BERGSON AND HIS PHILOSOPHY

BY

J. ALEXANDER GUNN, M. A. , FELLOW OF THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BYALEXANDER MAIR, M. A. , PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL

CONTENTS

 PREFACE

 INTRODUCTION

 I. LIFE OF BERGSON

 II. THE REALITY OF CHANGE

 III. PERCEPTION

 IV. MEMORY

 V. THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY

 VI. TIME-TRUE AND FALSE

 VII. FREEDOM OF THE WILL

VIII. EVOLUTION

 IX. THE GOSPEL OF INTUITION

 X. ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

 XI. RELATION TO RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

 XII. REFLECTIONS

 APPENDIX: BIBLIOGRAPHY

 INDEX

PREFACE

The aim of this little work is practical, and it is put forth in thehope that it may be useful to the general reader and to the student ofphilosophy as an introduction and guide to the study of Bergson'sthought. The war has led many to an interest in philosophy and to astudy of its problems. Few modern thinkers will be found morefascinating, more suggestive and stimulating than Bergson, and it ishoped that perusal of the following pages will lead to a study of thewritings of the philosopher himself. This is a work whose primary aim isthe clear exposition of Bergson's ideas, and the arrangement of chaptershas been worked out strictly with that end in view. An account of hislife is prefixed. An up-to-date bibliography is given, mainly to meetthe needs of English readers; all the works of Bergson which haveappeared in England or America are given, and the comprehensive list ofarticles is confined to English and American publications. Theconcluding chapters endeavour to estimate the value of Bergson's thoughtin relation to Politics (especially Syndicalism), Ethics, Religion, andthe development of thought generally. 

My thanks are due to Professor Mair, Professor of Philosophy in theUniversity of Liverpool, for having read the MS. While in course ofpreparation, for contributing an introduction, for giving some helpfulcriticism and suggestions, and, what is more, for stimulus andencouragement given over several years of student life. 

Professor Bergson has himself expressed his approval of the general formof treatment, and I am indebted to him for information on a number ofpoints. To Dr. Gillespie, Professor of Philosophy at Leeds, I amindebted for a discussion of most of the MS. Following the reading ofit. My thanks are also due to Miss Margaret Linn, whose energetic andcareful assistance in preparing the MS. For the press was invaluable. Iwish also to acknowledge kindness shown in supplying information oncertain points in connexion with the bibliography by Mr. F. C. Nicholson, Librarian of the University of Edinburgh, by Mr. R. Rye, Librarian to the University of London, and by the University of LondonPress. I am grateful to Professor Bergson and to the Delegates of theOxford University Press for permission to quote from La Perception duChangement, the lectures given at Oxford. Further I must acknowledgepermission accorded to me by the English publishers of Bergson's worksto quote passages directly from these authorized translations--ToMessrs. Geo. Allen & Unwin, Ltd. (Time and Free Will and Matter andMemory), to Messrs. Macmillan & Co. , Ltd. (Creative Evolution, Laughter, Introduction to Metaphysics), and to T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. (Dreams). Through the kindness of M. Louis Michaud, the Paris publisher, I havebeen enabled to reproduce (from his volume of selections, Henri Bergson:Choix de textes et etude de systeme philosophique, Gillouin) aphotograph of Bergson hitherto unpublished in this country. 

J. A. G. 

THE UNIVERSITY, LIVERPOOLMarch, 1920

INTRODUCTION

The stir caused in the civilized world by the writings of Bergson, particularly during the past decade, is evidenced by the volume of thestream of exposition and comment which has flowed and is still flowing. If the French were to be tempted to set up, after the German manner, aBergson-Archiv they would be in no embarrassment for material, as theAppendix to this book--limited though it wisely is--will show. Mr. Gunn, undaunted by all this, makes a further, useful contribution in hisunassuming but workmanlike and well-documented account of the ideas ofthe distinguished French thinker. It is designed to serve as anintroduction to Bergson's philosophy for those who are making theirfirst approach to it, and as such it can be commended. 

The eager interest which has been manifested in the writings of M. Bergson is one more indication, added to the many which historyprovides, of the inextinguishable vitality of Philosophy. When the manwith some important thought which bears upon its problems isforthcoming, the world is ready, indeed is anxious, to listen. Perhapsthere is no period in recorded time in which the thinker, with somethingrelevant to say on the fundamental questions, has had so large and soprepared an audience as in our own day. The zest and expectancy withwhich men welcome and listen to him is almost touching; it has itsdangerous as well as its admirable aspects. The fine enthusiasm for thephysical and biological sciences, which is so noble an attribute of themodern mind, has far from exhausted itself, but the almost boundlesshope which for a time accompanied it has notably abated. The study ofthe immediate problems centring round the concepts of matter, life, andenergy goes on with undiminished, nay, with intensified, zeal, but in amore judicious perspective. It begins to be noticed that, far fromleading us to solutions which will bring us to the core of reality andfurnish us with a synthesis which can be taken as the key to experience, it is carrying the scientific enquirer into places in which he feels thepressing need of Philosophy rather than the old confidence that he is onthe verge of abolishing it as a superfluity. The former hearty and self-assured empiricism of science is giving way before the outcome of itsown logic and a new and more promising spirit of reflection on its own"categories" is abroad. Things are turning out to be very far from whatthey seemed. The physicists have come to a point where, it may be totheir astonishment, they often find themselves talking in a way which issuspiciously like that of the subjective idealist. They have made theuseful discovery that if you sink your shaft deep enough in your searchfor reality you come upon Mind. Here they are in a somewhat unfamiliarregion, in which they may possibly find that other instruments and othermethods than those to which they have been accustomed are required. Atany rate, they and the large public which hangs upon their words show agrowing inclination to be respectful to the philosopher and an anxiety(sometimes an uncritical anxiety) to hear what he has to say. 

No one needs to be reminded of the ferment which is moving in the worldof social affairs, of the obscure but powerful tendencies which areforcing society out of its grooves and leaving it, aspiring but dubious, in new and uncharted regions. This may affect different minds indifferent ways. Some regret it, others rejoice in it; but all are awareof it. Time-honoured political and economic formulae are become "oldclothes" for an awakened and ardent generation, and before the newgarments are quite ready; the blessed word "reconstruction" is oftenmentioned. Men are not satisfied that society has really developed sosuccessfully as it might have done; many believe that it finds itself ina cul-de-sac. But what is to be done? The experienced can see that manyof the offered reforms are but the repetition of old mistakes which willinvolve us in the unhappy cycle of disillusion and failure. It is not tobe wondered at, therefore, if men everywhere are seeking for a sign, aglimpse of a scheme of life, a view of reality, a hint of human destinyand the true outcome of human effort, to be an inspiration and a guideto them in their pathetic struggle out of the morass in which they, tooobviously, are plunged. If Philosophy has anything to say which is tothe point, then let Philosophy by all means say it. They are ready toattend. They may indeed expect too much from it, as those who best graspthe measure of Philosophy's task would be the first to urge. 

This is the opportunity of the charlatan. Puzzled and half-desperate, westrongly feel the influence of the need to believe, are prone to listento any gospel. The greater its air of finality and assurance thestronger is its appeal. But it is the opportunity also of the seriousand competent thinker, and it is fortunate for the world that one of M. Bergson's quality is forthcoming. He is too wise a man, he knows thehistory of human thought too well, he realizes too clearly the extent ofthe problem to pretend that his is the last word or that he has in hispocket the final solution of the puzzle of the universe and the one andonly panacea for human distresses. But he has one of the most subtle andpenetrating intellects acting in and upon the world at this moment, andis more worthy of attention than all the charlatans. That he hasobtained for himself so great an audience is one of the most strikingand hopeful signs of the present time. 

It is the more impressive inasmuch as Bergson cannot be said to be aneasy author. The originality and sweep of his conceptions, the fine anddelicate psychological analysis in which he is so adept and which isnecessary for the development of his ideas--e. G. , in his exposition ofduree--make exacting demands upon those readers who wish to closelyfollow his thought. An interesting fact is that this is realized most ofall by those who come to Bergson with a long process of philosophicaldiscipline behind them. It is not surprising when we remember what he istrying to do, namely, to induce philosophical thought to run in newchannels. The general reader has here an advantage over the other, inasmuch as he has less to unlearn. In the old words, unless we becomeas little children we cannot enter into this kingdom; though it is truethat we do not remain as little children once entry is made. This is aserious difficulty for the hard-bitten philosopher who at considerablepains has formed conceptions, acquired a technique, and taken anorientation towards life and the universe which he cannot dismiss in amoment. It says much for the charitable spirit of Bergson's fellow-philosophers that they have given so friendly and hospitable a receptionto his disturbing ideas, and so essentially humane a man as he must havebeen touched by this. The Bahnbrecher has his troubles, no doubt, but soalso have those upon whose minds he is endeavouring to operate. Reinhold, one of Kant's earliest disciples, ruefully stated, accordingto Schopenhauer's story, that it was only after having gone through theCritique of Pure Reason five times with the closest and most scrupulousattention that he was able to get a grasp of Kant's real meaning. Now, after the lapse of a century and a half, Kant to many is child's playcompared with Bergson, who differs more fundamentally from Kant than theScoto-German thinker did from Leibniz and Hume. But this need not alarmthe general reader who, innocent of any very articulate philosophicalpreconceptions, may indeed find in the very "novelty" of Bergson'steaching a powerful attraction, inasmuch as it gives effectiveexpression to thoughts and tendencies moving dimly and half-formed inthe consciousness of our own epoch, felt rather than thought. In thissense Bergson may be said to have produced a "philosophy for the times. "In one respect Bergson has a marked advantage over Kant, and indeed overmost other philosophers, namely, in his recognized masterly control overthe instrument of language. There is a minimum of jargon, nothing turgidor crabbed. He reminds us most, in the skill and charm of hisexpression, of Plato and Berkeley among the philosophers. He does notwork with so fine and biting a point as his distinguished countryman andfellow-philosopher, Anatole France, but he has, nevertheless, a burin atcommand of remarkable quality. He is a master of the succinct andmemorable phrase in which an idea is etched out for us in a few strokes. Already, in his lifetime, a number of terms stamped with the impress ofBergson's thought have passed into international currency. In thisconnexion, has it been remarked that while an Englishman gave to theFrench the term "struggle for life, " a Frenchman has given to us theterm elan vital? It is worthy of passing notice and gives rise toreflections on the respective national temperaments, fanciful perhaps, but interesting. It is not, however, under the figure of the etcher'sart or of the process of the mint that we can fully represent Bergson'sresources of style. These suggest staccato effects, hard outlines, andthat does not at all represent the prose of this writer. It is a fine, delicately interwoven, tissue-like fabric, pliant and supple. If onewere in the secret of M. Bergson's private thoughts, it might bediscovered that he does not admire his style so much as others do, forhis whole manner of thought must, one suspects, have led him often toattempt to express the inexpressible. The ocean of life, that fluidebienfaisant in which we are immersed, has no doubt often proved toofluid even for him. "Only the understanding has a language, " he almostruefully declares in L'Evolution creatrice; and the understanding is, for him, compared with intuition peu de chose. Yet we can say that inwhat he has achieved his success is remarkable. The web of languagewhich he weaves seems to fit and follow the movements of his thought asthe skin ripples over the moving muscles of the thoroughbred. And thisis not an accidental or trivial fact. M. Bergson may possibly agree withSeneca that "too much attention to style does not become a philosopher, "but the quality of his thought and temperament does not allow him toexpress himself otherwise than lucidly. Take this, almost at random, asa characteristic example. It must be given, of course, in the original:

L'intelligence humaine, telle que nous la representons, n'est point dutout celle que nous montrait Platon dans l'allegorie de la caverne. Ellen'a pas plus pour fonction de regarder passer des ombres vaines que decontempler, en se retournant derriere elle, l'astre eblouissant. Elle aautre chose a faire. Atteles comme des boeufs de labour, a une lourdetache, nous sentons le jeu de nos muscles et de nos articulations, lepoids de la charrue et la resistance du sol: agir et se savoir agir, entrer en contact avec la realite et meme la vivre, mais dans la measureseulement ou elle interesse l'oeuvre qui s'accomplit et le sillon qui secreuse, voila la fonction de l'intelligence humaine. "

That is sufficiently clear; we may legitimately doubt whether it is anadequate account of the function of the human intelligence, but wecannot be in any doubt as to what the view is; and more than that, oncewe have become acquainted with it, we are not likely to forget it. 

For the student as yet unpractised in philosophical reflection, Bergson's skill and clarity of statement, his fertility in illustration, his frequent and picturesque use of analogy may be a pitfall. It allsounds so convincing and right, as Bergson puts it, that the criticalfaculty is put to sleep. There is peril in this, particularly here, where we have to deal with so bold and even revolutionary a doctrine. Ifwe are able to retain our independence of judgment we are bound sooneror later, in spite of Bergson's persuasiveness, to have our misgivings. After all, we may begin to reflect, he has been too successful, he hasproved too much. In attempting to use, as he was bound to do, theintelligence to discredit the intelligence he has been attempting theimpossible. He has only succeeded in demonstrating the authority, themagisterial power, of the intelligence. No step in Philosophy can betaken without it. What are Life, Consciousness, Evolution, evenMovement, as these terms are employed by Bergson, but the symbolizationof concepts which on his own showing are the peculiar products of thehuman understanding or intelligence? It seems, indeed, on reflection, the oddest thing that Philosophy should be employed in the service of ananti-intellectual, or as it would be truer to call it a supra-intellectual, attitude. Philosophy is a thinking view of things. Itrepresents the most persistent effort of the human intelligence tosatisfy its own needs, to attempt to solve the problems which it hascreated: in the familiar phrase, to heal the wounds which it has itselfmade. The intellect, therefore, telling itself that it is incompetentfor this purpose, is a strange, and not truly impressive, spectacle. 

We are not enabled to recover from the sense of impotency thus createdby being referred to "intuition. " Bergson is not the first to try thisway out. It would be misleading, no doubt, to identify him with themembers of the Scottish School of a hundred years ago or with Jacobi; hereaches his conclusion in another way, and that conclusion isdifferently framed; nevertheless, in essence there is a similarity, andHegel's comments[Footnote: Smaller Logic, Wallace's translation, c. V. ]on Bergson's forerunners will often be found to have point withreference to Bergson himself. 

It is hardly conceivable that any careful observer of human experiencewould deny the presence and power of intuition in that experience. Thefact is too patent. Many who would not give the place to intuition whichis assigned to it by Bergson would be ready to say that there may bemore in the thrilling and passionate intuitive moments than Philosophy, after an age-long and painful effort, has been able to express. Allknowledge, indeed, may be said to be rooted in intuition. Many a thinkerhas been supported and inspired through weary years of inquiry andreflection by a mother-idea which has come to him, if not unsought yetuncompelled, in a flash of insight. But that is the beginning, not theend, of his task. It is but the raw material of knowledge, knowledge inpotentia. To invert the order is to destroy Philosophy not to serve it, is, indeed, a mere counsel of desperation. An intuitive Philosophy so-called finds itself sooner or later, generally sooner, in a blind alley. Practically, it gives rise to all kinds of crude and wasteful effort. Itis not an accident that Georges Sorel in his Reflexions sur la Violencetakes his "philosophy" from Bergson or, at least, leans on him. Thereare intuitions and intuitions, as every wise man knows, as William Jamesonce ruefully admitted after his adventures with nitrous oxide, or asthe eaters of hashish will confess. To follow all our intuitions wouldlead us into the wildest dervish dance of thought and action and leaveus spent and disheartened at the end. "Agnosticism" would be too mild aterm for the result. Our intuitions have to be tried and tested; thereis a thorny and difficult path of criticism to be traversed before wecan philosophically endorse them and find peace of mind. What Hoffdingsays is in a sense quite true: "When we pass into intuition we pass intoa state without problems. " But that is, as Hoffding intends us tounderstand, not because all problems are thereby solved, but becausethey have not yet emerged. If we consent to remain at that point, werefuse to make the acquaintance of Philosophy; if we recognize theproblems that are really latent there, we soon realize that the businessof Philosophy is yet to be transacted. 

The fact is that in this part of his doctrine--and it is an importantpart--the brilliant French writer, in his endeavours to makephilosophizing more concrete and practical, makes it too abstract. Intuition is not a process over against and quite distinct fromconceptual thought. Both are moments in the total process of man'sattempt to come to terms with the universe, and too great emphasis oneither distorts and falsifies the situation in which we find ourselveson this planet. The insistence on intuition is doubtless due, at bottom, to Bergson's admiration for the activity in the creative artist. Theborder-line between Art and Philosophy becomes almost an imaginary linewith him. In the one case as in the other we have, according to him, toget inside the object by a sort of sympathy. True, there is thisdifference, he says, that aesthetic intuition achieves only theindividual--which is doubtful--whereas the philosophic intuition is tobe conceived as a "recherche orientee dans la meme sens que l'art, indeed, but qui prendrait pour objet la vie en general. " He fails tonote, it may be observed, that the expression of the aestheticintuition, that is to say, Art, is always fixed and static. This in viewof other aspects of his doctrine is remarkable. But apart from thisattempt to practically identify Art and Philosophy--a hopeless attempt--there is, of course, available as a means of explanation the well-knownand not entirely deplorable tendency of the protestant and innovator tooverstate his case, to bring out by strong emphasis the aspect withwhich he is chiefly concerned and which he thinks has been undulyneglected. This, as hinted, has its merits, and not only or chiefly forPhilosophy, but also, and perhaps primarily, for the conduct of life. Ifhe convinces men, should they need convincing, that they cannot be savedby the discursive reason alone, he will have done a good service to hisgeneration, and to the philosophers among them who may (though theyought not to) be tempted to ignore the intuitive element in experience. 

The same tendency to over-emphasis can be observed elsewhere. It isnoticeable, for instance, in his discussions of Change, which are somarked and important a feature in his writings. His Philosophy has beencalled, with his approval apparently, the Philosophy of Change, thoughit might have been called, still more truly and suggestively, thePhilosophy of Creation. It is this latter phase of it which has soenormously interested and stimulated the world. As to his treatment ofChange, it reveals Bergson in one of his happiest moods. It is difficultto restrain one's praise in speaking of the subtle and resourceful wayin which he handles this tantalizing and elusive question. It is astroke of genius. The student of Philosophy, of course, at once thinksof Heraclitus; but Bergson is not merely another Heraclitus any morethan he is just an echo of Jacobi. He places Change in a new light, enables us to grasp its character with a success which, if he had noother claim to remembrance, would ensure for him an honourable place inthe History of Philosophy. In the process he makes but a mouthful ofZeno and his eternal puzzles. But, as Mr. Gunn also pointsout, [Footnote: See p. 142. ] Change cannot be the last word in ourcharacterization of Reality. Pure Change is not only unthinkable--thatperhaps Bergson would allow--but it is something which cannot beexperienced. There must be points of reference--a starting point and anending point at least. Pure Change, as is the way with "pure" anything, turns into its contradictory. Paradoxical though it may seem, it ends asstatic. It becomes the One and Indivisible. This, at least, wasrecognized by Heraclitus and is expressed by him in his figure of theGreat Year. 

It is not my purpose, however, to usurp the function of the author ofthis useful handbook to Bergson. The extent of my introductory remarksis an almost involuntary tribute to the material and provocative natureof Bergson's discussions, just as the frequent use by the author of thisbook of the actual words of Bergson are a tribute to the excellence andessential rightness of his style. The Frenchman, himself a free andcandid spirit, would be the last to require unquestioning docility inothers. He knows that thereby is the philosophic breath choked out ofus. If we read him in the spirit in which he would wish to be read, weshall find, however much we may diverge from him on particular issues, that our labour has been far from wasted. He undoubtedly calls forconsiderable effort from the student who takes him, as he ought to betaken, seriously; but it is effort well worth while. He, perhaps, shineseven more as a psychologist than as a philosopher--at least in the time-honoured sense. He has an almost uncanny introspective insight and, ashas been said, a power of rendering its result in language which createsin the reader a sense of excitement and adventure not to be excelled bythe ablest romancer. Fadaises, which are to be met with in philosophicalworks as elsewhere, are not to be frequently encountered in hiswritings. There is always the fresh breeze of original thought blowinghere. He is by nature as well as by doctrine the sworn foe ofconventionality. Though he may not give us all we would wish, in ourhaste to be all-wise, let us yet be grateful to him for this, that hehas the purpose and also the power to shake us out of complacency, tocompel us to recast our philosophical account. In this he is supremelyserviceable to his generation, and is deserving of the gratitude of allwho care for Philosophy. For, while Philosophy cannot die, it may beallowed to fall into a comatose condition; and this is the unpardonablesin. ALEXANDER MAIR

 LIVERPOOL UNIVERSITY

This huge vision of time and motion, of a mighty world which is alwaysbecoming, always changing, growing, striving, and wherein the word ofpower is not law, but life, has captured the modern imagination no lessthan the modern intellect. It lights with its splendour the patientdiscoveries of science. It casts a new radiance on theology, ethics andart. It gives meaning to some of our deepest instincts, our strangestand least explicable tendencies. But above and beyond all this, it liftsthe awful weight which determinism had laid upon our spirits and fillsthe future with hope; for beyond the struggle and suffering inseparablefrom life's flux, as we know it, it reports to us, though we may nothear them, "the thunder of new wings. "

 Evelyn Underhill

CHAPTER I

LIFE OF BERGSON

Birth and education--Teaches at Clermont-Ferrand--Les donnees immediatesde la conscience--Matiere et Memoire--Chair of Greek Philosophy, then ofModern Philosophy, College de France--L'Evolution creatrice--Relationswith William James--Visits England and America--Popularity--Neo-Catholics and Syndicalists--Election to Academie francaise--War-work--L'Energie spirituelle. 

Bergson's life has been the quiet and uneventful one of a Frenchprofessor, the chief landmarks in it being the publication of his threeprincipal works, first, in 1889, the Essai sur les donnees immediates dela conscience, then Matiere et Memoire in 1896, and L'Evolutioncreatrice in 1907. On October 18th, 1859, Henri Louis Bergson was bornin Paris in the Rue Lamartine, not far from the Opera House. [Footnote:He was not born in England as Albert Steenbergen erroneously states inhis work, Henri Bergsons Intuitive Philosophie, Jena, 1909, p. 2, nor in1852, the date given by Miss Stebbing in her Pragmatism and FrenchVoluntarism. ] He is descended from a prominent Jewish family of Poland, with a blend of Irish blood from his mother's side. His family lived inLondon for a few years after his birth, and he obtained an earlyfamiliarity with the English language from his mother. Before he wasnine years old his parents crossed the Channel and settled in France, Henri becoming a naturalized citizen of the Republic. 

In Paris from 1868 to 1878 he attended the Lycee Fontaine, now known asthe Lycee Condorcet. While there he obtained a prize for his scientificwork and also won a prize when he was eighteen for the solution of amathematical problem. This was in 1877, and his solution was publishedthe following year in Annales de Mathematiques. It is of interest asbeing his first published work. After some hesitation over his career, as to whether it should lie in the sphere of the sciences or that of"the humanities, " he decided in favour of the latter, and when nineteenyears of age, he entered the famous Ecole Normale Superieure. Whilethere he obtained the degree of Licencie-es-Lettres, and this wasfollowed by that of Agrege de philosophie in 1881. 

The same year he received a teaching appointment at the Lycee in Angers, the ancient capital of Anjou. Two years later he settled at the LyceeBlaise-Pascal in Clermont-Ferrand, chief town of the Puy de Domedepartment, whose name is more known to motorists than to philosophers. The year after his arrival at Clermont-Ferrand he displayed his abilityin "the humanities" by the publication of an excellent edition ofextracts from Lucretius, with a critical study of the text and thephilosophy of the poet (1884), a work whose repeated editions aresufficient evidence of its useful place in the promotion of classicalstudy among the youth of France. While teaching and lecturing in thisbeautiful part of his country (the Auvergne region), Bergson found timefor private study and original work. He was engaged on his Essai sur lesdonnees immediates de la conscience. This essay, which, in its Englishtranslation, bears the more definite and descriptive title, Time andFree Will, was submitted, along with a short Latin Thesis on Aristotle, for the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres, to which he was admitted by theUniversity of Paris in 1889. The work was published in the same year byFelix Alcan, the Paris publisher, in his series La Bibliotheque dephilosophie contemporaine. 

It is interesting to note that Bergson dedicated this volume to JulesLachelier, then ministre de l'instruction publique, who was an ardentdisciple of Ravaisson and the author of a rather important philosophicalwork Du fondement de l'Induction (1871), who in his view of thingsendeavoured "to substitute everywhere force for inertia, life for death, and liberty for fatalism. "[Footnote: Lachelier was born in 1832, Ravaisson in 1813. Bergson owed much to both of these teachers of theEcole Normale Superieure. Cf. His memorial address on Ravaisson, whodied in 1900. (See Bibliography under 1904. )]

Bergson now settled again in Paris, and after teaching for some monthsat the Municipal College, known as the College Rollin, he received anappointment at the Lycee Henri-Quatre, where he remained for eightyears. In 1896 he published his second large work, entitled Matiere etMemoire. This rather difficult, but brilliant, work investigates thefunction of the brain, undertakes an analysis of perception and memory, leading up to a careful consideration of the problems of the relation ofbody and mind. Bergson, we know, has spent years of research inpreparation for each of his three large works. This is especiallyobvious in Matiere et Memoire, where he shows a very thoroughacquaintance with the extensive amount of pathological investigationwhich has been carried out in recent years, and for which France isjustly entitled to very honourable mention. 

In 1898 Bergson became Maitre de conferences at his Alma Mater, L'EcoleNormale Superieure, and was later promoted to a Professorship. The year1900 saw him installed as Professor at the College de France, where heaccepted the Chair of Greek Philosophy in succession to CharlesL'Eveque. The College de France, founded in 1530, by Francois I, is lessancient, and until recent years has been less prominent in generalrepute than the Sorbonne, which traces back its history to the middle ofthe thirteenth century. Nevertheless, it is one of the intellectualheadquarters of France, indeed of the whole world. While the Sorbonne isnow the seat of the University of Paris, the College is an independentinstitution under the control of the Ministre de l'Instruction publique. The lectures given by the very eminent professors who fill its forty-three chairs are free and open to the general public, and are attendedmainly by a large number of women students and by the senior studentsfrom the University. The largest lecture room in the College was givento Bergson, but this became quite inadequate to accommodate his hearers. 

At the First International Congress of Philosophy, which was held inParis, during the first five days of August, 1900, Bergson read a short, but important, paper, Sur les origines psychologiques de notre croyancea la loi de causalite. In 1901 Felix Alcan published in book form a workwhich had just previously appeared in the Revue de Paris entitled LeRire, one of the most important of his minor productions. This essay onthe meaning of the Comic was based on a lecture which he had given inhis early days in the Auvergne. The study of it is essential to anunderstanding of Bergson's views of life, and its passages dealing withthe place of the artistic in life are valuable. In 1901 he was electedto the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques, and became a memberof the Institute. In 1903 he contributed to the Revue de metaphysique etde morale a very important essay entitled Introduction a lametaphysique, which is useful as a preface to the study of his threelarge books. 

On the death of Gabriel Tarde, the eminent sociologist, in 1904, Bergsonsucceeded him in the Chair of Modern Philosophy. From the 4th to the 8thof September of that year he was at Geneva attending the SecondInternational Congress of Philosophy, when he lectured on Le Paralogismepsycho-physiologique, or, to quote its new title, Le Cerveau et laPensee: une illusion philosophique. An illness prevented his visitingGermany to attend the Third Congress held at Heidelberg. 

His third large work--his greatest book--L'Evolution creatrice, appearedin 1907, and is undoubtedly, of all his works, the one which is mostwidely known and most discussed. It constitutes one of the most profoundand original contributions to the philosophical consideration of thetheory of Evolution. Un livre comme L'Evolution creatrice, remarksImbart de la Tour, n'est pas seulment une oeuvre, mais une date, celled'une direction nouvelle imprimee a la pensee. By 1918, Alcan, thepublisher, had issued twenty-one editions, making an average of twoeditions per annum for ten years. Since the appearance of this book, Bergson's popularity has increased enormously, not only in academiccircles, but among the general reading public. 

He came to London in 1908 and visited William James, the Americanphilosopher of Harvard, who was Bergson's senior by seventeen years, andwho was instrumental in calling the attention of the Anglo-Americanpublic to the work of the French professor. This was an interestingmeeting and we find James' impression of Bergson given in his Lettersunder date of October 4, 1908. "So modest and unpretending a man butsuch a genius intellectually! I have the strongest suspicions that thetendency which he has brought to a focus, will end by prevailing, andthat the present epoch will be a sort of turning point in the history ofphilosophy. "

As in some quarters erroneous ideas prevail regarding both thehistorical and intellectual relation between James and Bergson, it maybe useful to call attention to some of the facts here. As early as 1880James contributed an article in French to the periodical La Critiquephilosophique, of Renouvier and Pillon, entitled Le Sentiment del'Effort. [Footnote: Cf. His Principles of Psychology, Vol. II. , chapxxvi. ] Four years later a couple of articles by him appeared in Mind:What is an Emotion?[Footnote: Mind, 1884, pp. 188-205. ] and On someOmissions of Introspective Psychology. [Footnote: Mind, 1884, pp. 1-26. ]Of these articles the first two were quoted by Bergson in his work of1889, Les donnees immediates de la conscience. In the following years1890-91 appeared the two volumes of James' monumental work, ThePrinciples of Psychology, in which he refers to a pathologicalphenomenon observed by Bergson. Some writers taking merely these datesinto consideration, and overlooking the fact that James' investigationshad been proceeding since 1870, registered from time to time by variousarticles which culminated in The Principles, have mistakenly assigned toBergson's ideas priority in time. [Footnote: For example A. Chaumeix:William James (Revue des Deux Mondes, Oct, 1910), and J. Bourdeau:Nouvelles modes en philosophie, Journal de Debats, Feb. , 1907. Cf. Flournoy: La philosophie de William James. (Eng. Trans. Holt and James, pp. 198-206). ] On the other hand insinuations have been made to theeffect that Bergson owes the germ-ideas of his first book to the 1884article by James On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology, which heneither refers to nor quotes. This particular article deals with theconception of thought as a stream of consciousness, which intellectdistorts by framing into concepts. We must not be misled by parallels. Bergson has replied to this insinuation by denying that he had anyknowledge of the article by James when he wrote Les donnees immediatesde la conscience. [Footnote: Relation a William James et a James Ward. Art. In Revue philosophique, Aug. , 1905, lx. , p. 229. ] The two thinkersappear to have developed independently until almost the close of thecentury. In truth they are much further apart in their intellectualposition than is frequently supposed. [Footnote: The reader who desiresto follow the various views of the relation of Bergson and James willfind the following works useful. Kallen (a pupil of James): WilliamJames and Henri Bergson: a study in contrasting theories of life. Stebbing: Pragmatism and French Voluntarism. Caldwell: Pragmatism andIdealism (last chap). Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies. Boutroux:William James (Eng. Tr. ). Flournoy: La philosophie de James (Eng. Tr. ). And J. E. Turner: An Examination of William James' Philosophy. ] Bothhave succeeded in appealing to audiences far beyond the purely academicsphere, but only in their mutual rejection of "intellectualism" as finalis there real harmony or unanimity between them. It will not do to presstoo closely analogies between the Radical Empiricism of the American andthe Doctrine of Intuition of the Frenchman. Although James obtains acertain priority in point of time in the development and enunciation ofhis ideas, we must remember that he confessed that he was baffled bymany of Bergson's notions. James certainly neglected many of the deepermetaphysical aspects of Bergson's thought, which did not harmonize withhis own, and are even in direct contradiction. In addition to thisBergson is no pragmatist, for him "utility, " so far from being a test oftruth, is rather the reverse, a synonym for error. 

Nevertheless, William James hailed Bergson as an ally veryenthusiastically. Early in the century (1903) we find him remarking inhis correspondence: "I have been re-reading Bergson's books, and nothingthat I have read since years has so excited and stimulated my thoughts. I am sure that that philosophy has a great future, it breaks through oldcadres and brings things into a solution from which new crystals can begot. " The most noteworthy tributes paid by him to Bergson were thosemade in the Hibbert Lectures (A Pluralistic Universe), which James gaveat Manchester College, Oxford, shortly after he and Bergson met inLondon. He there remarked upon the encouragement he had received fromBergson's thought, and referred to the confidence he had in being "ableto lean on Bergson's authority. " [Footnote: A Pluralistic Universe, pp. 214-15. Cf. The whole of Lecture V. The Compounding of Consciousness, pp. 181-221, and Lecture VI. Bergson and His Critique ofIntellectualism, pp. 225-273. ] "Open Bergson, and new horizons loom onevery page you read. It is like the breath of the morning and the songof birds. It tells of reality itself, instead of merely reiterating whatdusty-minded professors have written about what other previousprofessors have thought. Nothing in Bergson is shop-worn or at second-hand. " [Footnote: Lecture VI. , p. 265. ] The influence of Bergson had ledhim "to renounce the intellectualist method and the current notion thatlogic is an adequate measure of what can or cannot be. " [Footnote: APluralistic Universe, p. 212. ] It had induced him, he continued, "TOGIVE UP THE LOGIC, squarely and irrevocably" as a method, for he foundthat "reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what wordyou will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it. " [Footnote: APluralistic Universe, p. 212. ]

Naturally, these remarks, which appeared in book form in 1909, directedmany English and American readers to an investigation of Bergson'sphilosophy for themselves. A certain handicap existed in that hisgreatest work had not then been translated into English. James, however, encouraged and assisted Dr. Arthur Mitchell in his preparation of theEnglish translation of L'Evolution creatrice. In August of 1910 Jamesdied. It was his intention, had he lived to see the completion of thetranslation, to introduce it to the English reading public by aprefatory note of appreciation. In the following year the translationwas completed and still greater interest in Bergson and his work was theresult. By a coincidence, in that same year (1911), Bergson penned forthe French translation of James' book, Pragmatism, [Footnote: LePragmatisme: Translated by Le Brun. Paris, Flammarion. ] a preface ofsixteen pages, entitled Verite et Realite. In it he expressedsympathetic appreciation of James' work, coupled with certain importantreservations. 

In April (5th to 11th) Bergson attended the Fourth InternationalCongress of Philosophy held at Bologna, in Italy, where he gave abrilliant address on L'Intuition philosophique. In response toinvitations received he came again to England in May of that year, andhas paid us several subsequent visits. These visits have always beennoteworthy events and have been marked by important deliverances. Manyof these contain important contributions to thought and shed new lighton many passages in his three large works, Time and Free Will, Matterand Memory, and Creative Evolution. Although necessarily briefstatements, they are of more recent date than his books, and thus showhow this acute thinker can develop and enrich his thought and takeadvantage of such an opportunity to make clear to an English audiencethe fundamental principles of his philosophy. 

He visited Oxford and delivered at the University, on the 26th and 27thof May, two lectures entitled La Perception du Changement, which werepublished in French in the same year by the Clarendon Press. As Bergsonhas a delightful gift of lucid and brief exposition, when the occasiondemands such treatment, these lectures on Change form a most valuablesynopsis or brief survey of the fundamental principles of his thought, and serve the student or general reader alike as an excellentintroduction to the study of the larger volumes. Oxford honoured itsdistinguished visitor by conferring upon him the degree of Doctor ofScience. Two days later he delivered the Huxley Lecture at BirminghamUniversity, taking for his subject Life and Consciousness. Thissubsequently appeared in The Hibbert Journal (Oct. , 1911), and sincerevised, forms the first essay in the collected volume L'Energiespirituelle or Mind-Energy. In October he was again in England, where hehad an enthusiastic reception, and delivered at London University(University College) four lectures on La Nature de l'Ame. In 1913 hevisited the United States of America, at the invitation of ColumbiaUniversity, New York, and lectured in several American cities, where hewas welcomed by very large audiences. In February, at ColumbiaUniversity, he lectured both in French and English, taking as hissubjects: Spiritualite et Liberte and The Method of Philosophy. Beingagain in England in May of the same year, he accepted the Presidency ofthe British Society for Psychical Research, and delivered to the Societyan impressive address: Fantomes des Vivants et Recherche psychique. 

Meanwhile, his popularity increased, and translations of his works beganto appear in a number of languages, English, German, Italian, Danish, Swedish, Magyar, Polish and Russian. In 1914 he was honoured by hisfellow-countrymen in being elected as a member of the Academiefrancaise. He was also made President of the Academie des Sciencesmorales et politiques, and in addition he became Officier de la Legiond'Honneur, and Officier de l'Instruction publique. He found disciples ofmany varied types, and in France movements such as Neo-Catholicism orModernism on the one hand and Syndicalism on the other, endeavoured toabsorb and to appropriate for their own immediate use and propagandasome of the central ideas of his teaching. That important continentalorgan of socialist and syndicalist theory, Le Mouvement socialiste, suggested that the realism of Karl Marx and Prudhon is hostile to allforms of intellectualism, and that, therefore, supporters of Marxiansocialism should welcome a philosophy such as that of Bergson. Otherwriters, in their eagerness, asserted the collaboration of the Chair ofPhilosophy at the College de France with the aims of the ConfederationGenerale du Travail and the Industrial Workers of the World. It wasclaimed that there is harmony between the flute of personalphilosophical meditation and the trumpet of social revolution. Thesestatements are considered in the chapter dealing with the politicalimplications of Bergson's thought. 

While social revolutionaries were endeavouring to make the most out ofBergson, many leaders of religious thought, particularly the moreliberal-minded theologians of all creeds, e. G. , the Modernists and Neo-Catholic Party in his own country, showed a keen interest in hiswritings, and many of them endeavoured to find encouragement andstimulus in his work. The Roman Catholic Church, however, which stillbelieves that finality was reached in philosophy with the work of ThomasAquinas, in the thirteenth century, and consequently makes thatmediaeval philosophy her official, orthodox, and dogmatic view, took thestep of banning Bergson's three books by placing them upon the Index(Decree of June 1, 1914). 

It was arranged by the Scottish Universities that Bergson should deliverin 1914 the famous Gifford Lectures, and one course was planned for thespring and another for the autumn. The first course, consisting ofeleven lectures, under the title of The Problem of Personality, wasdelivered at Edinburgh University in the Spring of that year. 

Then came the War. The course of lectures planned for the autumn monthshad to be abandoned. Bergson has not, however, been silent during theconflict, and he has given some inspiring addresses. As early asNovember 4th, 1914, he wrote an article entitled La force qui s'use etcelle qui ne s'use pas, which appeared in that unique and interestingperiodical of the poilus, Le Bulletin des Armees de la RepubliqueFrancaise. A presidential address delivered in December, 1914, to theAcademie des sciences morales et politiques, had for its title LaSignificance de la Guerre. This, together with the preceding article, has been translated and published in England as The Meaning of the War. Bergson contributed also to the publication arranged by The DailyTelegraph in honour of the King of the Belgians, King Albert's Book(Christmas, 1914). In 1915 he was succeeded in the office of Presidentof the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques by M. AlexandreRibot, and then delivered a discourse on The Evolution of GermanImperialism. Meanwhile he found time to issue at the request of theMinister of Public Instruction a delightful little summary of FrenchPhilosophy. Bergson did a large amount of travelling and lecturing inAmerica during the war. He was there when the French Mission under M. Viviani paid a visit in April and May of 1917, following upon America'sentry into the conflict. M. Viviani's book La Mission francaise enAmerique, 1917, contains a preface by Bergson. 

Early in 1918 he was officially received by the Academie francaise, taking his seat among "The Select Forty" as successor to M. EmileOllivier, the author of the large and notable historical work L'Empireliberal. A session was held in January in his honour at which hedelivered an address on Ollivier. 

In the War, Bergson saw the conflict of Mind and Matter, or rather ofLife and Mechanism; and thus he shows us in action the central idea ofhis own philosophy. To no other philosopher has it fallen, during hislifetime, to have his philosophical principles so vividly and soterribly tested. We are too close to the smoking crucible of war to beaware of all that has been involved in it. Even those who have helped inthe making of history are too near to it to regard it historically, muchless philosophically. Yet one cannot help feeling that the defeat ofGerman militarism has been the proof in action of the validity of muchof Bergson's thought. 

As many of Bergson's contributions to French periodicals are not readilyaccessible, he agreed to the request of his friends that these should becollected and published in two volumes. The first of these was beingplanned when war broke out. The conclusion of strife has been marked bythe appearance of this delayed volume in 1919. It bears the titleL'Energie spirituelle: Essais et Conferences. The noted expounder ofBergson's philosophy in England, Dr. Wildon Carr, has prepared anEnglish Translation under the title Mind-Energy. The volume opens withthe Huxley Memorial Lecture of 1911, Life and Consciousness, in arevised and developed form under the title Consciousness and Life. Signsof Bergson's growing interest in social ethics and in the idea of afuture life of personal survival are manifested. The lecture before theSociety for Psychical Research is included, as is also the one given inFrance, L'Ame et le Corps, which contains the substance of the fourLondon lectures on the Soul. The seventh and last article is a reprintof Bergson's famous lecture to the Congress of Philosophy at Geneva in1904, Le paralogisme psycho-physiologique, which now appears as LeCerveau et la Pensee: une illusion philosophique. Other articles are onthe False Recognition, on Dreams, and Intellectual Effort. The volume isa most welcome production and serves to bring together what Bergson haswritten on the concept of mental force, and on his view of "tension" and"detension" as applied to the relation of matter and mind. 

It is Bergson's intention to follow up this collection shortly byanother on the Method of Philosophy, dealing with the problems ofIntuition. For this he is preparing an important introduction, dealingwith recent developments in philosophy. This second volume will includethe Lectures on The Perception of Change given at Oxford, TheIntroduction to Metaphysics, and the brilliant paper PhilosophicalIntuition. In June, 1920, Cambridge honoured him with the degree ofDoctor of Letters. In order that he may be able to devote his full timeto the great new work he is preparing on ethics, religion, andsociology, Bergson has been relieved of the duties attached to the Chairof Modern Philosophy at the College de France. He still holds thischair, but no longer delivers lectures, his place being taken by hisbrilliant pupil Edouard Le Roy. Living with his wife and daughter in amodest house in a quiet street near the Porte d'Auteuil in Paris, Bergson is now working as keenly and vigorously as ever. 

CHAPTER II

THE REALITY OF CHANGE

Fundamental in Bergson's philosophy. We are surrounded by changes--weourselves change--Belief in change--Simplicity of change--Immobility iscomposite and relative--All movement is indivisible. The fallacy of"states"--Intellect loves the static--Life is dynamic--Change, the verystuff of life, constitutes reality. 

Throughout the history of thought we find that the prevailingphilosophies have always reflected some of the characteristics of theirtime. For instance, in those periods when, as historians tell us, thetendency towards unity, conformity, system, order, and authority wasstrong, we find philosophy reflecting these conditions by emphasizingthe unity of the universe; while in those periods in which establishedorder, system, and authority were disturbed, the philosophy of the timeemphasizes the idea of multiplicity as opposed to the unity of theuniverse, laying stress on freedom, creative action, spontaneity ofeffort, and the reality of change. There can be little doubt that thisis the chief reason why Bergson's philosophy has found such an amount ofacceptance in a comparatively short period. The response to his thoughtmay be explained very largely by this, that already his fundamentalideas existed, although implicit, unexpressed, in the minds of a greatmultitude of thoughtful people, to whom the static conceptions of theuniverse were inadequate and false. 

We must not, on the other hand, overlook the fact that Bergson'sstatements have in their turn given an emphasis to all aspects ofthought which take account of the reality of change and which realizeits importance in all spheres. A writer on world politics very aptlyreminds us that "life is change, and a League of Peace that aimed atpreserving peace by forbidding change would be a tyranny as oppressiveas any Napoleonic dictatorship. These problems called for periodicchange. The peril of our future is that, while the need for change isinstinctively grasped by some peoples as the fundamental fact of world-politics, to perceive it costs others a difficult effort ofthought. "[Footnote: H. N. Brailsford on Peace and Change, Chap. 3 of hisBook A League of Nations. ] However difficult it may be for someindividuals and for some nations to grasp it, the great fact is there--the reality of change is undeniable. 

Bergson himself would give to his philosophy the title, The Philosophyof Change, and this for a very good reason, for the principle of Changeand an insistence on its reality lies at the root of histhought. [Footnote: He suggested this as a sub-title to Dr. H. WildonCarr for his little work Henri Bergson (People's Books). Dr. WildonCarr's later and larger work bears this as its full title. ] "We knowthat everything changes, " we find him saying in his London lectures, "but it is mere words. From the earliest times recorded in the historyof philosophy, philosophers have never stopped saying that everythingchanges; but, when the moment came for the practical application of thisproposition, they acted as if they believed that at the bottom of thingsthere is immobility and invariability. The greatest difficulties ofphilosophy are due to not taking account of the fact that Change andMovement are universal. It is not enough to say that everything changesand moves--we must believe it. "[Footnote: Second of the four lectures onLa Nature de l'Ame delivered at London University, Oct. 21, 1911. Fromreport in The Times for Oct. 23, 1911, p. 4. ] In order to think Changeand to see it, a whole mass of prejudices must be swept aside--someartificial, the products of speculative philosophy, and others thenatural product of common-sense. We tend to regard immobility as a moresimple affair than movement. But what we call immobility is reallycomposite and is merely relative, being a relation between movements. If, for example, there are two trains running in the same direction onparallel lines at exactly the same speed, opposite one another, then thepassengers in each train, when observing the other train, will regardthe trains as motionless. So, generally, immobility is only apparent, Change is real. We tend to be misled by language; we speak, forinstance, of 'the state of things'; but what we call a state is theappearance which a change assumes in the eyes of a being who, himself, changes according to an identical or analogous rhythm. "Take, forexample, " says Bergson, "a summer day. We are stretched on the grass, welook around us--everything is at rest--there is absolute immobility--nochange. But the grass is growing, the leaves of the trees are developingor decaying--we ourselves are growing older all the time. That whichseems rest, simplicity itself, is but a composite of our ageing with thechanges which takes place in the grass, in the leaves, in all that isaround us. Change, then, is simple, while 'the state of things' as wecall it, is composite. Every stable state is the result of the co-existence between that change and the change of the person who perceivesit. "[Footnote: La Nature de l'Ame, lecture 2. ]

It is an axiom in the philosophy of Bergson that all change or movementis indivisible. He asserts this expressly in Matter andMemory, [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 246 ff. (Fr. P. 207 ff). ] andagain in the second lecture on The Perception of Change he deals withthe indivisibility of movement somewhat fully, submitting it to acareful analysis, from which the following quotation is an extract--"Myhand is at the point A. I move it to the point B, traversing theinterval AB. I say that this movement from A to B is a simple thing--each of us has the sensation of this, direct and immediate. Doubtless, while we carry our hand over from A to B, we say to ourselves that wecould stop it at an intermediate point, but then that would no longer bethe same movement. There would then be two movements, with an intervalof rest. Neither from within, by the muscular sense, nor from without, by sight, should we have the same perception. If we leave our movementfrom A to B such as it is, we feel it undivided, and we must declare itindivisible. It is true that when I look at my hand, going from A to B, traversing the interval AB, I say to myself 'the interval AB can bedivided into as many parts as I wish, therefore the movement from A to Bcan be divided into as many parts as I like, since this movement coversthis interval, ' or, again, 'At each moment of its passing, the movingobject passes over a certain point, therefore we can distinguish in themovement as many stopping-places as we wish--therefore the movement isinfinitely divisible. ' But let us reflect on this for a minute. How canthe movement possibly coincide with the space which it traverses? Howcan the moving coincide with the motionless? How can the object whichmoves be said to 'be' at any point in its path? It passes over, or, inother words, it could 'be' there. It would 'be' there if it stoppedthere, but, if it stopped there, it is no longer the same movement withwhich we are dealing. It is always at one bound that a trajectory istraversed when, on its course, there is no stoppage. The bound may lasta few seconds, or it may last for weeks, months, or years, but it isunique and cannot be decomposed. Only, when once the passage has beenmade, as the path is in space, and space is infinitely divisible, wepicture to ourselves the movement itself as infinitely divisible. Welike to imagine it thus, because, in a movement it is not the change ofposition which interests us, it is the positions themselves which themoving object has left, which it will take up, which it might assume ifit were to stop in its course. We have need of immobility, and the morewe succeed in presenting to ourselves the movement as coinciding withthe space which it traverses, the better we think we understand it. Really, there is no true immobility, if we imply by that, an absence ofmovement. "[Footnote: Translated from La Perception du Changement, pp. 19-20. ] This immobility of which we have need for the purposes of actionand of practical life, we erect into an absolute reality. It is ofcourse convenient to our sense of sight to lay hold of objects in thisway; as pioneer of the sense of touch, it prepares our action on theexternal world. But, although for all practical purposes we require thenotion of immobility as part of our mental equipment, it does not at allhelp us to grasp reality. Then we habitually regard movement assomething superadded to the motionless. This is quite legitimate in theworld of affairs; but when we bring this habit into the world ofspeculation, we misconceive reality, we create lightheartedly insolubleproblems, and close our eyes to what is most alive in the real world. For us movement is one position, then another position, and so onindefinitely. It is true that we say there must be something else, viz. , the actual passing across the interval which separates those positions. But such a conception of Change is quite false. All true change ormovement is indivisible. We, by constructing fictitious states andtrying to compose movement out of them, endeavour to make a processcoincide with a thing--a movement with an immobility. This is the way toarrive at dilemmas, antinomies, and blind-alleys of thought. The puzzlesof Zeno about "Achilles and the Tortoise" and "The Moving Arrow" areclassical examples of the error involved in treating movement asdivisible. [Footnote: Bergson in Matter and Memory examines Zeno's fourpuzzles: "The Dichotomy, " "Achilles and the Tortoise, " "The Arrow" and"The Stadium. "] If movement is not everything, it is nothing, and if wepostulate, to begin with, that the motionless is real, then we shall beincapable of grasping reality. The philosophies of Plato, of Aristotle, and of Plotinus were developed from the thesis that there is more in theimmutable than in the moving, and that it is by way of diminution thatwe pass from the stable to the unstable. 

The main reason why it is such a difficult matter for us to grasp thereality of continuous change is owing to the limitations of ourintellectual nature. "We are made in order to act, as much as and morethan in order to think--or, rather, when we follow the bent of ournature, it is in order to act that we think. "[Footnote: CreativeEvolution, p. 313 (Fr. P. 321). ] Intellect is always trying to carve outfor itself stable forms because it is primarily fitted for action, and"is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life" and graspChange. [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 174 (Fr. P. 179). ] Ourintellect loves the solid and the static, but life itself is not static--it is dynamic. We might say that the intellect takes views across theever-moving scene, snapshots of reality. It acts like the camera of thecinematograph operator, which is capable only of producing photographs, successive and static, in a series upon a ribbon. To grasp reality, wehave to do what the cinematograph does with the film--that is, introduceor rather, re-introduce movement. [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 320-324 (Fr. Pp. 328-332). ] The stiff photograph is an abstraction bereft ofmovement, so, too, our intellectual views of the world and of our ownnature are static instead of being dynamic. Human life is not made up ofchildhood, adolescence, manhood, and old age as "states, " although wetend to speak of it in this way. Life is not a thing, nor the state of athing--it is a continuous movement or change. The soul itself is amovement, not an entity. In the physical world, light, when examined, proves itself to be a movement. Even physical science, bound, as itwould seem, to assert the fixity and rigidity of matter, is now of theopinion that matter is not the solid thing we are apt to think it. Theexperiments of Kelvin and Lodge and the discovery of radium, havebrought forward a new theory of matter; the old-fashioned base, theatom, is now regarded as being essentially movement; matter is aswonderful and mysterious in its character as spirit. Further we mustnote that the researches of Einstein, culminating in the formulation ofhis general Theory of Relativity and his special Theory of Gravitation, which are arousing such interest at the present time, threaten veryseriously the older static views of the universe and seem to frustrateany efforts to find and denote any stability therein. [Footnote: Consulton this Dr. Einstein's own work of which the translation by R. W. Lawsonis just published: Relativity: The Special and the General Theory. Methuen, 1920. ] In the light of these discoveries, Bergson's views onthe reality of Change seem less paradoxical than they might formerlyhave appeared. The reality of Change is, for Bergson, absolute, and onthis, as a fundamental point, he constructs his thought. In conjunctionwith his study of Memory, it leads up to his discussions of Real Time(la duree), of Freedom, and of Creative Evolution. We must then, at theoutset of any study of Bergson's philosophy, obtain a grasp of thisuniversal 'becoming'--a vision of the reality of Change. Then we shallrealize that Change is substantial, that it constitutes the very stuffof life. "There are changes, but there are not things that change;change does not need a support. There are movements, but there are not, necessarily, constant objects which are moved; movement does not implysomething that is movable. "[Footnote: Translated from La Perception duChangement, Lecture 2, p. 24. ]

To emphasize and to illustrate this point, so fundamental in histhought, Bergson turns to music. "Let us listen, " he says, "to a melody, letting ourselves be swayed by it; do we not have the clear perceptionof a movement which is not attached to any mobility--of a change devoidof anything which changes? The change is self-sufficient, it is thething itself. It avails nothing to say that it takes time, for it isindivisible; if the melody were to stop sooner, it would not be anylonger the same volume of sound, but another, equally indivisible. Doubtless we have a tendency to divide it and to represent it toourselves as a linking together of distinct notes instead of theuninterrupted continuity of the melody. But why? Simply because ourauditive perception has assumed the habit of saturating itself withvisual images. We hear the melody across the vision which the conductorof the orchestra can have of it in looking at his score. We represent toourselves notes linked on to notes on an imaginary sheet of paper. Wethink of a keyboard on which one plays, of the bow of a violin whichcomes and goes, of the musicians, each one of whom plays his part inconjunction with the others. Let us abstract these spatial images; thereremains pure change, self-sufficing, in no way attached to a 'thing'which changes. "[Footnote: Translated from La Perception du Changement, pp. 24-25. ]

We must conceive reality as a continual flux, then immobility will seema superficial abstraction hypostatized into states, concepts, andsubstances, and the old difficulties raised by the ancients, in regardto the problem of Change, will vanish, along with the problems attachedto the notion of "substance" in modern thought, because there is nothingsubstantial but Change. Apart from Change there is no reality. We shallsee that all is movement, that we ourselves are movement--part of anelan, a poussee formidable, which carries with it all things and allcreatures, and that in this eternity--not of immutability but of lifeand Change--"we live and move and have our being. "[Footnote: LaPerception du Changement, concluding paragraph, p. 37. ]

CHAPTER III

PERCEPTION

Images as data--Nerves, afferent and efferent, cannot beget images, norcan the brain give rise to representations--All our perception relativeto action. Denial of this involves the fallacies of Idealism or ofRealism--Perception and knowledge--Physiological data--Zone ofindetermination--"Pure" perception--Memory and Perception. 

From the study of Change we are led on to a consideration of theproblems connected with our perception of the external world, which hasits roots in change. These problems have given rise to some veryopposing views--the classic warfare between Realism and Idealism. Bergson is of neither school, but holds that they each rest onmisconceptions, a wrong emphasis on certain facts. He invites us tofollow him closely while he investigates the problems of Perception inhis own way. 

"We will assume for the moment that we know nothing of theories ofmatter and theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions as to thereality or ideality of the external world. Here I am in the presence ofimages, in the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when mysenses are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed. . .. Now ofthese images there is ONE which is distinct from all the others, in thatI do not know it only from without by perceptions, but from within byaffections; it is my body. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 1 (Fr. P. 1). ] Further examination shows me that these affections "alwaysinterpose themselves between the excitations from without and themovement which I am about to execute. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 1(Fr. P. 1). ] Indeed all seems to take place as if, in this aggregate ofimages which I call the universe, nothing really new could happen exceptthrough the medium of certain particular images, the type of which isfurnished me by my body. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 3 (Fr. P. 2). ]Reference to physiology shows in the structure of human bodies afferentnerves which transmit a disturbance to nerve centres, and also efferentnerves which conduct from other centres movement to the periphery, thussetting in motion the body in whole or in part. When we make enquiriesfrom the physiologist or the psychologist with regard to the origin ofthese images and representations, we are sometimes told that, as thecentrifugal movements of the nervous system can evoke movement of thebody, so the centripetal movements--at least some of them--give rise tothe representation, mental picture, or perception of the external world. Yet we must remember that the brain, the nerves, and the disturbance ofthe nerves are, after all, only images among others. So it is absurd tostate that one image, say the brain, begets the others, for "the brainis part of the material world, but the material world is not part of thebrain. Eliminate the image which bears the name 'material world, ' andyou destroy, at the same time, the brain and the cerebral disturbanceswhich are parts of it. Suppose, on the contrary, that these two images, the brain and the cerebral disturbance, vanish; ex hypothesi you effaceonly these, that is to say, very little--an insignificant detail from animmense picture--the picture in its totality, that is to say, the wholeuniverse remains. To make of the brain the condition on which the wholeimage depends is a contradiction in terms, since the brain is, byhypothesis, a part of this image. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 4(Fr. Pp. 3-4). ] The data of perception are external images, then mybody, and changes brought about by my body in the surrounding images. The external images transmit movement to my body, it gives back movementto them. My body or part of my body, i. E. , my brain, could not beget awhole or part of my representation of the external world. "You may saythat my body is matter or that it is an image--the word is of noimportance. If it is matter, it is a part of the material world, and thematerial world consequently exists around it and without it. If it is animage--that image can give but what has been put into it, and since itis, by hypothesis, the image of my body only, it would be absurd toexpect to get from it that of the whole universe. My body, an objectdestined to move other objects, is then a centre of action; it cannotgive birth to a representation. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 5 (Fr. P. 4). ] The body, however, is privileged, since it appears to choosewithin certain limits certain reactions from possible ones. It exercisesa real influence on other images, deciding which step to take amongseveral which may be possible. It judges which course is advantageous ordangerous to itself, by the nature of the images which reach it. Theobjects which surround my body reflect its possible action upon them. All our perception has reference, primarily, to action, not tospeculation. [Footnote: Cf. Creative Evolution, p. 313 (Fr. P. 321). ] Thebrain centres are concerned with motor reaction rather than withconscious perception, "the brain is an instrument of action and not ofrepresentation. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 83 (Fr. P. 69). ]Therefore, in the study of the problems of perception, the starting-point should be action and not sensation. All the confusions, inconsistencies and absurdities of statement, made in regard to ourknowledge of the external world, have here their origin. Manyphilosophers and psychologists "show us a brain, analogous in itsessence to the rest of the material universe, consequently an image, ifthe universe is an image. Then, since they want the internal movementsof this brain to create or determine the representation of the wholematerial world--an image infinitely greater than that of the cerebralvibrations--they maintain that these molecular movements, and movementin general, are not images like others, but something which is eithermore or less than an image--in any case is of another nature than animage--and from which representation will issue as by a miracle. Thusmatter is made into something radically different from representation, something of which, consequently, we have no image; over against it theyplace a consciousness empty of images, of which we are unable to formany idea. Lastly, to fill consciousness, they invent an incomprehensibleaction of this formless matter upon this matterless thought. "[Footnote:Matter and Memory, p. 9 (Fr. Pp. 7-8). ]

The problem at issue between Realists and Idealists turns on the factthat there are two systems of images in existence. "Here is a system ofimages which I term 'my perception of the universe, ' and which may beentirely altered by a very slight change in the privileged image--mybody. This image occupies the centre. By it all the others areconditioned; at each of its movements everything changes as though by aturn of a kaleidoscope. Here, on the other hand, are the same images, but referred each one to itself, influencing each other no doubt, but insuch a manner that the effect is always in proportion to the cause; thisis what I term the 'universe. '"[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 12 (Fr. P. 10). ] The question is, "How is it that the same images can belong atthe same time to two different systems--the one in which each imagevaries for itself and in the well-defined measure that it is patient ofthe real action of surrounding images--the other in which all change fora single image and in the varying measure that they reflect the eventualaction of this privileged image?"[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 13(Fr. P. 11). ] We may style one the system of science, the other thesystem of consciousness. Now, Realism and Idealism are both incapable ofexplaining why there are two such systems at all. Subjective Idealismderives the system of science from that of consciousness, whilematerialistic Realism derives the system of consciousness from that ofscience. They have, however, this common meeting-place, that they bothregard Perception as speculative in character--for each of them "toperceive" is to "know. " Now this is just the postulate which Bergsondisputes. The office of perception, according to him, is to give us, notknowledge, but the conditions necessary for action. [Footnote: Notrecroyance a la loi de causalite (Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 1900), p. 658. ] A little examination shows us that distance stands forthe degree in which other bodies are protected, as it were, against theaction of my body against them, and equally too for the degree in whichmy body is protected from them. [Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et lafausse reconnaissance in L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 117-161 (Mind-Energy), or Revue philosophique, 1908, pp. 561-593. ] Perception isutilitarian in character and has reference to bodily action, and wedetach from all the images coming to us those which interest uspractically. 

Bergson then examines the physiological aspects of the perceptualprocess. Beginning with reflex actions and the development of thenervous system, he goes on to discuss the functions of the spinal cordand the brain. He finds in regard to these last two that "there is onlya difference of degree--there can be no difference in kind--between whatis called the perceptive faculty of the brain and the reflex functionsof the spinal cord. The cord transforms into movements the stimulationreceived, the brain prolongs into reactions which are merely nascent, but in the one case as in the other, the function of the nerve substanceis to conduct, to co-ordinate, or to inhibit movements. [Footnote: Matterand Memory, pp. 10-11 (Fr. P. 9). ] As we rise in the organic series wefind a division of physiological labour. Nerve cells appear, arediversified and tend to group themselves into a system; at the same timethe animal reacts by more varied movements to external stimulation. Buteven when the stimulation received is not at once prolonged intomovement, it appears merely to await its occasion; and the sameimpression which makes the organism aware of changes in the environment, determines it or prepares it to adapt itself to them. No doubt there isin the higher vertebrates a radical distinction between pure automatism, of which the seat is mainly in the spinal cord, and voluntary activitywhich requires the intervention of the brain. It might be imagined thatthe impression received, instead of expanding into more movementsspiritualizes itself into consciousness. But as soon as we compare thestructure of the spinal cord with that of the brain, we are bound toinfer that there is merely a difference of complication, and not adifference in kind, between the functions of the brain and the reflexactivity of the medullary system. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, pp. 17-18 (Fr. P. 15). ] The brain is no more than a kind of central telephoneexchange, its office is to allow communication or to delay it. It addsnothing to what it receives, it is simply a centre where perceptions getinto touch with motor mechanisms. Sometimes the function of the brain isto conduct the movement received to a chosen organ of reaction, while atother times it opens to the movement the totality of the motor tracks. The brain appears as an instrument of analysis in regard to movementsreceived by it, but an instrument of selection in regard to themovements executed. In either case, its office is limited to thetransmission and division of movements. In the lower organisms, stimulation takes the form of immediate contact. For example, a jelly-fish feels a danger when anything touches it, and reacts immediately. The more immediate the reaction has to be, the more it resembles simplecontact. Higher up the scale, sight and hearing enable the individual toenter into relation with a greater number of objects and with objects ata distance. This gives rise to an amount of uncertainty, "a zone ofindetermination, " where hesitation and choice come into play. Hence, says Bergson: "Perception is master of space in the exact measure inwhich action is master of time. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 23 (Fr. P. 19). ]

In the paper read before the First International Congress of Philosophyat Paris in 1900, on Our Belief in the Law of Causality, [Footnote: Notrecroyance a la loi de causalite (Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Sept. , 1900, pp. 655-660). ] Bergson showed that it has its root in theco-ordination of our tactile impressions with our visual impressions. This co-ordination becomes a continuity which generates motor habits ortendencies to action. 

There now comes up for consideration the question as to why thisrelation of the organism, to more or less distinct objects, takes theparticular form of conscious perception, and further, why doeseverything happen as if this consciousness were born of the internalmovements of the cerebral substance? To answer this question, we mustturn to perceptual processes, as these occur in our everyday life. Wefind at once that "there is no perception which is not full of memories. With the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a thousanddetails out of our past experience. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 24(Fr. P. 20). ] To such an extent is this true that the immediate data ofperception serve as a sign to bring much more to the mind. Psychologicalexperiments have conclusively proved that we never actually perceive allthat we imagine to be there. Hence arise illusions, examples of whichmay be easily thought of--incorrect proof-reading is one, while anothercommon one is the mistake of taking one person for another because ofsome similarity of dress. What is actually perceived is but a fractionof what we are looking at and acts normally as a suggestion for thewhole. Now, although it is true that, in practice, Perception and Memoryare never found absolutely separate in their purity, yet it is necessaryto distinguish them from one another absolutely in any investigation ofa psychological nature. If, instead of a perception impregnated withmemory-images, nothing survived from the past, then we should have"pure" perception, not coloured by anything in the individual's pasthistory, and so a kind of impersonal perception. However unreal it mayseem, such a perception is at the root of our knowledge of things andindividual accidents are merely grafted on to this impersonal or "pure"perception. Just because philosophers have overlooked it, and becausethey have failed to distinguish it from that which memory contributes toit, they have regarded Perception as a kind of interior and subjectivevision, differing from Memory only by its greater intensity and notdiffering in nature. In reality, however, Perception and Memory differfundamentally. 

Our conscious perception is just our power of choice, reflected fromthings as though by a mirror, so that representation arises from theomission of that in the totality of matter which has no bearing on ourneeds and consequently no interest for us. "There is for images merely adifference of degree and not of kind between 'being' and 'beingconsciously perceived. '"[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 30 (Fr. P. 25). ] Consciousness--in regard to external perception--is explained bythis indeterminateness and this choice. "But there is in this necessarypoverty of conscious perception, something that is positive, thatforetells spirit; it is, in the etymological sense of the word, discernment. '"[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 31 (Fr. P. 26). ] Thechief difficulty in dealing with the problems of Perception, is toexplain "not how Perception arises, but how it is limited, since itshould be the image of the whole and is in fact reduced to the image ofthat which interests you. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 34 (Fr. P. 29). ] We only make an insuperable difficulty if we imagine Perception tobe a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a fixed point bythat special apparatus which is called an organ of perception--aphotograph which would then be developed in the brain-matter by someunknown chemical and psychical process. "Everything happens as thoughyour perception were a result of the internal motions of the brain andissued in some sort from the cortical centres. It could not actuallycome from them since the brain is an image like others, enveloped in themass of other images, and it would be absurd that the container shouldissue from the content. But since the structure of the brain is like thedetailed plan of the movements among which you have the choice, andsince that part of the external images which appears to return uponitself, in order to constitute perception, includes precisely all thepoints of the universe which these movements could affect, consciousperception and cerebral movement are in strict correspondence. Thereciprocal dependence of these two terms is therefore simply due to thefact that both are functions of a third, which is the indetermination ofthe Will. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 35 (Fr. P. 29). ]

Moreover, we must recognize that the image is formed and perceived inthe object, not in the brain, even although it would seem that rays oflight coming from a point P are perceived along the path of the sensori-motor processes in the brain and are afterwards projected into P. Thereis not, however, an unextended image which forms itself in consciousnessand then projects itself into the position P. Really, the point P, andthe rays which it emits, together with the retina and nervous elementsaffected in the process of perception, all form a single whole. Thepoint P is an indispensable factor in this whole and it is really in Pand not anywhere else that the image of P is formed andperceived. [Footnote: Cf. Matter and Memory, p. 37 (Fr p. 31), also paperentitled Notre croyance a la loi de causalite in the Revue demetaphysique et de morale, 1900, p. 658. ]

In the field of "pure" perception, that is to say, perceptionunadulterated by the addition of memory-images, there can arise no imagewithout an object. "Sensation is essentially due to what is actuallypresent. "[Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, p. 579 of Revue philosophique, Dec. , 1908; also L'Energie spirituelle, p. 141 (Mind-Energy). ] Exactly how external stimuli, such as rays of acertain speed and length, come to give us a certain image, e. G. , thesensation "red" or the sound of "middle C, " we shall never understand. "No trace of the movements themselves can be actually perceived in thesensation which translates them. "[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 34-35 (Fr. P. 26). ] We only make trouble by regarding sensations in anisolated manner and attempting to construct Perception from them. "Oursensations are to our perceptions, that which the real action of ourbody is to its possible or virtual action. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 58 (Fr. P. 48). ] Thus, everything happens as if the external imageswere reflected by our body into surrounding space. This is why thesurface of the body, which forms the common limit of the external andinternal, is the only portion of space which is both perceived and felt. Just as external objects are perceived by me where they are, inthemselves and not in me, so my affective states (e. G. Pains--which arelocal, unavailing efforts) are experienced where they occur, in my body. Consider the system of images which we term the "external world. " Mybody is one of them and around it is grouped the representation, i. E. , its eventual influence on others. Within it occurs affection, i. E. , itsactual effort upon itself. It is because of this distinction betweenimages and sensations that we affirm that the totality of perceivedimages subsists, even if our body disappears, whereas we cannotannihilate our body without destroying our sensations. In practice, our"pure" perception is adulterated with affection, as well as withmemories. To understand Perception, however, we must--as previouslyinsisted upon--study it with reference to action. It is false to suppose"that perception and sensation exist for their own sake; the philosopherascribes to them an entirely speculative function, "[Footnote: Matter andMemory, p. 311 (Fr p. 261). ] a proceeding which gives rise to thefallacies of Realism and Idealism. 

It has been said that the choice of perceptions from among images ingeneral is the effect of a "discernment" which foreshadows spirit. Butto touch the reality of spirit, we must place ourselves at the pointwhere an individual consciousness continues and retains the past in apresent, enriched by it. [Footnote: See Chapter VI on la duree. Time--True and False. ] Perception we never meet in its pure state; it isalways mingled with memories. The rose has a different scent for youfrom that which it has for me, just because the scent of the rose bearswith it all the memories of all the roses we have ever experienced, eachof us individually. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 161-162 (Fr. P. 124). ] Memory, however mingled with Perception, is neverthelessfundamentally different in character. [Footnote: Le Souvenir du presentet la fausse reconnaissance, Revue philosophique, Dec. , 1908, p. 580;also L'Effort intellectuel, Revue philosophique, Jan. , 1902, p. 23;L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 141 and 197 (Mind-Energy). ] "When we passfrom 'pure' Perception to Memory, we definitely abandon matter forspirit. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 313 (Fr. P. 263). ]

CHAPTER IV

MEMORY

Definition--Two forms--memorizing power related to habit; recallingpower or "pure" memory. Is memory a function of the brain?--PathologicalPhenomena. Memory something other than merely a function of the brain. The "Box" theory--Memory records everything--Dreams--The well-balancedmind--Memory a manifestation of spirit. 

The importance of Memory is recognized by all persons--whetherpsychologists or not. At the present time there is a growing interest insystems of memory-training offered to the public, which aim at mentalefficiency as a means to success in life. Indeed, from the tone of someadvertisements seen in the press, one might be prompted to think thatMemory itself was the sole factor determining success in either aprofessional or a business career. Yet, although we are likely to regardthis as a somewhat exaggerated statement, nevertheless we cannot denythe very great importance of the power of Memory. How often, in everydaylife, we hear people excuse themselves by remarking "My memory failedme" or "played me false" or, more bluntly, "I forgot all about that. "Without doubt, Memory is a most vital factor, though not the only one inmental efficiency. [Footnote: The true ideal of mental efficiency mustinclude power of Will as well as of Memory. ] It is an element in mentallife which puzzles both the specialist in psychology and the layman. "What is this wonderfully subtle power of mind?" "How do we remember?"Even the mind, untrained in psychological investigation, cannot helpasking such questions in moments of reflection; but for the psychologistthey are questions of very vital significance in his science. ForBergson, as psychologist, Memory is naturally, a subject of greatimportance. We must note, however, that for Bergson, as metaphysician, it plays an even more important role, since his study of Memory andconclusions as to its nature lead him on to a discussion of the relationof soul and body, spirit and matter. His second large work, whichappeared in 1896, bears the title Matiere et Memoire. For him, Memory isa pivot on which turns a whole scheme of relationships--material andspiritual. He wrote in 1910 a new introduction for the EnglishTranslation of this work. He there says that "among all the factscapable of throwing light on the psycho-physiological relation, thosewhich concern Memory, whether in the normal or the pathological state, hold a privileged position. "[Footnote: Introduction to Matter andMemory, p. Xii. ] Let us then, prior to passing on to the considerationof the problem of the relation of soul and body, examine what Bergsonhas to say on the subject of Memory. 

At the outset, we may define Memory as the return to consciousness ofsome experience, accompanied by the awareness that it has been presentearlier at a definite time and place. [Footnote: The above is to be takenas a definition of the normal memory. In a subtle psychological analysisin the paper entitled Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissancein L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 117-161 (Mind-Energy), Bergson considerscases of an abnormal or fictitious memory, coinciding with perception inrather a strange manner. This does not, however, affect the validity ofthe above definition. ] Bergson first of all draws attention to adistinction between two different forms of Memory, the nature of whichwill be best brought out by considering two examples. We are fond ofgiving to children or young persons at school selections from the playsof Shakespeare, "to be learned by heart, " as we say. We praise the boyor girl who can repeat a long passage perfectly, and we regard thatscholar as gifted with a good memory. To illustrate the second type ofcase, suppose a question to be put to that boy asking him what he saw onthe last half-holiday when he took a ramble in the country. He may, ormay not, be able to tell us much of his adventures on that occasion, forwhatever he can recall is due to a mental operation of a differentcharacter from that which enabled him to learn his lesson. There is hereno question of learning by rote, of memorizing, but of capacity torecall to mind a past experience. The boy who is clever at memorizing apassage from Shakespeare may not have a good memory at all for recallingpast events. To understand why this is so we must examine these twoforms of Memory more closely and refer to Bergson's own words: "I studya lesson, and in order to learn it by heart I read it a first time, accentuating every line; I then repeat it a certain number of times. Ateach repetition there is progress; the words are more and more linkedtogether, and at last make a continuous whole. When that moment comes, it is said that I know my lesson by heart, that it is imprinted on mymemory. I consider now how the lesson has been learnt and picture tomyself the successive phases of the process. Each several reading thenrecurs to me with its own individuality. It is distinguished from thosewhich preceded or followed it, by the place which it occupied in time;in short, each reading stands out before my mind as a definite event inmy history. Again it will be said that these images are recollections, that they are imprinted on my Memory. The same words then are used inboth cases. Do they mean the same thing? The memory of the lesson whichis remembered, in the sense of learned by heart, has ALL the marks of ahabit. Like a habit, it is acquired by the repetition of the sameeffort. Like every habitual bodily exercise, it is stored up in amechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial impulse, in aclosed system of automatic movements, which succeed each other in thesame order and together take the same length of time. The memory of eachseveral reading, on the contrary, has NONE of the marks of a habit, itis like an event in my life; it is a case of spontaneous recollection asdistinct from mere learnt recollection. Now a learnt recollection passesout of time in the measure that the lesson is better known; it becomesmore and more impersonal, more and more foreign to our pastlife. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, pp. 89-90 (Fr. Pp. 75-76). ] Thisquotation makes clear that of these two forms of Memory, it is the powerof spontaneous recollection which is Memory par excellence andconstitutes "real" Memory. The other, to which psychologists usuallyhave devoted most of their attention in discussing the problem ofMemory, is habit interpreted as Memory, rather than Memory itself. Having thus made clear this valuable and fundamental distinction--"oneof the best things in Bergson"[Footnote: Bertrand Russell's remark inhis Philosophy of Bergson, p. 7. ]--and having shown that in practicallife the automatic memory necessarily plays an important part, ofteninhibiting "pure" Memory, Bergson proceeds to examine and criticizecertain views of Memory itself, and endeavours finally to demonstrate tous what he himself considers it to be. 

He takes up the cudgels to attack the view which aims at blending Memorywith Perception, as being of like kind. Memory, he argues, must bedistinguished from Perception, however much we admit (and rightly) thatmemories enter into and colour all our perceptions. They are quitedifferent in their nature. A remembrance is the representation of anabsent object. We distinguish between hearing a faint tap at the door, and the faint memory of a loud one. We cannot admit the validity of thestatement that there is only a difference of intensity betweenPerception and Recollection. "As our perception of a present object issomething of that object itself, our representation of the absentobject, as in Memory, must be a phenomenon of quite other order thanPerception, since between presence and absence there are no degrees, nointermediate stages. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 315 (Fr. P. 264). ]If we maintain that recollection is merely a weakened form of Perceptionwe must note the consequences of such a thesis. "If recollection is onlya weakened Perception, inversely, Perception must be something like anintenser Memory. Now, the germ of English Idealism is to be found here. This Idealism consists in finding only a difference of degree and not ofkind, between the reality of the object perceived, and the ideality ofthe object conceived. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 318 (Fr. P. 267). ] The maintenance of such a doctrine involves the furtherremarkable contention that "we construct matter from our own interiorstates and that perception is only a true hallucination. "[Footnote:Matter and Memory, p 318 (Fr. P. 267). ] Such a theory will not harmonizewith the experienced difference between Perceptions andMemories. [Footnote: Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, Revue philosophique, Dec. , 1908, p. 568; also L'Energie spirituelle(Mind-Energy). ] We do not mistake the perception of a slight sound forthe recollection of a loud noise, as has already been remarked. Theconsciousness of a recollection "never occurs as a weak state which wetry to relegate to the past so soon as we become aware of its weakness. How indeed, unless we already possess the representation of a past, previously lived, could we relegate to it the less intense psychicalstates, when it would be so simple to set them alongside of strongstates as a present experience more confused, beside a presentexperience more distinct?"[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 319 (Fr. P. 268). ] The truth is that Memory does not consist in a regression fromthe present into the past, but on the contrary, in a progress from thepast to the present. Memory is radically distinct from Perception, inits character. 

Bergson then passes on to discuss other views of Memory, and inparticular, those which deal with the nature of Memory and its relationto the brain. It is stated dogmatically by some that Memory is afunction of the brain. Others claim, in opposition to this, that Memoryis something other than a function of the brain. Between two suchstatements as these, compromise or reconciliation is obviouslyimpossible. It is then for experience to decide between these twoconflicting views. This empirical appeal Bergson does not shirk. He hasmade a most comprehensive and intensive study of pathological phenomenarelating to the mental malady known as aphasia. This particular type ofdisorder belongs to a whole class of mental diseases known as amnesia. Now amnesia (in Greek, "forgetfulness") is literally any loss or defectof the Memory. Aphasia (in Greek "absence of speech") is a total orpartial loss of the power of speech, either in its spoken or writtenform. The term covers the loss of the power of expression by spokenwords, but is often extended to include both word-deafness, i. E. , themisunderstanding of what is said, and word-blindness--the inability toread words. An inability to execute the movements necessary to expressoneself, either by gesture, writing, or speech, is styled "motoraphasia, " to distinguish it from the inability to understand familiargestures and written or spoken words, which is known as "sensory-aphasia. " The commonest causes of this disease are lesions, affectingthe special nerve centres, due to haemorrhage or the development oftumours, being in the one case rapid, in the other a gradualdevelopment. Of course any severe excitement, fright or illness, involving a disturbance of the normal circulation in the cerebralcentres, may produce asphasia. During the war, it has been one of theafflictions of a large number of the victims of "shell-shock. " But, whatever be the cause, the patient is reduced mentally to an elementarystate, resembling that of a child, and needs re-educating in theelements of language. 

Now, from his careful study of the pathological phenomena, manifested inthese cases, Bergson draws some very important conclusions in regard tothe nature of Memory and its relation to the brain. In 1896, when hebrought out his work Matiere et Memoire, in Paris, the general view wasagainst his conclusions and his opinions were ridiculed. By 1910, amarked change had come about and he was able to refer to this in the newintroduction. [Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 158. ] His view was nolonger considered paradoxical. The conception of aphasia, onceclassical, universally admitted, believed to be unshakeable, had beenconsiderably shaken in that period of fourteen years. Localization, andreference to centres would not, it was found, explain thingssufficiently. [Footnote: The work of Pierre Janet was largely influentialalso in bringing about this change of view. ] This involved a too rigidand mechanical conception of the brain as a mere "box, " and Bergsonattacks it very forcibly under the name of "the box theory. " "All thearguments, " he says, "from fact which may be invoked in favour of aprobable accumulation of memories in the cortical substance, are drawnfrom local disorders of memory. But if recollections were reallydeposited in the brain, to definite gaps in memory characteristiclesions of the brain would correspond. Now in those forms of amnesia inwhich a whole period of our past existence, for example, is abruptly andentirely obliterated from memory, we do not observe any precise cerebrallesion; and on the contrary, in those disorders of memory where cerebrallocalization is distinct and certain, that is to say, in the differenttypes of aphasia, and in the diseases of visual or auditory recognition, we do not find that certain definite recollections are, as it were, tornfrom their seat, but that it is the whole faculty of remembering that ismore or less diminished in vitality, as if the subject had more or lessdifficulty in bringing his recollections into contact with the presentsituation. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 315 (Fr. Pp. 264-265). ] Butas it is a fact that the past survives under two distinct forms, viz. , "motor mechanisms" and "independent recollections, " we find that thisexplains why "in all cases where a lesion of the brain attacks a certaincategory of recollections, the affected recollections do not resembleeach other by all belonging to the same period, or by any logicalrelationship to one another, but simply in that they are all auditive orall visual or all motor. That which is damaged appears to be the varioussensorial or motor areas, or more often still, those appendages whichpermit of their being set going from within the cortex rather than therecollections themselves. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 317 (Fr. P. 266). ] Going even further than this, by the study of the recognition ofwords, and of sensory-aphasia, Bergson shows that "recognition is in noway affected by a mechanical awakening of memories that are asleep inthe brain. It implies, on the contrary, a more or less high degree oftension in consciousness, which goes to fetch pure recollections in purememory, in order to materialize them progressively, by contact with thepresent perception. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 317 (Fr. P. 266). ]

In the face of all this mass of evidence and thoroughness of argumentwhich Bergson brings forward, we are led to conclude that Memory isindeed something other than a function of the brain. Criticizing Wundt'sview, [Footnote: As expressed in his Grundzuge der physiologischepsychologie, vol. I. , pp. 320-327. See Matter and Memory, p. 164 (Fr. P. 137). ]Bergson contends that no trace of an image can remain in thesubstance of the brain and no centre of apperception can exist. "Thereis not in the brain a region in which memories congeal and accumulate. The alleged destruction of memories by an injury to the brain is but abreak in the continuous progress by which they actualizethemselves. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 160 (Fr. P. 134). ] It isthen futile to ask in what spot past memories are stored. To look forthem in any place would be as meaningless as asking to see traces of thetelephonic message upon the telephone wire. 

"Memory, " it has been said, "is a faculty which loses nothing andrecords everything. "[Footnote: Ball, quoted by Rouillard, Les Amnesies, Paris, 1885, p. 25; Matter and Memory, p. 201 (Fr. P. 168). ] This isonly too true, although normally we do not recognize it. But we cannever be sure that we have absolutely forgotten anything. Illness, producing delirium, may provoke us to speak of things we had thoughtwere gone beyond recall and which perhaps we even wish were beyondrecall. A somnambulistic state or even a dream may show us memoryextending far further back than we could ordinarily imagine. The facingof death in battle, we know, recalls to many, with extreme vividness, scenes of early childhood which they had deemed long since forgotten. "There is nothing, " says Bergson, "more instructive in this regard thanwhat happens in cases of sudden suffocation--in men drowned or hanged. The man, when brought to life again, states that he saw in a very shorttime all the forgotten events of his life, passing before him with greatrapidity, with their smallest circumstances, and in the very order inwhich they occurred. "[Footnote: La Perception du Changement, pp. 30-31, and Matter and Memory, p 200 (Fr p 168). ] Hence we can never beabsolutely sure that we have forgotten anything although at any giventime we may be unable to recall it to mind. There is an unconsciousmemory. [Footnote: Cf. Samuel Butler's Unconscious Memory. ] Speaking ofthe profound and yet undeniable reality of the unconscious, Bergsonsays, [Footnote: Matter and Memory, pp 181-182 (Fr. Pp. 152-153). Seealso Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, Revuephilosophique, Dec. , 1908, p. 592, and L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 159-161 (Mind-Energy). ] "Our unwillingness to conceive unconscious psychicalstates, is due, above all, to the fact that we hold consciousness to bethe essential property of psychical states, so that a psychical statecannot, it seems, cease to be conscious without ceasing to exist. But ifconsciousness is but the characteristic note of the present, that is tosay, of the actually lived, in short, of the active, then that whichdoes not act may cease to belong to consciousness without thereforeceasing to exist in some manner. In other words, in the psychologicaldomain, consciousness may not be the synonym of existence, but only ofreal action or of immediate efficacy; limiting thus the meaning of theterm, we shall have less difficulty in representing to ourselves apsychical state which is unconscious, that is to say, ineffective. Whatever idea we may frame of consciousness in itself, such as it wouldbe if it could work untrammelled, we cannot deny that in a being whichhas bodily functions, the chief office of consciousness is to presideover action and to enlighten choice. Therefore it throws light on theimmediate antecedents of the decision and on those past recollectionswhich can usefully combine with it; all else remains in shadow. " But wehave no more right to say that the past effaces itself as soon asperceived than to suppose that material objects cease to exist when wecease to perceive them. Memory, to use a geometrical illustration whichBergson himself employs, comes into action like the point of a conepressing against a plane. The plane denotes the present need, particularly in relation to bodily action, while the cone stands for allour total past. Much of this past, indeed most of it, only endures asunconscious Memory, but it is always capable of coming to the apex ofthe cone, i. E. , coming into consciousness. So we may say that there aredifferent planes of Memory, conic sections, if we keep up the originalmetaphor, and the largest of these contains all our past. This may bewell described as "the plane of dream. "[Footnote: See Matter and Memory, p. 222 (Fr. P. 186) and the paper L'Effort intellectuel, Revuephilosophique, Jan. , 1902, pp. 2 and 25, L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 165and 199 (Mind-Energy). ]

This connexion of Memory with dreams is more fully brought out byBergson in his lecture before the Institut psychologique international, five years after the publication of Matiere et Memoire, entitled LeReve. [Footnote: Delivered March 26, 1901. See Bibliography, p. 153. ]The following is a brief summary of the view there set forth. Memories, and only memories, weave the web of our dreams. They are "such stuff asdreams are made on. " Often we do not recognize them. They may be veryold memories, forgotten during waking hours, drawn from the most obscuredepths of our past, or memories of objects we have perceiveddistractedly, almost unconsciously, while awake. They may be fragmentsof broken memories, composing an incoherent and unrecognizable whole. Ina waking state our memories are closely connected with our presentsituation (unless we be given to day-dreams!). In an animal memoryserves to recall to him the advantageous or injurious consequences whichhave formerly arisen in a like situation, and so aids his presentaction. In man, memory forms a solid whole, a pyramid whose point isinserted precisely into our present action. But behind the memorieswhich are involved in our occupations, there are others, thousands ofothers, stored below the scene illuminated by consciousness. "Yes, Ibelieve indeed, " says Bergson, "that all our past life is there, preserved even to the most infinitesimal details, and that we forgetnothing and that all that we have ever felt, perceived, thought, willed, from the first awakening of our consciousness, survives indestructibly. "[Footnote: Dreams, p. 37. For this discussion in full, see pages 34-39, or see L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 100-103 (Mind-Energy). ] Of course, inaction I have something else to do than occupy myself with these. Butsuppose I become disinterested in present action--that I fall asleep--then the obstacle (my attention to action) removed, these memories tryto raise the trap-door--they all want to get through. From the multitudewhich are called, which will be chosen? When I was awake, only thosewere admitted which bore on the present situation. Now, in sleep, morevague images occupy my vision, more indecisive sounds reach my ear, moreindistinct touches come to my body, and more vague sensations come frommy internal organs. Hence those memories which can assimilate themselvesto some element in this vague mass of very indistinct sensations manageto get through. When such union is effected, between memory andsensation, we have a dream. 

In order that a recollection should be brought to mind, it is necessarythat it should descend from the height of pure memory to the precisepoint where action is taking place. Such a power is the mark of thewell-balanced mind, pursuing a via media between impulsiveness on theone hand, and dreaminess on the other. "The characteristic of the man ofaction, " says Bergson in this connexion, "is the promptitude with whichhe summons to the help of a given situation all the memories which havereference to it. To live only in the present, to respond to a stimulusby the immediate reaction which prolongs it, is the mark of the loweranimals; the man who proceeds in this way is a man of impulse. But hewho lives in the past, for the mere pleasure of living there, and inwhom recollections emerge into the light of consciousness, without anyadvantage for the present situation, is hardly better fitted for action;here we have no man of impulse, but a dreamer. Between these twoextremes lies the happy disposition of a memory docile enough to followwith precision all the outlines of the present situation, but energeticenough to resist all other appeal. Good sense or practical sense, isprobably nothing but this. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 198 (Fr. Pp. 166-167). ]

In the paper L'Effort intellectuel, contributed in 1902 to the Revuephilosophique, and now reprinted in L'Energie spirituelle, [Footnote: Pp. 163-202. See also Mind-Energy. ]Bergson gives an analysis of what isinvolved in intellectual effort. There is at first, he shows, somethingconceived quite generally, an idea vague and abstract, a schema whichhas to be completed by distinct images. In thought there is a movementof the mind from the plane of the schema to the plane of the concreteimage. Various images endeavour to fit themselves into the schema, orthe schema may adapt itself to the reception of the images. These doubleefforts to secure adaptation and cooperation may both encounterresistance from the other, a situation which is known to us ashesitation, accompanied by the awareness of obstacles, thus involvingintellectual effort. 

Memory then, Bergson wishes us to realize, in response to his treatmentof it, is no mere function of the brain; it is something infinitely moresubtle, infinitely more elusive, and more wondrous. Our memories are notstored in the brain like letters in a filing cabinet, and all our pastsurvives indestructibly as Memory, even though in the form ofunconscious memory. We must recognize Memory to be a spiritual fact andso regard it as a pivot on which turn many discussions of vitalimportance when we come to investigate the problem of the relation ofsoul and body. For "Memory must be, in principle, a power absolutelyindependent of matter. If then, spirit is a reality, it is here, in thephenomenon of Memory that we may come into touch with itexperimentally. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 81 (Fr. P. 68). ]"Memory, " he would remind us finally, "is just the intersection of mindand matter. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, Introduction, p. Xii. ] "Aremembrance cannot be the result of a state of the brain. The state ofthe brain continues the remembrance; it gives it a hold on the presentby the materiality which it confers upon it, but pure memory is aspiritual manifestation. With Memory, we are, in very truth, in thedomain of spirit. "[Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 320 (Fr. P. 268). ]

CHAPTER V

THE RELATION OF SOUL AND BODY

The hypothesis of Psycho-physical Parallelism--Not to be accepteduncritically--Bergson opposes it, and shows the hypothesis to rest on aconfusion of terms. Bergson against Epiphenomenalism--Soul-life uniqueand wider than the brain--Telepathy, subconscious action and psychicalresearch--Souls and survival. 

For philosophy in general, and for psychology in particular, the problemof the relation of soul and body has prime significance, and moreover, it is a problem with which each of us is acquainted intimately andpractically, even if we know little or nothing of the academicdiscussions, or of the technical terms representing various views. It isvery frequently the terminology which turns the plain man away from theconsideration of philosophical problems; but he has some conception, however crude it may be, of his soul or his mind and of his body. Theseterms are familiar to him, but the sight of a phrase like "psycho-physical parallelism" rather daunts him. Really, it stands for quite asimple thing, and is just the official label used to designate thetheory commonly held by scientific men of all kinds, to describe therelation of soul and body. Put more precisely, it is just the assertionthat brain and consciousness work on parallel lines. 

Bergson does not accept the hypothesis of psycho-physical parallelism. In the first of his four lectures on La Nature de l'Ame, given at LondonUniversity in 1911, we find him criticizing the notion thatconsciousness has no independence of its own, that it merely expressescertain states of the brain, that the content of a fact of consciousnessis to be found wholly in the corresponding cerebral state. It is truethat we should not find many physiologists or philosophers who wouldtell us now that "the brain secretes thought as the liver secretesbile. "[Footnote: Cabanis (1757-1808). Rapports du physique et du moralede l'homme, 1802. See quotation by William James in Human Immortality. Note (4) in his Appendix. ] But there was an idea that, if we could seethrough the skull and observe what takes place in the brain, if we hadan enormously powerful microscope which would permit us to follow themovements of the molecules, atoms, electrons, of the brain, and if wehad the key to the correspondence between these phenomena and the mind, we should know all the thoughts and wishes of the person to whom thebrain belonged--we should see what took place in his soul, as atelegraph operator could read by the oscillation of his needles themeaning of a message which was sent through his instrument. The notionof an equality or parallelism between conscious activity and cerebralactivity, was commonly adopted by modern physiology, and it was adoptedwithout discussion as a scientific notion by the majority ofphilosophers. Yet the experimental basis of this theory is extremelyslight, indeed altogether insufficient, and in reality the theory is ametaphysical conception, resulting from the views of the seventeenthcentury thinkers who had hopes of "a universal mathematic. " The idea hadbeen accepted that all was capable of determination in the psychical aswell as the physical world, inasmuch as the psychical was only a reflexof the physical. Parallelism was adopted by science because of itsconvenience. [Footnote: See The Times of Oct. 21, 1911. ] Bergson, however, pointed out that philosophy ought not to accept it withoutcriticism, and maintained, moreover, that it could not stand thecriticism that might be brought against it. Relation of soul and bodywas undeniable, but that it was a parallel or equivalent relation hedenied most emphatically. That criticism he had launched himself withgreat vigour in 1901 at a Meeting of the Societe francaise dephilosophie, [Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 153. ] and on a morememorable occasion, at the International Congress of Philosophy atGeneva in 1904. [Footnote: See Bibliography, p. 154. ] Before thePhilosophical Society he lectured on Le Parallelisme psycho-physique etla Metaphysique positive, and propounded the following propositions:

1. If psycho-physical parallelism is neither rigorous nor complete, ifto every determined thought there does not correspond an absolutelydetermined state (si a toute pensee determinee ne correspond pas un etatcerebral determine absolument), it will be the business of experience tomark with increasing accuracy the precise points at which parallelismbegins and ends. 

2. If this empirical inquiry is possible, it will measure more and moreexactly the separation between the thought and the physical conditionsin which this thought is exercised. In other words, it will give us aprogressive knowledge of the relation of man as a thinking being to manas a living being, and therefore of what may be termed "the meaning ofLife. "

3. If this meaning of Life can be empirically determined more and moreexactly, and completely, a positive metaphysic is possible: that is tosay, a metaphysic which cannot be contested and which will admit of adirect and indefinite progress; such a metaphysic would escape theobjections urged against a transcendental metaphysic, and would bestrictly scientific in form. 

After having propounded these propositions, he defended them byrecalling much of the data considered in his work Matiere et Memoirewhich he had published five years previously and which has been examinedin the previous chapter. The onus of proof lay, said Bergson, with theupholders of parallelism. It is a purely metaphysical hypothesisunwarrantable in his opinion as a dogma. He distinguishes betweencorrespondence--which he of course admits--and parallelism, to which heis opposed. We never think without a certain substratum of cerebralactivity, but what the relation is precisely, between brain andconsciousness, is one for long and patient research: it cannot bedetermined a priori and asserted dogmatically. Until such investigationhas been carried out, it behoves us to be undogmatic and not to allegemore than the facts absolutely warrant, that is to say, a relation ofcorrespondence. Parallelism is far too simple an explanation to be atrue one. Before the International Congress, Bergson launched anotherattack on parallelism which caused quite a little sensation among thosepresent. Says M. E. Chartier, in his report: La lecture de ce memoire, lecture qui commandait l'attention a provoque chez presque tous lesauditeurs un mouvement de surprise et d'inquietude. [Footnote: The paperLe Paralogisme psycho-physiologique is given in Revue de metaphysique etde morale, Nov. , 1904, pp. 895-908. The Discussion in the Congress isgiven on pp. 1027-1037. This was reissued under the title Le Cerveau etla Pensee: une illusion philosophique in the collected volume of essaysand lectures, published in 1919, L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 203-223(Mind-Energy). ] He there set out to show that Parallelism cannot beconsistently stated from any point of view, for it rests on a fallaciousargument--on a fundamental contradiction. To grasp Bergson's points inthis argument, the reading of this paper in the original, as a whole, isnecessary. It is difficult to condense it and keep its clearness ofthought. Briefly, it amounts to this, that the formulation of thedoctrine of Parallelism rests on an ambiguity in the terms employed inits statement, that it contains a subtle dialectical artifice by whichwe pass surreptitiously from one system of notation to another ignoringthe substitution: logically, we ought to keep to one system of notationthroughout. The two systems are: Idealism and Realism. Bergson attemptsto show that neither of these separately can admit Parallelism, and thatParallelism cannot be formulated except by a confusion of the two--by aprocess of mental see-sawing as it were, which of course we are notentitled to perform, Idealism and Realism being two opposed andcontradictory views of reality. For the Idealist, things external to themind are images, and of these the brain is one. Yet the images are inthe brain. This amounts to saying that the whole is contained in thepart. We tend, however, to avoid this by passing to a pseudo-realisticposition by saying that the brain is a thing and not an image. This ispassing over to the other system of notation. For the Realist it is theessence of reality to suppose that there are things behindrepresentations. Some Realists maintain that the brain actually createsthe representation, which is the doctrine of Epiphenomenalism: whileothers hold the view of the Occasionalists, and others posit one realityunderlying both. All however agree in upholding Parallelism. In thehands of the Realist, the theory is equivalent to asserting that arelation between two terms is equal to one of them. This involvescontradiction and Realism then crosses over to the other system ofnotation. It cannot do without Idealism: science itself oscillates fromthe one system to the other. We cannot admit Parallelism as a dogma--asa metaphysical truth--however useful it may be as a working hypothesis. 

Bergson then proceeds to state and to criticize some of the mischievousideas which arise from Parallelism. There is the idea of a brain-soul, of a spot where the soul lives or where the brain thinks--which we havenot quite abandoned since Descartes named the pineal gland as the seatof the soul. Then there is the false idea that all causality ismechanistic and that there is nothing in the universe which is notmathematically calculable. There is the confusion of representations andof things. There is the false notion that we may argue that if twowholes are bound together there must be an equivalent relation of theparts. Bergson points out in this connexion that the absence or thepresence of a screw can stop a machine or keep it going, but the partsof the screw do not correspond to the parts of the machine. In his newintroduction to Matiere et Memoire, he said, "There is a close connexionbetween a state of consciousness and the brain: this we do not dispute. But there is also a close connexion between a coat and the nail on whichit hangs, for if the nail is pulled out the coat falls to the ground. Shall we say then that the shape of the nail gives us the shape of thecoat or in any way corresponds to it? No more are we entitled toconclude because the psychical fact is hung on to a cerebral state thatthere is any parallelism between the two series psychical andphysiological. " [Footnote: There must be an awkward misprint "physical"for "psychical" in the English translation, p. Xi. ] Our observation andexperience, and science itself, strictly speaking, do not allow us toassert more than that there exists a certain CORRESPONDENCE betweenbrain and consciousness. The psychical and the physical are inter-dependent but not parallel. 

Bergson however has more to assert than merely the inadequacy andfalsity of Parallelism or Epiphenomenalism. This last theory merely addsconsciousness to physical facts as a kind of phosphorescent gleam, resembling, in Bergson's words, a "streak of light following themovement of a match rubbed along a wall in the dark. " [Footnote: L'Ameet le Corps, pp. 12-13, in Le Materialisme actuel, or pp. 35-36 ofL'Energie spirituelle (Mind-Energy). ] He maintains, as against all this, the irreducibility of the mental, our utter inability to interpretconsciousness in terms of anything else, the life of the soul beingunique. He further claims that this psychical life is wider and richerthan we commonly suppose. The brain is the organ of attention to life. What was said in regard to memory and the brain is applicable to all ourmental life. The mind or soul is wider than the brain in everydirection, and the brain's activity corresponds to no more than aninfinitesimal part of the activity of the mind. [Footnote: L'Ame et leCorps, Le Materialisme actuel, p. 45, L'Energie spirituelle, p. 61. ]This is expressed more clearly in his Presidential Address to theBritish Society for Psychical Research at the Aeolian Hall, London, 1913, where he remarked, "The cerebral life is to the mental life whatthe movements of the baton of a conductor are to the symphony. "[Footnote: The Times, May 29, 1913. ] Such a remark contains fruitfulsuggestions to all engaged in Psychical Research, and to all personsinterested in the fascinating study of telepathy. Bergson is of theopinion that we are far less definitely cut off from each other, soulfrom soul, than we are body from body. "It is space, " he says, "whichcreates multiplicity and distinction. It is by their bodies that thedifferent human personalities are radically distinct. But if it isdemonstrated that human consciousness is partially independent of thehuman brain, since the cerebral life represents only a small part of themental life, it is very possible that the separation between the varioushuman consciousnesses or souls, may not be so radical as it seems tobe. " [Footnote: The Times, May 29, 1913. ] There may be, he suggests, inthe psychical world, a process analogous to what is known in thephysical world as "endosmosis. " Pleading for an impartial and frankinvestigation of telepathy, he pointed out that it was probable, or atleast possible, that it was taking place constantly as a subtle and sub-conscious influence of soul on soul, but too feebly to be noticed byactive consciousness, or it was neutralized by certain obstacles. Wehave no right to deny its possibility on the plea of its beingsupernatural, or against natural law, for our ignorance does not entitleus to say what may be natural or not. If telepathy does not square atall well with our preconceived notions, it may be more true that ourpreconceived notions are false than that telepathy is fictitious;especially will this be so if our notion of the relation of soul andbody be based on Parallelism. We must overcome this prejudice and seekto make others set it aside. Telepathy and the sub-conscious mental lifecombine to make us realize the wonder of the soul. It is not spatial, itis spiritual. Bergson insists strongly on the unity of our consciouslife. Merely associationist theories are vicious in this respect: theytry to resolve the whole into parts, and then neglect the whole in theirconcentration on the parts. All psychological investigation incurs thisrisk of dealing with abstractions. "Psychology, in fact, proceeds likeall the other sciences by analysis. It resolves the self which has beengiven to it at first in a simple intuition, into sensations, feelings, ideas, etc. , which it studies separately. It substitutes then for theself a series of elements which form the facts of psychology. But arethese elements really parts? That is the whole question, and it isbecause it has been evaded that the problem of human personality has sooften been stated in insoluble terms. " [Footnote: Introduction toMetaphysics, p. 21. ] "Personality cannot be composed of psychical stateseven if there be added to them a kind of thread for the purpose ofjoining the states together. " [Footnote: Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 25. ] We shall never make the soul fit into a category or succeed inapplying concepts to our inner life. The life of the soul is wider thanthe brain and wider than all intellectual constructions or moulds we mayattempt to form. It is a creative force capable of producing novelty inthe world: it creates actions and can, in addition, create itself. 

Philosophy shows us "the life of the body just where it really is, onthe road that leads to the life of the spirit"; our powers of senseimpression and of intelligence are both instruments in the service ofthe will. With a little will one can do much if one places the will inthe right direction. For this force of will which is the essence of thesoul or personality has these exceptional characteristics, that itsintensity depends on its direction, and that its quality may become thecreator of quantity. [Footnote: See the lectures La Nature de l'Ame. ]The brain and the body in general are instruments of the soul. The brainorients the mind toward action, it is the point of attachment betweenthe spirit and its material environment. It is like the point of a knifeto the blade--it enables it to penetrate into the realm of action or, togive another of Bergson's metaphors, it is like the prow of the ship, enabling the soul to penetrate the billows of reality. Yet, for allthat, it limits and confines the life of the spirit; it narrows visionas do the blinkers which we put on horses. We must, however, abandon thenotion of any rigid and determined parallelism between soul and body andaccustom ourselves to the fact that the life of the mind is wider thanthe limits of cerebral activity. And further, there is this to consider--"The more we become accustomed to this idea of a consciousness whichoverflows the organ we call the brain, then the more natural andprobable we find the hypothesis that the soul survives the body. Forwere the mental exactly modelled on the cerebral, we might have to admitthat consciousness must share the fate of the body and die with it. "[Footnote: New York Times, Sept. 27, 1914. ] "But the destiny ofconsciousness is not bound up with the destiny of cerebral matter. "[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 285 (Fr. P. 293). ] "Although the datais not yet sufficient to warrant more than an affirmation of highprobability, " [Footnote: Louis Levine's interview with Bergson, New YorkTimes, Feb. 22, 1914. Quoted by Miller, Bergson and Religion, p. 268. ]yet it leaves the way open for a belief in a future life and creates apresumption in favour of a faith in immortality. "Humanity, " as Bergsonremarks, "may, in its evolution, overcome the most formidable of itsobstacles, perhaps even death. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 286(Fr. P. 294). In Life and Consciousness he says we may admit that in manat any rate "Consciousness pursues its path beyond this earthly life"Cf. Also conclusion to La Conscience el la Vie in L'Energie spirituelle, p. 29, and to L'Ame et le Corps, in the same vol. , p. 63. ]

The great error of the spiritual philosophers has been the idea that byisolating the spiritual life from all the rest, by suspending it inspace, as high as possible above the earth, they were placing it beyondattack; as if they were not, thereby, simply exposing it to be taken asan effect of mirage! Certainly they are right to believe in the absolutereality of the person and in his independence of matter: but science isthere which shows the inter-dependence of conscious life and cerebralactivity. When a strong instinct assures the probability of personalsurvival, they are right not to close their ears to its voice; but ifthere exist "souls" capable of an independent life, whence do they come?When, how, and why do they enter into this body which we see arise quitenaturally from a mixed cell derived from the bodies of its two parents?[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 283 (Fr. P. 291). ] At the close of theLectures on La Nature de l'Ame, Bergson suggests, by referring to anallegory of Plotinus, in regard to the origin of souls, that in thebeginning there was a general interpenetration of souls which wasequivalent to the very principle of life, and that the history of theevolution of life on this planet shows this principle striving untilman's consciousness has been developed, and thus personalities have beenable to constitute themselves. "Souls are being created which, in asense, pre-existed. They are nothing else but the little rills intowhich the great river of life divides itself, flowing through the greatbody of humanity. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 284 (Fr. P. 292). ]

CHAPTER VI

TIME--TRUE AND FALSE

Our ordinary conception of Time false because it is spatial andhomogeneous--Real Time (la duree) not spatial or homogeneous--Flow ofconsciousness a qualitative multiplicity--The real self and the externalself. La duree and the life of the self--No repetition--Personality andthe accumulation of experience-Change and la duree as vital elements inthe universe. 

For any proper understanding of Bergson's thought, it is necessary tograsp his views regarding Time, for they are fundamental factors in hisphilosophy and serve to distinguish it specially from that of previousthinkers. It is interesting to note however, in passing, that Dr. Ward, in his Realm of Ends, claims to have anticipated Bergson's view ofConcrete Time. In discussing the relation of such Time to the conceptionof God, he says, "I think I may fairly claim to have anticipated him(Bergson) to some extent. In 1886 I had written a long paragraph on thistopic. " [Footnote: See The Realm of Ends' foot-note on pp. 306-7. Wardis referring to his famous article in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, eleventh edition, Psychology, p. 577 (now revised and issued in bookform as Psychological Principles). ] Be this as it may, no philosopherhas made so much of this view of Time as Bergson. One might say it isthe corner-stone of his philosophy, for practically the whole of it isbuilt upon his conception of Time. His first large work, Essai sur lesdonnees immediates de la conscience, or, to give it its better title, inEnglish, Time and Free Will, appeared in 1889. 

Our ordinary conception of Time, that which comes to us from thephysical sciences, is, Bergson maintains, a false one. It is falsebecause so far from being temporal in character, it is spatial. We lookupon space as a homogeneous medium without boundaries; yet we look onTime too, as just such another medium, homogeneous and unlimited. Nowhere is an obvious difficulty, for since homogeneity consists in beingwithout qualities, it is difficult to see how one homogeneity can bedistinguished from another. This difficulty is usually avoided by theassertion that homogeneity takes two forms, one in which its contentsco-exist, and another in which they follow one another. Space, then, wesay, is that homogeneous medium in which we are aware of side-by-sideness, Time--that homogeneous medium in which we are aware of anelement of succession. But this surely we are not entitled to maintain, for we are then distinguishing two supposed homogeneities by asserting adifference of quality in them. To do so is to take away homogeneity. Wemust think again and seek a way out of this difficulty. Let us admitspace to be a homogeneous medium without bounds. Then every homogeneousmedium without bounds must be space. What, then, becomes of Time?--foron this showing, Time becomes space. Yes, says Bergson, that is so, forour common view of Time is a false one, being really a hybridconception, a spurious concept due to the illicit introduction of theidea of space, and to our application of the notion of space, which isapplicable to physical objects, to states of consciousness, to which itis really inapplicable. Objects occupying space are marked out asexternal to one another, but this cannot be said of conscious states. Yet, in our ordinary speech and conventional view of things, we think ofconscious states as separated from one another and as spread out like"things, " in a fictitious, homogeneous medium to which we give the nameTime. Bergson says, "At any rate, we cannot finally admit two forms ofthe homogeneous, Time and Space, without first seeking whether one ofthem cannot be reduced to the other. Now, externality is thedistinguishing mark of things which occupy space, while states ofconsciousness are not essentially external to one another and become soonly by being spread out in Time regarded as a homogeneous medium. If, then, one of these two supposed forms of the homogeneous, viz. , Time andSpace, is derived from the other, we can surmise a priori that the ideaof space is the fundamental datum. Time, conceived under the form of anunbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space, haunting the reflective consciousness. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 98 (Fr. P. 75). ] Bergson remarks that Kant's great mistake was totake Time as a homogeneous medium. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 232(Fr. P. 178). ]

Having asserted the falsity of the view of Time ordinarily held, Bergsonproceeds to make clear to us his view of what Real Time is--anundertaking by no means easy for him, endeavouring to lay before us thesubtleties of this problem, nor for us who endeavour to interpret hislanguage and grasp his meaning. We are indeed here face to face withwhat is one of the most difficult sections of his philosophy. An initialdifficulty meets us in giving a definite name to the Time which Bergsonregards as so real, as opposed to the spatial falsity, masquerading asTime, whose true colours he has revealed. In the original French textBergson employs the term duree to convey his meaning. But for thetranslation of this into English there is no term which will suffice andwhich will adequately convey to the reader, without further exposition, the wealth of meaning intended to be conveyed. "Duration" is usuallyemployed by translators as the nearest approach possible in English. Theinadequacy of language is never more keenly felt than in dealing withfundamental problems of thought. Its chief mischief is its all-too-frequent ambiguity. In the following remarks the original French term laduree will be used in preference to the English word "Duration. "

The distinction between the false Time and true Time may be regarded asa distinction between mathematical Time and living Time, or betweenabstract and concrete Time. This living, concrete Time is that true Timeof which Bergson endeavours to give us a conception as la duree. He hascriticized the abstract mathematical Time, his attack having been madeto open up the way for a treatment of what he really considers Time tobe. Now, from the arguments previously mentioned, it follows that Time, Real Time, which is radically different from space, cannot be anyhomogeneous medium. It is heterogeneous in character. We are aware of itin relation to ourselves, for it has reference not to the existence of amultiplicity of material objects in space, but to a multiplicity of aquite different nature, entirely non-spatial, viz. , that of consciousstates. Being non-spatial, such a multiplicity cannot be composed ofelements which are external to one another as are the objects existingin space. States of consciousness are not in any way external to oneanother. Indeed, they interpenetrate to such a degree that even the useof the word "state" is apt to be misleading. As we saw in the chapter onThe Reality of Change, there can be strictly no states of consciousness, for consciousness is not static but dynamic. Language and conventionalfigures of speech, of which the word "state" itself is a good example, serve to cut up consciousness artificially, but, in reality, it is, asWilliam James termed it, "a stream" and herein lies the essence ofBergson's duree--the Real as opposed to the False Time. "Pure Duration"(la duree pure), he says, "is the form which the succession of ourconscious states assumes when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrainsfrom separating its present state from its former states. For thispurpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation oridea, for then, on the contrary, it would no longer 'endure. ' Nor needit forget its former states; it is enough that in recalling thesestates, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one pointalongside another, but forms both the past and the present states intoan organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. Might it not be said that evenif these notes succeed one another, yet, we perceive them in oneanother, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whoseparts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are soclosely connected?" [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. P. 76). ]Such a duration is Real Time. Unfortunately, we, obsessed by the idea ofspace, introduce it unwittingly and set our states of consciousness sideby side in such a way as to perceive them alongside one another; in aword, we project them into space and we express duree in terms ofextensity and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or achain--the parts of which touch without interpenetrating one another. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. P. 76). ] Thus is brought tobirth that mongrel form, that hybrid conception of False Time criticizedabove. Real Time, la duree, is not, however, susceptible like False Timeto measurement, for it is, strictly speaking, not quantitative incharacter, but is rather a qualitative multiplicity. "Real Duration (laduree reele) is just what has always been called Time, but it is Timeperceived as indivisible. " [Footnote: La Perception du Changement, p. 26. Cf. The whole of the Second Lecture. ] Certainly pure consciousnessdoes not perceive Time as a sum of units of duration, for, left toitself, it has no means and even no reason to measure Time, but afeeling which lasted only half the number of days, for example, would nolonger be the same feeling for it. It is true that when we give thisfeeling a certain name, when we treat it as a thing, we believe that wecan diminish its duration by half, for example, and also halve theduration of all the rest of our history. It seems that it would still bethe same life only on a reduced scale. But we forget that states ofconsciousness are processes and not things; that they are alive andtherefore constantly changing, and that, in consequence, it isimpossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer bythe loss of some impression and thus altering their quality. [Footnote:Time and Free Will, p. 196 (Fr. P. 150). ] La duree appears as a "whollyqualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements whichpass over into one another. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 229 (Fr. P. 176). ] Such a time cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only byconscious beings, for "it is the very stuff of which life andconsciousness are made. " Intellect does not grasp Real Time--we can onlyhave an intuition of it. "We do not think Real Time--but we live itbecause life transcends intellect. "

In order to bring out the distinctly qualitative character of such aconception of Time, Bergson says, "When we hear a series of blows of ahammer, the sounds form an indivisible melody in so far as they are puresensations, and here again give rise to a dynamic progress; but, knowingthat the same objective cause is at work, we cut up this progress intophases which we then regard as identical; and this multiplicity ofelements no longer being conceivable except by being set out in space--since they have now become identical--we are, necessarily, led to theidea of a homogeneous Time, the symbolical image of la duree. "[Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 125 (Fr. Pp. 94-95). ] "Whilst I amwriting these lines, " he continues, "the hour strikes on a neighbouringclock, but my inattentive ear does not perceive it until several strokeshave made themselves heard. Hence, I have not counted them and yet Ionly have to turn my attention backwards, to count up the four strokeswhich have already sounded, and add them to those which I hear. If, then, I question myself carefully on what has just taken place, Iperceive that the first four sounds had struck my ear and even affectedmy consciousness, but that the sensations produced by each one of them, instead of being set side by side, had melted into one another in such away as to give the whole a peculiar quality, to make a kind of musicalphrase out of it. In order, then, to estimate retrospectively, thenumber of strokes sounded, I tried to reconstruct this phrase inthought; my imagination made one stroke, then two, then three, and aslong as it did not reach the exact number, four, my feeling, whenconsulted, was qualitatively different. It had thus ascertained, in itsown way, the succession of four strokes, but quite otherwise than by aprocess of addition and without bringing in the image of a juxtapositionof distinct terms. In a word, the number of strokes was perceived as aquality and not as a quantity; it is thus that la duree is presented toimmediate consciousness and it retains this form so long as it does notgive place to a symbolical representation, derived from extensity. "[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 127-8 (Fr. Pp. 96-97). ] In thesewords Bergson endeavours to drive home his contention that la duree isessentially qualitative. He is well aware of the results of "the breachbetween quality and quantity, " between true duration and pure extensity. He sees its implications in regard to vital problems of the self, ofcausality and of freedom. Its specific bearing on the problems offreedom and causality we shall discuss in the following chapter. Asregards the self, Bergson recognizes that we have much to gain bykeeping up the illusion through which we make our conscious states sharein the reciprocal externality of outer things, because this distinctnessand solidification enables us to give them fixed names in spite of theirinstability, and distinct names in spite of their interpenetration. Above all it enables us to objectify them, to throw them out into thecurrent of social life. But just for this very reason we are in dangerof living our lives superficially and of covering up our real self. Weare generally content with what is but a shadow of the real self, projected into space. Consciousness, goaded on by an insatiable desireto separate, substitutes the symbol for the reality or perceives thereality only through the symbol. As the self thus refracted and therebybroken in pieces, is much better adapted to the requirements of sociallife in general, and of language in particular, consciousness prefers itand gradually loses sight of the fundamental self which is a qualitativemultiplicity of conscious states flowing, interpenetrating, melting intoone another, and forming an organic whole, a living unity orpersonality. It is through a consideration of la duree and what itimplies that Bergson is led on to the distinction of two selves in eachof us. 

Towards the close of his essay on Time and Free Will, he points out thatthere are finally two different selves, a fundamental self and a socialself. We reach the former by deep introspection which leads us to graspour inner states as living things, constantly becoming, never amenableto measure, which permeate one another and of which the succession in laduree has nothing in common with side-by-sideness. But the moments atwhich we thus grasp ourselves are rare; the greater part of our time welive outside ourselves, hardly perceiving anything of ourselves but ourown ghost--a colourless shadow which is but the social representation ofthe real and largely concealed Ego. Hence our life unfolds in spacerather than in time. We live for the external world rather than forourselves, we speak rather than think, we are "acted" rather than "act"ourselves. To act freely, however, is to recover possession of one'sreal self and to get back into la duree reele. [Footnote: Time and FreeWill, p. 232 (Fr. P. 178). ]

Real Time, then, is a living reality, not discrete, not spatial incharacter--an utter contrast to that fictitious Time with which so manythinkers have busied themselves, setting up "as concrete reality thedistinct moments of a Time which they have reduced to powder, while theunity which enables us to call the grains 'powder' they hold to be muchmore artificial. Others place themselves in the eternal. But as theireternity remains, notwithstanding, abstract since it is empty, being theeternity of a concept which by hypothesis excludes from itself theopposing concept, one does not see how this eternity would permit of anindefinite number of moments co-existing in it, an eternity of death, since it is nothing else than the movement emptied of the mobility whichmade its life. " [Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 51-54. ]The true view of Time, as la duree, would make us see it as a durationwhich expands, contracts, and intensifies itself more and more; at thelimit would be eternity, no longer conceptual eternity, which is aneternity of death, but an eternity of life and change--a living, andtherefore still moving, eternity in which our own particular duree wouldbe included as the vibrations are in light, [Footnote: Speaking inMatter and Memory on the Tension of la duree, Bergson calls attention tothe "trillions of vibrations" which give rise to our sensation of redlight, p. 272 (Fr. P. 229) Cf. La Conscience et la Vie in L'Energiespirituelle, p. 16. ] an eternity which would be the concentration of allduree. Altering the old classical phrase sub specie aeternitatis, tosuit his special view of Time, Bergson urges us to strive to perceiveall things sub specie durationis. [Footnote: La Perception duChangement, p. 36. ]

Finally, Bergson reminds us that if our existence were composed ofseparate states, with an impassive Ego to unite them, for us there wouldbe no duration, for an Ego which does not change, does not endure. Laduree, however, is the foundation of our being and is, as we feel, thevery substance of the world in which we live. Associating his view ofReal Time with the reality of change, he points out that nothing is moreresistant or more substantial than la duree, for our duree is not merelyone instant replacing another--if it were there would never be anythingbut the present, no prolonging of the past into the actual, no growth ofpersonality, and no evolution of the universe. La duree is thecontinuous progress of the past which gnaws into the future and whichswells as it advances, leaving on all things its bite, or the mark ofits tooth. This being so, consciousness cannot go through the same statetwice; history does never really repeat itself. Our personality is beingbuilt up each instant with its accumulated experience; it shoots, grows, and ripens without ceasing. We are reminded of George Eliot's lines:

 "Our past still travels with us from afar And what we have been makes us what we are. "

For our consciousness this is what we mean by the term "exist. " "For aconscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, and togo on creating oneself endlessly. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 8(Fr. P. 8). ] Real Time has, then, a very vital meaning for us asconscious beings, indeed for all that lives, for the organism whichlives is a thing that "endures. " "Wherever anything lives, " saysBergson, "there is a register in which Time is being inscribed. This, itwill be said, is only a metaphor. It is of the very essence of mechanismin fact, to consider as metaphorical every expression which attributesto Time an effective action and a reality of its own. In vain doesimmediate experience show us that the very basis of our consciousexistence is Memory--that is to say, the prolongation of the past intothe present, or in a word, duree, acting and irreversible. " [Footnote:Creative Evolution, p. 17 (Fr. Pp. 17-18). ] Time is falsely assumed tohave just as much reality for a living being as for an hour-glass. Butif Time does nothing, it is nothing. It is, however, in Bergson's view, vital to the whole of the universe. He expressly denies that la duree ismerely subjective; the universe "endures" as a whole. In Time and FreeWill it did not seem to matter whether we regarded our inner life ashaving duree or as actually being duree. In the first instance, if wehave duree it is then only an aspect of reality, but if our personalityitself is duree, then Time is reality itself. He develops this lastpoint of view more explicitly in his later works, and la duree isidentified not only with the reality of change, but with memory and withspirit. [Footnote: La Perception du Changement, Lecture 2. ] In it hefinds the substance of a universe whose reality is change. "God, " saidPlato, "being unable to make the world eternal, gave it Time--a movingimage of reality. " Bergson himself quotes this remark of Plato, andseems to have a vision like that of Rosetti's "Blessed Damozel, " who . .. .. . "saw Time like a pulse shake fierce Through all the worlds. "

The more we study Time, the more we may grasp this vision ourselves, andthen we shall comprehend that la duree implies invention, the creationof new forms, the continual elaboration of the absolutely new--in short, an evolution which is creative. 

CHAPTER VII

FREEDOM OF THE WILL

Spirit of man revolts from physical and psychological determinism--Former examined and rejected--The latter more subtle--Vice of"associationism"--Psychology without a self. Condemnation ofpsychological determinism--Room for freedom--The self in action--Astronomical forecasts--Foreseeableness of any human action impossible--Human wills centres of indetermination--Not all our acts free--Truefreedom, self-determination. 

Before passing on to an examination of Bergson's treatment of Evolution, we must consider his discussion of the problem of Freedom of the Will. Few problems which have occupied the attention of philosophers have beenmore discussed or have given rise to more controversy than that ofFreedom. This is, of course, natural as the question at issue is one ofvery great importance, not merely as speculative, but also in the realmof action. We ask ourselves: "Are we really free?" Can we will either oftwo or more possibilities which are put before us, or, on the otherhand, is everything fixed, predestined in such a way that an all-knowingconsciousness could foretell from our past what course our future actionwould take?

The study of the physical sciences has led to a general acceptance of aprinciple of causality which is of such a kind that there seems no placein the universe for human freedom. Further, there is a type ofpsychology which gives rise to the belief that even mental occurrencesare as determined as those of the physical world, thus leaving no roomfor autonomy of the Will. But even when presented with the argumentswhich make up the case for physical or psychological determinism, thespirit of man revolts from it, refuses to accept it as final, andbelieves that, in some way or other, the case for Freedom may bemaintained. It is at this point that Bergson offers us some help in thesolution of the problem, by his Essai sur les donnees immediates de laconscience, better described by its English title Time and Free Will. 

The arguments for physical determinism are based on the view thatFreedom is incompatible with the fundamental properties of matter, andin particular, with the principle of the conservation of energy. Thisprinciple "has been assumed to admit of no exception; there is not anatom either in the nervous system or in the whole of the universe whoseposition is not determined by the sum of the mechanical actions whichthe other atoms exert upon it. And the mathematician who knew theposition of the molecules or atoms of a human organism at a givenmoment, as well as the position and motion of all the atoms in theuniverse, capable of influencing it, could calculate with unfailingcertainty the past, present, and future actions of the person to whomthis organism belonged, just as one predicts an astronomicalphenomenon. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 144 (Fr. P. 110). ] Now, it follows that if we admit the universal applicability of such a theoryas that of the conservation of energy, we are maintaining that the wholeuniverse is capable of explanation on purely mechanical principles, inherent in the units of which the universe is composed. Hence, therelative position of all units at a given moment, whatever be theirnature, strictly determines what their position will be in thesucceeding moments, and this mechanistic succession goes on like aJuggernaut car with crushing unrelentlessness, giving rise to a rigidfatalism:

 "The moving finger writes; and having writ Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit Shall lure it back to cancel half a line, Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it. "

Is there no way out of this cramping circle? We feel vaguely, intuitively, that there is. Bergson points out to us a way. Even if weadmit, he says, that the direction and the velocity of every atom ofmatter in the universe (including cerebral matter, i. E. , the brain, which is a material thing) are strictly determined, it would not at allfollow from the acceptance of this theorem that our mental life issubject to the same necessity. For that to be the case, we should haveto show absolutely that a strictly determined psychical statecorresponds to a definite cerebral state. This, as we have seen, has notbeen proved. It is admitted that to some psychical states of a limitedkind certain cerebral states do correspond, but we have no warrantwhatever for concluding that, because the physiological and thepsychological series exhibit some corresponding terms, the two seriesare absolutely parallel. "To extend this parallelism to the seriesthemselves, in their totality, is to settle a priori the problem offreedom. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 147 (Fr. Pp. 112-113). ] Howfar the two series do run parallel is a question--as we saw in thechapter on the relation of Soul and Body--for experience, observation, and experiment to decide. The cases which are parallel are limited, andinvolve facts which are independent of the power of the Will. 

Bergson then proceeds to an examination of the more subtle and plausiblecase for psychological determinism. A very large number of our actionsare due to some motive. There you have it, says the psychologicaldeterminist. Your so-called Freedom of the Will is a fiction; in realityit is merely the strongest motive which prevails and you imagine thatyou "freely willed it. " But then we must ask him to define "strongest, "and here is the fallacy of his argument, for there is no other test ofwhich is the strongest motive, than that it has prevailed. Suchstatements do not help to solve the difficulty at all, for they avoid itand attempt to conceal it; they are due to a conception of mind which isboth false and mischievous, viz. , Associationism. This view regards theself as a collection of psychical states. The existing state ofconsciousness is regarded as necessitated by the preceding states. As, however, even the associationist is aware that these states differ fromone another in quality, he cannot attempt to deduce any one of them apriori from its predecessors. He therefore endeavours to find a linkconnecting the two states. That there is such a link as the simple"association of ideas" Bergson would not think of denying. What he doesdeny however, very emphatically, is the associationist statement thatthis relation which explains the transition is the cause of it. Evenwhen admitting a certain truth in the associationist view, it isdifficult to maintain that an act is absolutely determined by itsmotive, and our conscious states by one another. The real mischief ofthis view lies, however, in the fact, that it misrepresents the self bymaking it merely a collection of psychical states. John Stuart Millsays, in his Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy: "I couldhave abstained from murder if my aversion to the crime and my dread ofits consequences had been weaker than the temptation which impelled meto commit it. " [Footnote: Quoted by Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 159(Fr. P. 122). ] Here desire, aversion, fear, and temptation are regardedas clear cut phenomena, external to the self which experiences them, andthis leads to a curious balancing of pain and pleasure on purelyutilitarian lines, turning the mind into a calculating machine such asone might find in a shop or counting-house, and taking no account of thecharacter of the self that "wills. " There is, really, in such a systemof psychology, no room for self-expression, indeed, no meaning left forthe term "self. " It is only an inaccurate psychology, misled bylanguage, which tries to show us the soul determined by sympathy, aversion, or hate, as though by so many forces pressing upon it fromwithout. These feelings, provided that they go deep enough, make up thewhole soul; in them the character of the individual expresses itself, since the whole content of the personality or soul is reflected in eachof them. Then my character is "me. " "To say that the soul is determinedunder the influence of any one of these feelings, is thus to recognizethat it is self-determined. The associationist reduces the self to anaggregate of conscious states, sensations, feelings, and ideas. But ifhe sees in these various states no more than is expressed in their name, if he retains only their impersonal aspect, he may set them side by sidefor ever without getting anything but a phantom self, the shadow of theEgo, projecting itself into space. If, on the contrary, he takes thesepsychical states with the particular colouring which they assume in thecase of a definite person, and which comes to each of them by reflectionfrom all the others, then there is no need to associate a number ofconscious states in order to rebuild the person, for the wholepersonality is in a single one of them, provided that we know how tochoose it. And the outward manifestation of this inner state will bejust what is called a free act, since the self alone will have been theauthor of it and since it will express the whole of the self. "[Footnote: Time and Free Will, pp. 165-166 (Fr. Pp. 126-127). ] There isthen room in the universe for a Freedom of the human Will, a definitecreative activity, delivering us from the bonds of grim necessity andfate in which the physical sciences and the associationist psychologyalike would bind us. Freedom, then, is a fact, and among the facts whichwe observe, asserts Bergson, there is none clearer. [Footnote: Time andFree Will, p. 221 (Fr. P. 169). ] There are, however, one or two thingswhich bear vitally upon the question of Freedom and which tend toobscure the issue. Of these, the foremost is that once we have acted ina particular manner we look back upon our actions and try to explainthem with particular reference to their immediate antecedents. Here iswhere the mischief which gives rise to the whole controversy has itsorigin. We make static what is essentially dynamic in character. We calla process a thing. There is no such "thing" as Freedom; it is a relationbetween the self and its action. Indeed, it is only characteristic of aself IN ACTION, and so is really indefinable. Viewed after the action, it presents a different aspect; it has then become historical, an eventin the past, and so we try to explain it as being caused by formerevents or conditions. This casting of it on to a fixed, rigid plan, gives action the appearance of having characteristics related to spacerather than to time, in the real sense. As already shown in the previouschapter, this is due entirely to our intellectual habit of thinking interms of space, by mathematical time, rather than in terms of livingtime or la duree. 

Another point which causes serious confusion in the controversy is thenotion that because, when an act has been performed, its antecedents maybe reckoned up and their value and relative importance or influenceassigned, this is equivalent to saying the actor could not have acted inany other way than he did, and, further, that his final act could havebeen foretold from the events which led up to it. It is a fact that inthe realm of physical science we can foretell the future with accuracy. The astronomer predicts the precise moment and place in which Halley'scomet will become visible from our earth. It is also a fact that we sayof men and women who are our intimate friends: "I knew he (or she) woulddo such and such a thing" or "It's just like him. " We base our judgmenton our intimate acquaintance with the character of our friend, but this, as Bergson points out, "is not so much to predict the future conduct ofour friend as to pass a judgment on his present character--that is tosay, on his past. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 184 (Fr. P. 140). ]For, although our feelings and our ideas are constantly changing, yet wefeel warranted in regarding our friend's character as stable, asreliable. But, as Mill remarked in his Logic: "There can be no scienceof human nature, " because, although we trust in the reliability of ourfriend, although we have faith in his future actions, we do not, and cannot, know them. "Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner. " To say that, ifwe knew all the conditions, motives, fears, and temptations which led upto the actions of another, we could foretell what he would do, amountsto saying that, to do so, we should have actually to become that otherperson, and so arrive at the point where we act as he did because we arehim. For Paul to foretell Peter's act, Paul would simply have to becomePeter. [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 187 (Fr. P. 144). ] The veryreasons which render it possible to foretell an astronomical phenomenonare the very ones which prevent us from determining in advance an actwhich springs from our free activity. For the future of the materialuniverse, although contemporaneous with the future of a conscious being, has no analogy to it. The astronomer regards time from the point of viewof mathematics. He is concerned with points placed in a homogeneoustime, points which mark the beginning or end of certain intervals. Hedoes not concern himself with the interval in its actual duration. Thisis proved by the fact that, could all velocities in the universe bedoubled, the astronomical formulae would remain unaffected, for thecoincidences with which that science deals would still take place, butat intervals half as long. To the astronomer as such, this would make nodifference, but we, in ourselves, would find that our day did not giveus the full experience. Situations which arose as a result of theintroduction of "summer time" serve to make this point clear. As then wefind that time means two different things for the astronomer and thepsychologist, the one being concerned with the points at the extremitiesof intervals, and the other with the enduring reality of the intervalsthemselves, we can see why astronomical phenomena are capable ofprediction and see too that, for the same reason, events in the realm ofhuman action cannot be so predicted and therefore the future is notpredetermined but is being made. 

Upon exactly parallel lines lie the references to causality in thecontroversy. In the physical realm events may recur, but in the mentalrealm the same thing can never happen again because we are living inreal, flowing time, or la duree, and our conscious states are changing. Admitting that there is that in experience which warrants theapplication of the principle of causality, taking that principle as thestatement that physical phenomena once perceived can recur, and that agiven phenomenon, happening only after certain conditions, will recurwhen those precise conditions are repeated, [Footnote: See the briefpaper Notre croyance a la loi de causalite, Revue de metaphysique et demorale, 1900. ] still it remains open whether such a regularity ofsuccession is ever possible in the human consciousness, and so theassertion of the principle of causality proves nothing against Freedom. We may admit that the principle is based on experience--but what kind ofexperience? Consideration of this question leads us to assert that theprinciple of causality only tends to accentuate the difference betweenobjects in a realm wherein regular succession may be observed andpredicted and a realm where it may not be observed or predicted, therealm of the self. Just because I endure and change I do not necessarilyact to-day as I acted yesterday, when under like conditions. We doexpect, however, that this will not be the case in the physical realm;for example, we expect that a flame applied to dry paper will always setit alight. Indeed, the more we realize the causal relation as one ofnecessary determination, we come to see that things do not exist as wedo ourselves, and distinction between physical and psychical eventsbecomes clear. We perceive that we, in ourselves, are centres ofindetermination enjoying Freedom, and capable of creative activity. 

We must, however, be careful to observe that such Freedom as we have isnot absolute at all and that it admits of degrees. All our acts are byno means free. Indeed, Free Will is exceptional, and many live and diewithout having known true Freedom. Our everyday life consists in theperformance of actions which are largely habitual or, indeed, automatic, being determined not by Free Will, but by custom and convention. OurFreedom is the exception and not the rule. Through sluggishness orindolence, we jog on in the even tenor of a way towards which habit hasdirected us. Even at times when our whole personality ought to vibrate, finding itself at the cross-roads, it fails to rise to the occasion. But, says Bergson, "it is at the great and solemn crises, decisive ofour reputation with others, and yet more with ourselves, that we choosein defiance of what is conventionally called a motive, and this absenceof any tangible reason, is the more striking the deeper our Freedomgoes. " [Footnote: Time and Free Will, p. 170 (Fr. P. 130). ] At suchtimes the self feels itself free and says so, for it feels itself to becreative. "All determinism will thus be refuted by experience, but everyattempt to define Freedom will open the way to determinism. " [Footnote:Time and Free Will, p. 330 (Fr. P. 177). ]

It has been urged that, although Bergson is a stanch upholder ofFreedom, it is Freedom of such a kind that it must be distinguished fromFree Will, that is, from the liberty of choice which indeterminists haveasserted and which determinists have denied; and that the Freedom forwhich he holds the brief is not the feeling of liberty that we have whenconfronted with alternative courses of action, or the feeling we havewhen we look back upon a choice made and an action accomplished, that weneed not have acted as we did, and that we could have acted differently. Such Freedom it has been further maintained, is of little importance tous, for it is merely a free, creative activity which is the essence oflife, which we share with all that lives and so cannot be styled "human"Freedom. Now, although many of Bergson's expressions, in regard to free, creative activity in general, lead to a connexion of this with theproblem of "human" Freedom, such an identification would seem to beunfair. This seems specially so when we read over carefully his remarksabout the coup d'etat of the fundamental self in times of grave crisis. We cannot equate this with a purely biological freedom or vitality, orspontaneity. But in the light of the criticism which has been made, itwill be well to consider, in concluding this chapter, the statementsmade by Bergson in his article on Liberty in the work in connexion withthe Vocabulaire philosophique for the Societe francaise de philosophie:[Footnote: Quoted by Le Roy in his Une nouvelle philosophie: HenriBergson, English Translation (Benson), Williams and Norgate, p. 192. ]"The word Liberty has for me a sense intermediate between those which weassign, as a rule, to the two terms 'Liberty' and 'Free Will. ' On onehand I believe that 'Liberty' consists in being entirely oneself, inacting in conformity with oneself; it is then to a certain degree the'moral liberty' of philosophers, the independence of the person withregard to everything other than itself. But that is not quite thisLiberty, since the independence I am describing has not always a moralcharacter. Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as aneffect depends on the cause which, of necessity, determines it. In this, I should come back to the sense of 'Free Will. '" And yet, he continues, "I do not accept this sense either, since Free Will, in the usualmeaning of the term, implies the equal possibility of two contraries, and, on my theory, we cannot formulate or even conceive, in this case, the thesis of the equal possibility of the two contraries, withoutfalling into grave error about the nature of Time. The object of mythesis has been precisely to find a position intermediate between 'moralLiberty' and 'Free Will. ' Liberty, such as I understand it, is situatedbetween these two terms, but not at equal distances from both; if I wereobliged to blend it with one of the two, I should select 'Free-Will. '"Nor is Liberty to be reduced to spontaneity. "At most, this would be thecase in the animal world where the psychological life is principallythat of the affections. But in the case of a man, a thinking being, thefree act can be called a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and theevolution which leads to it, a reasonable evolution. " [Footnote: Matterand Memory, p. 243 (Fr. P. 205). ] "In a word, if it is agreed to callevery act free, which springs from the self, and from the self alone, the act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free, for ourself alone will lay claim to its paternity. " [Footnote: Time and FreeWill, p. 172 (Fr. P. 132). It is interesting to compare with this theremark by Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra, Thus SpakeZarathustra, --"Let your Ego be in relation to your acts that which themother is in relation to the child. "] The secret of the solution liessurely here, and in the words given above: "Liberty consists in beingentirely oneself. " If we act rightly we shall act freely, and yet bedetermined. Yet here there will be no contradiction, for we shall beself-determined. It is only the man who is self-determined that can inany sense be said to know the meaning of "human" Freedom. "We callfree, " said Spinoza, "that which exists in virtue of the necessities ofits own nature, and which is determined by itself alone. " Liberty is notabsolute, for then we ourselves would be at the beck and call of everyexternal excitation, desire, passion, or temptation. Our salvationconsists in self-determination, so we shall avoid licence but preserveFreedom. We can only repeat the Socratic maxim--"Know thyself"--andresolve to take to heart the appeal of our own Shakespeare:

 "To thine own self be true!"

CHAPTER VIII

EVOLUTION

Work of Darwin and Spencer--Bergson's L'Evolution creatrice--Life--L'elan vital--Evolution not progress in a straight line--Adaptation aninsufficient explanation--Falsity of mechanistic view--Finalistconception of reality as fulfilling a plan false--Success along certainlines only--Torpor, Instinct, and Intelligence--Genesis of matter--Humanity the crown of evolution--Contingency and Freedom--The Future isbeing created. 

Since the publication of Darwin's famous work on The Origin of Speciesin 1859, the conception of Evolution has become familiar and has wongeneral acceptance in all thinking minds. Evolution is now a householdword, but the actual study of evolutionary process has been the work ofcomparatively few. Science nowadays has become such a highly specializedaffair, that few men cover a large enough field of study to enable themto deal effectively with this tremendous subject. What is more, thosewho shouted so loudly about Evolution as explaining all things have cometo see that, in a sense, Evolution explains nothing by itself. Meredescription of facts undoubtedly does serve a very useful purpose andmay help to demolish some of the stanchly conservative theories stillheld in some quarters by those who prefer to take Hebrew conceptions asa basis of their cosmology however irreconcilable with fact these mayprove to be. Mere description, however, is not ultimate, some philosophyof Evolution must be forthcoming. "Nowadays, " remarks Hoffding, "everyphilosopher has to take up a position with respect to the concept ofEvolution. It has now achieved its place among the categories oressential forms of thought by the fact of its providing indicationswhence new problems proceed. We must ask regarding every event, andevery phenomenon, by what stages it has passed into its actual state. Itis a special form of the general concept of cause. A philosophy isessentially characterized by the position which it accords to thisconcept and by the way in which it applies it. " [Footnote: ThePhilosophy of Evolution--lecture IV, of Lectures on Bergson, in ModernPhilosophers, Translated by Mason (MacMillan), p. 270. ]

No one has done more to make familiar to English minds the notion ofEvolution than Herbert Spencer. His Synthetic Philosophy had a grandaim, but it was manifestly unsatisfactory. The high hopes it had raisedwere followed by mingled disappointment and distrust. The secret of theunsatisfactoriness of Spencer is to be found in his method, which is anelaborate and plausible attempt to explain the evolution of the universeby referring the complex to the simple, the more highly organized to theless organized. His principle of Evolution never freed itself frombondage to mechanical conceptions. 

Bergson's Creative Evolution, his largest and best known work, appearedin 1907. It has been regarded not only as a magnificent book, but as adate in the history of thought. Two of the leading students ofevolutionary process in England, Professors Geddes and Thomson, refer tothe book as "one of the most profound and original contributions to thephilosophical consideration of the theory of Evolution. " [Footnote: Inthe Bibliography in their volume Evolution. ]

For some time there had been growing a need for an expression ofevolutionary theory in terms other than those of Spencer, or of Haeckel--the German monistic philosopher. The advance in the study of biologyand the rise of Neo-Vitalism, occasioned by an appreciation of theinadequacy of any explanation of life in terms purely physical andchemical, made the demand for a new statement, in greater harmony withthese views, imperative. To satisfy this demand is the task to whichBergson has applied himself. He sounds the note of departure from theolder conceptions right at the commencement by his very title, 'Creative' Evolution. For this, his views on Change, on Time, and onFreedom, have in some degree prepared us. We have seen set forth thefact of Freedom, the recognition of human beings as centres ofindetermination, not mere units in a machine, "a block universe" whereall is "given, " but creatures capable of creative activity. Then by aconsideration of Time, as la duree, we found that the history of anindividual can never repeat itself; "For a conscious being, to exist isto change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creatingoneself endlessly. Should the same be said, " Bergson asks, "of existencein general?" [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 8 (Fr. P. 8). ]

So he proceeds to portray with a wealth of analogy and brilliance ofstyle, more akin to the language of a poet than a philosopher, thestupendous drama of Evolution, the mystery of being, the wonders oflife. He makes the great fact of life his starting point. Is lifesusceptible to definition? We feel that, by the very nature of the case, it is not. A definition is an intellectual operation, while life iswider, richer, more fundamental than intellect. Indeed Bergson shows usthat intellect is only one of the manifestations or adaptations of lifein its progress. To define life, being strictly impossible, Bergsonattempts to describe it. He would have us picture it as a great currentemerging from some central point, radiating in all directions, butdiverted into eddies and backwaters. Life is an original impetus, unepoussee formidable, not the mere heading affixed to a class of objectswhich live. We must not speak any longer of life in general as anabstraction or a category in which we may place all living beings. Life, or the vital impulse, consists in a demand for creation, we might almostsay "a will to create. " It appears to be a current passing from one germto another through the medium of a developed organism, "an internal pushthat has carried life by more and more complex forms, to higher andhigher destinies. " It is a dynamic continuity, a continuity ofqualitative progress, a duration which leaves its bite on things. [Footnote: For these descriptions of life, see Creative Evolution, pp. 27-29 and 93-94 (Fr. Pp. 28-30 and 95-96). ] We shall be absolutelywrong, however, if we attempt to view the evolutionary process asprogressive in a straight line. The facts contradict such a facile andshallow view. Some of the stock phrases of the earlier writers onEvolution were: "adaptation to environment, " "selection" and"variation, " and a grave problem was presented by this last. How are weto account for the variations of living beings, together with thepersistence of their type? Herein lies the problem of the origin ofspecies. Three different solutions have been put forward. There is the"Neo-Darwinian" view which attributes variation to the differencesinherent in the germ borne by the individual, and not to the experienceor behaviour of the individual in the course of his existence. Thenthere is the theory known as "Orthogenesis" which maintains that thereis a continual changing in a definite direction from generation togeneration. Thirdly, there is the "Neo-Lamarckian" theory whichattributes the cause of variation to the conscious effort of theindividual, an effort passed on to descendants. [Footnote: ConcerningLamarck (1744-1829) Bergson remarks in La Philosophie (1915) thatwithout diminishing Darwin's merit Lamarck is to be regarded as thefounder of evolutionary biology. ] Now each one of these theoriesexplains a certain group of facts, of a limited kind, but twodifficulties confront them. We find that on quite distinct and widelyseparated lines of Evolution, exactly similar organs have beendeveloped. Bergson points out to us, in this connexion, the Pecten genusof molluscs, which have an eye identical in structure with that of theeye of vertebrates. [Footnote: The common edible scallop (Pectenmaximus) has several eyes of brilliant blue and of very complexstructure. ] It is obvious, however, that the eye of this mollusc and theeye of the vertebrate must have developed quite independently, agesafter each had been separated from the parent stock. Again, we find thatin all organic evolution, infinite complexity of structure accompaniesthe utmost simplicity of function. The variation of an organ so highlycomplex as the eye must involve the simultaneous occurrence of aninfinite number of variations all co-ordinated to the simple end ofvision. Such facts as these are incapable of explanation by reference toany or all of the three theories of adaptation and variation mentioned. Indeed they seem capable of explanation only by reference to a singleoriginal impetus retaining its direction in courses far removed from thecommon origin. "That adaptation to environment is the necessarycondition of Evolution we do not question for a moment. It is quiteevident that a species would disappear, should it fail to bend to theconditions of existence which are imposed on it. But it is one thing torecognize that outer circumstances are forces Evolution must reckonwith, another to claim that they are the directing causes of Evolution. "[Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 107 (Fr. P. 111). ]

"The truth is that adaptation explains the sinuosities of the movementof Evolution, but not the general directions of the movement, still lessthe movement itself. The road which leads to the town is obliged tofollow the ups and downs of the hills; it adapts itself to the accidentsof the ground, but the accidents of the ground are not the cause of theroad nor have they given it its direction. " [Footnote: CreativeEvolution, p. 108 (Fr. P. 112). ] The evolution of life cannot beexplained as merely a series of adaptations to accidental circumstances. Moreover, the mechanistic view, where all is "given, " is quiteinadequate to explain the facts. The finalist or teleological conceptionis not any more tenable, for Evolution is not simply the realization ofa plan. "A plan is given in advance. It is represented or at leastrepresentable, before its realization. The complete execution of it maybe put off to a distant future or even indefinitely, but the idea isnone the less formulable at the present time, in terms actually given. If, on the contrary, Evolution is a creation unceasingly renewed, itcreates as it goes on, not only the forms of life but the ideas thatenable the intellect to understand it. Its future overflows its presentand cannot be sketched out therein, in an idea. There is the first errorof finalism. It involves another yet more serious. If life realizes aplan it ought to manifest a greater harmony the further it advances, just as the house shows better and better the idea of the architect asstone is set upon stone. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 108 (Fr. P. 112). ] Such finalism is really reversed mechanism. If, on the contrary, the unity of life is to be found solely in the impetus (pousseeformidable) that pushes it along the road of Time, the harmony is not infront but behind. The unity is derived from a vis a tergo: it is givenat the start as an impulsion, not placed at the end as an attraction, asa kind of

 ". .. Far-off divine event To which the whole creation moves. "

"In communicating itself the impetus splits up more and more. Life, inproportion to its progress, is scattered in manifestations whichundoubtedly owe to their common origin the fact that they arecomplementary to each other in certain aspects, but which are none theless mutually incompatible and antagonistic. So that the discord betweenspecies will go on increasing. " "There are species which are arrested, there are some that retrogress. Evolution is not only a movementforward; in many cases we observe a marking-time, and still more often adeviation or turning back. Thence results an increasing disorder. Nodoubt there is progress, if progress means a continual advance in thegeneral direction determined by a first impulsion; but this progress isaccomplished only on the two or three great lines of Evolution on whichforms ever more and more complex, ever more and more high, appear;between these lines run a crowd of minor paths in which deviations, arrests, and set-backs are multiplied. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 107-110 (Fr. Pp. 111-114). ] Evolution would be a very simple andeasy process to understand if it followed one straight path. To describeit, Bergson uses, in one place, this metaphor: "We are here dealing witha shell which has immediately burst into fragments, which, beingthemselves species of shells, have again burst into fragments, destinedto burst again, and so on. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 103 (Fr. P. 107). ]

A study of the facts shows us three very marked tendencies which may bedenoted by the terms "Torpor, " "Instinct, " and "Intelligence. " Theseare, in a sense "terminal points" in the evolutionary process. Hencearises the distinction of plant and animal, one showing a tendency tounconscious torpor, the other manifesting a tendency towards movementand consciousness. Then again arises another divergence which gives riseto two paths or tendencies, one along the line of the arthropods, at theend of which come the ants and the bees with their instincts, and theother along the line of the vertebrates, at the end of which is man withhis intelligence. These three, Torpor, Instinct, and Intelligence, mustnot, however, be looked upon as three successive stages in the lineardevelopment of one tendency, but as three diverging directions of acommon activity, which split up as it went on its way. Instinct andIntelligence are the two important terminal points in Evolution. Theyare not two stages of which one is higher than the other, they are atthe end of two different roads. The wonders of Instinct are acommonplace to students of animal and insect life. [Footnote: See theinteresting books by the French writer, Henri Fabre. ] Men, with theirintellect, make tools, while Instinct is tied to its tool. There is awondrous immediacy, however, about Instinct, in the way it achievesends, and its operations are often quite unconsciously performed. Theinsect or animal could not possibly "know" all that was involved in itsaction. Instinct, then, is one form of adaptation, while Intellect isquite another. In man--the grown man--Intellect is seen at its best. Yetwe are not without Instincts; by them we are bound to the race and tothe whole animal creation. But in ants and bees and such like creatures, Instinct is the sole guide of life, and it is often a highly organizedlife. The following example clearly shows the contrast between Instinctand Intelligence. A cat knows how to manage her new-born kittens, how tobring them up and teach them; a human mother does not know how to manageher baby unless she is trained either directly or by her own quickobservation of other mothers. A cat performs her simple duties byInstinct, a human mother has to make use of her Intelligence in order tofulfil her very complex duties. We must observe, however, the relativevalue of Instinct and Intelligence. Each is a psychical activity, butwhile Instinct is far more perfect, far more complete in its insight, itis confined within narrow limits. Intelligence, while far less perfectin accomplishing its work, less complete in insight, is not limited insuch a way. But while Intellect is external, looking on reality asdifferent from life, Instinct is an inner sympathy with reality; it isdeeper than any intellectual bond which binds the conscious creature toreality, for it is a vital bond. 

Bergson now turns to a consideration of Life and Matter in theevolutionary process, and their precise relation to one another. Life isfree, spontaneous, incalculable, not out of relation to Matter, but itsdirection is not entirely determined by Matter nor has its initialimpulse Matter as its source. Although Bergson denies that Will andConsciousness, as we know them, are mere functions of the materialorganism, yet they do depend upon it as a workman depends upon his tool. We are fond of insinuating that a bad workman always blames his tools. Agood workman, however, cannot be expected to do the best work with badtools. The tool, although he uses it, at the same time limits him. So itis with the material organism at our disposal, our body, and so, too, with spirit and matter in general. Spirit and Matter are not to beregarded as independent or as ranged against one another from alleternity. Matter is a product of Spirit or Consciousness, the underlyingpsychic force. "For want of a better word, " says Bergson, "we havecalled it Consciousness. But we do not mean the narrowed consciousnessthat functions in each of us. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 250(Fr. P. 258). ] It is rather super-Consciousness than a consciousnesslike ours. Matter is a flux rather than a thing, but its flow is in theopposite direction to that of Spirit. The flow of Spirit shows itself inthe creativeness of the evolutionary process; Matter is the inversemovement towards stability. Bergson adheres to the view of Spirit asfundamental, while Matter, he says, is due to a lessening of the tensionof the spiritual force which is the initial elan. Now, of course, Matterand Spirit have come to be two opposing forces, for one is determinedand the other free. Yet Bergson has to make out that there must havebeen some indetermination in Matter, however small, to give Spirit anopening to "insinuate itself" into Matter and thus use it for its ownends. It always seems, however, as if Spirit were trying to free itselffrom material limitations. It evolved the Intellect to cope with Matter. This is why Reason is at home, not in life and freedom, but in solidMatter, in mechanical and spatial distinctions. There is thus an eternalconflict in progress between Spirit and Matter. The latter is alwaystending to automatism, to the sacrifice of the Spirit with its creativepower. In his little book on The Meaning of the War Bergson claims thathere we have an instance of Life and Matter in conflict--Germanyrepresenting a mechanical and materialistic force. In quite another wayhe illustrates the same truth, in his book on Laughter, where he showsus that "rigidity, automatism, absent-mindedness, and unsociability, areall inextricably entwined, and all serve as ingredients to the making upof the comic in character, " [Footnote: Laughter, p. 147 (Fr. P. 151). ]for "the comic is that side of a person which reveals his likeness to athing, that aspect of human events which, through its peculiarinelasticity, conveys the impression of pure mechanism, of automatism, of movement without life. " [Footnote: Laughter, p. 87 (Fr. P. 89). ]

Finally, in reviewing the evolutionary process as a whole, Bergsonasserts that it manifests a radical contingency. The forms of lifecreated, also the proportion of Intuition to Intelligence, in man, andthe physique and morality of man, are all of them contingent. Life mighthave stored up energy in a different way through plants selectingdifferent chemical elements. The whole of organic chemistry would thenhave been different. Then, too, it is probable that Life manifestsitself in other planets, in other solar systems also, in forms of whichwe have no idea. He points out that between the perfect humanity andours one may conceive many possible intermediaries, corresponding to allthe degrees imaginable of Intelligence and Intuition. Another solutionmight have issued in a humanity either more intelligent or moreintuitive. Man has warred like the other species, he has warred againstthe other species. If the evolution of life had been opposed bydifferent accidents en route, if the current of life had been dividedotherwise, we should have been, in physique and in morality, verydifferent from what we are. [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 280-282(Fr. P. 288-290). ] We cannot regard humanity as prefigured in theevolutionary process, nor look on man as the ultimate outcome of thewhole of Evolution. The rest of Nature does not exist simply for thesake of man. Certainly man stands highest, for only in man hasconsciousness succeeded, but man has, as it were, lost much in coming tothis position. The whole process of Evolution "IS AS IF A VAGUE ANDFORMLESS BEING, WHOM WE MAY CALL, AS WE WILL, man OR super-man, HADSOUGHT TO REALIZE HIMSELF AND HAD SUCCEEDED ONLY BY ABANDONING A PART OFHIMSELF ON THE WAY. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 281 (Fr. P. 289). (Italics are Bergson's. )]

In the lectures on The Nature of the Soul, Bergson referred to the"Pathway of the evolutionary process" as being a "Way to Personality. "For on the line which leads to man liberation has been accomplished andthus personalities have been able to constitute themselves. If we couldview this line of evolution it would appear to resemble a telegraph wireon which has travelled a dispatch sent off as long ago as the firstbeginnings of life, a message which was then confused, of which a parthas been lost on the way, but which has at last found in the human racethe appropriate instrument. 

Humanity is one; we are members one of another. Bergson insists on thissolidarity of man, and, indeed, of all living creatures. "As thesmallest grain of dust is bound up with our entire solar system, drawnalong with it in that undivided movement of descent which is materialityitself, so all organized beings, from the humblest to the highest, fromthe first origins of life to the time in which we are, and in all placesas in all times, do but evidence a single impulsion, the inverse of themovement of matter, and in itself indivisible. All the living holdtogether and all yield to the same tremendous push. The animal takes itsstand on the plant, man bestrides animality, and the whole of humanity, in space and in time, is one immense army galloping beside and beforeand behind each of us, in an overwhelming charge, able to beat downevery resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, perhaps evendeath. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, pp. 285-286 (Fr. Pp. 293-294). ]

CHAPTER IX

THE GOSPEL OF INTUITION

Intelligence and Intuition not opposed--Intellectual sympathy--Synthesisand analysis. "Understanding as one loves"--Concepts--Intellect notfinal--Man's spirit and intuitions--Joy, creative power and art--Valueof Intuitive Philosophy. 

We now approach the grand climax of Bergson's philosophy, his doctrineof Intuition, which he preaches with all the vigour of an evangelist. Our study of his treatment of Change, of Perception, of la duree, and ofInstinct, has prepared us for an investigation of what he means byIntuition, for in dealing with these subjects he has been laying thefoundations of his doctrine of Intuition. He pointed out to us that Lifeis Change, but that our intellect does not really grasp the reality ofChange, for it is adapted to solids and to concepts, it resembles thecinematograph film. Then he has tried to show us that in Perceptionthere is really much more than we think, for our intellect carves outwhat is of practical interest, while the penumbra or vague fringes ofperceptions which have no bearing on action are neglected. By hisadvocacy of a real psychological Time, in opposition to the physicalabstraction which bears the name, he again brought out the inadequacy ofintellect to grasp Life in its flow and has put before us the soul's ownappreciation of Time, which is a valuation rather than a magnitude, anintuition of our consciousness. Then, in examining the Evolution ofInstinct and Intelligence, we found that Instinct, however blindintellectually, contained a wonderful and unique element of immediacy ordirect insight. These are just preparatory indications of the directionof Bergson's thought all the time. 

It is admittedly difficult to determine with very great definitenesswhat Bergson's view of Intuition really is, for he has made manystatements regarding it which appear at first sight irreconcilable and, in his earlier writings, has not been sufficiently careful when speakingof the distinction between Intelligence and Intuition. Some of his earlystatements are reactionary and crude and give the impression of a purelyanti-intellectualist position involving the condemnation of Intellectand all its work. [Footnote: E. G. , the statement "To philosophize is toinvert the habitual direction of the work of thought"--Introduction toMetaphysics p. 59. ] In his later work, however, Bergson has made it moreclear that he does not mean to throw Intellect overboard; it has itsplace, but is not final, nor is it the supreme human faculty which mostphilosophers have thought it to be. It must be lamented, however, thatBergson's language was ever so ill defined as to encourage the manyvaried and conflicting views which are held regarding his doctrine ofIntuition. Around this the greatest controversy has raged. Little is tobe gained by heeding the shouts of either those who acclaim Bergson as arevolutionary against all use of the Intellect, or of those who regardhim as no purely anti-intellectualist at all. We must turn to Bergsonhimself and study carefully what he has said and written, reserving ourjudgment until we have examined his own statements. 

What is this "Intuition"? In what is now a locus classicus [Footnote:Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 7. ] he says, "By Intuition is meant thekind of INTELLECTUAL SYMPATHY by which one places oneself within anobject in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequentlyinexpressible. Analysis is the operation which reduces the object toelements already known, that is, to elements common to it and otherobjects. To analyse, therefore, is to express a thing as a function ofsomething other than itself. All analysis is thus a translation, adevelopment into symbols, a representation taken from successive pointsof view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between thenew object which we are studying and others which we believe we knowalready. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the objectaround which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without endthe number of its points of view in order to complete its alwaysincomplete representation, and ceaselessly varies its symbols that itmay perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on therefore toinfinity. But Intuition, if Intuition be possible, is a simple act. Itis an act directly opposed to analysis, for it is a viewing in totality, as an absolute; it is a synthesis, not an analysis, not an intellectualact, for it is an immediate, emotional synthesis. 

Two illustrations, taken from the same essay, may serve to make thispoint clearer. A visitor in Paris, of an artistic temperament, makessome sketches of the city, writing underneath them, by way of memento, the word "Paris. " As he has actually seen Paris he is able, with thehelp of the original Intuition he has had of that unique whole which isParis itself, to place his sketches therein, and synthesize them. Butthere is no way of performing the inverse operation. It is impossible, even with thousands of sketches, to achieve the Intuition, to giveoneself the impression of what Paris is like, if one has never beenthere. Or again, as a second illustration, "Consider a character whoseadventures are related to me in a novel. The author may multiply thetraits of his hero's character, may make him speak and act as much as hepleases, but all this can never be equivalent to the simple andindivisible feeling which I should experience if I were able, for aninstant, to identify myself with the person of the hero himself. Out ofthat indivisible feeling, as from a spring, all the words, gestures, andactions of the man would appear to me to flow naturally. They would nolonger be accidents which, added to the idea I had already formed of thecharacter, continually enriched that idea without ever completing it. The character would be given to me all at once, in its entirety, and thethousand incidents which manifest it, instead of adding themselves tothe idea and so enriching it, would seem to me, on the contrary, todetach themselves from it, without, however, exhausting it orimpoverishing its essence. All the things I am told about the manprovide me with so many points of view from which I can observe him. Allthe traits which describe him and which can make him known to me, onlyby so many comparisons with persons or things I know already, are signsby which he is expressed more or less symbolically. Symbols and pointsof view, therefore, place me outside him; they give me only what he hasin common with others, and not what belongs to him, and to him alone. But that which is properly 'himself, ' that which constitutes hisessence, cannot be perceived from without, being internal by definition, nor be expressed by symbols, being incommensurable with everything else. Description, history, and analysis leave me here in the relative. Coincidence with the person himself would alone give me the absolute. "[Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 3. ] This, as Gaston Rageotputs it, is "to understand in the fashion in which one loves. " Thisstatement is of suggestive interest in considering the practical problemof how we may be said to "know" other people, and has vital bearing onthe revelation of one personality to another, urging, as it does, thevalue and necessity of some degree of sympathy and indeed of love, forthe full understanding and knowledge of any personality. 

In another place Bergson says: "When a poet reads me his verses, I caninterest myself enough in him to enter into his thought, put myself intohis feelings, live over again the simple state he has broken intophrases and words. I sympathize then with his inspiration, I follow itwith a continuous movement which is, like the inspiration itself, anundivided act. " If this sympathy could extend its object and so reflectupon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations in the sameway as Intelligence, developed and corrected, introduces us into Matter. Intelligence, by the intermediary of science, which is its work, tellsmore and more completely the secret of physical operations; of Life itgives and pretends only to give an expression in terms of inertia. Weshould be led into the very interior of Life by Intuition, that is, byInstinct become disinterested, conscious of itself, capable ofreflecting on its object and enlarging it indefinitely. 

In proclaiming the gospel of Intuition, Bergson's main point is to showthat man is capable of an experience and a knowledge deeper than thatwhich the Intellect can possibly give. "At intervals a soul arises whichseems to triumph. .. By dint of simplicity--the soul of an artist or apoet, which, remaining near its source, reconciles, in a harmonyappreciable by the heart, terms irreconcilable by the intelligence"[Footnote: From the address on Ravaisson, delivered before the Academiedes Sciences morales et politiques 1904. ] His point of view is here akinto that of an earlier French thinker, Pascal, who said: "The heart hathreasons that the reason cannot know. " The Intellect is, by its nature, the fabricator of concepts, and concepts are, in Bergson's view, mischievous. They are static, they leave out the flux of things, theyomit too much of experience, they are framed at an expensive cost, theexpense of vital contact with Life itself. Of course he admits a certainvalue in concepts, but he refuses to admit that they help us at all tograsp reality in its flux. "Metaphysics must transcend concepts in orderto reach Intuition. Certainly concepts are necessary to it, for all theother sciences work, as a rule, with concepts, and Metaphysics cannotdispense with the other sciences. But it is only truly itself when itgoes beyond the concept, or at least when it frees itself from rigid andready-made concepts, in order to create a kind very different from thosewhich we habitually use; I mean supple, mobile, and almost fluidrepresentations, always ready to mould themselves on the fleeting formsof Intuition. " [Footnote: An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 18. ]

The true instrument of Metaphysics is intuition. We can only graspourselves, Bergson points out, by a metaphysical Intuition, for the souleludes thought; we cannot place it among concepts or in a category. Intuition, however, reveals to us Real Time (la duree) and our realselves, changing and living as free personalities in a Time which, as itadvances, creates. 

Intuition is in no way mysterious, Bergson claims. Every one of us hashad opportunities to exercise it in some degree, and anyone, forexample, who has been engaged in literary work, knows perfectly wellthat after long study has been given to the subject, when all documentshave been collected and necessary drafts worked out, one thing more isneedful--an effort, a travail of soul, a setting of oneself in the heartof the subject; in short, the getting of inspiration. MetaphysicalIntuition seems to be of this nature, and its relation to the empiricaldata contributed by the Intellect is parallel to the relation betweenthe literary man's inspiration and his collected material. Of course "itis impossible to have an Intuition of reality, that is, an intellectualsympathy, with its innermost nature, unless its confidence has been wonby a long comradeship with its external manifestation. " In his study ofLucretius [Footnote: Extraits de Lucrece avec etude sur la poesie, laphilosophie, la physique le texte et la langue de Lucrece (1884). Preface, p. Xx. ] he remarks that the chief value of the Latin poet-philosopher lay in his power of vision, in his insight into the beautyof nature, in his synthetic view, while at the same time he was able toexercise his keenly analytic intellect in discovering all he could aboutthe facts of nature in their scientific aspect. At the same time, metaphysical Intuition, although only to be obtained throughacquaintance with empirical data, is quite other than the mere summaryof such knowledge. [Footnote: See protest: L'Intuition philosophique inRevue de metaphysique et de morale, 1911, p. 821. ] It is distinct fromthese data, as the motor impulse is distinct from the path traversed bythe moving body, as the tension of the spring is distinct from thevisible movements of the pendulum. In this sense Metaphysics has nothingin common with a generalization of facts. It might, however, be definedas "integral experience. " Nevertheless Intuition, once attained, mustfind a mode of expression in well-defined concepts, for in itself it isincommunicable. Dialectic is necessary to put Intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that Intuition should break itself up intoconcepts and so be propagated to others. But when we use language andconcepts to communicate it, we tend to make these in themselves meansomething, whereas they are but counters or symbols used to express whatis their inspiration--Intuition. Hence we often forget the metaphysicalIntuitions from which science itself has sprung. What is relative inscience is the symbolic knowledge, reached by pre-existing conceptswhich proceed from the fixed to the moving. A truly intuitive philosophywould bring science and metaphysics together. Modern science dates fromthe day when mobility was set up as an independent reality and studiedas such by Galileo. But men of science have mainly fixed their attentionon the concepts, the residual products of Intuition, the symbols whichhave lent a symbolic character to every kind of science. Metaphysicians, too, have done the same thing. Hence it was easy for Kant to show thatour science is wholly relative and our metaphysics entirely artificial. For Kant, science was a universal mathematic and metaphysics apractically unaltered Platonism. The synthetic Intuition was hidden bythe analysis to which it had given rise. For Kant, Intuition was infra-intellectual, but for Bergson it is supra-intellectual. Kant's greaterror was in concluding that it is necessary for us, in order to attainIntuition, to leave the domain of the senses and of consciousness. Thiswas because of his views of Time and Change. If Time and Change reallywere what he took them to be, then Metaphysics and Intuition alike areimpossible. For Bergson, however, Time and Change lead up to Intuition;indeed it is by Intuition that we come to see all things, as heexpresses it, sub specie durationis. This is the primary vision which anintuitive philosophy supplies. Such a philosophy will not be merely aunification of the sciences. 

In an article contributed to the Revue de metaphysique et de morale inJanuary of 1908, under the title L'Evolution de l'intelligencegeometrique, we find Bergson remarking: "Nowhere have I claimed that weshould replace intelligence by something else, or prefer instinct to it. I have tried to show merely that when we leave the region of physicaland mathematical objects for the realm of life and consciousness, wehave to depend on a certain sense of living, which has its origin in thesame vital impulse that is the basis of instinct, although instinct, strictly speaking, is something quite different. "

Intellect and Intuition, Bergson says very emphatically, at the close ofhis Huxley Lecture on Life and Consciousness, are not opposed to oneanother. "How could there be a disharmony between our Intuitions and ourScience, how, especially, could our Science make us renounce ourIntuition, if these Intuitions are something like Instinct--an Instinctconscious, refined, spiritualized--and if Instinct is still nearer Lifethan Intellect and Science? Intuition and Intellect do not oppose eachother, save where Intuition refuses to become more precise by cominginto touch with facts, scientifically studied, and where Intellect, instead of confining itself to Science proper (that is, to what can beinferred from facts, or proved by reasoning), combines with this anunconscious and inconsistent metaphysic which in vain lays claim toscientific pretensions. The future seems to belong to a philosophy whichwill take into account the whole of what is given. " [Footnote: Life andConsciousness, as reported in The Hibbert Journal, Vol. X, Oct. , 1911, pp. 24-44. ] Intuition, to be fruitful, must interact with Intellect. Ithas the direct insight of Instinct, but its range is widened inproportion as it blends with Intellect. To imagine that the acceptanceof the gospel of Intuition means the setting aside of all valuation inregard to the Intellect and its work would be preposterous. Bergson, however unguarded his language at times has been, does not mean this. Hedoes not mean that we must return to the standpoint of the animal orthat we must assume that the animal view, which is instinctive, ishigher than the view which, through Intellect, gives it a meaning andvalue to the percipient. That would involve the rejection of all thatour culture has accumulated, all our social heritage from the past, theoverthrow of our civilization, the undoing of all that has developed inour world, since man's Intelligence came into it. We cannot obtainIntuition without intellectual labour, for it must have an intellectualor scientific basis. Yet, however valuable Intellect is, it is notfinal. "It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word, that we reach by the combined and progressive development of science andphilosophy. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 210 (Fr. P. 217). ] Weneed, therefore, if we are to get into touch with the deeper aspects ofreality, something more than bare science. We cannot live on its drybread alone; we need philosophy--an intuitional philosophy. 

In his brilliant paper L'Intuition philosophique Bergson shows us, by asplendid study of Berkeley and Spinoza, that the great Intuitionunderlying the thought of a philosopher is of more worth to the worldthan the logic and dialectic through the aid of which it is mademanifest, and elaborated. [Footnote: He makes this clear in a letter toDr. Mitchell in the latter's Studies in Bergson's Philosophy, p. 31. ]Then in the Lectures La Perception du Changement and in his little workon Laughter he sets forth the meaning of Intuition in relation to Art. From time to time Nature raises up souls more or less detached frompractical life, seers of visions and dreamers of dreams, men ofIntuition, with powers of great poetry, great music, or great painting. The clearest evidence of Intuition comes to us from the works of thesegreat artists. What is it that we call the "genius" of great painters, great musicians, and great poets? It is simply the power they have ofseeing more than we see and of enabling us, by their expressions, topenetrate further into reality ourselves. What makes the picture is theartist's vision, his entry into the subject by sympathy or Intuition, and however imperfectly he expresses this, yet he reveals to us morethan we could otherwise have perceived. 

The original form of consciousness, Bergson asserts, was nearer toIntuition than to Intelligence. But man has found Intellect the morevaluable faculty for practical use and so has used it for the solutionof questions it was never intended to solve, by reason of its nature andorigin. Yet "Intuition is there, but vague and, above all, discontinuous. It is a lamp almost extinguished which only glimmers nowand then for a few moments at most. But it glimmers whenever a vitalinterest is at stake. On our personality, on our liberty, on the placewe occupy in the whole of Nature, on our origin, and perhaps also on ourdestiny, it throws a light, feeble and vacillating, but which, none theless, pierces the darkness of the night in which the Intellect leavesus. " [Footnote: Creative Evolution, p. 282 (Fr. P. 290). ]

Science promises us well-being, or, at the most, pleasure, butphilosophy, through the Intuition to which it leads us, is capable ofbestowing upon us Joy. The future belongs to such an intuitivephilosophy, Bergson holds, for he considers that the whole progress ofEvolution is towards the creation of a type of being whose Intuitionwill be equal to his Intelligence. Finally, by Intuition we shall findourselves in--to invent a word--"intunation" with the elan vital, withthe Evolution of the whole universe, and this absolute feeling of "at-one-ment" with the universe will result in that emotional synthesiswhich is deep Joy, which Wordsworth describes as:

 "that blessed mood In which the burthen of the mystery, In which the heavy and the weary weight Of all this unintelligible world, Is lightened:--that serene and blessed mood, In which the affections gently lead us on, -- Until, the breath of this corporeal frame And even the motion of our human blood Almost suspended, we are laid asleep In body, and become a living soul: While with an eye made quiet by the power Of harmony and the deep power of joy We see into the life of things. "

CHAPTER X

ETHICAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

Anti-intellectualism and the State--Syndicalism--Class war, "directaction. " Sorel advocates General Strike--Bergson cited in support--Unfair use of Bergson's view of reality--His ethic--Value of Will andCreativeness; not a supporter of impulse. Development of personality. Intuitive mind of woman. Change and the moral life. 

Bergson has not written explicitly upon Ethics. In some quarters, however, so much has been made of Bergson as a supporter of certainethical tendencies and certain social movements, that we must examinethis question of ethical and political implications and try to ascertainhow far this use of Bergson is justified. 

Both ethical and political thought to-day are deriving fresh stimulationfrom the revision of many formulae, the modification of many conceptionswhich the War has inevitably caused. At the same time the keen interesttaken in studies like social psychology and political philosophycombines with a growing interest in movements such as Guild Socialismand Syndicalism. The current which in philosophy sets againstintellectualism, in the political realm sets against the State. Thispolitical anti-intellectualism shows a definite tendency to belittle theState in comparison with economic or social groups. "If socialpsychology tends to base the State as it is, on other than intellectualgrounds, Syndicalism is prone to expect that non-intellectual forceswill suffice to achieve the State as it should be. " [Footnote: ErnestBarker in his Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to thePresent Day, p. 248. ] Other tendencies of the same type are noticeable. For example, Mr. Bertrand Russell's work on The Principles of SocialReconstruction is based on the view that impulse is a larger factor inour social life than conscious purpose. 

The Syndicalists have been citing the philosophy of Bergson in supportof their views, and it is most interesting to see how skilfully at timessayings of Bergson are quoted by them as authoritative, as justificationfor their actions, in a spirit akin to that of the devout man who quotesscripture texts as a guide to conduct. 

In this country, Syndicalism has not been popular, and when it did showits head the government promptly prosecuted the editor and printers ofits organ, The Syndicalist, and suppressed the paper owing to itsaggressive anti-militarism. [Footnote: Imprisonment of Mr. Tom Mann]English Syndicalism has few supporters and it is a rather diluted formof French Syndicalism. To understand the movement, we must turn to itshistory in France or in America. Its history in Russia will be an objectof research in the future, when more material and more news areavailable from that "distressful country. " In France local unions orsyndicats were legalized as early as 1884 but 1895 is the importantlandmark, being the date of the foundation with which Syndicalism isassociated to-day, the Confederation Generale du Travail, popularlyknown as the "C. G. T. , " the central trade-union organization in France. In the main, Syndicalism is an urban product, and has not many adherentsamong the agricultural population. In America a "Federation of Labour"was formed in 1886, but the Syndicalist organization there is the bodyknown as "The Industrial Workers of the World. " In its declaration ofpolicy, it looks forward to a union which is to embrace the wholeworking class and to adopt towards the capitalist class an unendingwarfare, until the latter is expropriated. "The working class and theemploying class, " says the declaration, "have nothing in common. Betweenthese two classes a struggle must go on until all the toilers cometogether on the industrial field and take and hold that which theyproduce by their labour. " Among the leaders of Syndicalist thought onthe Continent may be mentioned the names of three prominent Frenchmen, Berth, Lagardelle, and Sorel, together with that of the young Italianprofessor Labriola, who is leading the increasingly active party in hisown country. 

In France, Italy, and America alike, Syndicalism stands for the class-war. Its central feature is the idea of a General Strike. It manifests ahatred of the State, which makes it bitterly opposed to State Socialism, which it regards as centralized and tyrannical, or to a Labour-party ofany kind in Parliament. [Footnote: Attempts at carrying out a GeneralStrike, in France, Sweden, Italy, and Spain have failed. The greatestStrikes have been: Railwaymen in Italy, in 1907; Postal Workers inFrance, in 1909. Miners in New South Wales, in 1909, and in Sweden, 1909; Miners and Railwaymen in England; Textile Workers inMassachusetts, 1912; Railwaymen in England, 1919, in France, 1920. ] Itregards the State as fixed, rigid, and intellectual, and adopts all theBergsonian anathemas it can find which condemn intellectualconstructions, concepts, and thought in general. Its war-cry is not only"Down with Capitalism" but also, in a great number of cases, "Down withIntellectualism"! Instinct and impulse alone are to be guides. Syndicalism, unlike Socialism, has no programme--it does not believe ina prearranged plan. Reality, it says, quoting Bersgon, has no plan. Itsays, "Let us act, act instinctively and impulsively against what wefeel to be wrong, and the future will grow out of our acting. " We findGeorges Sorel, the philosopher of Syndicalism, talking about what heterms the INTUITION of Socialism, and he talks emphatically about thetremendous moral value of strikes, apart from any material gain achievedby them. He believes religiously in a General Strike as the great ideal, but considers it a myth capable of rousing enthusiasm in the workers, anideal to which they must strive, a myth as inspiring as the belief ofthe early Christians in the Second Coming of Christ, which, althoughquite a false belief, contributed largely to the success of the earlyChurch. "Strikes, " says Sorel, "have engendered in the proletariat themost noble, the most profound, the most moving sentiments they possess. The General Strike groups these in a composite picture, and by bringingtogether, gives to each its maximum intensity; appealing to the mostacute memories of particular conflicts, it colours with an intense lifeall the details of the composition presented to the mind. We obtain thusan intuition of Socialism which language cannot clearly express and weobtain it in a symbol instantly perceived, such as is maintained in theBergsonian philosophy. " [Footnote: Quoted by C. Bougle, in aninteresting article Syndicalistes et Bergsoniens, Revue du mois, April10, 1909. And by Rev. Rhondda Williams in Syndicalism in France and itsRelation to the Philosophy of Bergson, Hibbert Journal, 1914. Also by J. W. Scott in his book Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism, 1919, pp. 39-40, and by Harley in Syndicalism. ] In England, although the idea ofthe General Strike has not been so prominent, yet in recent yearsStrikes have assumed an aspect different from those of former years. Workers who had "struck" before for definite objects, for wages orhours, or reformed workshop conditions, now seem to be seeking aftersomething vaster--a fundamental alteration in industrial conditions orthe total abolition of the present system. The spirit of unrest is onthe increase; no doubt War conditions have, in many cases, intensifiedit, but there is in the whole industrial world an instinctive impulseshowing itself, which is issuing in Syndicalist and Bolshevist[Footnote: "Bolshevik"--simply the Russian word for majority party asdistinct from Mensheviks or minority. ] activities of various kinds. Syndicalism is undoubtedly revolutionary. There are Les Syndicats rougesand Les Syndicats jaunes, of which the "Reds" are by far the mostrevolutionary. [Footnote: See article Des Ouvriers syndiques et leSyndicalisme jaune, Revue de metaphysique et morale, 1912] The C. G. T. And the Industrial Workers of the World are out for what they call"direct action. " Their anarchy is really an organization directedagainst organization, at least against that organization we know as themodern State. They have no hope of salvation for themselves coming aboutthrough the State in any way. It has become somewhat natural for us tothink of the social reformer as a Member of Parliament and of therevolutionary socialist as a "strike-agitator. " The cries of "Don'tvote!" "Don't enlist!" are heard, and care is taken to keep the workmanfrom ceasing to quarrel with his employer. Any discussion of the rightsor wrongs of any Strike is condemned at once. [Footnote: RamsayMacDonald was condemned by the Syndicalists for claiming that a strikeMIGHT be wrong. ] All Strikes are regarded as right and as an approach tothe ideal of the General Strike. Sorel cites Bergson as calling us toturn from traditional thought, to seek reality in the dynamic, ratherthan the static. He claims that the Professor of Philosophy at theCollege de France really co-operates with the C. G. T. An unexpectedharmony arises "between the flute of personal meditation, and thetrumpet of social revolution, and the workman is inspired by being madeto feel that the elan ouvrier est frere de l'elan vital. " [Footnote:Quoted by C. Bougie in the article previously mentioned. ] As Bergsonspeaks of all movement as unique and indivisible, so the triumphantmovement of the General Strike is to be regarded as a whole, no analysisis to be made of its parts. As the portals of the future stand wideopen, as the future is being made, so Bergson tells us, that is deemedan excuse by the Syndicalists for having no prearranged plan of theconduct of the General Strike, and no conception of what is to be doneafterwards. It is unforeseen and unforeseeable. All industries, however, are to be in the hands of those who work them, the present industrialsystem is to be swept away. The new order which is to follow will haveentirely new moral codes. Sorel justifies violence to be used againstthe existing order, but says he wishes to avoid unnecessary blood-shedor brutality. [Footnote: Reflections on Violence. It is interesting tonote that Bergson refers briefly to Sorel as an original thinker whom itis impossible to place in any category or class, in La Philosophie, p. 13. ] He remarks however, in this connexion, that ancient society, withall its brutality, compares favourably with modern society which hasreplaced ferocity by cunning. The ancient peoples had less hypocrisythan we have; this, in his opinion, justifies violence in the overthrowof the modern system and the creation of a nobler ethic than that onwhich the modern State is based. For this reason, he disagrees with mostof his Syndicalist colleagues, and condemns sabotage and also the cacanny policy, both of which are a kind of revenge upon the employer, based on the principle of "bad work for bad pay. " He would have theworkers produce well now, and urges that moral progress is to be aimedat no less than material progress. 

It certainly seems, however, that the Syndicalists are making an unfairuse of Bergson. They have got hold of three or four points rather out ofrelation to their context, and are making the most of them. These pointsare, chiefly, his remarks against the Intellect, his appreciation ofInstinct and Intuition, his insistence on Freedom and on theIndeterminateness of the Future. In the hands of the Syndicalists thesebecome in effect: "Never mind what you think, rouse up your feelingintensely; act as you feel and then see what you think. " Briefly thisamounts to saying: "Act on impulse, behave instinctively and notrationally. " In too many cases, as we know, this is equivalent to amerely selfish "Down tools if you feel like it. " Now so far from Bergsonreally giving any countenance to capricious behaviour, or mere impulse, he expressly condemns such action. Although the future is being made, hedoes not admit that it will be merely CAPRICIOUSLY made, and he condemnsthe man of mere impulse along with the dreamer, in a fine passage wherehe speaks of the value of an intelligent memory in practicallife. [Footnote: See p. 48 of the present work. ] When the Syndicalistsassert that elan, instinct, impulse, or intuition are a better guidethan intelligence and reasoned principles, and cite Bergson as theirauthority, they omit an important qualification which upsets theirtheory entirely, for Bergson's anti-intellectualism is not at all of thetype which they advocate. He does not intend to rule Intellect out ofpractical affairs. Indeed it is just the opposite that he asserts, for, in his view, the Intellect is pre-eminently fitted for practical life, for action, and it is for this very reason that he maintains it does notgive us insight into reality itself, which Intuition alone can do. Hedoes not wish, however, to decrease the small element of rationalitymanifested in ethical and political life, least of all to make men lessrational, in the sense that they are to become mere creatures ofImpulse. 

Nevertheless, Bergson's great emphasis on Will and Creativeness condemnsany laissez-faire type of political theory. It would be wrong for us toaccept the social order which is felt to be imperfect and unjust in somany ways, simply because we find ourselves in it and fear we cannotwork a way out. WE HAVE GREAT POWER OF CREATION, AND IN LARGE MEASURE WECAN CREATE WHAT WE WILL IN THE WORLD OF POLITICS AND SOCIAL LIFE, and itis good that men generally should be made to see this. But it is of veryvital importance that we should will the right thing. This we are notlikely to do impulsively and without reflection. Even if we admit Mr. Russell's contention that "impulse has more effect than consciouspurpose in moulding men's lives" [Footnote: Principles of SocialReconstruction, Preface, p. 5. ] and agree that "it is not the weakeningof impulse that is to be desired, but the direction of impulse towardlife and growth, " [Footnote: p. 18. Cf. The whole of the first chapteron The Principle of Growth. ] yet, we none the less assert that instinctis an insufficient guide in the determination of social behaviour, andask how the direction of impulse, of which Mr. Russell himself speaks, is to be arrived at? Surely our only hope lies in striving to make mennot less, but more rational in order that they may grasp--however dimly--something of what is implied in ethical and political ideals, that theymay recognize in society some embodiment of will and purpose and come tolook upon Thought and Reason as the unifying and organizing principlesof human society. 

We cannot help wishing that Bergson had given us some contribution tothe study of Ethics. In one of his letters to Father de Tonquedecregarding the relation of his philosophy to Theology, we find himremarking that "Before these conclusions [theological statements] can beset out with greater precision, or considered at greater length, certainproblems of quite another kind would have to be attacked--the problemsof Ethics. I am not sure that I shall ever publish anything on thissubject. I shall do so only if I attain the results that appear to me asdemonstrable or as clearly to be shown as those of my other books. "[Footnote: In Etudes (Revue des Peres de Jesus), Vol. CXXX, pp. 514, 515, 1912. ] Prior to the War, however, we know that Bergson was takingup the problem of working out the implications of his philosophy in thesphere of social ethics, with particular reference to the meaning of"Duty" and the significance of "Personality. " Although hisinvestigations of these supremely important problems have not yet beencompleted or made public, nevertheless certain ethical implicationswhich have an important bearing on personal and social life seem to becontained in what he has already written. 

In its application to social life, Bergson's philosophy would involvethe laying of greater stress upon the need for all members of societyhaving larger opportunities of being more fully themselves, of beingself-creative and having fuller powers of self-expression as freecreative agents. It would lay emphasis upon the value of the personalityof the worker and would combat the systematic converting of him into amere "hand. " Thus would be set in clearer light the claims of humanpersonality to create and to enjoy a good life in the widest sense, toenter into fuller sympathy and fellowship with other personalities, andso develop a fuller and richer form of existence than is possible underpresent social and industrial conditions. It would mean a transvaluationof all social values, an esteeming of personality before property, arecognition of material goods as means to a good life, when employed inthe social service of the spirit of man. It would involve a denunciationof the enslavement of man's spirit to the production of material wealth. Each man would be a member of a community of personalities, each ofunique value, treating each other, not as means to their own particularselfish ends, but as ends in themselves. At the same time it wouldinvolve the putting of the personality of the citizen in the foremostplace in our social and political life, instead of a development of apurely class consciousness with its mischievous distinctions. 

Articles have been written dealing with Bergson's message to Feminism. This point is not without its importance in our modern life. It must beadmitted that the present system of civilization with its scientificcampaign of conquest of the material environment has been the work ofman's intellect. In the ruder stages of existence women's subordinationto men may have been necessary and justifiable. But in the developmentof society it has become increasingly less necessary, and humanity isnow at a stage where the contributions of women to society areabsolutely vital to its welfare and progress. Woman is proverbially andrightly regarded as more intuitive than man. This need not be taken tomean that, given the opportunity of intellectual development (until nowpractically denied to her), woman would not show as great ability inthis direction as man. But it is an undeniable fact that woman has keptmore closely to the forces of the great life-principle, both by the factthat in her rests the creative power for the continuation of the humanfamily and also by the fact that the development of the personalities ofchildren has been her function. The subjection in which women have beenlargely kept until now has not only hindered them from taking part inthe work of society as a whole and from expressing their point of view, but has meant that many of them have little or no knowledge of theircapacities and abilities in wider directions. However, with theirincreasing realization of their own powers, with the granting ofincreased opportunities to them, and an adequate recognition of theirpersonality side by side with that of men, achievements of supreme valuefor humanity as a whole may be expected from them. In certain spheresthey may be found much better adapted than are men to achieve a visionwhich will raise human life to a higher plane and give it greater worth. More especially in the realms of ethical development, of social science, problems of sex, of war and peace, of child welfare, health, andeducation, of religion and philosophy we may hope to have valuablecontributions from the more intuitive mind of woman. "It is not in thefighting male of the race: it is in Woman that we have the future centreof Power in civilization. " [Footnote: Benjamin Kidd in The Science ofPower, p. 195. This is more fully shown in his chapters, Woman thePsychic Centre of Power in the Social Integration, and The Mind ofWoman, pp. 192-257. ] The wandering Dante required for his guidance notonly the intellectual faculties of a Vergil but in addition theintuitive woman-soul of a Beatrice to lead him upward and on. 

In La Conscience et la Vie [Footnote: L'Energie spirituelle, p. 27(Mind-Energy). ] Bergson indicates slightly his views on SOCIALevolution--c'est a la vie sociale que l'evolution aboutit, comme si lebesoin s'en etait fait sentir des le debut, ou plutot comme si quelqueaspiration originelle et essentielle de la vie ne pouvait trouver quedans la societe sa pleine satisfaction. He seems inclined to turn hisattention to the unity of life, not simply as due to an identity oforiginal impulse but to a common aspiration. There is involved a processof subordination and initiative on the part of the individual. Theexistence of society necessitates a certain subordination, while itsprogress depends on the free initiative of the individual. It isextremely dangerous for any society, whether it be an InternationalLeague, a State, either Communistic or Capitalistic, a Trade Union, or aChurch, to suppress individual liberty in the interests of greatersocial efficiency or of increased production or rigid uniformity ofdoctrine. With the sacrifice of individual initiative will go the lossof all "soul, " and the result will be degeneration to a mechanical typeof existence, a merely stagnant institution expressing nothing of man'sspirit. This personal power of initiative Bergson appeals to each one tomaintain. In an important passage of his little work on Laughter hemakes a personal moral appeal. 

"What life and society require of each of us is a constantly alertattention, that discerns the outlines of the present situation, togetherwith a certain elasticity of mind and body to enable us to adaptourselves in consequence. "[Footnote: Laughter, p. 18 (Fr. P. 18). ] Thelack of tension and elasticity gives rise to mental deficiency and tograve inadaptability which produces misery and crime. Society demandsnot only that we live but that we live well. This means that we must betruly alive; for Bergson, the moral ideal is to keep spiritually alert. We must be our real, living selves, and not hide behind the social selfof hypocrisy and habit. We must avoid being the victims of mechanism orautomatism. We must avoid at all costs "getting into a rut" morally orspiritually. Change and vision are both necessary to our welfare. Wherethere is no vision, no undying fire of idealism, the people perish. 

Resistance to change is the sin against the Holy Spirit. Bergson isopposed to the conventional view of morality as equivalent to rigidity, and grasps the important truth that if morality is to be of worth at allit must lie not in a fixed set of rules, habits, or conventions, but ina spirit of living. This is of very great ethical importance indeed, asit means that we must revise many of our standards of character. Forexample, how often do we hear of one who, holding an obviously falseview long and obstinately, is praised as consistent, whereas a mindwhich moves and develops with the times, attempting always to adjustitself to changing conditions in its intellectual or materialenvironment, is contemptuously dubbed as "changeable" by the moralistsof rigidity. We must, however, learn that consistency of character doesnot mean lack of change. Stanchness of character is too often mereobstinate resistance to change. We must therefore be on our guardagainst those who would run ethics into rigid moulds, and so raise upstatic concepts and infallible dogmas for beliefs or action. Change mustbe accepted as a principle which it is both futile and immoral toignore, even in the moral life. This does not mean setting up caprice orimpulsiveness, for in so far as our change of character expresses thedevelopment of the single movement of our own inner life it will bequite other than capricious, but it will be change, and a change whichis quite consistent, a creative evolution of our personality. 

No merely materialistic ethic can breathe in the atmosphere of Bergson'sthought, which sets human consciousness in a high place and insists uponthe fact of Freedom. He maintains a point of view far removed from theold naturalistic ethic; he does take some account of "values, " freedom, creativeness, and joy (as distinct from pleasure). He points out thatMatter, although to a degree the tool of Spirit, is nevertheless theenemy who threatens us with a lapse into mere automatism which is onlythe parody of true life. The eternal conflict of Matter and Spirit inEvolution demands that we place ourselves on the side of spiritualrather than merely material values. We must not be like "the man withthe muck rake. " Our conceptions of goodness must be not merely staticbut dynamic, for the moral life is essentially an evolution--"a growthin grace. " It means a constant "putting on of the new man, " never"counting oneself to have attained, " for spirituality is a progress toever new creations, the spiritual life is an unending adventure, and is, moreover, one which is hampered and crushed by all refusals to recognizethat Change is the fundamental feature of the universe. Nothing can bemore mischievous, more detrimental to moral progress--which isultimately the only progress of value and significance to humanity--thanthe deification of the status quo either in the individual or in societyas a whole. 

CHAPTER XI

RELATION TO RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

Avoidance of theological terms--Intuition and faith--God and Change--Deity not omnipotent but creative and immanent--God as "Creator ofcreators"--Problem of teleology--Stimulus to theology--The need forrestatements of the nature of God--Men as products and instruments ofdivine activity--Immortality. 

We have seen that Bergson holds no special brief for science, for, ashas been shown, he opposes many of the hypotheses to which scienceclings. Consequently, some persons possessing only a superficialacquaintance with Bergson, and having minds which still think in theexclusive and opposing terms of the conflict of science and religion ofa generation past, have enthusiastically hailed him as an ally of theirreligion. We must examine carefully how far this is justifiable. It isperfectly natural and just that many people, unable to devote time orenergy to the study of his works, want to know, in regard to Bergson, asabout every other great thinker, what is the bearing of his thought ontheir practical theory of life, upon their ideals of existence, upon thecourage, faith, and hope which enable them to work and live, feelingthat life is worth while. We must, however, guard against misuse ofBergson, particularly such misuse of him as that made in another sphere, by the Syndicalists. We find that in France he has been welcomed by theModernists of the Roman Catholic Church as an ally, and by not a fewliberal and progressive Christian theologians in this country. 

At the outset, we must note that Bergson avoids theological forms ofexpression, because he is well aware that these--especially in aphilosophical treatise--may give rise to misconceptions. He does not, like Kant, attack any specific or traditional argument for Theism; hedoes not enter into theological controversy. He has not formulated, withany strictness, his conception of God; for he has recognized that anexamination of Theism would be of little or no value, which was notprefaced by a refutation of mechanism and materialism, and by theassertion of some spiritual value in the universe. It is to such alabour that Bergson has applied himself; it is only incidentally that wefind him making remarks on religious or theological conceptions. Hiswhole philosophy, however, involves some very important religiousconceptions and theological standpoints. In France, Bergson has had aconsiderable amount of discussion on the theological implications of hisphilosophy with the Jesuit Fathers, notably Father de Tonquedec. Thesearise particularly from his views concerning Change, Time, Freedom, Evolution and Intuition. 

Bergson has been cited as a "Mystic" because he preaches a doctrine ofIntuition. But his metaphysical Intuition bears no relation to themysticism of the saint or of the fervid religious mind. He expresslysays, "The doctrine I hold is a protest against mysticism since itprofesses to reconstruct the bridge (broken since Kant) betweenmetaphysics and science. " Yet, if by mysticism one means a certainappeal to the inner and profound life, then his philosophy is mystical--but so is all philosophy. We must beware of any attempts to runBergson's thought into moulds for which it was never intended, and guardagainst its being strained and falsely interpreted in the interests ofsome special form of religious belief. Intuition is not what thereligious mind means by Faith, in the accepted sense of belief in adoctrine or a deity, which is to be neither criticized nor reasonedabout. Religion demands "what passeth knowledge. " Furthermore, it seeksa reality that abides above the world of Change, "The same yesterday, to-day, and for ever, " to which it appeals. The religious consciousnessfinds itself most reluctant to admit the reality of Change, and this, wemust remember, is the fundamental principle of Bergson's thought. Faber, one of the noblest hymn writers, well expresses this attitude:

 "O, Lord, my heart is sick, Sick of this everlasting change, And Life runs tediously quick Through its unresting race and varied range. Change finds no likeness of itself in Thee, And makes no echo in Thy mute eternity. "

For Bergson, God reveals Himself in the world of Time, in the veryprinciple of Change. He is not "a Father of lights in Whom is novariableness nor shadow of turning. "

It has been said that the Idea of God is one of the objects ofphilosophy, and this is true, if, by God, we agree to mean the principleof the universe, or the Absolute. Unity is essential to the Idea of God. For the religious consciousness, of course, God's existence is anecessary one, not merely contingent. It views Him as eternal andunchangeable. But if we accept the Bergsonian philosophy, God cannot beregarded as "timeless, " or as "perfect" in the sense of being "eternal"and "complete. " He is, so to speak, realizing Himself in the universe, and is not merely a unity which sums up the multiplicity of timeexistence. Further, He must be a God who acts freely and creatively andwho is in time. Trouble has arisen in the past over the relation of"temporal" and "eternal"--the former being regarded as appearance. ForBergson, this difficulty does not arise; there is, for him, no suchdualism. His God is not exempt from Change, He is not to be conceived asexisting apart from and independent of the world. Indeed, for him, Godwould seem to be merely a focus imaginarius of Life and Spirit, a"hypostatization" of la duree. He cannot be regarded as the lovingFather of the human race whom He has begotten or created in order thatintelligent beings "may glorify Him and enjoy Him for ever. " Bergsondoes not offer us a God, personal, loving, and redemptive, as theChristian religious consciousness demands or imagines. He does not, andcan not, affirm Christian Theism, for he considers that the facts do notwarrant the positing of a self-conscious and personal Individual in theonly sense in which we, from our experience, can understand these words. God is pure, creative activity, a flowing rather than a fountain head; acontinuity of emanation, not a centre from which things emanate. ForBergson, God is anthropomorphic--as He must necessarily be for us all--but Bergson's is anthropomorphism of a subtle kind. His God is the dureeof our own conscious life, raised to a higher power. Dieu se fait in theevolutionary process. He is absolutely unfinished, not complete orperfect. He is incessant life, action, freedom, and creativeness, and inso far as we ourselves manifest these (seen, above all, in the creativejoy of the inventor, poet, artist, and mother) each of us has the"divine" at work within. For Bergson, God is a Being immanent in theuniverse, but He is ignorant of the direction in which Evolution isprogressing. This is not the God of the ordinary religiousconsciousness, nor is it a conception of God which satisfies the limitednotion which our own imagination both creates and craves to find real. God, it would seem, must be greater than His works, and He must knowwhat He is doing. It has been objected that a force, even if a divineforce (one can hardly call it "God" in the ordinary meaning of thatvague word) which urges on Matter without knowing in what direction orto what end, is no God at all, for it is merely personified chance. Thisis due to what Hegel calls "the error of viewing God as free. "[Footnote: Logic, Wallace's translation, first edition, p. 213. ]

In reply to certain criticisms of his book L'Evolution creatrice made byFather de Tonquedec, Bergson wrote in 1912: "I speak of God as thesource whence issue successively, by an effort of his freedom, thecurrents or impulses each of which will make a world; he thereforeremains distinct from them, and it is not of him that we can say that'most often it turns aside' or is 'at the mercy of the materiality thatit has been bound to adopt. ' Finally, the reasoning whereby I establishthe impossibility of 'nothing' is in no way directed against theexistence of a transcendent cause of the world; I have, on the contrary, explained that this reasoning has in view the Spinozist conception ofBeing. It issues in what is merely a demonstration that 'something' hasalways existed. As to the nature of this 'something' it is true thatnothing in the way of a positive conclusion is conveyed. But neither isit stated in any fashion that what has always existed is the worlditself, and the rest of the book explicitly affirms the contrary. "[Footnote: Tonquedec: Dieu dans l'Evolution creatrice (Beauchesne), andAnnales de philosophie chretienne, 1912. ] "Now the considerations setforth in my Essai sur les donnees immediates result in bringing to lightthe fact of freedom, those of Matiere et Memoire point directly, I hope, to the reality of Spirit, those of L'Evolution creatrice exhibitcreation as a fact. From all this emerges clearly the idea of a God, creator and free, the generator of both Matter and Life, whose work ofcreation is continued on the side of Life by the evolution of speciesand the building up of human personalities. From all this emerges arefutation of monism and of pantheism. " [Footnote: Tonquedec: Dieu dansl'Evolution creatrice (Beauchesne), and also Etudes des Peres de Jesus, Vol. CXXX, 1912. ] To this it was replied that, for Catholic theology, God is not merely the source from which the river springs, God does notdevelop Himself to a world but He causes it to appear by a kind ofcreation quite different from that of Bergson. Bergson's God is not theGod of pantheism, because, for him, the Deity is immanent in nature, notidentifiable with it. A true account of the Absolute would, for him, take the form of history. Human history has a vital meaning for him. Godis not omnipotent; He is a fighter who takes sides. He is not a "potter-God" with a clay world. The world involves a limiting of God, andtheology has always found this its most difficult problem, for the evilsor defects against which the Creator is waging war are evils and defectsin a world of His own creating. Speaking in 1914, at the EdinburghPhilosophical Society, Bergson remarked that God might be looked upon as"a Creator of creators. " Such a view, more explicitly worked out, mightbring him into line with the religious attempt to reconcile the divineaction with our own work and freedom. Our wills are ours, but in somemystic way religion believes they may become His also, and that we maybe "fellow-labourers together with God. " The religious view of theperfection of the Divine, its omniscience and omnipotence, has alwaysbeen hard to reconcile with free will. Christian theology, when based onthe perfection of the Divine nature, has always tended to bedeterminist. Indeed, free will has been advocated rather as anexplanation of the presence of evil (our waywardness as in opposition tothe will of God) than as the privilege and necessary endowment of aspiritual being, and so the really orthodox religious mind has beenforced to seek salvation in self-surrender and has found consolation inreliance on the "grace" or "active good will" of God. Thus manytheologians in an attempt to reconcile this with human freedom speakmystically, nevertheless confidently, of "the interaction of Grace andFree-Will. "

The acceptance of Creative Evolution involves the acceptance of a Godwho expresses Himself in creative action called forth by changingsituations. It cannot regard Evolution as merely the unrolling in timeof the eternally complete, as in the view of monistic idealism. We findin Bergson, however, two hints which suggest that some vague idealisticconception has been present to his mind. For instance, in speaking ofTime in relation to God, we find him suggesting that "the whole ofhistory might be contained in a very short time for a consciousness at ahigher degree of tension than our own, which should watch thedevelopment of humanity while contracting it, so to speak, into thegreat phases of its evolution. " [Footnote: Matter and Memory, p. 275(Fr. P. 231). ] This remark seems an echo of the words of the old Hebrewpoet:

 "For a thousand years in Thy sight Are but as yesterday when it is past, And as a watch in the night. "

Again, in L'Evolution creatrice we find him suggesting that in maternityand love may lie the secret of the universe. 

The important point however, in considering Bergson in relation toReligion and Theology, is his marked objection to teleology. It is thiswhich has led many to style his philosophy pessimistic. Religion doesnot live readily in a pessimistic atmosphere. Then religion regards Lifeand the Universe as valuable, not because they yield to some singleimpulsion, but because, at every step, they manifest a meaning andsignificance interpreted by our conceptions of value. Bergson's viewonly favours religion as ordinarily comprehended, in so far as it breaksaway from a materialistic mechanism, and asserts freedom and givesSpirit some superiority over Matter. At first sight, the term "creative"seemed very promising, but can we stop where Bergson has left us? Whyshould he banish teleology? His super-consciousness is so indeterminatethat it is not allowed to hamper itself with any purpose more definitethan that of self-augmentation. The course and goal of Evolution are toit unknown and unknowable. Creation, freedom, and will are great things, as Mr. Balfour remarks, but we cannot lastingly admire them unless weknow their drift. It is too haphazard a universe which Bergson displays. Joy does not seem to fit in with what is so aimless. It would be betterto invoke God with a purpose than a supra-consciousness with none. [Footnote: Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt, Hibbert Journal, Oct. , 1911, pp. 1-23. ]

In response to an international inquiry, conducted by Frederic Charpin, for the Mercure de France, formulated in the question, Assistons-nous aune dissolution ou a une evolution de l'idee religieuse et du sentimentreligieux? Bergson wrote: "I feel quite unable to foretell what theexternal manifestation of the religious sense may be in time to come. Ican only say that it does not seem to me likely to be disintegrated. Only that which is made up of parts can be disintegrated. Now, I amwilling to admit that the religious sense has been gradually enrichedand complicated by very diverse elements; none the less it is in essencea simple thing, sui generis; and resembles no other emotion of the soul. It may, perhaps be urged that a simple element, although it cannot bedecomposed, may yet disappear, and that the religious sense willinevitably vanish when it has no object to which it can attach itself. But this would be to forget that the object of the religious sense is, in part at least, prior to that sense itself; that this object is felteven more than it is thought and that the idea is, in this case, theeffect of the feeling quite as much as its cause. The progressivedeepening of the idea may therefore make the religious sense clearer andever clearer; it cannot modify that which is essential in it, still lesseffect its disappearance. " [Footnote: Charpin: La Question religieuse, 1908, Paris. ]

We find Bergson reported as believing that the individual cannot beguided solely by considerations of a purely moral character. Morality, even social ethics, is not enough in view of the longing for religiousexperience, the yearning for at least a feeling of definite relationshipbetween the individual human personality and the great spiritual sourceof life. This is a feeling which he believes will grow. [Footnote: NewYork Times, Feb. 22, 1914. ]

Bergson's philosophy has aroused a new interest in many theologicalquestions. The dogmas of theology, philosophy holds itself free tocriticize; they are for it problems. The teleological arguments of theolder theologians have had to be left behind. "We are fearfully andwonderfully made, " no doubt, but not perfectly, and the arguments infavour of an intelligent contriver (cf. The Bridgewater Treatises) whichshowed the greatest plausibility, were made meaningless by Darwin'swork. Further, Evoluton knows no break. We cannot believe in thedoctrines of the "fall" or in "original sin, " for Evolution means aprogress from lower to higher forms. Thus we see that many of the olderforms of theological statement call for revision. Bergson has done muchto stimulate a keener and fresher theological spirit which will expressGod in a less static and less isolated form, so that we shall not havethe question asked, either by children or older folks, "What does Goddo?"

It should be noted before closing this section that the religiousconsciousness is tempted to take Bergson's views on Soul and Body toimply more than they really do. The belief in Immortality which Westernreligion upholds is not a mere swooning into the being of God, but aperfect realization of our own personalities. It is only this that is animmortality worthy of the name. To regard souls as Bergson does, asmerely "rivulets" into which the great stream of Life has divided, doesnot do sufficient justice to human individuality. A "Nirvana, " afterdeath, is not immortality in the sense of personal survival and in thesense demanded by the religious consciousness. 

The influence of Bergson's thought upon religion and theology may be putfinally as follows: We must reject the notion of a God for whom all isalready made, to whom all is given, and uphold the conception of a Godwho acts freely in an open universe. The acceptance of Bergson'sphilosophy involves the recognition of a God who is the enduringcreative impulse of all Life, more akin perhaps to a Mother-Deity than aFather-Deity. This divine vital impetus manifests itself in continualnew creation. We are each part of this great Divine Life, and are boththe products and the instruments of its activity. We may thus come toview the Divine Life as self-given to humanity, emptying itself intomankind as a veritable incarnation, not, however, restricted to one timeand place, but manifest throughout the whole progress of humanity. Ourconception will be that of a Deity, not external and far-off, but onewhose own future is bound up in humanity, rejoicing in its joy, butsuffering, by a kind of perpetual crucifixion, through man's errors andhis failures to be loyal to the higher things of the spirit. Thus weshall see that, in a sense, men's noble actions promote God's fullerbeing. A Norwegian novelist has recently emphasized this point by hisstory of the man who went out and sowed corn in his late enemy's fieldTHAT GOD MIGHT EXIST! [Footnote: The Great Hunger, by Johan Bojer. ] Butit is important to remember that in so far as we allow ourselves tobecome victims of habit, living only a materialistic and static type ofexistence, we retard the divine operations. On the other hand, in so faras our spirit finds joy in creative activity and in the furtherance ofspiritual values, to this extent we may be regarded as fellow-labourerstogether with God. We cannot, by intellectual searching find out God, yet we may realize and express quite consistently with Bergson'sphilosophy the truth that "in Him we live, and move, and have ourbeing. "

CHAPTER XII

REFLECTIONS

Bergson not systematic--His style--Difficult to classify--Empirical andspiritual--Value of his ideas on Change, the nature of Mind, of Freedom--Difficulties in his evolutionary theory--Ethical lack--Need forsupplement-Emphasis on Will, Creativeness, Human Progress andPossibilities. 

In concluding this study of Bergson's philosophy, it remains to sum upand to review its general merits and deficiencies. We must remember, infairness to Bergson, that he does not profess to offer us A SYSTEM ofphilosophy. In fact, if he were to do so, he would involve himself in agrave inconsistency, for his thought is not of the systematic type. Heis opposed to the work of those individual thinkers who have offered"systems" to the world, rounded and professedly complete constructions, labelled, one might almost say, "the last word in Philosophy. " Bergsondoes not claim that his thought is final. His ideal, of which he speaksin his lectures on La Perception du Changement--that excellent summaryof his thought--is a progressive philosophy to which each thinker shallcontribute. If we feel disappointed that Bergson has not gone further ordone more by attempting a solution of some of the fundamental problemsof our human experience, upon which he has not touched, then we mustrecollect his own view of the philosophy he is seeking to expound. Allthinking minds must contribute their quota. A philosophy such as hewishes to promote by establishing a method by his own works will not bemade in a day. "Unlike the philosophical systems properly so called, each of which was the individual work of a man of genius, and sprang upas a whole to be taken or left, it will only be built up by thecollective and progressive effort of many thinkers, of many observersalso, completing, correcting, and improving one another. " [Footnote:Introduction to Creative Evolution, p. Xiv. (Fr. P. Vii). ] Both scienceand the older kind of metaphysics have kept aloof from the vitalproblems of our lives. In one of his curious but brilliant metaphorsBergson likens Life to a river over which the scientists haveconstructed an elaborate bridge, while the laborious metaphysicians havetoiled to build a tunnel underneath. Neither group of workers hasattempted to plunge into the flowing tide itself. In the most brilliantof his short papers: L'Intuition philosophique, he makes an energeticappeal that philosophy should approach more closely to practical life. His thought aims at setting forth, not any system of knowledge, butrather a method of philosophizing; in a phrase, this method amounts tothe assertion that Life is more than Logic, or, as Byron put it, "Thetree of Knowledge is not the tree of Life. "

It is because Bergson has much to say that is novel and opposed to olderconceptions that a certain lack of proportion occasionally mars histhought; for he--naturally enough--frequently lays little emphasis onimportant points which he considers are sufficiently familiar, in orderto give prominent place and emphasis to some more novel point. Hereinlies, it would now appear, the explanation of the seeming disharmonybetween Intuition and Intellect which was gravely distressing to many inhis earlier writing on the subject. Later works, however, make a pointof restoring this harmony, but, as William James has remarked: "We areso subject to the philosophical tradition which treats logos, ordiscursive thought generally, as the sole avenue to truth, that to fallback on raw, unverbalized life, as more of a revealer, and to think ofconcepts as the merely practical things which Bergson calls them, comesvery hard. It is putting off our proud maturity of mind and becomingagain as foolish little children in the eyes of reason. But, difficultas such a revolution is, there is no other way, I believe, to thepossession of reality. " [Footnote: Lecture on Bergson and his anti-intellectualism, in A Pluralistic Universe. It may be remarked herethat, although James hailed Bergson as an ally, Bergson cannot beclassed as a pragmatist. His great assertion is that just becauseintellect is pragmatic it does not help us to get a vision of reality. Cf. The interesting work on William James and Henri Bergson, by W. H. Kallen. ]

Bergson's style of writing merits high praise. He is no "dry"philosopher; he is highly imaginative and picturesque; many of hispassages might be styled, like those of Macaulay, "purple, " for at timeshe rises to a high pitch of feeling and oratory. Yet this has been urgedagainst him by some critics. The ironic remark has been repeated, inregard to Bergson, which was originally made of William James, by Dr. Schiller, that his work was "so lacking in the familiar philosophiccatch-words, that it may be doubted whether any professor has quiteunderstood it. " There is in his works a beauty of style and acomparative absence of technical terms which have contributed much tohis popularity. The criticism directed against his poetic style, accuseshim of hypnotizing us by his fine language, of employing metaphors wherewe expect facts, and of substituting illustrations for proof. Sir RayLankester says: "He has exceeded the limits of fantastic speculationwhich it is customary to tolerate on the stage of metaphysics, and hascarried his methods into the arena of sober science. " [Footnote: In thepreface to Elliot's volume, Modern Science and the Illusions of Bergson, p. Xvii. ] Another critic remarks that "as far as Creative Evolution isconcerned, his writing is neither philosophy nor science. " [Footnote:McCabe: Principles of Evolution, p. 254. ] Certainly his language ischarming; it called forth from William James the remark that itresembled fine silk underwear, clinging to the shape of the body, sowell did it fit his thought. But it does not seem a fair criticism toallege that he substitutes metaphor for proof, for we find, onexamination of his numerous and striking metaphors, that they areemployed in order to give relief from continuous abstract statements. Hedoes not submit analogies as proof, but in illustration of his points. For example, when he likens the elan vital to a stream, he does notsuggest that because the stream manifests certain characteristics, therefore the life force does so too. Certainly that would be a highlyillegitimate proceeding. But he simply puts forward this to help us tograsp by our imaginative faculty what he is striving to make clear. Somecritics are apt to forget the tense striving which must be involved inany highly philosophical mind dealing with deep problems, to achieveexpression, to obtain a suitable vehicle for the thought--what wrestlingof soul may be involved in attempting to make intuitions communicable. Metaphor is undoubtedly a help and those of Bergson are always strikingand unconventional. Had Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, given moreillustrations, many of his readers would have been more enlightened. 

Bergson's thought, although in many respects it is strikingly originaland novel, is, nevertheless, the continuation, if not the culmination, of a movement in French philosophy which we can trace back throughBoutroux, Guyau, Lachelier and Ravaisson to Maine de Biran, who died in1824. Qui sait, wrote this last thinker, [Footnote: In his Pensees, p. 213. ] tout ce que peut la reflection concentree et s'il n'y a pas unnouveau monde interieur qui pourra etre decouvert un jour par quelqueColomb metaphysicien. 

Many of the ideas contained in Bergson's work find parallels in thephilosophy of Schopenhauer, as given in his work The World as Will andIdea (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), particularly his Voluntarismand his Intuitionism. The German thinker regarded all great scientificdiscoveries as an immediate intuition, a flash of insight, not simplythe result of a process of abstract reasoning. Schelling also maintaineda doctrine of intuition as supra-rational. 

Ravaisson, [Footnote: Ravaisson (1813-1900) wrote De l'habitude, 1832;La metaphysique d'Aristote, 1837; and his Rapport sur la philosophie enFrance au xix siecle, 1867. See Bergson's Memoir, 1904. ] to whom Bergsonis indebted for much inspiration, attended the lectures of Schelling atMunich in 1835. This French thinker, Ravaisson, has had an importantinfluence on the general development of thought in France during thelatter half of the last century, and much of his work foreshadowsBergson's thought. He upheld a spiritual activity, manifesting itselfmost clearly in love and art, while he allowed to matter, to mathematicsand logic only an imperfect reality. He extolled synthetic views ofreality rather than analytic ones. We are prevented, he said, fromrealizing our true selves because of our slavery to habit. To theultimate reality, or God, we can attain because of our kinship with thatreality, and by an effort of loving sympathy enter into union with it byan intuition which lies beyond and above the power of intellectualsearching. As Maine de Biran foretold the coming of a metaphysicalColumbus, so Ravaisson, in his famous Rapport sur la philosophic enFrance au xix siecle, published in 1867, prophesied as follows: "Manysigns permit us to foresee in the near future a philosophical epoch ofwhich the general character will be the predominance of what may becalled spiritualistic realism or positivism, having as generatingprinciple the consciousness which the mind has of itself of an existencerecognized as being the source and support of every other existence, being none other than its action. "

Lachelier, a disciple of Ravaisson, brought out--as has been alreadyremarked [Footnote: Page 3. ]--the significance of the operations ofvital forces and of liberty. Guyau, whose brief life ended in 1888 andwhose posthumous work La Genese de I'Idee de Temps was reviewed byBergson two years after the publication of his own Time and Free Will, laid great stress on the intensification and expansion of life. Boutroux, in his work, has insisted upon the fact of contingency. 

These forecasts of Bergson's thought made by men to whom he owes muchand for whom he personally has the greatest admiration are interesting, but we are not yet able to look upon his work through the medium ofhistorical perspective. We can however see it as the culmination ofvarious tendencies in modern French philosophy; first, the effort tobring philosophy into the open air of human nature, into immediatecontact with life and with problems vital to humanity; secondly, theupholding of contingency in all things, thus ensuring human freedom;thirdly, a disparagement of purely intellectual constructions as trueinterpretations of human life and all existence, coupled with aninsistence on an insight that transcends logical formulation. 

As a thinker, Bergson is very difficult to classify. "All classificationof philosophies is effected, as a rule, either by their methods or bytheir results, 'empirical' and 'a priori' is a classification bymethods; 'realist' and 'idealist' is a classification by results. Anattempt to classify Bergson's philosophy, in either of these ways, ishardly likely to be successful, since it cuts across all the recognizeddivisions. " [Footnote: Mr. Bertrand Russell's remark at the opening ofhis Lecture on The Philosophy of Bergson, before The Heretics, TrinityCollege, Cambridge, March 11, 1912. ] We find that Bergson cannot be putin any of the old classes or schools, or identified with any of theinnumerable isms. He brings together, without being eclectic, action andreflection, free will and determinism, motion and rest, intellect andintuition, subjectivity and externality, idealism and realism, in a mostunconventional way. His whole philosophy is destructive of a largeamount of the "vested interests" of philosophy. "We are watching therise of a new agnosticism, " remarked Dr. Bosanquet. A similar remarkcame from one of Bergson's own countrymen, Alfred Fouillee, who, in hiswork Le Mouvement idealist et la reaction contre la science positive, expressed the opinion that Bergson's philosophy could but issue in lescepticisme et le nihilisme (p. 206). Bergson runs counter to so manyestablished views that his thought has raised very wide and animateddiscussions. The list of English and American articles in theBibliography appended to the present work shows this at a glance. In hispreface to the volume on Gabriel Tarde, his predecessor in the chair ofModern Philosophy at the College de France, written in 1909, we findBergson remarking: On mesure la portee d'une doctrine philosophique a lavariete des idees ou elle s'epanouit et a la symplicite du principe ouelle se ramasse. This remark may serve us as a criterion in surveyinghis own work. The preceding exposition of his thought is a sufficientindication of the wealth of ideas expressed. Bergson is most suggestive. Moreover, no philosopher has been so steeped in the knowledge of bothMind and Matter, no thinker has been at once so "empirical" and so"spiritual. " His thought ranges from subtle psychological analyses andminute biological facts to the work of artists and poets, all-embracingin its attempt to portray Life and make manifest to us the reality ofTime and of Change. His insistence on Change is directed to showing thatit is the supreme reality, and on Time to demonstrating that it is thestuff of which things are made. He is right in attacking the falseconception of Time, and putting before us la duree as more real; right, too, in attacking the notion of empty eternity. But although Change andDevelopment may be the fundamental feature of reality, Bergson does notconvincingly show that it is literally THE Reality, nor do we think thatthis can be shown. He does not admit that there is any THING thatchanges or endures; he is the modern Heraclitus; all teaching whichsavours of the Parmenidean "one" he opposes. Yet it would seem thatthese two old conceptions may be capable of a reconciliation and that ifall reality is change, there is a complementary principle that Changeimplies something permanent. 

Then, again, we feel Bergson is right in exposing the errors which the"idea of the line, " the trespassing of space, causes; but he comes verynear to denying, in his statements regarding duree pure, any knowledgeof the past as past; he overlooks the decisive difference between the"no more" and the "not yet" feeling of the child's consciousness, whichis the germ of our clear knowledge of the past as past, and distinctfrom the future. 

To take another of his "pure" distinctions, we cannot see any necessityfor his formulation of what he terms "Pure Perception. " Not only does itobscure the relation of Sensation to Perception, but it seems to bequite unknown and unknowable and unnecessary as an hypothesis. As to his"Pure" Memory, there is more to be said. It stands on a different planeand seems to be the statement of a very profound truth which sheds lighton many difficult problems attaching to personality and consciousness, for it is the conservation of memories which is the central point inindividuality. His distinction between the habit of repeating and the"pure" memory is a very good and very necessary one. In his study of therelation of Soul and Body, we find some of his most meritorious work--his insistence on the uniqueness of Mind and the futility of attempts toreduce it to material terms. His treatment of this question is parallelto that of William James in the first part of his Ingersoll Lecture atHarvard in 1898, when he called attention to "permissive" or"transmissive" function of the brain. Bergson's criticisms ofParallelism are very valuable. 

No less so are his refutations of both physical and psychologicalDeterminism. Men were growing impatient of a science claiming so muchand yet admittedly unable to explain the really vital factors ofexistence, of which the free action of men is one of the most important. The value placed on human freedom, on the creative power of human beingsto mould the future, links Bergson again with James, and it is thishumanism which is the supremely valuable factor in the philosophies ofboth thinkers. This has been pointed out in the consideration of theethical and political implications of Bergson's Philosophy. Nevertheless, although his insistence on Freedom and Creative Evolutionimplies that we are to realize that by our choices and our free acts wemay make or mar the issue, and that through us and by us that issue maybe turned to good, the good of ourselves and of our fellows, there is anethical lack in Bergson's philosophy which is disappointing. Then, ashas been remarked in the chapter on Religion, there is the lack ofteleology in his conception of the Universe; his denial of ANY purposehardly seems to be in harmony with his use of the phrase "the meaning oflife. "

Much in Bergson would point to the need for the addition of a philosophyof Values. This, however, he does not give us. He shirks the deeperproblems of the moral and spiritual life of man. He undervalues, indeedignores, the influence of transcendent ideas or ideals on the life-history of mankind. The study of these might have led him to admit ateleology of some kind; for "in the thinking consciousness the order ofgrowth is largely determined by choice; and choice is guided byvaluation. We are, in general, only partially aware of the ends that wepursue. But we are more and more seeking to attain what is good, trueand beautiful, and the order of human life becomes more and more guidedby the consciousness of these ends. " [Footnote: Professor Mackenzie:Elements of Constructive Philosophy, p. 111. ] Bergson, however, will notultimately be able to evade the work of attempting some reconciliationof moral ideas and ideals with their crude and animal origins andenvironment, to which they are so opposed and to which they are actuallyoffering a very strong opposition. That he himself has seen this isproved by the attention he is now giving to the problems of socialEthics. 

There are four problems which confront every evolutionary theory. Theseconcern the origin of: Matter, Life, Consciousness, and Conscience. Bergson finds it very difficult to account for the origin of Matter, andit is not clear from what he says why the original consciousness shouldhave made Matter and then be obliged to fight against it in order to befree. Then, in speaking of the law of Thermodynamics, he says: "Anymaterial system which should store energy by arresting its degradationto some lower level, and produce effects by its sudden liberation, wouldexhibit something in the nature of Life. " This, however, is not veryprecise, for this would hold true of thunder-clouds and of manymachines. In regard to Instinct, it has been pointed out by severalexperts that Instinct is not so infallible as Bergson makes out. Of themistakes of Instinct he says little. Dr. McDougall in his great workBody and Mind says, when speaking of Bergson's doctrine of Evolution:"Its recognition of the continuity of all Life is the great merit ofProfessor Bergson's theory of Creative Evolution; its failure to giveany intelligible account of individuality is its greatest defect. Iventure to think, " he continues, "that the most urgent problemconfronting the philosophic biologist is the construction of a theory oflife which will harmonize the facts of individuality with the appearanceof the continuity of all life, with the theory of progressive evolution, and with the facts of heredity and biparental reproduction. " [Footnote:McDougall, Body and Mind, Footnote to p. 377. ]

In the light of such criticism it is important to note that Bergson isnow giving attention to the problem of personality which he made thesubject of his Gifford Lectures. It is a highly important problem forhumanity, and concentration on it seems the demand of the times uponthose who feel the urgent need of reflection and who have the ability tophilosophize. Can philosophy offer any adequate explanation of humanpersonality, its place and purpose in the cosmos? Why should individualsystems of energy, little worlds within the world, appear inside theunity of the whole, depending on their environment, physical and mental, for much, but yet capable of freedom and unforeseen actions, and ofcreative and progressive development? Further, why should idealsconcentrate themselves as it were round such unique centres ofindeterminateness as these are? On these problems of our origin anddestiny, in short, on an investigation of human personality, thinkersmust concentrate. Humanity will not be satisfied with systems whichleave no room for the human soul. Human personality and its experiencemust have ample place and recognition in any philosophy put forward inthese days. 

Bergson's work is a magnificent attempt to show us how, in the words ofGeorge Meredith: "Men have come out of brutishness. " His theory ofevolution is separated from Naturalism by his insistence on humanfreedom and on the supra-consciousness which is the origin of things; onthe other hand, he is separated from the Idealists by his insistenceupon the reality of la duree. He contrasts profoundly with AbsoluteIdealism. While in Hegel, Mind is the only truth of Nature, in Bergson, Life is the only truth of Matter, or we may express it--whereas forHegel the truth of Reality is its ideality, for Bergson the truth ofReality is its vitality. 

The need for philosophical thought, as Bergson himself points out, [Footnote: See the closing remarks in his little work on Frenchphilosophy, La Philosophie. ] is world-wide. Philosophy aims at bringingall discussion, even that of business affairs, on to the plane of ideasand principles. By looking at things from a truly "general" standpointwe are frequently helped to approach them in a really "generous" frameof mind, for there is an intimate connexion between the large mind andthe large heart. 

Bergson has rendered valuable service in calling attention to the needfor man to examine carefully his own inner nature, and the deepest worthand significance of his own experiences. For the practical purposes oflife, man is obliged to deal with objects in space, and to learn theirrelations to one another. But this does not exhaust the possibilities ofhis nature. He has himself the reality of his own self-consciousness, his own spiritual existence to consider. Consequently, he can never restsatisfied with any purely naturalistic interpretation of himself. Thestep of realizing the importance of mental constructions to interpretthe impressions of the external world, and the applying them topractical needs, was a great advance. Much greater progress, however, isthere in man's realization of qualities within himself which transcendthe ordinary dead level of experience, the recognition of the spiritualvalue of his own nature, of himself as a personality, capable even amidthe fluctuations of the world about him, and the illusions of senseimpressions, of obtaining a foretaste of eternity by a life that has theinfinite and the eternal as its inheritance; "He hath set eternity inthe heart of man. " Man craves other values in life than the purelyscientific. "There are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamtof" in the philosophies of the materialist or the naturalist. Bergsonassures us that the future belongs to a philosophy which will take intoaccount THE WHOLE of what is given. Transcending Body and Intellect isthe life of the Spirit, with needs beyond either bodily satisfaction orintellectual needs craving its development, satisfaction and fullerrealization. The man who seeks merely bodily satisfaction lives the lifeof the animal; even the man who poses as an intellectual finds himselfentangled ultimately in relativity, missing the uniqueness of allthings--his own life included. An intuitive philosophy introduces us tothe spiritual life and makes us conscious, individually andcollectively, of our capacities for development. Humanity may say: "Itdoth not yet appear what we shall be, " for man has yet "something tocast off and something to become. "

APPENDIX

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Note on Bibliographies. 

PART ONE. 

Bergson's own writings chronologically arranged. 

PART TWO. 

Section 1. Books directly on Bergson: (a) French. (b) English and American. (c) Others. 

Section 2. Books indirectly on Bergson: (a) French. (b) English and American. 

Section 3. Articles: English and American. (a) Signed, under author. (b) Unsigned, under date. 

Section 4. English Translations of Bergson. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A NOTE ON BIBLIOGRAPHIES

The books and articles which have appeared, dealing with Bergson's thought, are trulylegion. Three bibliographies have alreadybeen compiled, one in each of the countries: England, America and Germany, which are of value and meritattention. 

In 1910, Mr. F. L. Pogson, M. A. , prefixed to Timeand Free Will (the English translation of the Essai surles donnees immediates de la conscience) a comprehensivebibliography, giving a list of Bergson's ownpublished works, and numerous articles contributedto various periodicals, and in addition, lists of articlesin English, American, French, German and otherforeign reviews upon Bergson's philosophy. Thisbibliography was partly reprinted in France two yearslater as an appendix to the little work on Bergson byM. Joseph Desaymard, La Pensee de Henri Bergson(Paris, Mercure de France, pp. 82, 1912). 

Then in 1913, when Bergson paid his visit to America, Mr. W. Dawson Johnston, the Librarian of theColumbia University, New York, presented him witha copy of a little work of fifty-six pages entitled AContribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson. Thisexhaustive work was prepared under the direction ofMiss Isadore G. Mudge, the Reference Librarian, andincludes all books published and all periodical literatureof value by or on Bergson, complete up to 1913. "The bibliography includes" (to quote the Preface)"90 books and articles by Professor Bergson (includingtranslations of his works), and 417 books and articlesabout him. These 417 items represent 11 differentlanguages divided as follows: French, 170; English, 159; German, 40; Italian, 19; Polish, 5; Dutch, 3;Spanish, 3; Roumanian, 2; Swedish, 2; Russian, 2;Hungarian, 1. " For this work Professor John Deweywrote an introduction. It was published by theColumbia University Press in 1913, and is the bestevidence of the world-wide popularity of Bergson andthe international interest aroused by his writings. 

A more recent compilation, however, which containslater books and articles, is a German one, which appeared during the war. It is the work ofWalter Meckauer and forms a valuable part of his bookDer Intuitionismus und seine Elemente bei Henri Bergson, published in Leipsig in 1917 (Verlag Felix Meiner). 

The bibliography which follows gives more up-to-date lists of works than those mentioned, bringing thelist of Bergson's writings up to 1919, and it includesbooks and articles on Bergson which have appearedin the current year (1920). All the important books inFrench, English, or German on Bergson are given. As the present work is designed mainly to meet theneeds of English readers, lists of foreign articles arenot given, but in order to show the wide interestaroused by Bergson's thought in the English speakingworld, and for purposes of reference, a comprehensivelist of articles which have appeared in English andAmerican periodicals is appended. Finally, a list ofthe English Translations of Bergson's works is givenin full under their publishers' names. 

PART ONE

BERGSON'S OWN WRITINGS CHRONOLOGICALLYARRANGED

1878 SOLUTION OF A MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM. This, his first published work, appeared when he was nineteen years of age in Annales de Mathematiques. (Brisse et Gerono. ) It is of interest, as it shows us an early ability in the study of this science. 

1882 LA SPECIALITE. Discours au Lycee d'Angers--a publication of sixteen pages; address given at the prize-giving in August of that year. Angers: Imprimerie Lacheze et Dolbeau. 

1884 EXTRAITS DE LUCRECE avec un commentaire, des notes et une étude sur la poésie, la philosophie, la physique, le texte et la langue de Lucrèce. Published Delagrave, Paris, 1884. By 1914 ten editions had appeared. This work is of interest in showing his ability in classical scholarship. Pp. Xlvii l59. 

1885 LA POLITESSE. Another address. This one was given at Clermont- Ferrand, and was published on August 5, 1885, in the local paper Moniteur du Puy de Dome. It is of interest because in it is to be found his original view of "Grace" which he developed later in the Essai sur les donnees immidiates de la conscience (1889). 

1886 LA SIMULATION INCONSCIENTE DANS L'ETAT D'HYPNOTISME. His first contribution to the Revue philosophique (Vol. XXII, pp. 525-31). It is interesting to note that correspondence following the appearance of this article led to the inclusion in Myers' Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death of a case cited by Bergson (see Vol. I, p. 447), 1901. 

1889 QUID ARISTOTELES DE LOCO SENSERIT. A Latin thesis, presented along with the following French thesis, for the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres. Published Alcan, Paris, pp. 82. 

1889 ESSAI SUR LES DONNEES IMMEDIATES DE LA CONSCIENCE. French thesis, presented along with the above Latin thesis, for the degree of Docteur-es-Lettres. Published by Alcan, Paris, same year, in La Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine (pp viii-185) Eighteen editions called for by 1920. 

 English Translation: Time and Free Will, by F. L. Pogson, M. A. Published in 1910 by Swan & Sonnenschein (now George Allen & Unwin) in Library of Philosophy. 

1891 LA GENESE DE L'IDEE DE TEMPS. A review, published in the Revue philosophique (Vol. For 1891, pp 185-190), of the book by Jean Mane Guyau, La Genese de l'Idee de Temps, with an introduction by Alfred Fouillee which appeared posthumously in 1890, two years after Guyau's death. 

1895 LE BON SENS ET LES ETUDES CLASSIQUES. Discours au concours general des lycees et colleges, 1895-- another prize-giving address. Published in Revue scientifique, 4th Ser. , No. 15, pp. 705-713, June, 1901, and by Delalain, Paris, 1895. 

1896 MATIERE ET MEMOIRE. Essai sur la relation du corps avec l'esprit. Bergson's second notable work Published by Alcan, Paris, in Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine, pp iii-280. Thirteen editions by 1919. English Translation: Matter and Memory, by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. S. Palmer. Published 1911, Swan & Sonnenschein (now George Allen & Unwin), in the Library of Philosophy. 

1897 PRINCIPES DE METAPHYSIQUE ET DE PSYCHOLOGIE D'APRES MONSIEUR PAUL JANET. A critical review in Revue philosophique (Vol. XLIV, Nov. , 1897, pp. 525-551). 

1900 LE RIRE. Essai sur la signification du comique. First published as two articles in Revue de Paris, 1900 (Vol. I, pp. 512-545 and pp. 759-791). Book form, Paris (Alcan), 1901, Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine, pp. Vii-205. By 1919, seventeen editions. English Translation: Laughter--An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, by Brereton and Rothwell. Published 1911, Macmillan. This essay is based on a lecture given by Bergson while at Clermont-Ferrand, on Feb 18, 1884, a report of which appeared in the local paper Moniteur du Puy de Dome, Feb. 21, 1884. 

1900 NOTES SUR LES ORIGINES PSYCHOLOGIES DE NOTRE CROYANCE A LA LOI DE CAUSALITE. Short paper of fifteen pages, read at the First International Congress of Philosophy, held in Paris, August 1 to 5, 1900 Published in Bibhotheque du Congres International de Philosophie, being special numbers of the Revue de metaphysique et de morale. Paris (Armand Colin). Discussion reported in the Revue, Sept, 1900, Vol VIII, pp 655-660. 

1901 LE REVE. Conférence a l'Institut psychologique international. March 26, 1901 Published, Pans, Bulletin de l'Institut, May, 1901; Revue scientifique, June 8, 1901, and abridged, Revue de philosophie, 1901. As Book, Alcan, 1901. Reprinted in the volume of collected papers L'Energie spiriuelle, 1919, pp 91-116. English Translation: Dreams, by Dr Edwin E Slosson. Published first as articles in the Independent of Oct 23 and 30, 1913 Book form 1914 Fisher Unwin. Reissued in 1920 in Mind-Energy, English Translation of L'Energie spirituelle. 

1901 LE PARALLELISME PSYCHO-PHYSIQUE ET LA METAPHYSIQUE POSITIVE. Bergson's first contribution to the Bulletin de la Societe française de philosophie, June, 1901. The important lecture in which he defended the propositions set forth on pages 53-54 of this present work. 

1901 L'INCONSCIENT DANS LA VIE MENTALE. Article in the Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie. 

1901 LE VOCABULAIRE TECHNIQUE ET CRITIQUE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE. Article in the Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie. 

1902 L'EFFORT INTELLECTUEL. Article in the Revue philosophique, Jan, 1902, Vol XLIII, pp 1-27. This article supplements parts of the larger work Matière et Mémoire. Reprinted in 1919 in the volume of collected essays, L'Energie spintuelle, pp 163-202 English Translation in 1920 in volume Mind-Energy (Macmillan). 

1902 L'INTELLECT ET LA VOLONTE Discours au Lycée Voltaire, July, 1902 Published Imprimerie Quelquejeu

1902 LE VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Collaboration Bulletin de la Societé française de philosophie, July, 1902. 

1903 RAPPORT SUR LA FONDATION "CARNOT" (1902). Published in Jan, 1903, in Seances et travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales et pohtiques. Also Memoires de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904. 

1903 INTRODUCTION A LA METAPHYSIQUE. Article in Revue de métaphysique et de morale. Paris, Jan, 1903. English Translation: An Introduction to Metaphysics, by T. E. Hulme Published in 1913, Macmillan. Valuable as an independent statement of his doctrine of Intuition. Not to be regarded as a mere epitome of the larger works, although it makes a good preface to them. To be included in forthcoming volume of collected essays and lectures. 

1903 LA PLACE ET LE CARACTERE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE DANS L'ENSEIGNEMENT SECONDAIRE. Article in the Bulletin de la Societé française de philosophie, Feb. , 1903, p. 44. An address delivered before the Societé in Dec. , 1902. 

1903 LA NOTION DE LA LIBERTE MORALE. Article in the Bulletin de la Societé française de philosophie, April, 1903, p. 101. 

1903 RAPPORT SUR LE PRIX "HALPHEN. " Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, July, 1903. Also Memoir es de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904. 

1903 LA PHILOSOPHIE SOCIALE DE COURNOT. Article in the Bulletin de la Societé française de philosophie, Aug, 1903, p. 229. 

1904 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE RUSKIN "LA BIBLE D'AMIENS. " Traduction francaise de M. Proust, Seances de l'Acadimie des sciences morales et politiques, 1904. 

1904 NOTICE SUR LA VIE ET SUR LES OEUVRES DE FELIX RAVAISSON-MOLLIEN, Lue dans les seances du 20 et 27 fevrier, 1904, de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

 Published in Seances et travaux de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, Paris, 1904, and in Memoires de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, in 1907. 

1904 LE PARALOGISME PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGIQUE. Lecture given at the Second International Congress of Philosophy held at Geneva from Sept. 4 to 8, 1904. Published in Revue de metaphysique et de morale, numero exceptionel (Nov, 1904). Reprinted in 1919 in the volume of collected essays L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 203-223, under new title Le Cerveau et la pensee: une illusion philosophique. English Translation, 1920 in volume: Mind-Energy. 

1904 LES COURBES RESPIRATOIRES PENDANT L'HYPNOSE Article contributed to the Bulletin de l'Institut general psychologique. 

1904 PREFACE de la Psychologie Rationelle, d'Emile Lubac. Published at Paris, Alcan. Four pages on Intuition. 

1904 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MORTET "Notes sur le texte des 'Institutiones' de Cassiodore. " Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1904 VISION DE LUEURS DANS L'OBSCURITE PAR LES SENSITIFS. Bulletin de l'Institut general psychologique, Jan. , 1904. 

1904 LES RADIATIONS "N. " Bulletin de l'Institut general psychologiques, Jan. , 1904. 

1905 ESPRIT ET MATIERE. Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie. 

1905 THEORIE DE LA PERCEPTION. Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, March, 1905, pp. 94-95. An address given in Dec. , 1904. 

1905 REPONSE A MONSIEUR RAGEOT. Article in Revue philosophique, Vol LX, p 229. Criticism by Monsieur Rageot appears on p. 84. See Ward on this point. Realm of Ends, p. 307. 

1905 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. OSSIP LOURIE (now Professeur a l'Universite nouvelle de Bruxelles). Le Bonheur et l'intelligence, published by Alcan in 1904. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1905 RELATION A WILLIAM JAMES ET A JAMES WARD. A Letter on la duree in the Revue philosophique, Aug. , 1905. Vol. LX, pp. 229-230

1906 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LE PRIX "BORDIN" (1905). Ayant pour sujet "Maine de Biran. " Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1906: also Memoires de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1907. 

1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BARDOUX. Essai d'une psychology de l'Angleterre contemporaine (premiere partie). Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M LUQUET, entitule:-- Idees generales de psychologie. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1906 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. GAULTIER, entitule:-- Le Sens de l'art, avec une preface de M. Emile Boutroux. Séances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1907 L'EVOLUTION CREATRICE. Published by Alcan, Paris, in La Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, 1907 (pp viii 4O3). By 1918 the work was in its twenty-first edition. English Translation: Creative Evolution, by Arthur Mitchell, Ph. D. Published in 1911, Macmillan. This is Bergson's third large work, and his most important, being one of the most profound and original contributions to the philosophieal consideration of the theory of Evolution. "Un livre comme L'Evolution créatrice n'est pas seulement une oeuvre mais une date celle d'une direction nouvelle imprimée a la pensée. " Pierre Imbart de la Tour--in Le Pangermanisme et la philosophie de l'histoire. 

1907 ARTICLE SUR "L'EVOLUTION CREATRICE. " Revue du Mois, Sept. , 1907, pp. 351-354. Bergson's reply to a critic, M. Le Dantec. 

1907 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Collaboration. Bulletin de la Societé française de philosophie, Aug. , 1907. 

1907 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LE PRIX "LE DISSEZ DE PENANRUN. " Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1907. PP. 91-102. Also in Memoires de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques, 1909. 

1907 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BARDOUX. Psychologie de l'Angleterre contemporaine (Deuxieme partie). Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1908 REPONSE A UNE ENQUETE INTERNATIONALE SUR LA QUESTION RELIGIEUSE. Arranged by the Mercure de France, and published in Paris in the book La Question Religieuse, by Frederic Charpin. Bergson's answer is less than a page. 

1908 L'INFLUENCE DE SA PHILOSOPHIE SUR LES ELEVES DES LYCEES. Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, Jan. , 1908 Address delivered before the Societé in the previous Nov. 

1908 LETTRE SUR L'INFLUENCE DE SA PHILOSOPHIE SUR LES ELEVES DES LYCEES Appended to Binet's L'Evolution de l'ensignement philosophique, in L'Année psychologique, 1908, pp. 230-231. 

1908 LE SOUVENIR DU PRESENT ET LA FAUSSE RECONAISSANCE. Article in the Revue philosophique, Dec, 1908, pp 561- 593. Reprited in 1919 in the volume of collected essays L'Energie spirituelle, pp 117-161 English Translation in volume: Mind-Energy. Macmillan, 1920. 

1908 L'EVOLUTION DE L'INTELLIGENCE GEOMETRIQUE. Article in the Revue de metaphysique et de morale, Jan, 1908, pp. 28-33. Another reply to a critic, Monsieur Borel. 

1908 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Collaboration. Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, Aug, 1908. On the words "immediat" and "inconnaissable"

1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MERLANT, ayant pour sujet "Senancour" Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BAZAILLAS, entitule:-- Musique et inconscience. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. BOIRAC, entitule:-- La psychologie inconnue. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1908 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. NAYRAC. La Fontaine. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1909 PREFACE A "GABRIEL TARDE" A volume of the collection Les Grands Philosophes, published by Louis Michaud, Paris. This book was written by Tarde's sons. It is interesting to note that Tarde was Bergson's predecessor in the Chair of Modern Philosophy at the College de France. The Preface (pp. 5 and 6) treats of Causality A volume of this same series devoted to Bergson himself appeared in 1910, by Rene Gillouin. 

1909 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. MEYERSON, entitule:-- Identiti et realite. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1909 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. HENRI DELACROIX. Etudes d'histoire et de psychologie du mysticisme. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1909 L'ORGANISATION DES CONGRES DE PHILOSOPHIE. Article in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, Jan. , 1909. 

1909 VOCABULAIRE PHILOSOPHIQUE. Collaboration Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, Aug. , 1909. 

1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. WENDELL. La France d'aujourd hui. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politques. 

1910 RAPPORT SUR LE CONCOURS POUR LES PRIX "CHARLES L'EVEQUE. " Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1910 JAMES ET BERGSON. Remarques a propos d'un article de Mr. W. B. Pitkin, intitule James and Bergson, or, Who is against Intellect? Mr. Pitkin's article appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods on April 28, 1910. Bergson's reply appeared in the same journal on July 7th of the same year. 

1910 NEW INTRODUCTION WRITTEN IN ENGLISH FOR THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MATIERE ET MEMOIRE. This new introduction was subsequently translated into French and prefaced to the next French edition of Matiere et Memoire which appeared. This was the seventh edition. The English translation by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer was published in 1911 (see note under date 1896). The new introduction called attention mainly to the change in orthodox opinion regarding aphasia which had come about since the original publication of the work in French in 1896--a change of view which only served to make Bergson's opinions appear less novel and more probable. 

1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. DAURIAC. Le musicien-poete Wagner: etude de psychologie musicale. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1910 RAPPORT SUR UN OUVRAGE DE M. JOUSSAIN. Entitule:-- Le Fondement psychologique de la morale. Seances de l'Academie des sciences morales et politiques. 

1910 L'INCONSCIENT DANS LA VIE MENTALE Remarques a propos d'une these soutenue par M. Dwelshauvers (Now Belgian Professor. ) An address delivered to the Societe in the previous November. Published in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie, Feb. , 1910. Here Bergson has another encounter with a critic. As far back as 1901 Bergson contributed to this same periodical an article bearing this title. M. Georges Dwelshauvers criticized Bergson's views in his articles--

 "Raison et Intuition, " étude sur la philosophie de M. Bergson, in La Belgique artistique et litteraire, Nov. -Dec. , 1905, and April, 1906. 

 "Bergson et la methode intuitive, " in the Revue des Mois, Sept. , 1907. 

 "De l'intuition dans l'acte de l'esprit, " in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale, Jan. , 1908. 

1911 L'INTUITION PHILOSOPHIQUE. Paper read at the Fourth International Congress of Philosophy, held at Bologna, April 5 to 11, 1911. Published in Nov. In Revue de métaphysique et de morale (Numero exceptionel), pp. 809-827. To reappear in forthcoming second volume of collected papers. 

1911 LA PERCEPTION DU CHANGEMENT. Deux conférences faites a l'Université d'Oxford, les 26 et 27 Mai, 1911. Published in original French by the Clarendon Press, Oxford, in 1911. (Out of print now. ) To reappear in forthcoming second volume of collected essays and lectures. 

1911 LIFE AND CONSCIOUSNESS. The Huxley Lecture delivered at University of Birmingham, May 29, 1911. Published in The Hibbert Journal for Oct. , 1911, Vol X, pp. 24-44, and also in the volume Huxley Memorial Lectures in 1914. In a revised and somewhat developed form this appeared in 1919 in the volume of collected essays and lectures L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 1-29 (Mind-Energy, 1920). 

1911 VERITE ET REALITE Introduction of sixteen pages written for the French Translation of William James' Pragmatism. Translated by Le Brun. Published Flammarion, Paris. 

1911 LES REALITES QUE LA SCIENCE N'ATTEINT PAS. Article in Foi et Vie (French Protestant Review). 

1911 LA NATURE DE L'AME. Four lectures delivered at the University of London, Oct. , 1911. Up to the time of writing, these lectures have not been published Reports are to be found, however, in The Times, Oct 21, 23, 28 and 30, 1911 (For definite information regarding these lectures, I am indebted to Mr. Reginald Rye, Librarian of the University of London, to the University of London Press, and to Professor Bergson himself. )

1912 L'AME ET LE CORPS. Conférence faite pour la Societé Foi et Vie. Published in Le Matérialisme actuel, Paris, 1913, Flammarion. During the year 1912, the Paris Review Foi et Vie arranged a series of lectures on Materialism. These were given in Paris, alternating with a series on Pascal, likewise arranged by Foi et Vie, under the direction of in Paul Doumergue, chief editor This was the sixth year in which such courses of lectures had been arranged by this Review. The most of these lectures were subsequently published in the Review itself, but the 1912 lectures on Materialism were issued separately in a volume entitled Le Materialisme actuel, published in the Bibliotheque de philosophie scientifique, with a preface by in Paul Doumergue. Two illustrious names headed the list of lecturers--those of Henri Bergson and the late Henri Poincare. Bergson's lecture bears the title L'Ame et le Corps, pp. 7-48. (I am told by Prof. Bergson that it is a Summary of the four unpublished London lectures. ) This was reprinted in 1919 in L'Energie spirituelle, pp. 31-63 (Mind-Energy, 1920). 

1912 PREFACE written for the French Translation of Eucken's Der Sinn und der Wert des Lebens Le sens et la valeur de la vie--translated by M. A. Hullet and A. Leicht. Published, Paris, Alcan. 

1912 LETTER ON HIS PHILOSOPHY IN RELATION TO THEOLOGY. Written to Father de Tonquedec, S J, in the Jesuit periodical Les Etudes of Feb 20, 1912, Vol CXXX, pp 514-515. Father de Tonquedec had criticized Bergson's philosophy from the point of view of Roman Catholic Theology. The following are amongst his criticisms: La Notion de la veritt dans la philosophie nouvelle, Paris, 1908. Comment interpreter l'ordre du monde a-propos du dernier ouvrage de in Bergson, Paris, Beauchesne, 1908. Bergson est-il moniste? Article in Les Annales de philosophie chretienne, March, 1912. Dieu dans l'Evolution créatrice, Beauchesne, 1912, which gives two letters from Bergson

1913 FANTOMES DE VIVANTS ET RECHERCHE PSYCHIQUE Presidential address to the British Society for Psychical Research. Delivered at the Aeolian Hall, London, May 28, 1913. Published report in the Times, May 29, 1913; and of the New York Times, Sept 27, 1914, Proceedings of the Society, Vol 1914-15, pp 157-175. This address was reprinted in 1919 in L'Energie spirituelle, pp 65-89. English Translation: Mind- Energy, 1920. 

1914 LETTER TO "LE FIGARO. " Letter on his Philosophy generally, March 7, 1914. 

1914 THE PROBLEM OF PERSONALITY. The Gifford Lectures at Edinburgh University One course of eleven lectures, given in the Spring. The Autumn course was abandoned owing to the War. These lectures have not yet been published. (For information regarding them I am indebted to Mr. F. C. Nicholbon, Librarian of the University of Edinburgh, and to Prof. Bergson himself. )

1914 LA FORCE QUI S'USE ET CELLE QUI NE S'USE PAS. Article written for the famous organ of the poilus. Bulletin des Armees de la Republique francaise, Nov. 4, 1914. 

1914 HOMMAGE AU ROI ALBERT ET AU PEUPLE BELGE. Contribution to King Albert's Book, issued by the Daily Telegraph. 

1915 LA SIGNIFICATION DE LA GUERRE Collection of War speeches and writings in the series Pages actuelles, 1914-15. Published by Bloud et Gay, Paris, 1915. Small volume of 47 pages Contains: 1. Discours prononce a l'Academie des Sciences morales et politiques le 12 dec, 1914, pp 7-29. This was a Presidential address La Signification de la Guerre. 2. Allocution prononcee a l'Academie le 16 Jan, 1915, a l'occasion de l'installation de M. Alexandre Ribot au fauteuil de la presidence (in succession to Bergson). Reported only in part, pp 33-35. 3. La force qui s'use et celle qui ne s'use pas, pp 39-42. Reprinted from the pages of the Bulletin des Armees de la, Republique francaise, Nov. 4, 1914. 4. Hommage au Roi Albert et au Peuple Belge, pp 45-46. Reprinted from King Albert's Book, War publication of Daily Telegraph. Items Nos 1 and 3 have been translated into English as The Meaning of the War, with preface by Dr. H. Wildon Carr. Published 1915, Fisher Unwin. No. 1 appeared in The Hibbert Journal in English, as "Life and Matter at War, " April, 1915, pp. 465-475; and in the American paper The Living Age on July 31, 1915, pp. 259-264

1915 AUTOUR DE LA GUERRE A discourse on the Evolution of German Imperialism, delivered before the Academie des Sciences morales et politiques. Published in La Revue, Feb. -March, 1915, pp. 369-377. 

1915 LA PHILOSOPHIE. Ouvrage publié sous les auspices du ministre de l'Instruction publique. A delightful little work of 27 pages. Reprinted from La Sciencé française, Tome I. Published in the series of that name by Larousse, Pans, and costing fifty centimes. It is a review of French Philosophy, and contains a bibliography, and portraits of the philosophers, Descartes, Malebranche, Pascal, and Renouvier. 

1916 LETTRE A PROF. HOFFDING. Published in the original French in the French edition of the Danish Professor's Lectures on Bergson; La Philosophie de Bergson expose et critique par H. Hoffding, Professeur a l'Université de Copenhague. Traduit d'après l'édition danoise avec un avant- propos par Jacques de Coussange et suivi d'une lettre de M. Bergson à l'auteur. Alcan, Paris. The letter, pp. L57-165. 

1917 PREFACE A "LA MISSION FRANCAISE EN AMERIQUE 24 AVRIL-13 MAI, 1917. " Compiled by M. R. Viviani, published, Flammarion, Paris, 1917, pp 264. Bergson's Preface is seven pages. 

1918 DISCOURS DE RECEPTION. Bergson's address on being received by the Academy. On M. Ollivier. Published by Perrin, Paris. Seance de l'Academie francaise, Jan. 24, 1918, pp. 44. (The work also contains the reply to Bergson by the Director of the Academy, M. Rene Doumic, pp. 45-75. )

1919 L'ENERGIE SPIRITUELLE (Essais et Conferences). Felix Alcan's Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaire, pp. 227. This is a volume of collected essays and lectures of which three editions appeared in 1919. It deals with the concept of mental force, with problems of the interaction of mind and body, and with Bergson's view of "tension" and "detension" in relation to matter and mind. With a brief foreword, explaining that this is the first of a couple of volumes of collected essays, there are seven papers: 1. "La Conscience et la Vie, " pp. 1-29. A revised and developed version of "Life and Consciousness, " the Huxley Lecture of 1911. 2. "L'Ame et le Corps, " pp. 31-63. Reprinted from Le Materialisme actuel. Lecture given in 1912. 3. "Fantomes de Vivants et Recherche Psychique, " pp. 65-89. Presidential address of 1913. 4. "Le Reve, " pp. 91-116. The lecture of 1901. 5. "Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, " pp. 117-161. Reprint from Revue philosophique of article of 1908. 6. "L'Effort intellectuel, " pp. 163-202. Reprint from Revue philosophique of article of 1902. 7. "Le Cerveau et la Pensee: une illusion philosophique, " pp. 203-223. The Lecture given at the International Congress at Geneva, formerly printed in the Revue de metaphysique et de morale as "Le Paralogisme psycho- physiologique. " English Translation: MIND-ENERGY, by Dr. Wildon Carr. Macmillan, 1920. 

 The forthcoming second volume of collected essays on The Method of Intuitional Philosophy will contain inter alia: Introduction on "Method. " Reprint of "L'Intuition philosophique. " Introduction a la metaphysique, "La Perception du Changement. "

Three articles, bearing the titles "Memoire et reconaissance, ""Perception et matiere" and "L'Idee de neant, " which appearedrespectively in Revue philosophique (1896), Revue de metaphysiqueet de morale (1896) and Revue philosophique (1906) have beenomitted from their places in the above list because they weresubsequently incorporated into the larger works Matiere etMemoire and L'Evolution creatrice. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PART TWO

BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON BERGSON

Section I. Books directly on Bergson

(a) French Publications. 

BENDA, Julien. Le Bergsonisme ou une Philosophie de la Mobilité. Paris, Mercure de France. 1912. 

 Une Philosophie pathétique. Cahiers de la Quinzaine. Paris, 1913, Ser. 15, Cah 2. 

 Sur le succes du Bergsonisme. 1914. Incorporates Une Philosophie pathétique. 

BERTHELOT, R. Un Romantisme Utilitaire. Paris, 1911. Vol. 2, Le Pragramatisme chez Bergson. 

 Le pragmatisme de Bergson. Paris, Alcan, 1913. 

COIGNET, Clarisse. De Kant a Bergson. Reconciliation de la religion et de la science dans un spiritualisme nouveau. Paris, 1911 (Alcan). Concluding 60 pages deal with Bergson. 

DESAYMARD, Joseph. La Pensee d'Henri Bergson. In series Les Hommes et les Idees. Paris, 1912. Mercure de France. Pp. 82. With portrait and bibliography (reprint of Mr. Pogson's list). 

DWELSHAUVERS, Georges. Raison et intuition. Etudes sur la philosophie de Bergson, 1906. 

FARGES. Theorie fondamentale de l'Acte et de la Puissance avec la critique de la philosophie nouvelle de MM. Bergson et Le Roy. Paris, 1909. (Etudes philosophiques, No. 1. )

 La philosophie de M. Bergson. Expose et critique. Paris, 1912. 

FOUILLEE, Alfred. La Pensee et les nouvelles ecoles anti-intellectuelles. Paris, 1910. 

GAGNEBIN, S. La philosophie de l'intuition. 1912. Saint Blaise, 'Foyer Solidariste. Pp. 240. Mainly on Le Roy, Bergson's disciple, but a third of the book deals with the master. 

GILLOUIN, Rene. Bergson: Choix de textes, etudes sur l'OEuvre, notices biographiques et bibliographiques. Paris, 1910, Michaud. Series Les Grands Philosophes. Illustrated. Pp. 220. 

 Essay of 30 pages on Bergson's philosophy. Extracts from Bergson's works. Pp. 39-220. 

 La Philosophie de M. Bergson. Paris, 1911, Grasset. Pp. 187. 

GRANDJEAN, F. Une revolution dans la philosophie, La Doctrine de Bergson. Atar, Geneva, 2nd ed. , 1916. 

LE ROY, Edouard. Une Philosophie nouvelle: Henri Bergson. Paris, 1912. English Translation: A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson, by Vincent Benson. 1913. Williams and Norgate. Pp. 235. The author of this work is Bergson's famous pupil, who now lectures in his place at the College de France. 

MARITAIN, J. La philosophie bergsonienne. Paris, Riviere, 1914. Pp. 477. 

MEUNIER, D. Lecon de Bergson. 1914. 

PEGUY, Charles. Note Sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne. Paris. (Bourgeois). Cahiers de la Quinzaine. Pp. 101. 

PENIDO, Dr. M. T. L. La methode intuitive de Bergson. Essai critique. Atar, Geneva, and Alcan, Paris, 1918, pp. 220. 

SEGOND, J. L'Intuition bergsonienne. Alcan, Paris, 1912 and 1913. Pp. 157. 

(b) English and American Publications

BALSILLIE, David. An Examination of Professor Bergson's Philosophy. 1912. Williams and Norgate. Pp. 228. 

CARR, Dr. H. Wildon. Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change, 1912. Jack, "The People's Books. " Pp. 91. Good brief sketch. 1919. Jack and Nelson. Second revised edition. Pp. 126. 

 The Philosophy of Change: A study of the Fundamental Principle of the Philosophy of Bergson. 1914. Macmillan. Pp. 216. 

 Time and History in Contemporary Philosophy, with special reference to Bergson and Croce. Proceedings of British Academy, 1918. Pp. 20. Separately, Oxford University Press. 

CUNNINGHAM, Gustave W. , Dr. Study in the Philosophy of Bergson. 1916. Longman. New York. Pp. 212. 

DODSON, G. R. , Dr. Bergson and the Modern Spirit. An Essay in Constructive Thought. 1914. Lindsey Press. Pp. 295. 

ELLIOT, Hugh S. R. Modern Science and the Illusions of Professor Bergson. 1912. Preface by Sir Ray Lankester. Longman, New York, and 1913, Longman, London. Pp. 257. Very hostile to Bergson, indeed contemptuously or bitterly so. 

GERRARD, Father Thomas. Bergson: an Exposition and Criticism from the point of view of Saint Thomas Aquinas. 1913. Sands & Co. Pp. 208. 

HERMANN, Mrs. E. Bergson and Eucken. Their significance for Christian Thought. 1912. James Clark & Co. Pp. 224. 

HOFFDING, Prof Harald. Six Lectures on Bergson. Delivered 1913. Published in the volume Modern Philosophers, Macmillan, 1915. Pp. 227-302. Translated by Alfred C. Mason. 

HOUGH, Dr. Lynn H. The Quest of Wonder. Studies in Bergson and Theology. 

JOHNSTON, W. (with MISS I. MUDGE). A Contribution to a Bibliography of Henri Bergson. 1913. Columbia University Press, New York. Pp. 56. For this pamphlet, Professor John Dewey has written an introduction. 

KALLEN, H. M. William James and Henri Bergson: A Study of Contrasting Theories of Life. 1914. Chicago University Press. Pp. 248. 

KITCHIN, Darcy B. Bergson for Beginners: A Summary of his Philosophy. 1913. Geo. Allen and Unwin. Pp. 309. 

LE ROY, Edouard. A New Philosophy: Henri Bergson. 1913. Williams and Norgate. English Translation by V. Benson of Une Nouvelle philosophie. Pp. 235. 

LIBBY, M. F. The Continuity of Bergson's Thought. 1912. University of Colorado Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4. Pp. 147-202. 

LINDSAY, A. D. The Philosophy of Bergson. 1911. Dent. Pp. 247. 

LOVEJOY. Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism. 1914. University of California Press, Berkeley. Pp. 61. 

MILLER, Lucius Hopkins. Bergson and Religion. 1916. Holt & Co. , New York. (Out of print. )

MITCHELL, Dr. Arthur. Studies in Bergson's Philosophy. 1914. Kansas University Humanistic Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2. Pp. 115. 

PECKHAM, G. W. The Logic of Bergson's Philosophy. (Time and Free Will compared with Matter and Memory. ) 1917. Archives of Philosophy, Columbia University Press, New York, No. 8. Pp. 68. 

RUHE AND PAUL. Henri Bergson: An Account of his Life and Philosophy. 1914. Macmillan. Pp. 245 (With portrait. )

RUSSELL, Hon. Bertrand. The Philosophy of Bergson. 1914. London, Macmillan for Bowes, Cambridge. Pp. 36. Lecture to The Heretics, Cambridge, March 11, 1912. Contains reply by Dr. Wildon Carr, and rejoinder by Mr. Russell. 

SAIT, Bernard Una. The Ethical Implications of Bergson's Philosophy. 1914. Columbia University Contributions to Philosophy and Psychology. New York Science Press. Pp. 183. 

SEWELL, Frank, Dr. Is the Universe Self-Centred or God-Centred? 1913. Examination of the systems of Eucken and Bergson. Presidential Address to Swedenborg Scientific Association, Philadelphia, USA. Published by the Association. Pp. 13. 

SHASTRI, Prabhu Datta. The Conception of Freedom in Hegel, Bergson, and Indian Philosophy. 1914. Address before the Calcutta Philosophical Society, March 14, 1913. Published Albion Press, Calcutta. Pp. 26. 

SOLOMON, Joseph. Bergson. 1911. Constable, in Series Philosophies Ancient and Modern. Pp. 128. 

STEWART, Dr. J. M'Kellar. A Critical Exposition of Bergson's Philosophy. 1911. Macmillan Pp. 295. 

WILM, Emil C. Henri Bergson: A Study in Radical Evolution. (1914. ) Sturgis

HOOGVILD, J. E. H. J. De Niewe Wysbegeerte: Een studie over H. Bergson. 1911. 

JACOBSON, Malte. Henri Bergson's Intuitionsfilosofi. 

LEVI, A. La filosofia della contingenza. Firenze, Seeber, 1905. In L'indeterminismo nella filosofita francese contemporanea. 

LARSSON, Prof. Hans. Intuitionsprobleme. 

OLGIATI, F. La Filosofia di Enrico Bergson, 1914. 

PAPINI, Giovanni. Stroncature. Firenze, 1918. Libreria della voce. Section on Bergson and Croce (in French), written in 1914. Pp. 51-56. 

RUHE, Algot. Henri Bergson: Tankesattet. 1914. Swedish volume (similar to his English work in conjunction with Miss Paul). Stockholm. 

Section II. Books dealing Indirectly with Bergson

(a) French Publications

CHAUMEIX, A. Pragmatisme et Modernisme. Paris, Alcan, 1909

DWELSHAUVERS, Georges. La Synthèse mentale. Alcan, Paris, 1908. 

FOUILLEE, Alfred. Le Mouvement idéaliste et la Réaction centre la Science positive, 1896. Paris, Alcan. 

IMBART DE LA TOUR, Pierre. Le Pangermanisme et la Philosophie de L'Histoire. Letter to Bergson, published in book form, 1916. Reprinted from Pour la verite, 1914-15. Perrin. Pp. 75. This letter was occasioned by Bergson's writings on the War. 

LANESSAN, J. De. Transformation et Créationisme. 1914. Paris, Alcan. 

PIAT, Clodius. Insuffisance des Philosophies de L'Intuition. 1908. Paris, Plon-Nourrit. Pp. 319. 

SOREL, Georges. Reflexions sur la Violence. This has been translated into English by T. E. Hulme, and published by Geo. Allen and Unwin, Reflections on Violence. Les Illusions du Progres. Le Mouvement socialists. Collected volumes of the periodical. 

WILBOIS. Devoir et Durée. 1912. Paris, Alcan. Pp. 408. 

(b) English and American Publications

ALIOTTA. The Idealistic Reaction against Science 1914. Macmillan. English translation from Italian by W. Agnes McCaskill. 

BENNETT, W. The Ethical Aspects of Evolution Regarded as the Parallel Growth of Opposite Tendencies. 1908. Clarendon Press, Oxford. 

BJORKMAN, Edwin. Voices of Tomorrow. Critical studies of the New Spirit in Literature. London, Grant Richards. See Section The New Mysticism, Part 3, Its Philosopher, Henri Bergson, pp. 205-223. 

BOSANQUET, B. The Principle of Individuality and Value. 1912. Macmillan. The Gifford Lectures for 1911. The Value and Destiny of the Individual. Gifford Lectures, 1912. 

BURNS, Delisle. Political Ideals. Clarendon Press, Oxford Discusses in concluding pages the rational element in politics. 

CALDWELL, Dr. Wm. Pragmatism and Idealism 1913. Macmillan, New York, and A. And C. Black, London. Chap. (9) is entitled "Pragmatism and Idealism in the Philosophy of Bergson, " pp. 234-261. 

CARR, H. Wildon. The Problem of Truth. Jack. "People's Books. "

DREVER, Dr James. Instinct in Man. 1917. Cambridge University Press. 

FREUD. Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious. Fisher Unwin. Remarks on Bergson's Le Rire, pp. 301 and 360. 

GRUBB. The Religion of Experience. Chapter IV. Bergson and Intuition. 

HARLEY, J. H. Syndicalism. "People's Books. "

HARPER, Dr. J. Wilson. Christian Ethics and Social Progress. 1912. Contains chapter on Bergson. 

HOCKING. Meaning of God in Human Experience. Yale University Press. 1912. 

HUGEL, Baron Frednch von. Eternal Life: its Implications and Applications. T. And T. Clark. 1912. Deals with Bergson's view of duree and of Liberty, pp. 288-302. 

HUNT, Harriet E. The Psychology of Auto-Education. Based on the interpretation of Intellect, given by Bergson in his Creative Evolution Illustrated in the work of Maria Montessori. 1912. Bardeen, Syracuse, New York. 

INGE, Very Rev Dr W. R. The Philosophy of Plotmus. Gifford Lectures, published 1919. These lectures on the great Neo-platonist to whom Bergson owes not a little, contain important discussions of Bergson's views on Time, Consciousness and Change. 

JACKS, L. P. Alchemy of Thought. Holt & Co, New York. 1911. 

JAMES, William A Pluralistic Universe (Hibbert Lectures) 1909. Lectures 5 and 6, pp 181-273. 

JEVONS, Dr F. B. Personality. Methuen, 1913. Especially Chap. 3 on Bergson, pp 78-124. 

JOHNSON, F. H. God in Evolution. A Pragmatic Study of Theology. . Longman. 1911. 

JOHNSTONE, Dr James The Philosophy of Biology. 1914. Cambridge University Press. 

JONES, Prof. Tudor. The Spiritual Ascent of Man. 1916. University of London Press, Chapter (4) Intellect and Intuition. 

LAIRD, John Problems of the Self. Shaw Lectures at Edinburgh for 1914. 1917. Macmillan. 

LODGE, Sir Oliver. Modern Problems. Methuen, 1912. Balfour and Bergson, pp. 189-210 (Chap. 18). Reprint of Article in Hibbert Journal (1912). 

MACKENZIE, Prof. Elements of Constructive Philosophy. 1918. Geo Allen & Unwin. 

MARSHALL Consciousness. On Revival and Memory. P. 436. 

MELLOR, Dr Stanley A. Religion as Affected by Modern Science and Philosophy. 1914. Lindsey Press. Devotes a section to the consideration of Bergson and Religion, pp 147-166. 

McCABE, Joseph. Principles of Evolution. Collins--Nation's Library. Very hostile to Bergson, pp 247-253. 

McDOUGALL, William. Body and Mind 1911. Methuen & Co. 

MORGAN, C. Lloyd. Instinct and Experience. Methuen. 1912. 

PERRY, R. B. Present Philosophical Tendencies. 1912. Longmans. U. S. A. 

PRINGLE-PATTISON, A. S. The Idea of God. Gifford Lectures, 1912-13. Lecture (19) on Bergson, pp. 366-385. 

RUSSELL, Bertrand Our Knowledge of the External World. 1914. Open Court Publishing Co. Chapter (8) on Cause and Free Will, criticizes Bergson, pp. 229-242. The Principles of Social Reconstruction. Geo. Allen & Co. 1917. Shows Impulse to be greater than conscious purpose in our social life. Mysticism and Logic. 1918. Longman. Roads to Freedom. On Socialism, Anarchism and Syndicalism. Geo. Allen & Co. 1918. 

SANTAYANA, Prof. George. Winds of Doctrine. . Scribner, U. S. A. 

SAROLEA, Prof. Charles. The French Renascence. 1916. Allen and Unwin. Chapter on Bergson, pp. 271-284, with portrait. 

SCOTT. J. W. Syndicalism and Philosophical Realism. 1919. A. & C. Black. For Bergson, pp. 70-160. 

SLOSSON, Dr. E. Major Prophets of To-day. 1914. Little, Boston, U. S. A. Pp. 44-103. (Portrait. )

SMITH, Norman Kemp, D. Phil. Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. 1918. Macmillan. 

SORLEY, Dr. W. R. Moral Values and the Idea of God. Cambridge University Press, 1918. Gifford Lectures, 1914-15. Discusses Intuition and Vital Impulse. 

STEBBING, L. Susan, M. A. Pragmatism and French Voluntarism with Special Reference to the Notion of Truth in the Development of Philosophy from Maine de Biran to Bergson. M. A. (London. ) Thesis, 1912. Cambridge University Press, 1914. Girton College Studies, No 6. 

UNDERHILL, Evelyn. Mysticism. A Study in the Nature and development of man's spiritual consciousness. Dutton, U. S. A. 1912. 

WALLAS, Graham. The Great Society. Error on p. 236, where he has 1912 for 1911, as date of Bergson's Lectures at London University. 

WARD, Prof. James. The Realm of Ends. (Pluralism and Theism. ) Cambridge University Press. Cf. Pp. 306-7. 

WARDELL, R. J. Contemporary Philosophy. Contains careless blunders. The date of the publication of L'Evolution creatrice in Paris is given as 1901 instead of 1907. This is on page 74. Then on page 95, Lectures given at London University are referred to as having been given at Oxford. The whole section of 28 pages, devoted to Bergson, tends to be somewhat misleading. 

WEBB, C. C. J. God and Personality. Gifford Lectures, 1918-19. Geo. Allen and Unwin. 

WOODBRIDGE, F. J. E. The Purpose of History. Reflections on Bergson, Dewey and Santayana. 1916. Columbia University Press. 

Section III. English and American Articles

(a) Signed Articles

ABBOTT. "Philosophy of Progress. " Outlook, Feb, 1913. 

AKELY. "Bergson and Science. " Philosophical Review, May, 1915. 

ALEXANDER, H. B. "Socratic Bergson. " Mid-West Quarterly, Oct. , 1913. 

ALEXANDER, S. "Matière et Mémoire. " Mind, Oct, 1897. 

ARMSTRONG. "Bergson, Berkeley and Intuition. " Philosophical Review, 1914. 

BABBITT. "Bergson and Rousseau. " Nation, Nov. , 1912. 

BALDWIN. "Intuition. " American Year Book, 1911. 

BALFOUR. "Creative Evolution and Philosophic Doubt. " Hibbert Journal, Oct, 1911; and Living Age, Dec. 2, 1911. 

BALSILLIE. "Bergson on Time and Free Will. " Mind, 1911. 

BARR. "The Dualism of Bergson. " Philosophical Review, 1914. 

BEYER. "Creative Evolution and the Woman's Question. " EducationalReview, Jan, 1914. 

BJORKMAN. "The Philosopher of Actuality. " Forum, Sept, 1911. "Is there Anything New?" Forum. "Bergson: Philosopher or Prophet?" Review of Reviews, Aug, 1911. 

BLACKLOCK. "Bergson's Creative Evolution. " Westminster Review, Mar. , 1912. 

BODE"L'Evolution creatrice. " Philosophical Review, 1908. "Creative Evolution. " American Journal of Psychology, April, 1912. 

BOSANQUET. Prediction of Human Conduct. " International Journal ofEthics, Oct, 1910. 

BOYD. "L'Evolution créatrice. " Review of Theology and Philosophy, Oct, 1907. 

BROWN. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Church Quarterly Revtew, April, 1912. 

BURNS. "Criticism of Bergson's Philosophy. " North American Review, March, 1913. 

BURROUGHS. "The Prophet of the Soul. " Atlantic Monthly, Jan. , 1914. 

BUSH. "Bergson's Lectures. " Columbia University Quarterly, 1913. 

CALKINS. "Bergson: Personalist. " Philosophieal Review, 1912-13. No. (6). 

CARR"Philosophy of Bergson" Hibbert Journal, July, 1910. "Creative Evolution" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 9 and 10. "Bergson's Theory of Instinct" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol 10. "Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. " Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol 9"Psycho-physical Parallelism as a working hypothesis in Psychology. " Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 1910-11. "The Philosophy of Bergson. " Mind, Oct, 1911. "Science and Bergson" Mind, Oct, 1912. "On Mr Russell's Reasons for supposing that Bergson's Philosophy is not true" Cambridge Magazine, April, 1913. "The Concept of Mind-Energy. " Mind, Jan. , 1920. 

CARUS. "The Anti-intellectual movement of to-day. " Monist, July, 1912. 

COCKERELL. "The New Voice in Philosophy. " Dial, Oct. , 1911. 

COOKE. "Ethics and New Intuitionists. " Mind, 1913. 

CORRANCE. "Bergson and the Idea of God. " Hibbert Journal, Feb, 1914. 

CORY. "Bergson's Intellect and Matter. " Philosophical Review, May, 1914. "Answer to Mr. Bertrand Russell's Philosophy of Bergson. " Monist, Jan, 1914. 

COSTELLOE (Mrs. ADRIAN STEPHEN). "What Bergson means by Inter-penetration" Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 1913-14. "Complexity and Synthesis: Data and Methods of Russell and Bergson. Proc. Aristotelian Soc. , 1914-15. 

COX. "Bergson's Message to Feminism. " Forum, May, 1913. 

CUNNINGHAM. "Bergson's Conception of Duration. " Philosophical Review, 1914-15. "Bergson's Conception of Finality. " Philosophical Review, 1914-15. 

DIMNET. "Meaning of Bergson's Success. " Saturday Review, 1914. 

DOLSON. "Philosophy of Bergson. " I. Philosophical Review, Nov. , 1910. "Philosophy of Bergson. " II. Philosophical Review, Jan. , 1911. 

DOUGLAS. "Christ and Bergson. " North American Review, April, 1913. 

DUBRAY. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Bulletin of Catholic University of Washington, April, 1914. 

DURBAN. "Philosophy of Bergson. Homiletic Review, Jan. , 1912. 

EWALD. "Philosophy in Germany in 1911. " Trans. From German by Hammond. Philosophieal Review, Sept. , 1912. 

FAWCETT. "Matter and Memory. " Mind, April, 1912. 

FERRAR. "L'Evolution créatrice. " Commonwealth, Dec. , 1909. 

FOSTER. "Henri Bergson. " Overland, April, 1918. 

GARDINER. "Memoire et Reconnaissance. " Psychological Review, 1896. 

GERRARD. "Bergson's Philosophy of Change. " Catholic World, Jan, 1913. "Bergson, Newman and Aquinas. " Catholic World, Mar. , 1913. "Bergson and Freedom. " Catholic World, May, 1913. "Bergson and Finahsm. " Catholic World, June, 1913. "Bergson and Divine Fecundity. " Catholic World, Aug. , 1913. 

GIBSON. "The Intuitiomsm of Bergson. " The Quest, Jan. , 1911, GOETZ. "Bergson, " A poem. Open Court, Sept. , 1912. 

GOULD. "Balfour and Bergson. " Literary Guide and Rationalist Review, Nov. , 1911. 

GUNTHER. "Bergson, Pragmatism and Schopenhauer. " Monist, Vol. 22. 

HICKS. "Recent Bergson Literature. " Hibbert Journal, Jan. , 1911. " " " " " " 1912. 

HOCKING. "Significance of Bergson" Yale Review, 1914. 

HOOKHAM. "Bergson as Critic of Darwin. " National Review, Mar, 1912. "Further Notes on Bergson. " National Review, April, 1912. 

HULME. "The New Philosophy. " New Age, July, 1909. 

HUNEKER. "The Playboy of Western Philosophy. " Forum, March, HUSBAND. "L'Evolution creatrice. " International Journal of Ethics, July, 1912. 

JAMES. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Hibbert Journal, April, 1909. "Bradley or Bergson?" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, Jan, 1910. "A Great French Philosopher at Harvard. " Nation (U. S), March, 1910. 

JOHNSTON. "Where Bergson Stands. " Harper's Weekly, March, 1913. 

JOHNSTONE. "Bergson's Philosophy of the Organism. " Proc. Of Liverpool Biological Society, 1913. 

JORDAN. "Kant and Bergson. " Monist, 1913. 

JOURDAIN. "Logic, Bergson and H. G. Wells. " Hibbert Journal, Vol. 10. 

KALLEN. "James, Bergson and Mr Pitkin. " Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, June, 1910. "James, Bergson and Traditional Metaphysics" Mind, 1914. "Laughter" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, May, 1912. 

KEEFFE. "Bergson's Critical Philosophy. " Irish Theological Studies, April, 1913. 

KHOROSHKO. "Bergson's Philosophy from a Physician's Point of View. " Russkaya Misl. , Feb, 1915. 

LALANDE. "Philosophy in France in 1905. " Philosophieal Rev. , May, 1906. "Philosophy in France in 1907. " Philosophieal Rev. , May, 1908. "Philosophy in France in 1912. " Philosophieal Rev. , April, 1914. 

LEIGHTON"On Continuity and Discreteness. " Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, April, 1910. 

LEWIS. "Bergson and Contemporary Thought. " University of California Chronicle, 1914. 

LICORISH"Bergson's Creative Evolution and the Nervous System in Organic Evolution" Lancet, Vol. 182. 

LIPPMANN"The most Dangerous Man in the World. " Everybody's Magazine, July, 1912. "Bergson's Philosophy" New York Times Book Review, Nov, 1912. 

LODGE"Bergson's Intuitional Philosophy Justified. " Current Literature, April, 1912. "Balfour and Bergson" Hibbert Journal, Jan. , 1912. 

LOVEDAY. "L'Evolution creatrice" Mind, 1908. 

LOVEJOY. "The Metaphysician of the Life Force" Nation, Sept, 1909"The Problem of Time in Recent French Philosophy, (III). Bergson s Temporalism and Anti-intellectualism" Philosophical Review, May, 1912"Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism" International Journal of Ethics, 1913"Some Antecedents of Bergson's Philosophy" Mind, 1913. "Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism. " University of California Chronicle, 1914. 

LOW. "Mr Balfour in the Study. " Edinburgh Review, Oct, 1912. 

MARTIN. "Bergson's Creative Evolution" Pnnceton Theological Review, Jan. , 1912. 

MASON. "Bergson's Principle" Nation, July, 1911. "Bergson's Method Confirmed" North American Review, Jan, 1913. 

McCABE. "The Anti rationalism of Bergson. " Literary Guide and Rationalist Review, Oct 4-1911. 

MACASKILL. "Intellect and Intuition" Footnote to "Bergson and Bradley. " Contemporary Review, July, 1915. 

MACDONALD"L'Effort itellectuel" Philosophical Review, July, 1902. 

McGILVARY. "Philosophy of Bergson" Philosophical Review, Sept, 1912. 

MACKINTOSH. "Bergson and Religion" Biblical World, Jan, 1913

MEREDITH. "Critical Side of Bergson's Philosophy. " Westminster Review, Feb, 1912. 

MILLER. "Bergson and Religion. " Biblical World, Nov. , 1915. 

MITCHELL. "L'Evolution creatrice" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Oct, 1908. "Studies on Bergson. " Bulletin of University of Kansas, 1915. 

MOORE. A. W. "Bergson and Pragmatism. " Philosophical Review, 1912. 

MOORE, C. L"Return of the Gods. " The Dial, Nov, 1912. 

MORIES. "Bergson and Mysticism" Westminster Review, June, 1912. 

MORRISON. "The Treatment of History by Philosophers. " Proc Aristotelian Soc, Vol. 1913-14. 

MUIRHEAD. "Creative Evolution" Hibbert Journal, 1911. "Matter and Memory" Hibbert Journal, 1911. "Time and Free Will. " Hibbert Journal, 1911. 

MULFORD. "What is Intuition ?" Monist, Vol. 26, 1916. 

OVERSTREET. "Mind and Body. " Psychological Bulletin, Jan. , 1912. 

PALMER. "Thought and Instinct" Nation, June, 1909"Life and the Brain" Contemporary Review, Oct, 1909. "Presence and Omni-presence. " Contemporary Review, June, 1908

PAULHAN. "Contemporary Philosophy in France. " Philosophical Review, Jan, 1900. 

PERRY. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1911. 

PITKIN"James and Bergson, or, Who is against Intellect ?" Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, April, 1910

POULTON. "Darwin and Bergson on Evolution. " Bedrock, April, 1912. 

QUICK"Creative Evolution and the Individual. " Mind, 1913. 

RADHAKRISHNAN. "Bergson's Idea of God" Quest, Oct, 1916. "Bergson and Absolute Idealism 1. " Mind, Jan, 1919. "Bergson and Absolute Idealism 2. " Mind, July, 1919. 

ROBINSON"The Philosophy of Bergson. " Churchman, March, 1912. 

ROSS"A New Theory of Laughter" Nation, Nov, 1908. "The Philosophy of Vitalism" Nation, March, 1909. 

ROOSEVELT. "The Search for Truth in a Reverent Spirit. " Outlook, Dec, 1911. 

ROYCE. "The Reality of the Temporal" International Journal of Ethics, April, 1910. 

RUSSELL, B. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Monist, July, 1912. "Mr Carr's Defence of Bergson. " Cambridge Magazine, April, 1913. 

RUSSELL, J. E. "Bergson's Anti-Intellectualism. " Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 1912. 

SANBORN. "Bergson: His Personality, Philosophy and Influence. " Century Review, Dec, 1912. "Bergson; Creator of a New Philosophy. " Outlook, Feb, 1913. 

SAUVAGE. "The New Philosophy in France" Catholic University Bulletin, Washington, April, 1906, and March, 1908. 

SCOTT"Pessimism of Bergson" Hibbert Journal, Oct, 1912; International Journal of Ethics, Jan, 1914; Mind, July, 1913. 

SHEPHERD. "Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance. " Psychological Bulletin, Sept. , 1910. 

SHIMER. "Bergson's View of Organic Evolution. " Popular Science Monthly Feb. , 1913. 

SHOTWELL"Bergson's Philosophy. " Political Science Quarterly, March, 1913. 

SLATER. "Vision of Bergson. " Forum, Dec. , 1914. 

SLOSSON. "Major Prophets of To-day" Independent, June, 1911. "Recent Developments of Bergson's Philosophy. " Independent, June, 1913. 

SMITH"Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy. " Philosophical Review, April, 1908. 

SOLOMON. "Bergson's Philosophy. " Mind, Jan, 1911, also Fortnightly Review, Dec, 1911"Creative Evolution. " Mind, July, 1911. 

STEBBING. "Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge. " Proc. Aristotelian Soc, Vol 1912-13. 

STORK. "Bergson and his Philosophy. " Lutheran Quarterly, 1913. 

STOUT. "Free Will and Determinism. " Speaker, May, 1890. 

STRANGE. "Bergson's Theory of Intuition. " Monist, 1915. 

SYMONS"Bergson's Theory of Intellect and Reality. " Scientific American Supplement, Dec, 1916. 

TAYLOR. "Henri Bergson. " Quest, 1912. 

TAYLOR, A. E. "Matter and Memory. " International Journal of Ethics, Oct. , 1911. "Creative Evolution. " International Journal of Ethics, July, 1912. 

THOMSON"Biological Philosophy of Bergson. " Nature, Oct. , 1911. 

TITCHENER. "Laughter. " American Journal of Psychology, Jan. , 1912. 

TOWNSEND. "Bergson and Religion. " Monist, July, 1912. 

TUFTS. "Humor. " Psychological Review, 1901. 

TUTTLE"Bergson on Life and Consciousness. " Philosophical Review, Jan. , 1912. 

TYRRELL, G. "Creative Evolution. " Hibbert Journal, Jan. , 1908. 

TYRRELL, H. "Bergson. " A Poem. Art World, Sept. , 1917. 

UNDERHILL"Bergson and the Mystics. " Living Age, March, 1912, and English Review, Feb. , 1912. 

WATERLOW. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Quarterly Review, Jan. , 1912. 

WHITE. "Bergson and Education. " Educational Review, May, 1914. 

WHITTAKER, A. L. "Bergson: First Aid to Common-sense. " Forum, March, 1914. 

WHITTAKER, T. "Les donnees immediates de la conscience. " Mind, April, 1890. 

WILLCOX. "Impressions of M. Bergson. " Harper's Weekly, March, 1913. "Implications of Bergson's Philosophy. " North American Review, March, 1914. 

WILLIAMS. "Syndicalism in France and Its Relation to the Philosophy of Bergson. " Hibbert Journal, Feb. , 1914. 

WILM"Bergson and Philosophy of Religion" Biblical World, Nov. , 1913. 

WOLF. "Natural Realism and Present Tendencies in Philosophy" Proc Aristotelian Soc, Vol, 1908-9. "Philosophy of Bergson. " Jewish Review, Sept, 1911. 

WOLFF. "Balfour on Teleology and Bergson's Creative Evolution. " Hibbert Journal, Jan, 1912. 

WYANT"Bergson and His Philosophy. " Bookman, March, 1915. 

(b) Unsigned Articles

1909 Sept. "Creative Evolution. " Nation. 1909 Dec. "Creative Evolution. " Current Literature. 1909 Dec. "Bergson's New Idea" Current Literature. 

1910 Sept. "Bergson on Free Will" Spectator. 1910 Oct. "Time and Free Will. " Athenaeum. 1910 Oct. "Time and Free Will. " Saturday Review. 1910 Nov. "Time and Free Will. " Nation (USA)

1911 April "Creative Evolution" Athenaeum1911 May "Bergson's Wonder-working Philosophy. " Current Literature. "Bergson and Others" Spectator. 1911 June "Creative Evolution" Saturday Review. 1911 June "Bergson in English" Nation. 1911 Aug. "Latest of Philosophers" New York Times. 1911 Aug. "New Conception of God as Creative Evolution. " Current Literature1911 Oct. "Creative Evolution" Bookman. 1911 Oct. "Creative Evolution" Dial. 1911 Oct. "Creative Evolution" Nature. 1911 Oct. "Matter and Memory. " International Journal of Ethics. 1911 Dec. "Balfour's Objections to Bergson's Philosophy. " Current Literature. 

1912 Jan. "Bergson and Balfour discuss Philosophy. " Review of Reviews. 1912 Jan. "The Soul" Educational Review1912 Feb. "Is the Philosophy of Bergson that of a Charlatan?" Current Literature1912 Feb. "Bergson on Comedy" Living Age1912 Apríl "Bergson's Intuitional Philosophy justified by Sir Oliver Lodge. " Current Literature. 1912 Apríl "Laughter" Edinburgh Review1912 Apríl "Bergson Criticized. " London Quarterly Review1912 June "Laughter. " North American Review. "Modern Science and Bergson. " Contemporary Review. July "Creative Evolution. " International Journal of Ethics. "Pressing Forward into Space. " Nation. "Balfour and Bergson. " Westminster Review. Sept. "Prof. Henri Bergson. " Open Court. "Laughter. " Dublin Review. 

1913 Feb. "Eucken and Bergson. " Independent. "Bergson's Lectures. " Outlook. March "Bergson's New Idea of Evolution. " Literary Digest. "Bergson's Reception in America. " Current Opinion. "Visiting the French Philosopher. " Literary Digest. "The Jewishness of Bergson. " Literary Digest. "Bergson at the City College. " Outlook. 1913 March "The Spiritual Philosopher. " Review of Reviews. April "Introduction to Metaphysics. " Contemporary Review. "Bergson and Eucken under Fire. " Current Opinion. Oct. "Such Stuff as Dreams are Made On. " Independent. "The Birth of a Dream. " Independent. "Bergson on Psychical Research. " Educational Review. 

1914 March "Portrait of Bergson. " American Magazine. May "Threatened Collapse of Bergson boom in France. " Current Opinion. July "The Banning of Bergson. " Independent. Dec. "Bergson Looking Backward. " Literary Digest. "Bergson on Germany's Moral Force. " Literary Digest. 

1915 Jan. "Mr. Kallen on Bergson. " North American Review. April " " " Nation. "Mr. Wildon Carr and Philosophy of Change. " Quest. 1917 May "Bergson and the Art World. " Art World. Sept. "Are Americans Money Worshippers? Bergson's Opinion. " Outlook. Dec. "Bergson thanks America. " New Republic. 

1919 Dec. "French Ideals in Education and the American Student. " Living Age. 

Section IV. The English Translations of Bergson's Works

As, in the foregoing lists, the English Translations of Bergson'sWorks are given separately under the heading of the date and titleof the original work, they are here set forth together under the titleof the publishers with translators' names and the published pricesfor convenience of reference for English readers or students. 

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN, LTD. Time and Free Will. Translator--F. L. Pogson, M. A. Pp. Xxiii+252 (12/6). 

 Matter and Memory. Translators--Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. Pp. Xx+339 (12/6). 

 Both of these are in "The Library of Philosophy. "

MACMILLAN AND CO. , LTD. Creative Evolution. Translator--Arthur Mitchell, Ph. D. Pp. Xv+407 (12/6). 

 Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, Translators-- Cloudesley Brereton L. -es-L. , M. A. , and Fred Rothwell, B. A. Pp. Vi+200 (4/6). 

 An Introduction to Metaphysics. Translator--T. E. Hulme. Pp. Vi+79 (3/e). 

 Mind-Energy. Translator. Dr. Wildon Carr. (Announced. )

T. FISHER UNWIN, LTD. Dreams. Translator--Dr. Slosson. Pp. 62 (2/6). 

 The Meaning of the War. Editor, Dr. Carr. Pp. 47 (1/6). 

The above are all the English Translations which have appearedup to now. The Oxford University Press published in the originalFrench the lectures given at Oxford, La Perception du Changement. These are now out of print, but will be included in theforthcoming volume of Essays.