4) That there be complete freedom of speech for the representatives oflabor in the commission;

(5) That all the working-people arrested on January 9th be released. 

These demands of the working-men's organizations were rejected by thegovernment, whereupon the workers agreed to boycott the commission andrefuse to have anything to do with it. At last it became evident to thegovernment that, in the circumstances, the commission could not accomplishany good, and it was therefore abandoned. The Czar and his advisers weredesperate and vacillating. One day they would adopt a conciliatory attitudetoward the workers, and the next day follow it up with fresh measures ofrepression and punishment. 

Little heeding the stupid charge by the Holy Synod that the revolutionaryleaders were in the pay of the Japanese, the workers went on organizing andstriking. All over Russia there were strikes, the movement had spread farbeyond the bounds of St. Petersburg. General strikes took place in many ofthe large cities, such as Riga, Vilna, Libau, Warsaw, Lodz, Batum, Minsk, Tiflis, and many others. Conflicts between strikers and soldiers and policewere common. Russia was aflame with revolution. The movement spread to thepeasants in a most surprising manner. Numerous extensive and seriousrevolts of peasants occurred in different parts of Russia, the peasantslooting the mansions of the landowners, and indulging in savage outbreaksof rioting. 

While this was going on the army was being completely demoralized. Theterrible defeat of the Russian forces by the Japanese--the foe that hadbeen so lightly regarded--at Mukden was a crushing blow which greatlyimpaired the morale of the troops, both those at home and those at thefront. Disaster followed upon disaster. May saw the destruction of thegreat Russian fleet. In June rebellion broke out in the navy, and the crewof the battle-ship _Potyamkin_, which was on the Black Sea, mutinied andhoisted the red flag. After making prisoners of their officers, the sailorshastened to lend armed assistance to striking working-men at Odessa whowere in conflict with soldiers and police. 

VII

It was a time of turbulent unrest and apparent utter confusion. It was noteasy to discern the underlying significance and purpose of some of the mostimportant events. On every hand there were strikes and uprisings, many ofthem without any sort of leadership or plan. Strikes which began overquestions of wages and hours became political demonstrations in favor of aConstituent Assembly. On the other hand, political demonstrations becametransformed, without any conscious effort on the part of anybody, intostrikes for immediate economic betterment. There was an intense classconflict going on in Russia, as the large number of strikes for increasedwages and shorter hours proved, yet the larger political struggle dwarfedand obscured the class struggle. For the awakened proletariat of thecities the struggle in which they were engaged was economic as well aspolitical. They wisely regarded the political struggle as part of the classstruggle, as Plechanov and his friends declared it to be. Yet the factremained that the capitalist class against which the proletariat wasfighting on the economic field was, for the most part, fighting againstautocracy, for the overthrow of Czarism and the establishment of politicaldemocracy, as earnestly, if less violently, than the proletariat was. Thereason for this was the recognition by the leading capitalists of Russia ofthe fact that industrial progress was retarded by the old régime, and thatcapitalist development requires popular education, a relatively highstandard of living, political freedom, and stability and order ingovernment. It was perfectly natural, therefore, for the great associationsof manufacturers and merchants to unite in urging the government to grantextensive political reforms so long as the class conflict was merelyincidental. 

What had begun mainly as a class war had become the war of all classesagainst autocracy. Of course, in such a merging of classes therenecessarily appeared many shadings and degrees of interest. Not all thesocial groups and classes were as radical in their demands as the organizedpeasants and city workers, who were the soul of the revolutionary movement. There were, broadly speaking, two great divisions of social life with whichthe Revolution was concerned--the political and the economic. With regardto the first there was practical unanimity; he would be a blind slave totheoretical formulæ who sought to maintain the thesis that class interestsdivided masses and classes here. All classes, with the exception of thebureaucracy, wanted the abolition of Czarism and Absolutism and theestablishment of a constitutional government, elected by the people on abasis of universal suffrage, and directly responsible to the electorate. 

Upon the economic issue there was less agreement, though all parties andclasses recognized the need of extensive change. It was universallyrecognized that some solution of the land question must be found. There cannever be social peace or political stability in Russia until that problemis settled. Now, it was easy for the Socialist groups, on the one hand, andthe moderate groups, upon the other, to unite in demanding that the largeestates be divided among the peasants. But while the Socialistgroups--those of the peasants as well as those of city workers--demandedthat the land be taken without compensation, the bourgeois elements, especially the leaders of the zemstvos, insisted that the state should paycompensation for the land taken. Judgment upon this vital question has longbeen embittered by the experience of the peasants with the "redemptionpayments" which were established when serfdom was abolished. During theperiod of greatest intensity, the summer of 1905, a federation of thevarious revolutionary peasants' organizations was formed and based itspolicy upon the middle ground of favoring the payment of compensation _insome cases_. 

All through this trying period the Czar and his advisers were temporizingand attempting to obtain peace by means of petty concessions. A greaterdegree of religious liberty was granted, and a new representative body, theImperial Duma, was provided for. This body was not to be a parliament inany real sense, but a debating society. It could _discuss_ proposedlegislation, but it had no powers to _enact_ legislation of any kind. Absolutism was dying hard, clinging to its powers with remarkable tenacity. Of course, the concessions did not satisfy the revolutionists, not eventhe most moderate sections, and the net result was to intensify rather thanto diminish the flame. 

On the 2d of August--10th, according to the old Russian calendar--the warwith Japan came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Russia had experienced humiliating and disastrous defeat at the hands of anation far inferior in population and wealth, but infinitely superior inmilitary capacity and morale. The news of the conditions of peaceintensified the ardor and determination of the revolting Russian peopleand, on the other hand, added to the already great weakness of thegovernment. September witnessed a great revival of revolutionary agitation, and by the end of the month a fresh epidemic of strikes had broken out invarious parts of the country. By the middle of October the whole life ofRussia, civil, industrial, and commercial, was a chaos. In some of thecities the greater part of the population had placed themselves in a stateof siege, under revolutionary leadership. 

On the 17th of October--Russian style--the Czar issued the famous Manifestowhich acknowledged the victory of the people and the death of Absolutism. After the usual amount of pietistic verbiage by way of introduction theManifesto said:

 We make it the duty of the government to execute our firm will:

 (1) To grant the people the unshakable foundations of civic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom of conscience, of speech, of assemblage of unions. 

 (2) To admit now to participation in the Imperial Duma, without stopping the pending elections and in so far as it is feasible in the short time remaining before the convening of the Duma, all the classes of the population, _leaving the farther development of the principle of universal suffrage to the new legislative order. _

 (3) _To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can become binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, and that the representatives of the people must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over the lawfulness of the authorities appointed by us_. 

 We call upon all faithful sons of Russia to remember their duty to their fatherland, to aid in putting an end to the unprecedented disturbances, and to exert with us all their power to restore quiet and peace in our native land. 

VIII

The Czar's Manifesto rang through the civilized world. In all lands it washailed as the end of despotism and the triumph of democracy and freedom. The joy of the Russian people was unbounded. At last, after fourscore yearsof heroic struggle and sacrifice by countless heroes, named and nameless, the goal of freedom was attained. Men, women, and children sang in thestreets to express their joy. Red flags were displayed everywhere andsolemnly saluted by the officers and men of the Czar's army. But therejoicing was premature, as the events of a few hours clearly proved. Withthat fatal vacillation which characterized his whole life, Nicholas II hadno sooner issued his Manifesto than he surrendered once more to the evilforces by which he was surrounded and harked back to the old ways. The dayfollowing the issuance of the Manifesto, while the people were stillrejoicing, there began a series of terrible pogroms. The cry went forth, "Kill the Intellectuals and the Jews!"

There had been organized in support of the government, and by its agents, bodies of so-called "patriots. " These were, in the main, recruited from theunderworld, a very large number of them being criminals who were releasedfrom the prison for the purpose. Officially known as the Association ofthe Russian People and the Association to Combat the Revolution, theseorganizations were popularly nicknamed the Black Hundreds. Most of themembers were paid directly by the government for their services, whileothers were rewarded with petty official positions. The Czar himselfaccepted membership in these infamous organizations of hired assassins. Within three weeks after the issuance of the Manifesto more than a hundredorganized pogroms took place, the number of killed amounting to nearly fourthousand; the wounded to more than ten thousand, according to the mostcompetent authorities. In Odessa alone more than one thousand persons werekilled and many thousands wounded in a four-days' massacre. In all thebloody pages of the history of the Romanovs there is nothing comparable tothe frightful terror of this period. 

Naturally, this brutal vengeance and the deception which Nicholas II andhis advisers had practised upon the people had the immediate effect ofincreasing the relative strength and prestige of the Socialists in therevolutionary movement as against the less radical elements. To meet suchbrutality and force only the most extreme measures were deemed adequate. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, which had been organized by theproletariat of St. Petersburg a few days before the Czar issued hisManifesto, now became a great power, the central guiding power of theRevolution. Similar bodies were organized in other great cities. Theexample set by the city workers was followed by the peasants in many placesand Councils of Peasants' Deputies were organized. In a few cases largenumbers of soldiers, making common cause with these bodies representing theworking class, formed Councils of Soldiers' Deputies. Here, then, was a newphenomenon; betrayed by the state, weary of the struggle to democratizeand liberalize the political state, the workers had established a sort ofrevolutionary self-government of a new kind, entirely independent of thestate. We shall never comprehend the later developments in Russia, especially the phenomenon of Bolshevism, unless we have a sympatheticunderstanding of these Soviets--autonomous, non-political units ofworking-class self-government, composed of delegates elected directly bythe workers. 

As the revolutionary resistance to the Black Hundreds increased, and therapidly growing Soviets of workmen's, peasants' and soldiers' delegatesasserted a constantly increasing indifference to the existing politicalstate, the government again tried to stem the tide by making concessions. On November 3d--new style--in a vain attempt to appease the incessantdemand for the release of the thousands of political prisoners, and to putan end to the forcible release of such prisoners by infuriated mobs, apartial amnesty was declared. On the 16th a sop was thrown to the peasantsin the shape of a decree abolishing all the remaining land-redemptionpayments. Had this reform come sooner it might have had the effect ofstemming the tide of revolt among the peasants, but in the circumstances itwas of no avail. Early in December the press censorship was abolished bydecree, but that was of very little importance, for the radical press hadthrown off all its restraints, simply ignoring the censorship. Thegovernment of Nicholas II was quite as helpless as it was tyrannical, corrupt, and inefficient. The army and navy, demoralized by the defeatsuffered at the hands of Japan, and especially by knowledge of thecorruption in high places which made that defeat inevitable, were no longerdependable. Tens of thousands of soldiers and marines had joined with theworkmen in the cities in open rebellion. Many more indulged themselves inpurposeless rioting. 

The organization of the various councils of delegates representingfactory-workers and peasants, inevitable as it seemed to be, had onedisastrous effect, the seriousness of which cannot be overstated. As wehave seen, the cruel, blundering policy of the government had united allclasses against it in a revolutionary movement of unexampled magnitude. Given the conditions prevailing in Russia, and especially the lack ofindustrial development and the corresponding numerical weakness of theindustrial proletariat, it was evident that the only chance of success inthe Revolution lay in the united effort of all classes against the oldrégime. Nothing could have better served the autocracy, and thereforeinjured the revolutionary cause, than the creation of a division in theranks of the revolutionists. 

This was exactly what the separate organizations of the working classaccomplished. All the provocative agents of the Czar could not havecontrived anything so serviceable to the reaction. _Divide et impera_ hasbeen the guiding principle of cunning despots in all ages, and the astutestadvisers of Nicholas II must have grinned with Satanic glee when theyrealized how seriously the forces they were contending against weredividing. Stupid oppression had driven into one united force thewage-earning and wage-paying classes. Working-men and manufacturers madecommon cause against that stupid oppression. Now, however, as theinevitable result of the organization of the Soviets, and the predominanceof these in the Revolution, purely economic issues came to the front. Inproportion as the class struggle between employers and employed wasaccentuated the common struggle against autocracy was minimized andobscured. Numerous strikes for increased wages occurred, forcing theemployers to organize resistance. Workers in one city--St. Petersburg, forexample--demanded the immediate introduction of an eight-hour workday, andproclaimed it to be in force, quite regardless of the fact that longerhours prevailed elsewhere and that, given the competitive system, theiremployers were bound to resist a demand that would be a handicap favoringtheir competitors. 

As might have been foreseen, the employers were forced to rely upon thegovernment, the very government they had denounced and conspired tooverthrow. The president of the Council of Workmen's Deputies of St. Petersburg, Chrustalev-Nosar, in his _History of the Council of Workmen'sDeputies_, quotes the order adopted by acclamation on November 11th--newstyle--introducing, from November 13th, an eight-hour workday in all shopsand factories "in a revolutionary way. " By way of commentary, he quotes afurther order, adopted November 25, repealing the former order anddeclaring:

 The government, headed by Count Witte, _in its endeavor to break the vigor of the revolutionary proletariat, came to the support of capital_, thus turning the question of an eight-hour workday in St. Petersburg into a national problem. The consequence has been that the working-men of St. Petersburg are unable now, apart from the working-men of the entire country, to realize the decree of the Council. The Council of Workmen's Deputies, therefore, deems it necessary to _stop temporarily the immediate and general establishment of an eight-hour workday by force_. 

The Councils inaugurated general strike after general strike. At firstthese strikes were successful from a revolutionary point of view. Soon, however, it became apparent that the general strike is a weapon which canonly be used effectively on rare occasions. It is impossible to rekindlefrequently and at will the sacrificial passion necessary to make asuccessful general strike. This the leaders of the proletariat of Russiaoverlooked. They overlooked, also, the fact that the masses of the workerswere exhausted by the long series of strikes in which they had engaged andwere on the verge of starvation. The consequence was that most of the laterstrikes failed to accomplish anything like the ends sought. 

Naturally, the government was recovering its confidence and its courage inproportion to the class divisions and antagonisms of the opposition. Itonce more suppressed the revolutionary press and prohibited meetings. Oncemore it proclaimed martial law in many cities. With all its old-timeassurance it caused the arrest of the leaders of the unions of workmen andpeasants, broke up the organizations and imprisoned their officers. Itissued a decree which made it a crime to participate in strikes. With thefull sanction of the government, as was shown by the publication ofdocumentary evidence of unquestioned authenticity, the Black Hundredsrenewed their brutality. The strong Council of Workmen's Deputies of St. Petersburg, with which Witte had dealt as though it were part of thegovernment itself, was broken up and suppressed. Witte wantedconstitutional government on the basis of the October Manifesto, but hewanted the orderly development of Russian capitalism. In this attitude hewas supported, of course, by the capitalist organizations. The very men whoin the summer of 1905 had demanded that the government grant the demands ofthe workers and so end the strikes, and who worked in unison with theworkers to secure the much-desired political freedom, six months later weredemanding that the government suppress the strikes and exert its force toend disorder. 

Recognition of these facts need not imply any lack of sympathy with theproletariat in their demands. The class struggle in modern industrialsociety is a fact, and there is abundant justification--the justificationof necessity and of achievement--for aggressive class consciousness andclass warfare. But it is quite obvious that there are times when classinterests and class warfare must be set aside in favor of larger socialinterests. It is obviously dangerous and reactionary--and thereforewrong--to insist upon strikes or other forms of class warfare in moments ofgreat calamity, as, for example, during disasters like the Johnstown floodand the Messina earthquake, or amid the ravages of a pestilential plague. Marx, to whom we owe the formulation of the theory of class struggle whichhas guided the Socialist movement, would never have questioned thisimportant truth; he would never have supported class separatism underconditions such as those prevailing in Russia at the end of 1905. Onlydoctrinaires, slaves to formulæ, but blind to reality, could havesanctioned such separatism. But doctrinaires always abound in times ofrevolution. 

By December the government was stronger than it had been at any time sincethe Revolution began. The zemstvos were no longer an active part of therevolutionary movement. Indeed, there had come over these bodies a greatchange, and most of them were now dominated by relatively reactionarylandowners who, hitherto apathetic and indifferent, had been stirred todefensive action by the aggressive class warfare of the workers. Practically all the bourgeois moderates had been driven to the more or lessopen support of the government. December witnessed a new outburst in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and other cities. Barricades were raised in the streetsin many places. In Moscow, where the most bitter and sanguinary strugglestook place, more than a thousand persons were killed. The government wasbetter prepared than the workers; the army had recovered no little of itslost morale and did not refuse to shoot down the workers as it had done onprevious occasions. The strikes and insurrections were put down in bloodyvengeance and there followed a reign of brutal repression indescribablyhorrible and savage. By way of protest and retaliation, there wereindividual acts of terrorism, such as the execution of the Governor ofTambov by Marie Spiridonova, but these were of little or no avail. TheFirst Revolution was drowned in blood and tears. 

CHAPTER II

FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION

I

No struggle for human freedom was ever wholly vain. No matter how vast andseemingly complete the failure, there is always something of enduring goodachieved. That is the law of progress, universal and immutable. The FirstRussian Revolution conformed to the law; it had failed and died in a tragicway, yet its failure was relative and it left something of substantialachievement as the foundation for fresh hope, courage, and effort. Czarismhad gathered all its mighty black forces and seemed, at the beginning of1906, to be stronger than at any time in fifty years. The souls of Russia'snoblest and best sons and daughters were steeped in bitter pessimism. Andyet there was reason for hope and rejoicing; out of the ruin and despairtwo great and supremely vital facts stood in bold, challenging relief. 

The first of these facts was the new aspect of Czarism, its changed status. Absolutism as a legal institution was dead. Nothing that Nicholas II andhis advisers were able to do could undo the constitutional changes effectedwhen the imperial edict made it part of the fundamental law of the nationthat "no law can become binding without the consent of the Imperial Duma, "and that the Duma, elected by the people, had the right to control theactions of the officials of the government, even when such officials wereappointed by the Czar himself. Absolutism was illegal now. Attempts mightbe made to reintroduce it, and, indeed, that was the real significance ofthe policy pursued by the government, but Absolutism could no longerpossess the moral strength that inheres in the sanctity of law. In fightingit the Russian people now had that strength upon their side. 

The second vital and hopeful fact was likewise a moral force. Absolutismwith all its assumed divine prerogatives, in the person of the Czar, haddeclared its firm will "to grant the people the unshakable foundations ofcivic freedom on the basis of real personal inviolability, freedom ofconscience, of speech, of assemblage and of unions. " This civic freedomAbsolutism had sanctioned. By that act it gave the prestige of legality tosuch assemblages, discussions, and publications as had always hitherto beenforced to accept risks and disabilities inseparable from illegal conduct. Civic freedom had long been outlawed, a thing associated with lawlessnessand crime, and so long as that condition remained many who believed incivic freedom itself, who wanted a free press, freedom of public assemblageand of conscience in matters pertaining to religion, were kept fromparticipation in the struggle. Respect for law, as law, is deeply rooted incivilized mankind--a fact which, while it makes the task of therevolutionist hard, and at times impedes progress, is, nevertheless, ofimmense value to human society. 

Civic freedom was not yet a fact. It seemed, as a reality, to be as faraway as ever. Meetings were forbidden by officials and broken up bysoldiers and police; newspapers were suppressed, as of old; labor-unions, and even the unions of the Intellectuals, were ruthlessly persecuted andtreated as conspiracies against the state. All this and more was true anddiscouraging. Yet there was substantial gain: civic freedom as a practicalfact did not exist, but civic freedom as a lawful right lived in the mindsof millions of people--the greatest fact in Russia. The terms of theManifesto of October 17th--Absolutism's solemn covenant with thenation--had not been repealed, and the nation knew that the government didnot dare to repeal it. Not all the Czar's armies and Black Hundreds coulddestroy that consciousness of the lawful right to civic freedom. Nothingcould restore the old condition. Whereas in the past the government, insuppressing the press and popular assemblages, could say to the people, "Weuphold the law!" now when the government attempted these things, the peopledefiantly cried out, "You break the law!" Absolutism was no longer a thingof law. 

Nicholas II and all his bureaucrats could not return the chicken to the eggfrom which it had been hatched. They could not unsay the fateful wordswhich called into being the Imperial Duma. The Revolution had put intotheir souls a terrible fear of the wrath of the people. The Czar and hisgovernment had to permit the election of the Duma to proceed, and yet, conscious of the fact that the success of the Duma inevitably meant the endof the old régime, they were bound, in self-protection, to attempt to killthe Duma in the hope that thereby they would kill, or at least paralyze, the Revolution itself. Thus it was, while not daring to forbid theelections for the Duma to proceed, the government adopted a Machiavellianpolicy. 

The essentials of that policy were these: on the one hand, the Duma was notto be seriously considered at all, when it should assemble. It would beignored, if possible, and no attention paid to any of its deliberations orattempts to legislate. A certain amount of latitude would be given to itas a debating society, a sort of safety-valve, but that was all. If thispolicy could not be carried out in its entirety, if, for example, it shouldprove impossible to completely ignore the Duma, it would be easy enough todevise a mass of hampering restrictions and regulations which would renderit impotent, and yet necessitate no formal repudiation of the OctoberManifesto. On the other hand, there was the possibility that the Duma mightbe captured and made a safe ally. The suffrage upon which the electionswere to be based was most undemocratic and unjust, giving to the landlordsand the prosperous peasants, together with the wealthy classes in thecities, an enormous preponderance in the electorate. By using the BlackHundreds to work among the electors--bribing, cajoling, threatening, andcoercing, as the occasion might require--it might be possible to bringabout the election of a Duma which would be a pliant and ready tool of thegovernment. 

One of the favorite devices of the Black Hundreds was to send agents amongthe workers in the cities and among the peasants to discredit the Duma inadvance, and to spread the idea that it would only represent thebourgeoisie. Many of the most influential Socialist leaders unfortunatelypreached the same doctrine. This was the natural and logical outcome of theseparate action of the classes in the Revolution, and of the manner inwhich the proletariat had forced the economic struggle to the front duringthe political struggle. In the vanguard of the fight for the Duma were theConstitutional Democrats, led by Miliukov, Prince Lvov, and many prominentleaders of the zemstvos. The divorce between the classes represented bythese men and the proletariat represented by the Social Democrats wasabsolute. It was not surprising that the leaders of the Social Democraticparty should be suspicious and distrustful of the Constitutional Democratsand refuse to co-operate with them. 

But many of the Social Democrats went much farther than this, and, in thename of Socialism and proletarian class consciousness, adopted the sameattitude toward the Duma itself as that which the agents of the BlackHundreds were urging upon the people. Among the Socialist leaders who tookthis position was Vladimir Ulyanov, the great propagandist whom the worldknows to-day as Nikolai Lenine, Bolshevik Prime Minister and Dictator. Lenine urged the workers to boycott the Duma and to refuse to participatein the elections in any manner whatever. At a time when only a unitedeffort by all classes could be expected to accomplish anything, and whensuch a victory of the people over the autocratic régime as might have beensecured by united action would have meant the triumph of the Revolution, Lenine preached separatism. Unfortunately, his influence, even at thattime, was very great and his counsels prevailed with a great many Socialistgroups over the wiser counsels of Plechanov and others. 

It may be said, in explanation and extenuation of Lenine's course, that theboycotting of the elections was the logical outcome of the class antagonismand separatism, and that the bourgeois leaders were just as muchresponsible for the separatism as the leaders of the proletariat were. Allthis is true. It is quite true to say that wiser leadership of themanufacturing class in the critical days of 1905 would have madeconcessions and granted many of the demands of the striking workmen. By sodoing they might have maintained unity in the political struggle. But, evenif so much be granted, it is poor justification and defense of a Socialistpolicy to say that it was neither better nor worse, neither more stupid normore wise, than that of the bourgeoisie! In the circumstances, Lenine'spolicy was most disastrous for Russia. It is not necessary to believe thecharge that was made at the time and afterward that Lenine was in the payof the government and a tool of the Black Hundreds. Subsequent incidentsserved to fasten grave suspicion upon him, but no one ever offered proof ofcorruption. In all probability, he was then, and throughout the lateryears, honest and sincere--a fanatic, often playing a dangerous game, unmoral rather than immoral, believing that the end he sought justified anymeans. 

II

When the elections for the Duma were held, in March, 1906, the failure ofthe government's attempt to capture the body was complete. It wasoverwhelmingly a progressive parliament that had been elected. TheConstitutional Democrats, upon a radical program, had elected the largestnumber of members, 178. Next came the representatives of the peasants'organizations, with a program of moderate Socialism, numbering 116. Thisgroup became known in the Duma as the Labor Group. A third group consistedof 63 representatives of border provinces, mostly advanced Liberals, calledAutonomists, on account of their special interest in questions concerninglocal autonomy. There were only 28 avowed supporters of the government. Finally, despite the Socialist boycott of the elections, there were almostas many Socialists elected as there were supporters of the government. 

Once more Russia had spoken for democracy in no uncertain voice. And oncemore Czarism committed the incredible folly of attempting to stem the tideof democracy by erecting further measures of autocracy as a dam. Shortlybefore the time came for the assembling of the newly elected Duma, theCzar's government announced new fundamental laws which limited the powersof the Duma and practically reduced it to a farce. In the first place, theImperial Council was to be reconstituted and set over the Duma as an upperchamber, or Senate, having equal rights with the Duma. Half of the membersof the Imperial Council were to be appointed by the Czar and the other halfelected from universities, zemstvos, bourses, and by the clergy and thenobility. In other words, over the Duma was to be set a body which couldalways be so manipulated as to insure the defeat of any measure displeasingto the old régime. And the Czar reserved to himself the power to summon ordissolve the Duma at will, as well as the power to declare war and to makepeace and to enter into treaties with other nations. What a farce was thisconsidered as a fulfilment of the solemn assurances given in October, 1905!

But the reactionary madness went even farther; believing the revolutionarymovement to have been crushed to such a degree that it might act withimpunity, autocracy took other measures. Three days before the assemblingof the Duma the Czar replaced his old Ministry by one still morereactionary. At the head of the Cabinet, as Prime Minister, he appointedthe notorious reactionary bureaucrat, Goremykin. With full regard for thebloody traditions of the office, the infamous Stolypin, former Governor ofSaratov, was made Minister of the Interior. At the head of the Departmentof Agriculture, which was charged with responsibility for dealing withagrarian problems, was placed Stishinsky, a large landowner, bitterlyhostile to, and hated by, the peasants. The composition of the new Ministrywas a defiance of the popular will and sentiment, and was so interpreted. 

The Duma opened on April 27th, at the Taurida Palace. St. Petersburg was avast armed camp that day. Tens of thousands of soldiers, fully armed, weremassed at different points in readiness to suppress any demonstrations bythe populace. It was said that provocateurs moved among the people, tryingto stir an uprising which would afford a pretext for action by thesoldiers. The members of the Duma were first received by the Czar at theWinter Palace and addressed by him in a pompous speech which carefullyavoided all the vital questions in which the Russian people were so keenlyinterested. It was a speech which might as well have been made by the firstCzar Nicholas. But there was no need of words to tell what was in the mindof Nicholas II; that had been made quite evident by the new laws and thenew Ministry. Before the Duma lay the heavy task of continuing theRevolution, despite the fact that the revolutionary army had been scatteredas chaff is scattered before the winds. 

The first formal act of the Duma, after the opening ceremonies werefinished, was to demand amnesty for all the political prisoners. Themembers of the Duma had come to the Taurida Palace that day through streetscrowded with people who chanted in monotonous chorus the word "Amnesty. "The oldest man in the assembly, I. I. Petrunkevitch, was cheered again andagain as he voiced the popular demand on behalf of "those who havesacrificed their freedom to free our dear fatherland. " There were someseventy-five thousand political prisoners in Russia at that time, theflower of Russian manhood and womanhood, treated as common criminals and, in many instances, subject to terrible torture. Well might Petrunkevitchproclaim: "All the prisons of our country are full. Thousands of hands arebeing stretched out to us in hope and supplication, and I think that theduty of our conscience compels us to use all the influence our positiongives us to see that the freedom that Russia has won costs no moresacrifices ... I think, gentlemen ... We cannot refrain just now fromexpressing our deepest feelings, the cry of our heart--that free Russiademands the liberation of all prisoners. " At the end of the eloquent appealthere was an answering cry of: "Amnesty!" "Amnesty!" The chorus of thestreets was echoed in the Duma itself. 

There was no lack of courage in the Duma. One of its first acts was theadoption of an address in response to the speech delivered by the Czar tothe members at the reception at the Winter Palace. The address was inreality a statement of the objects and needs of the Russian people, theirprogram. It was a radical document, but moderately couched. It demandedfull political freedom; amnesty for all who had been imprisoned forpolitical reasons or for violations of laws in restriction of religiousliberty; the abolition of martial law and other extraordinary measures;abolition of capital punishment; the abolition of the Imperial Council anddemocratization of the laws governing elections to the Duma; autonomy forFinland and Poland; the expropriation of state and private lands in theinterest of the peasants; a comprehensive body of social legislationdesigned to protect the industrial workers. In a word, the program of theDuma was a broad and comprehensive program of political and socialdemocracy, which, if enacted, would have placed Russia among the foremostdemocracies of the world. 

The boldness of the Duma program was a direct challenge to the governmentand was so interpreted by the Czar and his Ministers. By the reactionarypress it was denounced as a conspiracy to hand the nation over to theSocialists. That it should have passed the Duma almost unanimously was anindication of the extent to which the liberal bourgeoisie represented bythe Constitutional Democrats was prepared to go in order to destroyautocracy. No wonder that some of the most trusted Marxian Socialists inRussia were urging that it was the duty of the Socialists to co-operatewith the Duma! Yet there was a section of the Marxists engaged in aconstant agitation against the Duma, preaching the doctrine of the classstruggle, but blind to the actual fact that the dominant issue was in theconflict between the democracy of the Duma and the autocracy of Czarism. 

The class consciousness of the old régime was much clearer and moreintelligent. The Czar refused to receive the committee of the Duma, appointed to make formal presentation of the address. Then, on May 12th, Goremykin, the Prime Minister, addressed the Duma, making answer to itsdemands. On behalf of the government he rebuked the Duma for itsunpatriotic conduct in a speech full of studied insult and contemptuousdefiance. He made it quite clear that the government was not going to grantany reforms worthy of mention. More than that, he made it plain to theentire nation that Nicholas II and his bureaucracy would never recognizethe Duma as an independent parliamentary body. Thus the old régime answeredthe challenge of the Duma. 

For seventy-two days the Duma worked and fought, seventy-two days ofparliamentary history for which there is no parallel in the annals ofparliamentary government. For the sake of the larger aims before it, theDuma carried out the demands of the government that it approve certainpetty measures placed before it for the formality of its approval. On theother hand, it formulated and passed numerous measures upon its owninitiative and demanded that they be recognized as laws of the land. Amongthe measures thus adopted were laws guaranteeing freedom of assemblage;equality of all citizens before the law; the right of labor organizationsto exist and to conduct strikes; reform of judicial procedure in thecourts; state aid for peasants suffering from crop failure and otheragrarian reforms; the abolition of capital punishment. In addition topursuing its legislative program, the Duma members voiced the country'sprotest against the shortcomings of the government, subjecting the variousMinisters to searching interpellation, day after day. 

Not a single one of the measures adopted by the Duma received the supportof the Imperial Council. This body was effectively performing the task forwhich it had been created. To the interpellations of the Duma the Czar'sMinisters made the most insulting replies, when they happened to take anynotice of them at all. All the old iniquities were resorted to by thegovernment, supported, as always, by the reactionary press. The homes ofmembers of the Duma were entered and searched by the police and everyparliamentary right and privilege was flouted. Even the publication of thespeeches delivered in the Duma was forbidden. 

The Duma had from the first maintained a vigorous protest against "theinfamy of executions without trial, pogroms, bombardment, andimprisonment. " Again and again it had been charged that pogroms werecarried out under the protection of the government, in accordance with theold policy of killing the Jews and the Intellectuals. The answer of thegovernment was--another pogrom of merciless savagery. On June 1st, atByalostock, upward of eighty men, women, and children were killed, manymore wounded, and scores of women, young and old, brutally outraged. TheDuma promptly sent a commission to Byalostock to investigate and reportupon the facts, and presently the commission made a report which provedbeyond question the responsibility of the government for the whole brutaland bloody business. It was shown that the inflammatory manifestos callingupon the "loyal" citizens to make the attack were printed in the office ofthe Police Department; that soldiers in the garrison had been told days inadvance when the pogrom would take place; and that in the looting andsacking of houses and shops, which occurred upon a large scale, officers ofthe garrison had participated. These revelations made a profound impressionin Russia and throughout Europe. 

III

The Duma finally brought upon itself the whole weight of Czarism when itaddressed a special appeal to the peasants of the country in which it dealtwith candor and sincerity with the great agrarian problems which bore uponthe peasants so heavily. The appeal outlined the various measures which theDuma had tried to enact for the relief of the peasants, and the attitude ofthe Czar's Ministers. The many strong peasants' organizations, and theirnumerous representatives in the Duma, made the circulation of this appealan easy matter. The government could not close these channels ofcommunication, nor prevent the Duma's strong plea for lawful rights andagainst lawlessness by government officials from reaching the peasants. Only one method of defense remained to the Czar and his Ministers: On July9th, like a thunderbolt from the sky, came a new Manifesto from the Czar, dissolving the Duma. In the Manifesto all the old arrogance of Absolutismreappeared. A more striking contrast to the Manifesto of the previousOctober could not be readily imagined. The Duma was accused of havingexceeded its rights by "investigating the actions of local authoritiesappointed by the Emperor, " notwithstanding the fact that in the OctoberManifesto it had been solemnly covenanted "that the representatives of thepeople must be guaranteed a real participation in the control over thelawfulness of the authorities appointed by us. " The Duma was condemned for"finding imperfections in the fundamental laws which can be altered only bythe monarch's will" and for its "overtly lawless act of appealing to thepeople. " The Manifesto charged that the growing unrest and lawlessness ofthe peasants were due to the failure of the Duma to ameliorate theirconditions--and this in spite of the record!

When the members of the Duma arrived at the Taurida Palace next day theyfound the place filled with troops who prevented their entrance. They werepowerless. Some two hundred-odd members adjourned to Viborg, whence theyissued an appeal to the people to defend their rights. These men were notSocialists, most of them belonging to the party of the ConstitutionalDemocrats, but they issued an appeal to the people to meet the dissolutionof the Imperial Duma by a firm refusal to pay taxes, furnish recruits forthe army, or sanction the legality of any loans to the government. This waspractically identical with the policy set forth in the Manifesto of theExecutive Committee of the St. Petersburg Council of Workmen's Deputies atthe beginning of the previous December, before the elections to the Duma. Now, however, the Socialists in the Duma--both the Social Democrats and theSocialist-Revolutionists--together with the semi-Socialist Labor Group, decided that it was not enough to appeal for passive resistance; that onlyan armed uprising could accomplish anything. They therefore appealed tothe city proletariat, the peasants, the army, and the navy to rise in armedstrength against the tyrannical régime. 

Neither appeal produced any noteworthy result. The response to the Viborgappeal was far less than that which followed the similar appeal of the St. Petersburg workmen in December. The signers of the appeal were arrested, sentenced to three months' imprisonment, and deprived of their electoralrights. To the appeal of the Duma Socialists there was likewise very littleresponse, either from city workers, peasants, soldiers, or marines. Russiawas struggle-weary. The appeals fell upon the ears of a cowed and beatenpopulace. The two documents served only to emphasize one fact, namely, thatcapacity and daring to attempt active and violent resistance was stilllargely confined to the working-class representatives. In appealing to theworkers to meet the attacks of the government with armed resistance, theleaders of the peasants and the city proletariat were ready to take theirplaces in the vanguard of the fight. On the other hand, the signers of theViborg appeal for passive resistance manifested no such determination ordesire, though they must have known that passive resistance could only be atemporary phase, that any concerted action by the people to resist thecollection of taxes and recruiting for the army would have led to attackand counter-attack-to a violent revolution. 

Feeling perfectly secure, the government, while promising the election ofanother Duma, carried on a policy of vigorous repression of all radical andrevolutionary agitation and organization. Executions without trial werealmost daily commonplaces. Prisoners were mercilessly tortured, and, inmany cases, flogged to death. Hundreds of persons, of both sexes, many ofthem simple bourgeois-liberals and not revolutionists in any sense of theword, were exiled to Siberia. The revolutionary organizations of theworkers were filled with spies and provocateurs, an old and effectivemethod of destroying their morale. In all the provinces of Russia fieldcourt martial was proclaimed. Field court martial is more drastic thanordinary court martial and practically amounts to condemnation withouttrial, for trials under it are simply farcical, since neither defense norappeal is granted. Nearly five hundred revolutionists were put to deathunder this system, many of them without even the pretense of a trial. 

The Black Hundreds were more active than ever, goaded on by the Holy Synod. Goremykin resigned as Premier and his place was taken by the unspeakablycruel and bloodthirsty Stolypin, whose "hemp neckties, " as the grim jest ofthe masses went, circled the necks of scores of revolutionists swingingfrom as many gallows. There were many resorts to terrorism on the part ofthe revolutionists during the summer of 1906, many officials paying for theinfamies of the government with their lives. How many of these "executions"were genuine revolutionary protests, and how many simple murders instigatedor committed by provocative agents for the purpose of discrediting therevolutionists and affording the government excuses for fresh infamies, will perhaps never be known. Certainly, in many cases, there was noauthorization by any revolutionary body. 

In February, 1907, the elections for the Second Duma were held under areign of terror. The bureaucracy was determined to have a "safe and sane"body this time, and resorted to every possible nefarious device to attainthat end. Whole masses of electors whose right to vote had been establishedat the previous election were arbitrarily disfranchised. While everyfacility was given to candidates openly favoring the government, includingthe Octobrists, every possible obstacle was placed in the way of radicalcandidates, especially Socialists. The meetings of the latter were, inhundreds of cases, prohibited; in other hundreds of cases they were brokenup by the Black Hundreds and the police. Many of the most popularcandidates were arrested and imprisoned without trial, as were members oftheir campaign committees. Yet, notwithstanding all these things, theSecond Duma was, from the standpoint of the government, worse than thefirst. The Socialists, adopting the tactics of Plechanov, against theadvice of Lenine, his former pupil and disciple, had decided not to boycottthe elections this time, but to participate in them. When the returns werepublished it was found that the Social Democrats and theSocialist-Revolutionists had each elected over sixty deputies, the totalbeing nearly a third of the membership--455. In addition there were someninety members in the peasants' Labor Group, which were semi-Socialist. There were 117 Constitutional Democrats. The government supporters, including the Octobrists, numbered less than one hundred. 

From the first the attitude of the government toward the new Duma was oneof contemptuous arrogance. "The Czar's Hangman, " Stolypin, lectured themembers as though they were naughty children, forbidding them to inviteexperts to aid them in framing measures, or to communicate with any of thezemstvos or municipal councils upon any questions whatsoever. "The Duma wasnot granted the right to express disapproval, reproach, or mistrust of thegovernment, " he thundered. To the Duma there was left about as much realpower as is enjoyed by the "governments" of our "juvenile republics. "

As a natural consequence of these things, the Second Duma paid lessattention to legislation than the First Duma had done, and gave its timelargely to interpellations and protests. Partly because of the absence ofsome of the most able leaders they had had in the First Duma, and partly tothe aggressive radicalism of the Socialists, which they could onlyhalf-heartedly approve at best, the Constitutional Democrats were lessinfluential than in the former parliament. They occupied a middleground--always a difficult position. The real fight was between theSocialists and the reactionaries, supporters of the government. Among thelatter were perhaps a score of members belonging to the Black Hundreds, constituting the extreme right wing of the reactionary group. Between theseand the Socialists of the extreme left the assembly was kept at feverpitch. The Black Hundreds, for the most part, indulged in violent tiradesof abuse, often in the most disgusting profanity. The Socialists repliedwith proletarian passion and vigor, and riotous scenes were common. TheSecond Duma was hardly a deliberative assembly!

On June 1st Stolypin threw a bombshell into the Duma by accusing the SocialDemocrats of having conspired to form a military plot for the overthrow ofthe government of Nicholas II. Evidence to this effect had been furnishedto the Police Department by the spy and provocative agent, Azev. Of coursethere was no secret about the fact that the Social Democrats were alwaystrying to bring about revolt in the army and the navy. They had openlyproclaimed this, time and again. In the appeal issued at the time of thedissolution of the First Duma they had called upon the army and navy torise in armed revolt. But the betrayal of their plans was a matter of someconsequence. Azev himself had been loudest and most persistent in urgingthe work on. Stolypin demanded that all the Social Democrats be excludedpermanently from the Duma and that sixteen of them be handed over to thegovernment for imprisonment. The demand was a challenge to the whole Duma, since it called into question the right of the Duma to determine its ownmembership. Obviously, if members of parliament are to be dismissedwhenever an autocratic government orders it, there is an end ofparliamentary government. The demand created a tremendous sensation andgave rise to a long and exciting debate. Before it was ended, however, Nicholas II ordered the Duma dissolved. On June 3d the Second Duma met thefate of its predecessor, having lasted one hundred days. 

IV

As on the former occasion, arrangements were at once begun to bring aboutthe election of another and more subservient Duma. It is significant thatthroughout Nicholas II and his Cabinet recognized the imperative necessityof maintaining the institution in form. They dared not abolish it, greatlyas they would have liked to do so. On the day that the Duma was dissolvedthe Czar, asserting his divine right to enact and repeal laws at will, disregarding again the solemn assurances of the October Manifesto, by edictchanged the electoral laws, consulting neither the Duma nor the ImperialCouncil. This new law greatly decreased the representation of the cityworkers and the peasants in the Duma and correspondingly increased therepresentation of the rich landowners and capitalists. A docile and "loyal"Duma was thus made certain, and no one was very much surprised when theelections, held in September, resulted in an immense reactionary majority. When the Third Duma met on December 14, 1907, the reactionaries were asstrong as the Socialist and Labor groups had been in the previous Duma, and of the reactionaries the group of members of the Black Hundreds was amajority. 

In the mean time there had been the familiar rule of brutal reaction. Mostof the Social Democratic members of the Second Duma were arrested andcondemned for high treason, being sent to prison and to Siberia. New lawsand regulations restricting the press were proclaimed and enforced withincreasing severity. By comparison with the next two years, the period from1905 to 1907 was a period of freedom. After the election of the Third Dumathe bureaucracy grew ever bolder. Books and leaflets which had beencirculated openly and with perfect freedom during 1905 and 1906 wereforbidden, and, moreover, their authors were arrested and sentenced to longterms of imprisonment. While the law still granted freedom of assemblageand the right to organize meetings, these rights did not exist asrealities. Everywhere the Black Hundreds held sway, patronized by the Czar, who wore their emblem and refused to permit the punishment of any of theirmembers, even though they might be found guilty by the courts. 

It is not necessary to dwell upon the work of the Third Duma. This is not ahistory of Russia, and a detailed study of the servile parliament ofNicholas II and Stolypin would take us too far afield from our specialstudy--the revolutionary movement. Suffice it, therefore, to say that somevery useful legislation, necessary to the economic development of Russia, was enacted, and that, despite the overwhelming preponderance ofreactionaries, it was not an absolutely docile body. On several occasionsthe Third Duma exercised the right of criticism quite vigorously, and ontwo or three occasions acted in more or less open defiance of the wishes ofthe government. A notable instance of this was the legislation of 1909, considerably extending freedom of religious organization and worship, whichwas, however, greatly curtailed later by the Imperial Council--and thennullified by the government. 

The period 1906-14 was full of despair for sensitive and aspiring souls. The steady and rapid rise in the suicide-rate bore grim and eloquenttestimony to the character of those years of dark repression. The number ofsuicides in St. Petersburg increased during the period 1905-08 more than400 per cent. ; in Moscow about 800 per cent. ! In the latter city two-fifthsof the suicides in 1908 were of persons less than twenty years old! Andyet, withal, there was room for hope, the soul of progress was not dead. Invarious directions there was a hopeful and promising growth. First amongthese hopeful and promising facts was the marvelous growth of theConsumers' Co-operatives. After 1905 began the astonishing increase in thenumber of these important organizations, which continued, year after year, right up to the Revolution of 1917. In 1905 there were 4, 479 suchco-operatives in Russia; in 1911 there were 19, 253. Another hopeful signwas the steadily increasing literacy of the masses. Statistics upon thispoint are almost worthless. Russian official statistics are notoriouslydefective and the figures relating to literacy are peculiarly so, but theleaders of Russian Socialism have attested to the fact. In this connectionit is worthy of note that, according to the most authentic officialrecords, the number of persons subscribing to the public press grew in asingle year, from 1908 to 1909, fully 25 per cent. Education andorganization were going on, hand in hand. 

Nor was agitation dead. In the Duma the Socialist and Labor parties andgroups, knowing that they had no chance to enact their program, made theDuma a rostrum from which to address the masses throughout the nation. Sometimes, indeed, the newspapers were forbidden to print their speeches, but as a rule they were published, at least by the liberal papers, and sodisseminated among the masses. In these speeches the Social Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Laborites, and more daring of the ConstitutionalDemocrats mercilessly exposed the bureaucracy, so keeping the fires ofdiscontent alive. 

V

Of vast significance to mankind was the controversy that was being wagedwithin the Socialist movement of Russia during these years, for this wasthe period in which Bolshevism was shaping itself and becoming articulate. The words "Bolsheviki" and "Bolshevism" first made their appearance in1903, but it was not until 1905 that they began to acquire their presentmeaning. At the second convention of the Social Democratic party, held in1903, the party split in two factions. The majority faction, headed byLenine, adopted the name Bolsheviki, a word derived from the Russian word"bolshinstvo, " meaning "majority. " The minority faction, which followedPlechanov, though he did not formally join it, was called, incontradistinction, the "Mensheviki"--that is, the minority. No question ofprinciple was involved in the split, the question at issue being simplywhether there should be more or less centralization in the organization. There was no thought on either side of leaving the Social Democratic party. It was simply a factional division in the party itself and did not preventloyal co-operation. Both the Bolsheviki and the Mensheviki remained SocialDemocrats--that is, Socialists of the school of Marx. 

During the revolutionary struggle of 1905-06 the breach between the twofactions was greatly widened. The two groups held utterly irreconcilableconceptions of Socialist policy, if not of Socialism as an ideal. Thepsychology of the two groups was radically different. By this time theLenine faction was no longer the majority, being, in fact, a rather smallminority in the party. The Plechanov faction was greatly in the majority. But the old names continued to be used. Although a minority, the Leninefaction was still called the Bolsheviki, and the Plechanov faction calledthe Mensheviki, despite the fact that it was the majority. Thus Bolshevismno longer connoted the principles and tactics of the majority. It came tobe used interchangeably with Leninism, as a synonym. The followers ofVladimir Ulyanov continued to regard themselves as part of the SocialDemocratic party, its radical left wing, and it was not until after theSecond Revolution, in 1917, that they manifested any desire to bedifferentiated from the Social Democrats. 

Vladimir Ulyanov was born in 1870, at Simbirsk, in central Russia. There isno mystery about his use of the alias, Nikolai Lenine, which he has madeworld-famous and by which he chooses to be known. Almost every Russianrevolutionist has had to adopt various aliases for self-protection and forthe protection of other Russian Socialists. Ulyanov has followed the ruleand lived and worked under several aliases, and his writings under the name"Nikolai Lenine" made him a great power in the Russian Socialist movement. 

Lenine's father was a governmental official employed in the Department ofPublic Instruction. It is one of the many anomalies of the life of theRussian Dictator that he himself belongs by birth, training, culture, andexperience to the bourgeoisie against which he fulminates so furiously. Even his habits and tastes are of bourgeois and not proletarian origin. Heis an Intellectual of the Intellectuals and has never had the slightestproletarian experience. As a youth still in his teens he entered theUniversity of St. Petersburg, but his stay there was exceedingly brief, owing to a tragedy which greatly embittered his life and gave it itsdirection. An older brother, who was also a student in the university, wascondemned to death, in a secret trial, for complicity in a terrorist plotto assassinate Alexander III. Shortly afterward he was put to death. Leninehimself was arrested at the same time as his brother, but released for lackof evidence connecting him with the affair. It is said, however, that thearrest caused his expulsion from the university. Lenine was not the onlyyoung man to be profoundly impressed by the execution of the youthfulAlexander Ulyanov; another student, destined to play an important rôle inthe great tragedy of revolutionary Russia, was stirred to bitter hatred ofthe system. That young student was Alexander Kerensky, whose father and thefather of the Ulyanovs were close friends. 

Lenine's activities brought him into conflict with the authorities severaltimes and forced him to spend a good deal of time in exile. As a youth ofseventeen, at the time of the execution of his brother, he was dismissedfrom the Law School in St. Petersburg. A few years later he was sent toSiberia for a political "crime. " Upon various occasions later he wascompelled to flee from the country, living sometimes in Paris, sometimes inLondon, but more often in Switzerland. It was through his writings mainlythat he acquired the influence he had in the Russian movement. There isnothing unusual or remarkable about this, for the Social Democratic partyof Russia was practically directed from Geneva. Lenine was in London whenthe Revolution of 1905 broke out and caused him to hurry to St. Petersburg. 

As a young man Lenine, like most of the Intelligentsia of the period, gaveup a good deal of his spare time to teaching small groups of uneducatedworking-men the somewhat abstract and intricate theories and doctrines ofSocialism. To that excellent practice, no doubt, much of Lenine's skill asa lucid expositor and successful propagandist is due. He has written anumber of important works, most of them being of a polemical nature anddealing with party disputations upon questions of theory and tactics. Thework by which he was best known in Socialist circles prior to hissensational rise to the Premiership is a treatise on _The Development ofCapitalism in Russia_. This work made its appearance in 1899, when theMarxian Socialist movement was still very weak. In it Lenine defended theposition of the Marxians, Plechanov and his group, that Russia was not anexception to the general law of capitalist development, as was claimed bythe leaders of the People's party, the _Narodniki_. The book gave Lenine anassured position among the intellectual leaders of the movement, and wasregarded as a conclusive defense of the position of the Plechanov group, towhich Lenine belonged. Since his overthrow of the Kerensky régime, and hisattempt to establish a new kind of social state in Russia, Lenine has beenfrequently confronted by his own earlier reasoning by those who believe hisposition to be contrary to the true Marxian position. 

From 1903 to 1906 Lenine's views developed farther and farther away fromthose of his great teacher, George Plechanov. His position in the period ofthe First Duma can best be stated, perhaps, in opposition to the positionof Plechanov and the Mensheviki. Accepting the Marxian theory of historicaldevelopment, Plechanov and his followers believed that Russia must passthrough a phase of capitalist development before there could be asocial--as distinguished from a merely political--revolution. Certainlythey believed, an intensive development of industry, bringing intoexistence a strong capitalist class, on the one hand, and a strongproletariat, on the other hand, must precede any attempt to create a SocialDemocratic state. They believed, furthermore, that a political revolution, creating a democratic constitutional system of government, must come beforethe social revolution could be achieved. They accepted the traditionalMarxian view that the achievement of this political revolution must bemainly the task of the bourgeoisie, and that the proletariat, andespecially the Socialists, should co-operate with the enlightenedbourgeoisie in attaining that political revolution without which therecould never be a Socialist commonwealth. 

Plechanov was not blind to the dangers of compromise which must be faced inbasing the policy of a movement of the masses upon this reasoning. Heargued, however, that there was no choice in the matter at all; that theiron law of historical inevitability and necessity determined the matter. He pointed out that the bourgeoisie, represented by the ConstitutionalDemocrats in the political struggle, were compelled to wage relentless warupon Absolutism, the abolition of which was as absolutely essential to therealization of their class aims as it was to the realization of the classaims of the proletariat. Hence, in this struggle, the capitalist class, asyet too weak to accomplish the overthrow of autocracy and Czarism, and theproletariat, equally dependent for success upon the overthrow of autocracyand Czarism, and equally too weak to accomplish it unaided, had to face thefact that historical development had given the two classes which weredestined to wage a long conflict an immediate unity of interest. Theirimperative needs at the moment were not conflicting needs, but identicalones. To divide their forces, to refuse to co-operate with each other, wasto play the game of the Czar and his associates, argued Plechanov. 

The Mensheviki favored participation in the Duma elections and co-operationwith the liberal and radical bourgeoisie parties, in so far as might benecessary to overthrow the autocracy, and without sacrificing Socialistprinciples. They pointed out that this position was evidently feared by thebureaucracy far more than the position of the extremists among the SocialDemocrats and the Socialist-Revolutionists, who refused to consider suchco-operation, and pointed to the fact that provocateurs in large numbersassociated themselves with the latter in their organizations and preachedthe same doctrine of absolute isolation and exclusiveness. 

It will be seen that the position of the Mensheviki was one of practicalpolitical opportunism, an opportunism, however, that must be sharplydistinguished from what Wilhelm Liebknecht used to call "politicalcow-trading. " No man in the whole history of international Socialism evermore thoroughly despised this species of political opportunism than GeorgePlechanov. To those who are familiar with the literature of internationalSocialism it will be unnecessary to say that Plechanov was not the man todeprecate the importance of sound theory as a guide to the formulation ofparty policies. For many years he was rightly regarded as one of thegreatest theoreticians of the movement. Certainly there was only one otherwriter in the whole international movement who could be named as having anequal title to be considered the greatest Socialist theorist sinceMarx--Karl Kautsky. 

But Plechanov[1]--like Marx himself--set reality above dogma, and regardedmovement as of infinitely greater importance than theory. The Menshevikiwanted to convene a great mass convention of representatives of theindustrial proletariat during the summer of 1906. "It is a class movement, "they said, "not a little sectarian movement. How can there be a _class_movement unless the way is open to all the working class to participate?"Accordingly, they wanted a convention to which all the factory-workerswould be invited to send representatives. There should be no doctrinaltests, the sole qualification being membership in the working class. It didnot matter to the advocates of this policy whether a man belonged to theSocial Democratic party or to any party; whether he called himself arevolutionist or anything else. It was, they said, a movement of theworking class, not the movement of a sect within the working class. 

They knew, of course, that in such a great mass movement there wouldprobably be some theoretical confusion, more or less muddled thinking. Theyrecognized, too, that in the great mass convention they proposed someSocial Democratic formulations might be rejected and some others adoptedwhich did not accord with the Marxian doctrines. But, quoting Marx to theeffect that "One step of real movement is worth a thousand programs, " theycontended that if there was anything at all in the Marxian theory ofprogress through class struggles, and the historic rule of the workingclass, it must follow that, while they might make mistakes and gotemporarily astray, the workers could not go far wrong, their classinterests being a surer guide than any amount of intellectualism couldproduce. 

Lenine and his friends, the Bolsheviki, bitterly opposed all this reasoningand took a diametrically opposite position upon every one of the questionsinvolved. They absolutely opposed any sort of co-operation with bourgeoisparties of any kind, for any purpose whatever. No matter how progressive aparticular bourgeois party might be, nor how important the reform aimed at, they believed that Social Democrats should remain in "splendid isolation, "refusing to make any distinction between more liberal and less liberal, progressive and reactionary, groups in the bourgeoisie. Trotzky, who didnot at first formally join the Bolsheviki, but was a true Bolshevik in hisintellectual convictions and sympathies, fully shared this view. 

Now, Lenine and Trotzky were dogmatic Marxists, and as such they could notdeny the contention that capitalism must attain a certain developmentbefore Socialism could be attained in Russia. Nor could they deny thatAbsolutism was an obstacle to the development both of capitalist industryand of Socialism. They contended, however, that the peculiar conditions inRussia, resulting from the retardation of her economic development for solong, made it both possible and necessary to create a revolutionarymovement which would, at one and the same time, overthrow both autocracyand capitalism. Necessarily, therefore, their warfare must be directedequally against autocracy and all political parties of the landlord andcapitalist classes. They were guided throughout by this fundamentalconviction. The policy of absolute and unqualified isolation in the Duma, which they insisted the Social Democrats ought to pursue, was based uponthat conviction. 

VI

All this is quite clear and easily intelligible. Granted the premise, thelogic is admirable. It is not so easy, however, to see why, even grantingthe soundness of their opposition to _co-operation_ with bourgeois partiesand groups in the Duma, there should be no political _competition_ withthem--which would seem to be logically implied in the boycott of the Dumaelections. Non-participation in the elections, consistently pursued as aproletarian policy, would leave the proletariat unrepresented in thelegislative body, without one representative to fight its battles on whatthe world universally regards as one of the most important battle-fields ofcivilization. And yet, here, too, they were entirely logical andconsistent--they did not believe in parliamentary government. As yet, theywere not disposed to emphasize this overmuch, not, apparently, because ofany lack of candor and good faith, but rather because the substitute forparliamentary government had not sufficiently shaped itself in their minds. The desire not to be confused with the Anarchists was another reason. Because the Bolsheviki and the Anarchists both oppose parliamentarygovernment and the political state, it has been concluded by many writerson the subject that Bolshevism is simply Anarchism in another guise. Thisis a mistake. Bolshevism is quite different from and opposed to Anarchism. It requires strongly centralized government, which Anarchism abhors. 

Parliamentary government cannot exist except upon the basis of the will ofthe majority. Whoever enters into the parliamentary struggle, therefore, must hope and aim to convert the majority. Back of that hope and aim mustbe faith in the intellectual and moral capacity of the majority. At thefoundation of Bolshevist theory and practice lies the important fact thatthere is no such faith, and, consequently, neither the hope nor the aim toconvert the majority and with its strength make the Revolution. Out of theadult population of Russia at that time approximately 85 per cent. Werepeasants and less than 5 per cent. Belonged to the industrial proletariat. At that time something like 70 per cent. Of the people were illiterate. Even in St. Petersburg--where the standard of literacy was higher than inany other city--not more than 55 per cent. Of the people could sign theirown names in 1905, according to the most authentic government reports. Whenwe contemplate such facts as these can we wonder that impatientrevolutionaries should shrink from attempting the task of converting amajority of the population to an intelligent acceptance of Socialism?

There was another reason besides this, however. Lenine--and he personifiesBolshevism--was, and is, a doctrinaire Marxist of the most dogmatic typeconceivable. As such he believed that the new social order must be thecreation of that class which is the peculiar product of modern capitalism, the industrial proletariat. To that class alone he and his followers pinnedall their faith and hope, and that class was a small minority of thepopulation and bound to remain a minority for a very long period of years. Here, then, we have the key. It cannot be too strongly stressed that theBolsheviki did not base their hope upon the working class of Russia, anddid not trust it. The working class of Russia--if we are to use the termwith an intelligent regard to realities--was and is mainly composed ofpeasants; the industrial proletariat was and is only a relatively smallpart of the great working class of the nation. _But it is upon that smallsection, as against the rest of the working class, that Bolshevism relies_. 

Lenine has always refused to include the peasants in his definition of theworking class. With almost fanatical intensity he has insisted that thepeasant, together with the petty manufacturer and trader, would soondisappear; that industrial concentration would have its counterpart in agreat concentration of landownings and agriculture; that the small peasantholdings would be swallowed up by large, modern agricultural estates, withthe result that there would be an immense mass of landless agriculturalwage-workers. This class would, of course, be a genuinely proletarianclass, and its interests would be identical with those of the industrialproletariat. Until that time came it would be dangerous to rely upon thepeasants, he urged, because their instincts are bourgeois rather thanproletarian. Naturally, he has looked askance at the peasant Socialistmovements, denying that they were truly Socialist at all. They could not beSocialist movements in the true sense, he contended, because they lackedthe essential quality of true Socialists, namely, proletarian classconsciousness. 

Naturally, too, Lenine and his followers have always regarded movementswhich aimed to divide the land among the peasants, and so tend to givepermanence to a class of petty agriculturists, as essentially reactionary. The exigencies of the struggle have forced them into some compromises, ofcourse. For example, at first they were not willing to admit that thepeasants could be admitted into their group at all, but later on theyadmitted some who belonged to the poorest class of peasants. Throughout, however, they have insisted that the peasant class as a whole was a classof petty bourgeoisie and that its instincts and interests would inevitablylead it to side with the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat. Of course, this is a very familiar phase of Socialist evolution in every country. Itlasted in Germany many years. In Russia, however, the question assumed animportance it never had in any other country, owing to the vastpreponderance of peasants in the population. Anything more un-Russian thanthis theorizing cannot be well conceived. It runs counter to every fact inRussian experience, to the very basis of her economic life at this stage ofher history. Lenine is a Russian, but his dogmas are not Russian, butGerman. Bolshevism is the product of perverted German scholasticism. 

Even the industrial workers as a whole, in their present stage ofdevelopment, were not to be trusted, according to the Bolshevist leaders. They frankly opposed the Mensheviki when the latter proposed to hold theirgreat convention of industrial workers, giving as their reason the fearthat the convention majority would not consist of class-consciousrevolutionary Marxian Socialists. In other words, they feared that themajority would not be on their side, and they had not the time or thepatience to convert them. There was no pretense of faith in the majority ofthe industrial proletariat, much less of faith in the entire working classof Russia. The industrial proletariat was a minority of the working class, and the Bolsheviki pinned their faith to a minority of that minority. Theywanted to establish, not democracy, but dictatorship of Russia by a small, disciplined, intelligent, and determined minority of working-men. 

The lines of cleavage between the Mensheviki and the Bolsheviki were thusclearly drawn. The former, while ready to join in mass uprisings and armedinsurrections by the masses, believed that the supreme necessity waseducation and organization of all the working-people. Still relying uponthe industrial proletariat to lead the struggle, they neverthelessrecognized that the peasants were indispensable. The Bolsheviki, on theother hand, relied exclusively upon armed insurrection, initiated anddirected by desperate minorities. The Mensheviki contended that the timefor secret, conspiratory action was past; that Russia had outgrown thatearlier method. As far as possible, they carried the struggle openly intothe political field. They organized unions, educational societies, andco-operatives, confident that through these agencies the workers woulddevelop cohesion and strength, which, at the right time, they would use astheir class interests dictated. The Bolsheviki, on the other hand, clung tothe old conspiratory methods, always mastered by the idea that a sudden_coup_ must some day place the reins of power in the hands of arevolutionary minority of the workers and enable them to set up adictatorship. That dictatorship, it must be understood, was not to bepermanent; democracy, possibly even political democracy, would come later. 

As we have already noted, into the ranks of the terroristSocialist-Revolutionaries and the Bolsheviki spies and provocative agentswormed their way in large numbers. It is the inevitable fate of secret, conspiratory movements that this should be so, and also that it shouldresult in saturating the minds of all engaged in the movements withdistrust and suspicion. More than once the charge of being a provocateurwas leveled at Lenine and at Trotzky, but without justification, apparently. There was, indeed, one incident which placed Lenine in a badlight. It belongs to a somewhat later period than we have been discussing, but it serves admirably to illustrate conditions which obtained throughoutthe whole dark period between the two great revolutions. One of Lenine'sclose friends and disciples was Roman Malinovsky, a fiery speaker ofconsiderable power, distinguished for his bitter attacks upon the bourgeoisprogressive parties and upon the Mensheviki. The tenor of his speeches wasalways the same--only the interest of the proletariat should be considered;all bourgeois political parties and groups were equally reactionary, andany co-operation with them, for any purpose, was a betrayal of Socialistprinciple. 

Malinovsky was trusted by the Bolsheviki. He was elected to the FourthDuma, where he became the leader of the little group of thirteen SocialDemocrats. Like other members of the Bolshevik faction, he entered theDuma, despite his contempt for parliamentary action, simply because itafforded him a useful opportunity for agitation and demonstrations. In theDuma he assailed even a portion of the Social Democratic group as belongingto the bourgeoisie, succeeding in splitting it in two factions and becomingthe leader of the Bolshevik faction, numbering six. This blatant demagogue, whom Lenine called "the Russian Bebel, " was proposed for membership in theInternational Socialist Bureau, the supreme council of the InternationalSocialist movement, and would have been sent as a delegate to that body asa representative of Russian Socialist movement but for the discovery of thefact that he was a secret agent of the Czar's government!

It was proved that Malinovsky was a provocateur in the pay of the PoliceDepartment, and that many, if not all, of his speeches had been preparedfor him in the Police Department by a former director named Beletzky. Theexposure made a great sensation in Russian Socialist circles at the time, and the fact that it was Nikolai Lenine who had proposed that Malinovsky bechosen to sit in the International Socialist Bureau naturally caused agreat deal of unfriendly comment. It cannot be denied that the incidentplaced Lenine in an unfavorable light, but it must be admitted thatnothing developed to suggest that he was guilty of anything more seriousthan permitting himself to be outwitted and deceived by a cunningtrickster. The incident serves to show, however, the ease with which theextreme fanaticism of the Bolsheviki played into the hands of theautocracy. 

VII

While Bolsheviki and Mensheviki wrangled and disputed, great forces were atwork among the Russian people. By 1910 the terrible pall of depression anddespair which had settled upon the nation as a result of the failure of theFirst Revolution began to break. There was a new generation of collegestudents, youthful and optimistic spirits who were undeterred by thefailure of 1905-06, confident that they were wiser and certain to succeed. Also there had been an enormous growth of working-class organizations, large numbers of unions and co-operative societies having been formed inspite of the efforts of the government. The soul of Russia was once morestirring. 

The end of 1910 and the beginning of 1911 witnessed a new series ofstrikes, such as had not occurred since 1905. The first were students'strikes, inaugurated in support of their demand for the abolition ofcapital punishment. These were quickly followed by important strikes in theindustrial centers for economic ends--better wages and shorterworking-hours. As in the period immediately preceding the First Revolution, the industrial unrest soon manifested itself in political ways. Without anyconscious leadership at all this would have been inevitable in the existingcircumstances. But there was leadership. Social Democrats of both factions, and Socialists of other groups as well, moved among the workers, preachingthe old, yet ever new, gospel of revolt. Political strikes followed thestrikes for immediate economic ends. Throughout the latter part of 1911 andthe whole of 1912 the revolutionary movement once more spread among themasses. 

The year 1913 was hardly well begun when revolutionary activities assumedformidable proportions. January 9th--Russian calendar--anniversary ofBloody Sunday, was celebrated all over the country by great demonstrationswhich were really demonstration-strikes. In St. Petersburg fifty-fivethousand workers went out--and there were literally hundreds of othersmaller "strikes" of a similar nature throughout the country. In Aprilanother anniversary of the martyrdom of revolting working-men was similarlycelebrated in most of the industrial centers, hundreds of thousands ofworkers striking as a manifestation against the government. The 1st of Maywas celebrated as it had not been celebrated since 1905. In the variousindustrial cities hundreds of thousands of workmen left their work to marchthrough the streets and hold mass meetings, and so formidable was themovement that the government was cowed and dared not attempt to suppress itby force. There was a defiant note of revolution in this great uprising ofthe workers. They demanded an eight-hour day and the right to organizeunions and make collective bargains. In addition to these demands, theyprotested against the Balkan War and against militarism in general. 

Had the great war not intervened, a tragic interlude in Russia's longhistory of struggle, the year 1914 would have seen the greatest strugglefor the overthrow of Czarism in all that history. Whether it would havebeen more successful than the effort of 1905 can never be known, but it iscertain that the working-class revolutionary movement was far strongerthan it was nine years before. On the other hand, there would not have beenthe same degree of support from the other classes, for in the interveningperiod class lines had been more sharply drawn and the class conflictgreatly intensified. Surging through the masses like a mighty tide was thespirit of revolt, manifesting itself much as it had done nine years before. All through the early months of the year the revolutionary temper grew. Theworkers became openly defiant and the government, held in check, doubtless, by the delicate balance of the international situation, dared not resort toforce with sufficient vigor to stamp out the agitation. Mass meetings wereheld in spite of all regulations to the contrary; political strikesoccurred in all parts of the country. In St. Petersburg and Moscowbarricades were thrown up in the streets as late as July. Then the warclouds burst. A greater passion than that of revolution swept over thenation and it turned to present a united front to the external foe. 

CHAPTER III

THE WAR AND THE PEOPLE

I

The war against Austria and Germany was not unpopular. Certainly there wasnever an occasion when a declaration of war by their rulers roused solittle resentment among the Russian people. Wars are practically neverpopular with the great mass of the people in any country, and this isespecially true of autocratically governed countries. The heavy burdenswhich all great wars impose upon the laboring class, as well as upon thepetty bourgeoisie, cause even the most righteous wars to be regarded withdread and sorrow. The memory of the war with Japan was too fresh and toobitter to make it possible for the mass of the Russian people to welcomethe thought of another war. It cannot, therefore, in truth be said that thewar with the Central Empires was popular. But it can be said with sincerityand the fullest sanction that the war was not unpopular; that it wasaccepted by the greater part of the people as a just and, moreover, anecessary war. Opposition to the war was not greater in Russia than inEngland or France, or, later, in America. Of course, there were religiouspacifists and Socialists who opposed the war and denounced it, as theywould have denounced any other war, on general principles, no matter whatthe issues involved might be, but their number and their influence weresmall and quite unimportant. 

The one great outstanding fact was the manner in which the sense of perilto the fatherland rallied to its defense the different races, creeds, classes, and parties, the great tidal wave of genuine and sincerepatriotism sweeping everything before it, even the mighty, passionaterevolutionary agitation. It can hardly be questioned or doubted that if thewar had been bitterly resented by the masses it would have precipitatedrevolution instead of retarding it. From this point of view the war was adeplorable disaster. That no serious attempt was made to bring about arevolution at that time is the best possible evidence that the declarationof war did not enrage the people. If not a popular and welcome event, therefore, the declaration of war by the Czar was not an unpopular one. Never before since his accession to the throne had Nicholas II had thesupport of the nation to anything like the same extent. 

Take the Jews, for example. Bitterly hated and persecuted as they had been, despised and humiliated beyond description; victims of the knout and thepogrom; tortured by Cossacks and Black Hundreds; robbed by officialextortions; their women shamed and ravaged and their babies doomed to rotand die in the noisome Pale--the Jews owed no loyalty to the Czar or evento the nation. Had they sought revenge in the hour of Russia's crisis, inhowsoever grim a manner, it would have been easy to understand their actionand hard indeed to regard it with condemnation. It is almost unthinkablethat the Czar could have thought of the Jews in his vast Empire in thosedays without grave apprehension and fear. 

Yet, as all the world knows, the Jews resolutely overcame whateversuggestion of revenge came to them and, with marvelous solidarity, responded to Russia's call without hesitation and without politicalintrigue or bargaining. As a whole, they were as loyal as any of theCzar's subjects. How shall we explain this phenomenon?

The explanation is that the leaders of the Jewish people, and practicallythe whole body of Jewish Intellectuals, recognized from the first that thewar was more than a war of conflicting dynasties; that it was a war ofconflicting ideals. They recognized that the Entente, as a whole, notwithstanding that it included the autocracy of Russia, represented thegenerous, democratic ideals and principles vital to every Jew in that theymust be securely established before the emancipation of the Jew could berealized. Their hatred of Czarism was not engulfed by any maudlinsentiment; they knew that they had no "fatherland" to defend. They were notswept on a tide of jingoism to forget their tragic history and proclaimtheir loyalty to the infamous oppressor. No. Their loyalty was to theEntente, not to the Czar. They were guided by enlightened self-interest, byan intelligent understanding of the meaning to them of the great struggleagainst Teutonic militarist-imperialism. 

Every intelligent and educated Jew in Russia knew that the real source ofthe brutal anti-Semitism which characterized the rule of the Romanovs wasPrussian and not Russian. He knew that it had long been one of the mainfeatures of Germany's foreign policy to instigate and stimulate hatred andfear of the Jews by Russian officialdom. There could not be a more tragicmistake than to infer from the ruthless oppression of the Jews in Russiathat anti-Semitism is characteristically Russian. Surely, the fact that theFirst Duma was practically unanimous in deciding to give equal rights tothe Jews with all the rest of the population proves that the Russian peopledid not hate the Jews. The ill-treatment of the Jews was part of the policyby which Germany, for her own ends, cunningly contrived to weaken Russiaand so prevent the development of her national solidarity. Racial animosityand conflict was an ideal instrument for attaining that result. Internalwar and abortive revolutionary outbreaks which kept the country unsettled, and the energies of the government taxed to the uttermost, served the sameend, and were, therefore, the object of Germany's intrigues in Russia, equally with hostility to the Jews, as we shall have occasion to note. 

German intrigue in Russia is an interesting study in economic determinism. Unless we comprehend it we shall strive in vain to understand Russia's partin the war and her rôle in the history of the past few decades. A briefstudy of the map of Europe by any person who possesses even an elementaryknowledge of the salient principles of economics will reveal Germany'sinterest in Russia and make quite plain why German statesmen have soassiduously aimed to keep Russia in a backward economic condition. As agreat industrial nation it was to Germany's interest to have Russia remainbackward industrially, predominantly an agricultural country, quite assurely as it was to her interest as a military power to have weakness andinefficiency, instead of strength and efficiency, in Russia's militaryorganization. As a highly developed industrial nation Russia would ofnecessity have been Germany's formidable rival--perhaps her most formidablerival--and by her geographical situation would have possessed an enormousadvantage in the exploitation of the vast markets in the far East. As afeudal agricultural country, on the other hand, Russia would be a greatmarket for German manufactured goods, and, at the same time, a mostconvenient supply-depot for raw materials and granary upon which Germanycould rely for raw materials, wheat, rye, and other staple grains--asupply-depot and granary, moreover, accessible by overland transportationnot subject to naval attack. 

For the Russian Jew the defeat of Germany was a vital necessity. Thevictory of Germany and her allies could only serve to strengthen Prussianinfluence in Russia and add to the misery and suffering of the Jewishpopulation. That other factors entered into the determination of theattitude of the Jews, such as, for example, faith in England as thetraditional friend of the Jew, and abhorrence at the cruel invasion ofBelgium, is quite true. But the great determinant was the well-understoodfact that Germany's rulers had long systematically manipulated Russianpolitics and the Russian bureaucracy to the serious injury of the Jewishrace. Germany's militarist-imperialism was the soul and inspiration of theoppression which cursed every Jew in Russia. 

II

The democratic elements in Russia were led to support the government byvery similar reasoning. The same economic and dynastic motives which hadled Germany to promote racial animosities and struggles in Russia led herto take every other possible means to uphold autocracy and prevent theestablishment of democracy. This had been long recognized by all liberalRussians, no matter to what political school or party they might belong. Itwas as much part of the common knowledge as the fact that St. Petersburgwas the national capital. It was part of the intellectual creed ofpractically every liberal Russian that there was a natural affinity betweenthe great autocracies of Germany and Russia, and that a revolution inRussia which seriously endangered the existence of monarchical absolutismwould be suppressed by Prussian guns and bayonets reinforcing those ofloyal Russian troops. It was generally believed by Russian Socialists thatin 1905 the Kaiser had promised to send troops into Russia to crush theRevolution if called upon for that aid. Many German Socialists, it may beadded, shared that belief. Autocracies have a natural tendency to combineforces against revolutionary movements. It would have been no more strangefor Wilhelm II to aid Nicholas II in quelling a revolution that menaced histhrone than it was for Alexander I to aid in putting down revolution inGermany; or than it was for Nicholas I to crush the Hungarian Revolution in1849, in the interest of Francis Joseph; or than it was for Bismarck torush to the aid of Alexander II in putting down the Polish insurrection in1863. 

The democrats of Russia knew, moreover, that, in addition to the naturalaffinity which served to bind the two autocracies, the Romanov andHohenzollern dynasties had been closely knit together in a strong union byyears and years of carefully planned and strongly wrought blood ties. AsIsaac Don Lenine reminds us in his admirable study of the RussianRevolution, Nicholas II was more than seven-eighths German, less thanone-eighth of his blood heritage being Romanov. Catherine the Great, wifeof Peter III, was a Prussian by birth and heritage and thoroughlyPrussianized her court. After her--from 1796 to 1917--six Czars reigned inRussia, five of whom married German wives. As was inevitable in suchcircumstances, the Russian court had long been notoriously subject toGerman influences and strongly pro-German in its sympathies--by no means asmall matter in an autocratic country. Fully aware of their advantage, theKaiser and his Ministers increased the German influence and power at theRussian court by encouraging German nobles to marry into Russian courtcircles. The closing decade of the reign of Nicholas II was marked by anextraordinary increase of Prussian influence in his court, an achievementin which the Kaiser was greatly assisted by the Czarina, who was, it willbe remembered, a German princess. 

Naturally, the German composition and character of the Czar's court wasreflected in the diplomatic service and in the most important departmentsof the Russian government, including the army. The Russian Secret Servicewas very largely in the hands of Germans and Russians who had marriedGerman wives. The same thing may be said of the Police Department. Many ofthe generals and other high officers in the Russian army were either ofGerman parentage or connected with Germany by marriage ties. In brief, thewhole Russian bureaucracy was honeycombed by German influence. 

Outside official circles, much the same condition existed among the greatlandowners. Those of the Baltic provinces were largely of Teutonic descent, of course. Many had married German wives. The result was that the nobilityof these provinces, long peculiarly influential in the political life ofRussia, was, to a very large degree, pro-German. In addition to these, there were numerous large landowners of German birth, while many, probablya big majority, of the superintendents of the large industrialestablishments and landed estates were German citizens. It is notoriousthat the principal factories upon which Russia had to rely for guns andmunitions were in charge of Germans, who had been introduced because oftheir high technical efficiency. 

In view of these facts, and a mass of similar facts which might be cited, it was natural for the democrats of Russia to identify Germany and Germanintrigue and influence with the hated bureaucracy. It was as natural as itwas for the German influence to be used against the democratic movement inRussia, as it invariably was. Practically the entire mass of democraticopinion in Russia, including, of course, all the Socialist factions, regarded these royal, aristocratic, and bureaucratic German influences as amenace to Russia, a cancer that must be cut out. With the exception of asection of the Socialists, whose position we shall presently examine, themass of liberal-thinking, progressive, democratic Russians saw in the war awelcome breaking of the German yoke. Believing that the victory of Germanywould restore the yoke, and that her defeat by Russia would eliminate thepower which had sustained Czarism, they welcomed the war and rallied withenthusiasm at the call to arms. They were loyal, but to Russia, not to theCzar. They felt that in warring against Prussian militarist-imperialismthey were undermining Russian Absolutism. 

That the capitalists of Russia should want to see the power of Germany tohold Russia in chains completely destroyed is easy to understand. To allintents and purposes, from the purely economic point of view, Russia wasvirtually a German colony to be exploited for the benefit of Germany. Thecommercial treaties of 1905, which gave Germany such immense tradeadvantages, had become exceedingly unpopular. On the other hand, theimmense French loan of 1905, the greater part of which had been used todevelop the industrial life of Russia, had the effect of bringing Russiancapitalists into closer relations with French capitalists. For furthercapital Russia could only look to France and England with any confidenthope. Above all, the capitalists of Russia wanted freedom for economicdevelopment; they wanted stability and national unity, the very thingsGermany was preventing. They wanted efficient government and theelimination of the terrible corruption which infested the bureaucracy. Thelaw of economic evolution was inexorable and inescapable; the capitalistsystem could not grow within the narrow confines of Absolutism. 

For the Russian capitalist class, therefore, it was of the most vitalimportance that Germany's power should not be increased, as it would ofnecessity be if the Entente submitted to her threats and permitted Serbiato be crushed by Austria, and the furtherance of the Pan-German_Mitteleuropa_ designs. It was vitally necessary to Russian capitalism thatGermany's strangle-hold upon the inner life of Russia should be broken. Theissue was not the competition of capitalism, as that is commonlyunderstood; it was not the rivalry for markets like that which animates thecapitalist classes of all lands. The Russian capitalist class was animatedby no fear of German competition in the sense in which the nations of theworld have understood that term. They had their own vast home market todevelop. The industrialization of the country must transform a very largepart of the peasantry into factory artisans living in cities, having newneeds and relatively high wages, and, consequently, more money to spend. For many years to come their chief reliance must be the home market, constantly expanding as the relative importance of manufacturing increasedand forced improved methods of agriculture upon the nation in the process, as it was bound to do. 

It was Germany as a persistent meddler in Russian government and politicsthat the capitalists of Russia resented. It was the unfair advantage thatthis underhand political manipulation gave her in their own home field thatstirred up the leaders of the capitalist class of Russia. That, and theknowledge that German intrigue by promoting divisions in Russia was themainstay of the autocracy, solidified the capitalist class of Russia insupport of the war. There was a small section of this class that went muchfarther than this and entertained more ambitious hopes. They realized fullythat Turkey had already fallen under the domination of Germany to such adegree that in the event of a German victory in the war, or, what reallyamounted to the same thing, the submission of the Entente to her will, Germany would become the ruler of the Dardanelles and European Turkey be inreality, and perhaps in form, part of the German Empire. 

Such a development could not fail, they believed, to have the mostdisastrous consequences for Russia. Inevitably, it would add to Germanprestige and power in the Russian Empire, and weld together theHohenzollern, Habsburg, and Romanov autocracies in a solid, reactionarymass, which, under the efficient leadership of Germany, might easilydominate the entire world. Moreover, like many of the ablest Russians, including the foremost Marxian Socialist scholars, they believed that thenormal economic development of Russia required a free outlet to the warmwaters of the Mediterranean, which alone could give her free access to thegreat ocean highways. Therefore they hoped that one result of a victoriouswar by the Entente against the Central Empires, in which Russia would playan important part, would be the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia. Thus the old vision of the Czars had become the vision of an influentialand rising class with a solid basis of economic interest. 

III

As in every other country involved, the Socialist movement was sharplydivided by the war. Paradoxical as it seems, in spite of the great revivalof revolutionary hope and sentiment in the first half of the year, theSocialist parties and groups were not strong when the war broke out. Theywere, indeed, at a very low state. They had not yet recovered from thereaction. The manipulation of the electoral laws following the dissolutionof the Second Duma, and the systematic oppression and repression of allradical organizations by the administration, had greatly reduced theSocialist parties in membership and influence. The masses were, for a longtime, weary of struggle, despondent, and passive. The Socialist factionsmeanwhile were engaged in an apparently interminable controversy upontheoretical and tactical questions in which the masses of theworking-people, when they began to stir at last, took no interest, andwhich they could hardly be supposed to understand. The Socialist partiesand groups were subject to a very great disability in that their leaderswere practically all in exile. Had a revolution broken out, as it wouldhave done but for the war, Socialist leadership would have asserted itself. 

As in all other countries, the divisions of opinion created by the waramong the Socialists cut across all previous existing lines of separationand made it impossible to say that this or that faction adopted aparticular view. Just as in Germany, France, and England, some of the mostrevolutionary Socialists joined with the more moderate Socialists inupholding the war, while extremely moderate Socialists joined withSocialists of the opposite extreme in opposing it. It is possible, however, to set forth the principal features of the division with tolerableaccuracy:

A majority of the Socialist-Revolutionary party executive issued ananti-war Manifesto. There is no means of telling how far the viewsexpressed represented the attitude of the peasant Socialists as a whole, owing to the disorganized state of the party and the difficulties ofassembling the members. The Manifesto read:

 There is no doubt that Austrian imperialism is responsible for the war with Serbia. But is it not equally criminal on the part of Serbs to refuse autonomy to Macedonia and to oppress smaller and weaker nations?

 It is the protection of this state that our government considers its "sacred duty. " What hypocrisy! Imagine the intervention of the Czar on behalf of poor Serbia, whilst he martyrizes Poland, Finland and the Jews, and behaves like a brigand toward Persia. 

 Whatever may be the course of events, the Russian workers and peasants will continue their heroic fight to obtain for Russia a place among civilized nations. 

This Manifesto was issued, as reported in the Socialist press, prior to theactual declaration of war. It was a threat of revolution made with a viewto preventing the war, if possible, and belongs to the same category as thesimilar threats of revolution made by the German Socialists before the warto the same end. The mildness of manner which characterizes the Manifestomay be attributed to two causes--weakness of the movement and a resultinglack of assurance, together with a lack of conviction arising from the factthat many of the leaders, while they hated the Czar and all his works, andcould not reconcile themselves to the idea of making any kind of truce withtheir great enemy, nevertheless were pro-Ally and anxious for the defeat ofGerman imperialism. In other words, these leaders shared the nationalfeeling against Germany, and, had they been free citizens of ademocratically governed country, would have loyally supported the war. 

When the Duma met, on August 8th, for the purpose of voting the warcredits, the Social Democrats of both factions, Bolsheviki and Mensheviki, fourteen in number, [2] united upon a policy of abstention from voting. Valentin Khaustov, on behalf of the two factions, read this statement:

 A terrible and unprecedented calamity has broken upon the people of the entire world. Millions of workers have been torn away from their labor, ruined, and swept away by a bloody torrent. Millions of families have been delivered over to famine. 

 War has already begun. While the governments of Europe were preparing for it, the proletariat of the entire world, with the German workers at the head, unanimously protested. 

 The hearts of the Russian workers are with the European proletariat. This war is provoked by the policy of expansion for which the ruling classes of all countries are responsible. 

 The proletariat will defend the civilization of the world against this attack. 

 The conscious proletariat of the belligerent countries has not been sufficiently powerful to prevent this war and the resulting return of barbarism. 

 But we are convinced that the working class will find in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force the conclusion of peace at an early date. The terms of that peace will be dictated by the people themselves, and not by the diplomats. 

 We are convinced that this war will finally open the eyes of the great masses of Europe, and show them the real causes of all the violence and oppression that they endure, and that therefore this new explosion of barbarism will be the last. 

As soon as this declaration was read the fourteen members of the SocialDemocratic group left the chamber in silence. They were immediatelyfollowed by the Laborites and Socialist-Revolutionists representing thepeasant Socialists, so that none of the Socialists in the Duma voted forthe war credits. As we shall see later on, the Laborites and most of theSocialist-Revolutionists afterward supported the war. The declaration ofthe Social Democrats in the Duma was as weak and as lacking in definitenessof policy as the Manifesto of the Socialist-Revolutionists already quoted. We know now that it was a compromise. It was possible to get agreement upona statement of general principles which were commonplaces of Socialistpropaganda, and to vaguely expressed hopes that "the working class willfind in the international solidarity of the workers the means to force theconclusion of peace at an early date. " It was easy enough to do this, butit would have been impossible to unite upon a definite policy of resistanceand opposition to the war. It was easy to agree not to vote for the warcredits, since there was no danger that this would have any practicaleffect, the voting of the credits--largely a mere form--being quitecertain. It would have been impossible to get all to agree to vote_against_ the credits. 

Under the strong leadership of Alexander Kerensky the Labor party soon tooka decided stand in support of the war. In the name of the entire group ofthe party's representatives in the Duma, Kerensky read at an early sessiona statement which pledged the party to defend the fatherland. "We firmlybelieve, " said Kerensky, "that the great flower of Russian democracy, together with all the other forces, will throw back the aggressive enemyand _will defend their native land_. " The party had decided, he said, tosupport the war "in defense of the land of our birth and of ourcivilization created by the blood of our race.... We believe that throughthe agony of the battle-field the brotherhood of the Russian people will bestrengthened and a common desire created to free the land from its terribleinternal troubles. " Kerensky declared that the workers would take noresponsibility for the suicidal war into which the governments of Europehad plunged their peoples. He strongly criticized the government, butended, nevertheless, in calling upon the peasants and industrial workers tosupport the war:

"The Socialists of England, Belgium, France, and Germany have tried toprotest against rushing into war. We Russian Socialists were not able atthe last to raise our voices freely against the war. But, deeply convincedof the brotherhood of the workers of all lands, we send our brotherlygreetings to all who protested against the preparations for thisfratricidal conflict of peoples. Remember that Russian citizens have noenemies among the working classes of the belligerents! _Protect yourcountry to the end against aggression by the states whose governments arehostile to us, but remember that there would not have been this terriblewar had the great ideals of democracy, freedom, equality, and brotherhoodbeen directing the activities of those who control the destinies of Russiaand other lands!_ As it is, our authorities, even in this terrible moment, show no desire to forget internal strife, grant no amnesty to those whohave fought for freedom and the country's happiness, show no desire forreconciliation with the non-Russian peoples of the Empire. 

"And, instead of relieving the condition of the laboring classes of thepeople, the government puts on them especially the heaviest load of the warexpenses, by tightening the yoke of indirect taxes. 

"Peasants and workers, all who want the happiness and well-being of Russiain these great trials, harden your spirit! Gather all your strength and, having defended your land, free it; and to you, our brothers, who areshedding blood for the fatherland, a profound obeisance and fraternalgreetings. "

Kerensky's statement was of tremendous significance. Made on behalf of theentire group of which he was leader, it reflected the sober second thoughtof the representatives of the peasant Socialists and socialisticallyinclined radicals. Their solemnly measured protest against the reactionarypolicy of the government was as significant as the announcement that theywould support the war. It was a fact that at the very time when nationalunity was of the most vital importance the government was already goadingthe people into despairing revolt. 

That a section of the Bolsheviki began a secret agitation against the war, aiming at a revolt among the soldiers, regardless of the fact that it wouldmean Russia's defeat and Germany's triumph, is a certainty. The governmentsoon learned of this movement and promptly took steps to crush it. ManyRussian Socialists have charged that the policy of the Bolsheviki wasinspired by provocateurs in the employ of the police, and by them betrayed. Others believe that the policy was instigated by German provocateurs, forvery obvious purposes. It was not uncommon for German secret agents to wormtheir way into the Russian Socialist ranks, nor for the agents of theRussian police to keep the German secret service informed of what was goingon in Russian Socialist circles. Whatever truth there may be in thesuspicion that the anti-war Bolshevik faction of the Social Democrats werethe victims of the Russian police espionage system, and were betrayed byone whom they had trusted, as the Socialist-Revolutionists had beenbetrayed by Azev, the fact remains that the government ordered the arrestof five of the Bolshevist Social Democratic members of the Duma, onNovember 17th. Never before had the government disregarded the principle ofparliamentary immunity. When members of the First Duma, belonging tovarious parties, and members of the Second Duma, belonging to the SocialDemocratic party, were arrested it was only after the Duma had beenformally dissolved. The arrest of the five Social Democrats while the Dumawas still sitting evoked a strong protest, even from the conservatives. 

The government based its action upon the following allegations, whichappear to have been substantially correct: in October arrangements weremade to convoke a secret conference of delegates of the Social Democraticorganization to plan for a revolutionary uprising. The police learned ofthe plan, and when at last, on November 17th, the conference was held atViborg, eight miles from Petrograd--as the national capital was nowcalled--a detachment of police found eleven persons assembled, includingfive members of the Imperial Duma, Messrs. Petrovsky, Badavev, Mouranov, Samoelov, and Chagov. The police arrested six persons, but did not arrestthe Duma members, on account of their parliamentary position. An examiningmagistrate, however, indicted the whole eleven who attended the conference, under Article No. 102 of the Penal Code, and issued warrants for theirarrest. Among those arrested was Kamanev, one of Lenine's closest friends, who behaved so badly at his trial, manifesting so much cowardice, that hewas censured by his party. 

At this conference, according to the government, arrangements were made tocirculate among the masses a Manifesto which declared that "from theviewpoint of the working class and of the laboring masses of all thenations of Russia, the defeat of the monarchy of the Czar and of its armieswould be of extremely little consequence. " The Manifesto urged theimperative necessity of _carrying on on all sides the propaganda of thesocial revolution among the army and at the theater of the war, and thatweapons should be directed not against their brothers, the hired slaves ofother countries, but against the reactionary bourgeois governments_. TheManifesto went on, according to the government, to favor the organizationof a similar propaganda in all languages, among all the armies, with theaim of creating republics in Russia, Poland, Germany, Austria, and allother European countries, these to be federated into a republican UnitedStares of Europe. 

The declaration that the defeat of the Russian armies would be "ofextremely little consequence" to the workers became the key-note of theanti-war agitation of the Bolsheviki. Lenine and Zinoviev, still in exile, adopted the view that the defeat of Russia was _actually desirable_ fromthe point of view of the Russian working class. "We are Russians, and forthat very reason we want Czarism to be defeated, " was the cry. [3] In hispaper, the _Social Democrat_, published in Switzerland, Lenine advocatedRussian defeat, to be brought about through treachery and revolt in thearmy, as the best means of furthering revolutionary progress. The majorityof the Bolshevik faction made common cause with the extreme left-wingSocialists of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, who shared their views andbecame known as "Porazhentsi"--that is, advocates of defeat. Naturally, thecharge was made that they were pro-German, and it was even charged thatthey were in the pay of Germany. Possibly some of them were, but it by nomeans follows that because they desired Russia's defeat they were thereforeconsciously pro-German. They were not pro-German, but anti-Czarists. Theybelieved quite honestly, most of them, that Russia's defeat was the surestand quickest way of bringing about the Revolution in Russia which wouldoverthrow Czarism. In many respects their position was quite like that ofthose Irish rebels who desired to see England defeated, even though itmeant Germany's triumph, not because of any love for Germany, but becausethey hated England and believed that her defeat would be Ireland'sopportunity. However short-sighted and stupid such a policy may be judgedto be, it is quite comprehensible and should not be misrepresented. It is aremarkable fact that the Bolsheviki, while claiming to be the most radicaland extreme internationalists, were in practice the most narrownationalists. They were exactly as narrow in their nationalism as theSinn-Feiners of Ireland. They were not blind to the terrible wrongsinflicted upon Belgium, or to the fact that Germany's victory over Russiawould make it possible for her to crush the western democracies, France andEngland. But neither to save Belgium nor to prevent German militarismcrushing French and English workers under its iron heel would they have theRussian workers make any sacrifice. They saw, and cared only for, what theybelieved to be _Russian_ interests. 

IV

But during the first months of the war the Porazhentsi--including theBolsheviki--were a very small minority. The great majority of theSocialist-Revolutionists rallied to the support of the Allied cause. Soonafter the war began a Socialist Manifesto to the laboring masses of Russiawas issued. It bore the signature of many of the best-known RussianSocialists, representing all the Socialist factions and groups except theBolsheviki. Among the names were those of George Plechanov, Leo Deutsch, Gregory Alexinsky, N. Avksentiev, B. Vorovonov, I. Bunakov, and A. Bach--representing the best thought of the movement in practically all itsphases. This document is of the greatest historical importance, not merelybecause it expressed the sentiments of Socialists of so many shades, buteven more because of its carefully reasoned arguments why Socialists shouldsupport the war and why the defeat of Germany was essential to Russian andinternational social democracy. Despite its great length, the Manifesto ishere given in its entirety:

 We, the undersigned, belong to the different shades of Russian Socialistic thought. We differ on many things, but we firmly agree in that the defeat of Russia in her struggle with Germany would mean her defeat in her struggle for freedom, and we think that, guided by this conviction, our adherents in Russia must come together for a common service to their people, in the hour of the grave danger the country is now facing. 

 We address ourselves to the politically conscious working-men, peasants, artisans, clerks--to all of those who earn their bread in the sweat of their brow, and who, suffering from the lack of means and want of political rights, are struggling for a better future for themselves, for their children, and for their brethren. 

 We send them our hearty greeting, and persistently say to them: Listen to us in this fatal time, when the enemy has conquered the Western strongholds of Russia, has occupied an important part of our territory and is menacing Kiev, Petrograd, and Moscow, these most important centers of our social life. 

 Misinformed people may tell you that in defending yourselves from German invasion you support our old political régime. These people want to see Russia defeated because of their hatred of the Czar's government. Like one of the heroes of our genius of satire, Shchedrin, they mix fatherland with its temporary bosses. But Russia belongs not to the Czar, but to the Russian working-people. In defending Russia, the working-people defend themselves, defend the road to their freedom. As we said before, the inevitable consequences of German victory would be the strengthening of our old régime. 

 The Russian reactionaries understand this very thoroughly. _In a faint, half-hearted manner they are defending Russia from Germany_. The Ministers who resigned recently, Maklakov and Shcheglovitov, presented a secret report to the Czar, in November, 1914, in which they explained how advantageous it would be for the Czar to make a separate peace with Germany. _They understand that the defeat of Germany would be a defeat of the principles of monarchism, so dear to all our European reactionaries_. 

 Our people will never forget _the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia_. But if the progressive, the politically conscious people will not take part in the struggle against Germany, the Czar's government will have an excuse for saying: "It is not our fault that Germany defeats us; it is the fault of the revolutionists who have betrayed their country, " and this will vindicate the government in the eyes of the people. 

 The political situation in Russia is such that only across the bridge of national defense can we reach freedom. Remember, _we do not tell you, first victory against the external enemy and then revolution against the internal, the Czar's government_. 

 In the course of events the defeat of the Czar's government may serve as a necessary preliminary condition for, and even as a guaranty of, the elimination of the German danger. The French revolutionists of the end of the eighteenth century would never have been able to have overcome the enemy, attacking France on all sides, had they not adopted such tactics only when the popular movement against the old régime became mature enough to render their efforts effective. 

 Furthermore, you must not be embarrassed by the arguments of those who believe that every one who defends his country refuses thereby to take part in the struggle of the classes. These persons do not know what they are talking about. In the first place, in order that the struggle of the classes in Russia should be successful, certain social and political conditions must exist there. _These conditions will not exist if Germany wins_. 

 In the second place, if the working-man of Russia cannot but defend himself against the exploitation of the Russian landed aristocrat and capitalist it seems incomprehensible that he should remain inactive when the lasso of exploitation is being drawn around his neck by the German landed aristocracy (the _Junker_) and the German capitalist who are, unfortunately, at the present time _supported by a considerable part of the German proletariat that has turned traitor to its duty of solidarity with the proletariat of other countries_. 

 By striving to the utmost to cut this lasso of German imperialistic exploitation, the proletariat of Russia will continue the struggle of the classes in that form which at the present moment is most appropriate, fruitful, and effective. 

 It has been our country's fate once before to suffer from the bloody horrors of a hostile invasion. But never before did it have to defend itself against an enemy so well armed, so skilfully organized, so carefully prepared for his plundering enterprise as he is now. 

 The position of the country is dangerous to the highest degree; therefore upon all of you, upon all the politically conscious children of the working-people of Russia, lies an enormous responsibility. 

 If you say to yourselves that it is immaterial to you and to your less developed brothers as to who wins in this great international collision going on now, and if you act accordingly, Russia will be crushed by Germany. And when Russia will be crushed by Germany, it will fare badly with the Allies. This does not need any demonstration. 

 But if, on the contrary, you become convinced that the defeat of Russia will reflect badly upon the interests of the working population, and if you will help the self-defense of our country with all your forces, our country and her allies will escape the terrible danger menacing them. 

 Therefore, go deeply into the situation. You make a great mistake if you imagine that it is not to the interests of the working-people to defend our country. In reality, nobody's interests suffer more terribly from the invasion of an enemy than the interests of the working-population. 

 Take, for instance, the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. When the Germans besieged Paris and the cost of all the necessaries of life rose enormously, it was clear that the poor suffered much more than the rich. In the same way, when Germany exacted five billions of contribution from vanquished France, this same, in the final count, was paid by the poor; for paying that contribution indirect taxation was greatly raised, the burden of which nearly entirely falls on the lower classes. 

 More than that. The most dangerous consequence to France, due to her defeat in 1870-71, was the retardation of her economic development. In other words, the defeat of France badly reflected upon the contemporary interests of her people, and, even more, upon her entire subsequent development. 

 The defeat of Russia by Germany will much more injure our people than the defeat of France injured the French people. The war now exacts incredibly large expenditures. It is more difficult for Russia, a country economically backward, to bear that expenditure than for the wealthy states of western Europe. Russia's back, even before the war, was burdened with a heavy state loan. Now this debt is growing by the hour, and vast regions of Russia are subject to wholesale devastation. 

 If the Germans will win the final victory, they will demand from us an enormous contribution, in comparison with which the streams of gold that poured into victorious Germany from vanquished France, after the war of 1871, will seem a mere trifle. 

 But that will not be all. The most consequent and outspoken heralds of German imperialism are even now saying that it is necessary to exact from Russia the cession of important territory, which should be cleared from the present population for the greater convenience of German settlers. Never before have plunderers, dreaming of despoiling a conquered people, displayed such cynical heartlessness!

 But for our vanquishers it will not be enough to exact an unheard-of enormous contribution and to tear up our western borderlands. Already, in 1904, Russia, being in a difficult situation, was obliged to conclude a commercial treaty with Germany, very disadvantageous to herself. The treaty hindered, at the same time, the development of our agriculture and the progress of our industries. It affected, with equal disadvantage, the interests of the farmers as well as of those engaged in industry. It is easy to imagine what kind of a treaty victorious German imperialism would impose upon us. In economic matters, Russia would become a German colony. Russia's further economic development would be greatly hindered if not altogether stopped. Degeneration and deprivation would be the result of German victory for an important part of the Russian working-people. 

 What will German victory bring to western Europe? After all we have already said, it is needless to expatiate on how many of the unmerited economic calamities it will bring to the people of the western countries allied to Russia. We wish to draw your attention to the following: England, France, even Belgium and Italy, are, in a political sense, far ahead of the German Empire, which has not as yet grown up to a parliamentary régime. German victory over these countries would be the victory of the old over the new, and if the democratic ideal is dear to you, you must wish success to our Western Allies. 

 Indifference to the result of this war would be, for us, equal to political suicide. The most important, the most vital interests of the proletariat and of the laboring peasantry demand of you an active participation in the defense of the country. Your watchword must be victory over the foreign enemy. In an active movement toward such victory, the live forces of the people will become free and strong. 

 Obedient to this watchword, you must be as wise as serpents. Although in your hearts may burn the flame of noble indignation, in your heads must reign, invariably, cold political reckoning. You must know that zeal without reason is sometimes worse than complete indifference. Every act of agitation in the rear of the army, fighting against the enemy, would be equivalent to high treason, as it would be a service to the foreign enemy. 

 The thunders of the war certainly cannot make the Russian manufacturers and merchants more idealistic than they were in time of peace. In the filling of the numerous orders, inevitable during the mobilization of industry for war needs, the capitalists will, as they are accustomed to, take great care of the interests of capital, and will not take care of the interests of hired labor. You will be entirely right if you wax indignant at their conduct. But in all cases, whenever you desire to answer by a strike, you must first think whether such action would not be detrimental to the cause of the defense of Russia. 

 The private must be subject to the general. The workmen of every factory must remember that they would commit, without any doubt, the gravest mistake if, considering only their own interests, they forget how severely the interests of the entire Russian proletariat and peasantry would suffer from German victory. 

 The tactics which can be defined by the motto, "All or nothing, " are the tactics of anarchy, fully unworthy of the conscious representatives of the proletariat and peasantry. The General Staff of the German Army would greet with pleasure the news that we had adopted such tactics. _Believe us that this Staff is ready to help all those who would like to preach it in our country_. They want trouble in Russia, they want strikes in England, they want everything that would facilitate the achievement of their conquering schemes. 

 But you will not make them rejoice. You will not forget the words of our great fabulist: "What the enemy advises is surely bad. " You must insist that all your representatives take the most active part in all organizations created now, under the pressure of public opinion, for the struggle with the foe. Your representatives must, if possible, take part not only in the work of the special technical organizations, such as the War-Industrial Committees which have been created for the needs of the army, but also in all other organizations of social and political character. 

 The situation is such that we cannot come to freedom in any other way than by the war of national defense. 

That the foregoing Manifesto expressed the position of the vast majority ofRussian Socialists there can be no doubt whatever. Between this positionand that of the Porazhentsi with their doctrine that Russia's defeat byGermany was desirable, there was a middle ground, which was taken by a notinconsiderable number of Socialists, including such able leaders as PaulAxelrod. Those who took up this intermediate position were bothanti-Czarists and anti-German-imperialists. They were pro-Ally in the largesense, and desired to see the Allies win over the Central Empires, if not a"crushing" victory, a very definite and conclusive one. But they regardedthe alliance of Czarism with the Allies as an unnatural marriage. Theybelieved that autocratic Russia's natural alliance was with autocraticGermany and Austria. Their hatred of Czarism led them to wish for itsdefeat, even by Germany, provided the victory were not so great as topermit Germany to extend her domain over Russia or any large part of it. Their position became embodied in the phrase, "Victory by the Allies on thewest and Russia's defeat on the east. " This was, of course, utterlyunpractical theorizing and bore no relation to reality. 

V

Thanks in part to the vigorous propaganda of such leaders as Plechanov, Deutsch, Bourtzev, Tseretelli, Kerensky, and many others, and in part tothe instinctive good sense of the masses, support of the war by Socialistsof all shades and factions--except the extreme Bolsheviki andthe so-called "Internationalist" sections of Mensheviki andSocialist-Revolutionists--became general. The anti-war minority wasexceedingly small and had no hold upon the masses. Had the government beenboth wise and honestly desirous of presenting a united front to the foe, and to that end made intelligent and generous concessions to the democraticmovement, it is most unlikely that Russia would have collapsed. As it was, the government adopted a policy which could not fail to weaken the militaryforce of the nation--a policy admirably suited to German needs. 

Extremes meet. On the one hand there were the Porazhentsi Socialists, contending that the interests of progress would be best served by a Germanvictory over Russia, and plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of theRussian army and to stir up internal strife to that end. On the other hand, within the royal court, and throughout the bureaucracy, reactionarypro-German officials were animated by the belief that the victory ofGermany was essential to the permanence of Absolutism and autocraticgovernment. They, too, like the Socialist "defeatists, " aimed to weakenand corrupt the morale of the army and to divide the nation. 

These Germanophiles in places of power realized that they had unconsciousbut exceedingly useful allies in the Socialist intransigents. Actuated bymotives however high, the latter played into the hands of the most corruptand reactionary force that ever infested the old régime. This force, thereactionary Germanophiles, had from the very first hoped and believed thatGermany would win the war. They had exerted every ounce of pressure theycould command to keep the Czar from maintaining the treaty with France andentering into the war on her side against Germany and Austria. When theyfailed in this, they bided their time, full of confidence that the superiorefficiency of the German military machine would soon triumph. But when theywitnessed the great victorious onward rush of the Russian army, which for atime manifested such a degree of efficiency as they had never believed tobe possible, they began to bestir themselves. From this quarter came thesuggestion, very early in the war, as Plechanov and his associates chargedin their Manifesto, that the Czar ought to make an early peace withGermany. 

They went much farther than this. Through every conceivable channel theycontrived to obstruct Russia's military effort. They conspired todisorganize the transportation system, the hospital service, thefood-supply, the manufacture of munitions. They, too, in a most effectivemanner, were plotting to weaken and corrupt the morale of the army. Therewas universal uneasiness. In the Allied chancelleries there was fear of atreacherous separate peace between Russia and Germany. It was partly toavert that catastrophe by means of a heavy bribe that England undertook theforcing of the Dardanelles. All over Russia there was an awakening of thememories of the graft that ate like a canker-worm at the heart of thenation. Men told once more the story of the Russian general in Manchuria, in 1904, who, when asked why fifty thousand men were marching barefoot, answered that the boots were in the pocket of Grand-Duke Vladimir! Theytold again the story of the cases of "shells" for the Manchurian army whichwere intercepted in the nation's capital, _en route_ to Moscow, and foundto contain--paving-stones! How General Kuropatkin managed to amass afortune of over six million rubles during the war with Japan wasremembered. Fear that the same kind of treason was being perpetrated grewalmost to the panic point. 

So bad were conditions in the army, so completely had the Germanophilereactionaries sabotaged the organization, that the people themselves tookthe matter in hand. Municipalities all over the country formed a Union ofCities to furnish food, clothes, and other necessaries to the army. TheNational Union of Zemstvos did the same thing. More than three thousandinstitutions were established on the different Russian fronts by theNational Union of Zemstvos. These institutions included hospitals, ambulance stations, feeding stations for troops on the march, dentalstations, veterinary stations, factories for manufacturing supplies, motortransportation services, and so on through a long catalogue of things whichthe administration absolutely failed to provide. The same greatorganization furnished millions of tents and millions of pairs of boots andsocks. Civil Russia was engaged in a great popular struggle to overcomeincompetence, corruption, and sabotage in the bureaucracy. For this workthe civilian agencies were not thanked by the government. Instead, theywere oppressed and hindered. Against them was directed the hate of thedark forces of the "occult government" and at the same time the fierceopposition and scorn of men who called themselves Socialists and championsof proletarian freedom!

There was treachery in the General Staff and throughout the War Department, at the very head of which was a corrupt traitor, Sukhomlinov. It wastreachery in the General Staff which led to the tragic disasters in EastPrussia. The great drive of the Austrian and German armies in 1915, whichled to the loss of Poland, Lithuania, and large parts of Volhynia andCourland, and almost entirely eliminated Russia from the war, wasunquestionably brought about by co-operation with the German General Staffon the part of the sinister "occult government, " as the Germanophilereactionary conspiracy in the highest circles came to be known. 

No wonder that Plechanov and his friends in their Manifesto to the Russianworkers declared that the reactionaries were defending Russia fromsubjugation by Germany in "a half-hearted way, " and that "our people willnever forget the failure of the Czar's government to defend Russia. " Theywere only saying, in very moderate language, what millions were thinking;what, a few months later, many of the liberal spokesmen of the country wereready to say in harsher language. As early as January, 1915, the Duma metand cautiously expressed its alarm. In July it met again, many of themembers coming directly from the front, in uniform. Only the fear that arevolution would make the continuance of the war impossible prevented arevolution at that time. The Duma was in a revolutionary mood. Miliukov, for example, thundered:

" ... In January we came here with ... The feeling of patriotic alarm. Wethen kept this feeling to ourselves. Yet in closed sessions of committeeswe told the government all that filled the soul of the people. The answerwe received did not calm us; it amounted to saying that the governmentcould get along without us, without our co-operation. To-day we haveconvened in a grave moment of trial for our fatherland. The patriotic alarmof the people has proved to be well founded, to the misfortune of ourcountry. Secret things have become open, and the assertions of half a yearago have turned out to be mere words. Yet the country cannot be satisfiedwith words. _The people wish to take affairs into their own hands and tocorrect what has been neglected. The people look upon us as legal executorsof their will_. "

Kerensky spoke to the same general effect, adding, "_I appeal to the peoplethemselves to take into their hands the salvation of the country and fightfor a full right to govern the state_. " The key-note of revolution wasbeing sounded now. For the spirit of revolution breathed in the words, "Thepeople wish to take affairs into their own hands, " and in Kerensky'schallenge, "I appeal to the people themselves to take into their hands thesalvation of the country. " The Duma was the logical center around which thedemocratic forces of the country could rally. Its moderate characterdetermined this. Only its example was necessary to the development of agreat national movement to overthrow the old régime with its manifoldtreachery, corruption, and incompetence. When, on August 22d, theProgressive Bloc was formed by a coalition of Constitutional Democrats, Progressives, Nationalists, and Octobrists--the last-named group havinghitherto generally supported the government--there was a general chorus ofapproval throughout the country, If the program of the Bloc was not radicalenough to satisfy the various Socialist groups, even the Laborites, led byKerensky, it was, nevertheless, a program which they could support in themain, as far as it went. 

All over the country there was approval of the demand for a responsiblegovernment. The municipal councils of the large cities passed resolutionsin support of it. The great associations of manufacturers supported it. Allover the nation the demand for a responsible government was echoed. It wasgenerally believed that the Czar and his advisers would accept thesituation and accede to the popular demand. But once more the influence ofthe reactionaries triumphed, and on September 3d came the defiant answer ofthe government to the people. It was an order suspending the Dumaindefinitely. The gods make mad those whom they would destroy. 

Things went from bad to worse. More and more oppressive grew thegovernment; more and more stupidly brutal and reactionary in its dealingswith the wide-spread popular unrest. Heavier and heavier grew the burden ofunscientific and unjustly distributed taxation. Worse and worse became thecondition of the soldiers at the front; ever more scandalous the neglect ofthe sick and wounded. Incompetence, corruption, and treason combined tohurry the nation onward to a disastrous collapse. The Germanophiles werestill industriously at work in the most important and vital places, practising sabotage upon a scale never dreamed of before in the history ofany nation. They played upon the fears of the miserable weakling who wasthe nominal ruler of the vast Russian Empire, and frightened him intosanctioning the most suicidal policy of devising new measures of oppressioninstead of making generous concessions. 

Russia possessed food in abundance, being far better off in this respectthan any other belligerent on either side, yet Russia was in the grip offamine. There was a vast surplus of food grains and cereals over and abovethe requirements of the army and the civilian population, yet there waswide-spread hunger. Prices rose to impossible levels. The most astonishinganarchy and disorganization characterized the administration of thefood-supply. It was possible to get fresh butter within an hour's journeyfrom Moscow for twenty-five cents a pound, but in Moscow the price was twoand a half dollars a pound. Here, as throughout the nation, incompetencewas reinforced by corruption and pro-German treachery. Many writers havecalled attention to the fact that even in normal times the enormousexportation of food grains in Russia went on side by side with per capitaunderconsumption by the peasants whose labor produced the great harvests, amounting to not less than 30 per cent. Now, of course, conditions were farworse. 

When the government was urged to call a convention of national leaders todeal with the food situation it stubbornly refused. More than that, it madewar upon the only organizations which were staving off famine and making itpossible for the nation to endure. Every conceivable obstacle was placed inthe way of the National Union of Zemstvos and the Union of Cities; theco-operative associations, which were rendering valuable service in meetingthe distress of working-men's families, were obstructed and restricted inevery possible way, their national offices being closed by the police. Theofficials of the labor-unions who were co-operating with employers insubstituting arbitration in place of strikes, establishing soup-kitchensand relief funds, and doing other similar work to keep the nation alive, were singled out for arrest and imprisonment. The Black Hundreds wereperniciously active in all this oppression and in the treacherous advocacyof a separate peace with Germany. 

In October, 1916, a conference of chairmen of province zemstvos adopted andpublished a resolution which declared:

 The tormenting and horrifying suspicion, the sinister rumors of perfidy and treason, of dark forces working in favor of Germany to destroy the unity of the nation, to sow discord and thus prepare conditions for an ignominious peace, have now reached the clear certainty that the hand of the enemy secretly influences the affairs of our state. 

VI

An adequate comprehension of the things set forth in this terrible summaryis of the highest importance to every one who would attempt the task ofreaching an intelligent understanding of the mighty upheaval in Russia andits far-reaching consequences. The Russian Revolution of 1917 was notresponsible for the disastrous separate peace with Germany. The foundationsfor that were laid by the reactionaries of the old régime. It was thelogical outcome of their long-continued efforts. Lenine, Trotzky, and theirBolshevist associates were mere puppets, simple tools whose visions, ambitions, and schemes became the channels through which the conspiracy ofthe worst reactionaries in Russia realized one part of an iniquitousprogram. 

The Revolution itself was a genuine and sincere effort on the part of theRussian people to avert the disaster and shame of a separate peace; toserve the Allied cause with all the fidelity of which they were capable. There would have been a separate peace if the old régime had remained inpower a few weeks longer and the Revolution been averted. It is most likelythat it would have been a more shameful peace than was concluded atBrest-Litovsk, and that it would have resulted in an actual and activealliance of the Romanov dynasty with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns andthe Habsburgs. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had this great merit: it sodelayed the separate peace between Russia and Germany that the Allies wereable to prepare for it. It had the merit, also, that it forced theattainment of the separate peace to come in such a manner as to reduceGermany's military gain on the western front to a minimum. 

The manner in which the Bolsheviki in their wild, groping, and frenziedefforts to apply theoretical abstractions to the living world, torn as itwas by the wolves of war, famine, treason, oppression, and despair, servedthe foes of freedom and progress must not be lost sight of. The Bolshevist, wherever he may present himself, is the foe of progress and the ally ofreaction. 

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND REVOLUTION

I

When the Duma assembled On November 14, 1916--new style--the approachingdoom of Czar Nicholas II was already manifest. Why the Revolution did notoccur at that time is a puzzle not easy to solve. Perhaps the mere factthat the Duma was assembling served to postpone resort to drastic measures. The nation waited for the Duma to lead. It is probable, also, that fearlest revolution prove disastrous to the military forces exercised arestraining influence upon the people. Certain it is that it would havebeen easy enough to kindle the fires of revolution at that time. Never inthe history of the nation, not even in 1905, were conditions riper forrevolt, and never had there been a more solid array of the nation againstthe bureaucracy. Discontent and revolutionary temper were not confined toSocialists, nor to the lower classes. Landowners, capitalists, militaryofficials, and Intellectuals were united with the peasants and artisans, toan even greater extent than in the early stages of the First Revolution. Conservatives and Moderates joined with Social Democrats andSocialist-Revolutionists in opposition to the corrupt and oppressiverégime. Even the president of the Duma, Michael Rodzianko, a conservativelandowner, assailed the government. 

One of the principal reasons for this unexampled unity against thegovernment was the wide-spread conviction, based, as we have seen, upon themost damning evidence, that Premier Sturmer and his Cabinet were not loyalto the Allies and that they contemplated making a separate peace withGermany. All factions in the Duma were bitterly opposed to a separatepeace. Rodzianko was loudly cheered when he denounced the intrigues againstthe Allies and declared: "Russia gave her word to fight in common with theAllies till complete and final victory is won. Russia will not betray herfriends, and with contempt refuses any consideration of a separate peace. Russia will not be a traitor to those who are fighting side by side withher sons for a great and just cause. " Notwithstanding the intensificationof the class conflict naturally resulting from the great industrialdevelopment since 1906, patriotism temporarily overshadowed all classconsciousness. 

The cheers that greeted Rodzianko's declaration, and the remarkable ovationto the Allied ambassadors, who were present, amply demonstrated that, inspite of the frightful suffering and sacrifice which the nation hadendured, all classes were united in their determination to win the war. Only a corrupt section of the bureaucracy, at one end of the social scale, and a small section of extreme left-wing Socialists, at the other end ofthe social scale, were at that time anti-war. There was this differencebetween the Socialist pacifists and the bureaucratic advocates of peacewith Germany: the former were not pro-German nor anti-Ally, but sincereinternationalists, honest and brave--however mistaken--advocates of peace. Outside of the bureaucracy there was no hostility to the Allies in Russia. Except for the insignificant Socialist minority referred to, the masses ofthe Russian people realized that the defeat of the Hohenzollern dynastywas necessary to a realization of the ideal of a free Russia. The new andgreater revolution was already beginning, and determination to defeat theHohenzollern bulwark of the Romanov despotism was almost universal. Thewhole nation was pervaded by this spirit. 

Paul Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, popularly known asthe "Cadets, " furiously lashed Premier Sturmer and quoted the irrefutableevidence of his pro-Germanism and of his corruption. Sturmer reeled underthe smashing attack. In his rage he forbade the publication of Miliukov'sspeech, but hundreds of thousands of copies of it were secretly printed anddistributed. Every one recognized that there was war between the Duma andthe government, and notwithstanding the criticism of the Socialists, whonaturally regarded it as a bourgeois body, the Duma represented Russia. 

Sturmer proposed to his Cabinet the dissolution of the Duma, but failed toobtain the support of a majority. Then he determined to get the Czar'ssignature to a decree of dissolution. But the Czar was at the GeneralHeadquarters of the army at the time and therefore surrounded by armyofficers, practically all of whom were with the Duma and inspired by abitter resentment of the pro-German intrigues, especially the neglect ofthe army organization. The weak will of Nicholas II was thus beyond thereach of Sturmer's influence for the time being. Meanwhile, the Ministersof the Army and Navy had appeared before the Duma and declared themselvesto be on the side of the people and their parliament. On his way to visitthe Czar at General Headquarters, Premier Sturmer was met by one of theCzar's messengers and handed his dismissal from office. The Duma had won. 

The evil genius which inspired and controlled him led Nicholas II toappoint as Sturmer's successor the utterly reactionary bureaucrat, Alexander Trepov, and to retain in office as Minister of the Interior theinfamous Protopopov, associate of the unsavory Rasputin. When Trepov madehis first appearance as Premier in the Duma he was loudly hissed by theSocialists. Other factions, while not concealing their disappointment, weremore tolerant and even became more hopeful when they realized that from thefirst Trepov was fighting to oust Protopopov. That meant, of course, afight against Rasputin as well. Whatever Trepov's motives might be infighting Protopopov and Rasputin he was helping the opposition. But Trepovwas no match for such opponents. It soon became evident that as Premier hewas a mere figurehead and that Rasputin and Protopopov held the governmentin their hands. Protopopov openly defied the Premier and the Duma. 

In December it began to be rumored in political circles that Sturmer, whowas now attached in some not clearly defined capacity to the ForeignOffice, was about to be sent to a neutral country as ambassador. The rumorcreated the utmost consternation in liberal circles in Russia and in theAllied embassies. If true, it could only have one meaning, namely, thatarrangements were being made to negotiate a separate peace withGermany--and that meant that Russia was to become Germany's economicvassal. 

The Duma demanded a responsible Ministry, a Cabinet directly responsibleto, and controlled by, the Duma as the people's representative. This demandhad been constantly made since the First Revolution. Even the ImperialCouncil, upon which the Czar had always been able to rely for supportagainst revolutionary movements, now joined forces with the Duma in makingthis demand. That traditionally reactionary, bureaucratic body, composedof former Premiers, Cabinet Ministers, and other high officials, formallydemanded that the Czar take steps to make the government responsible to thepopularly elected assemblage. This was a small revolution in itself. Thefabric of Czarism had cracked. 

II

There can be no doubt in the mind of any student of Russian affairs thatthe unity of the Imperial Council and the Duma, like the unity of classes, was due to the strong pro-Ally sentiment which at that time possessedpractically the entire nation. On December 12th--new style--Germany offeredRussia a separate peace, and three days later the Foreign Minister, Pokrovsky, visited the Duma and announced that Russia would reject theoffer. The Duma immediately passed a resolution declaring that "the Dumaunanimously favors a categorical refusal by the Allied governments toenter, under present conditions, into any peace negotiations whatever. " Onthe 19th a similar resolution was adopted by the Imperial Council, whichcontinued to follow the leadership of the Duma. Before adjourning for theChristmas holidays the Duma passed another resolution, aimed chiefly atProtopopov and Sturmer, protesting against the sinister activities whichwere undermining the war-making forces of the nation, and praising the workof the zemstvos and working-class organizations which had struggled bravelyto sustain the army, feed the people, care for the sick and wounded, andavert utter chaos. 

On December 30th, in the early hours of the morning, the monk Rasputin wasmurdered and his body thrown into the Neva. The strangest and most evil ofall the actors in the Russian drama was dead, but the system which madehim what he was lived. Rasputin dead exercised upon the diseased mind ofthe Czarina--and, through her, upon the Czar--even a greater influence thanwhen he was alive. Nicholas II was as powerless to resist the insaneCzarina's influence as he had proved himself to be when he banished theGrand-Duke Nicholas for pointing out that the Czarina was the tool of eviland crafty intriguers. Heedless of the warning implied in the murder ofRasputin, and of the ever-growing opposition to the government and thethrone, the Czar inaugurated, or permitted to be inaugurated, new measuresof reaction and repression. 

Trepov was driven from the Premiership and replaced by Prince Golitizin, abureaucrat of small brain and less conscience. The best Minister ofEducation Russia had ever had, Ignatyev, was replaced by one of theblackest of all reactionaries. The Czar celebrated the New-Year by issuingan edict retiring the progressive members of the Imperial Council, who hadsupported the Duma, and appointing in their stead the most reactionary menhe could find in the Empire. At the head of the Council as president heplaced the notorious Jew-hating Stcheglovitov. As always, hatred of the Jewsprang from fear of progress. 

As one reads the history of January, 1917, in Russia, as it was reported inthe press day by day, and the numerous accounts of competent andtrustworthy observers, it is difficult to resist the conclusion thatProtopopov deliberately sought to precipitate a revolution. Mad as thishypothesis seems to be, it is nevertheless the only one which affords arational explanation of the policy of the government. No sooner wasGolitizin made Premier than it was announced that the opening of the Dumawould be postponed till the end of January, in order that the Cabinetmight be reorganized. Later it was announced that the Duma opening would beagain postponed--this time till the end of February. In the reorganizationof the Cabinet, Shuvaviev, the War Minister, who had loyally co-operatedwith the zemstvos and had supported the Duma in November, was dismissed. Pokrovsky, the Foreign Minister, who had announced to the Duma in Decemberthe rejection of the German peace offer, was reported to be "sick" andgiven "leave of absence. " Other changes were made in the Cabinet, in everycase to the advantage of the reactionaries. It was practically impossiblefor anyone in Russia to find out who the Ministers of the government were. 

Protopopov released Sukhomlinov, the former Minister of War who had beenjustly convicted of treason. This action, taken, it was said, at thedirection of the Czarina, added to the already wide-spread belief that thegovernment was animated by a desire to make peace with Germany. That theCzar himself was loyal to the Allies was generally believed, but there wasno such belief in the loyalty of Protopopov, Sturmer, and their associates. The nation meantime was drifting into despair and anarchy. The railwaysystem was deliberately permitted to become disorganized. Hunger reigned inthe cities and the food reserves for the army were deliberately reduced toa two days' supply. The terror of hunger spread through the large citiesand through the army at the front like prairie fire. 

It became evident that Protopopov was carrying out the plans of theGermanophiles, deliberately trying to disorganize the life of the nationand make successful warfare impossible. Socialists and labor leaderscharged that his agents were encouraging the pacifist minority and opposingthe patriotic majority among the workers. The work of the War IndustriesCommittee which controlled organizations engaged in the manufacture ofwar-supplies which employed hundreds of thousands of workers was hamperedin every way. It is the testimony of the best-known and most-trustedworking-class leaders in Russia that the vast majority of the workers, while anxious for a general democratic peace, were opposed to a separatepeace with Germany and favored the continuation of the war againstPrussianism and the co-operation of all classes to that end. The pacifistsand "defeatist" Socialists represented a minority. To the minority everypossible assistance was given, while the leaders of the working class whowere loyal to the war, and who sought to sustain the morale of the workersin support of the war, were opposed and thwarted in their efforts and, inmany cases, cast into prison. The Black Hundreds were still at work. 

Socialist leaders of the working class issued numerous appeals to theworkers, warning them that Protopopov's secret police agitators were tryingto bring about strikes, and begging them not to lend themselves to suchtreacherous designs, which could only aid Germany at the expense ofdemocracy in Russia and elsewhere. It became known, too, that large numbersof machine-guns were being distributed among the police in Petrograd andplaced at strategic points throughout the city. It was said that Protopopovwas mad, but it was the methodical madness of a desperate, reactionary, autocratic régime. 

III

Protopopov and Sturmer and their associates recognized as clearly as theliberals did the natural kinship and interdependence of the three greatautocracies, the Romanov, Habsburg, and Hohenzollern dynasties. They knewwell that the crushing of autocracy in Austria-Hungary and Germany wouldmake it impossible to maintain autocracy in Russia. They realized, furthermore, that while the nation was not willing to attempt revolutionduring the war, the end of the war would inevitably bring with itrevolution upon a scale far vaster than had ever been attempted before, unless, indeed, the revolutionary leaders could be goaded into making apremature attempt to overthrow the monarchy. In that case, it might bepossible to crush them. Given a rebellion in the cities, which could becrushed by the police amply provided with machine-guns, and by "loyal"troops, with a vast army unprovided with food and no means of supplying it, there would be abundant justification for making a separate peace withGermany. Thus the Revolution would be crushed and the whole system ofautocracy, Russian, Austrian, and German, preserved. 

The morning of the 27th of February--new style--was tense with an ominousexpectancy. In the Allied chancelleries anxious groups were gathered. Theyrealized that the fate of the Allies hung in the balance. In Petrogradalone three hundred thousand workers went out on strike that day, and thepolice agents did their level best to provoke violence. The large bodies oftroops massed at various points throughout the city, and the police withtheir machine-guns, testified to the thoroughness with which the governmenthad prepared to crush any revolutionary manifestations. Thanks to theexcellent discipline of the workers, and the fine wisdom of the leaders ofthe Social Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, and the Labor Group, who constantly exhorted the workers not to fall into the trap set for them, there was no violence. 

At the opening session of the Duma, Kerensky, leader of the Labor Group, made a characteristic address in which he denounced the arrest of the LaborGroup members of the War Industries Committee. He directed his attackagainst the "system, " not against individuals:

"We are living in a state of anarchy unprecedented in our history. Incomparison with it the period of 1613 seems like child's play. Chaos hasenveloped not only the political, but the economic life of the nation aswell. It destroys the very foundations of the nation's social economicstructure. 

"Things have come to such a pass that recently one of the Ministries, shipping coal from Petrograd to a neighboring city, had armed the trainwith a special guard so that other authorities should not confiscate thecoal on the way! We have arrived already at the primitive stage when eachperson defends with all the resources at his command the material in hispossession, ready to enter into mortal combat for it with his neighbor. Weare witnessing the same scenes which France went through at the time of theRevolution. Then also the products shipped to Paris were accompanied byspecial detachments of troops to prevent their being seized by theprovincial authorities.... 

"Behold the Cabinet of Rittich-Protopopov-Golitizin dragging into the courtthe Labor Group of the War Industries Committee, charged with aiming at thecreation of a Russian Social-Democratic republic! They did not even knowthat nobody aims at a 'Social-Democratic' republic. One aiming at arepublic labors for popular government. But has the court anything to sayabout all these distinctions? We know beforehand what sentences are to beimposed upon the prisoners.... 

"I have no desire to criticize the individual members of the Cabinet. Thegreatest mistake of all is to seek traitors, German agents, separateSturmers. _We have a still greater enemy than the German influence, thanthe treachery and treason of individuals. And that enemy is the system--thesystem of a medieval form of government_. "

How far the conspiracy of the government of Russia against the war ofRussia and her Allies extended is shown by the revelations made in the Dumaon March 3d by one of the members, A. Konovalov. He reported that two dayspreviously, March 1st, the only two members of the Labor Group of the WarIndustries Committee who were not in prison issued an appeal to the workersnot to strike. These two members of the Labor Group of the War IndustriesCommittee, Anosovsky and Ostapenko, took their exhortation to the bureau ofthe War Industries Committee for its approval. But, although approved bythis great and important organization, the appeal was not passed by thegovernment censor. When Guchkov, president of the War Industries Committee, attempted to get the appeal printed in the newspapers he was prevented byaction emanating from the office of Protopopov. 

IV

Through all the early days of March there was labor unrest in Petrograd, aswell as in some other cities. Petrograd was, naturally, the storm center. There were small strikes, but, fortunately, not much rioting. The extremeradicals were agitating for the release of the imprisoned leaders of theLabor Group and urging drastic action by the workers. Much of thisagitation was sincere and honest, but no little of it was due to theprovocative agents. These, disguised as workmen, seized every opportunityto urge revolt. Any pretext sufficed them; they stimulated the honestagitation to revolt as a protest against the imprisonment of the LaborGroup, and the desperate threat that unless food was forthcoming revolutionwould be resorted to for sinister purposes. And all the time the police andthe troops were massed to crush the first rising. 

The next few days were destined to reveal the fact that the cunning andguile of Protopopov had overreached itself; that the soldiers could not berelied upon to crush any uprising of the people. There was some rioting inPetrograd on March 3d, and the next day the city was placed under martiallaw. On March 7th the textile workers went out on strike and were quicklyfollowed by several thousand workers belonging to other trades. Next daythere was a tremendous popular demonstration at which the workers demandedfood. The strike spread during the next two or three days until there was apretty general stoppage of industry. Students from the university joinedwith the striking workmen and there were numerous demonstrations, butlittle disposition to violence. When the Cossacks and mounted police weresent to break up the crowds, the Cossacks took great care not to hurt thepeople, fraternizing with them and being cheered by them. It was evidentthat the army would not let itself be used to crush the uprising of thepeople. The police remained "loyal, " but they were not adequate in numbers. Protopopov had set in motion forces which no human agency could control. The Revolution was well under way. 

The Duma remained in constant session. Meantime the situation in thecapital was becoming serious in the extreme. Looting of stores began, andthere were many victims of the police efforts to disperse the crowds. Inthe midst of the crisis the Duma repudiated the government and broke offall relations with it. The resolution of the Duma declared that "Thegovernment which covered its hands with the blood of the people should nolonger be admitted to the Duma. With such a government the Duma breaks allrelations forever. " The answer of Czar Nicholas was an order to dissolvethe Duma, which order the Duma voted to ignore, remaining in session asbefore. 

On Sunday, March 11th, there was a great outpouring of people at ademonstration. Police established on the roofs of some public buildingsattacked the closely packed throngs with machine-gun fire, killing andwounding hundreds. One of the famous regiments, the Volynski, revolted, killed its commander, and joined the people when ordered to fire into thecrowds. Detachments of soldiers belonging to other regiments followed theirexample and refused to fire upon the people. One or two detachments oftroops did obey orders and were immediately attacked by the revolutionarytroops. There was civil war in Petrograd. 

While the fighting was still going on, the president of the Duma sent thefollowing telegram to the Czar:

 The situation is grave. Anarchy reigns in the capital. The government is paralyzed. The transport of provisions and fuel is completely disorganized. General dissatisfaction is growing. Irregular rifle-firing is occurring in the streets. It is necessary to charge immediately some person enjoying the confidence of the people to form a new government. It is impossible to linger. Any delay means death. Let us pray to God that the responsibility in this hour will not fall upon a crowned head. 

 RODZIANKO. 

The Duma waited in vain that night for an answer from the Czar. Thebourgeois elements in the Duma were terrified. Only the leaders of thedifferent Socialist groups appeared to possess any idea of providing therevolutionary movement with proper direction. While the leaders of thebourgeois groups were proclaiming their conviction that the Revolutionwould be crushed in a few hours by the tens of thousands of troops inPetrograd who had not yet rebelled, the Socialist leaders were busypreparing plans to carry on the struggle. Even those Social Democrats whofor various reasons had most earnestly tried to avert the Revolution gavethemselves with whole-hearted enthusiasm to the task of organizing therevolutionary forces. Following the example set in the 1905 Revolution, there had been formed a central committee of the working-classorganizations to direct the movement. This body, composed of electedrepresentatives of the unions and Socialist societies, was later known asthe Council of Workmen's Deputies. It was this body which undertook theorganization of the Revolution. This Revolution, unlike that of 1905, wasinitiated by the bourgeoisie, but its originators manifested little desireand less capacity to lead it. 

When Monday morning came there was no longer an unorganized, planless massconfusedly opposing a carefully organized force, but a compact, well-organized, and skilfully led movement. Processions were formed, eachunder responsible directors with very definite instructions. As on theprevious day, the police stationed upon roofs of buildings, and at variousstrategic points, fired upon the people. As on the previous day, also, thesoldiers joined the Revolution and refused to shoot the people. The famousGuards' Regiment, long the pet and pride of the Czar, was the first torebel. The soldiers killed the officer who ordered them to fire, and thenwith cheers joined the rebels. When the military authorities sent outanother regiment to suppress the rebel Guards' Regiment they saw the newforce go over to the Revolution in a body. Other regiments deserted in thesame manner. The flower of the Russian army had joined the people inrevolting against the Czar and the system of Czarism. 

On the side of the revolutionists were now many thousands of well-trainedsoldiers, fully armed. Soon they took possession of the Arsenal, afterkilling the commander. The soldiers made organized and systematic warfareupon the police. Every policeman seen was shot down, police stations wereset on fire, and prisons were broken open and the prisoners released. Thenumerous political prisoners were triumphantly liberated and took theirplaces in the revolutionary ranks. In rapid succession the great bastilesfell! Peter and Paul Fortress, scene of infinite martyrdom, fell into thehands of the revolutionary forces, and the prisoners, many of them heroesand martyrs of other uprisings, were set free amid frenzied cheering. Thegreat Schlüsselburg Fortress was likewise seized and emptied. Withtwenty-five thousand armed troops on their side, the revolutionists werepractically masters of the capital. They attacked the headquarters of thehated Secret Service and made a vast, significantly symbolical bonfire ofits archives. 

Once more Rodzianko appealed to the Czar. It is no reflection uponRodzianko's honesty, or upon his loyalty to the people, to say that he wasappalled by the development of the struggle. He sympathized with the peoplein their demand for political democracy and would wage war to the end uponCzarism, but he feared the effect of the Revolution upon the army and theAllied cause. Moreover, he was a landowner, and he feared Socialism. In1906 he had joined forces with the government when the Socialists led themasses--and now the Socialist leaders were again at the head of the masses. Perhaps the result would have been otherwise if the Duma had followed upits repudiation of the government by openly and unreservedly placing itselfat the head of the uprising. In any other country than Russia that wouldhave been done, in all probability, but the Russian bourgeoisie was weak. This was due, like so much else in Russia, to the backwardness of theindustrial system. There was not a strong middle class and, therefore, thebourgeoisie left the fighting to the working class. Rodzianko's new appealto the Czar was pathetic. When hundreds of dead and dying lay in thestreets and in churches, hospitals, and other public buildings, he couldstill imagine that the Czar could save the situation: "The situation isgrowing worse. It is necessary to take measures immediately, for to-morrowit will be too late, " he telegraphed. "The last hour has struck to decidethe fate of the country and of the dynasty. " Poor, short-sighted bourgeois!It was already "too late" for "measures" by the weak-minded Nicholas II toavail. The "fate of the country and of the dynasty" was already determined!It was just as well that the Czar did not make any reply to the message. 

The new ruler of Russia, King Demos, was speaking now. Workers and soldierssent deputations to the Taurida Palace, where the Duma was sitting. Rodzianko read to them the message he had sent to the Czar, but that wassmall comfort. Thousands of revolutionists, civilian and military, stormedthe Taurida Palace and clamored to hear what the Socialists in the Duma hadto say. In response to this demand Tchcheidze, Kerensky, Skobelev, andother Socialists from various groups appeared and addressed the people. These men had a message to give; they understood the ferment and were partof it. They were of the Revolution--bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh, and so they were cheered again and again. And what a triumvirate they made, these leaders of the people! Tchcheidze, once a university professor, keen, cool, and as witty as George Bernard Shaw, listened to with the deferencedemocracy always pays to intellect. 

Kerensky, lawyer by profession, matchless as an orator, obviously theprophet and inspirer rather than the executive type; Skobelev, blunt, direct, and practical, a man little given to romantic illusions. It wasSkobelev who made the announcement to the crowd outside the Taurida Palacethat the old system was ended forever and that the Duma would create aProvisional Committee. He begged the workers and the soldiers to keeporder, to refrain from violence against individuals, and to observe strictdiscipline. "Freedom demands discipline and order, " he said. 

That afternoon the Duma selected a temporary committee to restore order. The committee, called the Duma Committee of Safety, consisted of twelvemembers, representing all the parties and groups in the Duma. The hastilyformed committee of the workers met and decided to call on the workmen tohold immediate elections for the Council of Workmen's Deputies--the firstmeeting of which was to be held that evening. That this was a perilousthing to do the history of the First Revolution clearly showed, but noother course seemed open to the workers, in view of the attitude of thebourgeoisie. On behalf of the Duma Committee, Rodzianko issued thefollowing proclamation:

 The Provisional Committee of the members of the Imperial Duma, aware of the grave conditions of internal disorder created by the measure of the old government, has found itself compelled to take into its hands the re-establishment of political and civil order. In full consciousness of the responsibility of its decision, the Provisional Committee expresses its trust that the population and the army will help it in the difficult task of creating a new government which will comply with the wishes of the population, and be able to enjoy its confidence. 

 MICHAIL RODZIANKO, _Speaker of the Imperial Duma_. February 27, 1917. [4]

That night the first formal session of the Council of Workmen's Deputieswas held. Tchcheidze was elected president, Kerensky vice-president. Thedeputies had been elected by the working-men of many factories and by themembers of Socialist organizations. It was not until the following day thatsoldiers' representatives were added and the words "and Soldiers" added tothe title of the Council. At this first meeting the Council--a mostmoderate and capable body--called for a Constituent Assembly on the basisof equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage. This demand was containedin an address to the people which read, in part:

 To finish the struggle successfully in the interests of democracy, the people must create their own powerful organization. 

 The Council of the Workmen's Deputies, holding its session in the Imperial Duma, makes it its supreme task to organize the people's forces and their struggle for a final securing of political freedom and popular government in Russia. 

 We appeal to the entire population of the capital to rally around the Council, to form local committees in the various boroughs, and to take over the management of local affairs. 

 All together, with united forces, we will struggle for a final abolition of the old system and the calling of a Constituent Assembly on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. 

This document is of the highest historical importance and merits closestudy. As already noted, Tchcheidze, leader of the Mensheviki, waspresident of the Council, and this appeal to the people shows how fully themoderate views of his group prevailed. Indeed, the manner in which themoderate counsels of the Mensheviki dominated the Council at a time ofgreat excitement and passion, when extremists might have been expected toobtain the lead, is one of the most remarkable features of the whole storyof the Second Russian Revolution. It appeared at this time that theRussian proletariat had fully learned the tragic lessons of 1905-06. 

It is evident from the text of the appeal that at the time the Councillooked upon the Revolution as being primarily a political event, not as amovement to reconstruct the economic and social system. There is noreference to social democracy. Even the land question is not referred to. How limited their purpose was at the moment may be gathered from thestatement, "The Council ... Makes it its supreme task to organize thepeople's forces and their struggle for a final securing of politicalfreedom and popular government. " It is also clearly evident that, notwithstanding the fact that the Council itself was a working-classorganization, a manifestation of the class consciousness of the workers, the leaders of the Council did not regard the Revolution as a proletarianevent, nor doubt the necessity of co-operation on the part of all classes. Proletarian exclusiveness came later, but on March 13th the appeal of theCouncil was "to the entire population. "

March 14th saw the arrest of many of the leading reactionaries, includingProtopopov and the traitor Sukhomlinov, and an approach to order. All thatday the representatives of the Duma and the representatives of the Councilof Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as it was now called, embryo of thefirst Soviet government, tried to reach an agreement concerning the futureorganization of Russia. The representatives of the Duma were pitifullylacking in comprehension of the situation. They wanted the Czar deposed, but the monarchy itself retained, subject to constitutional limitationsanalogous to those obtaining in England. They wanted the Romanov dynastyretained, their choice being the Czar's brother, Grand-Duke Michael. Therepresentatives of the Soviet, on the other hand, would not tolerate thesuggestion that the monarchy be continued. Standing, as yet, only forpolitical democracy, they insisted that the monarchy must be abolished andthat the new government be republican in form. The statesmanship andpolitical skill of these representatives of the workers were immeasurablysuperior to those possessed by the bourgeois representatives of the Duma. 

V

Thursday, March 15, 1917--new style--was one of the most fateful andmomentous days in the history of mankind. It will always be remembered asthe day on which Czarism ceased to exist in Russia. At three o'clock in theafternoon Miliukov, leader of the Constitutional Democrats, appeared infront of the Taurida Palace and announced to the waiting throngs that anagreement had been reached between the Duma and the Council of Workmen'sand Soldiers' Deputies; that it had been decided to depose the Czar, toconstitute immediately a Provisional Government composed of representativesof all parties and groups, and to proceed with arrangements for the holdingof a Constituent Assembly at an early date to determine the form of apermanent democratic government for Russia. 

At the head of the Provisional Government, as Premier, had been placedPrince George E. Lvov, who as president of the Union of Zemstvos had provedhimself to be a democrat of the most liberal school as well as anextraordinarily capable organizer. The position of Minister of ForeignAffairs was given to Miliukov, whose strong sympathy with the Allies waswell known. The position of Minister of Justice was given to AlexanderKerensky, one of the most extraordinary men in Russia, a leader of theGroup of Toil, a party of peasant Socialists, vice-president of the Councilof Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. At the head of the War Department wasplaced Alexander Guchkov, a soldier-politician, leader of the Octobristparty, who had turned against the First Revolution in 1905, when it becamean economic war of the classes, evoking thereby the hatred of theSocialists, but who as head of the War Industries Committee had achievedtruly wonderful results in the present war in face of the opposition of thegovernment. The pressing food problem was placed in the hands of AndreiShingarev. As Minister of Agriculture Shingarev belonged to the radicalleft wing of the Cadets. 

It cannot be said that the composition of the Provisional Government wasreceived with popular satisfaction. It was top-heavy with representativesof the bourgeoisie. There was only one Socialist, Kerensky. Miliukov'sselection, inevitable though it was, and great as his gifts were, wascondemned by the radical working-men because he was regarded as a dangerous"imperialist" on account of his advocacy of the annexation ofConstantinople. Guchkov's inclusion was equally unpopular on account of hisrecord at the time of the First Revolution. The most popular selection wasundoubtedly Kerensky, because he represented more nearly than any of theothers the aspirations of the masses. As a whole, it was the fact that theProvisional Government was too fully representative of the bourgeoisparties and groups which gave the Bolsheviki and other radicals a chance tocondemn it. 

The absence of the name of Tchcheidze from the list was a surprise and adisappointment to most of the moderate Socialists, for he had come to beregarded as one of the most capable and trustworthy leaders of the masses. The fact that he was not included in the new government could hardly failto cause uneasy suspicion. It was said later that efforts had been made toinduce him to join the new government, but that he declined to do so. Tchcheidze's position was a very difficult one. Thoroughly in sympathy withthe plan to form a coalition Provisional Government, and supportingKerensky in his position, Tchcheidze nevertheless declined to enter the newCabinet himself. In this he was quite honest and not at all the trickypolitician he has been represented as being. 

Tchcheidze knew that the Duma had been elected upon a most undemocraticsuffrage and that it did not and could not represent the masses of thepeasants and wage-workers. These classes were represented in the Council ofWorkmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which continued to exist as a separatebody, independent of the Duma, but co-operating with it as an equal. From aSocialist point of view it would have been a mistake to disband theCouncil, Tchcheidze believed. He saw Soviet government as the need of thecritical moment, rather than as the permanent, distinctive type of RussianSocial democracy as the critics of Kerensky have alleged. 

While the Provisional Government was being created, the Czar, at GeneralHeadquarters, was being forced to recognize the bitter fact that theRomanov dynasty could no longer live. When he could no more resist thepressure brought to bear upon him by the representatives of the Duma, hewrote and signed a formal instrument of abdication of the Russian throne, naming his brother, Grand-Duke Michael, as his successor. The latter darednot attempt to assume the imperial rôle. He recognized that the end ofautocracy had been reached and declined to accept the throne unless chosenby a popular referendum vote. On March 16th, the day after the abdicationof Nicholas II, Michael issued a statement in which he said:

 This heavy responsibility has come to me at the voluntary request of my brother, who has transferred the Imperial throne to me during a time of warfare which is accompanied by unprecedented popular disturbances. 

 Moved by the thought, which is in the minds of the entire people, that the good of the country is paramount, I have adopted the firm resolution to accept the supreme power only if this be the will of our great people, who, by a plebiscite organized by their representatives in a Constituent Assembly, shall establish a form of government and new fundamental laws for the Russian state. 

 Consequently, invoking the benediction of our Lord, I urge all citizens of Russia to submit to the Provisional Government, established upon the initiative of the Duma and invested with full plenary powers, until such time which will follow with as little delay as possible, as the Constituent Assembly, on a basis of universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage, shall, by its decision as to the new form of government, express the will of the people. 

The hated Romanov dynasty was ended at last. It is not likely thatGrand-Duke Michael entertained the faintest hope that he would ever becalled to the throne, either by a Constituent Assembly or by a popularreferendum. Not only was the Romanov dynasty ended, but equally so wasmonarchical Absolutism itself. No other dynasty would replace that of theRomanovs. Russia had thrown off the yoke of autocracy. The SecondRevolution was an accomplished fact; its first phase was complete. Thoughtful men among the revolutionists recognized that the next phasewould be far more perilous and difficult. "The bigger task is still beforeus, " said Miliukov, in his address to the crowd that afternoon. AConstituent Assembly was to be held and that was bound to intensify thedifferences which had been temporarily composed during the struggle tooverthrow the system of Absolutism. And the differences which existedbetween the capitalist class and the working class were not greater thanthose which existed within the latter. 

CHAPTER V

FROM BOURGEOISIE TO BOLSHEVIKI

I

It required no great gift of prophecy to foretell the failure of theProvisional Government established by the revolutionary coalition headed byPrince Lvov. From the very first day it was evident that the Cabinet couldnever satisfy the Russian people. It was an anomaly in that the Revolutionhad been a popular revolution, while the Provisional Government wasoverwhelmingly representative of the landowners, manufacturers, bankers, and merchants--the despised and distrusted bourgeoisie. The very meagerrepresentation given to the working class, through Kerensky, was, in thecircumstances, remarkable for its stupid effrontery and its disregard ofthe most obvious realities. Much has been said and written of thedoctrinaire attitude which has characterized the Bolsheviki in the laterphases of the struggle, but if by doctrinairism is meant subservience topreconceived theories and disregard of realities, it must be said that thestatesmen of the bourgeoisie were as completely its victims as theBolsheviki later proved to be. They were subservient to dogma andindifferent to fact. 

The bourgeois leaders of Russia--and those Socialists who co-operated withthem--attempted to ignore the biggest and most vital fact in the wholesituation, namely, the fact that the Revolution was essentially aSocialist Revolution in the sense that the overwhelming mass of the peoplewere bent upon the realization of a very comprehensive, though somewhatcrudely conceived, program of socialization. It was not a mere politicalRevolution, and political changes which left the essential social structureunchanged, which did not tend to bring about equality of democraticopportunity, and which left the control of the nation in the hands oflandowners and capitalists, could never satisfy the masses nor fail toinvite their savage attack. Only the most hopeless and futile ofdoctrinaires could have argued themselves into believing anything else. Itwas quite idle to argue from the experience of other countries that Russiamust follow the universal rule and establish and maintain bourgeois rulefor a period more or less prolonged. True, that had been the experience ofmost nations, but it was foolish in the extreme to suppose that it must bethe experience of Russia, whose conditions were so utterly unlike thosewhich had obtained in any nation which had by revolution establishedconstitutional government upon a democratic basis. 

To begin with, in every other country revolution by the bourgeoisie itselfhad been the main factor in the overthrow of autocracy. Feudalism andmonarchical autocracy fell in western Europe before the might of a powerfulrising class. That this class in every case drew to its side the masses andbenefited by their co-operation must not be allowed to obscure the factthat in these other countries of all the classes in society the bourgeoisiewas the most powerful. It was that fact which established its right to rulein place of the deposed rulers. The Russian middle class, however, lackedthat historic right to rule. In consequence of the backwardness of thenation from the point of view of industrial development, the bourgeoisiewas correspondingly backward and weak. Never in any country had a class soweak and uninfluential essayed the rôle of the ruling class. To believethat a class which at the most did not exceed six per cent. Of thepopulation could assert and maintain its rule over a nation of one hundredand eighty millions of people, when these had been stirred by years ofrevolutionary agitation, was at once pedantic and absurd. 

The industrial proletariat was as backward and as relatively weak as thebourgeoisie. Except by armed force and tyranny of the worst kind, thisclass could not rule Russia. Its fitness and right to rule are notappreciably greater than the fitness and right of the bourgeoisie. Itcannot even be said on its behalf that it had waged the revolutionarystruggle of the working class, for in truth its share in the Russianrevolutionary movement had been relatively small, far less than that of thepeasant organizations. With more than one hundred and thirty-five millionsof peasants, from whose discontent and struggle the revolutionary movementhad drawn its main strength, neither the bourgeoisie nor theclass-conscious section of the industrial proletariat could set up its rulewithout angry protest and attacks which, soon or late, must overturn it. Every essential fact in the Russian situation, which was so unique, pointedto the need for a genuine and sincere co-operation by the intelligentleaders of all the opposition elements until stability was attained, together with freedom from the abnormal difficulties due to the war. In anyevent, the domination of the Provisional Government by a class so weak andso narrow in its outlook and aims was a disaster. As soon as time forreflection had been afforded the masses discontent and distrust wereinevitable. 

II

From the first days there were ominous murmurings. Yet it must be confessedthat the Provisional Government manifested much greater enlightenment thanmight have been expected of it and hastened to enact a program--quiteremarkable for its liberality and vision; a program which, had it come froma government more truly representative in its personnel of revolutionaryRussia, might, with one important addition, have served as the foundationof an enduring structure. On March 18th the Provisional Government issued astatement of its program and an appeal to the citizens for support. Thisdocument, which is said to have been the joint work of P. I. Novgorodtzev, N. V. Nekrasov, and P. N. Miliukov, read as follows:

 CITIZENS: The Executive Committee of the Duma, with the aid and support of the garrison of the capital and its inhabitants, has succeeded in triumphing over the obnoxious forces of the old régime so that we can proceed to a more stable organization of the executive power, with men whose past political activity assures them the country's confidence. 

 The new Cabinet will base its policy upon the following principles: _First_. --An immediate and general amnesty for all political and religious offenses, including terrorist acts and military and agrarian offenses. 

 _Second_. --Liberty of speech and of the press; freedom for alliances, unions, and strikes, with the extension of these liberties to military officials, within the limits admitted by military requirements. 

 _Third_. --Abolition of all social, religious, and national restrictions. 

 _Fourth_. --To proceed forthwith to the preparation and convocation of a Constituent Assembly, based on universal suffrage. This Assembly will establish a stable universal régime. 

 _Fifth_. --The substitution of the police by a national militia, with chiefs to be elected and responsible to the municipalities. 

 _Sixth_. --Communal elections to be based on universal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage. 

 _Seventh_. --The troops which participated in the revolutionary movement will not be disarmed, but will remain in Petrograd. 

 _Eighth_. --While maintaining strict military discipline for troops in active service, it is desirable to abrogate for soldiers all restrictions in the enjoyment of civil rights accorded other citizens. 

 The Provisional Government desires to add that it has no intention of taking advantage of war conditions to delay the realization of the measures of reform above mentioned. 

This address is worthy of especial attention. The generous liberalism ofthe program it outlines cannot be denied, but it is political liberalismonly. It is not directly and definitely concerned with the greatfundamental economic issues which so profoundly affect the life andwell-being of the working class, peasants, and factory-workers alike. It isthe program of men who saw in the Revolution only a great epochal politicaladvance. In this it reflects its bourgeois origin. With the exception ofthe right to organize unions and strikes--which is a political measure--notone of the important economic demands peculiar to the working class is metin the program. The land question, which was the economic basis of theRevolution, and without which there could have been no Revolution, was noteven mentioned. And the Manifesto which the Provisional Governmentaddressed to the nation on March 20th was equally silent with regard to theland question and the socialization of industry. 

Evidently the Provisional Government desired to confine itself as closelyas possible to political democracy, and to leave fundamental economicreform to be attended to by the Constituent Assembly. If that were itspurpose, it would have helped matters to have had the purpose clearlystated and not merely left to inference. But whatever the shortcomings ofits first official statements, the actual program of the ProvisionalGovernment during the first weeks was far more satisfactory and affordedroom for great hope. On March 21st the constitution of Finland wasrestored. On the following day amnesty was granted to all political andreligious offenders. Within a few days freedom and self-government weregranted to Poland, subject to the ratification of the Constituent Assembly. At the same time all laws discriminating against the Jews were repealed bythe following decree:

All existing legal restrictions upon the rights of Russian citizens, basedupon faith, religious teaching, or nationality, are revoked. In accordancewith this, we hereby repeal all laws existing in Russia as a whole, as wellas for separate localities, concerning:

 1. Selection of place of residence and change of residence. 

 2. Acquiring rights of ownership and other material rights in all kinds of movable property and real estate, and likewise in the possession of, the use and managing of all property, or receiving such for security. 

 3. Engaging in all kinds of trades, commerce, and industry, not excepting mining; also equal participation in the bidding for government contracts, deliveries, and in public auctions. 

 4. Participation in joint-stock and other commercial or industrial companies and partnerships, and also employment in these companies and partnerships in all kinds of positions, either by elections or by employment. 

 5. Employment of servants, salesmen, foremen, laborers, and trade apprentices. 

 6. Entering the government service, civil as well as military, and the grade or condition of such service; participation in the elections for the institutions for local self-government, and all kinds of public institutions; serving in all kinds of positions of government and public establishments, as well as the prosecution of the duties connected with such positions. 

 7. Admission to all kinds of educational institutions, whether private, government, or public, and the pursuing of the courses of instruction of these institutions, and receiving scholarships. Also the pursuance of teaching and other educational professions. 

 8. Performing the duties of guardians, trustees, or jurors. 

 9. The use of language and dialects, other than Russian, in the proceedings of private societies, or in teaching in all kinds of private educational institutions, and in commercial bookkeeping. 

Thus all the humiliating restrictions which had been imposed upon theJewish people were swept away. Had the Provisional Government done nothingelse than this, it would have justified itself at the bar of history. Butit accomplished much more than this: before it had been in office a month, in addition to its liberation of Finns, Poles, and Jews, the ProvisionalGovernment abolished the death penalty; removed all the provincialgovernors and substituted for them the elected heads of the provincialcounty councils; _confiscated the large land holdings of the Imperialfamily and of the monasteries_; levied an excess war-profits tax on all warindustries; and fixed the price of food at rates greatly lower than hadprevailed before. The Provisional Government had gone farther, and, whiledeclaring that these matters must be left to the Constituent Assembly forsettlement, had declared itself in favor of woman suffrage and of _thedistribution of all land among the peasants, the terms and conditions ofexpropriation and distribution to be determined by the ConstituentAssembly_. 

The Provisional Government also established a War Cabinet which introducedvarious reforms into the army. All the old oppressive regulations wererepealed and an attempt made to democratize the military system. Some ofthese reforms were of the utmost value; others were rather dangerousexperiments. Much criticism has been leveled against the rules providingfor the election of officers by the men in the ranks, for a conciliationboard to act in disputes between men and officers over questions ofdiscipline, and the abolition of the regulations requiring private soldiersto address officers by the title "Sir. " It must be borne in mind, however, in discussing these things, that these rules represented a great, honesteffort to restore the morale of an army that had been demoralized, and toinfuse it with democratic faith and zeal in order that it might "carry on. "It is not just to judge the rules without considering the conditions whichcalled them forth. 

Certainly the Provisional Government--which the government of the UnitedStates formally recognized on March 22d, being followed in this by theother Allied governments next day--could not be accused fairly of beingeither slothful or unfaithful. Its accomplishments during those first weekswere most remarkable. Nevertheless, as the days went by it became evidentthat it could not hope to satisfy the masses and that, therefore, it couldnot last very long. 

III

The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates was pursuing itsindependent existence, under the leadership of Tchcheidze, Skobelev, Tseretelli, and other moderate Social Democrats. As yet the Bolsheviki werea very small and uninfluential faction, lacking capable leadership. Therecan be very little doubt that the Council represented the feelings of thegreat mass of the organized wage-earners far more satisfactorily than theProvisional Government did, or that it was trusted to a far greater degree, alike by the wage-earners of the cities and the peasants. A greatpsychological fact existed, a fact which the Provisional Government and thegovernments of the Allied nations might well have reckoned with: theRussian working-people, artisans and peasants alike, were aggressivelyclass conscious and could trust fully only the leaders of their own class. 

The majority of the Social Democratic party was, at the beginning, so farfrom anything like Bolshevism, so thoroughly constructive and opportunisticin its policies, that its official organ, _Pravda_--not yet captured by theBolsheviki--put forward a program which might easily have been made thebasis for an effective coalition. It was in some respects disappointinglymoderate: like the program of the Provisional Government, it left the landquestion untouched, except in so far as the clause demanding theconfiscation of the property of the royal family and the Church bore uponit. The Social Democratic party, reflecting the interests of the cityproletariat, had never been enthusiastic about the peasants' claim fordistribution of the land, and there had been much controversy between itsleaders and the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the party ofthe peasants. The program as printed in Pravda read:

 1. A biennial one-house parliament. 

 2. Wide extension of the principle of self-government. 

 3. Inviolability of person and dwelling. 

 4. Unlimited freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly. 

 5. Freedom of movement in business. 

 6. Equal rights for all irrespective of sex, religion, and nationality. 

 7. Abolition of class distinction. 

 8. Education in native language; native languages everywhere to have equal rights with official language. 

 9. Every nationality in the state to have the right of self-definition. 

 10. The right of all persons to prosecute officials before a jury. 

 11. Election of magistrates. 

 12. A citizen army instead of ordinary troops. 

 13. Separation of Church from state and school from Church. 

 14. Free compulsory education for both sexes to the age of sixteen. 

 15. State feeding of poor children. 

 16. Confiscation of Church property, also that of the royal family. 

 17. Progressive income tax. 

 18. An eight-hour day, with six hours for all under eighteen. 

 19. Prohibition of female labor where such is harmful to women. 

 20. A clear holiday once a week to consist of forty-two hours on end. 

It would be a mistake to suppose that this very moderate program embracedall that the majority of the Social Democratic party aimed at. It was notintended to be more than an ameliorative program for immediate adoption bythe Constituent Assembly, for the convocation of which the Social Democratswere most eager, and which they confidently believed would have a majorityof Socialists of different factions. 

In a brilliant and caustic criticism of conditions as they existed in thepre-Bolshevist period, Trotzky denounced what he called "the farce of dualauthority. " In a characteristically clever and biting phrase, he describedit as "The epoch of Dual Impotence, the government not able, and the Sovietnot daring, " and predicted its culmination in a "crisis of unheard-ofseverity. "[5] There was more than a little truth in the scornful phrase. Onthe one hand, there was the Provisional Government, to which the Soviet hadgiven its consent and its allegiance, trying to discharge the functions ofgovernment. On the other hand, there was the Soviet itself, claiming theright to control the course of the Provisional Government and indulging insystematic criticism of the latter's actions. It was inevitable that theSoviet should have been driven irresistibly to the point where it musteither renounce its own existence or oppose the Provisional Government. 

The dominating spirit and thought of the Soviet was that of internationalsocial democracy. While most of the delegates believed that it wasnecessary to prosecute the war and to defeat the aggressions of the CentralEmpires, they were still Socialists, internationalists, fundamentaldemocrats, and anti-imperialists. Not without good and sufficient reason, they mistrusted the bourgeois statesmen and believed that some of the mostinfluential among them were imperialists, actuated by a desire forterritorial expansion, especially the annexation of Constantinople, andthat they were committed to various secret treaties entered into by the oldrégime with England, France, and Italy. In the meetings of the Soviet, andin other assemblages of workers, the ugly suspicion grew that the war wasnot simply a war for national defense, for which there was democraticsanction and justification, but a war of imperialism, and that theProvisional Government was pursuing the old ways of secret diplomacy. 

Strength was given to this feeling when Miliukov, the Foreign Minister, inan interview championed the annexation of Constantinople as a necessarysafeguard for the outlet to the Mediterranean which Russian economicdevelopment needed. Immediately there was an outcry of protest from theSoviet, in which, it should be observed, the Bolsheviki were alreadygaining strength and confidence, thanks to the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine's colleague, who had returned from Siberian exile. It was not onlythe Bolsheviki, however, who protested against imperialistic tendencies. Practically the whole body of Socialists, Mensheviki and Bolsheviki alike, agreed in opposing imperialism and secret diplomacy. Socialists loyal tothe national defense and Socialists who repudiated that policy and deemedit treason to the cause of Socialism were united in this one thing. 

The storm of protest which Miliukov's interview provoked was stilledtemporarily when the Premier, Lvov, announced that the Foreign Minister'sviews concerning the annexation of Constantinople were purely personal anddid not represent the policy of the Provisional Government. Assurances weregiven that the Provisional Government was in accord with the policy of theSoviet. On April 16th a national congress of the Councils of Workmen's andSoldiers' Delegates adopted a series of resolutions in which there was adistinct menace to the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation bythe Petrograd Soviet had taken the form of a letter addressed to"Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries, " but being in fact anappeal to the German working class to rise and refuse to fight againstdemocratic and free Russia. [6] It declared that the peoples must take thematter of deciding questions of war and peace into their own hands. The newdeclaration was addressed to the Russian people:

 _First_. --The Provisional Government, which constituted itself during the Revolution, in agreement with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd, published a proclamation announcing its program. This Congress records that this program contains in principle political demands for Russian democracy, and _recognizes that so far the Provisional Government has faithfully carried out its promises_. 

 _Second_. --This Congress appeals to the whole revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally to the support of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, which is the center of the organized democratic forces that are capable, in unison with other progressive forces, of counteracting any counter revolutionary attempt and of consolidating the conquests of the revolution. 

 _Third_. --The Congress recognizes the necessity of permanent political control, the necessity of exercising an influence over the Provisional Government which will keep it up to a more energetic struggle against anti-revolutionary forces, and the necessity of exercising an influence which will insure its democratizing the whole Russian life and paving the way for a common _peace without annexations or contributions_, but on a basis of free national development of all peoples. 

 _Fourth_. --The Congress appeals to the democracy, while declining responsibility for any of its acts, to support the Provisional Government as long as it continues to consolidate and develop the conquest of the Revolution, _and as long as the basis of its foreign policy does not rest upon aspirations for territorial expansion_. 

 _Fifth_. --The Congress calls upon the revolutionary democracy of Russia, rallying around the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, to be ready to _vigorously suppress any attempt by the government to elude the control of democracy or to renounce the carrying out of its pledges_. [7]

On April 27th, acting under pressure from the Soviet, the ProvisionalGovernment published a Manifesto to the Russian people in which itannounced a foreign policy which conformed to that which the Congress ofCouncils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates had adopted. On May 1stMiliukov, the Foreign Minister, transmitted this Manifesto to the Alliedgovernments as a preliminary to an invitation to those governments torestate their war aims. Accompanying the Manifesto was a Note ofexplanation, which was interpreted by a great many of the Socialists as anintimation to the Allies that the Manifesto was intended merely for homeconsumption, and that the Provisional Government would be glad to have theAllies disregard it. It is difficult for any one outside of Russia, whosesympathies were with the Entente Allies, to gather such an impression fromthe text of the Note, which simply set forth that enemy attempts to spreadthe belief that Russia was about to make a separate peace with Germany madeit necessary for the Provisional Government to state its "entire agreement"with the aims of the Allies as set forth by their statesmen, includingPresident Wilson, and to affirm that "the Provisional Government, insafeguarding the right acquired for our country, will maintain a strictregard for its agreement with the allies of Russia. "

Although it was explained that the Note had been sent with the knowledgeand approval of the Provisional Government, the storm of fury it producedwas directed against Miliukov and, in less degree, Guchkov. Tremendousdemonstrations of protest against "imperialism" were held. In the Soviet avigorous demand for the overthrow of the Provisional Government was made bythe steadily growing Bolshevik faction and by many anti-BolshevikiSocialists. To avert the disaster of a vote of the Soviet against it, theProvisional Government made the following explanation of the so-calledMiliukov Note:

 The Note was subjected to long and detailed examination by the Provisional Government, and was unanimously approved. This Note, in speaking of a "decisive victory, " had in view a solution of the problems mentioned in the communication of April 9th, and which was thus specified:

 "The government deems it to be its right and duty to declare now that free Russia does not aim at the domination of other nations, or at depriving them of their national patrimony, or at occupying by force foreign territories, but that its object is to establish a durable peace on the basis of the rights of nations to decide their own destiny. 

 "The Russian nation does not lust after the strengthening of its power abroad at the expense of other nations. Its aim is not to subjugate or humiliate any one. In the name of the higher principles of equity, the Russian people have broken the chains which fettered the Polish nation, but it will not suffer that its own country shall emerge from the great struggle humiliated or weakened in its vital forces. 

 "In referring to the 'penalties and guarantees' essential to a durable peace, the Provisional Government had in view the reduction of armaments, the establishment of international tribunals, etc. 

 "This explanation will be communicated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers. "

This assurance satisfied a majority of the delegates to the Soviet meetingheld on the evening of May 4th, and a resolution of confidence in theProvisional Government was carried, after a very stormy debate. Themajority, however, was a very small one, thirty-five in a total vote ofabout twenty-five hundred. It was clearly evident that the politicalgovernment and the Soviet, which was increasingly inclined to assume thefunctions of government, were nearing a serious breach. With each day theCouncil of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, as the organized expressionof the great mass of wage-workers in Petrograd, grew in power over theProvisional Government and its influence throughout the whole of Russia. OnMay 13th Guchkov resigned, and three days later Miliukov followed hisexample. The party of the Constitutional Democrats had come to beidentified in the minds of the revolutionary proletariat with imperialismand secret diplomacy, and was utterly discredited. The crisis developed anintensification of the distrust of the bourgeoisie by the proletariat. 

IV

The crisis was not due solely to the diplomacy of the ProvisionalGovernment. Indeed, that was a minor cause. Behind all the discussions anddisputes over Miliukov's conduct of the affairs of the Foreign Office therewas the far more serious issue created by the agitation of the Bolsheviki. Under the leadership of Kamenev, Lenine, and others less well known, whoskillfully exploited the friction with the Provisional Government, the ideaof overthrowing that bourgeois body and of asserting that the Councils ofWorkmen's and Soldiers' Delegates would rule Russia in the interests of theworking class made steady if not rapid progress. 

Late in April Lenine and several other active Bolshevik leaders returned toPetrograd from Switzerland, together with Martov and other Menshevikleaders, who, while differing from the Bolsheviki upon practically allother matters, agreed with them in their bitter and uncompromisingopposition to the war and in demanding an immediate peace. [8] As is wellknown, they were granted special facilities by the German Government inorder that they might reach Russia safely. Certain Swiss Socialist leaders, regarded as strongly pro-German, arranged with the German Government thatthe Russian revolutionists should be permitted to travel across Germany byrail, in closed carriages. Unusual courtesies were extended to thetravelers by the German authorities, and it was quite natural that Lenineand his associates should have been suspected of being sympathizers with, if not the paid agents and tools of, the German Government. The manner inwhich their actions, when they arrived in Russia, served the ends soughtby the German military authorities naturally strengthened the suspicion sothat it became a strong conviction. 

Suspicious as the circumstances undoubtedly were, there is a very simpleexplanation of the conduct of Lenine and his companions. It is not at allnecessary to conclude that they were German agents. Let us look at thefacts with full candor: Lenine had long openly advocated the view that thedefeat of Russia, even by Germany, would be good for the Russianrevolutionary movement. But that was in the days before the overthrow ofthe Czar. Since that time his position had naturally shifted somewhat; hehad opposed the continuation of the war and urged the Russian workers towithhold support from it. He had influenced the Soviets to demand arestatement of war aims by the Allies, and to incessantly agitate forimmediate negotiations looking toward a general and democratic peace. Ofcourse, the preaching of such a policy in Russia at that time by a leaderso powerful and influential as Lenine, bound as it was to divide Russia andsow dissension among the Allies, fitted admirably into the German plans. That Germany would have been glad to pay for the performance of service sovaluable can hardly be doubted. 

On his side, Lenine is far too astute a thinker to have failed tounderstand that the German Government had its own selfish interests in viewwhen it arranged for his passage across Germany. But the fact that theAllies would suffer, and that the Central Empires would gain someadvantage, was of no consequence to him. That was an unavoidable accidentand was purely incidental. His own purpose, to lead the revolutionarymovement into a new phase, in which he believed with fanaticalthoroughness, was the only thing that mattered in the least. If theconditions had been reversed, and he could only have reached Russia by theco-operation of the Allies, whose cause would be served, howeverunintentionally, by his work, he would have felt exactly the same. On theother hand, it was of the essence of his faith that his policy would leadto the overthrow of all capitalist-imperialist governments, those ofGermany and her allies no less than those ranged on the other side. Germanymight reason that a revolutionary uprising led by Lenine would rid her ofone of her enemies and enable her to hurl larger forces against the foe onthe western front. At that reasoning Lenine would smile in derision, thoroughly believing that any uprising he might bring about in Russia wouldsweep westward and destroy the whole fabric of Austro-Germancapitalist-imperialism. Lenine knew that he was being used by Germany, buthe believed that he, in turn, was using Germany. He was supremely confidentthat he could outplay the German statesmen and military leaders. 

It was a dangerous game that Lenine was playing, and he knew it, but thestakes were high and worth the great risk involved. It was not necessaryfor Germany to buy the service he could render to her; that service wouldbe an unavoidable accompaniment of his mission. He argued that his workcould, at the worst, give only temporary advantage to Germany. So far asthere is any evidence to show, Lenine has been personally incorruptible. Holding lightly what he scornfully derides as "bourgeois morality, " unmoralrather than immoral, willing to use any and all means to achieve ends whichhe sincerely believes to be the very highest and noblest that ever inspiredmankind, he would, doubtless, take German money if he saw that it wouldhelp him to achieve his purposes. He would do so, however, without anythought of self-aggrandizement. It is probably safe and just to believethat if Lenine ever took money from the Germans, either at that time orsubsequently, he did so in this spirit, believing that the net result ofhis efforts would be equally disastrous to all the capitalist governmentsconcerned in the war. It must be remembered, moreover, that thedistinctions drawn by most thoughtful men between autocratic governmentslike those which ruled Germany and Austria and the more democraticgovernments of France, England, and America, have very little meaning orvalue to men like Lenine. They regard the political form as relativelyunimportant; what matters is the fundamental economic class interestrepresented by the governments. Capitalist governments are all equallyundesirable. 

What Lenine's program was when he left Switzerland is easily learned. A fewdays before he left Switzerland he delivered a lecture on "The RussianRevolution, " in which he made a careful statement of his position. It givesa very good idea of Lenine's mental processes. It shows him as a Marxist ofthe most dogmatic type--the type which caused Marx himself to rejoice thathe was not a "Marxist":

 As to the revolutionary organization and its task, the conquest of the power of the state and militarism: From the praxis of the French Commune of 1871, Marx shows that "the working class cannot simply take over the governmental machinery as built by the bourgeoisie, and use this machinery for its own purposes. " The proletariat must break down this machinery. And this has been either concealed or denied by the opportunists. [9] But it is the most valuable lesson of the Paris Commune of 1871 and the Revolution in Russia in 1905. The difference between us and the Anarchists is, that we admit the state is a necessity in the development of our Revolution. The difference with the opportunists and the Kautsky[10] disciples is that we claim that we do not need the bourgeois state machinery as completed in the "democratic" bourgeois republics, but _the direct power of armed and organized workers_. Such was the character of the Commune of 1871 and of the Council of Workmen and Soldiers of 1905 and 1917. On this basis we build. [11]

Lenine went on to outline his program of action, which was to begin a newphase of the Revolution; to carry the revolt against Czarism onward againstthe bourgeoisie. Notwithstanding his scorn for democracy, he declared atthat time that his policy included the establishment of a "democraticrepublic, " confiscation of the landed estates of the nobility in favor ofthe peasants, and the opening up of immediate peace negotiations. But thelatter he would take out of the hands of the government entirely. "Peacenegotiations should not be carried on by and with bourgeois governments, but with the proletariat in each of the warring countries. " In hiscriticism of Kerensky and Tchcheidze the Bolshevik leader was especiallyscornful and bitter. 

In a letter which he addressed to the Socialists of Switzerland immediatelyafter his departure for Russia, Lenine gave a careful statement of his ownposition and that of his friends. It shows an opportunistic attitude ofmind which differs from the opportunistic attitude of the moderateSocialists _in direction only_, not in the _quality of beingopportunistic_:

 Historic conditions have made the Russians, _perhaps for a short period_, the leaders of the revolutionary world proletariat, _but Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia_. We can expect only an agrarian revolution, which will help to create more favorable conditions for further development of the proletarian forces and _may result in measures for the control of production and distribution_. 

 The main results of the present Revolution will have to be _the creation of more favorable conditions for further revolutionary development_, and to influence the more highly developed European countries into action. [12]

The Bolsheviki at this period had as their program the following:

(1) The Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants to constitute themselvesinto the actual revolutionary government and establish the dictatorship ofthe proletariat; (2) immediate confiscation of landed estates withoutcompensation, the seizure to be done by the peasants themselves, withoutwaiting for legal forms or processes, the peasants to organize intoSoviets; (3) measures for the control of production and distribution by therevolutionary government, nationalization of monopolies, repudiation of thenational debt; (4) the workers to take possession of factories and operatethem in co-operation with the technical staffs; (5) refusal by the Sovietsto recognize any treaties made by the governments either of the Czar or thebourgeoisie, and the immediate publication of all such treaties; (6) theworkers to propose at once and publicly an immediate truce and negotiationsof peace, these to be carried on by the proletariat and not by and with thebourgeoisie; (7) bourgeois war debts to be paid exclusively by thecapitalists. 

According to Litvinov, who is certainly not an unfriendly authority, assoon as Lenine arrived in Russia he submitted a new program to his partywhich was so novel, and so far a departure from accepted Socialistprinciples, that "Lenine's own closest friends shrank from it and refusedto accept it. "[13]

This program involved the abandonment of the plans made for holding theConstituent Assembly, or, at any rate, such a radical change as to amountto the abandonment of the accepted plans. _He proposed that universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage be frankly abandoned, and that only theindustrial proletariat and the poorest section of the peasantry bepermitted to vote at all!_ Against the traditional Socialist view thatclass distinctions must be wiped out and the class war ended by thevictorious proletariat, Lenine proposed to make the class division morerigid and enduring. He proposed to give the sole control of Russia into thehands of not more than two hundred thousand workers in a land of onehundred and eighty millions of people, more than one hundred andthirty-five millions of whom were peasants!

Of course, there could be no reconciliation between such views as these andthe universally accepted Socialist principle of democratic government. Lenine did not hesitate to declare that democracy itself was a "bourgeoisconception" which the revolutionary proletariat must overthrow, adeclaration hard to reconcile with his demand for a "democratic republic. "Russia must not become a democratic republic, he argued, for a democraticrepublic is a bourgeois republic. Again and again, during the time we arediscussing and later, Lenine assailed the principle of democraticgovernment. "Since March, 1917, the word 'democracy' is simply a shacklefastened upon the revolutionary nation, " he declared in an article writtenafter the Bolsheviki had overthrown Kerensky. [14]

When democracy is abolished, parliamentary government goes with it. Fromthe first days after his return to Russia Lenine advocated, instead of aparliamentary republic similar to that of France or the United States, whathe called a Soviet republic, which would be formed upon these lines: localgovernment would be carried on by local Soviets composed of delegateselected by "the working class and the poorest peasantry, " to use a commonBolshevik phrase which bothers a great many people whose minds insist uponclassifying peasants as "working-people" and part of the working class. What Lenine means when he uses the phrase, and what Litvinov means[15] isthat the industrial wage-workers--to whom is applied the term "workingclass"--must be sharply distinguished from peasants and small farmers, though the very poorest peasants, not being conservative, as moreprosperous peasants are, can be united with the wage-workers. 

These local Soviets functioning in local government would, in Lenine'sSoviet republic, elect delegates to a central committee of all the Sovietsin the country, and that central committee would be the state. Except indetails of organization, this is not materially different from thefundamental idea of the I. W. W. With which we are familiar. [16] According tothe latter, the labor-unions, organized on industrial lines and federatedthrough a central council, will take the place of parliamentary governmentelected on territorial lines. According to the Bolshevik plan, Sovietswould take the place held by the unions in the plan of the I. W. W. It is notto be wondered at that, in the words of Litvinov, Lenine's own closestfriends shrank from his scheme and Lenine "was compelled to drop it for atime. "

V

Bolshevism was greatly strengthened in its leadership by the return of LeonTrotzky, who arrived in Petrograd on May 17th. Trotzky was born in Moscowabout forty-five years ago. Like Lenine, he is of bourgeois origin, hisfather being a wealthy Moscow merchant. He is a Jew and his real name isBronstein. To live under an assumed name has always been a common practiceamong Russian revolutionists, for very good and cogent reasons. Certainlyall who knew anything at all of the personnel of the Russian revolutionarymovement during the past twenty years knew that Trotzky was Bronstein, andthat he was a Jew. The idea, assiduously disseminated by a section of theAmerican press, that there must be something discreditable or mysteriousconnected with his adoption of an alias is extremely absurd, and can onlybe explained by monumental ignorance of Russian revolutionary history. 

Trotzky has been a fighter in the ranks of the revolutionary army of Russiafor twenty years. As early as 1900 his activities as a Socialistpropagandist among students had landed him in prison in solitaryconfinement. In 1902 he was exiled to eastern Siberia, whence he managed toescape. During the next three years he lived abroad, except for briefintervals spent in Russia, devoting himself to Socialist journalism. Hisfirst pamphlet, published in Geneva in 1903, was an attempt to reconcilethe two factions in the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki and theMensheviki. He was an orthodox Marxist of the most extreme doctrinairetype, and naturally inclined to the Bolshevik view. Yet he never joined theBolsheviki, preferring to remain aloof from both factions and steadfastlyand earnestly striving to unite them. 

When the Revolution of 1905 broke out Trotzky had already attainedconsiderable influence among the Socialists. He was regarded as one of theablest of the younger Marxians, and men spoke of him as destined to occupythe place of Plechanov. He became one of the most influential leaders ofthe St. Petersburg Soviet, and was elected its president. In that capacityhe labored with titanic energy and manifested great versatility, asorganizer, writer, speaker, and arbiter of disputes among warringindividuals and groups. When the end came he was arrested and thrown intoprison, where he remained for twelve months. After that he was tried andsentenced to life-exile in northern Siberia. From this he managed toescape, however, and from 1907 until the outbreak of the war in 1914 helived in Vienna. 

The first two years of the war he lived in France, doing editorial work fora radical Russian Socialist daily paper, the _Nashe Slovo_. His writing, together with his activity in the Zimmerwald movement of anti-warSocialists, caused his expulsion from France. The Swiss government havingrefused to permit him to enter Switzerland, he sought refuge in Spain, where he was once more arrested and imprisoned for a short time. Releasedthrough the intervention of Spanish Socialists, he set sail with his familyfor New York, where he arrived early in January, 1917. Soon after the newsof the Russian Revolution thrilled the world Trotzky, like many otherRussian exiles, made hasty preparations to return, sailing on March 27thon a Norwegian steamer. At Halifax he and his family, together with anumber of other Russian revolutionists, were taken from the ship andinterned in a camp for war prisoners, Trotzky resisting violently andhaving to be carried off the ship. The British authorities kept theminterned for a month, but finally released them at the urgent demand of theForeign Minister of the Russian Provisional Government, Miliukov. 

Such, in brief outline, is the history of the man Trotzky. It is a typicalRussian history: the story of a persistent, courageous, and exceedinglyable fighter for an ideal believed in with fanatical devotion. Lenine, inone of his many disputes with Trotzky, called him "a man who blinds himselfwith revolutionary phrases, "[17] and the description is very apt. Hepossesses all the usual characteristics of the revolutionary JewishSocialists of Russia. To a high-strung, passionate, nervous temperament andan exceedingly active imagination he unites a keen intellect which findsits highest satisfaction in theoretical abstractions and subtleties, andwhich accepts, phrases as though they were realities. 

Understanding of Trotzky's attitude during the recent revolutionary andcounter-revolutionary struggles is made easier by understanding thedevelopment of his thought in the First Revolution, 1905-06. He began as anextremely orthodox Marxist, and believed that any attempt to establish aSocialist order in Russia until a more or less protracted intensiveeconomic development, exhausting the possibilities of capitalism, madechange inevitable, must fail. He accepted the view that a powerfulcapitalist class must be developed and perform its indispensable historicalrôle, to be challenged and overthrown in its turn by the proletariat. Thatwas the essence of his pure and unadulterated faith. To it he clung withall the tenacity of his nature, deriding as "Utopians" and "dreamers" thepeasant Socialists who refused to accept the Marxian theory of Socialism asthe product of historic necessity as applicable to Russia. 

The great upheaval of 1905 changed his viewpoint. The manner in whichrevolutionary ideas spread among the masses created in Trotzky, as in manyothers, almost unbounded confidence and enthusiasm. In an essay writtensoon after the outbreak of the Revolution he wrote: "The Revolution hascome. _One move of hers has lifted the people over scores of steps, upwhich in times of peace we would have had to drag ourselves with hardshipsand fatigue_. " The idea that the Revolution had "lifted the people overscores of steps" possessed him and changed his whole conception of themanner in which Socialism was to come. Still calling himself a Marxist, andbelieving as strongly as ever in the fundamental Marxian doctrines, as heunderstood them, he naturally devoted his keen mind with its peculiaraptitude for Talmudic hair-splitting to a new interpretation of Marxism. Hedeclared his belief that in Russia it was possible to change fromAbsolutism to Socialism immediately, without the necessity of a prolongedperiod of capitalist development. At the same time, he maintained ascornful attitude toward the "Utopianism" of the peasant Socialists, whohad always made the same contention, because he believed they based theirhopes and their policy upon a wrong conception of Socialism. He had smallpatience for their agrarian Socialism with its economic basis inpeasant-proprietorship and voluntary co-operation. 

He argued that the Russian bourgeoisie was so thoroughly infected with theills of the bureaucratic system that it was itself decadent; not virileand progressive as a class aiming to possess the future must be. Since itwas thus corrupted and weakened, and therefore incapable of fulfilling anyrevolutionary historical rôle, that became the _immediate_ task of theproletariat. Here was an example of the manner in which lifting overrevolutionary steps was accomplished. Of course, the peasantry was in abackward and even primitive state which unfitted it for the proletarianrôle. Nevertheless, it had a class consciousness of its own, and anirresistible hunger for land. Without this class supporting it, or, atleast, acquiescing in its rule, the proletariat could never hope to seizeand hold the power of government. It would be possible to solve thedifficulty here presented, Trotzky contended, if the enactment of thepeasant program were permitted during the Revolution and accepted by theproletariat as a _fait accompli_. This would satisfy the peasants and makethem content to acquiesce in a proletarian dictatorship. Once firmlyestablished in power, it would be possible for the proletariat to graduallyapply the true Socialist solution to the agrarian problem and to convertthe peasants. "Once in power, the proletariat will appear before thepeasantry as its liberator, " he wrote. 

His imagination fired by the manner in which the Soviet of which he waspresident held the loyalty of the masses during the revolutionary uprising, and the representative character it developed, Trotzky conceived the ideathat it lent itself admirably to the scheme of proletarian dictatorship. Parliamentary government cannot be used to impose and maintain adictatorship, whether of autocracy or oligarchy, bourgeoisie orproletariat. In the Soviet, as a result of six weeks' experience inabnormal times, during which it was never for a moment subjected to thetest of maintaining the economic life of the nation, Trotzky saw the idealproletarian government. He once described the Soviet as "a true, unadulterated democracy, " but, unless we are to dismiss the description asidle and vain rhetoric, we must assume that the word "democracy" was usedin an entirely new sense, utterly incompatible with its etymological andhistorical meaning. Democracy has always meant absence of class rule;proletarian dictatorship is class rule. 

In the foregoing analysis of the theoretical and tactical views whichTrotzky held during and immediately after the First Revolution, it is easyto see the genesis of the policies of the Bolshevik government which cametwelve years later. The intervening years served only to deepen hisconvictions. At the center of all his thinking during that period was hisbelief in the sufficiency of the Soviet, and in the need of proletariandictatorship. Throwing aside the first cautious thought that these thingsarose from the peculiar conditions existing in Russia as a result of herretarded economic development, he had come to regard them as applicable toall nations and to all peoples, except, perhaps, the peoples still livingin barbarism or savagery. 

VI

After the crisis which resulted in the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov, it was evident that the Lvov government could not long endure. Thesituation in the army, as well as in the country, was so bad that thecomplete reorganization of the Provisional Government, upon much moreradical lines, was imperative. The question arose among the revolutionaryworking-class organizations whether they should consent to co-operationwith the liberal bourgeoisie in a new coalition Cabinet or whether theyshould refuse such co-operation and fight exclusively on class lines. This, of course, opened the entire controversy between Bolsheviki and Mensheviki. 

In the mean time the war-weary nation was clamoring for peace. The army wasdemoralized and saturated with the defeatism preached by the Porazhentsi. To deal with this grave situation two important conventions were arrangedfor, as follows: the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front, which opened on May 10th and lasted for about a week, and the FirstAll-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, which opened on May 17th andlasted for about twelve days. Between the two gatherings there was also animportant meeting of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'Deputies, which dealt with the same grave situation. The dates here are ofthe greatest significance: the first convention was opened three daysbefore Miliukov's resignation and was in session when that event occurred;the second convention was opened four days after the resignation ofMiliukov and one day after that of Guchkov. It was Guchkov's uniqueexperience to address the convention of Soldiers' Delegates from the Frontas Minister of War and Marine, explaining and defending his policy withgreat ability, and then, some days later, to address the same assembly as aprivate citizen. 

Guchkov drew a terrible picture of the seriousness of the militarysituation. With truly amazing candor he described conditions and explainedhow they had been brought about. He begged the soldiers not to lay downtheir arms, but to fight with new courage. Kerensky followed with a longspeech, noble and full of pathos. In some respects, it was the mostpowerful of all the appeals it fell to his lot to make to his people, whowere staggering in the too strong sunlight of an unfamiliar freedom. Hedid not lack courage to speak plainly: "My heart and soul are uneasy. I amgreatly worried and I must say so openly, no matter what ... Theconsequences will be. The process of resurrecting the country's creativeforces for the purpose of establishing the new régime rests on the basis ofliberty and personal responsibility.... A century of slavery has not onlydemoralized the government and transformed the old officials into a band oftraitors, _but it has also destroyed in the people themselves theconsciousness of their responsibility for their fate, their country'sdestiny_. " It was in this address that he cried out in his anguish: "Iregret that I did not die two months ago. I would have died happy with thedream that the flame of a new life has been kindled in Russia, hopeful of atime when we could respect one another's right without resorting to theknout. "

To the soldiers Kerensky brought this challenge: "You fired on the peoplewhen the government demanded. But now, when it comes to obeying your ownrevolutionary government, you can no longer endure further sacrifice! Doesthis mean that free Russia is a nation of rebellious slaves?" He closedwith an eloquent peroration: "I came here because I believe in my right totell the truth as I understand it. People who even under the old régimewent about their work openly and without fear of death, those people, Isay, will not be terrorized. The fate of our country is in our hands andthe country is in great danger. We have sipped of the cup of liberty and weare somewhat intoxicated; we are in need of the greatest possible sobrietyand discipline. We must go down in history meriting the epitaph on ourtombstones, 'They died, but they were never slaves. '"

From the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies came I. G. Tseretelli, who had just returned from ten years' Siberian exile. A nativeof Georgia, a prince, nearly half of his forty-two years had been spenteither in Socialist service or in exile brought about by such service. Aman of education, wise in leadership and a brilliant orator, his leadershipof the Socialist Group in the Second Duma had marked him as one of thetruly great men of Russia. To the Convention of Soldiers' Delegates fromthe Front Tseretelli brought the decisions of the Council of Workmen's andSoldiers' Deputies, in shaping which he had taken an important part withTchcheidze, Skobelev, and others. The Council had decided "to send anappeal to the soldiers at the front, and to explain to them that _in orderto bring about universal peace it is necessary to defend the Revolution andRussia by defending the front_. " This action had been taken despite theopposition of the Bolsheviki, and showed that the moderate Socialists werestill in control of the Soviet. An Appeal to the Army, drawn up byTseretelli, was adopted by the vote of every member except the Bolsheviki, who refrained from voting. This Appeal to the Army Tseretelli presented tothe Soldiers' Delegates from the Front:

 Comrades, soldiers at the front, in the name of the Revolutionary Democracy, we make a fervent appeal to you. 

 A hard task has fallen to your lot. You have paid a dear price, you have paid with your blood, a dear price indeed, for the crimes of the Czar who sent you to fight and left you without arms, without ammunition, without bread!

 Why, the privation you now suffer is the work of the Czar and his coterie of self-seeking associates who brought the country to ruin. And the Revolution will need the efforts of many to overcome the disorganization left her as a heritage by these robbers and executioners. 

 The working class did not need the war. The workers did not begin it. It was started by the Czars and capitalists of all countries. Each day of war is for the people only a day of unnecessary suffering and misfortune. Having dethroned the Czar, the Russian people have selected for their first problem the ending of the war in the quickest possible manner. 

 The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has appealed to all nations to end the butchery. We have appealed to the French and the English, to the Germans and the Austrians. [18] Russia wants an answer to this appeal. Remember, however, comrades and soldiers, that our appeal will be of no value if the regiments of Wilhelm overpower Revolutionary Russia before our brothers, the workers and peasants of other countries, will be able to respond. Our appeal will become "a scrap of paper" if the whole strength of the revolutionary people does not stand behind it, if the triumph of Wilhelm Hohenzollern will be established on the ruins of Russian freedom. The ruin of free Russia will be a tremendous, irreparable misfortune, not only for us, but for the toilers of the whole world. 

 Comrades, soldiers, defend Revolutionary Russia with all your might!

 The workers and peasants of Russia desire peace with all their soul. But this peace must be universal, a peace for all nations based on the agreement of all. 

 What would happen if we should agree to a separate peace--a peace for ourselves alone! What would happen if the Russian soldiers were to stick their bayonets into the ground to-day and say that they do not care to fight any longer, that it makes no difference to them what happens to the whole world!

 Here is what would happen. Having destroyed our allies in the west, German Imperialism would rush in upon us with all the force of its arms. Germany's imperialists, her landowners and capitalists, would put an iron heel on our necks, would occupy our cities, our villages, and our land, and would force us to pay tribute to her. Was it to bow down at the feet of Wilhelm that we overthrew Nicholas?

 Comrades--soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies leads you to peace by another route. We lead you to peace by calling upon the workers and peasants of Serbia and Austria to rise and revolt; we lead you to peace by calling an international conference of Socialists for a universal and determined revolt against war. There is a great necessity, comrades--soldiers, for the peoples of the world to awaken. Time is needed in order that they should rebel and with an iron hand force their Czars and capitalists to peace. Time is needed so that the toilers of all lands should join with us for a merciless war upon violators and robbers. 

 _But remember, comrades--soldiers, this time will never come if you do not stop the advance of the enemy at the front, if your ranks are crushed and under the feet of Wilhelm falls the breathless corpse of the Russian Revolution_. 

 Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are now standing in defense of Russia's freedom. You defend the Revolution, you defend your brothers, the workers and peasants. Let this defense be worthy of the great cause and the great sacrifices already made by you. _It is impossible to defend the front if, as has been decided, the soldiers are not to leave the trenches under any circumstances_. [19] At times only an attack can repulse and prevent the advance of the enemy. At times awaiting an attack means patiently waiting for death. Again, only the change to an advance may save you or your brothers, on other sections of the front, from destruction. 

 Remember this, comrades--soldiers! Having sworn to defend Russian freedom, do not refuse to start the offensive the military situation may require. The freedom and happiness of Russia are in your hands. 

 In defending this freedom be on the lookout for betrayal and trickery. The fraternization which is developing on the front can easily turn into such a trap. 

 Revolutionary armies may fraternize, but with whom? With an army also revolutionary, which has decided to die for peace and freedom. At present, however, not only in the German army, but even in the Austro-Hungarian army, in spite of the number of individuals politically conscious and honest, there is no revolution. In those countries the armies are still blindly following Wilhelm and Charles, the landowners and capitalists, and agree to annexation of foreign soil, to robberies and violence. There the General Staff will make use not only of your credulity, but also of the blind obedience of their soldiers. You go out to fraternize with open hearts. And to meet you an officer of the General Staff leaves the enemies' trenches, disguised as a common soldier. You speak with the enemy without any trickery. At that very time he photographs the surrounding territory. You stop the shooting to fraternize, but behind the enemies' trenches artillery is being moved, new positions built and troops transferred. 

 Comrades--soldiers, not by fraternization will you get peace, not by separate agreements made at the front by single companies, battalions, or regiments. Not in separate peace or in a separate truce lies the salvation of the Russian Revolution, the triumph of peace for the whole world. 

 The people who assure you that fraternizing is the road to peace lead you to destruction. Do not believe them. The road to peace is a different one. It has been pointed out to you already by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies: tread it. Sweep aside everything that weakens your fighting power, that brings into the army disorganization and loss of spirit. 

 Your fighting power serves the cause of peace. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is able to continue its revolutionary work with all its might, to develop its struggle for peace, only by depending on you, knowing that you will not allow the military destruction of Russia. 

 Comrades--soldiers, the workers and peasants, not only of Russia, but of the whole world, look to you with confidence and hope. 

 Soldiers of the Revolution, you will prove worthy of this faith, for you know that your military tasks serve the cause of peace. 

 In the name of the happiness and freedom of Revolutionary Russia, in the name of the coming brotherhood of nations, you will fulfil your military duties with unconquerable strength. 

Again and again Tseretelli was interrupted with cheers as he read thisAppeal to the Army. He was cheered, too, when he explained that the Soviethad decided to support the reconstructed Provisional Government and calledupon the soldiers to do likewise. There was a storm of applause when hesaid: "We well realize the necessity of having a strong power in Russia;however, the strength of this power must rely upon its progressive andrevolutionary policy. Our government must adopt the revolutionary slogansof democracy. It must grant the demands of the revolutionary people. Itmust turn over all land to the laboring peasantry. It must safeguard theinterests of the working class, enacting improved social legislation forthe protection of labor. It must lead Russia to a speedy and lasting peaceworthy of a great people. "

When Plechanov was introduced to the convention as "the veteran of theRussian Revolution" he received an ovation such as few men have ever beenaccorded. The great Socialist theorist plunged into a keen and forcefulattack upon the theories of the Bolsheviki. He was frequently interruptedby angry cries and by impatient questionings, which he answered withrapier-like sentences. He was asked what a "democratic" government shouldbe, and replied:

"I am asked, 'What should a democratic government be? My answer is: Itshould be a government enjoying the people's full confidence andsufficiently strong to prevent any possibility of anarchy. Under whatcondition, then, can such a strong, democratic government be established?In my opinion it is necessary, for this purpose, _that the government becomposed of representatives of all those parts of the population that arenot interested in the restoration of the old order. What is called acoalition Ministry is necessary_. Our comrades, the Socialists, acknowledging the necessity of entering the government, can and should setforth definite conditions, definite demands. _But there should be nodemands that would be unacceptable to the representatives of other classes, to the spokesmen of other parts of the population_. "

"Would you have us Russian proletarians fight in this war for England'scolonial interests?" was one of the questions hurled at Plechanov, andgreeted by the jubilant applause of the Bolsheviki. Plechanov replied withgreat spirit, his reply evoking a storm of cheers: "The answer is clear toevery one who accepts the principle of self-determination of nations, " hesaid. "The colonies are not deserts, but populated localities, and theirpopulations should also be given the right to determine freely their owndestinies. It is clear that Russia cannot fight for the sake of any one'spredatory aspirations. _But I am surprised that the question of annexationsis raised in Russia, whose sixteen provinces are under the Prussian heel!_I do not understand this exclusive solicitude for Germany's interests. "

To those who advocated fraternization, who were engaged in spreading theidea that the German working class would refuse to fight against theRussian revolutionists, the great Socialist teacher, possessing one of theripest minds in the whole international Socialist movement, and an intimateknowledge of the history of that movement, made vigorous reply and reciteda significant page of Socialist history:

"In the fall of 1906, when Wilhelm was planning to move his troops on thethen revolutionary Russia, I asked my comrades, the German SocialDemocrats, 'What will you do in case Wilhelm declares war on Russia?' Atthe party convention in Mannheim, Bebel gave me an answer to this question. Bebel introduced a resolution in favor of the declaration of a generalstrike in the event of war being declared on Russia. But this resolutionwas not adopted; _members of the trade-unions voted against it_. This is afact which you should not forget. Bebel had to beat a retreat and introduceanother resolution. Kautsky and Rosa Luxemburg were dissatisfied withBebel's conduct. I asked Kautsky whether there is a way to bring about ageneral strike against the workers' will. As there is no such way, therewas nothing else that Bebel could do. _And if Wilhelm had sent his hordesto Russia in 1906, the German workers would not have done an earthly thingto prevent the butchery_. In September, 1914, the situation was stillworse. "

The opposition to Plechanov on the part of some of the delegates was anevidence of the extent to which disaffection, defeatism, and the readinessto make peace at any price almost--a general peace preferably, but, if not, then a separate peace--had permeated even the most intelligent part of theRussian army. Bolshevism and its ally, defeatism, were far more influentialin the ranks of the soldiers than in those of the workers in the factories. Yet the majority was with Kerensky, Tseretelli, and Plechanov, as thefollowing resolutions adopted by the convention prove:

 The first convention of the Delegates from the Front, having heard reports on current problems from the representatives of the Provisional Government, members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and from representatives of the Socialist parties, and having considered the situation, hereby resolves:

 (1) That the disorganization of the food-supply system and the weakening of the army's fighting capacity, due to a distrust of a majority of the military authorities, to lack of inner organization, and to other temporary causes, have reached such a degree that the freedom won by the Revolution is seriously endangered. 

 (2) That the sole salvation lies in establishing a government enjoying the full confidence of the toiling masses, in the awakening of a creative revolutionary enthusiasm, and in concerted self-sacrificing work on the part of all the elements of the population. 

 The convention extends to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates its warmest appreciation of the latter's self-sacrificing and honest work for the strengthening of the new order in Russia, in the interests of the Russian Democracy and at the same time wishes to see, in the nearest possible future, the above Council transformed into an All-Russian Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. 

 _The convention is of the opinion that the war is at present conducted for purposes of conquest and against the interests of the masses_, and it, therefore, urges the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take the most energetic and effective measures for the purpose of ending this butchery, on the basis of free self-determination of nations and of renunciation by all belligerent countries of annexations and indemnities. Not a drop of Russian blood shall be given for aims foreign to us. 

 Considering that the earliest possible achievement of this purpose is contingent only upon a strong revolutionary army, which would defend freedom and government, and be fully supported by the organized Revolutionary Democracy, that is, by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, responsible for its acts to the whole country, the convention welcomes the responsible decision of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates to take part in the new Provisional Government. 

 The convention demands that the representatives of the Church give up for the country's benefit the treasures and funds now in the possession of churches and monasteries. The convention makes an urgent appeal to all parts of the population. 

 1. To the comrade-soldiers in the rear: Comrades! Come to fill up our thinning ranks in the trenches and rise shoulder to shoulder with us for the country's defense!

 2. Comrade-workers! Work energetically and unite your efforts, and in this way help us in our last fight for universal peace for nations! By strengthening the front you will strengthen freedom!

 3. Fellow-citizens of the capitalist class! Follow the historic example of Minin! Even as he, open your treasuries and quickly bring your money to the aid of Russia!

 4. To the peasants: Fathers and Brothers! Bring your last mite to help the weakening front! Give us bread, and oats and hay to our horses. Remember that the future Russia will be yours!

 5. Comrades-Intellectuals! Come to us and bring the light of knowledge into our dark trenches! Share with us the difficult work of advancing Russia's freedom and prepare us for the citizenship of new Russia!

 6. To the Russian women: Support your husbands and sons in the performing of their civil duty to the country! Replace them where this is not beyond your strength! Let your scorn drive away all those who are slackers in these difficult times!

No one can read this declaration without a deep sense of the lofty andsincere citizenship of the brave men who adopted it as their expression. The fundamental loyalty of these leaders of the common soldiers, theirspokesmen and delegates, is beyond question. Pardonably weary of a war inwhich they had been more shamefully betrayed and neglected than any otherarmy in modern times, frankly suspicious of capitalist governments whichhad made covenants with the hated Romanov dynasty, they were still far frombeing ready to follow the leadership of Bolsheviki. They had, instead, adopted the sanely constructive policy of Tchcheidze, Tseretelli, Skobelev, Plechanov, and other Socialists who from the first had seen the greatstruggle in its true perspective. That they did not succeed in avertingdisaster is due in part to the fact that the Revolution itself had come toolate to make military success possible, and in part to the failure of thegovernments allied with Russia to render intelligent aid. 

VII

The Provisional Government was reorganized. Before we consider the actionsof the All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, one of the mostimportant gatherings of representatives of Russian workers ever held, thereorganization of the Provisional Government merits attention. On the 17th, at a special sitting of the Duma, Guchkov and Miliukov explained why theyhad resigned. Guchkov made it a matter of conscience. Anarchy had enteredinto the administration of the army and navy, he said: "In the way ofreforms the new government has gone very far. Not even in the mostdemocratic countries have the principles of self-government, freedom, andequality been so extensively applied in military life. We have gonesomewhat farther than the danger limit, and the impetuous current drives usfarther still.... I could not consent to this dangerous work; I could notsign my name to orders and laws which in my opinion would lead to a rapiddeterioration of our military forces. A country, and especially an army, cannot be administered on the principles of meetings and conferences. "

Miliukov told his colleagues of the Duma that he had not resigned of hisown free will, but under pressure: "I had to resign, yielding not to force, but to the wish of a considerable majority of my colleagues. With a clearconscience I can say that I did not leave on my own account, but wascompelled to leave. " Nevertheless, he said, the foreign policy he hadpursued was the correct one. "You could see for yourselves that my activityin foreign politics was in accord with your ideas, " he declared amidapplause which eloquently testified to the approval with which thebourgeoisie regarded policies and tendencies which the proletariatcondemned. He pointed out that the pacifist policies of Zimmerwald andKeinthal had permeated a large part of the Socialist movement, and that theSoviet, the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, claiming toexercise control over the Provisional Government, were divided. He fearedthat the proposal to establish a Coalition Government would not lead tosuccess, because of "discord in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers'Delegates itself. " Not all the members of the latter body were agreed uponentering into a Coalition Government, and "it is evident that those who donot enter the government will continue to criticize those who have entered, and it is possible that the Socialists who enter the Cabinet will findthemselves confronted with the same storm of criticism as the governmentdid before. " Still, because it meant the creation of a stronger governmentat once, which was the most vital need, he, like Guchkov, favored acoalition which would ally the Constitutional Democratic party with themajority of the Socialists. 

The Soviet had decided at its meeting on May 14th to participate in aCoalition Ministry. The struggle upon that question between Bolsheviki andMensheviki was long and bitter. The vote, which was forty-one in favor ofparticipation to nineteen against, probably fairly represented the fullstrength of Bolshevism in its stronghold. After various conferences betweenPremier Lvov and the other Ministers, on the one side, and representativesof the Soviet, on the other side, a new Provisional Government wasannounced, with Prince Lvov again Prime Minister. In the new Cabinet therewere seven Constitutional Democrats, six Socialists, and two Octobrists. AsMinister of War and head of the army and navy Alexander Kerensky took theplace of Guchkov, while P. N. Pereverzev, a clever member of theSocialist-Revolutionary party, succeeded Kerensky as Minister of Justice. In Miliukov's position at the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wasplaced M. I. Terestchenko, a wealthy sugar-manufacturer, member of theConstitutional-Democratic party, who had held the post of Minister ofFinance, which was now given to A. I. Shingariev, a brilliant member of thesame party, who had proved his worth and capacity as Minister ofAgriculture. To the latter post was appointed V. M. Chernov, the leader ofthe Socialist-Revolutionists, one of the most capable Socialists in Russia, or, for that matter, the world. Other Socialists of distinction in the newProvisional Government were I. G. Tseretelli, as Minister of Posts andTelegraphs, and M. I. Skobelev, as Minister of Labor. As Minister of Supplyan independent Socialist, A. V. Peshekhonov, was chosen. 

It was a remarkable Cabinet. So far as the Socialists were concerned, itwould have been difficult to select worthier or abler representatives. Asin the formation of the First Provisional Government, attempts had beenmade to induce Tchcheidze to accept a position in the Cabinet, but withoutsuccess. He could not be induced to enter a Coalition Ministry, though hestrongly and even enthusiastically supported in the Soviet the motion toparticipate in such a Ministry. Apart from the regret caused byTchcheidze's decision, it was felt on every hand that the Socialists hadsent into the Second Provisional Government their strongest and mostcapable representatives; men who possessed the qualities of statesmen andwho would fill their posts with honorable distinction and full loyalty. Onthe side of the Constitutional Democrats and the Octobrists, too, therewere men of sterling character, distinguished ability, and very liberalminds. The selection of Terestchenko as Minister of Foreign Affairs was bymany Socialists looked upon with distrust, but, upon the whole, theCoalition Ministry met with warm approbation. If any coalition of the sortcould succeed, the Cabinet headed by Prince Lvov might be expected to doso. 

On the 18th, the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegatesadopted a resolution, introduced by Tchcheidze, president of the Council, warmly approving the entrance of the Socialist Ministers into the Cabinetand accepting the declaration of the new Provisional Government assatisfactory. This resolution was bitterly opposed by the Bolsheviki, whowere led in the fight by Trotzky. This was Trotzky's first speech inPetrograd since his arrival the previous day from America. His speech was ademagogic appeal against co-operation with any bourgeois elements. Participation in the Coalition Ministry by the Socialists was a dangerouspolicy, he argued, since it sacrificed the fundamental principle of classstruggle. Elaborating his views further, he said: "I never believed thatthe emancipation of the working class will come from above. Division ofpower will not cease with the entrance of the Socialists into the Ministry. A strong revolutionary power is necessary. The Russian Revolution will notperish. But I believe only in a miracle from below. There are threecommandments for the proletariat. They are: First, transmission of power tothe revolutionary people; second, control over their own leaders; andthird, confidence in their own revolutionary powers. "

This was the beginning of Trotzky's warfare upon the Coalition Government, a warfare which he afterward systematically waged with all his might. Tchcheidze and others effectively replied to the Bolshevik leader'scriticisms and after long and strenuous debate the resolution of theExecutive Committee presented by Tchcheidze was carried by a largemajority, the opposition only mustering seven votes. The resolution read asfollows:

 Acknowledging that the declaration of the Provisional Government, which has been reconstructed and fortified by the entrance of representatives of the Revolutionary Democracy, conforms to the idea and purpose of strengthening the achievements of the Revolution and its further development, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates has determined:

 I. Representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates must enter into the Provisional Government. 

 II. Those representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates who join the government must, until the creation of an All-Russian organ of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, consider themselves responsible to the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and must pledge themselves to give accounts of all their activities to that Council. 

 III. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates expresses its full confidence in the new Provisional Government, and urges all friends of democracy to give this government active assistance, which will insure it the full measure of power necessary for the safety of the Revolution's gains and for its further development. 

If there is any one thing which may be said with certainty concerning thestate of working-class opinion in Russia at that time, two months after theoverthrow of the old régime, it is that the overwhelming majority of theworking-people, both city workers and peasants, supported the policy of theMensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists--the policy of co-operatingwith liberal bourgeois elements to win the war and create a stablegovernment--as against the policy of the Bolsheviki. The two votes of thePetrograd Soviet told where the city workers stood. That very section ofthe proletariat upon which the Bolsheviki leaders based their hopes hadrepudiated them in the most emphatic manner. The Delegates of the Soldiersat the Front had shown that they would not follow the advice of the leadersof the Bolsheviki. And at the first opportunity which presented itself thepeasants placed themselves in definite opposition to Bolshevism. 

On the afternoon preceding the action of the Soviet in giving itsindorsement to the new Provisional Government and instructing itsrepresentatives to enter the Coalition Cabinet, there assembled in thePeople's House, Petrograd, more than one thousand peasant delegates to thefirst All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Never before had so many peasantdelegates been gathered together in Russia to consider their specialproblems. There were present delegates from every part of Russia, even fromthe extreme border provinces, and many from the front. On the platform werethe members of the Organizing Committee, the Executive Committee of theCouncil of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, the Socialist-Revolutionaryparty, the Social Democratic party, and a number of prominent Socialistleaders. As might be expected in a peasants' Congress, members of theSocialist-Revolutionary party were in the majority, numbering 537. The nextlargest group was the Social Democratic party, including Bolsheviki andMensheviki, numbering 103. There were 136 delegates described asnon-partizan; 4 belonged to the group called the "People's Socialists" and6 to the Labor Group. It was the most representative body of peasantworkers ever brought together. 

Among the first speakers to address the Congress was the venerable"Grandmother" of the Russian Revolution, Catherine Breshkovskaya, who spokewith the freedom accorded to her and to her alone. "Tell me, " she demanded, "is there advantage to us in keeping our front on a war footing and inallowing the people to sit in trenches with their hands folded and to diefrom fever, scurvy, and all sorts of contagious diseases? If our army had areal desire to help the Allies, the war would be finished in one or twomonths, _but we are prolonging it by sitting with our hands folded_. " V. M. Chernov, leader of the Socialist-Revolutionary party, the new Minister ofAgriculture, made a notable address in which he traversed with great skilland courage the arguments of the Bolsheviki, making a superb defense of thepolicy of participation in the government. 

Kerensky, idol of the peasants, appearing for the first time as Minister ofWar and head of the army and navy, made a vigorous plea for unity, forself-discipline, and for enthusiastic support of the new ProvisionalGovernment. He did not mince matters: "I intend to establish an irondiscipline in the army. I am certain that I shall succeed in myundertaking, because it will be a discipline based upon duty toward thecountry, the duty of honor.... By all means, we must see that the countrybecomes free and strong enough to elect the Constituent Assembly, theAssembly which, through its sovereign, absolute power, will give to thetoiling Russian peasants that for which they have been yearning forcenturies, the land.... We are afraid of no demagogues, whether they comefrom the right or from the left. We shall attend to our business, quietlyand firmly. " Kerensky begged the peasants to assert their will that thereshould be "no repetition of the sad events of 1905-06, when the entirecountry seemed already in our hands, but slipped out because it becameinvolved in anarchy. " The speech created a profound impression and it wasvoted to have it printed in millions of copies, at the expense of theCongress, and have them distributed throughout the army. 

A similar honor was accorded the speech of I. I. Bunakov, one of the bestknown and most popular of the leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party. With remorseless logic he traversed the arguments of the Bolsheviki and thePorazhentsi. Taking the cry that there must be "no annexations, " forexample, he declared that the peasants of Russia could only accept that inthe sense that Poland be reunited and her independence be restored; thatthe people of Alsace and Lorraine be permitted to be reunited to France;that Armenia be taken from Turkey and made independent. The peasants couldnot accept the _status quo ante_ as a basis for peace. He assailed thetreacherous propaganda for a separate peace with terrific scorn: "But suchpeace is unacceptable to us peasants. A separate peace would kill not onlyour Revolution, but the cause of social revolution the world over. Aseparate peace is dishonor for Russia and treason toward the Allies.... Wemust start an offensive. To remain in the trenches without moving is aseparate truce, more shameful even than a separate peace. A separate trucedemoralizes the army and ruins the people. This spring, according to ouragreement with the Allies, we should have begun a general offensive, butinstead of that we have concluded a separate truce. _The Allies saved theRussian Revolution, but they are becoming exhausted_.... When our Ministerof War, Kerensky, speaks of starting an offensive, the Russian army mustsupport him with all its strength, with all the means available.... Fromhere we should send our delegates to the front and urge our army to wage anoffensive. Let the army know that it must fight and die for Russia'sfreedom, for the peace of the whole world, and for the coming Socialistcommonwealth. "

In the resolutions which were adopted the Congress confined itself tooutlining a program for the Constituent Assembly, urging the abolition ofprivate property in land, forests, water-power, mines, and mineralresources. It urged the Provisional Government to "issue an absolutelyclear and unequivocal statement which would show that on this question theProvisional Government will allow nobody to oppose the people's will. " Italso issued a special appeal "to the peasants and the whole wage-earningpopulation of Russia" to vote at the forthcoming elections for theConstituent Assembly, "only for those candidates who pledge themselves toadvocate the nationalization of the land without reimbursement onprinciples of equality. " In the election for an Executive Committee tocarry on the work of the Congress and maintain the organization thedelegates with Bolshevist tendencies were "snowed under. " Those who wereelected were, practically without exception, stalwart supporters of thepolicy of participation in and responsibility for the ProvisionalGovernment, and known to be ardent believers in the Constituent Assembly. Chernov, with 810 votes, led the poll; Breshkovskaya came next with 809;Kerensky came third with 804; Avksentiev had 799; Bunakov 790; Vera Finger776, and so on. Nineteenth on the list of thirty elected came the venerableNicholas Tchaykovsky, well known in America. Once more a greatrepresentative body of Russian working-people had spoken and rejected theteachings and the advice of the Bolsheviki. 

VIII

As we have seen, it was with the authority and mandate of the overwhelmingmajority of the organized workers that the Socialists entered the CoalitionMinistry. It was with that mandate that Kerensky undertook the Herculeantask of restoring the discipline and morale of the Russian army. In thatwork he was the agent and representative of the organized working class. For this reason, if for no other, Kerensky and his associates were entitledto expect and to receive the loyal support of all who professed loyalty tothe working class. Instead of giving that support, however, the Bolshevikidevoted themselves to the task of defeating every effort of the ProvisionalGovernment to carry out its program, which, it must be borne in mind, hadbeen approved by the great mass of the organized workers. They availedthemselves of every means in their power to hamper Kerensky in his work andto hinder the organization of the economic resources of the nation tosustain the military forces. 

Kerensky had promised to organize preparations for a vigorous offensiveagainst the Austro-German forces. That such offensive was needed wasobvious and was denied by none except the ultra-pacifists and theBolsheviki. The Congress of Soldiers' Delegates from the Front and thePetrograd Soviet had specifically urged the need of such an offensive, ashad most of the well-known peasants' leaders. It was a working-classpolicy. But that fact did not prevent the Bolsheviki from throwingobstacles in the way of its fulfilment. They carried on an activepropaganda among the men in the army and the navy, urging insubordination, fraternization, and refusal to fight. They encouraged sabotage as a meansof insuring the failure of the efforts of the Provisional Government. Sothoroughly did they play into the hands of the German military authorities, whether intentionally or otherwise, that the charge of being in the pay ofGermany was made against them--not by prejudiced bourgeois politicians andjournalists, but by the most responsible Socialists in Russia. 

The epic story of Kerensky's magnificently heroic fight to recreate theRussian army is too well known to need retelling here. Though it was vainand ended in failure, as it was foredoomed to do, it must forever beremembered with gratitude and admiration by all friends of freedom. Theaudacity and the courage with which Kerensky and a few loyal associatesstrove to maintain Russia in the struggle made the Allied nations, and allthe civilized world, their debtors. Many mistakes were made, it is true, yet it is very doubtful if human beings could have achieved more orsucceeded where they failed. It must be confessed, furthermore, that thegovernments of the nations with which they were allied made many grievousmistakes on their part. 

Perhaps the greatest blunder that a discriminating posterity will charge toKerensky's account was the signing of the famous Declaration of Soldiers'Rights. This document, which was signed on May 27th, can only be regardedin the light of a surrender to overpowering forces. In his address to theAll-Russian Congress of Peasants' Delegates, on May 18th, speaking for thefirst time in his capacity as Minister of War, Kerensky had declared, "Iintend to establish an iron discipline in the army, " yet the Declaration ofSoldiers' Rights which he signed nine days later was certain to make anyreal discipline impossible. Was it because he was inconsistent, vacillating, and weak that Kerensky attached his name to such a document?

Such a judgment would be gravely unjust to a great man. The fact is thatKerensky's responsibility was very small indeed. He and his Socialistassociates in the Cabinet held their positions by authority of the Councilof Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and they had agreed to be subject toits guidance and instruction. The Soviet was responsible for theDeclaration of Soldiers' Rights. Kerensky was acting under its orders. TheSoviet had already struck a fatal blow at military discipline by its famousOrder Number One, which called on the soldiers not to execute the orders oftheir officers unless the orders were first approved by the revolutionaryauthorities--that is, by the Soviet or its accredited agents. That theorder was prompted by an intense love for revolutionary ideals, or that itwas justified by the amount of treachery which had been discovered amongthe officers of the army, may explain and even excuse it, but the factremains that it was a deadly blow at military discipline. The fact thatKerensky's predecessor, Guchkov, had to appear at a convention of soldiers'delegates and explain and defend his policies showed that discipline was ata low ebb. It brought the army into the arena of politics and madequestions of military strategy subject to political maneuvering. 

The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights was a further step along a road whichinevitably led to disaster. That remarkable document provided that soldiersand officers of all ranks should enjoy full civic and political rights;that they should be free to speak or write upon any subject; that theircorrespondence should be uncensored; that while on duty they should be freeto receive any printed matter, books, papers, and so on, which theydesired. It provided for the abolition of the compulsory salute toofficers; gave the private soldier the right to discard his uniform whennot actually on service and to leave barracks freely during "off-duty"hours. Finally, it placed all matters pertaining to the management in thehands of elective committees in the composition of which the men were tohave four-fifths of the elective power and the officers one-fifth. 

Of course, the Declaration of Soldiers' Rights represented a violentreaction. Under the old régime the army was a monstrously cruel machine;the soldiers were slaves. At the first opportunity they had revolted and, as invariably happens, the pendulum had swung too far. On May 28th theCouncil of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued a declaration in whichit was said: "From now on the soldier-citizen is free from the slavery ofsaluting, and as an equal, free person will greet whomsoever he chooses.... Discipline in the Revolutionary Army will exist, prompted by popularenthusiasm and the sense of duty toward the free country rather than by aslavish salute. " If we are tempted to laugh at this naïve idealism, weAmericans will do well to remember that it was an Americanstatesman-idealist who believed that we could raise an army of a millionmen overnight, and that a shrewd American capitalist-idealist sent forth a"peace ship" with a motley crew of dreamers and disputers to end thegreatest war in history. 

IX

Throughout the first half of June, while arrangements for a big militaryoffensive were being made, and were causing Kerensky and the otherSocialist Ministers to strain every nerve, Lenine, Trotzky, Kamenev, Zinoviev, and other leaders of the Bolsheviki were as strenuously engagedin denouncing the offensive and trying to make it impossible. Whatever giftor genius these men possessed was devoted wholly to destruction andobstruction. The student will search in vain among the multitude of recordsof meetings, conventions, debates, votes, and resolutions for a singleinstance of participation in any constructive act, one positive service tothe soldiers at the front or the workers' families in need, by anyBolshevik leader. But they never missed an opportunity to embarrass thosewho were engaged in such work, and by so doing add to the burden that wasalready too heavy. 

Lenine denounced the offensive against Germany as "an act of treasonagainst the Socialist International" and poured out the vials of his wrathagainst Kerensky, who was, as we know, simply carrying out the decisions ofthe Soviet and other working-class organizations. Thus we had theastonishing and tragic spectacle of one Socialist leader working withtitanic energy among the troops who had been betrayed and demoralized bythe old régime, seeking to stir them into action against the greatestmilitarist system in the world, while another Socialist leader worked withmight and main to defeat that attempt and to prevent the rehabilitation ofthe demoralized army. And all the while the German General Staff gloated atevery success of the Bolsheviki. There was a regular system ofcommunications between the irreconcilable revolutionists and the GermanGeneral Staff. In proof of this statement only one illustration need beoffered, though many such could be cited: At the All-Russian Congress ofWorkmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, on June 22d, Kerensky read, in thepresence of Lenine, a long message, signed by the commander-in-chief of theGerman eastern front, sent by wireless in response to a declaration ofcertain delegates of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. 

At this session Lenine bitterly assailed the proposed offensive. He saidthat it was impossible for either side to win a military victory, revampingall the defeatist arguments that were familiar in every country. Heminimized the loss which Russia had suffered at Germany's hands, and thegains Germany had made in Belgium and northern France, pointing out thatshe had, on the other hand, lost her colonies, which England would be veryunlikely to give back unless compelled to do so by other nations. Tauntedwith being in favor of a separate peace with Germany, Lenine indignantlydenied the accusation. "It is a lie, " he cried. "Down with a separatepeace! _We Russian revolutionists will never consent to it. _" He arguedthat there could be only one policy for Socialists in any country--namely, to seize the occasion of war to overthrow the capitalist-class rule in thatcountry. No war entered into by a capitalist ruling class, regardless whatits motives, should be supported by Socialists. He argued that the adoptionof his policy by the Russian working class would stand ten times the chanceof succeeding that the military policy would have. The German working classwould compel their government and the General Staff to follow the exampleof Russia and make peace. 

Kerensky was called upon to reply to Lenine. At the time when therestoration of the army required all his attention and all his strength, itwas necessary for Kerensky to attend innumerable and well-nigh interminabledebates and discussions to maintain stout resistance to the Bolshevikoffensive always being waged in the rear. That, of course, was part of theBolshevist plan of campaign. So Kerensky, wearied by his tremendous effortsto perform the task assigned him by the workers, answered Lenine. His replywas a forensic masterpiece. He took the message of the commander-in-chiefof the German eastern front and hurled it at Lenine's head, figurativelyspeaking, showing how Lenine's reasoning was paralleled in the Germanpropaganda. With merciless logic and incisive phrase he showed how theBolsheviki were using the formula, "the self-determination ofnationalities, " as the basis of a propaganda to bring about thedismemberment of Russia and its reduction to a chaotic medley of small, helpless states. To Lenine's statements about the readiness of the Germanworking class to rebel, Kerensky made retort that Lenine should haveremained in Germany while on his way to Russia and preached his ideasthere. 

A few days earlier, at a session of the same Congress, Trotzky and Kamenevhad made vigorous assault upon the Coalition Government and upon theSocialist policy with reference thereto. In view of what subsequentlytranspired, it is important to note that Trotzky made much of the delay incalling together the Constituent Assembly: "The policy of continualpostponement _and the detailed preparations_ for calling the ConstituentAssembly is a false policy. It may destroy even the very realization of theConstituent Assembly. " This profession of concern for the ConstituentAssembly was hypocritical, dishonest, and insincere. He did not in theleast care about or believe in the Constituent Assembly, and had not doneso at any time since the First Revolution of 1905-06. His whole thoughtrejected such a democratic instrument. However, he and his associates knewthat the demand for a Constituent Assembly was almost universal, and thatto resist that demand was impossible. Their very obvious policy in thecircumstances was to try and force the holding of the Assembly prematurely, without adequate preparation, and without affording an opportunity for anation-wide electoral campaign. A hastily gathered, badly organizedConstituent Assembly would be a mob-gathering which could be easilystampeded or controlled by a determined minority. 

Trotzky assailed the Coalition Government with vitriolic passion. At themoment when it was obvious to everybody that unity of effort was the onlypossible condition for the survival of the Revolution, and that anydivision in the ranks of the revolutionists, no matter upon what it mightbe based, must imperil the whole movement, he and all his Bolshevikcolleagues deliberately stirred up dissension. Even if their opposition topolitical union with non-proletarian parties was right as the basis of asound policy, to insist upon it at the moment of dire peril was eithertreachery or madness. When a house is already on fire the only thing inorder, the only thing that can have the sanction of wisdom and honor, is towork to extinguish the fire. It is obviously not the time to debate whetherthe house was properly built or whether mistakes were made. Russia was ahouse on fire; the Bolsheviki insisted upon endless debating. 

Kamenev followed Trotzky's lead in attacking the Coalition Government. In asubtle speech he supported the idea of splitting Russia up into a largenumber of petty states, insisting that the formula, "self-determination ofpeoples, " applied to the separatist movement in the Ukraine. He insistedthat for the Russian working-people it was a matter of indifference whetherthe Central Empires or the Entente nations won in the war. He argued thatthe only hope for the Russian Revolution must be the support of therevolutionary proletariat in the other European countries, particularlythose adjacent to Russia: "If the revolutionary proletariat of Europe failsto support the Russian Revolution the latter will be ruined. As thatsupport is the only guaranty of the safety of the Revolution, we cannotchange our policy by discussing the question of how much fraternizing willstimulate the awakening of the proletariat of Europe. " In other words, Kamenev was in the position of a desperate gambler who stakes his life andhis all upon one throw of the dice or one spin of the wheel. 

It was in this manner that the Bolshevist leaders conspired to Russia'sdestruction. They were absorbing the time and energies of the men who werereally trying to do something, compelling them to engage in numerousfutile debates, to the neglect of their vitally important work, debates, moreover, which could have no other effect than to weaken the nation. Further, they were actively obstructing the work of the government. ThusTseretelli, Kerensky, Skobelev, and many others whose efforts might havesaved the Revolution, were thwarted by men wholly without a sense ofresponsibility. Lenine was shrieking for the arrest of capitalists becausethey were capitalists, when it was obvious that the services of those samecapitalists were needed if the nation was to live. Later on, whenconfronted by the realities and responsibilities of government, he availedhimself of the special powers and training of the despised capitalists. Atthis earlier period he was, as Tseretelli repeatedly reminded the workers, without any sense of responsibility for the practical results of hispropaganda. And that was equally true of the Bolsheviki as a whole. Theytalked about sending "ultimatums" to the Allies, while the whole system ofnational defense was falling to pieces. Tseretelli made the only reply itwas possible for a sane man to make:

"It is proposed that we speak to the Allies with ultimatums, but did thosewho made this silly proposal think that this road might lead to thebreaking of diplomatic relations with the Allies, and to that very separatepeace which is condemned by all factions among us? Did Lenine think of theactual consequences of his proposal to arrest several dozen capitalists atthis time? Can the Bolsheviki guarantee that their road will lead us to thecorrect solution of the crisis? No. If they guarantee this they do not knowwhat they are doing and their guaranty is worthless. The Bolshevik road canlead us only to one end, civil war. "

Once more the good sense of the working class prevailed. By anoverwhelming majority of votes the Congress decided to uphold the CoalitionGovernment and rejected the Bolshevik proposals. The resolution adopteddeclared that "the passing over of all power to the bourgeoisie elementswould deal a blow at the revolutionary cause, " but that equally thetransfer of all power to the Soviets would be disastrous to the Revolution, and "would greatly weaken her powers by prematurely driving away from herelements which are still capable of serving her, and would threaten theruin of the Revolution. " Therefore, having heard the explanations of theSocialist Ministers and having full confidence in them, the Congressinsisted that the Socialist Ministers be solely responsible to the"plenipotentiary and representative organ of the whole organizedRevolutionary Democracy of Russia, which organ must be composed of therepresentatives of the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's andSoldiers' Delegates, as well as of representatives of the All-RussianCongress of Peasants' Delegates. "

But in spite of the fact that the workers upon every opportunity repudiatedtheir policies, the Bolsheviki continued their tactics. Lenine, Trotzky, Tshitsherin, Zinoviev, and others called upon the workers to stop workingand to go out into the streets to demonstrate for peace. The All-RussianCongress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates issued an appeal to theworkers warning them not to heed the call of the Bolsheviki, which had beenmade at the "moment of supreme danger. " The appeal said:

 Comrades, in the name of millions of workers, peasants, and soldiers, we tell you, "Do not do that which you are called upon to do. " At this dangerous moment you are called out into the streets to demand the overthrow of the Provisional Government, to whom the All-Russian Congress has just found it necessary to give its support. And those who are calling you cannot but know that out of your peaceful demonstrations bloodshed and chaos may result.... You are being called to a demonstration in favor of the Revolution, _but we know that counter-revolutionists want to take advantage of your demonstration ... The counter-revolutionists are eagerly awaiting the moment when strife will develop in the ranks of the Revolutionary Democracy and enable them to crush the Revolution_. 

X

Not only in this way were the Bolsheviki recklessly attempting to thwartthe efforts of the Socialist Ministers to carry out the mandates of themajority of the working class of Russia, but they were equally active intrying to secure the failure of the attempt to restore the army. Allthrough June the Bolshevik papers denounced the military offensive. In theranks of the army itself a persistent campaign against further fighting wascarried on. The Duma had voted, on June 17th, for an immediate offensive, and it was approved by the Petrograd Soviet. The Provisional Government onthat date published a Note to the Allied governments, requesting aconference with a view to making a restatement of their war aims. Theseactions were approved by the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's andSoldiers' Delegates, as was also the expulsion from Russia of the SwissSocialist, Robert Grimm, who was a notorious agent of the GermanGovernment. Grimm, as is now well known, was acting under the orders ofHoffman, the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying to bringabout a separate peace between Russia and Germany. He was also intimatelyconnected with the infamous "Parvus, " the trusted Social Democrat who was aspy and tool of the German Government. As always, the great majority of therepresentatives of the actual working class of Russia took the sanecourse. 

But the Bolsheviki were meanwhile holding mass meetings among the troops, preaching defeatism and surrender and urging the soldiers not to obey theorders of "bourgeois" officers. The Provisional Government was not blind tothe peril of this propaganda, but it dared not attempt to end it by force, conscious that any attempt to do so would provoke revolt which could not bestayed. The Bolsheviki, unable to control the Workmen's and Soldiers'Council, sought in every possible manner to weaken its influence and todiscredit it. They conspired to overthrow the Provisional Government. Theirplot was to bring about an armed revolt on the 24th of June, when theAll-Russian Congress of Soviets would be in session. They planned to arrestthe members of the Provisional Government and assume full power. _At thesame time, all the soldiers at the front were to be called on to leave thetrenches_. On the eve of the date when it was to be executed this plot wasdivulged. There was treachery within their own ranks. The Bolshevik leadershumbly apologized and promised to abandon their plans. Under otherconditions the Provisional Government might have refused to be satisfiedwith apologies, might have adopted far sterner measures, but it was face toface with the bitter fact that the nation was drunk with the strong wine offreedom. The time had not yet arrived when the masses could be expected torecognize the distinction between liberty within the law and the licensethat leads always to tyranny. It takes time and experience of freedom toteach the stern lesson that, as Rousseau has it, freedom comes by way ofself-imposed compulsions to be free. 

The offensive which Kerensky had urged and planned began on July 1st andits initial success was encouraging. It seemed as though the miracle of therestoration of the Russian army had been achieved, despite everything. Herewas an army whose killed and dead already amounted to more than threemillion men, [20] an army which had suffered incredible hardships, againgoing into battle with songs. On the 1st of July more than thirty-sixthousand prisoners were taken by the Russians on the southwestern front. Then came the tragic harvest of the Bolshevist propaganda. In northeasternGalicia the 607th Russian Regiment left the trenches and forced other unitsto do the same thing, opening a clear way for the German advance. Regimentafter regiment refused to obey orders. Officers were brutally murdered bytheir men. Along a front of more than one hundred and fifty miles theRussians, greatly superior in numbers, retreated without attempting tofight, while the enemy steadily advanced. This was made possible by theagitation of the Bolsheviki, especially by the mutiny which they provokedamong the troops in the garrison at Petrograd. On the 17th of July, at thevery time when the separatist movement in the Ukraine, the resignation ofthe Constitutional Democrats from the government, and the revolt andtreachery among the troops had produced a grave crisis, seizing theopportunity afforded by the general chaos, the Bolsheviki attempted torealize their aim of establishing what they called a "dictatorship of theproletariat, " but which was in reality the dictatorship of a small part ofthe proletariat. There was no pretense that they represented a majority ofthe proletariat, even. It was a desperate effort to impose the dictatorshipof a small minority of the proletariat upon the whole nation. For two daysthe revolt lasted, more than five hundred men, women, and children beingkilled in the streets of Petrograd. 

On the 20th Prince Lvov resigned as Premier. In the mean time theBolshevist uprising had been put down by Cossack troops and the leaderswere in hiding. Kerensky stepped into Lvov's position as Premier andcontinued to address himself to the task of bringing order out of thechaos. There could not have been any selfish ambition in this; noplace-hunter would have attempted to bear the heavy burden Kerensky thenassumed, especially with his knowledge of the seriousness of the situation. He knew that the undertaking was practically hopeless, yet he determinednever to give up the struggle so long as there was a single thing to bedone and his comrades desired him to do it. [21]

There had been created a revolutionary body representing all the organizedworkers, called the United Executive Committee of the All-Russian Councilsof Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates, a body of more than threehundred elected representatives of the various Soviets. They representedthe views of many millions. This body vigorously denounced the Bolshevikiand rallied to the support of Kerensky and his colleagues. In a Manifestoto the people the Bolsheviki were charged with responsibility for the bloodof all who had been slain in the uprising. On July 21st a second Manifestowas issued by the Committee calling upon the workers to uphold thegovernment so long as the authorized representatives of the working classdetermined that to be the proper course to follow. The charge that Lenine, Zinoviev, Trotzky, and others were acting under German instructions andreceiving German money spread until it was upon almost every tongue inPetrograd. On July 24th Gregory Alexinsky, a well-known Socialist, in hispaper, _Bez Lisnih Slov_, published a circumstantial story of Germanintrigue in the Ukraine, revealed by one Yermolenko, an ensign in the 16thSiberian Regiment, who had been sent to Russia by the German Government. This Yermolenko charged that Lenine had been instructed by the authoritiesin Berlin, just as he himself had been, and that Lenine had been furnishedwith almost unlimited funds by the German Government, the arrangement beingthat it was to be forwarded through one Svendson, at Stockholm. [22] By avote of 300 to 11 the United Executive Committee of the All-RussianCouncils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates adopted thefollowing resolution:

 The whole Revolutionary Democracy desires that the Bolsheviki group accused of having organized disorders, or inciting revolt, or of having received money from German sources be tried publicly. In consequence, the Executive Committee considers it absolutely inadmissible that Lenine and Zinoviev should escape justice, and demands that the Bolsheviki faction immediately and categorically express its censure of the conduct of its leaders. 

Later on, under the "terror, " there was some pretense of an "investigation"of the charge that Lenine and others had received German money, but therehas never been a genuine investigation so far as is known. Groups ofRussian Socialists belonging to various parties and groups have asked thata commission of well-known Socialists from the leading countries of Europeand from the United States, furnished with reliable interpreters, be sentto Russia to make a thorough investigation of the charge. 

The United Executive Committee of the workers' organizations adopted aresolution demanding that all members and all factions, and the members ofall affiliated bodies, obey the mandate of the majority, and that allmajority decisions be absolutely obeyed. They took the position--too late, alas!--that the will of the majority must be observed, since the onlyalternative was the rule of the majority by the aggressive minority. Repressive measures against the Bolsheviki were adopted by the KerenskyCabinet with the full approval of the Committee. Some of the Bolshevikpapers were suppressed and the death penalty, which had been abolished atthe very beginning of the Revolution, was partially restored in that it wasordered that it should be applied to traitors and deserters at the front. Lenine and Zinoviev were in hiding, but Trotzky, Kamenev, AlexandraKollontay, and many other noted Bolsheviki were imprisoned for a few days. 

It was Kerensky's hope that by arranging for an early conference by theAllies, at which the war aims would be restated in terms similar to thosewhich President Wilson had employed, and by definitely fixing the date forthe Constituent Assembly elections, September 30th, while sternlyrepressing the Bolsheviki, it might be possible to save Russia. But it wastoo late. Despite his almost superhuman efforts, and the loyal support ofthe great majority of the Soviets, he was defeated. Day after dayconditions at the front grew worse. By the beginning of August practicallythe whole of Galicia was in the hands of the Germans. Russian soldiers inlarge numbers retreated before inferior numbers of Germans, refusing tostrike a blow. Germans furnished them with immense quantities of spirits, and an orgy of drunkenness took place. The red flag was borne by debauchedand drunken mobs. What a fate for the symbol of universal freedom andhuman brotherhood!

It was a time of terrible strain and upheaval. Crisis followed upon crisis. Chernov resigned his position as Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky resignedas Premier, but the members of the Provisional Government by unanimous votedeclined to accept the resignation. They called a joint meeting of all theCabinet, of leaders of all political parties, of the Duma, of the Sovietsof workers, peasants, and soldiers. At this meeting the whole criticalsituation was discussed and all present joined in demanding that Kerenskycontinue in office. The political parties represented were the SocialDemocrats, the Socialist-Revolutionists, the Democratic Radicals, the LaborUnion party, the Popular Socialists, and the Constitutional Democrats. Fromthese groups came an appeal which Kerensky could not deny. He said:

"In view of the evident impossibility of establishing, by means of acompromise between the various political groups, Socialist as well asnon-Socialist, a strong revolutionary government ... I was obliged toresign. Friday's conference, ... After a prolonged discussion, resulted inthe parties represented at the conference deciding to intrust me with thetask of reconstructing the government. Considering it impossible for me inthe present circumstances, when defeat without and disintegration withinare threatening the country, to withdraw from the heavy task which is nowintrusted to me, I regard this task as an express order of the country toconstruct a strong revolutionary government in the shortest possible timeand in spite of all the obstacles which might arise. "

For the second time Kerensky was Premier at the head of a CoalitionMinistry. No other government was possible for Russia except a strongdespotism. Theorists might debate the advisability of such coalition, butthe stern reality was that nothing else was possible. The leader of thepeasants, Chernov, returned to his old post as Minister of Agriculture andthe Constitutional Democrats took their share of the burden. There were sixparties and groups in the new Cabinet, four of them of various shades ofSocialism and two of them liberal bourgeoisie. Never before, perhaps, andcertainly only rarely, if ever, have men essayed a heavier or moredifficult task than that which this new Provisional Government undertook. 

Heroically Kerensky sought to make successful the efforts of GeneralKornilov, as commander-in-chief, to restore order and discipline in thearmy, but it was too late. The disintegration had gone too far. Themeasures which the Revolutionary Democracy had introduced into the army, inthe hope of realizing freedom, had reduced it to a wild mob. Officers werebutchered by their men; regiment after regiment deserted its post and, insome instances, attempted to make a separate peace with the enemy, evenoffering to pay indemnities. Moreover, the industrial organization of thecountry had been utterly demoralized. The manufacture of army supplies hadfallen off more than 60 per cent. , with the result that the state ofaffairs was worse than in the most corrupt period of the old régime. 

XI

It became evident to the Provisional Government that something big anddramatic must be done, without waiting for the results of the ConstituentAssembly elections. Accordingly, it was decided to call together a greatextraordinary council, representing all classes and all parties, toconsider the situation and the best means of meeting it. The ExtraordinaryNational Conference, as it was called, was opened in Moscow, on August26th, with more than fourteen hundred members in attendance. Some of thesemembers--principally those from the Soviets--had been elected as delegates, but the others had been invited by the government and could not be said tospeak as authorized representatives. There were about one hundred andninety men who had been members of one or other of the Dumas; one hundredrepresentatives of the peasants' Soviets and other peasant organizations;about two hundred and thirty representatives of the Soviets of industrialworkers and of soldiers; more than three hundred from co-operatives; aboutone hundred and eighty from the trade-unions; about one hundred and fiftyfrom municipalities; one hundred and fifty representatives of banks andindustrial concerns, and about one hundred and twenty from the Union ofZemstvos and Towns. It was a Conference more thoroughly representative ofRussia than any that had ever been held. There were, indeed, norepresentatives of the old régime, and there were few representatives ofthe Bolsheviki. The former had no place in the new Russia that wasstruggling for its existence; the repressive measures that had been foundnecessary accounted for the scant representation of the latter. 

It was to this Conference that President Wilson sent his famous messagegiving the assurance of "every material and moral assistance" to the peopleand government of Russia. For three days the great assembly debated andlistened to speeches from men representing every section of the country, every class, and every party. Kerensky, Tseretelli, Tchcheidze, Boublikov, Plechanov, Kropotkin, Breshkovskaya, and others, spoke for the workers;General Kornilov and General Kaledine spoke for the military command;Miliukov, Nekrasov, Guchkov, Maklakov, and others spoke for thebourgeoisie. At times feeling ran high, as might have been expected, butthroughout the great gathering there was displayed a remarkable unanimityof feeling and immediate purpose; a common resolve to support theProvisional Government, to re-establish discipline in the army and navy, toremain loyal to the Allies, and reject with scorn all offers of a separatepeace, and to work for the success of the Constituent Assembly. 

But, notwithstanding the unity upon these immediately vital points, theMoscow Conference showed that there was still a great gulf between theclasses, and that no matter how they might co-operate to meet and overcomethe peril that hung over the nation like the sword of Damocles, there couldbe no unity in working out the great economic and social program which mustbe the basis for the Social Democratic commonwealth which the workerssought to establish, and which the bourgeois elements feared almost as muchas they feared the triumph of Germany. In some respects the Conferenceintensified class feeling and added to, instead of lessening, the civilstrife. The Bolsheviki were not slow to exploit this fact. They pointed tothe Conference as evidence of a desire on the part of the SocialistMinisters, and of the officials of the Soviets, to compromise with thebourgeoisie. This propaganda had its effect and Bolshevism grew inconsequence, especially in Petrograd. 

Then followed the disastrous military and political events which made itpractically impossible for the Kerensky government to stand. At the frontthe soldiers were still revolting, deserting, and retreating. Kornilov wasquite helpless. Germany began a new offensive, and on September 2d Germanarmies crossed the Dvina near Riga. On September 3d Riga was surrendered tothe Germans in the most shameful manner and panic reigned in Petrograd. Then on the 9th came the revolt of Kornilov against the ProvisionalGovernment and the vulgar quarrel between him and Kerensky. Kornilovcharged that the Provisional Government, under pressure from theBolsheviki, was playing into the hands of the German General Staff. Kerensky, backed by the rest of the Cabinet, ordered Kornilov's removal, while Kornilov despatched a division of troops, drawn from the front, against Petrograd. 

It was a most disastrous conflict for which no adequate explanation can befound except in the strained mental condition of all the principal partiesconcerned. In less strenuous times, and in a calmer atmosphere, the twoleaders, equally patriotic, would have found no difficulty in removingmisunderstandings. As things were, a mischievous intermediary, and two mensuffering the effects of a prolonged and intense nervous strain, providedall the elements of a disaster. Kornilov's revolt was crushed without greattrouble and with very little bloodshed, Kornilov himself being arrested. The Soviets stood by the Provisional Government, for they saw in the revoltthe attempt to set up a personal dictatorship. Even the Bolsheviki weretemporarily sobered by the sudden appearance of the "man on horseback. "Kerensky, by direction of his colleagues, became commander-in-chief of theRussian armies. Always, it seemed, through every calamity, all partiesexcept the Bolsheviki agreed that he was the one man strong enough toundertake the heaviest and hardest tasks. 

Toward the end of September what may be termed the Kerensky régime enteredupon its last phase. For reasons which have been already set forth, theBolsheviki kept up a bitter attack upon the Provisional Government, andupon the official leaders of the Soviets, on account of the MoscowConference. They demanded that the United Executive Committee of theSoviets convoke a new Conference. They contended that the Moscow Conferencehad been convoked by the government, not by the Soviets, and that theUnited Executive Committee must act for the latter. The United ExecutiveCommittee complied and summoned a new National Democratic Conference, whichassembled on September 27th. By this time, as a result of the exhaustion ofthe patience of many workers, many of the Soviets had ceased to exist, while others existed on paper only. According to the _Izvestya Soveta_, there had been more than eight hundred region organizations at one time, many scores of which had disappeared. According to the same authority, thepeasants were drawing away from the Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets. TheUnited Executive Committee, which had been elected in June, was, of course, dominated by anti-Bolsheviki--that is, by Menshevik Social Democrats and bySocialist-Revolutionists. 

The Democratic Conference was not confined to the Soviets. It embraceddelegates from Soviets of peasants, soldiers, and industrial workers; frommunicipalities, from zemstvos, co-operatives, and other organizations. Itdiffered from the Moscow Conference principally in that the delegates wereelected and that it did not include so many representatives of thecapitalist class. The petty bourgeoisie was represented, but not the greatcapitalists. There were more than a thousand members in attendance at thisDemocratic Conference, which was dominated by the most moderate section ofthe Social Democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionists were not very numerous. 

This Conference created another Coalition Cabinet, the last of the Kerenskyrégime. Kerensky continued as Premier and as commander-in-chief of thearmy. There were in the Cabinet five Social Democrats, twoSocialist-Revolutionists, eight Constitutional Democrats, and twonon-partisans. It was therefore as far as its predecessors from meeting thestandards insisted upon by many radical Socialists, who, while notBolsheviki, still believed that there should be at least an absoluteSocialist predominance in the Provisional Government. Of course, the newCoalition Ministry infuriated the Bolsheviki. From his hiding-place Lenineissued a series of "Letters to the Comrades, " which were published in the_Rabochiy Put_, in which he urged the necessity of an armed uprising likethat of July, only upon a larger scale. In these letters he scoffed at theConstituent Assembly as a poor thing to satisfy hungry men. Meanwhile, Trotzky, out of prison again, and other Bolshevik leaders were agitating byspeeches, proclamations, and newspaper articles for an uprising. TheProvisional Government dared not try to suppress them. Its hold upon thepeople was now too weak. 

The Democratic Conference introduced one innovation. It created aPreliminary Parliament, as the new body came to be known, though its firstofficial title was the Provisional Council of the Republic. This new bodywas to function as a parliament until the Constituent Assembly convened, when it would give place to whatever form of parliamentary body theConstituent Assembly might create. This Preliminary Parliament and itsfunctions were thus described:

 This Council, in which all classes of the population will be represented, and in which the delegates elected to the Democratic Conference will also participate, will be given the right of addressing questions to the government and of securing replies to them in a definite period of time, of working out legislative acts and discussing all those questions which will be presented for consideration by the Provisional Government, as well as those which will arise on its own initiative. Resting on the co-operation of such a Council, the government, preserving, in accordance with its pledge, the unity of the governmental power created by the Revolution, will regard it its duty to consider the great public significance of such a Council in all its acts up to the time when the Constituent Assembly gives full and complete representation to all classes of the population of Russia. 

This Preliminary Parliament was really another Duma--that is, it was a verylimited parliamentary body. Its life was short and quite uneventful. Itassembled for the first time on October 8th and was dispersed by theBolsheviki on November 7th. When it assembled there were 555 members--thenumber fixed by the decree of the Provisional Government. Of these, 53 wereBolsheviki, but these withdrew almost at the opening with three others, thus reducing the actual membership of the body to less than five hundred. Even with the Bolsheviki withdrawn, when Kerensky appeared before thePreliminary Parliament on November 6th and made his last appeal, aresolution expressing confidence in his government was carried only by asmall majority. Only about three hundred members were in attendance on thisoccasion, and of these 123 voted the expression of confidence, while 102voted against it, and 26 declined to vote at all. 

The Bolsheviki had forced the United Executive Committee to convene a newAll-Russian Congress of Soviets, and the date of its meeting had been fixedat November 7th. While the elections and arrangements for this Congresswere proceeding, the Bolsheviki were actively and openly organizing anuprising. In their papers and at their meetings they announced that onNovember 7th there would be an armed uprising against the government. Theirintentions were, therefore, thoroughly well known, and it was believed thatthe government had taken every necessary step to repress any attempt tocarry those intentions into practice. It was said that of the delegates tothe All-Russian Congress of Soviets-numbering 676 as against more than onethousand at the former Congress of peasant Soviets alone--a majority wereBolsheviki. It was charged that the Bolsheviki had intimidated many workersinto voting for their candidates; that they had, in some instances, putforward their men as anti-Bolsheviki and secured their election by falsepretenses; that they had practised fraud in many instances. It was quitecertain that a great many Soviets had refused to send delegates, and thatmany thousands of workers, and these all anti-Bolsheviki, had simply grownweary and disgusted with the whole struggle. Whatever the explanation mightbe, the fact remained that of the 676 delegates 390 were generally rated asBolsheviki, while 230 were Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki. Not allof the Socialist-Revolutionists could be counted as anti-Bolsheviki, moreover. There were fifty-six delegates whose position was not quiteclearly defined, but who were regarded as being, if not Bolsheviki, atleast anti-government. For the first time in the whole struggle theBolsheviki apparently had a majority of delegates in a working-classconvention. 

On the night of the 6th, a few hours before the opening of the Congress ofSoviets, the Bolsheviki struck the blow they had been so carefullyplanning. They were not met with the resistance they had expected--forreasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. Kerensky recognizedthat it was useless for him to attempt to carry on the fight. TheBolsheviki had organized their Red Guards, and these, directed by militaryleaders, occupied the principal government buildings, such as the centraltelephone and telegraph offices, the military-staff barracks, and so on. Part of the Petrograd garrison joined with the Bolsheviki, the other partsimply refusing to do anything. On the morning of November 7th the membersof the Provisional Government were arrested in the Winter Palace, butKerensky managed to escape. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_ was thusaccomplished practically without bloodshed. A new government was formed, called the Council of People's Commissaries, of which Nikolai Lenine wasPresident and Leon Trotzky Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The"dictatorship of the proletariat" was thus begun. Kerensky's attempt torally forces enough to put an end to this dictatorship was a patheticfailure, as it was bound to be. It was like the last fitful flicker withwhich a great flame dies. The masses wanted peace--for that they wouldtolerate even a dictatorship. 

CHAPTER VI

THE BOLSHEVIK WAR AGAINST DEMOCRACY

I

The defenders and supporters of the Bolsheviki have made much of the factthat there was very little bloodshed connected with the successfulBolshevik uprising in Petrograd. That ought not to be permitted, however, to obscure the fundamental fact that it was a military _coup d'état_, thetriumph of brute force over the will of the vast majority of the people. Itwas a crime against democracy. That the people were passive, worn out, anddistracted, content to wait for the Constituent Assembly, only makes theBolshevik crime appear the greater. Let us consider the facts very briefly. Less than three weeks away was the date set for the Constituent Assemblyelections. Campaigns for the election of representatives to that greatdemocratic convention were already in progress. It was to be the mostdemocratic constitutional convention that ever existed in any country, itsmembers being elected by the entire population, every man and woman inRussia being entitled to vote. The suffrage was equal, direct, universal, and secret. 

Moreover, there was a great democratic reconstruction of the nationactually in progress at the time. The building up of autonomous democraticlocal governing bodies, in the shape of a new type of zemstvos, was rapidlyprogressing. The old-time zemstvos had been undemocratic and did notrepresent the working-people, but the new zemstvos were composed ofrepresentatives nominated and elected by universal suffrage, equal, secret, and direct. Instead of being very limited in their powers as the oldzemstvos were, the new zemstvos were charged with all the ordinaryfunctions of local government. The elections to these bodies served as anadmirable practical education in democracy, making it more certain thanwould otherwise have been the case that the Russian people would know howto use their new political instrument so as to secure a ConstituentAssembly fully representing their will and their desire. 

At the same time active preparations for holding the election of members tothe Constituent Assembly were actually under way. The Socialist partieswere making special efforts to educate the illiterate voters how to usetheir ballots correctly. The Provisional Government, on its part, waspushing the preparations for the elections as rapidly as possible. All overthe country special courts were established, in central places, to trainthe necessary workers so that the elections might be properly conducted. Above all, the great problem of the socialization of the land which hadbeen agitated for so many years had now reached the stage at which itssolution might almost have been said to be complete. The National Soviet ofPeasants, together with the Socialist Revolutionary party, had formulated alaw on the subject which represented the aspiration and the best thought ofthe leaders of the peasants' movement. That law had been approved in theCouncil of Ministers and was ready for immediate promulgation. Peasantleaders like Chernov, Rakitnikov, Vikhiliaev, and Maslov had put an immenseamount of work into the formulation of this law, which aimed to avoidanarchy, to see to it that instead of an individualistic scramble by thepeasants for the land, in small and unorganized holdings, the problemshould be scientifically dealt with, lands being justly distributed amongthe peasant communes, and among the peasants who had been despoiled, andlarge estates co-operatively organized and managed. 

All this the Bolsheviki knew, for it was common knowledge. There is notruth whatever in the claim set up by many of the apologists for theBolsheviki that they became enraged and resorted to desperate tacticsbecause nothing effective was being done to realize the aims of theRevolution, to translate its ideals into fact. Quite the contrary is true. _The Bolshevik insurrection was precipitated by its leaders preciselybecause they saw that the Provisional Government was loyally andintelligently carrying out the program of the Revolution, in co-operationwith the majority of the working-class organizations and their leaders. _

The Bolsheviki did not want the ideals of the Revolution to be realized, for the very simple reason that they were opposed to those ideals. In allthe long struggle from Herzen to Kerensky the revolutionary movement ofRussia had stood for political democracy first of all. Now, at the momentwhen political democracy was being realized, the Bolsheviki sought to killit and to set up something else--namely, a dictatorship of a small party ofless than two hundred thousand over a nation of one hundred and eightymillions. There can be no dispute as to this aim; it has been stated byLenine with great frankness. "_Just as one hundred and fifty thousandlordly landowners under Czarism dominated the one hundred and thirtymillions of Russian peasants, so two hundred thousand members of theBolshevik party are imposing their proletarian will on the mass, but thistime in the interest of the latter. _"[23]

Lenine's figures probably exaggerate the Bolshevik numbers, but, assumingthem to be accurate, can anybody in his right mind, knowing anything of thehistory of the Russian revolutionary movement, believe that thesubstitution of a ruling class of one hundred and fifty thousand by one oftwo hundred thousand, to govern a nation of one hundred and eightymillions, was the end to which so many lives were sacrificed? Can any saneand sincere person believe that the class domination described by the greatarch-Bolshevik himself comes within measurable distance of being as much ofa realization of the ideals of the Revolution as did the ConstituentAssembly plan with its basis of political democracy, universal, equal, direct, secret, all-determining suffrage? We do not forget Lenine'sstatement that this new domination of the people by a ruling minoritydiffers from the old régime in that the Bolsheviki are imposing their willupon the mass "_in the interest of the latter_. " What ruling class everfailed to make that claim? Was it not the habit of the Czars, all of them, during the whole revolutionary epoch, to indulge in the pious cant ofproclaiming that they were motived only by their solicitude for theinterests and well-being of the peasants?

It is a curious illustration of the superficial character of the Bolshevistmentality that a man so gifted intellectually as Lenine undoubtedly isshould advance in justification of his policy a plea so repugnant tomorality and intelligence, and that it should be quietly accepted by menand women calling themselves radical revolutionists. Some years ago awell-known American capitalist announced with great solemnity that he andmen like himself were the agents of Providence, charged with managingindustry "for the good of the people. " Naturally, his naïve claim provokedthe scornful laughter of every radical in the land. Yet, strange as it mayseem, whenever I have pointed out to popular audiences that Lenine assertedthe right of two hundred thousand proletarians to impose their rule uponRussia, always, without a single exception, some defender of theBolsheviki--generally a Socialist or a member of the I. W. W. --has enteredthe plea, "Yes, but it is for the good of the people!"

If the Bolsheviki had wanted to see the realization of the ideals of theRevolution, they would have found in the conditions existing immediatelyprior to their insurrection a challenge calling them to the service of thenation, in support of the Provisional Government and the PreliminaryParliament. They would have permitted nothing to imperil the success of theprogram that was so well advanced. As it was, determination to defeat thatprogram was their impelling motive. Not only did they fear and oppose_political_ democracy; they were equally opposed to democracy in_industry_, to that democracy in the economic life of the nation whichevery Socialist movement in the world had at all times acknowledged to beits goal. As we shall see, they united to political dictatorship industrialdictatorship. They did not want democracy, but power; they did not wantpeace, even, as they wanted power. 

The most painstaking and sympathetic study of the Russian Revolution willnot disclose any great ideal or principle, moral or political, underlyingthe distinctive Bolshevik agitation and program. Nothing could well befarther from the truth than the view taken by many amiable people who, while disavowing the actions of the Bolsheviki, seek to mitigate thejudgment which mankind pronounces against them by the plea that, afterall, they are extreme idealists, misguided, of course, but, nevertheless, inspired by a noble ideal; that they are trying, as John Brown and manyothers have tried, to realize a great ideal, but have been made incapableof seeing their ideal in its proper perspective, and, therefore, of makingthe compromises and adjustments which the transmutation of ideals toreality always requires. 

No sympathizer with Russia--certainly no Socialist--can fail to wish thatthis indulgent criticism were true. Its acceptance would lighten thedarkest chapter in Russian history, and, at the same time, remove from thegreat international Socialist movement a shameful reproach. But the factsare incompatible with such a theory. Instead of being fanatical idealists, incapable of compromises and adjustments, the Bolsheviki have, from thevery beginning, been loudly scornful of rigid and unbending idealism; havemade numerous compromises, alliances, and "political deals, " and haverepeatedly shifted their ground in accordance with political expediency. They have been consistently loyal to no aim save one--the control of power. They have been opportunists of the most extreme type. There is not a singleSocialist or democratic principle which they have not abandoned when itserved, their political ends; not a single instrument, principle, or deviceof autocratic despotism which they have not used when by so doing theycould gain power. For the motto of Bolshevism we might well paraphrase thewell-known line of Horace, and make it read, "Get power, honestly, if youcan, if not--somehow or other. "

Of course, this judgment applies only to Bolshevism as such: to the specialand peculiar methods and ideas which distinguish the Bolsheviki from theirfellow-Socialists. It is not to be questioned that as Socialists andrevolutionists they have been inspired by some of the great ideals commonto all Socialists everywhere. But they differed from the great mass ofRussian Socialists so fundamentally that they separated themselves fromthem and became a separate and distinct party. _That which caused thisseparation is the essence of Bolshevism--not the ideals held in common_. Nounderstanding of Bolshevism is possible unless this fundamental fact isfirst fully understood. Power, to be gained at any cost, and ruthlesslyapplied, by the proletarian minority, is the basic principle of Bolshevismas a distinct form of revolutionary movement. Of course, the Bolshevikleaders sought this power for no sordid, self-aggrandizing ends; they arenot self-seeking adventurers, as many would have us believe. They aresincerely and profoundly convinced that the goal of social and economicfreedom and justice can be more easily attained by their method than by themethod of democratic Socialism. Still, the fact remains that what socialideals they hold are no part of Bolshevism. They are Socialist ideals. Bolshevism is a distinctive method and a program, and its essence is therelentless use of power by the proletariat against the rest of society inthe same manner that the bourgeois and military rulers of nations havecommonly used it against the proletariat. Bolshevism has simply invertedthe old Czarist régime. 

The fairness and justice of this judgment are demonstrated by theBolsheviki themselves. They denounced Kerensky's government for not holdingthe elections for the Constituent Assembly sooner, posing as the championsof the Constituante. When they had themselves assumed control of thegovernment they delayed the meeting of the Constituent Assembly and thensuppressed it by force of arms! They denounced Kerensky for havingrestored the death penalty in the army in cases of gross treachery, professing an intense horror of capital punishment as a form of "bourgeoissavagery. " When they came into power they instituted capital punishment for_civil_ and _political offenses_, establishing public hangings andfloggings as a means of impressing the population![24] They had bitterlyassailed Kerensky for his "militarism, " for trying to build up the army andfor urging men to fight. In less critical circumstances they themselvesresorted to forced conscription. They condemned Kerensky and his colleaguesfor "interfering with freedom of speech and press. " When they came intopower they suppressed all non-Bolshevist papers and meetings in a mannerdiffering not at all from that of the Czar's régime, forcing the otherSocialist parties and groups to resort to the old pre-Revolution"underground" methods. 

The evidence of all these things, and things even worse than these, isconclusive and unimpeachable. It is contained in the records of theBolshevik government, in its publications, and in the reports of the greatSocialist parties of Russia, officially made to the International SocialistBureau. Surely the evidence sustains the charge that, whatever else theymay or may not be, the Bolsheviki are not unbending and uncompromisingidealists of the type of John Brown and William Lloyd Garrison, as they areso often represented as being by well-meaning sentimentalists whoseindulgence of the Bolsheviki is as unlimited as their ignorance concerningthem. 

Some day, perhaps, a competent psychologist will attempt the task ofexplaining the psychology of our fellow-citizens who are so ready to defendthe Bolsheviki for doing the very things they themselves hate and condemn. In any list of men and women in this country friendly to the Bolsheviki itwill be found that they are practically all pacifists andanti-conscriptionists, while a great many are non-resistants andconscientious objectors to military service. Practically all of them arevigorous defenders of the freedom of the press, of the right of publicassemblage and of free speech. With the exception of a few Anarchists, theyare almost universally strong advocates of radical political democracy. Howcan high-minded and intelligent men and women--as many of them are--holdingsuch beliefs as these give countenance to the Bolsheviki, who bitterly andresolutely oppose all of them? How can they denounce America's adoption ofconscription and say that it means that "Democracy is dead in America"while, at the same time, hailing the birth of democracy in Russia, whereconscription is enforced by the Bolsheviki? How, again, can they at one andthe same time condemn American democracy for its imperfections, as in thematter of suffrage, while upholding and defending the very men who, inRussia, deliberately set out to destroy the universal equal suffragealready achieved? How can they demand freedom of the press and ofassemblage, even in war-time, and denounce such restrictions as we have hadto endure here in America, and at the same time uphold the men responsiblefor suppressing the press and public assemblages in Russia in a mannerworse than was attempted by the Czar? Is there no logical sense in theaverage radical's mind? Or can it be that, after all, the people who makeup the Bolshevist following, and who are so much given to engaging inprotest demonstrations of various kinds, are simply restless, unanchoredspirits, for whom the stimulant and excitation of revolt is a necessity?How many are simply victims of subtle neuroses occasioned by sexderangements, by religious chaos, and similar causes?

II

The Bolshevik rule began as a reign of terror. We must not make the mistakeof supposing that it was imposed upon the rest of Russia as easily as itwas imposed upon Petrograd, where conditions were exceptional. In thelatter city, with the assistance of the Preobrajenski and Seminovskyregiments from the garrison, and of detachments of sailors from the Balticfleet, to all of whom most extravagant promises were made, the _coupd'état_ was easily managed with little bloodshed. But in a great many otherplaces the Bolshevist rule was effected in no such peaceful fashion, but bymeans of a bloody terror. Here, for example, is the account of the mannerin which the counter-revolution of the Bolsheviki was accomplished atSaratov, as given by a competent eye-witness, a well-known RussianSocialist whose long and honorable service in the revolutionary movemententitles her to the honor of every friend of Free Russia--InnaRakitnikov:[25]

 Here ... Is how the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at Saratov. I was witness to these facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associations designed to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. The Zemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population of this province, among whom the revolutionary Socialist propaganda was carried on for several years, by the Revolutionary Socialist party, is wide awake and well organized. The Municipality and the Agricultural Committees were composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for the elections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list of candidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs of the different parties. On the night of October 28th [November 10th, European calendar], by reason of an order that had come from Petrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at Saratov. The following forces were its instruments: the garrison, which was a stranger to the mass of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity of leaders, some Intellectuals, who, up to that time, had played no rôle in the public life of the town. 

 It was indeed a military _coup d'état. The city hall, where sat the Socialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, was surrounded by soldiers; machine-guns were placed in front and the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded, some killed_. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifesto solemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people, " the "counter-revolutionaries, " were overthrown; that the power of Saratov was going to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. 

As soon as the overthrow of the existing authorities was effected and theBolsheviki, through their Red Guards and other means, were in a position toexert their authority, they resorted to every method of oppression andrepression known to the old autocratic régime. They suppressed the papersof the Socialist parties and groups opposed to them, and in some instancesconfiscated the plants, turned out the editors, and used the papersthemselves. In one of his "Letters to the Comrades, " published in the_Rabochiy Put_, a few days before the insurrection, Lenine had confessedthat Kerensky had maintained freedom of the press and of assemblage. Thepassage is worth quoting, not only for the information it containsconcerning the Kerensky régime, but also because it affords a standard bywhich to judge the Bolsheviki. Lenine wrote:

 The Germans have only one Liebknecht, no newspapers, no freedom of assemblage, no councils; they are working against the intense hostility of all classes of the population, including the wealthy peasants--with the imperialist bourgeoisie splendidly organized--and yet the Germans are making some attempt at agitation; _while we, with tens of papers, with freedom of assemblage, with the majority of the Council with us, we, the best situated of all the proletarian internationalists, can we refuse to support the German revolutionists in organizing a revolt?_

That it was not the "German revolutionists" who in November, 1917, wantedthe Russians to revolt against the Kerensky government, but the MajoritySocialists, upon whom Lenine had poured his contempt, on the one hand, andthe German General Staff, on the other hand, is a mere detail. Theimportant thing is that Lenine admitted that under the Kerensky governmentthe Russian workers, including the Bolsheviki, were "the best situated ofall the proletarian internationalists, " and that they had "tens of papers, with freedom of assemblage. " In the face of such statements by Leninehimself, written a few days before the Bolshevik counter-revolution, whatbecomes of the charge that the suppression of popular liberties underKerensky was one of the main causes of the revolt of the Bolsheviki?

Against the tolerance of Kerensky, the arbitrary and despotic methods ofthe Bolsheviki stand out in strong contrast. Many non-Bolshevist Socialistorgans were suppressed; papers containing matter displeasing to theBolshevik authorities were suspended, whole issues were confiscated, andeditors were imprisoned, precisely as in the days of the Czar. It becamenecessary for the Socialist-Revolutionists to issue their paper with adifferent title, and from a different place, every day. Here is thetestimony of Inna Rakitnikov again, contained in an official report to theInternational Socialist Bureau:

 All the non-Bolshevik newspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means of reaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing-establishments were looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal" the authors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well as the directors of newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned to make amends or go to prison, etc. 

 The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged. The Red Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequently objects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted the premises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27 Galernaia Street) and--several times--the office of the paper _Dielo Naroda_ (22 Liteinia Street) ... The office of the paper Volya Naroda, etc.... But the Central Committee ... Continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title, as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda.... 

The _Yolya Naroda_, referred to by Inna Rakitnikov, was the official organof the Socialist-Revolutionary party. It was raided on several occasions. For example, in January, 1918, the leaders of the party reported that adetachment of Bolshevik Red Guards had broken into the office of the paper, committed various depredations, and made several arrests. [26] Here isanother Socialist witness: One of the ablest of the leaders of the BohemianSocialists in the United States is Joseph Martinek, the brilliant andscholarly editor of the Bohemian Socialist weekly, the _Delnicke Listy_. Hehas always been identified with the radical section of the movement. Astudent of Russian history, speaking the language fluently, it was his goodfortune to spend several weeks in Petrograd immediately before and afterthe Bolshevik counter-revolution. He testifies that the "freedom of thepress established by Kerensky" was "terminated by the Bolsheviki. "[27]This is not the testimony of "capitalist newspapers, " but of Socialists ofunquestionable authority and standing. The _Dielo Naroda_ was a Socialistpaper, and the volunteer venders of it, who were brutally beaten and shotdown by Red Guards, were Socialist working-men. [28] When Oskar Tokoi, thewell-known revolutionary Finnish Socialist leader, former Prime Minister ofFinland, declares that "freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free press is altogether destroyed, "[29] the Bolsheviki and theirsympathizers cannot plead that they are the victims of "capitalistmisrepresentation. " The attitude of the Bolshevik leaders toward thefreedom of the press has been frankly stated editorially in Pravda, theirofficial organ, in the following words:

 The press is a most dangerous weapon in the hands of our enemies. We will tear it from them, we will reduce it to impotence. It is the moment for us to prepare battle. We will be inflexible in our defense of the rights of the exploited. The struggle will be decisive. We are going to smite the journals with fines, to shut them up, to arrest the editors, and hold them as hostages. [30]

Is it any wonder that Paul Axelrod, who was one of the representatives ofRussia on the International Socialist Bureau prior to the outbreak of thewar, has been forced to declare that the Bolsheviki have "introduced intoRussia a system worse than Czarism, suppressing the Constituent Assemblyand the liberty of the press"?[31] Or that the beloved veteran of theRussian Revolution, Nicholas Tchaykovsky, should lament that "theBolshevik usurpation is the continuation of the government by which Czarismheld the country in an iron grip"?[32]

III

Lenine, Trotzky, Zinoviev, and other Bolshevik leaders early foundthemselves so much at variance with the accepted Socialist position thatthey decided to change their party name. They had been Social Democrats, apart of the Social Democratic party of Russia. Now ever since BronterreO'Brien first used the terms "Social Democrat" and "Social Democracy, " in1839, their meaning has been pretty well established. A Social Democrat isone who aims to base government and industry upon democracy. Certainly, this cannot be said to be an accurate description of the position of menwho believe in the rule of a nation of one hundred and eighty millions by asmall party of two hundred thousand or less--or even by an entire classrepresenting not more than six per cent. Of the population--and Lenine andhis friends, recognizing the fact, decided to change the name of theirgroup to the _Communist party_, by which name they are now known in Russia. Lenine frankly admits that it would be a mistake to speak of this party asa party of democracy. He says:

 The word "democracy" cannot be scientifically applied to the Communist party. Since March, 1917, the word democracy is simply a shackle fastened upon the revolutionary nation and preventing it from establishing boldly, freely, and regardless of all obstacles a new form of power; the Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority. [33]

The phrase "harbinger of the abolition of every form of authority" wouldseem to indicate that Lenine's ideal is that of the old Nihilists--or ofAnarchists of the Bakuninist school. That is very far from the truth. Thephrase in question is merely a rhetorical flourish. No man has morecaustically criticized and ridiculed the Anarchists for their dream oforganization without authority than Nikolai Lenine. Moreover, hisconception of Soviet government provides for a very strong centralauthority. It is a new kind of state, but a state, nevertheless, and, as weshall discover, far more powerful than the political state with which weare familiar, exercising far greater control over the life of theindividual. It is not to be a democratic state, but a very despotic one, adictatorship by a small but powerful ruling class. It was not the word"democracy" which Lenine felt to be a "shackle upon the revolutionarynation, " but democracy itself. 

The manner in which they betrayed the Constituent Assembly will prove thecomplete hostility of the Bolsheviki to democratic government. In order toexcuse and justify the Bolsheviki's actions in this regard, theirsupporters in this country have assiduously circulated two statements. Theyare, first, that the Provisional Government purposely and with maliciousintent delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, hoping to staveit off altogether; second, that such a long time had elapsed between theelections and the convocation that when the latter date was reached thedelegates no longer represented the true feeling of the electorate. 

With regard to the first of these statements, which is a repetition of acharge made by Trotzky before the Bolshevik revolt, it is to be noted thatit is offered in justification of the Bolshevik _coup d'état_. If thecharge made were true, instead of false, as it can easily be shown to be, it would only justify the counter-revolution if the counter-revolutionitself were made the instrument for insuring the safety of the ConstituentAssembly. But the Bolsheviki _suppressed the Constituent Assembly_. By whatprocess of reasoning do we reach the result that because the ProvisionalGovernment delayed the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, which thepeople desired, a counter-revolutionary movement to _suppress italtogether_, by force of arms, was right and proper?

With regard to the second statement, which is a repetition of an argumentadvanced in Russia, it should be sufficient to emphasize a few dates. TheBolsheviki seized the power of government on November 7th and the electionsfor the Constituent Assembly took place on November 25th--nearly threeweeks later. The date set by the Kerensky government for the opening of theConstituent Assembly was December 12th and on that date some forty-oddmembers put in an appearance. Recognizing that they could not beginbusiness until a quorum appeared, these decided to wait until at least aquorum should be present. They did not attempt to do any work. Whathappened is told in the following passages from a signed statement by 109members--all Socialist-Revolutionists. [34]

 On the appointed day and hour of the opening of the session of the Constituent Assembly ... The delegates to the Constituent Assembly who had arrived in Petrograd gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace. The elected representatives of the people beheld innumerable banners and large crowds surrounding the palace. This was Petrograd greeting the representatives of the people. At the doors of the palace the picture changed. There stood armed guards and at the orders of the usurpers, the Bolsheviki, they refused to let the delegates pass into the Tavrichesky Palace. It appeared that, in order to enter the building, the _delegates had first to pay respects to the Commissaire, a satellite of Lenine and Trotzky, and there receive special permission_. The delegates would not submit to that; elected by the people and equipped with formal authorization, they had the right to freely enter any public building assigned for their meeting. The delegates decided to enter the Tavrichesky Palace without asking the new authorities, and they succeeded in doing so. On the first day the guards did not dare to lift their arms against the people's elected representatives and allowed them to enter the building without molestation. 

 There was no struggle, no violence, no sacrifices; the delegates demanded that the guards respect their rights; they demanded to be admitted, and the guards yielded. 

 In the Tavrichesky Palace the delegates opened their meeting; V. M. Chernov was elected chairman. There were, altogether, about forty delegates present. They realized that there were not enough present to start the work of the Constituent Assembly. _It was decided that it would be advisable to await the arrival of the other delegates and start the work of the Constituent Assembly only when a sufficient number were present_. Those already there decided to meet daily at the Tavrichesky Palace in order to count all the delegates as they arrived, and on an appointed day to publicly announce the day and hour of the beginning of the activities of the Constituent Assembly. 

 When the delegates finished their session and adjourned, the old guards had been dismissed for their submissive attitude toward the delegates and replaced by armed civilian followers of Lenine and Trotzky. The latter issued an order to disband the delegates, but there were none to be disbanded. 

 The following day the government of the Bolsheviki dishonestly and basely slandered the people's representatives in their official announcement which appeared in Pravda. That lying newspaper wrote that the representatives of the people had forced their way into the palace, accompanied by Junkers and the White Guards of the bourgeoisie, that the representatives wanted to take advantage of their small numbers and had begun the work of the Constituent Assembly. Every one knows that this is slanderous as regards the representatives of the people. Such lies and slanders were resorted to by the old régime. 

 The aim of the slanders and the lies is clear. _The usurpers do not want the people's representatives to have the supreme power and therefore are preparing to disband the Constituent Assembly_. On the 28th of November, in the evening, _having begun to arrest members of the Constitutional-Democratic party, the Bolsheviki violated the inviolability of the Constituent Assembly. On December 3d a delegate to the Constituent Assembly, the Socialist-Revolutionist, Filippovsky, who was elected by the army on the southwestern front, was arrested_. 

 In accordance with their decision reached on November 28th, the delegates gathered at the Tavrichesky Palace on November 29th and 30th. As on the first day, armed soldiers stood guard at the entrance of the palace and would not let any one pass. The delegates, however, insisted and were finally allowed to enter. 

 On the third day, scenes of brutal violence toward the people's representatives took place at the palace. Peasants were the unfortunate victims of this violence. 

 When the delegates had ended their session and all that remained was the affixing of the signatures to the minutes, sailors forced their way into the hall; these were headed by a Bolshevik officer, _a former commander of the Fortress of St. Peter and St. Paul_. The commander demanded that the delegates disband. In reply it was stated that the delegates would disband after they had finished their business. Then at the order of the commander the sailors took the delegate Ilyan, elected by the peasants of the Province of Tambov, by the arm and dragged him to the exit. After Ilyan, the sailors dragged out the peasant delegate from the Province of Moscow, Bikov; then the sailors approached Maltzev, a peasant delegate from the Province of Kostroma. He, however, shouted out that he would rather be shot than to submit to such violence. His courage appealed to the sailors and they stopped. 

 Now all the halls in the Tavrichesky Palace are locked and it is impossible to meet there. The delegates who come to the Tavrichesky Palace cannot even gather in the lobby, for as soon as a group gathers, the armed hirelings of Lenine and Trotzky disperse them. Thus, in former times, behaved the servants of the Czar and the enemies of the people, policemen and gendarmes. 

This is not the testimony of correspondents of bourgeois journals; it isfrom a statement prepared at the time and signed by more than a hundredSocialists, members of the oldest and largest Socialist party in Russia, many of them men whose long and honorable service has endeared them totheir comrades in all lands. It is not testimony that can be impeached orcontroverted. It forms part of the report of these well-known and trustedSocialists to their comrades in Russia and elsewhere. The claim that theelections to the Constituent Assembly were held on the basis of an obsoleteregister, before the people had a chance to become acquainted with theBolshevist program, and that so long a time had elapsed since the electionsthat the delegates could not be regarded as true representatives of thepeople, was first put forward by the Bolsheviki when the ConstituentAssembly was finally convened, on January 18th. It was an absurd claim forthe Bolsheviki to make, for one of the very earliest acts of the Bolshevikgovernment, after the overthrow of Kerensky, was to issue a decree orderingthat the elections be held as arranged. By that act they assumedresponsibility for the elections, and could not fairly and honorably enterthe plea, later on, that the elections were not valid. 

Here is the story of the struggle for the Constituent Assembly, brieflysummarized. The first Provisional Government issued a Manifesto on March20, 1917, promising to convoke the Constituent Assembly "as soon aspossible. " This promise was repeated by the Provisional Government when itwas reorganized after the resignation of Miliukov and Guchkov in themiddle of May. That the promise was sincere there can be no reasonabledoubt, for the Provisional Government at once set about creating acommission to work out the necessary machinery and was for the election bypopular vote of delegates to the Constituent Assembly. Russia was not likea country which had ample electoral machinery already existing; newmachinery had to be devised for the purpose. This commission was opened onJune 7, 1917; its work was undertaken with great earnestness, and completedin a remarkably short time, with the result that on July 22d theProvisional Government--Kerensky at its head--announced that the electionsto the Constituent Assembly would be held on September 30th, and theconvocation of the Assembly itself on the 12th of December. It was soonfound, however, that it would be physically impossible for the localauthorities all to be prepared to hold the election on the date set--it wasnecessary, among other things, to first elect the local authorities whichwere to arrange for the election of the delegates to the ConstituentAssembly--and so, on August 22d, Kerensky signed the following decree, making _the one and only postponement_ of the Constituent Assembly, so faras the Provisional Government was concerned:

 Desiring to assure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible, the Provisional Government designated the 30th of September as election-day, in which case the whole burden of making up the election lists must fall on the municipalities and the newly elected zemstvos. _The enormous labor of holding the elections for the local institution has taken time_. At present, in view of the date of establishment of the local institutions, on the basis decreed by the government--direct, general, equal, and secret suffrage--the Provisional Government has decided:

 To set aside as the day for the elections to the Constituent Assembly the 25th of November, of the year 1917, and as the date for the convocation of the Constituent Assembly the 12th of December, of the year 1917. 

Notwithstanding this clear and honorable record, we find Trotzky, at aConference of Northern Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, onOctober 25th, when he well knew that arrangements for holding theConstituent Assembly elections were in full swing, charging that Kerenskywas engaged in preventing the convocation of the Constituent Assembly! Hedemanded at that time that all power should be taken from the ProvisionalGovernment and transferred to the Soviets. These, he said, would convokethe Assembly on the date that had been assigned, December 12th. 

The Bolshevik _coup d'état_ took place, as already noted, less than threeweeks before the date set for the elections, for which every preparationhad been made by the government and the local authorities. It was at thebeginning of the campaign, and the Bolsheviki had their own candidates inthe field in many places. It was a foregone conclusion that the ConstituentAssembly brought into being by the universal suffrage would be dominated bySocialists. There was never the slightest fear that it would be dominatedby the bourgeois parties. What followed is best told in the exact languageof a protest to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov, representative of the Revolutionary Socialist party, which was, be itremembered, the largest and the oldest of the Russian Socialist parties:

 The _coup d'état_ was followed by various other manifestations of Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted the country houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of the people and the buildings of the Children's Holiday Settlement were also pillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to cause trouble there.... The bands of soldiers who were sent into the country used not only persuasion, but also violence, _trying to force the peasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time of the elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins of the Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc_.... The inhabitants of the country proved themselves in all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. There were hardly any abstentions; _90 per cent. Of the population took part in the voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priest said mass; the peasants dressed in their best clothes; they believed that the Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In the Government of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelve Socialist-Revolutionists. There were others (such as the Government of Pensa, for example) that elected only Socialist-Revolutionists. The Bolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certain units of the army. To violence and conquest of power by force of arms the population answered by the elections to the Constituent Assembly, the people sent to this Assembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority, Socialist-Revolutionists. 

Of course, this is the testimony of one who is confessedly anti-Bolshevist, one who has suffered deep injury at the hands of the Bolsheviki of whom shewrites. For all that, her testimony cannot be ignored or laughed aside. Ithas been indorsed by E. Roubanovitch, a member of the InternationalSocialist Bureau, and a man of the highest integrity, in the followingwords: "I affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspectedof partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the Bolsheviki. " What ismore important, however, is that the subsequent conduct of the Bolshevikiin all matters relating to the Constituent Assembly was such as to confirmbelief in her statements. 

No Bolshevik spokesman has ever yet challenged the accuracy of thestatement that an overwhelming majority of the deputies elected to theConstituent Assembly were representatives of the Revolutionary Socialistparty. As a matter of fact, the Bolsheviki elected less than one-third ofthe deputies. In the announcement of their withdrawal from the ConstituentAssembly when it assembled in January the Bolshevik members admitted thatthe Socialist-Revolutionists had "obtained a majority of the ConstituentAssembly. "

The attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the Constituent Assembly changed astheir electoral prospects changed. At first, believing that, as a result oftheir successful _coup_, they would have the support of the great mass ofthe peasants and city workers, they were vigorous in their support of theAssembly. In the first of their "decrees" after the overthrow of theKerensky Cabinet, the Bolshevik "Commissaries of the People" announced thatthey were to exercise complete power "until the meeting of the ConstituentAssembly, " which was nothing less than a pledge that they would regard thelatter body as the supreme, ultimate authority. Three days after the revoltLenine, as president of the People's Commissaries, published this decree:

 In the name of the Government of the Republic, elected by the All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, with the participation of the Peasants' Delegates, the Council of the People's Commissaries decrees:

 1. That the elections to the Constituent Assembly shall be held on November 25th, the day set aside for this purpose. 

 2. All electoral committees, all local organizations, the Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates and the soldiers' organizations at the front are to bend every effort toward safeguarding the freedom of the voters and fair play at the elections to the Constituent Assembly, which will be held on the appointed date. 

If this attitude had been maintained throughout, and had the Bolshevikiloyally accepted the verdict of the electorate when it was given, therecould have been no complaint. But the evidence shows that their earlyattitude was not maintained. Later on, as reports received from theinterior of the country showed that the masses were not flocking to theirbanners, they began to assume a critical attitude toward the ConstituentAssembly. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionary party were warningtheir followers that the Bolsheviki would try to wreck the ConstituentAssembly, for which they were bitterly denounced in organs like _Pravda_and _Izvestya_. Very soon, however, these Bolshevist organs began todiscuss the Constituent Assembly in a very critical spirit. It waspossible, they pointed out, that it would have a bourgeois majority, treating the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Cadets as being on the samelevel, equally servants of the bourgeoisie. Then appeared editorials toshow that it would not be possible to place the destinies of Russia in thehands of such people, even though they were elected by the "unthinkingmasses. " Finally, when it was clear that the Socialist-Revolutionary partyhad elected a majority of the members, _Pravda_ and _Izvestya_ took theposition that _the victorious people did not need a Constituent Assembly_;that a new instrument had been created which made the old democratic methodobsolete. [35] The "new instrument" was, of course, the Bolshevist Soviet. 

IV

For the moment we are not concerned with the merits or the failings of theSoviet considered as an instrument of government. We are concerned onlywith democracy and the relation of the Bolshevist method to democracy. Fromthis point of view, then, let us consider the facts. The Soviet was notsomething new, as so many of our American drawing-room champions ofBolshevism seem to think. The Soviet was the type of organization common toRussia. There were Soviets of peasants, of soldiers, of teachers, ofindustrial workers, of officers, of professional men, and so on. Everyclass and every group in the classes had its own Soviet. The Soviet in itssimplest form is a delegate body consisting of representatives of aparticular group--a peasants' Soviet, for example. Another type, moreimportant, roughly corresponds to the Central Labor Union in an Americancity, in that it is composed of representatives of workers of all kinds. These delegates are, in the main, chosen by the workers in the shops andfactories and in the meetings of the unions. The anti-BolshevistSocialists, such as the Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists, werenot opposed to Soviets as working-class organizations. On the contrary, they approved of them, supported them, and, generally, belonged to them. 

They were opposed only to the theory that these Soviets, recruited in amore or less haphazard manner, as such organizations must necessarily be, were better adapted to the governing of a great country like Russia than alegal body which received its mandate in elections based upon universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. No one ever pretended that the Sovietsrepresented all the workers of Russia--including peasants in that term--oreven a majority of them. No one ever pretended that the Soviet, as such, was a stable and constant factor. New Soviets were always springing up andothers dying out. Many existed only in name, on paper. _There never hasbeen an accurate list of the Soviets existing in Russia_. Many lists havebeen made, but always by the time they could be tabulated and publishedthere have been many changes. For these and other reasons which willsuggest themselves to the mind of any thoughtful reader, many of theleaders of the revolutionary movement in Russia have doubted the value ofthe Soviet as a _unit of government, while highly valuing it as a unit ofworking-class organization and struggle_. 

Back of all the strife between the Bolsheviki centered around the Sovietsand the Socialist-Revolutionists and Mensheviki, centered around theConstituent Assembly, was a greater fact than any we have been discussing, however. The Bolsheviki with their doctrinaire Marxism had carried thedoctrine of the class struggle to such extreme lengths that they virtuallyplaced the great mass of the peasants with the bourgeoisie. The Revolutionmust be controlled by the proletariat, they argued. The control of thegovernment and of industry by the people, which was the slogan of the olddemocracy, will not do, for the term "the people" includes bourgeoiselements. Even if it is narrowed by excluding the great capitalists andlandowners, still it embraces the lesser capitalists, small landowners, shopkeepers, and the petty bourgeoisie in general. These elements weakenthe militancy of the proletariat. What is needed is the dictatorship of theproletariat. Now, only a very small part of the peasantry, the very poorpeasants, can be safely linked to the proletariat--and even these must becarefully watched. It was a phase of the old and familiar conflict betweenagrarian and industrial groups in the Socialist movement. It is not verymany years since the Socialist party of America was convulsed by a similardiscussion. Could the farmer ever be a genuine and sincere and trustworthySocialist? The question was asked in the party papers in all seriousness, and in one or two state organizations measures were taken to limit thenumber of farmers entering the party, so that at all times there might bethe certainty of a preponderance of proletarian over farmer votes. 

Similar distrust, only upon a much bigger scale, explains the fight for andagainst the Constituent Assembly. Lenine and his followers distrusted thepeasants as a class whose interests were akin to the class of smallproperty-owners. He would only unite with the poor, propertyless peasants. The leaders of the peasantry, on the other hand, supported by the moreliberal Marxians, would expand the meaning of the term "working class" andembrace within its meaning all the peasants as well as all city workers, most of the professional classes, and so on. We can get some idea of thisstrife from a criticism which Lenine directs against the Mensheviki:

 In its class composition this party is not Socialist at all. It does not represent the toiling masses. It represents fairly prosperous peasants and working-men, petty traders, many small and some even fairly large capitalists, and a certain number of real but gullible proletarians who have been caught in the bourgeois net. [36]

It is clear from this criticism that Lenine does not believe that a genuineSocialist party--and, presumably, therefore, the same must apply to aSocialist government--can represent "fairly prosperous peasants andworking-men. " We now know how to appraise the Soviet government. Theconstitution of Russia under the rule of the Bolsheviki is required by lawto be posted in all public places in Russia. In Article II, Chapter V, paragraph 9, of this document it is set forth that "the Constitution of theRussian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic involves, in view of thepresent transition period, the establishment of a dictatorship of the urbanand rural proletariat and the poorest peasantry in the form of a powerfulAll-Russian Soviet authority. " Attention is called to this passage here, not for the sake of pointing out the obvious need for some exact definitionof the loose expression, "the poorest peasantry, " nor for the sake of anycaptious criticism, but solely to point out the important fact that Lenineonly admits a part of the peasantry--the poorest--to share in thedictatorship of the proletariat. 

Turning to another part of the same important document--Article III, Chapter VI, Section A, paragraph 25--we find the basis of representation inthe All-Russian Congress of Soviets stated. There are representatives oftown Soviets and representatives of provincial congresses of Soviets. Theformer represent the industrial workers; the latter represent the peasantsalmost exclusively. It is important, therefore, to note that there is onedelegate for every twenty-five thousand city voters and one for every onehundred and twenty-five thousand peasant voters! In Section B of the sameArticle, Chapter X, paragraph 53, we find the same discrimination: it takesfive peasants' votes to equal the vote of one city voter; it was thisgeneral attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, dividing them intoclasses and treating the great majority of them as petty, ruralbourgeoisie, which roused the resentment of the peasants' leaders. Theynaturally insisted that the peasants constituted a distinct class, co-operating with the proletariat, not to be ruled by it. Even MarieSpiridonova, who at first joined with the Bolsheviki, was compelled, lateron, to assert this point of view. 

It is easy to understand the distrust of the Bolsheviki by the Socialistparties and groups which represented the peasants. The latter classconstituted more than 85 per cent. Of the population. Moreover, it hadfurnished the great majority of the fighters in the revolutionary movement. Its leaders and spokesmen resented the idea that they were to be dictatedto and controlled by a minority, which was, as Lenine himself admitted, notmaterially more numerous than the old ruling class of landowners had been. They wanted a democratic governmental system, free from class rule, whilethe Bolsheviki wanted class rule. Generalizations are proverbiallyperilous, and should be very cautiously made and applied to great currentsof thought and of life. But in a broad sense we may fairly say that theSocialism of the Socialist-Revolutionists and the Mensheviki, the Socialismof Kerensky and the men who were the majority of the Constituent Assembly, was the product of Russian life and Russian economic development, while theSocialism that the Bolsheviki tried by force of arms to impose upon Russiawas as un-Russian as it could be. The Bolshevist conception of Socialismhad its origin in Marxian theory. Both Marx and Engels freely predicted thesetting up of "a dictatorship of the proletariat"--the phrase which theBolsheviki have made their own. 

Yet, the Bolsheviki are not Marxians. Their Socialism is as little Marxianas Russian. When Marx and Engels forecasted the establishment ofproletarian dictatorship it was part of their theorem that economicevolution would have reduced practically all the masses to a proletarianstate; that industrial and commercial concentration would have reached sucha stage of development that there would be on the one side a small classof owners, and, on the other side, the proletariat. There would be, theybelieved, no middle class. The disappearance of the middle class was, forthem and for their followers, a development absolutely certain to takeplace. They saw the same process going on with the same result inagriculture. It might be less rapid in its progress, but not one whit lesscertain. It was only as the inevitable climax to this evolution that theybelieved the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be achieved. In otherwords, the proletariat would be composed of the overwhelming majority ofthe body politic and social. That is very different from the Bolshevistattempt to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat in a land where morethan 85 per cent, of the people are peasants; where industrial developmentis behind the rest of the world, and where dictatorship of the proletariatmeans the domination of more than one hundred and eighty millions of peopleby two hundred thousand "proletarians and the poorest peasants, " accordingto Lenine's statement, or by six per cent. Of the population _if we assumethe entire proletariat to be united in the dictatorship!_

V

At the time of the disturbances which took place in Petrograd in December, over the delay in holding the Constituent Assembly, the Bolshevikgovernment announced that the Constituante would be permitted to convene onJanuary 18th, provided that not less than four hundred delegates were inattendance. Accordingly, the defenders of the Constituent Assembly arrangedfor a great demonstration to take place on that day in honor of the event. It was also intended to be a warning to the Bolsheviki not to try tofurther interfere with the Constituante. An earnest but entirely peacefulmass of people paraded with flags and banners and signs containing suchinscriptions as "Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty, ""Long Live the Constituent Assembly, " and many others. They set out fromdifferent parts of the city to unite at the Field of Mars and march to theTaurida Palace to protest against any interference with the ConstituentAssembly. As they neared the Taurida Palace they were confronted by RedGuards, who, without any preliminary warning or any effort at persuasion, fired into the crowd. Among the first victims was a member of the ExecutiveCommittee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberian peasantLogvinov, part of whose head was shot away by an explosive bullet. Anothervictim was the militant Socialist-Revolutionist Gorbatchevskaia. Severalstudents and a number of workmen were also killed. Similar massacresoccurred at the same time in other parts of the city. Other processionswending their way toward the meeting-place were fired into. Altogether onehundred persons were either killed or very seriously wounded by the RedGuards, who said that they had received orders "not to spare thecartridges. " Similar demonstrations were held in Moscow and other citiesand were similarly treated by the Red Guards. In Moscow especially the lossof life was great. Yet the Bolshevist organs passed these tragic eventsover in complete silence. They did not mention the massacres, nor did theymention the great demonstration at the funeral of the victims, four dayslater. 

When the Constituent Assembly was formally opened, on January 18th, it waswell known on every hand that the Bolshevik government would use force todestroy it if the deputies refused to do exactly as they were told. Thecorridors were filled with armed soldiers and sailors, ready for action. 

The Lenine-Trotzky Ministry had summoned an extraordinary Congress ofSoviets to meet in Petrograd at the same time, and it was well understoodthat they were determined to erect this Soviet Congress into the supremelegislative power. If the Constituent Assembly would consent to this, somuch the better, of course. In that case there would be a valuable legalsanction, the sanction of a democratically elected body expressly chargedwith the task of determining the form and manner of government for FreeRussia. Should the Constituent Assembly not be willing, there was anopportunity for another _coup d'état_. 

In precisely the same way as the Ministry during the last years of Czarismwould lay before the Duma certain documents and demand that they beapproved, so the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets--the Bolshevikpower--demanded that the Constituent Assembly meekly assent to a documentprepared for it in advance. It was at once a test and a challenge; if theAssembly was willing to accept orders from the Soviet authority and contentitself with rubber-stamping the decrees of the latter, as ordered, it couldbe permitted to go on--at least for a time. At the head of the ConstituentAssembly, as president, the deputies elected Victor Chernov, who had beenMinister of Agriculture under Kerensky. At the head of the Bolshevikfaction was Sverdlov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Soviets. He it was who opened the fight, demanding that the following declaration beadopted by the Constituante as the basis of a Constitution for Russia:

 DECLARATION OF THE RIGHT'S OF THE TOILING AND EXPLOITED PEOPLE

 I

 1. Russia is to be declared a republic of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets. All power in the cities and in the country belongs to the Soviets. 

 2. The Russian Soviet Republic is based on the free federation of free peoples, on the federation of national Soviet republics. 

 II

 Assuming as its duty the destruction of all exploitation of the workers, the complete abolition of the class system of society, and the placing of society upon a socialistic basis, and the ultimate bringing about of victory for Socialism in every country, the Constituent Assembly further decides:

 1. That the socialization of land be realized, private ownership of land be abolished, all the land be proclaimed common property of the people and turned over to the toiling masses without compensation on the basis of equal right to the use of land. 

 All forests, mines, and waters which are of social importance, as well as all living and other forms of property, and all agricultural enterprises, are declared national property. 

 2. To confirm the decree of the Soviets concerning the inspection of working conditions, the highest department of national economy, which is the first step in achieving the ownership by the Soviets of the factories, mines, railroads, and means of production and transportation. 

 3. To confirm the decree of the Soviets transferring all banks to the ownership of the Soviet Republic, as one of the steps in the freeing of the toiling masses from the yoke of capitalism. 

 4. To enforce general compulsory labor, in order to destroy the class of parasites, and to reorganize the economic life. In order to make the power of the toiling masses secure and to prevent the restoration of the rule of the exploiters, the toiling masses will be armed and a Red Guard composed of workers and peasants formed, and the exploiting classes shall be disarmed. 

 III

 1. Declaring its firm determination to make society free from the chaos of capitalism and imperialism, which has drenched the country in blood in this most criminal war of all wars, the Constituent Assembly accepts completely the policy of the Soviets, whose duty it is to publish all secret treaties, to organize the most extensive fraternization between the workers and peasants of warring armies, and by revolutionary methods to bring about a democratic peace among the belligerent nations without annexations and indemnities, on the basis of the free self-determination of nations--at any price. 

 2. For this purpose the Constituent Assembly declares its complete separation from the brutal policy of the bourgeoisie, which furthers the well-being of the exploiters in a few selected nations by enslaving hundreds of millions of the toiling peoples of the colonies and the small nations generally. 

 The Constituent Assembly accepts the policy of the Council of People's Commissars in giving complete independence to Finland, in beginning the withdrawal of troops from Persia, and in declaring for Armenia the right of self-determination. 

 A blow at international financial capital is the Soviet decree which annuls foreign loans made by the governments of the Czar, the landowners and the bourgeoisie. The Soviet government is to continue firmly on this road until the final victory from the yoke of capitalism is won through international workers' revolt. 

 As the Constituent Assembly was elected on the basis of lists of candidates nominated before the November Revolution, when the people as a whole could not yet rise against their exploiters, and did not know how powerful would be the strength of the exploiters in defending their privileges, and had not yet begun to create a Socialist society, the Constituent Assembly considers it, even from a formal point of view, unjust to oppose the Soviet power. The Constituent Assembly is of the opinion that at this moment, in the decisive hour of the struggle of the people against their exploiters, the exploiters must not have a seat in any government organization or institution. The power completely and without exception belongs to the people and its authorized representatives--the workers', soldiers' and peasants' Soviets. 

 Supporting the Soviet rule and accepting the orders of the Council of People's Commissars, the Constituent Assembly acknowledges its duty to outline a form for the reorganization of society. 

 Striving at the same time to organize a free and voluntary, and thereby also a complete and strong, union among the toiling classes of all the Russian nations, the Constituent Assembly limits itself to outlining the basis of the federation of Russian Soviet Republics, leaving to the people, to the workers and soldiers, to decide for themselves, in their own Soviet meetings, if they are willing, and on what conditions they prefer, to join the federated government and other federations of Soviet enterprise. These general principles are to be published without delay, and the official representatives of the Soviets are required to read them at the opening of the Constituent Assembly. 

The demand for the adoption of this declaration gave rise to a long andstormy debate. The leaders of the Socialist-Revolutionists and theMensheviki stoutly contended that the adoption of the declaration would bevirtually an abdication of the task for which the Constituent Assembly hadbeen elected by the people, and, therefore, a betrayal of trust. They couldnot admit the impudent claim that an election held in November, based uponuniversal suffrage, on lists made up as recently as September, could inJanuary be set aside as being "obsolete" and "unrepresentative. " That amajority of the Bolshevik candidates put forward had been defeated, nullified, they argued, the claim of the Bolsheviki that the fact that thecandidates had all been nominated before the November insurrection shouldbe regarded as reason for acknowledging the Bolshevik Soviet as superior tothe Constituent Assembly. They insisted upon the point, which the Bolshevikspokesmen did not attempt to controvert, that the Constituent Assemblyrepresented the votes of many millions of men and women, [37] while thetotal actual membership represented by the Soviet power did not at the timenumber one hundred thousand!

As might have been expected, the proposal to adopt the declarationsubmitted to the Constituent Assembly in this arrogant fashion was rejectedby an enormous majority. The Bolshevik members, who had tried to make thesession a farce, thereupon withdrew after submitting a statement in whichthey charged the Constituent Assembly with being a counter-revolutionarybody, and the Revolutionary-Socialist party with being a traitorous party"directing the fight of the bourgeoisie against the workers' revolution. "The statement said that the Bolshevik members withdrew "in order to permitthe Soviet power to determine what relations it would hold with thecounter-revolutionary section of the Constituent Assembly"--a threat whichneeded no interpretation. 

After the withdrawal of the Bolshevik members, the majority very quicklyadopted a declaration which had been carefully prepared by theSocialist-Revolutionists during the weeks which had elapsed since theelections in the preliminary conferences which had been held for thatpurpose. The declaration read as follows:

 RUSSIA'S FORM OF GOVERNMENT

 In the name of the peoples who compose the Russian state, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly proclaims the Russian State to be the Russian Democratic Federated Republic, uniting indissolubly into one whole the peoples and territories which are sovereign within the limits prescribed by the Federal Constitution. 

 LAWS REGARDING LAND OWNERSHIP

 1. _The right to privately own land within the boundaries of the Russian Republic is hereby abolished forever. _

 2. All land within the boundaries of the Russian Republic, with all mines, forests, and waters, is hereby declared the property of the nation. 

 3. The republic has the right to control all land, with all the mines, forests, and waters thereof, through the central and local administration, in accordance with the regulation provided by the present law. 

 4. The autonomous provinces of the Russian Republic have title to land on the basis of the present law and in accordance with the Federal Constitution. 

 5. The tasks of the central and local governments as regards the use of lands, mines, forests, and waters are:

 a. The creation of conditions conducive to the best possible utilization of the country's natural resources and the highest possible development of its productive forces. 

 b. The fair distribution of all natural wealth among the people. 

 6. The rights of individuals and institutions to land, mines, forests, and waters are restricted merely to utilization by said individuals and institutions. 

 7. The use of all mines, forests, land, and waters is free to all citizens of the Russian Republic, regardless of nationality or creed. This includes all unions of citizens, also governmental and public institutions. 

 8. The right to use the land is to be acquired and discontinued on the basis prescribed by this fundamental law. 

 9. _All titles to land at present held by the individuals, associations, and institutions are abolished in so far as they contradict this law. _

 10. All land, mines, forests, waters, at present owned by and otherwise in the possession of individuals, associations, and institutions, _are confiscated without compensation for the loss incurred. _

 DEMOCRATIC PEACE

 In the name of the peoples of the Russian Republic, the All-Russian Constituent Assembly expresses the firm will of the people to _immediately discontinue the war_ and conclude a just and general peace, appeals to the Allied countries proposing to define jointly the exact terms of the democratic peace acceptable to all the belligerent nations, in order to present these terms, in behalf of the Allies, to the governments fighting against the Russian Republic and her allies. 

 The Constituent Assembly firmly believes that the attempts of the peoples of Russia to end the disastrous war will meet with a unanimous response on the part of the peoples and the governments of the Allied countries, and that by common efforts a speedy peace will be attained, which will safeguard the well-being and dignity of all the belligerent countries. 

 The Constituent Assembly resolves to elect from its midst an authorized delegation which will carry on negotiations with the representatives of the Allied countries and which will present the appeal to jointly formulate terms upon which a speedy termination of the war will be possible, as well as for the purpose of carrying out the decisions of the Constituent Assembly regarding the question of peace negotiations with the countries fighting against us. 

 This delegation, which is to be under the guidance of the Constituent Assembly, is to immediately start fulfilling the duties imposed upon it. 

 Expressing, in the name of the peoples of Russia, its regret that the negotiations with Germany, which were started without preliminary agreement with the Allied countries, have assumed the character of negotiations for a separate peace, the Constituent Assembly, in the name of the peoples of the Federated Republic, _while continuing the armistice, accepts the further carrying on of the negotiations with the countries warring against us_ in order to work toward a general democratic peace which shall be in accordance "with the people's will and protect Russia's interests. "

VI

Immediately following the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly a body ofRed Guards shot the two Constitutional Democrats, Kokoshkin and Shingariev, who were at the time confined as prisoners who were ill in the NavalHospital. The reason for the brutal murder of these men was that they werebourgeoisie and, therefore, enemies of the working class! It is only justto add that the foul deed was immediately condemned by the Bolshevikgovernment and by the Soviet of Petrograd. "The working class will neverapprove of any outrages upon our prisoners, whatever may have been theirpolitical offense against the people and their Revolution, " the latter bodydeclared, in a resolution on the subject of the assassinations. Two daysafter the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly twenty-threeSocialist-Revolutionist members of that body, assembled at the office oftheir party, were arrested, and the premises occupied by Red Guards, theprocedure being exactly as it used to be in the old days under the Czar. 

There is a relentless logic of life and action from which there can be noescape. Czarism was a product of that inexorable process. All itsoppression and brutality proceeded by an inevitable and irresistiblesequence from the first determination and effort to realize the principleof autocracy. Any dictatorship, whether of a single man, a group or class, must rest ultimately upon oppressive and coercive force. Believing that themeans would be justified by the end, Lenine and Trotzky and theirassociates had suppressed the Constituent Assembly, claiming thatparliamentary government, based upon the equal and free suffrage of allclasses, was, during the transition period, dangerous to the proletariat;that in its stead a new type of government must be established--governmentby associations of wage-earners, soldiers, and peasants, called Soviets. 

But what if among these there should develop a purpose contrary to thepurpose of the Bolsheviki? Would men who, starting out with a belief in theConstituante, and as its champions, used force to destroy and suppress itthe moment it became evident that its purpose was not their purpose, hesitate to suppress and destroy any Soviet movement which adoptedpolicies contrary to their own? What assurance could there be, once theirpoint of view, their initial principle, was granted, that the freedomdenied to the Constituante would be assured to the Soviets? In the verynature of the case there could be no such assurance. However honest andsincere the Bolsheviki themselves might be in their belief that there wouldbe such assurance, there could in fact be none, for the logic of life isstronger than any human will. 

As was inevitable, the Bolsheviki soon found themselves in the position ofsuppressing Soviets which they could not control as freely and in the samemanner as they had suppressed the Constituent Assembly. When, for example, the soldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment--the very men who helped theBolsheviki into power--became dissatisfied and organized, publishing theirown organ, _The Soldier's Cloak_, the paper was confiscated and theorganization suppressed. [38] The forcible suppression of Soviets wascommon. The Central Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants'Delegates, together with the old Central Executive Committee of the Sovietsof Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates (who had never acknowledged theOctober elections), convoked an extraordinary assembly of Soviets onJanuary 8th, the same date as that on which the Bolshevik Congress ofSoviets was convoked. Circumstances compelled the opening to be deferreduntil two days later, the 10th. This conference, called the ThirdAll-Russian Congress of Peasants' Soviets, was suppressed by force, many ofthe 359 delegates and all the members of the Executive Committee beingarrested. The following extract from a declaration of protest addressed bythe outraged peasants to the Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, andPeasants convoked by the Bolshevik government tells the story:

 As soon as the Congress was opened, sailors and Red Guards, armed with guns and hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11 Kirillovskaia Street), surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, and ordered all persons to leave. 

 "In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants' Congress of All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants. 

 "In the name of the Baltic fleet, " the sailor's replied. 

 The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the peasants ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in speeches full of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in the Constituent Assembly.... 

 This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle: disturbed by men who confessed that they did not know why they were there, the peasants sang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joined them. Then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory of Logvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers, lowering their guns, knelt down also. 

 The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turn of events. "Enough said, " declared the chiefs; "we have come not to speak, but to act. If they do not want to go to Smolny, let them get out of here. " And they set themselves to the task. 

 In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled upon, and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out of doors during the night in the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing. 

 Members of the Executive Committee were arrested, [39] the premises occupied by sailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein stolen. 

 The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of Petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality. A certain number were lodged in the barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment. The sailors, who but a few minutes before had sung a funeral hymn to Logvinov, and wept when they saw that they had understood nothing, now became the docile executioners of the orders of the Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" they answered, as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the order. No need to talk. "[40]

We do not need to rely upon the testimony of witnesses belonging to theRevolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, or other factions unfriendlyto the Bolsheviki. However trustworthy such testimony may be, and howeverwell corroborated, we cannot expect it to be convincing to those who pintheir faith to the Bolsheviki. Such people will believe only what theBolsheviki themselves say about Bolshevism. It is well, therefore, that wecan supplement the testimony already given by equally definite and directtestimony from official Bolshevist sources to the same effect. From theofficial organs of the Bolsheviki it can be shown that the Bolshevikauthorities suppressed Soviet after Soviet; that when they found thatSoviets were controlled by Socialists who belonged to other factions theydissolved them and ordered new elections, refusing to permit the freechoice of the members to be expressed in selecting their officers. 

The Bolsheviki did this, it should be remembered, not merely in cases whereMensheviki or Socialist-Revolutionists were in the majority, butalso in cases where the majority consisted of members of theSocialist-Revolutionary party of the Left--the faction which had unitedwith the Bolsheviki in suppressing the Constituante. Their union with theBolsheviki was from the first a compromise, based upon the politicalopportunism of both sides. The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left did notbelieve in the Bolshevik theories or program, but they wanted the politicalassistance of the Bolsheviki. The latter did not believe in the theories orprogram of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, but they wanted theirpolitical support. The union could not long endure; the differences weretoo deeply rooted. Before very long the Bolsheviki were fighting theirformer allies and the Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, like MarieSpiridonova, for example, were fighting the Bolsheviki. At Kazan, whereLenine went to school, the Soviet was dissolved because it was controlledby Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, former allies, now hostile to theBolsheviki. Here are two paragraphs from _Izvestya_, one of the Bolshevistofficial organs:

 KAZAN, _July 26th. As the important offices in the Soviet were occupied by Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left, the Extraordinary Commission has dissolved the Provisional Soviet. The governmental power is now represented by a Revolutionary Committee. (Izvestya, July 28, 1918. )_

 KAZAN, _August 1_. The state of mind of the workmen is revolutionary. _If the Mensheviki dare to carry on their propaganda, death menaces them. (Idem, August 3. )_

And here is confirmation from another official organ of the Bolsheviki, _Pravda_:

 KAZAN, _August 4th_. The Provisional Congress of the Soviets of the Peasants has been dissolved because of the absence from it of poor peasants and _because its state of mind is obviously counter-revolutionary. (Pravda, August 6, 1918. )_

As early as April, 1918, the Soviet at Jaroslav was dissolved by theBolshevik authorities and new elections ordered. [41] In these electionsthe Mensheviki and the Socialist-Revolutionists everywhere gained anabsolute majority. [42] The population here wanted the Constituent Assemblyand they wanted Russia to fight on with the Allies. Attempts to suppressthis majority led to insurrection, which the Bolsheviki crushed in the mostbrutal manner, and when the people, overpowered and helpless, sought tomake peace, the Bolsheviki only _increased the artillery fire_! Here is an"Official Bulletin, " published in _Izvestya_, July 21, 1918:

 At Jaroslav the adversary, gripped in the iron ring of our troops, has tried to enter into negotiations. _The reply has been given under the form of redoubled artillery fire. _

_Izvestya_ published, on July 25th, a Bolshevist military proclamationaddressed to the inhabitants of Jaroslav concerning the insurrection whichoriginally arose from the suppression of the Soviet and other popularassemblages:

 The General Staff notifies to the population of Jaroslav that all those who desire to live are invited to abandon the town in the course of twenty-four hours and to meet near the America Bridge. Those who remain will be treated as insurgents, _and no quarter will be given to any one_. Heavy artillery fire and gas-bombs will be used against them. _All those who remain will perish In the ruins of the town with the insurrectionists, the traitors, and the enemies of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolution. _

Next day, July 26th, _Izvestya_ published the information that "afterminute questionings and full inquiry" a special commission appointed toinquire into the events relating to the insurrection at Jaroslav had listed350 persons as having "taken an active part in the insurrection and hadrelations with the Czecho-Slovaks, " and that by order of the commissionersthe whole band of 350 had been shot!

It is needless to multiply the illustrations of brutal oppression--of menand women arrested and imprisoned for no other crime than that of engagingin propaganda in favor of government by universal suffrage; of newspapersconfiscated and suppressed; of meetings banned and Soviets dissolvedbecause the members' "state of mind" did not please the Bolsheviki. MaximGorky declared in his _Novya Zhizn_ that there had been "ten thousandlynchings. " Upon what authority Gorky--who was inclined to sympathize withthe Bolsheviki, and who even accepted office under them--based thatstatement is not known. Probably it is an exaggeration. One thing, however, is quite certain, namely, that a reign of terror surpassing the worst daysof the old régime was inflicted upon unhappy Russia by the Bolsheviki. Atthe very beginning of the Bolshevik régime Trotzky laughed to scorn all theprotests against violence, threatening that resort would be had to theguillotine. Speaking to the opponents of the Bolshevik policy in thePetrograd Soviet, he said:

"You are perturbed by the mild terror we are applying against our classenemies, but know that not later than a month hence this terror will take amore terrible form on the model of the terror of the great revolutionariesof France. Not a fortress, but the guillotine will be for our enemies. "

That threat was not literally carried out, but there was a near approach toit when public hangings for civil offenses were established. Forreintroducing the death penalty into the army as a means of putting an endto treason and the brutal murder of officers by rebellious soldiers, theBolsheviki excoriated Kerensky. _Yet they themselves introduced hanging andflogging in public for petty civil crimes!_ The death penalty was neverinflicted for civil crimes under the late Czar. It was never inflicted forpolitical offenses. Only rarely was it inflicted for murder. It remainedfor a so-called "Socialist" government to resort to such savagery as wefind described in the following extract from the recognized official organof the Bolshevik government:

Two village robbers were condemned to death. All the people of Semenovskaiaand the surrounding communes were invited to the ceremony. On July 6th, atmidday, a great crowd of interested spectators arrived at the village ofLoupia. The organizers of the execution gave to each of the bystanders theopportunity of flogging the condemned to obtain from them supplementaryconfessions. The number of blows was unlimited. Then a vote of thespectators was taken as to the method of execution. The majority was forhanging. In order that the spectacle could be easily seen, the spectatorswere ranged in three ranks--the first row sat down, the second rested onthe knee, and the third stood up. [43]

The Bolshevik government created an All-Russian Extraordinary Commission, which in turn created Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions. These bodies--the local not less than the national--were empowered to makearrests and even decree and carry out capital sentences. There was noappeal from their decisions; they were simply required to _reportafterward_! Only members of the Bolshevik party were immune from thisterror. Alminsky, a Bolshevist writer of note, felt called upon to protestagainst this hideous travesty of democratic justice, and wrote in_Pravda_:

The absence of the necessary restraint makes one feel appalled at the"instruction" issued by the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission to "AllProvincial Extraordinary Commissions, " which says: "The All-RussianExtraordinary Commission is perfectly independent in its work, carrying outhouse searches, arrests, executions, of which it _afterward_ reports to theCouncil of the People's Commissaries and to the Central Executive Council. "Further, the Provincial and District Extraordinary Commissions "areindependent in their activities, and when called upon by the localExecutive Council present a report of their work. " In so far as housesearches and arrests are concerned, a report made _afterward_ may result inputting right irregularities committed owing to lack of restraint. The samecannot be said of executions.... It can also be seen from the "instruction"that personal safety is to a certain extent guaranteed only to members ofthe government, of the Central Council, and of the local ExecutiveCommittees. With the exception of these few persons all members of thelocal committees of the [Bolshevik] Party, of the Control Committees, andof the Executive Committee of the party may be shot at any time by thedecision of any Extraordinary Commission of a small district town if theyhappen to be on its territory, and a report of that made _afterward. _[44]

VII

While in some respects, such as this terrible savagery, Bolshevism hasout-Heroded Herod and surpassed the régime of the Romanovs in crueloppression, upon the whole its methods have been very like that of thelatter. There is really not much to choose between the ways of Stolypin andVon Plehve and those of the Lenine-Trotzky rule. The methods employed havebeen very similar and in not a few instances the same men who acted as theagents of espionage and tyranny for the Czar have served the Bolsheviki inthe same capacity. Just as under Czarism there was alliance with the BlackHundreds and with all sorts of corrupt and vicious criminal agents, so wefind the same phenomenon recurring under the Bolsheviki. The time has notyet arrived for the compilation of the full record of Bolshevism in thisparticular, but enough is known to justify the charge here made. Thatagents-provocateurs, spies, informers, police agents, and pogrom-makersformerly in the service of the Czar have been given positions of trust andhonor by Lenine and Trotzky unfortunately admits of no doubt whatever. 

It was stated at a meeting of Russians held in Paris in the summer of 1917that one of the first Russian regiments which refused to obey orders toadvance "contained 120 former political or civil police agents out of 181refractory soldiers. " During the Kerensky régime, at the time when Leninewas carrying on his propaganda through _Pravda_, [45] Vladimir Bourtzevexposed three notorious agents of the old police terror, provocateurs, whowere working on the paper. In August, 1917, the Jewish Conjoint Committeein London published a long telegram from the representative of the JewishCommittee in Petrograd, calling attention to the fact that Lenine's partywas working in tacit agreement with the Black Hundreds. The telegram ishere given in full:

 Extreme Russian reactionaries have allied themselves closely with extreme revolutionaries, and Black Hundreds have entered into tacit coalition with the Lenine party. In the army the former agents and detectives of the political police carry on ardent campaign for defeat, and in the rear the former agents-provocateurs prepare and direct endless troubles. 

 The motives of this policy on the part of the reactionaries are clear. It is the direct road to a counter-revolution. The troubles, the insurrections, and shocking disorders which follow provoke disgust at the Revolution, while the military defeats prepare the ground for an intervention of the old friend of the Russian Black Hundreds, William II, the counter-revolutionaries work systematically for the defeat of the Russian armies, sometimes openly, cynically. 

 Thus in their press and proclamations they go so far as to throw the whole responsibility for the war and for the obstacles placed in the way of a peace with Germany on the Jews. It is these "diabolical Jews, " they say, who prevent the conclusion of peace and insist on the continuation of the war, because they desire to ruin Russia. Proclamations in this sense have been found, together with a voluminous anti-Semitic literature, in the offices of the party of Lenine Bolsheviki (Maximalists), and particularly at the headquarters of the extreme revolutionaries, Château Knheshinskaja. Salutations. BLANK. 

That the leaders of the Bolsheviki, particularly Lenine and Trotzky, everentered into any "agreement" with the Black Hundreds, or took any part inthe anti-Semitic campaign referred to, is highly improbable. Unless anduntil it is supported by ample evidence of a competent nature, we shall bejustified in refusing to believe anything of the sort. It is, however, quite probable that provocateurs worming their way into Lenine's andTrotzky's good graces tried to use the Bolshevik agitation as a cover fortheir own nefarious work. As we have seen already, Lenine had previouslybeen imposed upon by a notorious secret police agent, Malinovsky. But theopen association of the Bolsheviki with men who played a despicable rôleunder the old régime is not to be denied. The simple-minded reader ofBolshevist literature who believes that the Bolshevik government, whateverits failings, has the merit of being a government by real working-men andworking-women, needs to be enlightened. Not only are Lenine and Trotzky notof the proletariat themselves, but they have associated with themselvesmen whose lives have been spent, not as workers, not even as simplebourgeoisie, but as servants of the terror-system of the Czar. They haveassociated with themselves, too, some of the most corrupt criminals inRussia. Here are a few of them:

Professor Kobozev, of Riga, joined the Bolsheviki and was active as adelegate to the Municipal Council of Petrograd. According to theinformation possessed by the Russian revolutionary leaders, this ProfessorKobozev used to be a police spy, his special job being to make reports tothe police concerning the political opinions and actions of students andfaculty members. One of the very first men released from prison by theBolsheviki was one Doctor Doubrovine, who had been a leader of the BlackHundreds, an organizer of many pogroms. He became an active Bolshevik. Kamenev, the Bolshevik leader, friend of Lenine, is a journalist. He wasformerly a member of the old Social Democratic party. Soon after the warbroke out he was arrested and behaved so badly that he was censured by hisparty. Early in the Revolution of 1917 he was accused of serving the secretpolice at Kiev. Bonno Brouevitch, Military Councilor to the Bolshevikgovernment, was a well-known anti-Semite who had been dismissed from hismilitary office on two occasions, once by the Czar's government and once bythe Provisional Government. General Komisarov, another of Lenine's trustedmilitary officials and advisers, was formerly a chief official of theCzar's secret police, known for his terrible persecution of therevolutionists. Accused of high treason by the Provisional Government, hefled, but returned and joined the Lenine-Trotzky forces. Prince Andronikov, associate of Rasputin; (Lenine's "My friend, the Prince"); Orlov, policeagent and "denouncer" and secretary of the infamous Protopopov; Postnikov, convicted and imprisoned as a German spy in 1910; Lepinsky, formerly in theCzar's secret police; and Gualkine, friend of the unspeakable Rasputin, aresome of the other men who have been closely identified with the"proletarian régime" of the Bolsheviki. [46] The man they released fromprison and placed in the important position of Military Commander ofPetrograd was Muraviev, who had been chief of the Czar's police and wasregarded by even the moderate members of the Provisional Government, bothunder Lvov and Kerensky, as a dangerous reactionary. [47] Karl Radek, theBohemian, a notorious leader of the Russian Bolsheviki, who undertook tostir up the German workers and direct the Spartacide revolt, was, accordingto _Justice_, expelled from the German Social Democratic party before thewar as a thief and a police spy. [48] How shall we justify men callingthemselves Socialists and proletarian revolutionists, who ally themselveswith such men as these, but imprison, harry, and abuse such men and womenas Bourtzev, Kropotkin, Plechanov, Breshkovskaya, Tchaykovsky, Spiridonova, Agounov, Larokine, Avksentiev, and many other Socialists like them?

In surveying the fight of the Bolsheviki to establish their rule it isimpossible to fail to observe that their chief animus has been directedagainst other Socialists, rather than against members of the reactionaryparties. That this has been the fact they do not themselves deny. Forexample, the "People's Commissary of Justice, " G. I. Oppokov, better knownas "Lomov, " declared in an interview in January, 1918: "Our chief enemiesare not the Cadets. Our most irreconcilable opponents are the ModerateSocialists. This explains the arrests of Socialists and the closing down ofSocialist newspapers. Such measures of repression are, however, onlytemporary. "[49] And in the Soviet at Petrograd, July 30, 1918, according to _Pravda_, Lachevitch, one of the delegates, said: "TheSocialist-Revolutionists of the Right and the Mensheviki are more dangerousfor the government of the Soviets than the bourgeoisie. But these enemiesare not yet exterminated and can move about freely. The proletariatmust act. We ought, once for all, to rid ourselves of theSocialist-Revolutionists of the Right and of the Mensheviki. "

In this summary of the Bolsheviki war against democracy, it will beobserved, no attempt has been made to gather all the lurid and fantasticstories which have been published by sensational journalists. The testimonycomes from Socialist sources of the utmost reliability, much of it fromofficial Bolshevist sources. The system of oppression it describes is twinbrother to that which existed under the Romanovs, to end which hundreds ofthousands of the noblest and best of our humankind gave up their lives. Under the banner of Social Democracy a tyranny has been established asinfamous as anything in the annals of autocracy. 

 "_O Liberty, what monstrous crimes are committed in thy great name!_"

CHAPTER VII

BOLSHEVIST THEORY AND PRACTICE

I

Utopia-making is among the easiest and most fascinating of all intellectualoccupations. Few employments which can be called intellectual are easierthan that of devising panaceas for the ills of society, of demonstrating onpaper how the rough places of life may be made plain and its crooked onesmade straight. And it is not a vain and fruitless waste of effort and oftime, as things so easy of achievement often are. Many of the noblest mindsof all lands and all ages have found pleasure and satisfaction in theimagining of ideal commonwealths and by so doing have rendered greatservice to mankind, enriching literature and, what is more important, stimulating the urge and passion for improvement and the faith of men intheir power to climb to the farthest heights of their dreams. But thematerial of life is hard and lacks the plastic quality of inspiredimagination. Though there is probably no single evil which exists for whicha solution has not been devised in the wonderful laboratory of visioning, the perversity of the subtle and mysterious thing called life is such thatmany great and grave evils continue to challenge, perplex, and harass ourhumankind. 

Yet, notwithstanding the plain lesson of history and experience, thereminder impressed on every page of humanity's record, that between theglow and the glamour of the vision and its actual realization stretches along, long road, there are many simple-minded souls to whom the visiongleamed is as the goal attained. They do not distinguish between schemes onpaper and ideals crystallized into living realities. This type of mind isfar more common than is generally recognized; that is why so many peoplequite seriously believe that the Bolsheviki have really established inRussia a society which conforms to the generous ideals of social democracy. They have read the rhetorical "decrees" and "proclamations" in which theshibboleths of freedom and democracy abound, and are satisfied. Yet itought to be plainly evident to any intelligent person that, even if thedecrees and proclamations were as sound as they are in fact unsound, and asdefinite as they are in fact vague, they would afford no real basis forjudging Bolshevism as an actual experiment in social polity. There is, inultimate analysis, only one test to apply to Bolshevism--namely, the testof reality. We must ask what the Bolsheviki did, not what they professed;what was the performance, not what was the promise. 

Of course, this does not mean that we are to judge result wholly withoutregard to aim. Admirable intention is still admirable as intention, evenwhen untoward circumstance defeats it and brings deplorable results. Bolshevism is not merely a body of belief and speculation. When theBolsheviki seized the government of Russia and began to attempt to carryout their ideas, Bolshevism became a living movement in a world of realityand subject to the acid test of pragmatic criteria. It must be judged bysuch a matter-of-fact standard as the extent to which it has enlarged ordiminished the happiness, health, comfort, freedom, well-being, satisfaction, and efficiency of the greatest number of individuals. Unlessthe test shows that it has increased the sum of good available for themass, Bolshevism cannot be regarded as a gain. If, on the contrary, thetest shows that it has resulted in sensibly diminishing the sum of goodavailable to the greatest number of people, Bolshevism must be counted as amove in the wrong direction, as so much effort lost. Nothing that can beurged on philosophical or moral grounds for or against the moral orintellectual impulses that prompted it can fundamentally change theverdict. Yet, for all that, it is well to examine the theory which inspiresthe practice; well to know the manner and method of thinking, and the viewof life, from which Bolshevism as a movement of masses of men and womenproceeds. 

Theoretically, Bolshevism, as such, has no necessary connection with thephilosophy or the program of Socialism. Certain persons have established aworking relation between Socialism, a program, and Bolshevism, a method. The connection is not inherently logical, but, on the contrary, whollyadventitious. As a matter of fact, Bolshevism can only be linked to theprogram of Socialism by violently and disastrously weakening the latter anddestroying its fundamental character. We shall do well to remember this; toremember that the method of action, and, back of the method, the philosophyon which it rests and from which it springs, are separate and distinct fromSocialism. They are incalculably older and they have been associated withvastly different programs. All that is new in Bolshevism is that a very oldmethod of action, and a very old philosophy of action, have been seizedupon by a new class which attempts to unite them to a new program. 

That is all that is implied in the "dictatorship of the proletariat. "Dictatorship by small minorities is not a new political phenomenon. Allthat is new when the minority attempting to establish its dictatorship iscomposed of poor, propertyless people, is the fact of their economiccondition and status. That is the only difference between the dictatorshipof Russia by the Romanov dynasty and the dictatorship of Russia by a smallminority of determined, class-conscious working-people. It is not only theprecise forms of oppressive power used by them that are identicallycharacteristic of Czarism and Bolshevism, but their underlying philosophy. Both forms of dictatorship rest upon the philosophy of might as the onlyvalid right. Militarism, especially as it was developed under Prussianleadership, has exactly the same philosophy and aims at the same generalresult, namely, to establish the domination and control of society by aminority class. The Bolsheviki have simply inverted Czarism and Militarism. 

What really shocks the majority of people is not, after all, the methods orthe philosophy of Bolshevism, but the fact that the Bolsheviki, belongingto a subject class, have seized upon the methods and philosophy of the mostpowerful ruling classes and turned them to their own account. There is aclass morality and a class psychology the subtle influences of which fewperceive as a matter of habit, which, however, to a great extent shape ourjudgments, our sympathies, and our antipathies. Men who never were shockedwhen a Czar, speaking the language of piety and religion, indulged in themost infamous methods and deeds of terror and oppression, are shockedbeyond all power of adequate expression when former subjects of that sameCzar, speaking the language of the religion of democracy and freedom, resort to the same infamous methods of terror and oppression. 

II

The idea that a revolting proletarian minority might by force impose itsrule upon society runs through the history of the modern working class, anote of impatient, desperate, menacing despair. The Bolsheviki say thatthey are Marxian Socialists; that Marx believed in and advocated thesetting up, during the transitory period of social revolution, of the"dictatorship of the proletariat. " They are not quite honest in this claim, however; they are indulging in verbal tricks. It is true that Marx taughtthat the proletarian dominion of society, as a preliminary to the abolitionof all class rule of every kind, must be regarded as certain andinevitable. But it is not honest to claim the sanction of his teaching forthe seizure of political power by a small class, consisting of about 6 percent. Of the population, and the imposition by force of its rule upon themajority of the population that is either unwilling or passive. That is thenegation of Marxian Socialism. _It is the essence of Marx's teaching thatthe social revolution must come as a historical necessity when theproletariat itself comprises an overwhelming majority of the people_. 

Let us summarize the theory as it appears in the _Communist Manifesto_:Marx begins by setting forth the fact that class conflict is as old ascivilization itself, that history is very largely the record of conflictsbetween contending social classes. In our epoch, he argues, class conflictis greatly simplified; there is really only one division, that whichdivides the bourgeoisie and the proletariat: "Society as a whole is moreand more splitting up into great hostile camps, into two great classesdirectly facing each other, bourgeoisie and proletariat. " ... "With thedevelopment of industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; itbecomes concentrated in great masses, its strength grows, and it feels thatstrength more. " ... "The proletarian movement is the _self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority in the interests of theimmense majority_. " It is this "immense majority" that is to establish itsdominion. Marx expressly points out that "all previous historical movementswere movements of minorities, or in the interest of minorities. " It is thegreat merit of the movement of the proletariat, as he conceives it, that itis the "movement of the immense majority, in the interests of the immensemajority. "

Clearly, when Lenine and his followers say that they take their doctrine ofthe "dictatorship of the proletariat" from Marx, they pervert the truth;they take from Marx only the phrase, not their fundamental policy. It isnot to be denied that there were times when Marx himself momentarily lapsedinto the error of Blanqui and the older school of Utopian, conspiratorySocialists who believed that they could find a short cut to socialdemocracy; that by a surprise stroke, carefully prepared and daringlyexecuted, a small and desperate minority could overthrow the existingsocial order and bring about Socialism. As Jaurès has pointed out, [50] themind of Marx sometimes harked back to the dramatic side of the FrenchRevolution, and was captivated by such episodes as the conspiracy of Babeufand his friends, who in their day, while the proletariat was a smallminority, even as it is in Russia now, sought to establish its dominion. But it is well known that after the failure of the Paris Commune, in 1871, Marx once and for all abandoned all belief in this form of the"dictatorship of the proletariat, " and in the possibility of securingSocialism through the conspiratory action of minorities. He was even ratherunwilling that the _Manifesto_ should be republished after that, except asa purely historical document. It was in that spirit of reaction that he andEngels wrote in 1872 that passage--to which Lenine has given such anunwarranted interpretation--in which they say that the Commune had shownthat "the working classes cannot simply take possession of the ready-madestate machine and set it in motion for their own aims. "

It was no less an interpreter of Marx than his great collaborator andfriend, Frederick Engels, who, in 1895, stated the reasons for abandoningall belief in the possibility of accomplishing anything through politicalsurprises and through the action of small conscious and determinedminorities at the head of unconscious masses:

 History proved that we were wrong--we and those who like us, in 1848, awaited the speedy success of the proletariat. It became perfectly clear _that economic conditions all over the Continent were by no means as yet sufficiently matured for superseding the capitalist organization of production_. This was proved by the economic revolution which commenced on the continent of Europe after 1848 and developed in France, Austria-Hungary, Poland, and, recently, also in Russia, and made Germany into an industrial state of the first rank--all on a capitalist basis, _which shows that in 1848 the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion_. And to-day we have a huge international army of Socialists.... If this mighty proletarian army has not yet reached its goal, if it is destined to gain its ends only in a long drawn out struggle, making headway but slowly, step by step, this only proves how impossible it was in 1848 to change social conditions by forcible means ... The time for small minorities to place themselves at the head of the ignorant masses and resort to force in order to bring about revolutions, is gone. _A complete change in the organization of society can be brought about only by the conscious co-operation of the masses_; they must be alive to the aim in view; they must know what they want. The history of the last fifty years has taught us that. [51]

What Engels had in mind when he stressed the fact that history showed thatin 1848 "the prevailing conditions were still capable of expansion" is thecentral Marxian doctrine of historical inevitability. It is surely lessthan honest to claim the prestige and authority of Marx's teachings uponthe slender basis of a distorted version of his early thought, whilecompletely ignoring the matured body of his doctrines. It may not mattermuch to the world to-day what Marx thought, or how far Lenine follows histeachings, but it is of importance that the claim set up by Lenine andTrotzky and many of their followers that they are guided by the principlesof Marxian Socialism is itself demonstrably an evidence of moral orintellectual obliquity, which makes them very dangerous guides to follow. It is of importance, too, that the claim they make allures many Socialistsof trusting and uncritical minds to follow them. 

Many times in his long life Marx, together with Engels, found himselfengaged in a fierce war against the very things Lenine and Trotzky andtheir associates have been trying to do. He thundered against Weitling, whowanted to have a "daring minority" seize the power of the state andestablish its dictatorship by a _coup d'état_. He was denounced as a"reactionary" by Willich and Kinkel because, in 1850, he rejected withscorn the idea of a sudden seizure of political power through conspiratoryaction, and had the courage to say that it would take fifty years for theworkers "to fit themselves for political power. " He opposed Lassalle's ideaof an armed insurrection in 1862, because he was certain that the economicdevelopment had not yet reached the stage which alone could make a socialchange possible. He fought with all the fierce impetuousness of his natureevery attempt of Bakunin to lead the workers to attempt the seizure ofpolitical power and forcibly establish their rule while still aminority. [52] He fought all these men because he had become profoundlyconvinced that "_no social order ever disappears before all the productiveforces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new andhigher relations of production never appear before the material conditionsof their existence have matured in the womb of the old society_. "[53] No"dictatorship of the proletariat, " no action by any minority, however wellarmed or however desperate, can overcome that great law. 

The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the sense in which that term isused by the Russian Bolshevik leaders, and by those who in other countriesare urging that their example be followed, is not a policy of MarxianSocialism. It is not a product of modern conditions. Rather it harks backto the earlier conspiratory Socialism of Blanqui, with its traditionsinherited from Robespierre and Babeuf. So far as its advocates areconcerned, Marx and the whole modern Socialist movement might as well neverhave existed at all. They take us back three-quarters of a century, to theera before Marx, to that past so remote in intellectual and moralcharacter, though recent in point of time, when the working class of nocountry in Europe possessed the right to vote--when the workers wereindeed proletarians and not citizens; not only propertyless, but also"without a fatherland. "

In truth, it is not difficult to understand how this theory has foundacceptance in Russia. It was not difficult to understand why Marx'sdoctrine of economic evolution was for many years rejected by most RussianSocialists; why the latter took the view that Socialism must be morequickly attained, that capitalism was not a necessary precursor ofSocialism in Russia, but that an intelligent leadership of passive masseswould successfully establish Socialism on the basis of the old Russiancommunal institutions. It was quite easy to understand the change that camewith Russia's industrial awakening, how the development of factoryproduction gave an impetus to the Marxian theories. And, though it presentsa strange paradox, in that it comes at a time when, despite everything, Russian capitalism continues to develop, it is really not difficult tounderstand how and why pre-Marxian conceptions reappear in that great landof paradoxes. Politically and intellectually the position of theproletariat of Russia before the recent Revolution was that of theproletariat of France in 1848. 

But that which baffles the mind of the serious investigator is thereadiness of so many presumably intelligent people living in countrieswhere--as in America--wholly different conditions prevail to ignore thedifferences and be ready to abandon all the democratic advance made by theworkers. There is nothing more certain in the whole range of social andpolitical life than the fact that the doctrine that the power of the statemust be seized and used by the proletariat against the non-proletarianclasses, even for a relatively brief period, _can only be carried out bydestroying all the democracy thus far achieved_. 

III

The validity of the foregoing contention can scarcely be questioned, exceptby those to whom phrases are of more consequence than facts, who placetheories above realities. The moment the Bolsheviki tried to translatetheir rhetorical propaganda for the dictatorship of the proletariat intothe concrete terms of political reality they found that they were compelledto direct their main opposition, not against the bourgeoisie, or evenagainst capitalism, but against the newly created democracy. In themovement to create a democratic government resting upon the basis ofuniversal, direct, equal, and secret suffrage they saw a peril to theirscheme far more formidable than militarism or capitalism. It was for thisreason that they set themselves to the task of suppressing the ConstituentAssembly. Only political simpletons will seriously regard the Bolshevikattempt to camouflage their motive by pretending that they determined tocrush the Constituent Assembly because its members were elected on aregister that was "obsolete" and therefore no longer truly represented thepeople. 

The German Spartacides, who were acting in full accord with the RussianBolsheviki, had not that miserable excuse. Yet they set out by force ofarms to _prevent any election being held_. In this they were quiteconsistent; they wanted to set up a dictatorship, and they knew that theoverwhelming mass of the people wanted something very different. At adinner of the Inter-Collegiate Socialist Society in New York, in December, 1918, a spokesman for the German variety of Bolshevism blandly explainedthat "Karl Liebknecht and his comrades know that they cannot hope to get amajority, therefore they are determined that no elections shall be held. They will prevent this by force. After some time, perhaps, when aproletarian régime has existed long enough, and people have becomeconvinced of the superiority of the Socialist way, or at least grown usedto it, _and it is safe to do so_, popular elections may be permitted. "Incredible as it seems, this declaration was received with cheers by anaudience which only a few minutes before had cheered with equal fervordenunciations of "encroachments upon American democracy. "

Curiously enough, the precise manner in which the Bolsheviki have actedagainst democracy was set forth, as far back as 1850, by a German, Johannvon Miquel, in a letter to Karl Marx. Miquel was born in Hanover, but hisancestors were of French origin. He studied at Heidelberg and Göttingen, and became associated with the Socialist movement of the period. He settleddown to the practice of law, however, and when Hanover was annexed byPrussia he entered the Prussian parliament. After the "dismissal of thepilot, " Bismarck, he became Prussian Minister of Finance, holding thatposition for ten years. Liebknecht referred to him as "my former _comradein communismo_ and present Chancellor _in re_. " This Miquel, while he wasstill a Socialist, in 1850 wrote to Marx as follows:

 The workers' party may succeed against the upper middle class and what remains of the feudal element, _but it will be attacked on its flank by the democracy_. We can perhaps give an anti-bourgeois tone to the Revolution for a little while, _we can destroy the essential conditions of bourgeois production_; but we cannot possibly put down the small tradesmen and shopkeeping class, the petty bourgeoisie. My motto is to secure all we can get. We should prevent the lower and middle class from _forming any organizations for as long a time as possible_ after the first victory, and especially oppose ourselves in serried ranks to the plan of calling a Constitutional Assembly. Partial terrorism, local anarchy, must replace for us what we lack in bulk. 

What a remarkable anticipation of the Bolshevist methods of 1917-18 is thusoutlined in this letter, written sixty-seven years before the Bolshevik_coup d'état!_ How literally Lenine, Trotzky and Co. Have followed Herr vonMiquel! They have desperately tried to "give an anti-bourgeois tone to theRevolution, " denouncing as bourgeois reactionaries the men and women whoselabors and sacrifices have made the Russian Socialist movement. They havedestroyed "the essential conditions" of bourgeois and of any other than themost primitive production. They have set themselves in serried ranks inopposition to "the plan of calling a Constitutional Assembly. " They havesuppressed not only the organizations of the "lower and middle class, " butalso those of a great part of the working class, thus going beyond Miquel. Finally, to replace what they lack in bulk, they have resorted to "partialterrorism and local anarchy. "

And it is in the name of revolutionary progress, of ultra-radicalism, thatwe are called upon to revert to the tactics of desperation born of thediscouraging conditions of nearly seventy years ago. A new philosophy hastaken possession of the easily possessed minds of Greenwich Villagephilosophers and parlor revolutionists--a new philosophy of progress, according to which revolutionary progress consists in the unraveling byfeverish fingers of the fabric woven through years of sacrifice; inabandoning high levels attained for the lower levels from which thestruggles of the past raised us; in harking back to the thoughts and thetactics of men who shouted their despairing, defiant cries into the gloomof the blackest period of the nineteenth century!

Universal, secret, equal, and direct suffrage was a fact in Russia, thefirst great achievement of the Revolution. Upon that foundation, and uponno other, it was possible to build an enduring, comprehensive socialdemocracy. Against that foundation the Bolsheviki hurled their destructivepower, creating a discriminating class suffrage, disfranchising a greatpart of the Russian people--not merely the bourgeoisie, but a considerablepart of the working class itself. Chapter XIII of Article 4 of theConstitution of the "Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic" setsforth the qualifications for voting, as follows:

 THE RIGHT TO VOTE

 CHAPTER THIRTEEN

 64. The right to vote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed by the following citizens, irrespective of religion, nationality, domicile, etc. , of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, of both sexes, who shall have completed their eighteenth year by the day of election:

 a. All who have acquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful to society, and also persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work--i. E. , laborers and employees of all classes who are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc. ; and peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers who employ no help for the purpose of making profits. 

 b. Soldiers of the army and navy of the Soviets. 

 c. Citizens of the two preceding categories who have to any degree lost their capacity to work. 

 Note 1: Local Soviets may, upon approval of the central power, lower the age standard mentioned herein. 

 Note 2: Non-citizens mentioned in Paragraph 20 (Article 2, Chapter Five) have the right to vote. 

 65. The following persons enjoy neither the right to vote nor the right to be voted for, even though they belong to one of the categories enumerated above, namely:

 a. Persons who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it an increase in profits. 

 b. Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, receipts from property, etc. 

 c. Private merchants, trade, and commercial brokers. 

 d. Monks and clergy of all denominations. 

 e. Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps, and the Okhrana (Czar's secret service), also members of the former reigning dynasty. 

 f. Persons who have in legal form been declared demented or mentally deficient, and also persons under guardianship. 

 g. Persons who have been deprived by a Soviet of their rights of citizenship because of selfish or dishonorable offenses, for the period fixed by the sentence. 

Apparently the Constitution does not provide any standard for determiningwhat labor is "useful and productive to society, " and leaves the way openfor a degree of arbitrariness on the part of some authority or other thatis wholly incompatible with any generally accepted ideal of freedom anddemocracy. It is apparent from the text of paragraph 64, subdivision "a" ofthe foregoing chapter that housekeeping as such is not included in thecategory of "labor that is productive and useful to society, " for aseparate category is made of it. The language used is that "The right tovote and to be elected to the Soviets is enjoyed by.... All who haveacquired the means of living through labor that is productive and useful tosociety, _and also_ persons engaged in housekeeping, which enables theformer to do productive work--_i. E. _, laborers and employees of all classeswho are employed in industry, trade, agriculture, etc. "

This _seems_ to mean that persons engaged in housekeeping can only vote ifand when they are so engaged in order to enable other persons thanthemselves to do "productive work. " It appears that housekeeping forpersons not engaged in such productive work--for children, forexample--would not confer the right to vote. It is not possible to tellwith certainty what it _does_ mean, however, for there is probably not asingle person in Russia or in the world who can tell exactly what thisprecious instrument actually means. What standard is to be established todetermine what labor is "productive" and "useful"? Is the journalist, forinstance, engaged in useful and productive labor? Is the novelist? is theagitator? Presumably the journalist employed in defending the SovietRepublic against attacks by unfriendly critics would be doing useful workand be entitled to vote, but what about the journalist employed in makingthe criticisms? Would the wife of the latter, no matter how much she mightdisagree with her husband's views, be barred from voting, simply becauseshe was "engaged in housekeeping" for one whose labors were not regarded"productive and useful to society"? If the language used means anything atall, apparently she would be so disfranchised. 

Upon what ground is it decided that the "private merchant" may not vote?Certainly it is not because his labor is of necessity neither productivenor useful, for paragraph 65 says that even though belonging to one of thecategories of persons otherwise qualified to vote, the private merchant may"enjoy neither the right to vote nor to be voted for. " The keeper of alittle grocery store, even though his income is not greater than that of amechanic, and despite the fact that his store meets a local need and makeshis services, therefore, "useful" in the highest degree, cannot enjoy civicrights, simply because he is a "merchant"! The clergy of all denominationsare excluded from the franchise. It does not matter, according to thisconstitution, that a minister belongs to a church independent of anyconnection with the state, that he is elected by people who desire hisservices and is paid by them, that he satisfies them and is thereforedoing a "useful service"--if utility means the satisfying of needs--becausehe is so employed he cannot vote. 

It is clearly provided that "peasants and Cossack agricultural laborers whoemploy no help for the purpose of making profits" can vote and be votedfor. But no persons "who employ hired labor in order to obtain from it anincrease in profits" may vote or be elected to office, _even though thework they do is productive and useful to society. _ A peasant who hires noassistance may vote, but if he decides that by employing a boy to help himhe will be able to give better attention to certain crops and make moremoney, even though he pays the boy every penny that the service is worth, judged by any standard whatever, he loses his vote and his civic statusbecause, forsooth, he has gained in his net income as a result of hisenterprise. And this is seriously put forward as the basis of government ina nation needing an intense and universal stimulation of its economicproduction. 

A militant suffragist friend of mine, whose passion for universal suffragein America is so great that it leads her to join in all sorts ofdemonstrations protesting against the failure of the United States Senateto pass the Susan B. Anthony amendment--even leading her to join in thepublic burning of President Wilson's speeches, a queer emulation of theancient ecclesiastical bigotry of burning heretical books!--manages tounite to her passion for equal and unrestricted suffrage an equallypassionate admiration for the Bolsheviki, arch-enemies of equal andunrestricted suffrage. Her case is not exceptional: it is rather typical ofthe Bolshevik following in England and in America. Such minds are notgoverned and directed by rational processes, but by emotional impulses, generally of pathological origin. 

What the Bolshevik constitution would mean if practically applied toAmerican life to-day can be briefly indicated. The following classes wouldcertainly be entitled to vote and to be elected to office:

1. All wage-earners engaged in the production of goods and utilitiesregarded by some designated authority as "productive and useful tosociety. "

2. Teachers and educators engaged in the public service. 

3. All farmers owning and working their own farms without hired help of anykind. 

4. All wage-earners engaged in the public service as employees of thestate, subdivisions of the state, or public service corporations-such aspostal clerks, street-railway workers, electricians, and so on. 

5. Wives and others engaged in keeping the homes of the foregoing, so as toenable them to work. 

6. The "soldiers of the army and navy"--whether all officers are includedis not clear from the text. 

Now let us see what classes would be as certainly excluded from the rightto vote and to be voted for. 

1. Every merchant from the keeper of a corner grocery store to the owner ofa great mercantile establishment. 

2. Every banker, every commission agent, every broker, every insuranceagent, every real-estate dealer. 

3. Every farmer who hires help of any kind--even a single "hand. "

4. Every petty contractor, garage-keeper, or other person employing anyhired help whatever, including the professional writer who hires astenographer, the doctor who hires a chauffeur, and the dentist who hires amechanic assistant. 

5. Every clergyman and minister of the Gospel. 

6. Every person whose income is derived from inherited wealth or frominvested earnings, including all who live upon annuities provided by giftor bequest. 

7. Every person engaged in housekeeping for persons included in any of theforegoing six categories--including the wives of such disqualified persons. 

There are many occupational groups whose civic status is not so easilydefined. The worker engaged in making articles of luxury, enjoyed only bythe privileged few, could hardly have a better claim to a vote than thehousekeeper of a man whose income was derived from foreign investments, orthan the chauffeur of a man whose income was derived from government bonds. All three represent, presumably, types of that parasitic labor whichsubjects those engaged in it to disfranchisement. Apparently, though notcertainly, then, the following would also be disfranchised:

1. All lawyers except those engaged by the public authorities for thepublic service. 

2. All teachers and educators other than those engaged in the publicservice. 

3. All bankers, managers of industries, commercial travelers, experts, andaccountants except those employed in the public service, or whose labor isjudged by a competent tribunal to be necessary and useful. 

4. All editors, journalists, authors of books and plays, except as specialprovision might be provided for individuals. 

5. All persons engaged in occupations which a competent tribunal decided toclassify as non-essential or non-productive. 

Any serious attempt to introduce such restrictions and limitations of theright of suffrage in America would provoke irresistible revolt. It would bejustly and properly regarded as an attempt to arrest the forward march ofthe nation and to turn its energies in a backward direction. It would bejust as reactionary in the political world as it would be in the industrialworld to revert back to hand-tool production; to substitute the ox-team forthe railway system, the hand-loom for the power-loom, the flail for thethreshing-machine, the sickle for the modern harvesting-machine, the humancourier for the electric telegraph. 

Yet we find a radical like Mr. Max Eastman giving his benediction andapproval to precisely such a program in Russia as a substitute foruniversal suffrage. We find him quoting with apparent approval an articlesetting forth Lenine's plan, hardly disguised, to disfranchise every farmerwho employs even a single hired helper. [54]

Lenine's position is quite clear. "Only the proletariat leading on thepoorest peasants (the semi-proletariat as they are called in our program)... May undertake the steps toward Socialism that have become absolutelyunavoidable and non-postponable.... The peasants want to retain their smallholdings and to arrive at some place of equal distribution.... So be it. Nosensible Socialist will quarrel with a pauper peasant on this ground. Ifthe lands are confiscated, _so long as the proletarians rule in the greatcenters, and all political power is handed over to the proletariat_, therest will take care of itself. "[55] Yet, in spite of Lenine's insistencethat all political power be "handed over to the proletariat, " in spite of ascore of similar utterances which might be quoted, and, finally, in spiteof the Soviet Constitution which so obviously excludes from the right tovote a large part of the adult population, an American Bolshevistpamphleteer has the effrontery to insult the intelligence of his readersby the stupidly and palpably false statement that "even at the present time95 per cent. In Russia can vote, while in the United States only about 65per cent. Can vote. "[56]

Of course it is only as a temporary measure that this dictatorship of aclass is to be maintained. It is designed only for the period of transitionand adjustment. In time the adjustment will be made, all forms of socialparasitism and economic exploitation will disappear, and then it will beboth possible and natural to revert to democratic government. Too simpleand naïve to be trusted alone in a world so full of trickery and trickstersas ours are they who find any asurance in this promise. They are surelyamong the most gullible of our humankind!

Of course, the answer to the claim is a very simple one: it is that noclass gaining privilege and power ever surrenders it until it is compelledto do so. Every one who has read the pre-Marxian literature dealing withthe dictatorship of the proletariat knows how insistent is the demand thatthe period of dictatorship must be _prolonged as much as possible_. EvenMarx himself insisted, on one occasion at least, that it must be maintainedas long as possible, [57] and in the letter of Johann von Miquel, alreadyquoted, we find the same thought expressed in the same terms, "as long aspossible. " But even if we put aside these warnings of human experience andof recorded history, and persuade ourselves that in Russia we have a whollynew phenomenon, a class possessing powers of dictatorship animated by aburning passion to relinquish those powers as quickly as possible, is itnot still evident that the social adjustments that must be made to reachthe stage where, according to the Bolshevik standards, political democracycan be introduced, must, under the most favorable circumstancesconceivable, take many, many years? Even Lenine admits that "a soundsolution of the problem of increasing the productivity of labor" (whichlies at the very heart of the problem we are now discussing) "requires atleast (especially after a most distressing and destructive war) severalyears. "[58]

From the point of view of social democracy the basis of the Bolshevik stateis reactionary and unsound. The true Socialist policy is that set forth byWilhelm Liebknecht in the following words: "The political power which theSocial Democracy aims at and which it will win, no matter what its enemiesmay do, _has not for its object the establishment of the dictatorship ofthe proletariat, but the suppression of the dictatorship of thebourgeoisie_. "[59]

IV

Democracy in government and in industry must characterize any system ofsociety which can be justly called Socialist. Thirteen years ago I wrote, "Socialism without democracy is as impossible as a shadow withoutlight. "[60] That seemed to me then, as it seems to-day, axiomatic. And sothe greatest Socialist thinkers and leaders always regarded it. "We haveperceived that Socialism and democracy are inseparable, " declared WilliamLiebknecht, the well-beloved, in 1899. [61] Thirty years earlier, in 1869, he had given lucid expression to the same conviction in these words:"Socialism and democracy are not the same, but they are only differentexpressions of the same fundamental idea. They belong to each other, roundout each other, and can never stand in contradiction to each other. Socialism without democracy is pseudo-Socialism, just as democracy withoutSocialism is pseudo-democracy. "[62] Democracy in industry is, as I haveinsisted in my writing with unfailing consistency, as inseparable fromSocialism as democracy in government. [63] Unless industry is brought withinthe control of democracy and made responsive to the common will, Socialismis not attained. 

Everywhere the organized working class aspires to attain that industrialdemocracy which is the counterpart of political democracy. Syndicalism, with all its vagaries, its crude reversal to outworn ideas and methods, is, nevertheless, fundamentally an expression of that yearning. It is the samepassion that lies back of the Shop Stewards' movement in England, and thatinspires the much more patiently and carefully developed theories and plansof the advocates of "Guild Socialism. " Motived by the same desire, ourAmerican labor-unions are demanding, and steadily gaining, an increasingshare in the actual direction of industry. Joint control by boards composedof representatives of employers, employees, and the general public is, toan ever-increasing extent, determining the conditions of employment, wagestandards, work standards, hours of labor, choice and conduct of foremen, and many other matters of vital importance to the wage-earners. That weare still a long way from anything like industrial democracy is all toopainfully true and obvious, but it is equally obvious that we arestruggling toward the goal, and that there is a serious purpose andintention to realize the ideal. 

Impelled by the inexorable logic of its own existence as a dictatorship, the Bolshevik government has had to set itself against any and everymanifestation of democracy in industry with the same relentless force as itopposed democracy in government. True, owing to the fact that, followingthe line of industrial evolution, the trade-union movement was not stronglyenough developed to even attempt any organization for the expression ofindustrial democracy comparable to the Constituent Assembly. It is equallytrue, however, that had such an organization existed the necessity tosuppress it, as the political organization was suppressed, would haveproceeded inevitably and irresistibly from the creation of a dictatorship. _There cannot be, in any country, as co-existent forces, politicaldictatorship and industrial democracy. _ It is also true that suchdemocratic agencies as there were existing the Bolsheviki neglected. 

That the Bolsheviki did not establish industrial democracy in its fullestsense is not to be charged to their discredit. Had Bolshevism neverappeared, and had the Constituent Assembly been permitted to functionunmolested and free, it would have taken many years to realize anythinglike a well-rounded industrial democracy, for which a highly developedindustrial system is absolutely essential. The leaders of the Bolshevikmovement recognized from the first that the time had not yet arrived foreven attempting to set up a Socialist commonwealth based on the socialownership and democratic control of industry. Lenine frankly declared that"Socialism cannot now prevail in Russia, "[64] and Trotzky said, a monthafter the _coup d'état_: "We are not ready yet to take over allindustry.... For the present, we expect of the earnings of a factory to paythe owner 5 or 6 per cent. Yearly on his actual investment. What we aim atnow is _control_ rather than _ownership_. "[65] He did not tell ProfessorRoss, who records this statement, on what grounds the owner of the propertythus controlled by the Soviet government, and who thus becomes a partner ofthe government, is to be excluded from the exercise of the franchise. Butlet that pass. 

When the Bolsheviki seized the power of the state, they found themselvesconfronted by a terrific task. Russia was utterly demoralized. Anundeveloped nation industrially, war and internal strife had wrought havocwith the industrial life she had. Her railways were neglected and the wholetransportation system, entirely inadequate even for peace needs, had, underthe strain of the war, fallen into chaos. After the March Revolution, as anatural consequence of the intoxication of the new freedom, suchdisciplines as had existed were broken down. Production fell off in a mostalarming manner. During the Kerensky régime Skobelev, as Minister of Labor, repeatedly begged the workers to prove their loyalty to the Revolution byincreased exertion and faithfulness in the workshops and factories. TheBolsheviki, on their part, as a means of fighting the ProvisionalGovernment, preached the opposite doctrine, that of sabotage. In everymanner possible they encouraged the workers to limit production, to wastetime and materials, strike for trivial reasons, and, in short, do all thatwas possible to defeat the effort to place industry upon a sound basis. 

When they found themselves in possession of the powers of government theBolshevik leaders soon had to face the stern realities of the conditionsessential to the life of a great nation. They could not escape thenecessity of intensifying production. They had not only promised peace, butbread, and bread comes only from labor. Every serious student of theproblem has realized that the first great task of any Socialist societymust be _to increase the productivity of labor_. It is all very well for apopular propaganda among the masses to promise a great reduction in thehours of labor and, at the same time, a great improvement in the standardsof living. The translation of such promises into actual achievements mustprove to be an enormous task. To build the better homes, make the betterand more abundant clothing, shoes, furniture, and other things required tofulfil the promise, will require a great deal of labor, and such anorganization of industry upon a basis of efficiency as no nation has yetdeveloped. If the working class of this or any other country should takepossession of the existing organization of production, there would not beenough in the fund now going to the capitalist class to satisfy therequirements of the workers, _even if not a penny of compensation were paidto the expropriated owners_. Kautsky, among others, has courageously facedthis fact and insisted that "it will be one of the imperative tasks of theSocial Revolution not simply to continue, but to increase production; thevictorious proletariat must extend production rapidly if it is to be ableto satisfy the enormous demands that will be made upon the new régime. "[66] From the firstthis problem had to be faced by the Bolshevik government. We find Lenineinsisting that the workers must be inspired with "idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence" to turn out as large a product as possible; that theproductivity of labor must be raised and a high level of industrialperformance as the duty of every worker be rigorously insisted upon. It isnot enough to have destroyed feudalism and the monarchy:

 In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry led by it--and, hence, also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on November 7, 1917, consists in the positive and constructive work of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net of newly organized relationships covering the systematic production and distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a revolution depends on the original historical creative work of the majority of the population, and first of all of the majority of the toilers. _The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be assured unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry manifest sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence. _ With the creation of a new--the Soviet--type of state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. _The main difficulty is in the economic domain; to raise the productivity of labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution, and actually to socialize production. _[67]

Lenine recognizes, as every thoughtful person must, that this task oforganizing production and distribution cannot be undertaken by "theproletariat and the poorest peasants. " It requires a vast amount of highlydeveloped technical knowledge and skill, the result of long training andsuperior education. This kind of service is so highly paid, in comparisonwith the wages paid to the manual workers, that it lifts those who performthe service and receive the high salaries into the ranks of thebourgeoisie. Certainly, even though they are engaged in performing work ofthe highest value and the most vital consequence, the specialists, experts, and directing managers of industry are not of the "working class, " as thatterm is commonly employed. And no matter how we may speculate upon thepossible attainment of approximate equality of income in some future nearor remote, the fact is that the labor of such men can only be secured bypaying much more than is paid to the manual workers. 

Quite wisely, the Bolshevik government decided that it must have suchservices, no matter that they must be highly paid for; that they could onlybe rendered by the hated bourgeoisie and that, in consequence, certaincompromises and relations with the bourgeoisie became necessary the momentthe services were engaged. The Bolshevik government recognized theimperative necessity of the service which only highly paid specialistscould give and wisely decided that no prejudice or theory must be permittedto block the necessary steps for Russia's reconstruction. In a spirit ofintelligent opportunism, therefore, they subordinated shibboleths, prejudices, dogmas, and theories to Russia's necessity. The sanity of thisopportunistic attitude is altogether admirable, but it contrasts strangelywith the refusal to co-operate with the bourgeoisie in establishing astable democratic government--no less necessary for Russia's reconstructionand for Socialism. As a matter of fact, the very promptitude and sanity oftheir opportunism when faced by responsibility, serves to demonstrate thetruth of the contention made in these pages, that in refusing to co-operatewith others in building up a permanently secure democratic government, they were actuated by no high moral principle, but simply by a desire togain power. The position of Russia to-day would have been vastly differentif the wisdom manifested in the following paragraphs had governed Lenineand his associates in the days when Kerensky was trying to save Russiandemocracy:

 _Without the direction of specialists of different branches of knowledge, technique, and experience, the transformation toward Socialism is impossible_, for Socialism demands a conscious mass movement toward a higher productivity of labor in comparison with capitalism and on the basis which had been attained by capitalism. Socialism must accomplish this movement forward in its own way, by its own methods--to make it more definite, by Soviet methods. But the specialists are inevitably bourgeois on account of the whole environment of social life which made them specialists.... In view of the considerable delay in accounting and control in general, although we have succeeded in defeating sabotage, we have _not yet_ created an environment which would put at our disposal the bourgeois specialists. Many sabotagers are coming into our service, but the best organizers and the biggest specialists can be used by the state either in the old bourgeois way (that is, for a higher salary) or in the new proletarian way (that is, by creating such an environment of universal accounting and control which would inevitably and naturally attract and gain the submission of specialists). We were forced now to make use of the old bourgeois method and agree to a very high remuneration for the services of the biggest of the bourgeois specialists. All those who are acquainted with the facts understand this, but not all give sufficient thought to the significance of such a measure on the part of the proletarian state. _It is clear that the measure is a compromise, that it is a defection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarian rule, which demand the reduction of salaries to the standard of remuneration of the average workers_--principles which demand that "career hunting" be fought by deeds, not words. 

 Furthermore, it is clear that such a measure is not merely a halt in a certain part and to a certain degree of the offensive against capitalism (for capitalism is not a quantity of money, but a definite social relationship), _but also a step backward by our Socialist Soviet state_, which has from the very beginning proclaimed and carried on a policy of reducing high salaries to the standard of wages of the average worker. 

 ... The corrupting influence of high salaries is beyond question--both on the Soviets ... And on the mass of the workers. But all thinking and honest workers and peasants will agree with us and will admit that we are unable to get rid at once of the evil heritage of capitalism.... The sooner we ourselves, workers and peasants, learn better labor discipline and a higher technique of toil, making use of the bourgeois specialists for this purpose, the sooner we will get rid of the need of paying tribute to these specialists. [68]

We find the same readiness to compromise and to follow the line of leastresistance in dealing with the co-operatives. From 1906 onward there hadbeen an enormous growth of co-operatives in Russia. They were of variouskinds and animated by varied degrees of social consciousness. They did notdiffer materially from the co-operatives of England, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, or Germany except in the one important particular that they reliedupon bourgeois Intellectuals for leadership and direction to a greaterextent than do the co-operatives in the countries named. They wereadmirably fitted to be the nuclei of a socialized system of distribution. Out of office the Bolsheviki had sneered at these working-classorganizations and denounced them as "bourgeois corruptions of the militantproletariat. " Necessity and responsibility soon forced the adoption of anew attitude toward them. The Bolshevik government had to accept thedespised co-operatives, and even compromise Bolshevist principles as theprice of securing their services:

 A Socialist state can come into existence only as a net of production and consumption communes, which keep conscientious accounts of their production and consumption, economize labor, steadily increasing its productivity and thus making it possible to lower the workday to seven, six, or even less hours. Anything less than rigorous, universal, thorough accounting and control of grain and of the production of grain, and later also of all other necessary products, will not do. We have inherited from capitalism mass organizations which can facilitate the transition to mass accounting and control of distribution--the consumers' co-operatives. They are developed in Russia less than in the more advanced countries, but they comprise more than 10, 000, 000 members. The decree on consumers' associations which was recently issued is extremely significant, showing clearly the peculiarity of the position and of the problem of the Socialist Soviet Republic at the present time. 

 The decree is an agreement with the bourgeois co-operatives and with the workmen's co-operatives adhering to the bourgeois standpoint. The agreement or compromise consists, firstly, in the fact that the representatives of these institutions not only participated in the deliberations on this decree, but had practically received a determining voice, for parts of the decree which met determined opposition from these institutions were rejected. Secondly and essentially, the compromise consists in the rejection by the Soviet authority of the principle of free admission to the co-operatives (the only consistent principle from the proletarian standpoint), and that the whole population of a given locality should be _united in a single co-operative_. The defection from this, the only Socialist principle, which is in accord with the problem of doing away with classes, allows the existence of working-class co-operatives (which in this case call themselves working-class co-operatives only because they submit to the class interests of the bourgeoisie). Lastly, the proposition of the Soviet government completely to exclude the bourgeoisie from the administration of the co-operatives was also considerably weakened, and only owners of capitalistic commercial and industrial enterprises are excluded from the administration. 

 * * * * *

 If the proletariat, acting through the Soviets, should successfully establish accounting and control on a national scale, there would be no need for such compromise. Through the Food Departments of the Soviets, through their organs of supply, we would unite the population in one co-operative directed by the proletariat, without the assistance from bourgeois co-operatives, without concessions to the purely bourgeois principle which compels the labor co-operatives to remain side by side with the bourgeois co-operatives instead of wholly subjecting these bourgeois co-operatives, fusing both?[69]

V

It is no mood of captious, unfriendly criticism that attention is speciallydirected to these compromises. Only political charlatans, ineffectivequacks, and irresponsible soap-box orators see crime against therevolutionary program of the masses in a wise and honest opportunism. History will not condemn the Bolsheviki for the give-and-take, compromise-where-necessary policy outlined in the foregoing paragraphs. Itscondemnation will be directed rather against their failure to act in thatspirit from the moment the first Provisional Government arose. Had theyjoined with the other Socialists and established a strong CoalitionGovernment, predominantly Socialist, but including representatives of themost liberal and democratic elements of the bourgeoisie, it would have beenpossible to bring the problems of labor organization and labor disciplineunder democratic direction. It would not have been possible to establishcomplete industrial democracy, fully developed Socialism, nor will it bepossible to do this for many years to come. 

But it would have been easy and natural for the state to secure to theworkers a degree of economic assurance and protection not otherwisepossible. It would have been possible, too, for the workers'organizations, recognized by and co-operating with the state, to haveundertaken, in a large degree, the control of the conditions of their ownemployment which labor organizations everywhere are demanding and graduallygaining. The best features of "Guild Socialism" could nowhere have been soeasily adopted. [70] But instead of effort in these directions, we find theBolsheviki resorting to the _Taylor System of Scientific Managementenforced by an individual dictator whose word is final and absolute, todisobey whom is treason_! There is not a nation in the world with aworking-class movement of any strength where it would be possible tointroduce the industrial servitude here described:

 The most conscious vanguard of the Russian proletariat has already turned to the problem of increasing labor discipline. For instance, the central committee of the Metallurgical Union and the Central Council of the Trades Unions have begun work on respective measures and drafts of decrees. This work should be supported and advanced by all means. _We should immediately introduce piece work and try it out in practice. We should try out every scientific and progressive suggestion of the Taylor System_; we should compare the earnings with the general total of production, or the exploitation results of railroad and water transportation, and so on. 

 The Russian is a poor worker in comparison with the workers of the advanced nations, and this could not be otherwise under the régime of the Czar and other remnants of feudalism. The last word of capitalism in this respect, the Taylor System--as well as all progressive measures of capitalism--combine the refined cruelty of bourgeois exploitation and a number of most valuable scientific attainments in the analysis of mechanical motions during work, in dismissing superfluous and useless motions, in determining the most correct methods of the work, the best systems of accounting and control, etc. The Soviet Republic must adopt valuable and scientific and technical advance in this field. _The possibility of Socialism will be determined by our success in combining the Soviet rule and the Soviet organization of management with the latest progressive measures of capitalism. We must introduce in Russia the study and the teaching of the Taylor System and its systematic trial and adaptation_. While working to increase the productivity of labor, we must at the same time take into account the peculiarities of the transition period from capitalism to Socialism, which require, on one hand, that we lay the foundation for the Socialist organization of emulation, and, on the other hand, _require the use of compulsion so that the slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat should not be weakened by the practice of a too mild proletarian government_. 

 The resolution of the last (Moscow) Congress of the Soviets advocates, as the most important problem at present, the creation of "efficient organization" and higher discipline. Such resolutions are now readily supported by everybody. But that their realization requires compulsion, and _compulsion in the form of a dictatorship_, is ordinarily not comprehended. And yet, it would be the greatest stupidity and the most absurd opportunism to suppose that the transition from capitalism to Socialism is possible without compulsion and dictatorship. The Marxian theory has long ago criticized beyond misunderstanding this petty bourgeois-democratic and anarchistic nonsense. And Russia of 1917-18 confirms in this respect the Marxian theory so clearly, palpably, and convincingly that only those who are hopelessly stupid or who have firmly determined to ignore the truth can still err in this respect. Either a Kornilov dictatorship (if Kornilov be taken as Russian type of a bourgeois Cavaignac) or a dictatorship of the proletariat--no other alternative is possible for a country which is passing through an unusually swift development with unusually difficult transitions and which suffers from desperate disorganization created by the most horrible war. [71]

This dictatorship is to be no light affair, no purely nominal force, but arelentless iron-hand rule. Lenine is afraid that the proletariat is toosoft-hearted and lenient. He says:

 But "dictatorship" is a great word. And great words must not be used in vain. A dictatorship is an iron rule, with revolutionary daring and swift and merciless in the suppression of the exploiters as well as of the thugs (hooligans). And our rule is too mild, quite frequently resembling jam rather than iron. [72]

And so the dictatorship of the proletariat becomes the _dictatorship of asingle person_, a super-boss and industrial autocrat: We must learn tocombine the stormy, energetic breaking of all restraint on the part of thetoiling masses _with iron discipline during work, with absolute submissionto the will of one person, the Soviet director, during work_. [73]

As I copy these words from Lenine's book my memory recalls the days, morethan twenty years ago, when as a workman in England and as shop steward ofmy union I joined with my comrades in breaking down the very things Leninehere proposes to set up in the name of Socialism. "Absolute submission tothe will of one person" is not a state toward which free men will strive. Not willingly will men who enjoy the degree of personal freedom existing indemocratic nations turn to this:

 With respect to ... The significance of individual dictatorial power from the standpoint of the specific problems of the present period, we must say that every large machine industry--which is the material productive source and basis of Socialism--requires an absolute and strict unity of the will which directs the joint work of hundreds, thousands, and tens of thousands of people. This necessity is obvious from the technical, economical, and historical standpoint, and has always been recognized by all those who had given any thought to Socialism, as its prerequisite. But how can we secure a strict unity of will? _By subjecting the will of thousands_ to the will of one. 

 This subjection, _if the participants in the common work are ideally conscious and disciplined_, may resemble the mild leading of an orchestra conductor; but may take the acute form of a dictatorship--if there is no ideal discipline and consciousness. But at any rate, _complete submission to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of the processes of work which is organized on the type of large machine industry_. This is doubly true of the railways. And just this transition from one political problem to another, which in appearance has no resemblance to the first, constitutes the peculiarity of the present period. The Revolution has just broken the oldest, the strongest, and the heaviest chains to which the masses were compelled to submit. So it was yesterday. And to-day, the same Revolution (and indeed in the interest of Socialism) demands the _absolute submission_ of the masses to the _single will_ of those who direct the labor process. It is self-evident that it can be realized only after great upheavals, crises, returns to the old; only through the greatest strain of the energy of the proletarian vanguard which is leading the people to the new order.... 

 To the extent to which the principal problem of the Soviet rule changes from military suppression to administration, suppression and compulsion will, _as a rule, be manifested in trials, and not in shooting on the spot_. And in this respect the revolutionary masses have taken, after November 7, 1918, the right road and have proved the vitality of the Revolution, when they started to organize their own workmen's and peasants' tribunals, before any decrees were issued dismissing the bourgeois-democratic judicial apparatus. _But our revolutionary and popular tribunals are excessively and incredibly weak. It is apparent that the popular view of the courts--which was inherited from the régime of the landowners and the bourgeoisie--as not their own, has not yet been completely destroyed_. It is not sufficiently appreciated that the courts serve to attract all the poor to administration (for judicial activity is one of the functions of state administration); that the court is _an organ of the rule of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry; that the court is a means of training in discipline_. There is a lack of appreciation of the simple and obvious fact that, if the chief misfortunes of Russia are famine and unemployment, these misfortunes cannot be overcome by any outbursts of enthusiasm, but only by thorough and universal organization and discipline, in order to increase the production of bread for men and fuel for industry, to transport it in time, and to distribute it in the right way. That therefore _responsibility_ for the pangs of famine and unemployment falls on _every one who violates the labor discipline in any enterprise and in any business_. That those who are responsible should be discovered, tried, and _punished without mercy_. The petty bourgeois environment, which we will have to combat persistently now, shows particularly in the lack of comprehension of the economic and political connection between famine and unemployment and the _prevailing dissoluteness in organization and discipline_--in the firm hold of the view of the small proprietor that "nothing matters, if only I gain as much as possible. "

 A characteristic struggle occurred on this basis in connection with the last decree on railway management, the decree which granted dictatorial (or "unlimited") power to individual directors. The conscious (and mostly, probably, unconscious) representatives of petty bourgeois dissoluteness contended that the granting of "unlimited" (_i. E. _, dictatorial) power to individuals was a defection from the principle of board administration, from the democratic and other principles of the Soviet rule. Some of the Socialist-Revolutionists of the left wing carried on a plainly demagogic agitation against the decree on dictatorship, appealing to the evil instincts and to the petty bourgeois desire for personal gain. The question thus presented is of really great significance; firstly, the question of principle is, in general, the appointment of individuals endowed with unlimited power, the appointment of dictators, in accord with the fundamental principles of the Soviet rule; secondly, in what relation is this case--this precedent, if you wish--to the special problems of the Soviet rule during the present concrete period? Both questions deserve serious consideration. [74]

With characteristic ingenuity Lenine attempts to provide this dictatorshipwith a theoretical basis which will pass muster as Marxian Socialism. Heuses the term "Soviet democracy" as a synonym for democratic Socialism andsays there is "absolutely no contradiction in principle" between it and"the use of dictatorial power of individuals. " By what violence to reasonand to language is the word _democracy_ applied to the system described byLenine? To use words with such scant respect to their meanings, establishedby etymology, history, and universal agreement in usage, is to invite andindeed compel the contempt of minds disciplined by reason's practices. Asfor the claim that there is no contradiction in principle betweendemocratic Socialism and the exercise of dictatorial power by individuals, before it can be accepted every Socialist teacher and leader of anystanding anywhere, the programs of all the Socialist parties, and theirpractice, must be denied and set aside. Whether democratic Socialism bewise or unwise, a practical possibility or an unrealizable idea, at leastit has nothing in common with such reactionary views as are expressed inthe following:

 That the dictatorship of individuals has very frequently in the history of revolutionary movements served as an expression and means of realization of the dictatorship of the revolutionary classes is confirmed by the undisputed experience of history. With bourgeois democratic principles, the dictatorship of individuals has undoubtedly been compatible. But this point is always treated adroitly by the bourgeois critics of the Soviet rule and by their petty bourgeois aides. On one hand, they declared the Soviet rule simply something absurd and anarchically wild, carefully avoiding all our historical comparisons and theoretical proofs that the Soviets are a higher form of democracy; nay, more, the beginning of a _Socialist_ form of democracy. On the other hand, they demand of us a higher democracy than the bourgeois and argue: with your Bolshevist (_i. E. _, Socialist, not bourgeois) democratic principles, with the Soviet democratic principles, individual dictatorship is absolutely incompatible. 

 Extremely poor arguments, these. If we are not Anarchists, we must admit the necessity of a state--that is, of _compulsion_, for the transition from capitalism to Socialism. The form of compulsion is determined by the degree of development of the particular revolutionary class, then by such special circumstances as, for instance, the heritage of a long and reactionary war, and then by the forms of resistance of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie. _There is therefore absolutely no contradiction in principle between the Soviet (Socialist) democracy and the use of dictatorial power of individuals_. The distinction between a proletarian and a bourgeois dictatorship consists in this: that the first directs its attacks against the exploiting minority in the interests of the exploited majority; and, further, in this, that the first is accomplished (also through individuals) not only by the masses of the exploited toilers, but also by the organizations which are so constructed that they arouse these masses to historical creative work (the Soviets belong to this kind of organization). [75]

This, then, is Bolshevism, not as it is seen and described by unfriendly"bourgeois" writers, but as it is seen and described by the acknowledgedintellectual and political leader of the Bolsheviki, Nikolai Lenine. I havenot taken any non-Bolshevist authority; I have not even restated his viewsin a summary of my own, lest into the summary might be injected somereflexes of my own critical thought. Bolshevism is revealed in all itsreactionary repulsiveness as something between which and absolute, individual dictatorial power there is "absolutely no contradiction inprinciple. " It will not avail for our American followers and admirers ofthe Bolsheviki to plead that these things are temporary, compromises withthe ideal due to the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in Russia, andto beg a mitigation of the severity of our judgment on that account. 

The answer to the plea is twofold: in the first place, they who offer itmust, if they are sincere, abandon the savagely critical attitude they haveseen fit to adopt toward our own government and nation because with"extraordinary conditions prevailing" we have had introduced conscription, unusual restrictions of movement and of utterance, and so forth. How else, indeed, can their sincerity be demonstrated? If the fact that extraordinaryconditions justified Lenine and his associates in instituting a régime sotyrannical, what rule of reason or of morals must be invoked to refuse tocount the extraordinary conditions produced in our own nation by the war asjustification for the special measures of military service and disciplinehere introduced?

But there is a second answer to the claim which is more direct andconclusive. It is not open to argument at all. It is found in the words ofLenine himself, in his claim that there is absolutely no contradictionbetween the principle of individual dictatorship, ruling with iron hand, and the principle upon which Soviet government rests. There has been nocompromise here, for if there is no contradiction in principle nocompromise could have been required. Lenine is not afraid to make or toadmit making compromises; he admits that compromises have been made. It wasa compromise to employ highly salaried specialists from the bourgeoisie, "adefection from the principles of the Paris Commune and of any proletarianrule, " as he says. It was a compromise, another "defection from the onlySocialist principle, " to admit the right of the co-operatives to determinetheir own conditions of membership. Having made these declarations quitecandidly, he takes pains to assure us that there was no such defection fromprinciple in establishing the absolute rule of an individual dictator, that there was absolutely no contradiction in principle in this. [76]

Moreover, there is no reason for regarding this dictatorship as a temporarything, if Lenine himself is to be accepted as an authoritative spokesman. Obviously, if there is nothing in the principle of an absolute individualdictatorship which is in contradiction to the Bolshevik ideal, there can beno Bolshevik principle which necessarily requires for its realization theending of such dictatorship. Why, therefore, may it not be continuedindefinitely? Certainly, if the dictatorship is abolished it will notbe--if Lenine is to be seriously considered--on account of itsincompatibility with Bolshevik principles. 

VI

The Bolshevik government of Russia is credited by many of its admirers inthis country with having solved the great land problem and with havingsatisfied the land-hunger of the peasants. It is charged, moreover, thatthe bitter opposition to the Bolsheviki is mainly due to agitation by thebourgeoisie, led by the expropriated landowners, who want to defeat theRevolution and to have their former titles to the land restored. Of course, it is true that, so far as they dare to do so, the former landownersactively oppose the Bolsheviki. No expropriated class ever acted otherwise, and it would be foolish to expect anything else. But any person whobelieves that the opposition of the great peasant Socialist organizations, and especially of the Socialist-Revolutionists, is due to the confiscationof the land, either consciously or unconsciously, is capable of believinganything and quite immune from rationality. 

The facts in the case are, briefly, as follows: First, as Professor Rosshas pointed out, [77] the land policy of the Bolshevik government was acompromise of the principles long advocated by its leaders, a compromisemade for political reasons only. Second, as Marie Spiridonova abundantlydemonstrated at an All-Russian Soviet Conference in July, 1918, theBolshevik government did not honorably live up to its agreement with theSocialist-Revolutionists of the Left. Third, so far as the land problem wasconcerned there was not the slightest need or justification for theBolshevik _coup d'état_, for the reason that the problem had already beensolved on the precise lines afterward followed in the Soviet decree and theleaders of the peasants were satisfied. We have the authority of no lesscompetent a witness than Litvinov, Bolshevist Minister to England, that"the land measure had been 'lifted' bodily from the program of theSocialist-Revolutionists. "[78] Each of these statements is amply sustainedby evidence which cannot be disputed or overcome. 

That the "land decree" which the Bolshevik government promulgated was acompromise with their long-cherished principles admits of no doubtwhatever. Every one who has kept informed concerning Russian revolutionarymovements during the past twenty or twenty-five years knows that during allthat time one of the principal subjects of controversy among Socialists wasthe land question and the proper method of solving it. The "Narodniki, " orpeasant Socialists, later organized into the Socialist-Revolutionary party, wanted distribution of the land belonging to the big estates among thepeasant communes, to be co-operatively owned and managed. They did not wantland nationalization, which was the program of the Marxists--the SocialDemocrats. This latter program meant that, instead of the land beingdivided among the peasants' communal organizations, it should be owned, used, and managed by the state, the principles of large-scale productionand wage labor being applied to agriculture in the same manner as toindustry. 

The attitude of the Social Democratic party toward the peasant Socialistsand their program was characterized by that same certainty that smallagricultural holdings were to pass away, and by the same contemptuousattitude toward the peasant life and peasant aspirations that we find inthe writings of Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and many other Marxists. [79]Lenine himself had always adopted this attitude. He never trusted thepeasants and was opposed to any program which would give the land to themas they desired. Mr. Walling, who spent nearly three years in Russia, including the whole period of the Revolution of 1905-06, writes of Lenine'sposition at that time:

 Like Alexinsky, Lenine awaits the agrarian movement ... And hopes that a railway strike with the destruction of the lines of communication and _the support of the peasantry_ may some day put the government of Russia into the people's hands. However, I was shocked to find that this important leader also, though he expects a full co-operation with the peasants on equal terms, _during the Revolution_, feels toward them a very _deep distrust_, thinking them to a large extent bigoted and blindly patriotic, and fearing that they may some day shoot down the working-men as the French peasants did during the Paris Commune. 

 The chief basis for this distrust is, of course, the prejudiced feeling that the peasants are not likely to become good Socialists. _It is on this account that Lenine and all the Social Democratic leaders place their hopes on a future development of large agricultural estates in Russia and the increase of the landless agricultural working class, which alone they believe would prove truly Socialist_. [80]

The Russian Social Democratic Labor party, to which Lenine belonged, and ofwhich he was an influential leader, adopted in 1906 the following programwith regard to land ownership:

 1. Confiscation of Church, Monastery, Appanage, Cabinet, [81] and private estate lands, _except small holdings_, and turning them over, together with the state lands, to the great organs of local administration, which have been democratically elected. Land, however, which is necessary as a basis for future colonization, together with the forests and bodies of water, which are of national importance, are to pass into the control of the democratic state. 

 2. Wherever conditions are unfavorable for this transformation, the party declares itself in favor of a division among the peasants of such of the private estates as already have the petty farming conditions, or which may be necessary to round out a reasonable holding. 

This program was at the time regarded as a compromise. It did not whollysuit anybody. The peasant leaders feared the amount of state ownership andmanagement involved. On the other hand, the extreme left wing of the SocialDemocrats--Lenine and his friends--wanted the party to proclaim itself infavor of _the complete nationalization of all privately owned land, eventhat of the small peasant owners_, but were willing, provided the principlewere this stated, to accept, as a temporary expedient, division of the landin certain exceptional instances. On the other hand, theSocialist-Revolutionists wanted, not the distribution of lands among amultitude of private owners, as is very generally supposed, but itssocialization. Their program provided for "the socialization of allprivately owned lands--that is, the taking of them out of the privateownership of persons into the public ownership and _their management bydemocratically organized leagues of communities with the purpose of anequitable utilization_. " They wanted to avoid the creation of a great armyof what they described as "wage-slaves of the state" and, on the otherhand, they wanted to build upon the basis of Russian communism and, as faras possible, prevent the extension of capitalist methods--and therefore ofthe class struggle--into the agrarian life of Russia. 

When the Bolsheviki came into power they sought first of all to split thepeasant Socialist movement and gain the support of its extreme left wing. For this reason they agreed to adopt the program of the RevolutionarySocialist party. It was Marie Spiridonova who made that arrangementpossible. It was, in fact, a political deal. Lenine and Trotzky, on behalfof the Bolshevik government, agreed to accept the land policy of theSocialist-Revolutionists, and in return Spiridonova and her friends agreedto support the Bolsheviki. There is abundant evidence of the truth of thefollowing account of Professor Ross:

 Among the first acts of the Bolsheviki in power was to square their debt to the left wing of the Social Revolutionists, their ally in the _coup d'état_. The latter would accept only one kind of currency--the expropriation of the private landowners without compensation and the transfer of all land into the hands of the peasant communes. The Bolsheviki themselves, as good Marxists, took no stock in the peasants' commune. As such, pending the introduction of Socialism, they should, perhaps, have nationalized the land and rented it to the highest bidder, regardless of whether it was to be tilled in small parcels without hired labor or in large blocks on the capitalistic plan. The land edict of November does, indeed, decree land nationalism; however, the vital proviso is added that "the use of the land must be equalized--that is, according to local conditions and according to the ability to work and the needs of each individual, " and further that "the hiring of labor is not permitted. " The administrative machinery is thus described: "All the confiscated land becomes the land capital of the nation. Its distribution among the working-people is to be in charge of the local and central authorities, beginning with the organized rural and urban communities and ending with the provincial central organs. " Such is the irony of fate. _Those who had charged the rural land commune with being the most serious brake upon Russia's progress, and who had stigmatized the People-ists as reactionaries and Utopians, now came to enact into law most of their tenets--the equalization of the use of land, the prohibition of the hiring of labor, and everything else!_[82]

The much-praised land policy of the Bolsheviki is, in fact, not a Bolshevikpolicy at all, but one which they have accepted as a compromise fortemporary political advantage. "Claim everything in sight, " said a notedAmerican politician on one occasion to his followers. Our followers of theBolsheviki, taught by a very clever propaganda, seem to be acting upon thatmaxim. They claim for the Bolsheviki everything which can in the slightestmanner win favor with the American public, notwithstanding that it involvesclaiming for the Bolsheviki credit to which they are not entitled. As earlyas May 18, 1917, it was announced by the Provisional Government that the"question of the transfer of the land to the toilers" was to be left to theConstituent Assembly, and there was never a doubt in the mind of anyRussian Socialist how that body would settle it; never a moment when it wasdoubted that the Constituent Assembly would be controlled by theSocialist-Revolutionary party. When Kerensky became Prime Minister one ofthe first acts of his Cabinet was to create a special committee for thepurpose of preparing the law for the socialization of the land and thenecessary machinery for carrying the law into effect. The All-RussianPeasants' Congress had, as early as May, five months before the Bolshevikcounter-revolution, adopted the land policy for which the Bolsheviki noware being praised by their admirers in this country. That policy had beencrystallized into a carefully prepared law which had been approved by theCouncil of Ministers. The Bolsheviki did no more than to issue a crudelyconceived "decree" which they have never at any time had the power toenforce in more than about a fourth of Russia--in place of a law whichwould have embraced all Russia and have been secure and permanent. 

On July 16, 1918, Marie Spiridonova, in an address delivered in Petrograd, protested vehemently against the manner in which the Bolshevik governmentwas departing from the policy it had agreed to maintain with regard to theland, and going back to the old Social Democratic ideas. She declared thatshe had been responsible for the decree of February, which provided for thesocialization of the land. That measure provided for the abolition ofprivate property in land, and placed all land in the hands of and under thedirection of the peasant communes. It was the old Socialist-Revolutionistprogram. But the Bolshevik government had not carried out the law ofFebruary. Instead, it had resorted to the Social Democratic method ofnationalization. In the western governments, she said, "great estates werebeing taken over by government departments and were being managed byofficials, on the ground that state control would yield better results thancommunal ownership. Under this system the peasants were being reduced tothe state of slaves paid wages by the state. Yet the law provided thatthese estates should be divided among the peasant communes to be tilled bythe peasants on a co-operative system. "[83] Spiridonova protested againstthe attitude of the Bolsheviki toward the peasants, against dividing theminto classes and placing the greater part of them with the bourgeoisie. Sheinsisted that the peasants be regarded as a single class, co-operating withthe industrial proletariat, yet distinct from it and from the bourgeoisie. For our present purpose, it does not matter whether the leaders of theBolsheviki were right or wrong in their decision that state operation wasbetter than operation by village co-operatives. Our sole concern here andnow is the fact that they did not keep faith with the section of thepeasants they had won over to their side, and the fact that, as thisincident shows, we cannot regard the formal decrees of the Soviet Republicas descriptions of realities. 

The Bolsheviki remain to-day, as at the beginning, a counter-revolutionarypower imposing its rule upon the great mass of the Russian people by armedforce. There can be little doubt that if a free election could be hadimmediately upon the same basis as that on which the Constituent Assemblywas elected--namely, universal, secret, equal, direct suffrage, theBolsheviki would be overwhelmingly beaten. There can be little doubt thatthe great mass of the peasantry would support, as before, the candidates ofthe Socialist-Revolutionary party. It is quite true that some of theleaders of that party have consented to work with the Bolshevik government. Compromises have been effected; the Bolsheviki have conciliated thepeasants somewhat, and the latter have, in many cases, sought to make thebest of a bad situation. Many have adopted a passive attitude. But therecan be no greater mistake than to believe that the Bolsheviki have solvedthe land question to the satisfaction of the peasants and so won theirallegiance. 

VII

This survey of the theories and practices of the Bolsheviki would invitecriticism and distrust if the peace program which culminated in theshameful surrender to Germany, the "indecent peace" as the Russians callit, were passed over without mention. And yet there is no need to tell herea story with which every one is familiar. By that humiliating peace Russialost 780, 000 square kilometers of territory, occupied by 56, 000, 000inhabitants. She lost one-third of her total mileage of railways, amountingto more than 13, 000 miles. She lost, also, 73 per cent. Of her ironproduction; 89 per cent. Of her coal production, and many thousands offactories of various kinds. These latter included 268 sugar-refineries, 918textile-factories, 574 breweries, 133 tobacco-factories, 1, 685distilleries, 244 chemical-factories, 615 paper-mills, and 1, 073machine-factories. [84] Moreover, it was not an enduring peace and waragainst Germany had to be resumed. 

In judging the manner in which the Bolsheviki concluded peace with Germany, it is necessary to be on guard against prejudice engendered by the war andits passions. The tragi-comedy of Brest-Litovsk, and the pitiable rôle ofTrotzky, have naturally been linked together with the manner in whichLenine and his companions reached Russia with the aid of the GermanGovernment, the way in which all the well-known leaders of the Bolshevikihad deliberately weakened the morale of the troops at the front, and theirpersistent opposition to all the efforts of Kerensky to restore thefighting spirit of the army--all these things combined have convinced manythoughtful and close observers that the Bolsheviki were in league with theGermans against the Allies. Perhaps the time is not yet ripe for passingfinal judgment upon this matter. Certainly there were ugly-lookingincidents which appeared to indicate a close co-operation with the Germans. 

There was, for example, the acknowledged fact that the Bolsheviki onseizing the power of government immediately entered into negotiations withthe notorious "Parvus, " whose rôle as an agent of the German Government isnow thoroughly established. "Parvus" is the pseudonym of one of the mostsinister figures in the history of the Socialist movement, Dr. AlexanderHelfandt. Born at Odessa, of German-Jewish descent, he studied in Germanyand in the early eighteen-nineties attained prominence as a prolific andbrilliant contributor to the German Socialist review, _Die Neue Zeit_. Hewas early "exiled" from Russia, but it was suspected by a great manySocialists that in reality his "exile" was simply a device to coveremployment in the Russian Secret Service as a spy and informer, for whichthe prestige he had gained in Socialist circles was a valuable aid. Whenthe Revolution of 1905 broke out Helfandt returned to Russia under theterms of the amnesty declared at that time. He at once joined the Leninistsection of the Social Democratic party, the Bolsheviki. A scandal occurredsome time later, when the connection of "Parvus" with the RussianGovernment was freely charged against him. Among those who attacked him andaccused him of being an agent-provocateur were Tseretelli, theSocialist-Revolutionist, and Miliukov, the leader of the Cadets. 

Some years later, at the time of the uprisings in connection with the YoungTurk movement, "Parvus" turned up in Constantinople, where he waspresumably engaged in work for the German Government. This was commonlybelieved in European political circles, though denied at the time by"Parvus" himself. One thing is certain, namely, that although he wasnotoriously poor when he went there--his financial condition was well knownto his Socialist associates--he returned at the beginning of 1915 a veryrich man. He explained his riches by saying that he had, while atConstantinople, Bucharest, and Sofia, successfully speculated in war wheat. He wrote this explanation in the German Socialist paper, _Die Glocke_, anddrew from Hugo Hasse the following observation: "I blame nobody for beingwealthy; I only ask if it is the rôle of a Social Democrat to become aprofiteer of the war. "[85] Very soon we find this precious gentlemansettled in Copenhagen, where he established a "Society for Studying theSocial Consequences of the War, " which was, of course, entirely pro-German. This society is said to have exercised considerable influence among theRussians in Copenhagen and to have greatly influenced many DanishSocialists to take Germany's side. According to _Pravda_, the Bolshevikorgan, the German Government, through the intermediary of German SocialDemocrats, established a working relation with Danish trade-unions and theDanish Social Democratic party, whereby the Danish unions got the coalneeded in Copenhagen at a figure below the market price. Then the Danishparty sent its leader, Borgdjerg, to Petrograd as an emissary to placebefore the Petrograd Soviet the terms of peace of the German MajoritySocialists, which were, of course, the terms of the German Government. Wefind "Parvus" at the same time, as he is engaged in this sort of intrigue, associated with one Furstenberg in shipping drugs into Russia and food fromRussia into Germany. [86] According to Grumbach, [87] he sought to induceprominent Norwegian Socialists to act as intermediaries to inform certainNorwegian syndicates that Germany would grant them a monopoly of coalconsignments if the Norwegian Social Democratic press would adopt a morefriendly attitude toward Germany and the Social Democratic members in theNorwegian parliament would urge the stoppage or the limitation of fishexports to England. 

During this period "Parvus" was bitterly denounced by Plechanov, byAlexinsky and other Russian Socialists as an agent of the Central Powers. He was denounced also by Lenine and Trotzky and by _Pravda_. Leninedescribed him as "the vilest of bandits and betrayers. " It was thereforesomewhat astonishing for those familiar with these facts to read thefollowing communication, which appeared in the German Socialist press onNovember 30, 1917, and, later, in the British Socialist organ, _Justice_:

 STOCKHOLM, November 20. --The Foreign Relations Committee of the Bolsheviki makes the following communication: "The German comrade, 'Parvus, ' has brought to the Bolshevik Committee at Stockholm the congratulations of the _Parteivorstand_ of the Majority Social Democrats, who declare their solidarity with the struggles of the Russian proletariat and with its request to begin pourparlers immediately on the basis of a democratic peace without annexations and indemnities. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Bolsheviki has transmitted these declarations to the Central Committee at Petrograd, as well as to the Soviets. "

When Hugo Hasse questioned Philipp Scheidemann about the negotiations whichwere going on through "Parvus, " Scheidemann replied that it was theBolsheviki themselves who had invited "Parvus" to come to Stockholm for thepurpose of opening up negotiations. This statement was denounced as a lieby Karl Radek in _Pravda_. Some day, doubtless, the truth will be known;for the present it is enough to note the fact that as early as November theBolsheviki were negotiating through such a discredited agent of the CentralPowers as Dr. Alexander Helfandt, otherwise "Parvus, " the well-knownMarxist! Such facts as this, added to those previously noticed, tendedinevitably to strengthen the conviction that Lenine and Trotsky were thepliant and conscious tools of Germany all the time, and that the protestsof Trotzky at Brest-Litovsk were simply stage-play. 

But for all that, unless and until official, documentary evidence isforthcoming which proves them to have been in such relations with theGerman Government and military authorities, they ought not to be condemnedupon the chain of suspicious circumstances, strong as that chain apparentlyis. The fact is that they had to make peace, and make it quickly. Kerensky, had he been permitted to hold on, would equally have had to make a separatepeace, and make it quickly. Only one thing could have delayed that forlong--namely, the arrival of an adequate force of Allied troops on theRussian front to stiffen the morale and to take the burden of fighting offfrom the Russians. Of that there was no sign and no promise or likelihood. Kerensky knew that he would have had to make peace, at almost any cost andon almost any terms, if he remained in power. If the Bolsheviki appear inthe light of traitors to the Allies, it should be remembered that pressureof circumstances would have forced even such a loyal friend of the Alliesas Kerensky certainly proved himself to be to make a separate peace, practically on Germany's terms, in a very little while. It was not a matterof months, but of weeks at most, probably of days. 

Russia had to have peace. The nation was war-weary and exhausted. TheAllies had not understood the situation--indeed, they never have understoodRussia, even to this day--and had bungled right along. What made itpossible for the Bolsheviki to assert their rule so easily was the factthat they promised immediate peace, and the great mass of the Russianworkers wanted immediate peace above everything else. They were so eagerfor peace that so long as they could get it they cared at the time fornothing. Literally nothing else mattered. As we have seen, the Bolshevikleaders had strenuously denied wanting to make a "separate peace. " There islittle reason for doubting that they were sincere in this in the sense thatwhat they wanted was a _general_ peace, if that could be possibly obtained. Peace they had to have, as quickly as possible. If they could not persuadetheir Allies to join with them in making such a general peace, they werewilling to make a _separate_ peace. That is quite different from _wanting_a separate peace from the first. There was, indeed, in the demand made atthe beginning of December upon the Allies to restate their war aims withina period of seven days an arrogant and provocative tone which invited thesuspicion that the ultimatum--for such it was--had not been conceived ingood faith; that it was deliberately framed in such a manner as to preventcompliance by the Allies. And it may well be the fact that Lenine andTrotzky counted upon the inevitable refusal to convince the Russian people, and especially the Russian army, that the Allied nations were fighting forimperialistic ends, just as the Bolsheviki had always charged. TheMachiavellian cunning of such a policy is entirely characteristic of theconspirator type. 

On December 14th the armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk, to last for aperiod of twenty-eight days. On December 5th, the Bolsheviki had publishedthe terms upon which they desired to effect the armistice. These terms, which the Germans scornfully rejected, provided that the German forceswhich had been occupied on the Russian front should not be sent to otherfronts to fight against the Allies, and that the German troops shouldretire from the Russian islands held by them. In the armistice as it wasfinally signed at Brest-Litovsk there was a clause which, upon its face, seemed to prove that Trotzky had kept faith with the Allies. The clauseprovided that there should be no transfer of troops by either side, for thepurpose of military operations, during the armistice, from the frontbetween the Baltic and the Black Sea. This, however, was, from the Germanpoint of view, merely a _pro forma_ arrangement, a "scrap of paper. "Grumbach wrote to _L'Humanité_ that on December 20th Berlin was full ofGerman soldiers from the Russian front en route to the western front. Hesaid that he had excellent authority for saying that this had been calledto the attention of Lenine and Trotzky by the Independent Social Democrats, but that, "nevertheless, they diplomatically shut their eyes. "[88] It ismore than probable that, in the circumstances, neither Lenine nor Trotzkycared much if at all for such a breach of the terms of the armistice, but, had their attitude been otherwise, what could they have done? They were ashelpless as ever men were in the world, as subsequent events proved. 

As one reads the numerous declamatory utterances of Trotzky in thosecritical days of early December, 1917, the justice of Lenine's scornfuldescription of his associate as a "man who blinds himself withrevolutionary phrases" becomes manifest. It is easy to understand thestrained relations that existed between the two men. His "neither war norpeace" gesture--it was no more!--his dramatic refusal to sign the stiffenedpeace terms, his desire to call all Russia to arms again to fight theGermans, his determination to create a vast "Red Army" to renew the waragainst Germany, and his professed willingness to "accept the services ofAmerican officers in training that army, " all indicated a mind given toillusions and stone blind to realities. Lenine at least knew that the gamewas up. He knew that the game into which he had so coolly entered when heleft Switzerland, and which he had played with all his skill and cunning, was at an end and that the Germans had won. The Germans behaved with aperfidy that is unmatched in modern history, disregarded the armistice theyhad signed, and savagely hurled their forces against the defenseless, partially demobilized and trusting Russians. There was nothing left for theBolsheviki to do. They had delivered Russia to the Germans. In March the"indecent peace" was signed, with what result we know. Bolshevism had beenthe ally of Prussian militarism. Consciously or unconsciously, willingly orunwillingly, Lenine, Trotzky, and the other Bolshevik leaders had done allthat men could do to make the German military lords masters of the world. Had there been a similar movement in France, England, the United States, oreven Italy, to-day the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs would be upon theirthrones, realizing the fulfilment of the Pan-German vision. 

VIII

In view of the fact that so many of our American pacifists have glorifiedthe Bolsheviki, it may be well to remind them, if they have forgotten, orto inform them, if they do not know it, that their admiration is by nomeans reciprocated. Both Lenine and Trotzky have spoken and written interms of utter disdain of pacifist movements in general and of thepacifists of England and America in particular. They have insisted that, _in present society_, disarmament is really a reactionary proposal. Theinclusion in the Constitution, which they have forced upon Russia by armedmight, of _permanent universal compulsory military service_ is not byaccident. They believe that only when all nations have become Socialistnations will it be a proper policy for Socialists to favor disarmament. Itwould be interesting to know how our American admirers and defenders ofBolshevism, who are all anti-conscriptionists and ultra-pacifists, so faras can be discovered, reconcile their position with that of the Bolshevikiwho base their state, not as a temporary expedient, _but as a matter ofprinciple_, upon universal, compulsory military service! What, one wonders, do these American Bolsheviki worshipers think of the teaching of theseparagraphs from an article by Lenine?[89]

 Disarmament is a Socialistic ideal. In Socialist society there will be no more wars, which means that disarmament will have been realized. But he is not a Socialist who expects the realization of Socialism _without_ the social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship is a government power, depending directly upon force, and, in the twentieth century, force means, not fists and clubs, but armies. To insert "disarmament" into our program is equivalent to saying, we are opposed to the use of arms. But such a statement would contain not a grain of Marxism, any more than would the equivalent statement, we are opposed to the use of force. 

 * * * * *

 _A suppressed class which has no desire to learn the use of arms, and to bear arms, deserves nothing else than to be treated as slaves_. We cannot, unless we wish to transform ourselves into mere bourgeois pacifists, forget that we are living in a society based on classes, and that there is no escape from such a society, except by the class struggle and the overthrow of the power of the ruling class. 

 In every class society, whether it be based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at the present moment, on wage-labor, the class of the oppressors is an armed class. Not only the standing army of the present day, but also the present-day popular militia--even in the most democratic bourgeois republics, as in Switzerland--means an armament of the bourgeoisie against the proletariat.... 

 How can you, in the face of this fact, ask the revolutionary Social Democracy to set up the "demand" of "disarmament"? _To ask this is to renounce completely the standpoint of the class struggle, to give up the very thought of revolution_. Our watchword must be: to arm the proletariat so that it may defeat, expropriate, and disarm the bourgeoisie. This is the only possible policy of the revolutionary class, a policy arising directly from the _actual evolution_ of capitalistic militarism, in fact, dictated by the evolution. Only after having disarmed the bourgeoisie can the proletariat, without betraying its historic mission, cast all weapons to the scrap-heap; and there is no doubt that the proletariat will do this, but only then, and not by any possibility before then. 

How is it possible for our extreme pacifists, with their relentlessopposition to military force in all its forms to conscription, to universalmilitary service, to armaments of all kinds, even for defensive purposes, and to voluntarily enlisted armies even, to embrace Bolshevism withenthusiasm, resting as it does upon the basis of the philosophy so franklystated by Lenine, is a question for which no answer seems wholly adequate. Of course, what Lenine advocates is class armament within the nation, forcivil war--the war of the classes. But he is not opposed to nationalarmaments, as such, nor willing to support disarmament as a national policy_until the time comes when an entirely socialized humanity finds itselffreed from the necessity of arming against anybody_. There is probably nota militarist in America to-day who, however bitterly opposed to disarmamentas a present policy, would not agree that if, in some future time, mankindreaches the happy condition of universal Socialism, disarmament will thenbecome practicable and logical. It would not be difficult for General Woodto subscribe to that doctrine, I think. It would not have been difficultfor Mr. Roosevelt to subscribe to it. 

Not only is Lenine willing to support national armaments, and even to fightfor the defense of national rights, whenever an attack on these is also anattack on proletarian rights--which he believes to be the case in thecontinued war against Germany, he goes much farther than this _and providesa theoretical justification for a Socialist policy of passive acceptance ofever-increasing militarism_. He draws a strangely forced parallel betweenthe Socialist attitude toward the trusts and the attitude which ought to betaken toward armaments. We know, he argues, that trusts bring great evils. Against the evils we struggle, but how? Not by trying to do away with thetrusts, for we regard the trusts as steps in progress. We must go onward, through the trust system to Socialism. In a similar way we should notdeplore "the militarization of the populations. " If the bourgeoisiemilitarizes all the men, and all the boys, nay, even all the women, why--somuch the better! "Never will the women of an oppressed class that is reallyrevolutionary be content" to demand disarmament. On the contrary, they willencourage their sons to bear the arms and "learn well the business of war. "Of course, this knowledge they will use, "not in order that they may shootat their brothers, the workers of other countries, as they are doing in thepresent war ... But in order that they may struggle against the bourgeoisiein their own country, in order that they may put an end to exploitation, poverty, and war, not by the path of good-natured wishes, but by the pathof victory over the bourgeoisie and of disarmament of the bourgeoisie. "[90] Universally the working class has taken a position thevery opposite of this. Universally we find the organized working classfavoring disarmament, peace agreements, and covenants in general opposingextensions of what Lenine describes as "the militarization of populations. "For this universality of attitude and action there can only be one adequateexplanation--namely, the instinctive class consciousness of the workers. But, according to Lenine, this instinctive class consciousness is allwrong; somehow or other it expresses itself in a "bourgeois" policy. Theworkers ought to welcome the efforts of the ruling class to militarize andtrain in the arts of war not only the men of the nations, but the boys andeven the women as well. Some day, if this course be followed, there will betwo great armed classes in every nation and between these will occur thedecisive war which shall establish the supremacy of the most numerous andpowerful class. Socialism is thus to be won, not by the conquests of reasonand of conscience, but by brute force. 

Obviously, there is no point of sympathy between this brutal and arrogantgospel of force and the striving of modern democracy for the peacefulorganization of the world, for disarmament, a league of nations, and, ingeneral, the supplanting of force of arms by the force of reason andmorality. There is a Prussian quality in Lenine's philosophy. He is theTreitschke of social revolt, brutal, relentless, and unscrupulous, gloryingin might, which is, for him, the only right. And that is what characterizesthe whole Bolshevik movement: it is the infusion into the class strife andstruggles of the world the same brutality and the same faith that might isright which made Prussian militarism the menace it was to civilization. 

And just as the world of civilized mankind recognized Prussian militarismas its deadly enemy, to be overcome at all costs, so, too, Bolshevism mustbe overcome. And that can best be done, not by attempting to drown it inblood, but by courageously and consistently setting ourselves to the taskof removing the social oppression, the poverty, and the servitude whichproduce the desperation of soul that drives men to Bolshevism. The remedyfor Bolshevism is a sane and far-reaching program of constructive socialdemocracy. 

POSTSCRIPTUM: A PERSONAL STATEMENT

This book is the fulfilment of a promise to a friend. Soon after my returnfrom Europe, in November, I spent part of a day in New York discussingBolshevism with two friends. One of these is a Russian Socialist, who haslived many years in America, a citizen of the United States, and a manwhose erudition and fidelity to the working-class movement during manyyears have long commanded my admiration and reverence. The other friend isa native American, also a Socialist. A sincere Christian, he has identifiedhis faith in the religion of Jesus and his faith in democratic Socialism. The two are not conflicting forces, or even separate ones, but merelydifferent and complementary aspects of the same faith. He is a man who isuniversally loved and honored for his nobility of character and hisgenerous idealism. While in Europe I had spent much time consulting withRussian friends in Paris, Rome, and other cities, and had collected aconsiderable amount of authentic material relating to Bolshevism and theBolsheviki. I had not the slightest intention of using this material tomake a book; in fact, my plans contemplated a very different employment ofmy time. But, in the course of the discussion, my American Socialist friendasked me to "jot down" for him some of the things I had said, and, especially, to write, in a letter, what I believed to be the psychology ofBolshevism. This, in an unguarded moment, I undertook to do. 

When I set out, a few days later, to redeem my promise, I found that, inorder to make things intelligible, it was absolutely necessary to explainthe historical backgrounds of the Russian revolutionary movement, todescribe the point of view of various persons and groups with some detail, and to quote quite extensively from the documentary material I hadgathered. Naturally, the limits of a letter were quickly outgrown and Ifound that my response to my friend's innocent request approached thelength of a small volume. Even so, it was quite unsatisfactory. It leftmany things unexplained and much of my own thought obscure. I decided thento rewrite the whole thing and make a book of it, thus making available forwhat I hope will be a large number of readers what I had at first intendedonly for a dear friend. 

I am very conscious of the imperfections of the book as it stands. It hasbeen written under conditions far from favorable, crowded into a very busylife. My keenest critics will, I am sure, be less conscious of its defectsthan I am. It is, however, an earnest contribution to a very importantdiscussion, and, I venture to hope, with all its demerits, a useful one. Ifit aids a single person to a clearer comprehension of the inherentwrongfulness of the Bolshevist philosophy and method, I shall be rewarded. 

 * * * * *

_So here, my dear Will, is the fulfilment of my promise. _

APPENDICES

I. AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S ANDSOLDIERS' COUNCIL

II. HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY--AREPORT TO THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST BUREAU

III. FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM

APPENDIX I

AN APPEAL TO THE PROLETARIAT BY THE PETROGRAD WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS'COUNCIL

COMRADES:

_Proletarians and Working-people of all Countries_:

We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Workmen's andSoldiers' Delegate Council, send you our warmest greetings and the news ofgreat events. The democracy of Russia has overthrown the century-olddespotism of the Czars and enters your ranks as a rightful member and as apowerful force in the battle for our common liberation. Our victory is agreat victory for the freedom and democracy of the world. The principalsupporter of reaction in the world, the "gendarme of Europe, " no longerexists. May the earth over his grave become a heavy stone! Long liveliberty, long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and itsbattle for the final victory!

Our cause is not yet entirely won. Not all the shadows of the old régimehave been scattered and not a few enemies are gathering their forcestogether against the Russian Revolution. Nevertheless, our conquests aregreat. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutionalconvention which is to be called within a short time upon the basis ofuniversal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And now it may already besaid with certainty in advance that the democratic republic will triumph inRussia. The Russian people is in possession of complete political liberty. Now it can say an authoritative word about the internal self-government ofthe country and about its foreign policy. And in addressing ourselves toall the peoples who are being destroyed and ruined in this terrible war, wedeclare that the time has come in which the decisive struggle against theattempts at conquest by the governments of all the nations must be begun. The time has come in which the peoples must take the matter of deciding thequestions of war and peace into their own hands. 

Conscious of its own revolutionary strength, the democracy of Russiadeclares that it will fight with all means against the policy of conquestof its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to united, decisive action for peace. We appeal to our brothers, to theGerman-Austrian coalition, and above all to the German proletariat. Thefirst day of the war you were made to believe that in raising your weaponsagainst absolutist Russia you were defending European civilization againstAsiatic despotism. In this many of you found the justification of thesupport that was accorded to the war. Now also this justification hasvanished. Democratic Russia cannot menace freedom and civilization. 

We shall firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary threats, whether they come from without or within. The Russian Revolution will notretreat before the bayonets of conquerors, and it will not allow itself tobe trampled to pieces by outside military force. We call upon you to throwoff the yoke of your absolutist régime, as the Russian people has shakenoff the autocracy of the Czars. Refuse to serve as the tools of conquestand power in the hands of the kings, Junkers, and bankers, and we shall, with common efforts, put an end to the fearful butchery that dishonorshumanity and darkens the great days of the birth of Russian liberty. 

Working-men of all countries! In fraternally stretching out our hands toyou across the mountains of our brothers' bodies, across the sea ofinnocent blood and tears, across the smoking ruins of cities and villages, across the destroyed gifts of civilization, we summon you to the work ofrenewing and solidifying international unity. In that lies the guaranty ofour future triumph and of the complete liberation of humanity. 

Working-men of all countries, unite!

 TCHCHEIDZE, _the President_. PETROGRAD, _April, 1917_. 

APPENDIX II

HOW THE RUSSIAN PEASANTS FOUGHT FOR A CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY[91]

A report to the International Socialist Bureau by Inna Rakitnikov, Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Delegates, placing themselves upon the grounds of the defense of the ConstituentAssembly. 

With a letter-preface by the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, member of theInternational Socialist Bureau. 

 _To the Executive Committee of the International Socialist Bureau_:

 DEAR COMRADES, --The citizen Inna Rakitnikov has lately come from Petrograd to Paris for personal reasons that are peculiarly tragic. At the time of her departure the Executive Committee of the Second Soviet of Peasant Delegates of All-Russia, of which she is one of the vice-presidents, requested her to make to the International Socialist Bureau a detailed report of the fights that this organization had to make against the Bolsheviki in order to realize the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. 

 This is the report under the title of a document that I present here, without commentary, asking you to communicate it without delay to all the sections of the International. Two words of explanation, only: First, I wish to draw your attention to the fact that this is the second time that the Executive Committee of the Soviet of the Peasants of All-Russia addresses itself publicly to the International. 

 At the time of my journey to Stockholm in the month of September, 1917, I made, at a session of the Holland, Scandinavian committee, presided over by Branting, a communication in the name of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants. I handed over on this occasion to our secretary, Camille Huysmans, an appeal to the democrats of the entire world, in which the Executive Committee indicated clearly its position in the questions of the world war and of agrarian reform, and vindicated its place in the Workers' and Socialist International family. 

 I must also present to you the author of this report. The citizen Rakitnikov, a member of the Russian Revolutionary Socialist party, has worked for a long time in the ranks of this party as a publicist and organizer and propagandist, especially among the peasants. She has known long years of prison, of Siberia, of exile. Before and during the war until the beginning of the Revolution she lived as a political fugitive in Paris. While being a partizan convinced of the necessity of national defense of invaded countries against the imperialistic aggression of German militarism--in which she is in perfect accord with the members of our party such as Stepan Sletof, Iakovlef, and many other voluntary Russian republicans, all dead facing the enemy in the ranks of the French army--the citizen Rakitnikov belonged to the international group. I affirm that her sincere and matured testimony cannot be suspected of partizanship or of dogmatic partiality against the Bolsheviki, who, as you know, tried to cover their follies and their abominable crimes against the plan of the Russian people, and against all the other Socialist parties, under the lying pretext of internationalist ideas, ideas which they have, in reality, trampled under foot and betrayed. 

 Yours fraternally, E. ROUBANOVITCH, _June 28, 1918. _ _Member of the B. S. I. _

"The Bolsheviki who promised liberty, equality, peace, etc. , have not beenashamed to follow in the footsteps of Czarism. It is not liberty; it istyranny. " (Extract from a letter of a young Russian Socialist, anenthusiast of liberty who died all too soon. )

I

_Organization of the Peasants after the Revolution in Soviets of PeasantDelegates_

A short time after the Revolution of February the Russian peasants groupedthemselves in a National Soviet of Peasant Delegates at the First Congressof the Peasants of All-Russia, which took place at Petrograd. The ExecutiveCommittee of this Soviet was elected. It was composed of well-known leadersof the Revolutionary Socialist party and of peasant delegates sent from thecountry. Without adhering officially to the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Soviet of Peasant Delegates adopted the line of conduct of this party. While co-ordinating its tactics with the party's, it nevertheless remainedan organization completely independent. The Bolsheviki, who at thisCongress attempted to subject the peasants to their influence, had not atthe time any success. The speeches of Lenine and the other members of thisparty did not meet with any sympathy, but on the contrary provoked livelyprotest. The Executive Committee had as its organ the paper _Izvestya ofthe National Soviet of Peasant Delegates_. Thousands of copies of this werescattered throughout the country. Besides the central national Soviet thereexisted local organizations, the Soviets, the government districts who werein constant communication with the Executive Committee staying atPetrograd. 

From its foundation the Executive Committee exercised great energy in thework of the union and the organization of the peasant masses, and in thedevelopment of the Socialist conscience in their breasts. Its membersspread thousands and hundreds of thousands of copies of pamphlets of theRevolutionary Socialist party, exposing in simple form the essence ofSocialism and the history of the International explaining the sense and theimportance of the Revolution in Russia, the history of the fight thatpreceded it, showing the significance of the liberties acquired. Theyinsisted, above all, on the importance of the socialization of the soil andthe convocation of the Constituent Assembly. A close and living tie wascreated between the members of the Executive Committee staying at Petrogradand the members in the provinces. The Executive Committee was truly theexpression of the will of the mass of the Russian peasants. 

The Minister of Agriculture and the principal agrarian committee were atthis time occupied in preparing the groundwork of the realization ofsocialization of the soil; the Revolutionary Socialist party did not ceaseto press the government to act in this sense. Agrarian committees wereformed at once to fight against the disorganized recovery of lands by thepeasants, and to take under their control large properties whereexploitation based on the co-operative principle was in progress oforganization; agricultural improvements highly perfected would thus bepreserved against destruction and pillage. At the same time agrariancommittees attended to a just distribution among the peasants of the landsof which they had been despoiled. 

The peasants, taken in a body, and in spite of the agrarian troubles whichoccurred here and there, awaited the reform with patience, understandingall the difficulties which its realization required and all theimpossibilities of perfecting the thing hastily. The Executive Committee ofthe Soviet of Peasants' Delegates played in this respect an important rôle. It did all it could to explain to the peasants the complexity of theproblem in order to prevent them from attempting anything anarchistic, orto attempt a disorganized recovery of lands which could end only with thefurther enrichment of peasants who were already rich. 

Such was, in its general aspect, the action of the National Soviet ofPeasants' Delegates, which, in the month of August, 1917, addressed, through the intermediary of the International Socialist Bureau, an appealto the democracies of the world. In order to better understand the eventswhich followed, we must consider for a moment the general conditions whichat that time existed in Russia, and in the midst of which the action ofthis organization was taking place. 

II

_The Difficulties of the Beginning of the Revolution_

The honeymoon of the Revolution had passed rapidly. Joy gave place to caresand alarms. Autocracy had bequeathed to the country an unwieldy heritage:the army and the whole mechanism of the state were disorganized. Takingadvantage of the listlessness of the army, the Bolshevist propagandadeveloped and at the same time increased the desire of the soldiers tofight no more. The disorganization was felt more and more at the front; atthe same time anarchy increased in the interior of the country; productiondiminished; the productiveness of labor was lowered, and an eight-hour daybecame in fact a five or six-hour day. The strained relations between theworkers and the administration were such that certain factories preferredto close. The central power suffered frequent crises; the Cadets, fearingthe responsibilities, preferred to remain out of power. 

All this created a state of unrest and hastened the preparations for theelection of the Constituent Assembly, toward which the eyes of the wholecountry were turned. Nevertheless, the country was far from chaos and fromthe anarchy into which further events plunged it. Young Russia, notaccustomed to liberty, without experience in political life and autonomousaction, was far from that hopeless state to which the Bolsheviki reduced itsome months later. The people had confidence in the Socialists, in theRevolutionary Socialist party, which then held sway everywhere, in themunicipalities, the zemstvos, and in the Soviets; they had confidence inthe Constituent Assembly which would restore order and work out the laws. All that was necessary was to combat certain characteristics and certainpeculiarities of the existence of the Russian people, which impelled themtoward anarchy, instead of encouraging them, as did the Bolsheviki, who, inthis respect, followed the line of least resistance. 

The Bolshevist propaganda did all within its power to weaken theProvisional Government, to discredit it in the eyes of the people, toincrease the licentiousness at the front and disorganization in theinterior of the country. They proclaimed that the "Imperialists" sent thesoldiers to be massacred, but what they did not say is that under actualconditions it was necessary for a revolutionary people to have arevolutionary army to defend its liberty. They spoke loudly for acounter-revolution and for counter-revolutionaries who await but thepropitious moment to take hold of the government, while in reality thecomplete failure of the insurrection of Kornilov showed that thecounter-revolution could rest on nothing, that there was no place for itthen in the life of Russia. 

In fine, the situation of the country was difficult, but not critical. Theunited efforts of the people and all the thousands of forces of the countrywould have permitted it to come to the end of its difficulties and to finda solution of the situation. 

III

_The Insurrection of Kornilov_

But now the insurrection of Kornilov broke out. It was entirely unexpectedby all the Socialist parties, by their central committees, and, of course, by the Socialist Ministers. Petrograd was in no way prepared for an attackof this kind. In the course of the evening of the fatal day when Kornilovapproached Petrograd, the central committee of the Revolutionary Socialistparty received by telephone, from the Palace of Hiver, the news of theapproach of Kornilovien troops. This news revolutionized everybody. Ameeting of all the organizations took place at Smolny; the members of theparty alarmed by the news, and other persons wishing to know the truthabout the events, or to receive indications as to what should be done, camethere to a reunion. It was a strange picture that Smolny presented thatnight. The human torrent rushed along its corridors, committees andcommissions sat in its side apartments. They asked one another what washappening, what was to be done. News succeeded news. One thing was certain. Petrograd was not prepared for the fight. It was not protected by anything, and the Cossacks who followed Kornilov could easily take it. 

The National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates in the session that it held thatsame night at No. 6 Fontaka Street adopted a resolution calling all thepeasants to armed resistance against Kornilov. The Central ExecutiveCommittee with the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates establisheda special organization which was to defend Petrograd and to fight againstthe insurrection. Detachments of volunteers and of soldiers were directedtoward the locality where Kornilov was, to get information and to organizea propaganda among the troops that followed the General, and in case offailure to fight hand to hand. As they quit in the morning they did notknow how things would turn; they were rather pessimistic with regard to theissue of the insurrection for the Socialists. 

The end of this conspiracy is known. The troops that followed Kornilov lefthim as soon as they found out the truth. In this respect, everything endedwell, but this event had profound and regrettable circumstances. 

The acute deplorable crisis of the central power became chronic. TheCadets, compromised by their participation in the Kornilov conspiracy, preferred to remain apart. The Socialist-Revolutionists did not see clearlywhat there was at the bottom of the whole affair. _It was as much as anyone knew at the moment_. Kerensky, in presence of the menace of thecounter-revolution on the right and of the growing anarchy on the extremeleft, would have called to Petrograd a part of the troops from the front tostem the tide. Such was the rôle of different persons in this story. It isonly later, when all the documents will be shown, that the story can beverified, but at all events it is beyond doubt that the RevolutionarySocialist party was in no wise mixed in this conspiracy. The conspiracy ofKornilov completely freed the hands of the Bolsheviki. In the Pravda, andin other Bolshevist newspapers, complaints were read of the danger of a newcounter-revolution which was developing with the complicity of Kerenskyacting in accord or in agreement with the traitor Cadets. The public wasexcited against the Socialist-Revolutionists, who were accused of havingsecretly helped this counter-revolution. The Bolsheviki alone, said itsorgans, had saved the Revolution; to them alone was due the failure of theKornilov insurrection. 

The Bolsheviki agitation assumed large proportions. Copies of the _Pravda_, spread lavishly here and there, were poisoned with calumny, campaignsagainst the other parties, boasting gross flatteries addressed to thesoldiers and appeals to trouble. Bolsheviki meetings permeated with thesame spirit were organized at Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities. Bolshevist agitators set out for the front at the same time with copies ofthe _Pravda_ and other papers, and the Bolsheviki enjoyed, during thistime--as Lenine himself admits--complete liberty. Their chiefs, compromisedin the insurrection of June 3d, had been given their freedom. 

Their principal watchword was "Down with the war!" "Kerensky and the otherconciliators, " they cried, "want war and do not want peace. Kerensky willgive you neither peace, nor land, nor bread, nor Constituent Assembly. Downwith the traitor and the counter-revolutionists! They want to smother theRevolution. We demand peace. We will give you peace, land to the peasants, factories and work to the workmen!" Under this simple form the agitationwas followed up among the masses and found a propitious ground, first amongthe soldiers who were tired of war and athirst for peace. In the Soviet ofthe Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates of Petrograd the Bolshevist partysoon found itself strengthened and fortified. Its influence was alsoconsiderable among the sailors of the Baltic fleet. Cronstadt was entirelyin their hands. New elections of the Central Executive Committee of theSoviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates soon became necessary; theygave a big majority to the Bolsheviki. The old bureau, Tchcheidze at itshead, had to leave; the Bolsheviki triumphed clamorously. 

To fight against the Bolsheviki the Executive Committee of the NationalSoviet of Peasants' Delegates decided at the beginning of December to calla Second General Peasants' Congress. This was to decide if the peasantswould defend the Constituent Assembly or if they would follow theBolsheviki. This Congress had, in effect, a decisive importance. It showedwhat was the portion of the peasant class that upheld the Bolsheviki. Itwas principally the peasants in soldiers' dress, the "déclassé soldiers, "men taken from the country life by the war, from their naturalsurroundings, and desiring but one thing, the end of the war. The peasantswho had come from the country had, on the contrary, received the mandate touphold the Constituent Assembly. They firmly maintained their point of viewand resisted all the attempts of the Bolsheviki and the"Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (who followed them blindly) to maketheir influence prevail. The speech of Lenine was received with hostility;as for Trotzky, who, some time before, had publicly threatened with theguillotine all the "enemies of the Revolution, " they prevented him fromspeaking, crying out: "Down with the tyrant! Guillotineur! Assassin!" Togive his speech Trotzky, accompanied by his faithful "capotes, " was obligedto repair to another hall. 

The Second Peasants' Congress was thus distinctly split into two parties. The Bolsheviki tried by every means to elude a straight answer to thequestion, "Does the Congress wish to uphold the Constituent Assembly?" Theyprolonged the discussion, driving the peasants to extremities by every kindof paltry discussion on foolish questions, hoping to tire them out and thuscause a certain number of them to return home. The tiresome discussionscarried on for ten days, with the effect that a part of the peasants, seeing nothing come from it, returned home. But the peasants had, in spiteof all, the upper hand; by a roll-call vote 359 against 314 pronouncedthemselves for the defense without reserve of the Constituent Assembly. 

Any work in common for the future was impossible. The fraction of thepeasants that pronounced itself for the Constituent Assembly continued tosit apart, named its Executive Committee, and decided to continue the fightresolutely. The Bolsheviki, on their part, took their partizans to theSmolny, declared to be usurpers of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates whopronounced themselves for the defense of the Constituante, and, with theaid of soldiers, ejected the former Executive Committee from their premisesand took possession of their goods, the library, etc. 

The new Executive Committee, which did not have at its disposition RedGuards, was obliged to look for another place, to collect the moneynecessary for this purpose, etc. Its members were able, with muchdifficulty, to place everything upon its feet and to assure thepublication of an organ (the _Izvestya_ of the National Soviet of Peasants'Delegates determined to defend the Constituent Assembly), to send delegatesinto different regions, and to establish relations with the provinces, etc. 

Together with the peasants, workmen and Socialist parties and numerousdemocratic organizations prepared themselves for the defense of theConstituent Assembly: The Union of Postal Employees, a part of the Union ofRailway Workers, the Bank Employees, the City Employees, the fooddistributors' organizations, the teachers' associations, the zemstvos, theco-operatives. These organizations believed that the _coup d'état_ ofOctober 25th was neither legal nor just; they demanded a convocation withbrief delay of the Constituent Assembly and the restoration of theliberties that were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki. 

These treated them as _saboteurs_, "enemies of the people, " deprived themof their salaries, and expelled them from their lodgings. They orderedthose who opposed them to be deprived of their food-cards. They publishedlists of strikers, thus running the risk of having them lynched by thecrowds. At Saratov, for example, the strike of postal workers andtelegraphers lasted a month and a half. The institutions whose strike wouldhave entailed for the population not only disorganization, but an arrest ofall life (such as the railroads, the organizations of food distributers), abstained from striking, only asking the Bolsheviki not to meddle withtheir work. Sometimes, however, the gross interference of the Bolsheviki inwork of which they understood nothing obliged those opposed to them, inspite of everything, to strike. It is to be noted also that the professorsof secondary schools were obliged to join the strike movements (thesuperior schools had already ceased to function at this time) as well asthe theatrical artistes: a talented artist, Silotti, was arrested; hedeclared that even in the time of Czarism nobody was ever uneasy onaccount of his political opinions. 

IV

_The Bolsheviki and the Constituent Assembly_

At the time of the accomplishment of their _coup d'état_, the Bolshevikicried aloud that the ministry of Kerensky put off a long time theconvocation of the Constituante (which was a patent lie), that they wouldnever call the Assembly, and that they alone, the Bolsheviki, would do it. But according as the results of the elections became known their opinionschanged. 

In the beginning they boasted of their electoral victories at Petrograd andMoscow. Then they kept silent, as if the elections had no existencewhatever. But the _Pravda_ and the _Izvestya_ of the Soviet of Workmen'sand Soldiers' Delegates continued to treat as caluminators those whoexposed the danger that was threatening the Constituent Assembly at thehands of the Bolsheviki. They did not yet dare to assert themselves openly. They had to gain time to strengthen their power. They hastily followed uppeace pourparlers, to place Russia and the Constituent Assembly, if thismet, before an accomplished fact. 

They hastened to attract the peasants to themselves. That was the reasonwhich motived the "decree" of Lenine on the socialization of the soil, which decree appeared immediately after the _coup d'état_. This decree wassimply a reproduction of a Revolutionary Socialists' resolution adopted ata Peasants' Congress. What could the socialization of the soil be to Lenineand all the Bolsheviki in general? They had been, but a short time before, profoundly indifferent with regard to this Socialist-Revolutionist"Utopia. " It had been for them an object of raillery. But they knew thatwithout this "Utopia" they would have no peasants. And they threw themthis mouthful, this "decree, " which astonished the peasants. "Is it a law?Is it not a law? Nobody knows, " they said. 

It is the same desire to have, cost what it may, the sympathy of thepeasants that explains the union of the Bolsheviki with those who arecalled the "Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left" (for the nameSocialist-Revolutionist spoke to the heart of the peasant), who played thestupid and shameful rôle of followers of the Bolsheviki, with a blindweapon between their hands. 

A part of the "peasants in uniform" followed the Bolsheviki to Smolny. TheGermans honored the Bolsheviki by continuing with them the pourparlers forpeace. The Bolshevist government had at its disposal the Red Guards, wellpaid, created suddenly in the presence of the crumbling of the army forfear of remaining without the help of bayonets. These Red Guards, who laterfled in shameful fashion before the German patrols, advanced into theinterior of the country and gained victories over the unarmed populace. TheBolsheviki felt the ground firm under their feet and threw off the mask. Acampaign against the Constituent Assembly commenced. At first in _Pravda_and in _Izvestya_ were only questions. What will this Constituent Assemblybe? Of whom will it be composed? It is possible that it will have amajority of servants of the bourgeoisie--Cadets Socialist-Revolutionists. _Can we confide to such a Constituent Assembly the destinies of the RussianRevolution? Will it recognize the power of the Soviets?_ Then came certainhypocritical "ifs. " "If, " yes, "if" the personnel of the ConstituentAssembly is favorable to us; "if" it will recognize the power of theSoviets, it can count on their support. _If not--it condemns itself todeath_. 

The Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left in their organ, _The Flag ofLabor_, repeated in the wake of the Bolsheviki, "We will uphold theConstituent Assembly in _the measure we_--"

Afterward we see no longer questions or prudent "ifs, " but distinctanswers. "The majority of the Constituent Assembly is formed, " said theBolsheviki, "of Socialist-Revolutionists and Cadets--that is to say, enemies of the people. This composition assures it of acounter-revolutionary spirit. Its destiny is therefore clear. Historicexamples come to its aid. _The victorious people has no need of aConstituent Assembly. It is above the Constituante_. It has gone beyondit. " The Russian people, half illiterate, were made to believe that in afew weeks they had outgrown the end for which millions of Russians hadfought for almost a century; that they no longer had need of the mostperfect form of popular representation, such as did not exist even in themost cultivated countries of western Europe. To the Constituent Assembly, legislative organ due to equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, theyopposed the Soviets, with their recruiting done by hazard and theirelections to two or three degrees, [92] the Soviets which were therevolutionary organs and not the legislative organs, and whose rôle besidesnone of those who fought for the Constituent Assembly sought to diminish. 

V

_The Fight Concentrates Around the Constituent Assembly_

This was a maneuver whose object appeared clearly. The defenders of theConstituent Assembly had evidence of what was being prepared. The peasantswho waited with impatience the opening of the Constituent Assembly sentdelegates to Petrograd to find out the cause of the delay of theconvocation. These delegates betook themselves to the Executive Committeeof the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates (11 Kirillovskaia Street), and to theSocialist-Revolutionist fraction of the members of the Constituante (2Bolotnai Street). This last fraction worked actively at its properorganization. A bureau of organization was elected, commissions charged toelaborate projects of law for the Constituante. The fraction issuedbulletins explaining to the population the program which theSocialist-Revolutionists were going to defend at the Constituante. Activerelations were undertaken with the provinces. At the same time the membersof the fraction, among whom were many peasants and workmen, followed up anactive agitation in the workshops and factories of Petrograd, and among thesoldiers of the Preobrajenski Regiment and some others. The members of theExecutive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates worked in concertwith them. It was precisely the opinion of the peasants and of the workmenwhich had most importance in the fight against the Bolsheviki. They, thetrue representatives of the people, were listened to everywhere; peoplewere obliged to reckon with them. 

It was under these conditions that the Democratic Conference met. Called bythe Provisional Government, it comprised representatives of the Soviets, ofparties, of organizations of the army, peasant organizations, co-operatives, zemstvos, agricultural committees, etc. Its object was tosolve the question of power until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. 

At this conference the Bolsheviki formed only a small minority; but theyacted as masters of the situation, calling, in a provocative manner, all those who were not in accord with them, "Kornilovist, counter-revolutionaries, traitors!" Because of this attitude theconference, which ought to have had the character of an assembly decidingaffairs of state, took on the character of a boisterous meeting, whichlasted several days of unending twaddle. What the Bolsheviki wanted was averbal victory--to have shouted more loudly than their opponents. The samespeeches were repeated every day. Some upheld a power exclusivelySocialist, others--the majority composed of delegates from differentcorners of the country--sanctioned an agreement with all the democraticelements. 

The provincial delegates, having come with a view to serious work, returnedto their homes, carrying with them a painful impression of lostopportunities, of useless debates. 

There remained but a few weeks before the convocation of the ConstituentAssembly. Those who voted against a government exclusively Socialist didnot think that, under the troublesome conditions of the time, they couldexpose the country to the risk of a dispersion of strength; they feared thepossible isolation of the government in face of certain elements whose helpcould not be relied on. But they did not take into account a fact which hadresulted from the Kornilovist insurrection: the natural distrust of theworking masses in presence of all the non-Socialists, of those who--notbeing in immediate contact with them--placed themselves, were it ever solittle, more on the right. 

The Democratic conference resulted in the formation of a Pre-Parliament. There the relations, between the forces in presence of each other, wereabout the same. Besides the Bolsheviki soon abandoned the Pre-Parliament, for they were already preparing their insurrection which curtailed thedissolution of that institution. 

"We are on the eve of a Bolshevik insurrection"--such was, at this time, the opinion of all those who took part in political life. "We are rushingto it with dizzy rapidity. The catastrophe is inevitable. " But what is verycharacteristic is this, that, while preparing their insurrection, theBolsheviki, in their press, did not hesitate to treat as liars andcalumniators all those who spoke of the danger of this insurrection, andthat on the eve of a conquest of power (with arms ready) premeditated andwell prepared in advance. 

 * * * * *

During the whole period that preceded the Bolshevik insurrection a greatcreative work was being carried on in the country in spite of theundesirable phenomena of which we have spoken above. 

1. With great difficulty there were established organs of a local, autonomous administration, volost and district zemstvos, which were tofurnish a basis of organization to the government zemstvos. The zemstvo offormer times was made up of only class representatives; _the elections tothe new zemstvos were effected by universal suffrage, equal, direct, andsecret_. These elections were a kind of schooling for the population, showing it the practical significance of universal suffrage, and preparingit for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. At the same time theylaid the foundation of a local autonomous administration. 

2. Preparations for the election to the Constituent Assembly were made; anagitation, an intense propaganda followed; preparations of a technicalorder were made. This was a difficult task because of the great number ofelectors, the dispersion of the population, the great number of illiterate, etc. Everywhere special courts had been established, in view of theelections, to train agitators and instructors, who afterward were sent ingreat numbers into the country. 

3. _At the same time the ground was hurriedly prepared for the lawconcerning the socialization of the soil. _ The abandonment of his post byTchernov, Minister of Agriculture, did not stop this work. The principalagricultural committee and the Minister of Agriculture, directed byRakitnikov and Vikhiliaev, hastened to finish this work before theconvocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Revolutionary Socialist partydecided to keep for itself the post of Minister of Agriculture; for theposition they named S. Maslov, who had to exact from the government animmediate vote on the law concerning the socialization of the soil. _Thestudy of this law in the Council of Ministers was finished. Nothing moreremained to be done but to adopt and promulgate it. Because of theexcitement of the people in the country, it was decided to do this at once, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly_. Finally, to better realizethe conditions of the time, it must be added that the whole country awaitedanxiously the elections to the Constituent Assembly. All believed that thiswas going to settle the life of Russia. 

VI

_The Bolshevist Insurrection_

It was under these conditions that the Bolshevist _coup d'état_ happened. In the capitals as well as in the provinces, it was accomplished by armedforce; at Petrograd, with the help of the sailors of the Baltic fleet, ofthe soldiers of the Preobrajenski, Semenovski, and other regiments, inother towns with the aid of the local garrisons. Here, for example, is howthe Bolshevist _coup d'état_ took place at Saratov. I was a witness tothese facts myself. Saratov is a big university and intellectual center, possessing a great number of schools, libraries, and divers associationsdesigned to elevate the intellectual standard of the population. Thezemstvo of Saratov was one of the best in Russia. The peasant population ofthis province, among whom the Revolutionary Socialist propaganda wascarried on for several years by the Revolutionary Socialist Party, is wideawake and well organized. The municipality and the agricultural committeeswere composed of Socialists. The population was actively preparing for theelections to the Constituent Assembly; the people discussed the list ofcandidates, studied the candidates' biographies, as well as the programs ofthe different parties. 

On the night of October 28th, by reason of an order that had come fromPetrograd, the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ broke out at Saratov. The followingforces were its instruments: the garrison which was a stranger to themasses of the population, a weak party of workers, and, in the capacity ofleaders, some Intellectuals who, up to that time, had played no rôle in thepublic life of the town. 

It was indeed a military _coup d'état_. The city hall, where sat theSocialists, who were elected by equal, direct, and secret universalsuffrage, was surrounded by the soldiers; machine-guns were placed in frontand the bombardment began. This lasted a whole night; some were wounded, some killed. The municipal judges were arrested. Soon after a Manifestosolemnly announced to the population that the "enemies of the people, " the"counter-revolutionaries, " were overthrown; that the power at Saratov wasgoing to pass into the hands of the Soviet (Bolshevist) of the Workmen'sand Soldiers' Delegates. 

The population was perplexed; the people thought that they had sent to theTown Hall Socialists, men of their choice. Now these men were declared"enemies of the people, " were shot down or arrested by other Socialists. What did all this mean? And the inhabitant of Saratov felt a fear stealinginto his soul at the sight of this violence; he began to doubt the value ofthe Socialist idea in general. The faith of former times gave place todoubt, disappointment, and discouragement. The _coup d'état_ was followedby divers other manifestations of Bolshevist activity--arrests, searches, confiscation of newspapers, ban on meetings. Bands of soldiers looted thecountry houses in the suburbs of the city; a school for the children of thepeople and the buildings of the children's holiday settlement were alsopillaged. Bands of soldiers were forthwith sent into the country to causetrouble there. 

_The sensible part of the population of Saratov severely condemned theseacts_ in a series of Manifestos signed by the Printers' Union, the millworkers, the City Employees' Union, Postal and Telegraph Employees, students' organizations, and many other democratic associations andorganizations. 

The peasants received the _coup d'état_ with distinct hostility. Meetingsand reunions were soon organized in the villages. Resolutions were votedcensuring the _coup d'état_ of violence, deciding to organize to resist theBolsheviki, and demanding the removal of the Bolshevist soldier membersfrom the rural communes. The bands of soldiers, who were sent into thecountry, used not only persuasion, but also violence, trying to force thepeasants to give their votes for the Bolshevik candidates at the time ofthe elections to the Constituent Assembly; they tore up the bulletins ofthe Socialist-Revolutionists, overturned the ballot-boxes, etc. 

But the Bolshevik soldiers were not able to disturb the confidence of thepeasants in the Constituent Assembly, and in the Revolutionary Socialistparty, whose program they had long since adopted, and whose leaders andways of acting they knew, the inhabitants of the country proved themselvesin all that concerned the elections wide awake to the highest degree. Therewere hardly any abstentions, _90 per cent. Of the population took part inthe voting_. The day of the voting was kept as a solemn feast; the priestsaid mass; the peasants dressed in their Sunday clothes; they believed thatthe Constituent Assembly would give them order, laws, the land. In thegovernment of Saratov, out of fourteen deputies elected, there were twelveSocialist-Revolutionists; there were others (such as the government ofPensa, for example) that elected _only_ Socialist-Revolutionists. TheBolsheviki had the majority only in Petrograd and Moscow and in certainunits of the army. The elections to the Constituent Assembly were adecisive victory for the Revolutionary Socialist party. 

Such was the response of Russia to the Bolshevik _coup d'état_. To violenceand conquest of power by force of arms, the population answered by theelections to the Constituent Assembly; the people sent to thisassembly, not the Bolsheviki, but, by an overwhelming majority, Socialist-Revolutionists. 

VII

_The Fight Against the Bolsheviki_

But the final result of the elections was not established forthwith. Inmany places the elections had to be postponed. The Bolshevik _coup d'état_had disorganized life, had upset postal and telegraphic communications, andhad even destroyed, in certain localities, the electoral mechanism itselfby the arrest of the active workers. The elections which began in themiddle of November were not concluded till toward the month of January. 

In the mean time, in the country a fierce battle was raging against theBolsheviki. It was not, on the part of their adversaries, a fight forpower. If the Socialist-Revolutionists had wished they could have seizedthe power; to do that they had only to follow the example of those who werecalled "the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. " Not only did they notfollow their example, but they also excluded them from their midst. A shorttime after the Bolshevik insurrection, when the part taken in thisinsurrection by certain Revolutionary Socialists of the Left was found out, the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party voted to excludethem from the party for having violated the party discipline and havingadopted tactics contrary to its principles. This exclusion was confirmedafterward by the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place inDecember, 1917. 

Soon after the _coup d'état_ of October the question was among all partiesand all organizations: "What is to be done? How will the situation beremedied?" The remedy included three points. First, creation of a powercomposed of the representatives of all Socialist organizations, with the"Populist-Socialists" on the extreme right, and with the express conditionthat the principal actors in the Bolshevik _coup d'état_ would not havepart in the Ministry. Second, immediate establishment of the democraticliberties, which were trampled under foot by the Bolsheviki, without whichany form of Socialism is inconceivable. Third, convocation without delay ofthe Constituent Assembly. 

Such were the conditions proposed to the Bolsheviki in the name of severalSocialist parties (the Revolutionary Socialist party, the Mensheviki, thePopulist-Socialists, etc. ), and of several democratic organizations(Railroad Workers' Union, Postal and Telegraphic Employees' Union, etc. ). The Bolsheviki, at this time, were not sure of being able to hold theirposition; certain Commissaries of the People, soon after they wereinstalled in power, handed in their resignation, being terrified by thetorrents of blood that were shed at Moscow and by the cruelties whichaccompanied the _coup d'état_. The Bolsheviki pretended to accept thepourparlers, but kept them dragging along so as to gain time. In the meantime they tried to strengthen themselves in the provinces, where theygained victories such as that of Saratov; they actively rushed thepourparlers for peace; they had to do it at all cost, even if, in doing it, they had to accept the assistance of the traitor and spy, by name Schneur, for they had promised peace to the soldiers. 

For this it sufficed them to have gained some victories in the provinces, and that the Germans accepted the proposition of pourparlers of peace ("theGerman generals came to meet us in gala attire, wearing their ribbons anddecorations, " with triumph announced in their appeal to the Russian peoplethe representatives of this "Socialist" government Schneur & Co. ), for thisthe Bolsheviki henceforth refused every compromise and all conference withthe other parties. For the other parties--those who did not recognize theBolshevik _coup d'état_ and did not approve of the violence that wasperpetrated--there was only one alternative, the fight. 

It was the Revolutionary Socialist party and the National Soviet ofPeasants' Delegates that had to bear the brunt of this fight, which wascarried on under extremely difficult conditions. All the non-Bolsheviknewspapers were confiscated or prosecuted and deprived of every means ofreaching the provinces; their editors' offices and printing establishmentswere looted. After the creation of the "Revolutionary Tribunal, " theauthors of articles that were not pleasing to the Bolsheviki, as well asthe directors of the newspapers, were brought to judgment and condemned tomake amends or go to prison, etc. 

The premises of numerous organizations were being constantly pillaged; theRed Guard came there to search, destroying different documents; frequentlyobjects which were found on the premises disappeared. Thus were looted thepremises of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party (27Galernaia Street), and, several times, the offices of the paper _DieloNarvda_ (22 Litcinaia Street), as well as the office of the "League for theDefense of the Constituent Assembly, " the premises of the committees ofdivers sections of the Revolutionary Socialist party, the office of thepaper _Volia Naroda_, etc. 

Leaders of the different parties were arrested. The arrest of the wholeCentral Committee of the Revolutionary Socialist party was to be carriedout as well as the arrest of all the Socialist-Revolutionists, and of allthe Mensheviki in sight. The Bolshevist press became infuriated, exclaimingagainst the "counter-revolution, " against their "complicity" with Kornilovand Kalodine. 

All those who did not adhere to the Bolsheviki were indignant at the sightof the crimes committed, and wished to defend the Constituent Assembly. Knowingly, and in a premeditated manner, the Bolshevist press excited thesoldiers and the workmen against all other parties. And then when theunthinking masses, drunk with flattery and hatred, committed acts oflynching, the Bolshevist leaders expressed sham regrets! Thus it was afterthe death of Doukhonine, who was cut to pieces by the sailors; and thus itwas after the dastardly assassination of the Cadets, Shingariev andKokochkine, after the shootings _en masse_ and the drowning of theofficers. 

It was under these conditions that the fight was carried on; and the bruntof it, as I have already stated, was sustained by the RevolutionarySocialist party and the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, and it wasagainst these two that the Bolsheviki were particularly infuriated. "Now itis not the Cadets who are dangerous to us, " said they, "but theSocialist-Revolutionists--these traitors, these enemies of the people. " Themost sacred names of the Revolution were publicly trampled under foot bythem. Their cynicism went so far as to accuse Breshkovskaya, "theGrandmother of the Russian Revolution, " of having sold out to theAmericans. Personally I had the opportunity to hear a Bolshevist orator, amember of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers'Delegates, express this infamous calumny at a meeting organized by thePreobrajenski Regiment. The Bolsheviki tried, by every means, to crush theparty, to reduce it to a clandestine existence. But the Central Committeedeclared that it would continue to fight against violence--and that in anopen manner; it continued to issue a daily paper, only changing its title, as in the time of Czarism, and thus continued its propaganda in thefactories, and helped to form public opinion, etc. 

At the Fourth Congress of the party, which took place in December, thedelegates from the provinces, where the despotism of the Bolsheviki wasparticularly violent, raised the question of introducing terrorist methodsin the fight against the Bolsheviki. "From the time that the party isplaced in a fight under conditions which differ nothing from those ofCzarism, ancient methods are to be resumed; violence must be opposed toviolence, " they said. But the Congress spurned this means; theRevolutionary Socialist party did not adopt the methods of terrorism; itcould not do it, because the Bolsheviki were, after all, followed by themasses--unthinking, it is true, but the masses, nevertheless. It is byeducating them, and not by the use of violence, that they are to be foughtagainst. Terrorist acts could bring nothing but a bloody suppression. 

VIII

_The Second Peasant Congress_

In the space of a month a great amount of work was accomplished. A breachwas made in the general misunderstanding. Moral help was assured to theConstituent Assembly on the part of the workmen and part of the soldiers ofPetrograd. There was no longer any confidence placed in the Bolsheviki. Besides, the agitation was not the only cause of this change. The workerssoon came to understand that the Bolshevik tactics could only irritate anddisgust the great mass of the population, that the Bolsheviki were not therepresentatives of the workers, that their promises of land, of peace, andother earthly goods were only a snare. The industrial production diminishedmore and more; numerous factories and shops closed their doors andthousands of workmen found themselves on the streets. The population ofPetrograd, which, at first, received a quarter of a pound of bread per day(a black bread made with straw), had now but one-eighth of a pound, whilein the time of Kerensky the ration was half a pound. The other products(oatmeal, butter, eggs, milk) were entirely lacking or cost extremely highprices. One ruble fifty copecks for a pound of potatoes, six rubles apound of meat, etc. The transportation of products to Petrograd had almostceased. The city was on the eve of famine. 

The workers were irritated by the violence and the arbitrary manner of theBolsheviki, and by the exploits of the Red Guard, well paid, enjoying allthe privileges, well nourished, well clothed, and well shod in the midst ofa Petrograd starving and in rags. 

Discontent manifested itself also among the soldiers of the Preobrajenskiand Litovsky regiments, and others. In this manner in the day of themeeting of the Constituent Assembly they were no longer very numerous. Whatloud cries, nevertheless, they had sent forth lately when Kerensky wishedto send the Preobrajenski and Seminovski regiments from Petrograd! "What?Send the revolutionary regiments from Petrograd? To make easier thesurrender of the capital to the counter-revolution?" The soldiers of thePreobrajenski Regiment organized in their barracks frequent meetings, wherethe acts of the Bolsheviki were sharply criticized; they started a paper, _The Soldiers' Cloak_, which was confiscated. 

On the other hand, here is one of the resolutions voted by the workers ofthe Putilov factory:

 The Constituent Assembly is the only organ expressing the will of the entire people. It alone is able to reconstitute the unity of the country. 

The majority of the deputies to the Constituent Assembly who had for sometime been elected had arrived in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviki alwaysretarded the opening. The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction startedconferences with the other fractions on the necessity for fixing a day forthe opening of the Constituante, without waiting the good pleasure of theCommissaries of the People. They chose the date, December 27th, but theopening could not take place on that day, the Ukrainian fraction havingsuddenly abandoned the majority to join themselves to the Bolsheviki andthe Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. Finally, the government fixed theopening of the Constituent Assembly for the 5th (18th) of January. 

Here is a document which relates this fight for the date of the opening ofthe Constituante:

 _Bulletin of Members of the Constituent Assembly Belonging to the Socialist-Revolutionist Fraction. No. 5, Dec. 31, 1917. _

 _To All the Citizens_:

 The Socialist-Revolutionist fraction of the Constituent Assembly addresses the whole people the present exposé of the reasons for which the Constituent Assembly has not been opened until this day: it warns them, at the same time, of the danger which threatens the sovereign rights of the people. 

 Let it be thus placed in clear daylight, the true character of those who, under pretext of following the well-being of the workers, forge new chains for liberated Russia, those who attempt to assassinate the Constituent Assembly, which alone is able to save Russia from the foreign yoke and from the despotism which has been born within. 

 Let all the citizens know that the hour is near when they must be ready to rise like one man for the defense of their liberty and their Constituent Assembly. 

 For, citizens, your salvation is solely in your own hands. 

 Citizens! you know that on the day assigned for the opening of the Constituent Assembly, November 28th, all the Socialist-Revolutionist deputies who were elected had come to Petrograd. You know that neither violence of a usurping power nor arrests of our comrades, by force of arms which were opposed to us at the Taurida Palace, could prevent us from assembling and fulfilling our duty. 

 But the civil war which has spread throughout the country retarded the election to the Constituent Assembly and the number of deputies elected was insufficient. 

 It was necessary to postpone the opening of the Constituent Assembly. 

 Our fraction utilized this forced delay by an intensive preparatory work. We elaborated, in several commissions, projects of law concerning all the fundamental questions that the Constituante would have to solve. We adopted the project of our fundamental law on the question of the land; we elaborated the measures which the Constituante would have to take from the very first day in order to arrive at a truly democratic peace, so necessary to our country; we discussed the principles which should direct the friendly dwelling together of all the nationalities which people Russia and assure each people a national point of view, the free disposition of itself, thus putting an end to the fratricidal war. 

 Our fraction would have been all ready for the day of the opening of the Constituante, in order to commence, from the first, a creative work and give to the impoverished country peace, bread, land, and liberty. 

 At the same time, we did our utmost to accelerate the arrival of the deputies and the opening of the Assembly. 

 During this time events became more and more menacing every day, the Bolshevik power was more rapidly leading our country to its fall. From before the time when the Germans had presented their conditions of peace the Bolsheviki had destroyed the army, suppressed its provisioning, and stripped the front, while at the same time by civil war and the looting of the savings of the people they achieved the economic ruin of the country. Actually, they recognized themselves that the German conditions were unacceptable and invited the reconstruction of the army. In spite of this, these criminals do not retire; they will achieve their criminal work. 

 Russia suffers in the midst of famine, of civil war, and enemy invasion which threatens to reach even the heart of the country. 

 No delay is permissible. 

 Our fraction fixed on the 27th of December the last delay for the opening of the Constituante; on this day more than half of the deputies could have arrived in Petrograd. We entered into conference with the other fractions. The Ukrainians, some other national fractions, and the Menshevik Social Democrats adhered to our resolution. The Revolutionary Socialists of the Left hypocritically declared themselves partizans of an early opening of the Constituante. But behold, the Council of the so-called "Commissaries of the People" fixed the opening for the 5th of January. _At the same time they called for the 8th of January a Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, thus hoping to be able to trick and to cover with the name of this Congress their criminal acts_. The object of this postponement is clear; they did not even hide it and threatened to dissolve the Constituent Assembly in case that it did not submit to the Bolshevik Congress of Soviets. The same threat was repeated by those who are called Socialist-Revolutionists of the Left. 

 The delegation of the Ukrainian Revolutionary Socialists abandoned us also and submitted to the order for the convocation on January 5th, considering that the fight of the Bolshevik power against the Constituent Assembly is an internal question, which interests only Greater Russia. 

 Citizens! We shall be there, too, on January 5th, so that the least particle of responsibility for the sabotage of the Constituent Assembly may not fall upon us. 

 But we do not think that we can suspend our activity with regard to the speediest possible opening of the Constituent Assembly. 

 We address an energetic appeal to all the deputies; in the name of the fatherland, in the name of the Revolution, in the name of the duty which devolves upon you by reason of your election, come, all, to Petrograd! On the 1st of January all the deputies present will decide on the day for the opening of the Constituent Assembly. 

 We appeal to you, citizens! Remind your elected representatives of their duty. 

 And remember that your salvation is solely in your own hands, a mortal danger threatens the Constituent Assembly; be all ready to rise in its defense!

 THE REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST FRACTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY. 

On the 3d of January the League for the Defense of the Constituent Assemblyheld a meeting at which were present 210 delegates, representing theSocialist parties as well as various democratic organizations and manyfactories--that of Putilov, that of Oboukhov, and still others from theoutskirts of Narva, from the districts of Viborg, Spassky, andPetrogradsky, from the Isle Vassily. It was decided to organize for January5th a peaceful display in honor of the opening of the ConstituentAssembly. 

The Bolsheviki answered this by furious articles in the _Pravda_, urgingthe people not to spare the counter-revolutionaries, these bourgeoisie whointend, by means of their Constituante, to combat the revolutionary people. They advised the people of Petrograd not to go out on the streets that day. "We shall act without reserve, " they added. 

Sailors were called from Cronstadt; cruisers and torpedo-boats came. Anorder was issued to the sailors and to the Red Guards who patrolled all theworks of the Taurida, to make use of their arms if any one attempted toenter the palace. For that day unlimited powers were accorded to themilitary authorities. At the same time an assembly of the representativesof the garrison at Petrograd, fixed for that day, was proscribed, and thenewspaper, _The Soldiers' Cloak_, was suppressed. 

A Congress of Soviets was called for the 8th of January. They prepared thedissolution of the Constituent Assembly and they wanted to place theCongress before the accomplished fact. The Executive Committee of theSoviet of Peasants' Delegates, and the Central Executive Committee of theSoviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates chosen at the first electionsanswered by the two following appeals:

 Peasant Comrades!

 The Bolsheviki have fixed the 5th of January for the opening of the Constituent Assembly; for the 8th of January they call the III Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, and for the 13th the Peasant Congress. 

 The peasants are, by design, relegated to the background. 

 An outrage against the Constituent Assembly is being prepared. 

 In this historic moment the peasants cannot remain aloof. 

 The Provisional Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, which goes on duty as a guard to the Constituent Assembly, has decided to call, on the 8th of January, also, the Third National Congress of the Soviets of Peasants' Delegates. The representation remains the same as before. Send your delegates at once to Petrograd, Grand Bolotnai, 2A. 

 The fate of the Constituent Assembly is the fate of Russia, the fate of the Revolution. 

 All up for the defense of the Constituent Assembly, for the defense of the Revolution--not by word alone, but by acts!

 [Signed] _The Provisional Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, upholding the principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly_. 

 APPEAL OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE SOVIETS OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES, CHOSEN AT THE FIRST ELECTIONS

 To all the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, to all the Committees of the Army and of the Navy, to all the organizations associated with the Soviets and Committees, to all the members of the Socialist-Revolutionist and Menshevist Social Democratic fractions who left the Second Congress of Soviets:

 Comrades, workmen, and soldiers! Our cry of alarm is addressed to all those to whom the work of the Soviets is dear. Know that a traitorous blow threatens the revolutionary fatherland, the Constituent Assembly, and even the work of the Soviets. Your duty is to prepare yourselves for their defense. 

 The Central Executive Committee, nominated at the October Congress, calls together for the 8th of January a Congress of Soviets, destined to bungle the Constituent Assembly. 

 Comrades! The Second Congress of Soviets assembled at the end of October, under conditions particularly unfavorable, at the time that the Bolshevik party, won over by its leaders to a policy of adventure, a plot unbecoming a class organization, executed at Petrograd a _coup d'état_ which gave it power; at a time when certain groups with the same viewpoint disorganized even the method of convocation of the Second Congress, thus openly aspiring to falsify the results; at this same Congress the regular representatives of the army were lacking (only two armies being represented), and the Soviets of the provinces were very insufficiently represented (only about 120 out of 900). Under these conditions it is but natural that the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets chosen at the first election would not recognize the right of this Congress to decide the politics of the Soviets. 

 However, in spite of the protestations, and even of the departure of a great number of delegates (those of the Revolutionary Socialist fraction, Mensheviki, and Populist-Socialists), a new Executive Committee of the Soviets was elected. To consider this last as the central director of all the Soviets of the country was absolutely impossible. The delegates who remained in the Congress formed only an assembly of a group with a little fraction of the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left, who had given their adhesion to them. Thus the Central Committee named by their Conference could not be considered except as representatives of these two groups only. 

 Bringing to the organization of Soviets an unheard-of disorder, establishing by their shameful methods of fighting its domination over the Soviets, some of which were taken by surprise, the others terrorized and broken in their personnel, deceiving the working class and the army by its short-sighted policy of adventure, the new Executive Committee during the two months that have since passed has attempted to subject all the Soviets of Russia to its influence. It succeeded in part in this, in the measure in which the confidence of the groups which constituted it in the policy was not yet exhausted. But a considerable portion of the Soviets, as well as fractions of other Soviets, fractions composed of the most devoted and experienced fighters, continued to follow the only true revolutionary road; to develop the class organization of the working masses, to direct their intellectual and political life, to develop the political and social aspects of the Revolution, to exert, by all the power of the working class organized into Soviets, the necessary pressure to attain the end that it proposed. The questions of peace and of war, that of the organization of production and of food-supply, and that of the fight for the Constituent Assembly are in the first place. The policy of adventure of the groups which seized the power is on the eve of failure. Peace could not be realized by a rupture with the Allies and an entente with the imperialistic orb of the Central Powers. By reason of this failure of the policy of the Commissaires of the People, of the disorganization of production (which, among other things, has had as a result the creation of hundreds of thousands of unemployed), by reason of the civil war kindled in the country and the absence of a power recognized by the whole people, the Central Powers tend to take hold in the most cynical fashion of a whole series of western provinces (Poland, Lithuania, Courland), and to subject the whole country to their complete economic, if not political, domination. 

 The question of provisioning has taken on an unheard-of acuteness; the gross interference in the functioning of organs already created for this object, and the civil war kindled everywhere throughout the country, have completely demoralized the provisioning of wheat in regions where they had none, the north and the army are found on the eve of famine. 

 Industry is dying. Hundreds of factories and workshops are stopped. The short-sighted policy of the Commissaries has caused hundreds of workmen to be thrown on the streets and become unemployed. The will of the entire people is threatened with being violated. The usurpers who in October got hold of the power by launching the word of order for a swift convocation of the Constituent Assembly strive hard, now that the elections are over, to retain the power in their hands by arresting the deputies and dissolving the Constituante itself. 

 _All that which the country holds of life, and in the first place all the working class and all the army, ought to rise with arms in their hands to defend the popular power represented by the Constituante, which must bring peace to the people and consolidate by legislative means the revolutionary conquests of the working class. _

 In bringing this to your knowledge, the Central Committee chosen at the first elections invites you, Comrades, to place yourself immediately in agreement with it. 

 Considering the Congress of October as incompetent, the Central Committee chosen at the first elections has decided to begin a preparatory work in view of the convocation of a new Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates. 

 In the near future, while the Commissaires of the People, in the persons of Lenine and Trotzky, are going to fight against the sovereign power of the Constituent Assembly, we shall have to intervene with all our energy in the conflict artificially encited by the adventurers, between that Assembly and the Soviets. _It will be our task to aid the Soviets in taking consciousness of their rôle, in defining their political lines, and in determining their functions and those of the Constituante. _

 Comrades! The convocation of the Congress for the 8th of January is dictated by the desire to provoke a conflict between the Soviets and the Constituante, and thus botch this last. Anxious for the fate of the country, the Executive Committee chosen at the first elections decides to convoke at Petrograd for the 8th of January an extraordinary assembly of _all the Soviets, all the Committees of the Army and the Navy, all the fractions of the Soviets and military committees, all the organizations that cluster around the Soviets and the Committees that are standing upon the ground of the defense of the Constituante. _ The following are the Orders of the Day:

 1. The power of the Constituent Assembly. 2. The fight for the general democratic peace and the re-establishment of the International. 3. The immediate problems of the policy of the Soviets. 

 Comrades! Assure for this extraordinary assembly of Soviets the most complete representation of all the organizations of workmen and soldiers. Establish at once election centers. We have a fight to uphold. 

 In the name of the Revolution, all the reason and all the energy ought to be thrown into the balance. 

 THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF SOVIETS OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES CHOSEN AT THE FIRST ELECTIONS. 

 _25 December, 1917. _

IX

_The Manifestation of January 5th at Petrograd_

From eleven o'clock in the morning cortèges, composed principally ofworking-men bearing red flags and placards with inscriptions such as"Proletarians of All Countries, Unite!" "Land and Liberty!" "Long Live theConstituent Assembly!" etc. , set out from different parts of the city. Themembers of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegateshad agreed to meet at the Field, of Mars where a procession coming from thePetrogradsky quarter was due to arrive. It was soon learned that a part ofthe participants, coming from the Viborg quarter, had been assailed at theLiteiny bridge by gunfire from the Red Guards and were obliged to turnback. But that did not check the other parades. The peasant participants, united with the workers from Petrogradsky quarter, came to the Field ofMars; after having lowered their flags before the tombs of the Revolutionof February and sung a funeral hymn to their memory, they installedthemselves on Liteinaia Street. New manifestants came to join them and thestreet was crowded with people. At the corner of Fourstatskaia Street (oneof the Streets leading to the Taurida Palace) they found themselves all atonce assailed by shots from the Red Guards. 

The Red Guard fired _without warning_, something that never beforehappened, even in the time of Czarism. The police always began by invitingthe participators to disperse. Among the first victims was a member of theExecutive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants' Delegates, the Siberianpeasant, Logvinov. An explosive bullet shot away half of his head (aphotograph of his body was taken; it was added to the documents which weretransferred to the Commission of Inquiry). Several workmen and students andone militant of the Revolutionary Socialist party, Gorbatchevskaia, werekilled at the same time. Other processions of participants on their way tothe Taurida Palace were fired into at the same time. On all the streetsleading to the palace, groups of Red Guards had been established; theyreceived the order "Not to spare the cartridges. " On that day at Petrogradthere were one hundred killed and wounded. 

It must be noted that when, at a session of the Constituent Assembly, inthe Taurida Palace, they learned of this shooting, M. Steinberg, Commissioner of Justice, declared in the corridor that it was a lie, thathe himself had visited the streets of Petrograd and had found everywherethat "all was quiet. " Exactly as the Ministers of Nicholas Romanov afterthe suppressions said "Lie. Lie, " so cried the Bolsheviki and theRevolutionary Socialists of the Left, in response to the question formallyput on the subject of the shooting by a member of the Constituent Assembly. 

The following day the Bolshevik organs and those of the RevolutionarySocialists of the Left passed over these facts in silence. This silencethey kept also on the 9th of January, the day on which literally allPetrograd assembled at the funeral of the victims. Public indignation, however, obliged them in the end to admit that there had been some smallgroups of participants and to name a Commission of Inquiry concerning thestreet disorders which had taken place on January 5th. This Commission wasvery dilatory in the performance of its duty and it is very doubtful ifthey ever came to any decision. 

Analogous manifestations took place at Moscow, at Saratov and other cities;everywhere they were accompanied by shootings. The number of victims wasparticularly considerable at Moscow. 

X

_At the Taurida Palace on the Day of the Opening of the ConstituentAssembly_

The Taurida Palace on that day presented a strange aspect. At every door, in the corridors, in the halls, everywhere soldiers and sailors and RedGuards armed with guns and hand-grenades, who at every turn demanded yourpass. It was no easy matter to get into the palace. Nearly all the placesreserved for the public were occupied by the Bolsheviki and their friends. The appearance of the Taurida Palace was not that of a place where thefree representatives of a free people were going to assemble. 

The Bolsheviki delayed as much as possible the opening of the session. Itwas only at four o'clock instead of at midday that they deigned to make uptheir minds. They and the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left occupiedseats of the extreme left; then came the Revolutionary Socialists, theMensheviki, and the other Socialist fractions. The seats on the rightremained vacant. The few Cadets that had been chosen preferred not to come. In this manner the Constituent Assembly was composed at this first and lastsession solely of Socialists. This, however, did not prevent the presencein the corridors and the session hail of a crowd of sailors and Red Guardsarmed, as if it were a question of an assembly of conspirators, enemies ofthe Revolution. 

From the beginning a fight was started by the election of president. Themajority nominated for the office of president Chernov; the Bolsheviki andthe Revolutionary Socialists of the Left voted against him. The Bolshevikidid not propose any candidate of their own, and placed before the membersthe candidacy of a Revolutionary Socialist of the Left, Marie Spiridonova, who was totally incapable of fulfilling this rôle. Afterward severaldeclarations were read--that of the Bolsheviki, that of theSocialist-Revolutionists (read by Chernov), that of the Mensheviki (read byTseretelli). The partizans of each fraction greeted the reading of theirown declaration with deafening applause (for the audience was one of"comrades" and did not hesitate to take part in the debates); cat-calls andshouts greeted the orators of the opposing fractions. Each word of thedeclarations of the Socialist-Revolutionists and of the Mensheviki(declarations which every Socialist could sign) was received with a roundof hisses, shouts, deafening cries, exclamations of contempt for theBolsheviki, the sailors, and the soldiers. The speech of Chernov--presidentand member of a detested party--had above all the honor of such agreeting. As for Tseretelli, he was at first greeted by an inconceivabledin, but was able afterward--his speech was so full of profound sense--tocapture the attention of the Bolsheviki themselves. 

A general impression that was extremely distressing came from this historicsession. The attitude of the Bolsheviki was grossly unbecoming andprovocative of disdain. It indicated clearly that the dissolution of theConstituante was, for them, already decided. Lenine, who continually keptcontemptuous silence, wound up by stretching himself upon his bench andpretending to sleep. Lunotcharsky from his ministerial bench pointedcontemptuously with his finger toward the white hair of a veteran of theRevolutionary Socialist party. The sailors leveled the muzzles of theirrevolvers at the Socialist-Revolutionists. The audience laughed, whistled, and shouted. 

The Bolsheviki finally left the Assembly, followed, as might be understood, by their servants, the Revolutionary Socialists of the Left. The fractionswhich remained voted the law proposed by the Socialist-Revolutionists onthe transfer of the lands to common ownership (socialization of the soil). The sailors and Red Guards attempted several times to interrupt thesession. At five o'clock in the morning they finally demanded with a loudvoice that everybody leave. 

"We were obliged to go, " said, later, the members of the ConstituentAssembly at a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasants'Delegates in recounting these tragic moments, "not that we were afraid ofbeing shot; we were prepared for that, and each one of us expected it, butfear of something else which is far worse: for fear of insults and grossviolence. We were only a handful; what was that beside those great bigfellows full of malice toward the Constituante and of defiance for the'enemies of the people, ' the 'servants of the bourgeoisie, ' which we werein their eyes, thanks to the lies and the calumnies of the Bolsheviki?Careful of our dignity, and out of respect for the place where we were, wecould not permit ourselves to be cuffed, nor that they throw us out of theTaurida Palace by force--and that is what would have inevitably happened. "

It was thus that the Constituent Assembly ended. TheSocialist-Revolutionist fraction maintained an attitude of surprising calmand respectful bearing, not allowing itself to be disturbed by anyprovocation. The correspondents of foreign newspapers congratulated themembers and said to them that in this session to which the Bolsheviki hadwished to give the character of "any-old-kind-of-a-meeting" all thefractions maintained a truly parliamentary attitude. 

The Bolshevik terror became rife. _All the newspapers that tried to openthe eyes of the people as to what was happening were confiscated_. Everyattempt to circulate the _Dielo Naroda_ or other newspapers of theopposition was severely punished. The volunteer venders of these paperswere arrested, cruelly struck down by rifle butts, and sometimes even shot. The population, indignant, gathered in groups on the streets, but the RedGuards dispersed all assemblages. 

XI

_The Dissolution of the Third All-Russian Peasants' Congress_

This is the course of the events which followed the dissolution of theConstituante. On the 8th of January the members of the Constituanteassembled at Bolotnaia; two were arrested; the premises of the fractionwere occupied by the Red Guards. On the 9th of January took place thefuneral of the victims, in which all Petrograd took part. The Bolshevikithis time did not dare to shoot into the magnificent procession preceded bya long line of coffins. The 10th of January they dispersed the ThirdAll-Russian Congress of Peasants which had placed itself on the side of theConstituent Assembly. The Congress had been at first arranged for the 8thof January (the same day as the Bolshevik Congress of the Soviets), but, because of the events, it was postponed to the 10th. The peasants who hadcome to this Congress knew perfectly well that they would have a fight touphold, perhaps even to give their lives. Their neighbors, theirco-villagers, wept when they saw them set out, as if it were a question ofmen condemned to death. That alone suffices to show to what degree wereconscious these peasants who had come from all corners of the country toprepare themselves for the defense of the Constituent Assembly. 

As soon as the Congress was opened sailors and Red Guards, armed with gunsand hand-grenades, broke into the premises (11 Kirillovskaia Street), surrounded the house, poured into the corridors and the session hall, andordered all persons to leave. 

"In whose name do you order us, who are Delegates to the Peasants' Congressof All-Russia, to disperse?" asked the peasants. 

"In the name of the Baltic fleet, " the soldiers replied. 

The peasants refused; cries of protest were raised. One by one the peasantdelegates ascended the tribune to stigmatize the Bolsheviki in speechesfull of indignation, and to express the hopes that they placed in theConstituent Assembly. 

The sailors listened. They had come to disperse a counter-revolutionaryCongress, and these speeches troubled them. One sailor, not able to standit any longer, burst into tears. 

"Let me speak!" he shouted to the president. "I hear your speeches, peasantcomrades, and I no longer understand anything.... What is going on? We arepeasants, and you, too, are peasants. But we are of this side, and you areof the other.... Why? Who has separated us? For we are brothers.... But itis as if a barrier had been placed between us. " He wept and, seizing hisrevolver, he exclaimed, "No, I would rather kill myself!"

This session of the Congress presented a strange spectacle, disturbed bymen who confessed that they did not know why they were there; the peasantssang revolutionary songs; the sailors, armed with guns and grenades, joinedthem. Then the peasants knelt down to sing a funeral hymn to the memory ofLogvinov, whose coffin was even yesterday within the room. The soldiers, lowering their guns, knelt down also. 

The Bolshevik authorities became excited; they did not expect such a turnto events. "Enough said, " declared the chief; "we have come not to speak, but to act. If they do not want to go to Smolny, let them get out of here. "And they set themselves to the task. 

In groups of five the peasants were conducted down-stairs, trampled on, and, on their refusal to go to Smolny, pushed out of doors during the nightin the midst of the enormous city of which they knew nothing. 

Members of the Executive Committee were arrested, the premises occupied bysailors and Red Guards, the objects found therein stolen. 

The peasants found shelter in the homes of the inhabitants of Petrograd, who, indignant, offered them hospitality; a certain number were lodged inthe barracks of the Preobrajenski Regiment. The sailors, who but a fewminutes before had sung a funeral hymn to Logvinov, and wept when they sawthat they understood nothing, now became the docile executors of the ordersof the Bolsheviki. And when they were asked, "Why do you do this?" theyanswered as in the time, still recent, of Czarism: "It is the order. Noneed to talk. "

It was thus there was manifested the habit of servile obedience, ofarbitrary power and violence, which had been taking root for severalcenturies; under a thin veneer of revolution one finds the servile andviolent man of yesterday. 

In the midst of these exceptional circumstances the peasants gave proof ofthat obstinacy and energy in the pursuit of their rights for which they arenoted. Thrown out in the middle of the night, robbed, insulted, theydecided, nevertheless, to continue their Congress. "How, otherwise, can wego home?" said they. "We must come to an understanding as to what is to bedone. "

The members of the Executive Committee who were still free succeeded infinding new premises (let it be noted that among others the workmen of thebig Oboukhovsky factory offered them hospitality), and during three daysthe peasants could assemble secretly by hiding themselves from the eyes ofthe Red Guard, and the spies in various quarters of Petrograd, until suchtime as the decisions were given on all great questions. _A procès-verbalwas prepared concerning all that had taken place on Kirillovskaia Street. Adeclaration was made protesting against the acts of the Bolshevikgovernment_. This declaration was to be read at the Taurida Palace when theSoviets were in congress by delegates designated for that purpose. TheBolsheviki, however, would not permit the delegates to enter the TauridaPalace. 

Here are the texts of the declaration and of the procès-verbal:

 At the Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Delegates grouped around the principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, this declaration was sent to the Congress of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates called together by the Bolshevist government at the Taurida Palace:

 At the Second National Peasants' Congress the 359 delegates who had come together for the defense of the Constituent Assembly continued the work of the Congress and elected a provisional Executive Committee, independently of the 354 delegates who had opposed the power of the Constituent Assembly and adhered to the Bolsheviki. 

 We, peasant delegates, having come to Petrograd, more than 300 in number, to participate in a Congress called by the Provisional Executive Committee, which is that of those of the Soviets which acknowledge the principle of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, declare to our electors, to the millions of the peasant population, and to the whole country, that the actual government which is called "The Government of the Peasants and Workmen" has established in their integrity the violence, the arbitrariness, and all the horrors of the autocratic régime which was overthrown by the great Revolution of February. All the liberties attained by that Revolution and won by innumerable sacrifices during several generations are scouted and trodden under foot. Liberty of opinion does not exist; men who under the government of the Czar had paid by years of prison and exile for their devotedness to the revolutionary cause are now again thrown into the dungeons of fortresses without any accusation whatever, of anything of which they might be guilty, being made to them. Again spies and informers are in action. Again capital punishment is re-established in its most horrible forms; shooting on the streets and assassinations without judgment or examination. _Peaceful processions, on their way to salute the Constituent Assembly, are greeted by a fusillade of shots upon the orders of the autocrats of Smolny. The liberty of the press does not exist; the papers which displease the Bolsheviki are suppressed, their printing plants and offices looted, their editors arrested. _

 The organizations which, during the preceding months, were established with great difficulty--zemstvos, municipalities, agricultural and food committees--are foolishly destroyed in an excess of savage fanaticism. 

 The Bolsheviki even try to kill the supreme representation, the only one legitimately established, of the popular will--the Constituent Assembly. 

 To justify this violence and this tyranny they try to allege the well-being of the people, but we, peasant workers, we see well that their policy will only tighten the cord around the workers' necks, while the possibility of a democratic peace becomes more remote every day; matters have come to the point where the Bolsheviki proclaim a further mobilization--of salaried volunteers, it is true--to renew the hostilities. They strive to represent the war with Ukraine and with the Cossacks under the aspect of a war of classes; it is not, however, the bourgeoisie, but the representatives of the working classes who are killed on one side and on the other. They promised the Socialist régime, and they have only destroyed the production of the factories so as to leave the population without product and throw the workers into an army of unemployed; the horrible specter of famine occupies the void left by the broken organizations of food-supply; millions of the money of the people are squandered in maintaining a Red Guard--or sent to Germany to keep up the agitation there, while the wives and the widows of our soldiers no longer receive an allowance, there being no money in the Treasury, and are obliged to live on charity. 

 The Russian country is threatened with ruin. Death knocks at the doors of the hovels of the workmen. 

 By what forces have the Bolsheviki thus killed our country? Twelve days before the organization of the autonomous administration was achieved and the elections to the Constituent Assembly begun, at the time when there had been organized all the autonomous administrations of volosts, districts, governments, and cities, chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage, thus assuring the realization of the will of the people and justifying the confidence of the population--even then they seized the power and established a régime which subjects all the institutions of the country to the unlicensed power of the Commissaries of the People. _And these Commissaries rely upon the Soviets, which were chosen at elections that were carried out according to rank, with open balloting and inequality of vote, for therein the peasants count only as many representatives as the workmen of the cities, although in Russia their number is sixty times greater_. 

 Absence of control permits every abuse of power; absence of secret voting permits that into these Soviets at these suspicious elections some enter who are attracted by the political rôle of these institutions; the defeat of inequality in the suffrage restrains the expression of the will of the peasants, and, accordingly, these cannot have confidence in this system of government. The tyranny that presided at these elections was such that the Bolsheviki themselves pay no attention to the results, and declare that the Soviets that are opposed to themselves are bourgeoisie and capitalists. We, representing the peasant workers, must declare in the name of our constituents: if anything can save Russia, it can only be the re-establishment of the organs of local autonomous administration, chosen by equal, direct, and secret universal suffrage and the resumption, without delay, of the work of the Constituent Assembly. 

 The Constituent Assembly alone can express the exact will of the working-people, for the system of election which governs it includes every measure of precaution against violence, corruption, and other abuses, and assures the election of deputies chosen by the majority; now, in the country, the majority is composed of the working class. 

 Millions of peasants delegated us to defend the Constituante, but this was dissolved as soon as it began to work for the good of the people. The work of the Constituante was interrupted at the time that it was discussing the law concerning land, when a new agricultural régime was being elaborated for the country. For this reason, and for this alone, the Constituante adopted only the first articles of this law, articles which established the definite transfer of all the land to the hands of the workers, without any ransom. The other articles of this law, which concerned the order of the apportionment of lots, its forms, its methods of possession, etc. , could not be adopted, although they were completely elaborated in the commission and nothing remained but to sanction them. 

 We, peasants assembled in Congress, we, too, have been the object of violence and outrages, unheard of even under the Czarist régime. Red Guards and sailors, armed, invaded our premises. We were searched in the rudest manner. Our goods and the provisions which we had brought from home were stolen. Several of our comrade-delegates and all the members of the Committee were arrested and taken to Peter and Paul Fortress. We ourselves were, late at night, put out of doors in a city which we did not know, deprived of shelter under which to sleep. All that, to oblige us either to go to Smolny, where the Bolshevist government called another Congress, or to return to our homes without having attained any result. But violence could not stop us; secretly, as in the time of Czarist autocracy, we found a place to assemble and to continue our work. 

 In making known these facts to the country and the numerous millions of the peasant population, we call upon them to stigmatize the revolting policy practised by the Bolshevik government with regard to all those who are not in accord with it. Returned to our villages, dispersed in every corner of immense Russia, we shall use all our powers to make known to the mass of peasants and to the entire country the truth concerning this government of violence; to make known in every corner of the fatherland that the actual government, which has the hardihood to call itself "Government of the Workmen and Peasants, " in reality shoots down workmen and peasants and shamelessly scoffs at the country. We shall use all our strength to induce the population of peasant workers to demand an account from this government of violence, as well as from their prodigal children, their sons and brothers, who in the army and navy give aid to these autocrats in the commission of violence. 

 In the name of millions of peasants, by whom we were delegated, we demand that they no longer obstruct the work of the Constituent Assembly. We were not allowed to finish the work for which we had come; at home we shall continue this work. We shall employ all our strength to effect, as soon as possible, the convocation of a new National Congress of Peasants' Delegates united on the principle of the defense of the Constituante, and that in a place where we need not fear a new dissolution. Lately we fought against autocracy and Czarist violence; we shall fight with no less energy against the new autocrats who practise violence, whoever they may be, and whatever may be the shibboleths by which they cover their criminal acts. We shall fight for the Constituent Assembly, because it is in that alone that we see the salvation of our country, that of the Revolution, and that of Land and Liberty. 

 Charged by our constituents to defend the Constituent Assembly, we cannot participate in a Congress called by those who have dissolved it; who have profaned the idea which to the people is something sacred; who have shot down the defenders of true democracy; who have shed the sacred blood of our Logvinov, member of the Executive Committee of peasant deputies, who on the 5th of January was killed by an explosive bullet during a peaceful manifestation, bearing the flag "Land and Liberty. " Comrade-peasants who have come by chance to this Congress declare to these violators that the only Executive Committee that upholds the idea of the defense of the Constituante forms a center around which are grouped all the peasant workers. We call the entire mass of peasants to the work that is common to all--the fight for "Land and Liberty, " for the true government of the people. "We all come from the people, children of the same family of workers, " and we all have to follow a route that leads to happiness and liberty. Now this road, which leads to "Land and Liberty, " goes through the Constituent Assembly alone. The Constituent Assembly was dissolved, but it was chosen by the entire people, and it ought to live. 

 _Long live the Constituent Assembly!_ _Down with violence and tyranny!_ _All power to the people, through the agency of the_ _Constituent Assembly!_

 [Signed] The Third National Congress of Soviets of Peasant Delegates, United on the Principle of the Defense of the Constituent Assembly. 

PROCÈS-VERBAL OF THE SESSION OF THE III NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OFPEASANTS' DELEGATES, UNITED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF THE DEFENSE OF THECONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

The Provisional Executive Committee of Soviets of Peasants' Delegatesnominated by the fraction of the Second National Congress of these Soviets, which, to the number of 359 delegates, was organized on the basis of theprinciple of the defense of the Constituent Assembly, had addressed to allthe Soviets an appeal inviting those who believe in the defense of theConstituante to send representatives to the Third Congress, fixed by theCommittee for the 8th of January, and destined to offset the Congresscalled for the 12th of January by the Committee of that fraction of theCongress which, to the number of 314 votes, took sides against the power ofthe Constituent Assembly and joined the Bolsheviki. 

The Peasants' Congress, meeting by districts and by governments, as well asthe local executive committees of Soviets which have chosen us, knew wellto which Congress they delegated us and had given us precise mandates, expressing their confidence in the Constituent Assembly and their blame ofthe Soviets and the Bolshevik organs that impede the work of theConstituante and call the peasants to the Congress of January 12th. Thesecongresses and these committees have charged us to use all our efforts todefend the Constituent Assembly, binding themselves, on their part, in caseour efforts were insufficient, to rise in a body for its defense. 

By reason of the disorganization of postal and telegraphic communications, and because in different localities the calls of the Committee were held upby the Bolshevist organizations, the instructions concerning the Congressfixed for the 8th of January were not received in many provinces untilafter considerable delay. 

Some minutes before the opening of the Conference, which was to take placeon the premises of the Committee (11 Kirillovskaia Street), where thedelegates on hand had lodged, there arrived a detachment of sailors and RedGuards armed with guns and bombs, who surrounded the house, guarding allthe entrances, and occupied all the apartments. The Executive Committee, performing its duty toward the peasant workers, which duty was to holdtheir flag with a firm hand, not fearing any violence, and not allowingthemselves to be intimidated by the bayonets and the bombs of the enemiesof the peasant workers, opened the session at the hour indicated. 

The Bolshevist pretorians, however, violating the freedom of assembly, broke into the hall and surrounded the office and members of the Conferencewith bayonets drawn. Their leader, Kornilov, staff-commandant of the RedGuards of the Rojdestvensky quarter, made a speech to the delegates, inwhich he said that they were to go to the Smolny Institute, to theBolshevist Congress, assuring them that they had come to this Congress bymistake; at the end he read a document ordering him to make a search of thepremises, to confiscate all papers, and to arrest all who would offerresistance. In reply to this speech the delegates and the members of theExecutive Committee spoke in turn; they stigmatized vehemently the criminalpolicy of the Bolshevist government, which dissolved the ConstituentAssembly, the true representation of the popular will, without having givenit the time to register a vote on the agricultural law; which shot downworkers participating in peaceful negotiations; which deprived the peopleof the right of assembly to discuss their needs; which destroyed freedom ofspeech and assembly and trampled in the dust the whole Russian Revolution. The delegates, one after another, tried to explain to the Red Guards thatit was not the delegates that were deceived in coming to this conference, but those who were going to Smolny to the Bolshevist Congress, those who, by order of the Bolsheviki, kill the peasants' representatives and dissolvetheir Congress. 

In the midst of these speeches Kornilov declared the Congress dissolved; tothis Comrade Ovtchinnikov, president of the Conference, replied that theCongress would not be dissolved except by force, and, besides, that thedocument read by Kornilov did not authorize him to pronounce itsdissolution. Members of the Congress having entered into arguments with thesailors and the Red Guards, concerning the violence inflicted on thepeasant delegates, the sound of the rattling of guns was heard and theleader of the pretorians declared that if the Congress would not submit tohis orders he would stop at nothing. All the members of the Congress wereforthwith searched and thrown out of doors in groups of five, with the ideathat, having come from the provinces, and not knowing Petrograd, they wouldfind themselves dispersed in such a way as not to be able to assemble againanywhere, and would be obliged either to betake themselves to the railwayand return home or to direct their steps toward Smolny, the address ofwhich was given to each one at the exit. At the same time, without reason, the following were arrested: Minor, a deputy to the Constituent Assembly;Rakitnikov, Ovtchinnikov, Roussine, Sorokine, and Tchernobaiev, members ofthe Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates; and Chmelev, asoldier. The premises of the Committee, on which were various documents andpapers which were to be sent into the country, were occupied by Red Guards, and machine-guns were placed at the entrance. The search ended about nineo'clock in the evening. Some late delegates alone were authorized to spendthe night on the premises under the supervision of Red Guards. 

An inquiry held among the comrades, who had come for this Third NationalPeasants' Congress, established that, at the time when the premises of theExecutive Committee were seized, January 10, 1918, there were, among thesailors and Red Guards of the detachment that did the work, _German andAustrian prisoners dressed in Russian uniforms_; it also established thefact that many objects had disappeared in the course of the search. TheCongress decided: first, to consider as a law the socialization of the soilvoted by the Constituent Assembly and to apply the same in the country;second, to consider that the Constituent Assembly, dispersed by brutalforce, was nevertheless elected by the whole people and ought to exist andto assemble again as soon as that would be possible; third, to fighteverywhere in the provinces in the defense of the organs of autonomousadministration, which the Bolsheviki dispersed by armed force. During thesefew days when the peasants were obliged to assemble in secret and tostation patrols to protect their meetings, they followed those methods ofconspiracy that the Russian Socialists had been obliged to employ when theyfought against the tyranny of autocracy. Returning to their villages, thepeasants bore with them the greatest hate for the Bolsheviki, whom theyconsidered the personification of tyranny and violence. And they took withthem also a firm resolution to fight against this violence. 

The Executive Committee, whose powers were confirmed by the Third Congress, found itself thus, for the second time, deprived of all its goods, itspremises, and its pecuniary resources; it found itself obliged to lead ahalf-clandestine existence, to organize secret assemblies, etc. MissSpiridonova, who, in this fight against the peasants that rose to thedefense of the Constituent Assembly, gave proof of intolerance and peculiarfanaticism, found herself at the head of the "peasants in uniform, " sittingat Smolny, _adopting a decree whereby all the moneys that came by post tothe Executive Committee of the Soviet of Peasant Delegates defending theConstituent Assembly were to be confiscated. _

The action of the Executive Committee was thus rendered very difficult. Butit continued to fight, to publish an organ, to commission delegates, toentertain continued relations with the provinces and the country. 

XII

_Conclusion_

_Morally, Bolshevism was killed in the eyes of the workers in the course ofthese days_ when a peaceful demonstration was fired upon, the ConstituentAssembly dissolved, the Peasant Congress (and, very soon, the Congress ofthe Agricultural Committees) dispersed. The Central Committee of theRevolutionary Socialist party issued an order for new elections to theSoviets, thinking thus to eliminate automatically the Bolsheviki. And, intruth, when at Petrograd and in the provinces, these elections began, theRevolutionary Socialists and the Mensheviki received the majority and theBolsheviki were snowed under. But these new elections were thwarted by manycircumstances: first, because of the lessening of production the workmenwere discharged in a body and quit the factories; second, the Bolshevikiput obstacles in the way of the elections and sometimes openly prohibitedthem. Nevertheless, wherever they could be held, the results wereunfavorable to the Bolsheviki. 

Finally, when the working classes clearly saw the shameful rôle played bythe Bolsheviki in the matter of peace, when they saw the Bolsheviki humblybeg for peace at any price from the Germans, they understood that it wasimpossible to continue to tolerate such a government. _The CentralCommittee of the Revolutionary Socialist party published a Manifestoappealing to an armed fight against the Bolshevik government and the Germangangs_ that were overrunning the country. 

The frightful results of this "peace, " so extolled by the Bolsheviki, rendered even the name of the Bolshevist government odious in the eyes ofevery conscientious and honest man. 

 * * * * *

But Bolshevism still endures, for it is based on the armed force of the RedGuard, on the supineness of the masses deprived of a political education, and not accustomed to fight or to act, and from ancient habit of submittingto force. 

The causes which produced Bolshevism are: first, the accumulation of allthe conditions of the historic past of the Russian people; second, theirpsychic character and their habits; third, the conditions of the presenttime; and fourth, the general situation of the world--that is to say, thewar. 

We also note the vague and hesitating policy of the Provisional Government;the lack of political education among the people, ready to follow him whopromises the most; small development of civic sentiment; the want of anyattachment whatever to the state--that of the Romanov having never givenanything to the people and having taken all from them. Czarism took fromthe miserable peasant his last penny under form of taxes; it took hischildren from him for war; for the least act of disobedience to authorityhe was whipped. He wallowed in misery and in ignorance, deprived of everyright, human or legal. How could he, this wretched and oppressed peasantdevelop civic sentiments, a consciousness of his personal dignity? On theother hand, we must take into account the immense weariness caused by thewar and by the disorganization which it brought into the whole cycle ofexistence (to an incomparably greater degree than in western Europe). Suchwere the causes which had established a favorable scope for Bolshevikpropaganda; to introduce their domination they knew how to make use of theshortcomings of the people and the defects of Russian life. 

In fine, what is Bolshevism in its essence? _It is an experiment, that iseither criminal or that proceeds from a terrible thoughtlessness, tried, without their consent, on the living body of the Russian people_. Thus someattempt to apply their theories, others wish to measure the height of theirpersonal influence, while still others (and they are found in everymovement) seek to profit by the circumstances. 

Bolshevism is a phenomenon brought about by force; it is not a naturalconsequence of the progress of the Russian Revolution. Taken all in all, Bolshevism is not Socialism. The Bolshevist _coup d'état_ was accomplishedcontrary to the wish of the majority of the people, who were preparing forthe Constituent Assembly. 

_It was accomplished with the help of armed force, and it is because ofthis that the Bolshevist régime holds out. _

_It has against it the whole conscious portion of the peasant and workingpopulation and all the Intellectuals. _

_It has crushed and trampled under foot the liberty that was won by theRussian people. _

The Bolsheviki pretend to act in the name of the people. Why, then, havethey dissolved the Constituent Assembly elected by the people?

They pretend to have the majority of the people with them. Why, then, thisgovernmental terror that is being used in a manner more cruel even than inthe time of Czarism?

They say that, to fight against the bourgeoisie, the use of violence isnecessary. But their principal thrusts are directed not against thebourgeoisie, but against the Socialist parties that do not agree with them. And they dare give this caricature the name of Dictatorship of theProletariat!

Socialism must necessarily be founded on democratic principles. If not, "itcuts off the branch of the tree on which it rests, " according to theexpression of Kautsky. 

Socialism needs constructive elements. It does not limit itself to thedestruction of ancient forms of existence; it creates new ones. ButBolshevism has only destructive elements. It does nothing but destroy, always destroy, with a blind hatred, a savage fanaticism. 

What has it established? Its "decrees" are only verbal solutions withoutsense, skeletons of ideas, or simply a revolutionary phraseology containingnothing real (as for example the famous shibboleth, "neither peace norwar"). 

During the few months of its reign Bolshevism has succeeded in destroyingmany things; nearly everything that the effort of the Russian people hadestablished. Life, disorganized almost to its foundations, has becomealmost impossible in Russia. The railroads do not function, or functiononly with great difficulty; the postal and telegraphic communications areinterrupted in several places. The zemstvos--bases of the life of thecountry--are suppressed (they are "bourgeois" institutions); the schoolsand hospitals, whose existence is impossible without the zemstvos, areclosed. The most complete chaos exists in the food-supply. TheIntellectuals, who, in Russia, had suffered so much from the Czaristtyranny and oppression, are declared "enemies of the people" and compelledto lead a clandestine existence; they are dying of hunger. It is theIntellectuals and not the bourgeois (who are hiding) that suffer most fromthe Bolshevist régime. 

The Soviets alone remain. But the Soviets are not only revolutionaryorgans, they are "guardians of the Revolution, " but in no way legislativeand administrative organs. 

Bolshevism is an experiment tried on the Russian people. The people aregoing to pay dearly for it. At least let not this experiment be lost, onthem, as well as on other peoples! Let the Socialists of western Europe benot unduly elated by words or by far-fetched judgments. Let them look thecruel reality in the face and examine facts to find out the truth. 

A tyranny which is supported by bayonets is always repugnant, wherever itcomes from, and under whatever name it may strut. It can have nothing incommon with Socialism, which is not only a doctrine of economic necessity, but also a doctrine of superior justice and truth. 

"All the societies or individuals adhering to the Internationale will knowwhat must be the basis of their conduct toward all men: Truth, Justice, Morality, without Distinction of Color, Creed, or Nationality, " said thestatutes that were drawn up by the prime founders of our Internationale. 

_The Executive Committee of the National Soviet of Peasant DelegatesPlacing themselves on the Grounds of the Defense of the ConstituentAssembly, having had to examine, in its session of February 8, 1918, theviolence committed by the Bolsheviki, and to pass in review thepersecutions that this organization had to suffer from that party and fromthe government of the Commissaries of the People, decided to bring theviolence committed by the Bolsheviki in the name of Socialism to theknowledge of the Socialists of western Europe and of the InternationalSocialist Bureau through the citizen, E. Roubanovitch, representative ofthe Revolutionary Socialist party at the International Socialist Bureau andintrusted with International relations by the Executive Committee of theFirst Soviet of Peasants. 

The Executive Committee demands the expulsion, from the Socialist family, of the Bolshevist leaders, as well as of those of the RevolutionarySocialists of the Left, who seized the power by force, held it by violenceand compromised Socialism in the eyes of the popular masses. 

Let our brothers of western Europe be judges between the Socialist peasantswho rose in the defense of the Constituent Assembly and the Bolsheviki, whodispersed them by armed force, thus trampling under foot the will of theRussian people. _

INNA RAKITNIKOV, _Vice-President of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of PeasantDelegates, who stand in Defense of the Constituent Assembly. _

_May 30, 1918. _

APPENDIX III

FORMER SOCIALIST PREMIER OF FINLAND ON BOLSHEVISM

The following letter was addressed to Mr. Santeri Nuorteva, who, it will beremembered, was appointed Minister to America by the RevolutionaryGovernment of Finland. The author of the letter, Oskar Tokoi, was the firstSocialist Prime Minister in the world. He is a Socialist of long standing, who has always been identified with the radical section of the movement. Mr. Nuorteva, it should be added, is himself a strong supporter of theBolsheviki, and is their accredited American representative. 

 ARCHANGEL, _September 10, 1918. _

 SANTERI NUORTEVA, _Fitchburg, Mass. _:

 DEAR COMRADE, --I deem it my duty to appeal to you and to other comrades in America in order to be able to make clear to you the trend of events here. 

 The situation here has become particularly critical. We, the Finnish refugees, who, after the unfortunate revolution, had to flee from Finland to Russia, find ourselves to-day in a very tragic situation. A part of the former Red Guardists who fled here have joined the Red Army formed by the Russian Soviet Government; another part has formed itself as a special Finnish legion, allied with the army of the Allied countries; and a third part, which has gone as far as to Siberia, is prowling about there, diffused over many sections of the country, and there have been reports that a part of those Finns have joined the ranks of the Czecho-Slovaks. The Finnish masses, thus divided, may therefore at any time get into fighting each other, which indeed would be the greatest of all misfortunes. It is therefore necessary to take a clear position, and to induce all the Finns to support it, and we hope that you as well, over in America, will support it as much as is in your power. 

 During these my wanderings I have happened to traverse Russia from one end to another, and I have become deeply convinced that Russia is not able to rise from this state of chaos and confusion by her own strength and of her own accord. The magnificent economic revolution, which the Bolsheviki in Russia are trying now to bring about, is doomed in Russia to complete failure. The economic conditions in Russia have not even approximately reached a stage to make an economic revolution possible, and the low grade of education, as well as the unsteady character of the Russian people, makes it still more impossible. 

 It is true that magnificent theories and plans have been laid here, but their putting into practice is altogether impossible, principally because of the following reasons: The whole propertied class--which here in Russia, where small property ownership mainly prevails, is very numerous--is opposing and obstructing; technically trained people and specialists necessary in the industries are obstructing; local committees and sub-organs make all systematic action impossible, as they in their respective fields determine things quite autocratically and make everything unsuccessful which should be based on a strong, coherent, and in every respect minutely conceived system as a social production should be based. But even if all these, in themselves unsurmountable obstacles, could be made away with, there remains still the worst one--and that is the workers themselves. 

 It is already clear that in the face of such economic conditions the whole social order has been upset. Naturally only a small part of the people will remain backing such an order. The whole propertied class belongs to the opponents of the government, including the petty bourgeoisie, the craftsmen, the small merchants, the profiteers. The whole Intellectual class and a great part of the workers are also opposing the government. In comparison with the entire population only a small minority supports the government, and, what is worse to the supporters of the government, are rallying all the hooligans, robbers, and others to whom this period of confusion promises a good chance of individual action. It is also clear that such a régime cannot stay but with the help of a stern terror. But, on the other hand, the longer the terror continues the more disagreeable and hated it becomes. Even a great part of those who from the beginning could stay with the government and who still are sincere Social Democrats, having seen all this chaos, begin to step aside, or to ally themselves with those openly opposing the government. Naturally, as time goes by, there remains only the worst and the most demoralized element. Terror, arbitrary rule, and open brigandage become more and more usual, and the government is not able at all to prevent it. And the outcome is clearly to be foreseen--the unavoidable failure of all this magnificently planned system. 

 And what will be the outcome of that? My conviction is that as soon as possible we should turn toward the other road--the road of united action. I have seen, and I am convinced that the majority of the Russian people is fundamentally democratic and whole-heartedly detests a reinstitution of autocracy, and that therefore all such elements must, without delay, be made to unite. But it is also clear that at first they, even united, will not be able to bring about order in this country on their own accord. I do not believe that at this time there is in Russia any social force which would be able to organize the conditions in the country. For that reason, to my mind, we should, to begin with, frankly and honestly rely on the help of the Allied Powers. Help from Germany cannot be considered, as Germany, because of her own interests, is compelled to support the Bolshevik rule as long as possible, as Germany from the Bolshevik rule is pressing more and more political and economic advantages, to such an extent even that all of Russia is becoming practically a colony of Germany. Russia thus would serve to compensate Germany for the colonies lost in South Africa. 

 A question presents itself at once whether the Allied Powers are better. And it must be answered instantly that neither would they establish in Russia any Socialist society. Yet the democratic traditions of these countries are some surety that the social order established by them will be a democratic one. It is clear as day that the policy of the Allied Powers is also imperialistic, but the geographical and economic position of these countries is such that even their own interests demand that Russia should be able to develop somewhat freely. The problem has finally evolved into such a state of affairs where Russia must rely on the help either of the Allies or Germany; we must choose, as the saying goes, "between two evils, " and, things being as badly mixed as they are, the lesser evil must be chosen frankly and openly. It does not seem possible to get anywhere by dodging the issue. Russia perhaps would have saved herself some time ago from this unfortunate situation if she had understood immediately after the February Revolution the necessity of a union between the more democratic elements. Bolshevism undoubtedly has brought Russia a big step toward her misfortune, from which she cannot extricate herself on her own accord. 

 Thus there exists no more any purely Socialist army, and all the fighting forces and all those who have taken to arms are fighting for the interests of the one or the other group of the Great Powers. The question therefore finally is only this--in the interests of which group one wants to fight. The revolutionary struggles in Russia and in Finland, to my mind, have clearly established that a Socialist society cannot be brought about by the force of arms and cannot be supported by the force of arms, but that a Socialist order must be founded on a conscious and living will by an overwhelming majority of the nations, which is able to realize its will without the help of arms. 

 But now that the nations of the world have actually been thrown into an armed conflict, and the war, which in itself is the greatest crime of the world, still is raging, we must stand it. We must, however, destroy the originator and the cause of the war, the militarism, by its own arms, and on its ruins we must build, in harmony and in peace--not by force, as the Russian Bolsheviki want--a new and a better social order under the guardianship of which the people may develop peacefully and securely. 

 I have been explaining to you my ideas, expecting that you will publish them. You over in America are not able to imagine how horrible the life in Russia at the present time is. The period after the French Revolution surely must have been as a life in a paradise compared with this. Hunger, brigandage, arrests, and murders are such every-day events that nobody pays any attention to them. Freedom of assemblage, association, free speech, and free press is a far-away ideal which is altogether destroyed at the present time. Arbitrary rule and terror are raging everywhere, and, what is worst of all, not only the terror proclaimed by the government, but individual terror as well. 

 My greetings to all friends and comrades. 

 OSKAR TOKOI. 

THE END

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Plechanov never formally joined the Menshevik faction, I believe, buthis writings showed that he favored that faction and the Menshevikiacknowledged his intellectual leadership. 

[2] They had gained one member since the election. 

[3] Quoted by Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 22. Litvinov, it must be remembered, was the Bolshevik Minister to GreatBritain. His authority to speak for the Bolsheviki is not to be questioned. 

[4] The date is Russian style--March 12th, our style. 

[5] _The State in Russia--Old and New_, by Leon Trotzky; _The ClassStruggle_, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 213-221. 

[6] This document is printed in full at the end of the volume as Appendix. I

[7] The author of the present study is responsible for the use of italicsin this document. 

[8] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 30. 

[9] Lenine is not quite accurate in his statement of Marx's views nor quitefair in stating the position of the "opportunists. " The argument of Marx in_The Civil War in France_ is not that the proletariat must "break down" thegovernmental machinery, but that it must _modify_ it and _adapt_ it to theclass needs. This is something quite different, of course. Moreover, it isthe basis of the policy of the "opportunists. " The Mensheviki and othermoderate Socialists in Russia were trying to _modify_ and _adapt_ thepolitical state. 

[10] The reference is to Karl Kautsky, the great German exponent of Marxiantheory. 

[11] _The New International_ (American Bolshevik organ), June 30, 1917. 

[12] _The New International_, July 23, 1917. 

[13] Litvinov, _op. Cit. _, p. 31. 

[14] _The New International_, April, 1918. 

[15] See, _e. G. _, the article by Lenine, _New International_, April, 1918, and Litvinov, _op. Cit. _

[16] See my _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_ for theI. W. W. Philosophy. 

[17] Bryant, _Six Months in Red Russia_, p. 141. 

[18] This appeal is published as Appendix I at the end of this volume. 

[19] Certain Soviets of Soldiers at the Front had decided that they wouldstay in their trenches for defensive purposes, but would obey no commandsto go forward, no matter what the military situation. 

[20] Figures supplied by the Russian Information Bureau. 

[21] "It was with a deep and awful sense of the terrible failure before usthat I consented to become Premier at that time, " Kerensky told the presentwriter. 

[22] The story was reproduced in _New Europe_ (London), September, 1917. 

[23] _The New International_, April, 1918. 

[24] See p. 254. 

[25] See the letter of E. Roubanovitch, Appendix II, p. 331. 

[26] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918. 

[27] _Justice_, London, May 16, 1918. 

[28] _Vide_ Special Memorandum to the International Socialist Bureau onbehalf of the Revolutionary Socialist party of Russia. 

[29] See Appendix III. 

[30] _Pravda_, July 5, 1918. 

[31] February, 1918, Protest Against Recognition of BolshevikRepresentative by British Labor Party Conference. 

[32] Proclamation to People of the Northern Province, etc. , December, 1918

[33] _The New International_, April, 1918. 

[34] The dates given are according to the Russian calendar. 

[35] See the Rakitnikov Memorandum--Appendix. 

[36] _The New International_, April, 1918. 

[37] The number of votes was over 36, 000, 000. 

[38] _Vide_ Rakitnikov report. 

[39] Twenty-three members of the Executive Committee were arrested and, without any trial, thrown into the Fortress of Peter and Paul. 

[40] From a Declaration of Protest by the Executive Committee of the ThirdNational Congress of Peasants' Delegates (anti-Bolshevist), sent to theBolshevik Congress of Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers, and Peasants, but notpermitted to be read to that assembly. 

[41] _L'Ouorier Russe_, May, 1918. 

[42] _Idem_. 

[43] _Izvestya_, July 28, 1918. 

[44] _Pravda_, October 8, 1918 (No. 216). 

[45] "Agents-Provocateurs and the Russian Revolution, " article in_Justice, _, August 16, 1916, by J. Tchernoff. 

[46] Most of the information in this paragraph is based upon an article inthe Swiss newspaper _Lausanne Gazette_ by the well-known Russianjournalist, Serge Persky, carefully checked up by Russian Socialist exilesin Paris. 

[47] Joseph Martinek, in the _Cleveland Press_. 

[48] _Justice_ (London), January 23, 1919. 

[49] _Justice_, London, January 31, 1918. 

[50] Jean Jaurès, _Studies in Socialism_. 

[51] F. Engels, 1895, Preface to Marx's _Civil War in France_. 

[52] The reader is referred to my _Sidelights on Contemporary Socialism_and my _Karl Marx: His Life and Works_ for a fuller account of thesestruggles. 

[53] Marx, _A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy_, p. 12. 

[54] Editorial entitled "Bolshevik Problems, " in _The Liberator_, April, 1918. 

[55] The article by Lenine quoted by Mr. Eastman appeared in _The NewInternational_, February, 1918. 

[56] _The Bolsheviks and the Soviets_, by Albert Rhys Williams, p. 6. 

[57] _Ansprache der Centralbehorde an den Bund, vom Marz, 1850_: Anhang IXder Enthullerngen über den Kommunisten-process Zu Koln, p. 79. 

[58] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_. 

[59] Wilhelm Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 30. 

[60] _Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_, byJohn Spargo, p. 215 (1st edition Macmillan, 1916). 

[61] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 16. 

[62] Liebknecht, _No Compromise, No Political Trading_, p. 28. 

[63] This subject is treated in the following, among others, of my books:

_Socialism: a Summary and Interpretation of Socialist Principles_; _AppliedSocialism_; _Syndicalism, Industrial Unionism, and Socialism_; _Elements ofSocialism_ (Spargo and Arner), and _Social Democracy Explained_. 

[64] _The New International_, July 23, 1917. 

[65] Conversation with Trotzky reported by E. A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_, p. 208. 

[66] Kautsky, _The Social Revolution_, p. 137. 

[67] Lenine, _The Soviets at Work_. 

[68] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[69] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[70] The best expositions of Guild Socialism are _Self-Government inIndustry_, by G. D. H. Cole, and _National Guilds_, by S. G. Hobson, edited byA. R. Orage. 

[71] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[72] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[73] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[74] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[75] Lenine, _op. Cit. _

[76] Of course, Trotzky's statement to Professor Ross about paying thecapitalists "5 or 6 per cent. A year" was frankly a compromise. 

[77] E. A. Ross, _Russia in Upheaval_, pp. 206-207. 

[78] Litvinov, _The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning_, p. 39. 

[79] Marx and Engels speak of the "idiocy of rural life" from whichcapitalism, through the concentration of agriculture and the abolition ofsmall holdings, would rescue the peasant proprietors (_CommunistManifesto_). In _Capital_ Marx speaks of the manner in which modernindustry "annihilates the peasant, _the bulwark of the old society_" (Vol. I, p. 513). Liebknecht says that in 1848 it was the _city_ which overthrewthe corrupt citizen king and the _country_ which overthrew the newrepublic, chose Louis Bonaparte and prepared the way for the Empire. "TheFrench peasantry created an empire through their blind fear of proletarianSocialism" (_Die Grund und Bodenfrage_). Kautsky wrote, "Peasants who feelthat they are not proletarians, but true peasants, are not only not to bewon over to our cause, _but belong to our most dangerous adversaries_"(_Dat Erfurter Programm und die Land-agitation_). It would be easy tocompile a volume of such utterances. 

[80] Walling, _Russia's Message_, p. 118. The italics are mine. 

[81] "Cabinet lands" are the crown lands, property of the Czar and royalfamily. 

[82] Ross, _op. Cit. _, pp. 206-207. 

[83] _Justice_, London, August 1, 1917. 

[84] The figures given are quoted by Sack, in _The Birth of RussianDemocracy_, and were originally published by the Bolshevist Commissaire ofCommerce. 

[85] _Parvus et le Parti Socialiste Danois_, by P. G. La Chesnais. 

[86] La Chesnais, _op. Cit. _

[87] In "_L'Humanité_, " article condensed in _Justice_, January 31, 1918. 

[88] International Notes, _Justice_, January 3, 1918. 

[89] _The Disarmament Cry_, by N. Lenine, in _The Class Struggle_, May-June, 1918. 

[90] _The "Disarmament" Cry_, by N. Lenine, _The Class Struggle_, May-June, 1918. 

[91] Most, if not all, dates in this document are given as in the Russiancalendar, which is thirteen days behind ours. 

[92] This refers, doubtless, to the different basis for voting applied tothe peasants and the industrial workers, as provided in the SovietConstitution.